1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::Header;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
23 use bitcoin::key::constants::SECRET_KEY_SIZE;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
27 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
28 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
31 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
32 use bitcoin::{secp256k1, Sequence};
34 use crate::blinded_path::BlindedPath;
35 use crate::blinded_path::payment::{PaymentConstraints, ReceiveTlvs};
37 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
38 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
39 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, WithChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
40 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
42 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
43 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
44 // construct one themselves.
45 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, ChannelId, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
46 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelPhase, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UnfundedChannelContext, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, WithChannelContext};
47 use crate::ln::features::{Bolt12InvoiceFeatures, ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
48 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
49 use crate::ln::features::Bolt11InvoiceFeatures;
50 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
51 use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteParameters, Router};
52 use crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters};
53 use crate::ln::onion_payment::{check_incoming_htlc_cltv, create_recv_pending_htlc_info, create_fwd_pending_htlc_info, decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion, InboundOnionErr, NextPacketDetails};
55 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
56 use crate::ln::onion_utils::{HTLCFailReason, INVALID_ONION_BLINDING};
57 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
59 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
60 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{Bolt12PaymentError, OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment, SendAlongPathArgs, StaleExpiration};
61 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
62 use crate::offers::invoice::{BlindedPayInfo, Bolt12Invoice, DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY, DerivedSigningPubkey, InvoiceBuilder};
63 use crate::offers::invoice_error::InvoiceError;
64 use crate::offers::merkle::SignError;
65 use crate::offers::offer::{DerivedMetadata, Offer, OfferBuilder};
66 use crate::offers::parse::Bolt12SemanticError;
67 use crate::offers::refund::{Refund, RefundBuilder};
68 use crate::onion_message::{Destination, OffersMessage, OffersMessageHandler, PendingOnionMessage, new_pending_onion_message};
69 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider};
70 use crate::sign::ecdsa::WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner;
71 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
72 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
73 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
74 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
75 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
76 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger, WithContext};
77 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
79 use alloc::collections::{btree_map, BTreeMap};
82 use crate::prelude::*;
84 use core::cell::RefCell;
86 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
87 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, AtomicBool, Ordering};
88 use core::time::Duration;
91 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
92 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, ProbeSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
93 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
95 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
97 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
98 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
99 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
101 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
102 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
103 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
104 // before we forward it.
106 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
107 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
108 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
109 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
110 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
112 /// Information about where a received HTLC('s onion) has indicated the HTLC should go.
113 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
114 pub enum PendingHTLCRouting {
115 /// An HTLC which should be forwarded on to another node.
117 /// The onion which should be included in the forwarded HTLC, telling the next hop what to
118 /// do with the HTLC.
119 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
120 /// The short channel ID of the channel which we were instructed to forward this HTLC to.
122 /// This could be a real on-chain SCID, an SCID alias, or some other SCID which has meaning
123 /// to the receiving node, such as one returned from
124 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] or [`ChannelManager::get_phantom_scid`].
125 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
126 /// Set if this HTLC is being forwarded within a blinded path.
127 blinded: Option<BlindedForward>,
129 /// The onion indicates that this is a payment for an invoice (supposedly) generated by us.
131 /// Note that at this point, we have not checked that the invoice being paid was actually
132 /// generated by us, but rather it's claiming to pay an invoice of ours.
134 /// Information about the amount the sender intended to pay and (potential) proof that this
135 /// is a payment for an invoice we generated. This proof of payment is is also used for
136 /// linking MPP parts of a larger payment.
137 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
138 /// Additional data which we (allegedly) instructed the sender to include in the onion.
140 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately be exposed in
141 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::onion_fields`] as
142 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`].
143 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
144 /// CLTV expiry of the received HTLC.
146 /// Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed.
147 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32,
148 /// If the onion had forwarding instructions to one of our phantom node SCIDs, this will
149 /// provide the onion shared secret used to decrypt the next level of forwarding
151 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
152 /// Custom TLVs which were set by the sender.
154 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately be exposed in
155 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::onion_fields`] as
156 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`].
157 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
159 /// The onion indicates that this is for payment to us but which contains the preimage for
160 /// claiming included, and is unrelated to any invoice we'd previously generated (aka a
161 /// "keysend" or "spontaneous" payment).
163 /// Information about the amount the sender intended to pay and possibly a token to
164 /// associate MPP parts of a larger payment.
166 /// This will only be filled in if receiving MPP keysend payments is enabled, and it being
167 /// present will cause deserialization to fail on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.116.
168 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
169 /// Preimage for this onion payment. This preimage is provided by the sender and will be
170 /// used to settle the spontaneous payment.
171 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
172 /// Additional data which we (allegedly) instructed the sender to include in the onion.
174 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately bubble back up as
175 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`].
176 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
177 /// CLTV expiry of the received HTLC.
179 /// Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed.
180 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32,
181 /// Custom TLVs which were set by the sender.
183 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, these will ultimately bubble back up as
184 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`].
185 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
189 /// Information used to forward or fail this HTLC that is being forwarded within a blinded path.
190 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
191 pub struct BlindedForward {
192 /// The `blinding_point` that was set in the inbound [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC`], or in the inbound
193 /// onion payload if we're the introduction node. Useful for calculating the next hop's
194 /// [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC::blinding_point`].
195 pub inbound_blinding_point: PublicKey,
196 // Another field will be added here when we support forwarding as a non-intro node.
199 impl PendingHTLCRouting {
200 // Used to override the onion failure code and data if the HTLC is blinded.
201 fn blinded_failure(&self) -> Option<BlindedFailure> {
202 // TODO: needs update when we support receiving to multi-hop blinded paths
203 if let Self::Forward { blinded: Some(_), .. } = self {
204 Some(BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode)
211 /// Full details of an incoming HTLC, including routing info.
212 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
213 pub struct PendingHTLCInfo {
214 /// Further routing details based on whether the HTLC is being forwarded or received.
215 pub routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
216 /// Shared secret from the previous hop.
217 /// Used encrypt failure packets in the event that the HTLC needs to be failed backwards.
218 pub incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
219 /// Hash of the payment preimage, to lock the payment until the receiver releases the preimage.
220 pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
221 /// Amount offered by this HTLC.
222 pub incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
223 /// Sender intended amount to forward or receive (actual amount received
224 /// may overshoot this in either case)
225 pub outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
226 /// Outgoing timelock expiration blockheight.
227 pub outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
228 /// The fee being skimmed off the top of this HTLC. If this is a forward, it'll be the fee we are
229 /// skimming. If we're receiving this HTLC, it's the fee that our counterparty skimmed.
230 pub skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
233 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
234 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
235 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
236 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
239 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
240 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
241 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
242 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
243 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
246 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
247 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
249 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
250 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
251 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
254 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
255 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
257 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
258 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
261 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
262 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
265 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
269 // Used for failing blinded HTLCs backwards correctly.
270 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
271 enum BlindedFailure {
272 FromIntroductionNode,
273 // Another variant will be added here for non-intro nodes.
276 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
277 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
278 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
279 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
280 short_channel_id: u64,
281 user_channel_id: Option<u128>,
283 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
284 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
285 blinded_failure: Option<BlindedFailure>,
287 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
288 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
293 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
295 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
296 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
297 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
299 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
300 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
303 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
304 struct ClaimableHTLC {
305 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
307 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
309 /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
310 /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
311 sender_intended_value: u64,
312 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
314 /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
315 /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
316 total_value_received: Option<u64>,
317 /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
319 /// The extra fee our counterparty skimmed off the top of this HTLC.
320 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
323 impl From<&ClaimableHTLC> for events::ClaimedHTLC {
324 fn from(val: &ClaimableHTLC) -> Self {
325 events::ClaimedHTLC {
326 channel_id: val.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
327 user_channel_id: val.prev_hop.user_channel_id.unwrap_or(0),
328 cltv_expiry: val.cltv_expiry,
329 value_msat: val.value,
330 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: val.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0),
335 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
336 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
338 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
339 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
340 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; Self::LENGTH]);
343 /// Number of bytes in the id.
344 pub const LENGTH: usize = 32;
347 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
348 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
353 impl Readable for PaymentId {
354 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
355 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
360 impl core::fmt::Display for PaymentId {
361 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut core::fmt::Formatter) -> core::fmt::Result {
362 crate::util::logger::DebugBytes(&self.0).fmt(f)
366 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
368 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
369 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
370 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
372 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
373 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
378 impl Readable for InterceptId {
379 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
380 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
385 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
386 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
387 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
388 PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
389 OutboundRoute { session_priv: [u8; SECRET_KEY_SIZE] },
392 pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
394 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
395 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
396 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
398 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
399 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: session_priv.secret_bytes() },
403 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
404 (0, PreviousHopData) => {
405 (0, short_channel_id, required),
406 (2, htlc_id, required),
408 (2, OutboundRoute) => {
409 (0, session_priv, required),
414 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
415 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
416 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
417 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
418 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
421 session_priv: SecretKey,
422 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
423 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
424 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
425 payment_id: PaymentId,
428 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
429 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
430 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
432 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
434 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
436 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
439 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
440 payment_id.hash(hasher);
441 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
447 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
449 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
450 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
451 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
452 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
453 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
454 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
458 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
459 /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
460 /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
461 pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
462 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
463 *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
465 // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
471 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
472 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
474 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
475 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
476 pub enum FailureCode {
477 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
478 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
479 TemporaryNodeFailure,
480 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
481 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
482 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing,
483 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
484 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
485 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
486 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
487 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails,
488 /// We failed to process the payload after the onion was decrypted. You may wish to
489 /// use this when receiving custom HTLC TLVs with even type numbers that you don't recognize.
491 /// If available, the tuple data may include the type number and byte offset in the
492 /// decrypted byte stream where the failure occurred.
493 InvalidOnionPayload(Option<(u64, u16)>),
496 impl Into<u16> for FailureCode {
497 fn into(self) -> u16 {
499 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => 0x2000 | 2,
500 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
501 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => 0x4000 | 15,
502 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(_) => 0x4000 | 22,
507 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
508 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
509 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
510 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
511 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
513 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
514 err: msgs::LightningError,
515 chan_id: Option<(ChannelId, u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
516 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
517 channel_capacity: Option<u64>,
519 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
521 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
523 err: LightningError {
525 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
526 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
533 shutdown_finish: None,
534 channel_capacity: None,
538 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
539 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None, channel_capacity: None }
542 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId, user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>, channel_capacity: u64) -> Self {
543 let err_msg = msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: err.clone() };
544 let action = if shutdown_res.monitor_update.is_some() {
545 // We have a closing `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, which means the channel was funded and we
546 // should disconnect our peer such that we force them to broadcast their latest
547 // commitment upon reconnecting.
548 msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(err_msg) }
550 msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: err_msg }
553 err: LightningError { err, action },
554 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
555 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
556 channel_capacity: Some(channel_capacity)
560 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
563 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
565 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
566 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
570 log_level: Level::Warn,
573 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
575 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
577 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
579 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
580 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
588 shutdown_finish: None,
589 channel_capacity: None,
593 fn closes_channel(&self) -> bool {
594 self.chan_id.is_some()
598 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
599 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
600 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
601 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
602 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
604 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
605 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
606 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
607 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
608 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
609 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
610 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
612 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
616 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
617 struct ClaimingPayment {
619 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
620 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
621 htlcs: Vec<events::ClaimedHTLC>,
622 sender_intended_value: Option<u64>,
624 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
625 (0, amount_msat, required),
626 (2, payment_purpose, required),
627 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
628 (5, htlcs, optional_vec),
629 (7, sender_intended_value, option),
632 struct ClaimablePayment {
633 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
634 onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
635 htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
638 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
639 struct ClaimablePayments {
640 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
641 /// failed/claimed by the user.
643 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
644 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
646 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
647 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
648 claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
650 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
651 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
652 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
653 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
656 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be processed immediately at the generation site
657 /// usually because we're running pre-full-init. They are handled immediately once we detect we are
658 /// running normally, and specifically must be processed before any other non-background
659 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are applied.
661 enum BackgroundEvent {
662 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which closes the channel or for an already-closed channel.
663 /// This is only separated from [`Self::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`] as the
664 /// maybe-non-closing variant needs a public key to handle channel resumption, whereas if the
665 /// channel has been force-closed we do not need the counterparty node_id.
667 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
668 /// are regenerated on startup.
669 ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
670 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which may or may not close the channel and may unblock the
671 /// channel to continue normal operation.
673 /// In general this should be used rather than
674 /// [`Self::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`], however in cases where the
675 /// `counterparty_node_id` is not available as the channel has closed from a [`ChannelMonitor`]
676 /// error the other variant is acceptable.
678 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
679 /// are regenerated on startup.
680 MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
681 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
682 funding_txo: OutPoint,
683 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate
685 /// Some [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (s) completed before we were serialized but we still have
686 /// them marked pending, thus we need to run any [`MonitorUpdateCompletionAction`] (s) pending
688 MonitorUpdatesComplete {
689 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
690 channel_id: ChannelId,
695 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
696 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
697 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
698 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
699 /// event can be generated.
700 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
701 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user and possibly resume the
702 /// operation of another channel.
704 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
705 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
706 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. In that case, after the inbound
707 /// edge completes, we will surface an [`Event::PaymentForwarded`] as well as unblock the
709 EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
710 event: events::Event,
711 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction)>,
713 /// Indicates we should immediately resume the operation of another channel, unless there is
714 /// some other reason why the channel is blocked. In practice this simply means immediately
715 /// removing the [`RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction`] provided from the blocking set.
717 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
718 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
719 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. However, we use this variant
720 /// instead of [`Self::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel`] when we discover that the claim was in
721 /// fact duplicative and we simply want to resume the outbound edge channel immediately.
723 /// This variant should thus never be written to disk, as it is processed inline rather than
724 /// stored for later processing.
725 FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
726 downstream_counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
727 downstream_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
728 blocking_action: RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
732 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
733 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
734 // Note that FreeOtherChannelImmediately should never be written - we were supposed to free
735 // *immediately*. However, for simplicity we implement read/write here.
736 (1, FreeOtherChannelImmediately) => {
737 (0, downstream_counterparty_node_id, required),
738 (2, downstream_funding_outpoint, required),
739 (4, blocking_action, required),
741 (2, EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel) => {
742 (0, event, upgradable_required),
743 // LDK prior to 0.0.116 did not have this field as the monitor update application order was
744 // required by clients. If we downgrade to something prior to 0.0.116 this may result in
745 // monitor updates which aren't properly blocked or resumed, however that's fine - we don't
746 // support async monitor updates even in LDK 0.0.116 and once we do we'll require no
747 // downgrades to prior versions.
748 (1, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint, option),
752 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
753 pub(crate) enum EventCompletionAction {
754 ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
755 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
756 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
759 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(EventCompletionAction,
760 (0, ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate) => {
761 (0, channel_funding_outpoint, required),
762 (2, counterparty_node_id, required),
766 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
767 /// If something is blocked on the completion of an RAA-generated [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] we track
768 /// the blocked action here. See enum variants for more info.
769 pub(crate) enum RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
770 /// A forwarded payment was claimed. We block the downstream channel completing its monitor
771 /// update which removes the HTLC preimage until the upstream channel has gotten the preimage
773 ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
774 /// The upstream channel ID (i.e. the inbound edge).
775 channel_id: ChannelId,
776 /// The HTLC ID on the inbound edge.
781 impl RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
782 fn from_prev_hop_data(prev_hop: &HTLCPreviousHopData) -> Self {
783 Self::ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
784 channel_id: prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
785 htlc_id: prev_hop.htlc_id,
790 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
791 (0, ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim) => { (0, channel_id, required), (2, htlc_id, required) }
795 /// State we hold per-peer.
796 pub(super) struct PeerState<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
797 /// `channel_id` -> `ChannelPhase`
799 /// Holds all channels within corresponding `ChannelPhase`s where the peer is the counterparty.
800 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>,
801 /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `InboundChannelRequest`.
803 /// When manual channel acceptance is enabled, this holds all unaccepted inbound channels where
804 /// the peer is the counterparty. If the channel is accepted, then the entry in this table is
805 /// removed, and an InboundV1Channel is created and placed in the `inbound_v1_channel_by_id` table. If
806 /// the channel is rejected, then the entry is simply removed.
807 pub(super) inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, InboundChannelRequest>,
808 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
809 latest_features: InitFeatures,
810 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
811 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
812 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
813 /// Map from Channel IDs to pending [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s which have been passed to the
814 /// user but which have not yet completed.
816 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example if the channel was closed but we
817 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
818 /// for a missing channel.
819 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<OutPoint, Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>,
820 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
821 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
823 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
824 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
825 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
826 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
828 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
829 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
830 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
831 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
832 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
833 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
834 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
835 /// If another channel's [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] needs to complete before a channel we have
836 /// with this peer can complete an RAA [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (e.g. because the RAA update
837 /// will remove a preimage that needs to be durably in an upstream channel first), we put an
838 /// entry here to note that the channel with the key's ID is blocked on a set of actions.
839 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
840 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
841 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
842 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
846 impl <SP: Deref> PeerState<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
847 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
848 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
849 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
850 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
851 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
854 self.channel_by_id.iter().filter(|(_, phase)| matches!(phase, ChannelPhase::Funded(_))).count() == 0
855 && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
856 && self.in_flight_monitor_updates.is_empty()
859 // Returns a count of all channels we have with this peer, including unfunded channels.
860 fn total_channel_count(&self) -> usize {
861 self.channel_by_id.len() + self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
864 // Returns a bool indicating if the given `channel_id` matches a channel we have with this peer.
865 fn has_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId) -> bool {
866 self.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
867 self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.contains_key(channel_id)
871 /// A not-yet-accepted inbound (from counterparty) channel. Once
872 /// accepted, the parameters will be used to construct a channel.
873 pub(super) struct InboundChannelRequest {
874 /// The original OpenChannel message.
875 pub open_channel_msg: msgs::OpenChannel,
876 /// The number of ticks remaining before the request expires.
877 pub ticks_remaining: i32,
880 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unaccepted inbound channel to be
881 /// accepted. An unaccepted channel that exceeds this limit will be abandoned.
882 const UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: i32 = 2;
884 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
885 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
887 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
890 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
891 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
892 struct PendingInboundPayment {
893 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
894 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
895 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
896 /// this payment being removed.
898 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
899 user_payment_id: u64,
900 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
901 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
902 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
905 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
906 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
907 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
908 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
909 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
910 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
911 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
912 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
914 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
915 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
916 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
924 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
926 Arc<RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>,
927 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
928 ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>,
933 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
934 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
935 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
936 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
937 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
938 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
939 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
940 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
941 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
943 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
944 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
945 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> =
954 &'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>,
956 &'h RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>,
957 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
958 ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>
963 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`].
965 /// This is not exported to bindings users as general cover traits aren't useful in other
967 pub trait AChannelManager {
968 /// A type implementing [`chain::Watch`].
969 type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
970 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Watch`].
971 type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
972 /// A type implementing [`BroadcasterInterface`].
973 type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface + ?Sized;
974 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Broadcaster`].
975 type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
976 /// A type implementing [`EntropySource`].
977 type EntropySource: EntropySource + ?Sized;
978 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::EntropySource`].
979 type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
980 /// A type implementing [`NodeSigner`].
981 type NodeSigner: NodeSigner + ?Sized;
982 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::NodeSigner`].
983 type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
984 /// A type implementing [`WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner`].
985 type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner + Sized;
986 /// A type implementing [`SignerProvider`] for [`Self::Signer`].
987 type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<EcdsaSigner= Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
988 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::SignerProvider`].
989 type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
990 /// A type implementing [`FeeEstimator`].
991 type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator + ?Sized;
992 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::FeeEstimator`].
993 type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
994 /// A type implementing [`Router`].
995 type Router: Router + ?Sized;
996 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Router`].
997 type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
998 /// A type implementing [`Logger`].
999 type Logger: Logger + ?Sized;
1000 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Logger`].
1001 type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
1002 /// Returns a reference to the actual [`ChannelManager`] object.
1003 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
1006 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
1007 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
1009 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
1010 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1011 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1012 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1013 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1014 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1018 type Watch = M::Target;
1020 type Broadcaster = T::Target;
1022 type EntropySource = ES::Target;
1024 type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
1026 type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner;
1027 type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
1029 type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
1031 type Router = R::Target;
1033 type Logger = L::Target;
1035 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
1038 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
1039 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
1041 /// Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
1042 /// to individual Channels.
1044 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
1045 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
1046 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
1047 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
1049 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
1050 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST durably write each
1051 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] before returning from
1052 /// [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`] or before completing async writes. With
1053 /// `ChannelManager`s, writing updates happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other
1054 /// `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during the serialization process). If the
1055 /// deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to
1056 /// [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds
1057 /// will be lost (modulo on-chain transaction fees).
1059 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
1060 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
1061 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
1063 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
1064 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
1065 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
1066 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
1067 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
1069 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
1070 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
1071 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
1072 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
1074 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
1075 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
1076 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
1078 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
1079 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
1080 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
1081 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
1082 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
1084 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
1085 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
1086 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
1087 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
1088 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
1089 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
1090 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
1091 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
1094 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
1095 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
1096 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
1097 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
1098 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
1102 // `pending_offers_messages`
1104 // `total_consistency_lock`
1106 // |__`forward_htlcs`
1108 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
1110 // |__`per_peer_state`
1112 // |__`pending_inbound_payments`
1114 // |__`claimable_payments`
1116 // |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
1122 // |__`short_to_chan_info`
1124 // |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
1128 // |__`pending_events`
1130 // |__`pending_background_events`
1132 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
1134 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
1135 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1136 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1137 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1138 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1139 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1143 default_configuration: UserConfig,
1144 chain_hash: ChainHash,
1145 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1151 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1153 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1155 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1156 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
1158 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
1159 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
1160 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
1161 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
1163 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1164 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
1166 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
1167 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
1168 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
1169 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
1170 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
1171 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
1172 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
1173 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
1175 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
1177 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1178 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
1180 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
1182 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
1183 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
1184 /// and via the classic SCID.
1186 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
1187 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
1189 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1191 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1193 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1194 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
1195 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
1197 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1198 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
1200 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
1201 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
1203 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1204 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
1206 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
1207 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
1208 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
1209 /// active channel list on load.
1211 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1212 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
1214 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
1216 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
1217 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
1218 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
1220 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
1221 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
1222 /// the handling of the events.
1224 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
1225 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
1228 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
1229 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
1230 /// would break backwards compatability.
1231 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
1232 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
1233 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
1235 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1236 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<ChannelId, PublicKey>>,
1238 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
1240 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
1241 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
1242 /// confirmation depth.
1244 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
1245 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
1246 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
1248 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1250 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1252 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1254 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
1256 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
1258 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
1259 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
1260 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
1262 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
1263 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
1265 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
1266 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
1267 /// keeping additional state.
1268 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
1270 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
1271 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
1272 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
1273 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
1275 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
1276 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
1278 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
1279 /// are currently open with that peer.
1281 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
1282 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
1285 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
1287 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1288 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1289 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1290 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1291 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1293 /// The set of events which we need to give to the user to handle. In some cases an event may
1294 /// require some further action after the user handles it (currently only blocking a monitor
1295 /// update from being handed to the user to ensure the included changes to the channel state
1296 /// are handled by the user before they're persisted durably to disk). In that case, the second
1297 /// element in the tuple is set to `Some` with further details of the action.
1299 /// Note that events MUST NOT be removed from pending_events after deserialization, as they
1300 /// could be in the middle of being processed without the direct mutex held.
1302 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1303 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1304 pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1305 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1306 pub(crate) pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1308 /// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
1309 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
1311 /// If we are running during init (either directly during the deserialization method or in
1312 /// block connection methods which run after deserialization but before normal operation) we
1313 /// cannot provide the user with [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s through the normal update flow -
1314 /// prior to normal operation the user may not have loaded the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into their
1315 /// [`ChainMonitor`] and thus attempting to update it will fail or panic.
1317 /// Thus, we place them here to be handled as soon as possible once we are running normally.
1319 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1321 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
1322 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
1323 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
1324 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
1325 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
1326 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
1327 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
1328 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
1329 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
1330 /// Tracks the progress of channels going through batch funding by whether funding_signed was
1331 /// received and the monitor has been persisted.
1333 /// This information does not need to be persisted as funding nodes can forget
1334 /// unfunded channels upon disconnection.
1335 funding_batch_states: Mutex<BTreeMap<Txid, Vec<(ChannelId, PublicKey, bool)>>>,
1337 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool,
1339 event_persist_notifier: Notifier,
1340 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool,
1342 pending_offers_messages: Mutex<Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>>>,
1346 signer_provider: SP,
1351 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
1353 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
1354 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
1355 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
1356 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
1357 pub struct ChainParameters {
1358 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
1359 pub network: Network,
1361 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
1363 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
1364 pub best_block: BestBlock,
1367 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
1371 SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1372 SkipPersistNoEvents,
1375 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
1376 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
1377 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
1378 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
1379 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
1380 /// updates are ready for persistence).
1382 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
1383 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
1384 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
1385 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1386 event_persist_notifier: &'a Notifier,
1387 needs_persist_flag: &'a AtomicBool,
1389 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
1390 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
1393 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
1394 /// Notifies any waiters and indicates that we need to persist, in addition to possibly having
1395 /// events to handle.
1397 /// This must always be called if the changes included a `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, as well as in
1398 /// other cases where losing the changes on restart may result in a force-close or otherwise
1400 fn notify_on_drop<C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1401 Self::optionally_notify(cm, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
1404 fn optionally_notify<F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C, mut persist_check: F)
1405 -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1406 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1407 let force_notify = cm.get_cm().process_background_events();
1409 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1410 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1411 needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1412 should_persist: move || {
1413 // Pick the "most" action between `persist_check` and the background events
1414 // processing and return that.
1415 let notify = persist_check();
1416 match (notify, force_notify) {
1417 (NotifyOption::DoPersist, _) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1418 (_, NotifyOption::DoPersist) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1419 (NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents, _) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1420 (_, NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1421 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
1424 _read_guard: read_guard,
1428 /// Note that if any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are possibly generated,
1429 /// [`ChannelManager::process_background_events`] MUST be called first (or
1430 /// [`Self::optionally_notify`] used).
1431 fn optionally_notify_skipping_background_events<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>
1432 (cm: &'a C, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1433 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1435 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1436 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1437 needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1438 should_persist: persist_check,
1439 _read_guard: read_guard,
1444 impl<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1445 fn drop(&mut self) {
1446 match (self.should_persist)() {
1447 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
1448 self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
1449 self.event_persist_notifier.notify()
1451 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
1452 self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
1453 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
1458 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1459 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1461 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1463 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1464 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1465 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1466 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1467 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1469 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1470 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1472 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1474 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1475 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1476 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1477 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1478 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1479 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1480 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
1481 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
1482 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
1483 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
1484 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
1485 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
1486 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
1488 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1489 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
1491 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1492 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1493 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1494 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
1496 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1497 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1498 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1499 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1500 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1501 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1504 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1506 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1507 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1510 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1512 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1513 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1515 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
1516 /// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
1517 pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
1519 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is connected until
1520 /// we mark the channel enabled and gossip the update.
1521 pub(crate) const ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 5;
1523 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
1524 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
1525 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
1526 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1528 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1529 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1530 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1532 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1533 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1534 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1536 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1537 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1538 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1539 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1540 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1541 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1542 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1543 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1544 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1545 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1546 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1549 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1550 /// to better separate parameters.
1551 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1552 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1553 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1554 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1555 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1556 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1557 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1558 pub features: InitFeatures,
1559 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1560 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1561 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1563 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1565 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1566 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1567 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1568 /// payments to us through this channel.
1569 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1570 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1571 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1572 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1573 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1574 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1575 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1578 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
1579 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1580 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1581 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1582 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1583 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1584 /// lifetime of the channel.
1585 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
1586 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1587 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1588 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1589 /// our counterparty already.
1591 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1592 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1593 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1594 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1596 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1597 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1598 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1599 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1601 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1602 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1604 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1605 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1607 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1608 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1609 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1610 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1611 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1612 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1613 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1614 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1615 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1618 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1620 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1621 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1622 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1623 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1624 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1625 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1626 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1628 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1629 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1631 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1632 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1633 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1634 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1635 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1636 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1637 /// this value on chain.
1639 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1641 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1643 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1644 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1645 /// The `user_channel_id` value passed in to [`ChannelManager::create_channel`] for outbound
1646 /// channels, or to [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`] for inbound channels if
1647 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] config flag is set to true. Otherwise
1648 /// `user_channel_id` will be randomized for an inbound channel. This may be zero for objects
1649 /// serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1651 /// [`ChannelManager::create_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_channel
1652 /// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel
1653 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels
1654 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1655 /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
1656 /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
1658 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
1659 pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
1660 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1661 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1662 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1664 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1665 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1666 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1667 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1669 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1670 pub balance_msat: u64,
1671 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1672 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1673 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1674 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1676 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1678 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1679 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1680 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1681 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1682 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1683 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1684 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1685 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1687 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat`],
1688 /// [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`], and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1689 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1690 /// The minimum value for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is the equivalent of
1691 /// [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat`] but represents a lower-bound, rather than
1692 /// an upper-bound. This is intended for use when routing, allowing us to ensure we pick a
1693 /// route which is valid.
1694 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1695 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1696 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1697 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1698 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1699 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1701 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1702 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1703 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1704 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1705 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1706 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1707 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1708 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1709 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1711 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1713 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1714 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1715 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1716 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1717 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1719 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1720 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1721 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1722 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1723 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1724 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1725 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1727 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1728 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1729 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1730 pub is_outbound: bool,
1731 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1732 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1733 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1734 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1735 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1737 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1738 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1739 /// The stage of the channel's shutdown.
1740 /// `None` for `ChannelDetails` serialized on LDK versions prior to 0.0.116.
1741 pub channel_shutdown_state: Option<ChannelShutdownState>,
1742 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1743 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1745 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1746 pub is_usable: bool,
1747 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1748 pub is_public: bool,
1749 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1750 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1751 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1752 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1753 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1754 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1756 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1757 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1760 impl ChannelDetails {
1761 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1762 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1763 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1765 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1766 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1767 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1768 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1771 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1772 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1773 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1775 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1776 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1777 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1778 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1781 fn from_channel_context<SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
1782 context: &ChannelContext<SP>, best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures,
1783 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
1786 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1787 F::Target: FeeEstimator
1789 let balance = context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
1790 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1791 context.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1793 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
1794 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1795 node_id: context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1796 features: latest_features,
1797 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1798 forwarding_info: context.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1799 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1800 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1801 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1802 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1803 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1804 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if context.have_received_message() {
1805 Some(context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1806 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1808 funding_txo: context.get_funding_txo(),
1809 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1810 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1811 channel_type: if context.have_received_message() { Some(context.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1812 short_channel_id: context.get_short_channel_id(),
1813 outbound_scid_alias: if context.is_usable() { Some(context.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1814 inbound_scid_alias: context.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1815 channel_value_satoshis: context.get_value_satoshis(),
1816 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
1817 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1818 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1819 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1820 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1821 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1822 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1823 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
1824 confirmations_required: context.minimum_depth(),
1825 confirmations: Some(context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1826 force_close_spend_delay: context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1827 is_outbound: context.is_outbound(),
1828 is_channel_ready: context.is_usable(),
1829 is_usable: context.is_live(),
1830 is_public: context.should_announce(),
1831 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(context.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1832 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1833 config: Some(context.config()),
1834 channel_shutdown_state: Some(context.shutdown_state()),
1839 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1840 /// Further information on the details of the channel shutdown.
1841 /// Upon channels being forced closed (i.e. commitment transaction confirmation detected
1842 /// by `ChainMonitor`), ChannelShutdownState will be set to `ShutdownComplete` or
1843 /// the channel will be removed shortly.
1844 /// Also note, that in normal operation, peers could disconnect at any of these states
1845 /// and require peer re-connection before making progress onto other states
1846 pub enum ChannelShutdownState {
1847 /// Channel has not sent or received a shutdown message.
1849 /// Local node has sent a shutdown message for this channel.
1851 /// Shutdown message exchanges have concluded and the channels are in the midst of
1852 /// resolving all existing open HTLCs before closing can continue.
1854 /// All HTLCs have been resolved, nodes are currently negotiating channel close onchain fee rates.
1855 NegotiatingClosingFee,
1856 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point `ChannelManager` is about
1857 /// to drop the channel.
1861 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1862 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1863 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1864 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1865 /// When an invoice was requested and thus a payment has not yet been sent.
1867 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1868 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1869 payment_id: PaymentId,
1871 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1873 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1874 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1875 payment_id: PaymentId,
1876 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1878 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1879 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1880 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1883 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1884 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1885 /// payment is removed from tracking.
1887 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1888 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1889 payment_id: PaymentId,
1890 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1891 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1892 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1894 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1895 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1896 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1898 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1899 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1900 payment_id: PaymentId,
1901 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1902 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1906 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1908 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
1910 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1911 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1912 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1913 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1915 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1916 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1917 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1920 macro_rules! handle_error {
1921 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
1922 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1923 // entering the macro.
1924 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1925 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1929 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish, channel_capacity }) => {
1930 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1932 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1933 $self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1934 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1935 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1939 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1940 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1941 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1942 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() },
1943 counterparty_node_id: Some($counterparty_node_id),
1944 channel_capacity_sats: channel_capacity,
1949 let logger = WithContext::from(
1950 &$self.logger, Some($counterparty_node_id), chan_id.map(|(chan_id, _)| chan_id)
1952 log_error!(logger, "{}", err.err);
1953 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1955 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1956 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1957 action: err.action.clone()
1961 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1962 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1963 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1964 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1965 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1969 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1976 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1977 ($self: expr, $channel_context: expr) => {{
1978 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.channel_id());
1979 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1980 if let Some(short_id) = $channel_context.get_short_channel_id() {
1981 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1983 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1984 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1985 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1986 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1987 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1989 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
1990 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1992 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
1996 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1997 macro_rules! convert_chan_phase_err {
1998 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, $channel_update: expr) => {
2000 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
2001 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), *$channel_id))
2003 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
2004 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), *$channel_id))
2006 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
2007 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$channel.context);
2008 log_error!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", $channel_id, msg);
2009 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel.context);
2010 let shutdown_res = $channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
2011 let user_id = $channel.context.get_user_id();
2012 let channel_capacity_satoshis = $channel.context.get_value_satoshis();
2014 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, user_id,
2015 shutdown_res, $channel_update, channel_capacity_satoshis))
2019 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, FUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
2020 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, { $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast($channel).ok() })
2022 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
2023 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, None)
2025 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_phase: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
2026 match $channel_phase {
2027 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
2028 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL)
2030 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel) => {
2031 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2033 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel) => {
2034 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2040 macro_rules! break_chan_phase_entry {
2041 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2045 let key = *$entry.key();
2046 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
2048 $entry.remove_entry();
2056 macro_rules! try_chan_phase_entry {
2057 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2061 let key = *$entry.key();
2062 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
2064 $entry.remove_entry();
2072 macro_rules! remove_channel_phase {
2073 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2075 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
2076 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &channel.context());
2082 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
2083 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
2084 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
2085 node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2086 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
2088 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
2089 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
2090 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
2091 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.context.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2092 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2093 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2094 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
2095 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2096 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2097 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2102 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
2103 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2104 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
2105 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelPending {
2106 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2107 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.context.temporary_channel_id(),
2108 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2109 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2110 funding_txo: $channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
2112 $channel.context.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
2117 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
2118 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2119 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
2120 debug_assert!($channel.context.channel_pending_event_emitted());
2121 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelReady {
2122 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2123 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2124 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2125 channel_type: $channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
2127 $channel.context.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
2132 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
2133 ($self: ident, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2134 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$chan.context);
2135 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&&logger,
2136 &$self.node_signer, $self.chain_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
2137 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
2138 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
2139 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.context.is_usable() {
2140 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
2141 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
2142 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
2143 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
2145 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
2146 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2147 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2153 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
2154 .remove(&$chan.context.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
2156 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
2157 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
2158 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
2159 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
2160 updates.announcement_sigs);
2161 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
2162 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
2165 let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id();
2166 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = $chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2167 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
2168 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
2170 // If the channel belongs to a batch funding transaction, the progress of the batch
2171 // should be updated as we have received funding_signed and persisted the monitor.
2172 if let Some(txid) = unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2173 let mut funding_batch_states = $self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2174 let mut batch_completed = false;
2175 if let Some(batch_state) = funding_batch_states.get_mut(&txid) {
2176 let channel_state = batch_state.iter_mut().find(|(chan_id, pubkey, _)| (
2177 *chan_id == channel_id &&
2178 *pubkey == counterparty_node_id
2180 if let Some(channel_state) = channel_state {
2181 channel_state.2 = true;
2183 debug_assert!(false, "Missing channel batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2185 batch_completed = batch_state.iter().all(|(_, _, completed)| *completed);
2187 debug_assert!(false, "Missing batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2190 // When all channels in a batched funding transaction have become ready, it is not necessary
2191 // to track the progress of the batch anymore and the state of the channels can be updated.
2192 if batch_completed {
2193 let removed_batch_state = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2194 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2195 let mut batch_funding_tx = None;
2196 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, _) in removed_batch_state {
2197 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2198 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2199 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
2200 batch_funding_tx = batch_funding_tx.or_else(|| chan.context.unbroadcasted_funding());
2201 chan.set_batch_ready();
2202 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2203 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, chan);
2207 if let Some(tx) = batch_funding_tx {
2208 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting batch funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
2209 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
2214 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
2216 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
2217 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
2219 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
2220 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2221 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2222 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
2227 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
2228 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $chan: expr, _internal, $completed: expr) => { {
2229 debug_assert!($self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire));
2230 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$chan.context);
2232 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::UnrecoverableError => {
2233 let err_str = "ChannelMonitor[Update] persistence failed unrecoverably. This indicates we cannot continue normal operation and must shut down.";
2234 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
2235 panic!("{}", err_str);
2237 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
2238 log_debug!(logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
2239 &$chan.context.channel_id());
2242 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
2248 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, INITIAL_MONITOR) => {
2249 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $chan, _internal,
2250 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan))
2252 ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2253 let in_flight_updates = $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.entry($funding_txo)
2254 .or_insert_with(Vec::new);
2255 // During startup, we push monitor updates as background events through to here in
2256 // order to replay updates that were in-flight when we shut down. Thus, we have to
2257 // filter for uniqueness here.
2258 let idx = in_flight_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd == &$update)
2259 .unwrap_or_else(|| {
2260 in_flight_updates.push($update);
2261 in_flight_updates.len() - 1
2263 let update_res = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($funding_txo, &in_flight_updates[idx]);
2264 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, update_res, $chan, _internal,
2266 let _ = in_flight_updates.remove(idx);
2267 if in_flight_updates.is_empty() && $chan.blocked_monitor_updates_pending() == 0 {
2268 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
2274 macro_rules! process_events_body {
2275 ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
2276 let mut processed_all_events = false;
2277 while !processed_all_events {
2278 if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
2285 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
2286 // persists happen while processing monitor events.
2287 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2289 // Because `handle_post_event_actions` may send `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to the user we must
2290 // ensure any startup-generated background events are handled first.
2291 result = $self.process_background_events();
2293 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
2294 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
2295 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
2296 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2300 let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
2301 let num_events = pending_events.len();
2302 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
2303 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2306 let mut post_event_actions = Vec::new();
2308 for (event, action_opt) in pending_events {
2309 $event_to_handle = event;
2311 if let Some(action) = action_opt {
2312 post_event_actions.push(action);
2317 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2318 pending_events.drain(..num_events);
2319 processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
2320 // Note that `push_pending_forwards_ev` relies on `pending_events_processor` being
2321 // updated here with the `pending_events` lock acquired.
2322 $self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
2325 if !post_event_actions.is_empty() {
2326 $self.handle_post_event_actions(post_event_actions);
2327 // If we had some actions, go around again as we may have more events now
2328 processed_all_events = false;
2332 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
2333 $self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
2334 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify();
2336 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
2337 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
2338 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
2344 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
2346 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
2347 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2348 ES::Target: EntropySource,
2349 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2350 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2351 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2355 /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
2357 /// The current time or latest block header time can be provided as the `current_timestamp`.
2359 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
2360 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
2362 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
2364 /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
2365 /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
2366 /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
2369 /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
2370 /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
2371 /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
2373 fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES,
2374 node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters,
2375 current_timestamp: u32,
2377 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2378 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
2379 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
2380 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
2382 default_configuration: config.clone(),
2383 chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(params.network),
2384 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
2389 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
2391 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
2392 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2393 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
2394 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2395 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
2396 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2397 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2398 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2400 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
2403 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
2404 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2406 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2408 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(current_timestamp as usize),
2410 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2412 pending_events: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
2413 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
2414 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2415 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
2416 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
2417 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
2418 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
2419 funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
2421 pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2431 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
2432 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
2433 &self.default_configuration
2436 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
2437 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2438 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
2441 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
2442 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
2444 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
2446 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
2450 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
2455 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
2457 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
2458 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
2459 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
2460 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
2461 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
2463 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
2464 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
2466 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to
2467 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2468 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`].
2470 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
2471 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
2472 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
2474 /// If `temporary_channel_id` is specified, it will be used as the temporary channel ID of the
2475 /// channel. Otherwise, a random one will be generated for you.
2477 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
2478 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
2479 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
2480 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
2481 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
2482 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
2484 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
2485 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
2486 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
2487 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<ChannelId, APIError> {
2488 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
2489 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
2492 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2493 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
2494 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2496 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2498 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
2499 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
2501 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2503 if let Some(temporary_channel_id) = temporary_channel_id {
2504 if peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(&temporary_channel_id) {
2505 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Channel with temporary channel ID {} already exists!", temporary_channel_id)});
2510 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
2511 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2512 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
2513 match OutboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
2514 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
2515 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias, temporary_channel_id)
2519 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
2524 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.chain_hash);
2526 let temporary_channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
2527 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
2528 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2530 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
2532 panic!("RNG is bad???");
2535 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel)); }
2538 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
2539 node_id: their_network_key,
2542 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
2545 fn list_funded_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&ChannelId, &Channel<SP>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2546 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2547 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2548 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2549 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2550 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2551 // the same channel.
2552 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2554 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2555 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2556 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2557 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2558 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2559 res.extend(peer_state.channel_by_id.iter()
2560 .filter_map(|(chan_id, phase)| match phase {
2561 // Only `Channels` in the `ChannelPhase::Funded` phase can be considered funded.
2562 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => Some((chan_id, chan)),
2566 .map(|(_channel_id, channel)| {
2567 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2568 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2576 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
2577 /// more information.
2578 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2579 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2580 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2581 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2582 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2583 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2584 // the same channel.
2585 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2587 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2588 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2589 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2590 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2591 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2592 for context in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().map(|(_, phase)| phase.context()) {
2593 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height,
2594 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2602 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
2603 /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
2605 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
2606 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
2608 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2609 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
2610 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
2611 // really wanted anyway.
2612 self.list_funded_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.context.is_live())
2615 /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
2616 pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2617 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2618 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2620 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
2621 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2622 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2623 let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2624 let context_to_details = |context| {
2625 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height, features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2627 return peer_state.channel_by_id
2629 .map(|(_, phase)| phase.context())
2630 .map(context_to_details)
2636 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
2637 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
2639 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
2640 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
2641 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
2643 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2644 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
2645 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
2646 .filter_map(|(payment_id, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
2647 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {
2648 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2650 // InvoiceReceived is an intermediate state and doesn't need to be exposed
2651 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {
2652 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2654 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
2655 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
2656 payment_id: *payment_id,
2657 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2658 total_msat: *total_msat,
2661 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
2662 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2664 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
2665 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2667 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
2672 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
2673 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, context: &ChannelContext<SP>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
2674 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2675 match context.unbroadcasted_funding() {
2676 Some(transaction) => {
2677 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::DiscardFunding {
2678 channel_id: context.channel_id(), transaction
2683 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
2684 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
2685 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
2686 reason: closure_reason,
2687 counterparty_node_id: Some(context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
2688 channel_capacity_sats: Some(context.get_value_satoshis()),
2692 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2693 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2695 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
2696 let shutdown_result;
2698 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2700 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2701 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2703 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2704 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2706 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2707 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
2708 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
2709 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
2710 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2711 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs, local_shutdown_result) =
2712 chan.get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
2713 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
2714 shutdown_result = local_shutdown_result;
2715 debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
2717 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
2718 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
2719 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
2720 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2721 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
2725 debug_assert!(monitor_update_opt.is_none() || !chan.is_shutdown(),
2726 "We can't both complete shutdown and generate a monitor update");
2728 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
2729 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
2730 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
2731 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
2735 if chan.is_shutdown() {
2736 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
2737 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2738 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2742 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2748 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
2749 // If we reach this point, it means that the channel_id either refers to an unfunded channel or
2750 // it does not exist for this peer. Either way, we can attempt to force-close it.
2752 // An appropriate error will be returned for non-existence of the channel if that's the case.
2753 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
2754 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
2755 return self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, false).map(|_| ())
2760 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2761 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2762 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
2763 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
2766 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
2767 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
2773 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2774 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2775 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2777 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] and
2778 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
2780 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
2781 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] feerate or the feerate which
2782 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
2783 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
2785 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2787 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2788 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2789 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2792 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2793 /// [`ChannelCloseMinimum`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum
2794 /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
2795 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2796 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2797 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None)
2800 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2801 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2802 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2804 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
2805 /// the channel being closed or not:
2806 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
2807 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
2808 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
2809 /// fee estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
2810 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
2811 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
2812 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
2814 /// The `shutdown_script` provided will be used as the `scriptPubKey` for the closing transaction.
2815 /// Will fail if a shutdown script has already been set for this channel by
2816 /// ['ChannelHandshakeConfig::commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey`]. The given shutdown script must
2817 /// also be compatible with our and the counterparty's features.
2819 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2821 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2822 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2823 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2826 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2827 /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
2828 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2829 pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2830 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script)
2833 fn finish_close_channel(&self, mut shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
2834 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2835 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2836 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
2837 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2840 let logger = WithContext::from(
2841 &self.logger, Some(shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id), Some(shutdown_res.channel_id),
2843 log_debug!(logger, "Finishing closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.len());
2844 for htlc_source in shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.drain(..) {
2845 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
2846 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2847 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2848 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
2850 if let Some((_, funding_txo, monitor_update)) = shutdown_res.monitor_update {
2851 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2852 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2853 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2854 // ignore the result here.
2855 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
2857 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
2858 if let Some(txid) = shutdown_res.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2859 let mut funding_batch_states = self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2860 let affected_channels = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2861 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2862 let mut has_uncompleted_channel = None;
2863 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, state) in affected_channels {
2864 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2865 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2866 if let Some(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id) {
2867 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
2868 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context(), ClosureReason::FundingBatchClosure);
2869 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
2872 has_uncompleted_channel = Some(has_uncompleted_channel.map_or(!state, |v| v || !state));
2875 has_uncompleted_channel.unwrap_or(true),
2876 "Closing a batch where all channels have completed initial monitor update",
2879 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
2880 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
2884 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2885 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2886 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
2887 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2888 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2889 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2890 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
2891 let (update_opt, counterparty_node_id) = {
2892 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2893 let closure_reason = if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2894 ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) }
2896 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
2898 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*peer_node_id), Some(*channel_id));
2899 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2900 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel {}", channel_id);
2901 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan_phase_entry.get().context(), closure_reason);
2902 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
2903 mem::drop(peer_state);
2904 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
2906 ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) => {
2907 self.finish_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(broadcast));
2908 (self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan).ok(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2910 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {
2911 self.finish_close_channel(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
2912 // Unfunded channel has no update
2913 (None, chan_phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id())
2916 } else if peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(channel_id).is_some() {
2917 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel {}", &channel_id);
2918 // N.B. that we don't send any channel close event here: we
2919 // don't have a user_channel_id, and we never sent any opening
2921 (None, *peer_node_id)
2923 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, peer_node_id) });
2926 if let Some(update) = update_opt {
2927 // Try to send the `BroadcastChannelUpdate` to the peer we just force-closed on, but if
2928 // not try to broadcast it via whatever peer we have.
2929 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2930 let a_peer_state_opt = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2931 .ok_or(per_peer_state.values().next());
2932 if let Ok(a_peer_state_mutex) = a_peer_state_opt {
2933 let mut a_peer_state = a_peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2934 a_peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2940 Ok(counterparty_node_id)
2943 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2944 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2945 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2946 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2947 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2948 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2949 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2950 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
2951 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2952 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2953 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
2954 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() })
2965 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2966 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2967 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2969 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2970 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2971 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2974 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2975 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2976 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2978 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2979 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2980 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2981 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2982 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2985 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2986 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2987 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2988 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2989 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2993 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2994 /// local transaction(s).
2995 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2996 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2997 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
3001 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(
3002 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey,
3004 (onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>), HTLCFailureMsg
3006 let (next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_details_opt) = decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion(
3007 msg, &self.node_signer, &self.logger, &self.secp_ctx
3010 let is_blinded = match next_hop {
3011 onion_utils::Hop::Forward {
3012 next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedForward { .. }, ..
3014 _ => false, // TODO: update this when we support receiving to multi-hop blinded paths
3017 macro_rules! return_err {
3018 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3021 WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id)),
3022 "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg
3024 let (err_code, err_data) = if is_blinded {
3025 (INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, &[0; 32][..])
3026 } else { ($err_code, $data) };
3027 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3028 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3029 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3030 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason(err_code, err_data.to_vec())
3031 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3037 let NextPacketDetails {
3038 next_packet_pubkey, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_scid, outgoing_cltv_value
3039 } = match next_packet_details_opt {
3040 Some(next_packet_details) => next_packet_details,
3041 // it is a receive, so no need for outbound checks
3042 None => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)),
3045 // Perform outbound checks here instead of in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] because we
3046 // can't hold the outbound peer state lock at the same time as the inbound peer state lock.
3047 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
3048 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&outgoing_scid).cloned();
3049 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
3050 None => { // unknown_next_peer
3051 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
3052 // phantom or an intercept.
3053 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
3054 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)) ||
3055 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)
3059 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3062 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
3064 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
3065 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3066 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3067 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3068 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3070 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3071 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3072 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).map(
3073 |chan_phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
3076 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
3077 // have no consistency guarantees.
3078 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3082 if !chan.context.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
3083 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
3084 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
3085 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
3086 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3088 if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && outgoing_scid != chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() {
3089 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
3090 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
3091 // we don't have the channel here.
3092 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3094 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
3096 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
3097 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
3098 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
3099 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
3100 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
3101 if !chan.context.is_live() { // channel_disabled
3102 // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
3103 // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
3104 // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
3105 if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
3106 break Some(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
3108 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
3111 if outgoing_amt_msat < chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
3112 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
3114 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value) {
3115 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
3122 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3124 if let Err((err_msg, code)) = check_incoming_htlc_cltv(
3125 cur_height, outgoing_cltv_value, msg.cltv_expiry
3127 if code & 0x1000 != 0 && chan_update_opt.is_none() {
3128 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
3129 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
3130 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
3131 break Some((err_msg, 0x2000 | 2, None))
3133 let chan_update_opt = if code & 0x1000 != 0 { chan_update_opt } else { None };
3134 break Some((err_msg, code, chan_update_opt));
3140 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
3141 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
3142 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
3143 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3145 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
3146 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3148 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3149 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
3150 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3152 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3153 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3154 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3155 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
3156 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
3157 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
3158 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
3162 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
3164 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, Some(next_packet_pubkey)))
3167 fn construct_pending_htlc_status<'a>(
3168 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
3169 decoded_hop: onion_utils::Hop, allow_underpay: bool,
3170 next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>,
3171 ) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
3172 macro_rules! return_err {
3173 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3175 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id));
3176 log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3177 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3178 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3179 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3180 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
3181 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3187 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
3189 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3190 match create_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash,
3191 msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None, allow_underpay, msg.skimmed_fee_msat,
3192 current_height, self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
3195 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
3196 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
3197 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
3198 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
3199 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
3201 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3204 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
3205 match create_fwd_pending_htlc_info(msg, next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac,
3206 new_packet_bytes, shared_secret, next_packet_pubkey_opt) {
3207 Ok(info) => PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info),
3208 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3214 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
3215 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
3216 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
3218 /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
3219 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
3220 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3222 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3223 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3224 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3225 if !chan.context.should_announce() {
3226 return Err(LightningError {
3227 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
3228 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
3231 if chan.context.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
3232 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
3234 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3235 log_trace!(logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3236 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
3239 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
3240 /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
3241 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
3242 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
3244 /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
3245 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
3246 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3248 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3249 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3250 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3251 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3252 log_trace!(logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.context.channel_id().0));
3253 let short_channel_id = match chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
3254 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
3258 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
3261 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3262 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3263 log_trace!(logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.context.channel_id().0));
3264 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
3266 let enabled = chan.context.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
3267 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
3268 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
3269 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
3270 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => false,
3273 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
3274 chain_hash: self.chain_hash,
3276 timestamp: chan.context.get_update_time_counter(),
3277 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
3278 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.context.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
3279 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
3280 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.context.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
3281 fee_base_msat: chan.context.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
3282 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.context.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
3283 excess_data: Vec::new(),
3285 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
3286 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
3287 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
3289 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
3291 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
3298 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3299 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3300 self.send_payment_along_path(SendAlongPathArgs {
3301 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3306 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, args: SendAlongPathArgs) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3307 let SendAlongPathArgs {
3308 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3311 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
3312 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
3313 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
3314 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
3316 let (onion_packet, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::create_payment_onion(
3317 &self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height,
3318 payment_hash, keysend_preimage, prng_seed
3320 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey), None);
3321 log_error!(logger, "Failed to build an onion for path for payment hash {}", payment_hash);
3325 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
3326 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
3328 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey), None);
3329 log_error!(logger, "Failed to find first-hop for payment hash {}", payment_hash);
3330 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()})
3332 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3335 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(id));
3337 "Attempting to send payment with payment hash {} along path with next hop {}",
3338 payment_hash, path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
3340 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3341 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3342 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
3343 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3344 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3345 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
3346 match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
3347 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
3348 if !chan.context.is_live() {
3349 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
3351 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
3352 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3353 let send_res = chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
3354 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3356 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
3357 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
3359 }, onion_packet, None, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger);
3360 match break_chan_phase_entry!(self, send_res, chan_phase_entry) {
3361 Some(monitor_update) => {
3362 match handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
3364 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
3365 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
3366 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
3367 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
3368 // which we do in the send_payment check for
3369 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
3370 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
3378 _ => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel to first hop is unfunded".to_owned()}),
3381 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
3382 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
3383 // `channel_by_id` map.
3384 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
3385 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
3389 match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
3390 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3392 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
3397 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
3399 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
3400 /// fields for more info.
3402 /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
3403 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
3405 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
3407 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
3408 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
3409 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
3410 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
3411 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
3413 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
3414 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
3415 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
3416 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
3417 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
3419 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
3420 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
3421 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
3422 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
3424 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
3426 /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
3427 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
3428 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
3430 /// In general, a path may raise:
3431 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
3432 /// node public key) is specified.
3433 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available as it has been
3434 /// closed, doesn't exist, or the peer is currently disconnected.
3435 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
3436 /// relevant updates.
3438 /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
3439 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
3440 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
3442 /// [`RouteHop`]: crate::routing::router::RouteHop
3443 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3444 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
3445 /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
3446 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
3447 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3448 pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3449 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3450 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3451 self.pending_outbound_payments
3452 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id,
3453 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3454 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3457 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route`], but will automatically find a route based on
3458 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3459 pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
3460 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3461 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3462 self.pending_outbound_payments
3463 .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
3464 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
3465 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
3466 &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3470 pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3471 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3472 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3473 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion,
3474 keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer,
3475 best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3479 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
3480 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3481 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
3485 pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
3486 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
3489 pub(super) fn send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&self, invoice: &Bolt12Invoice, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), Bolt12PaymentError> {
3490 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3491 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3492 self.pending_outbound_payments
3493 .send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(
3494 invoice, payment_id, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3495 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer,
3496 best_block_height, &self.logger, &self.pending_events,
3497 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args)
3501 /// Signals that no further attempts for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
3502 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
3503 /// retries are exhausted.
3505 /// # Event Generation
3507 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
3508 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
3510 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
3511 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
3512 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
3514 /// # Requested Invoices
3516 /// In the case of paying a [`Bolt12Invoice`] via [`ChannelManager::pay_for_offer`], abandoning
3517 /// the payment prior to receiving the invoice will result in an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`]
3518 /// and prevent any attempts at paying it once received. The other events may only be generated
3519 /// once the invoice has been received.
3521 /// # Restart Behavior
3523 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated and we restart without first persisting the
3524 /// [`ChannelManager`], another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated; likewise for
3525 /// [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
3527 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
3528 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
3529 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3530 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
3533 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
3534 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
3535 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
3536 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
3537 /// never reach the recipient.
3539 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
3540 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
3542 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
3543 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
3545 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
3546 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
3547 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3548 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3549 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
3550 route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
3551 &self.node_signer, best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3554 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
3555 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3557 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
3560 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
3561 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
3562 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3563 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3564 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
3565 payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3566 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3567 &self.logger, &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3570 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
3571 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
3572 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
3573 pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
3574 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3575 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3576 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret,
3577 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3578 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3581 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
3584 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
3585 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
3588 /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay the given
3589 /// amount to the given `node_id`.
3591 /// See [`ChannelManager::send_preflight_probes`] for more information.
3592 pub fn send_spontaneous_preflight_probes(
3593 &self, node_id: PublicKey, amount_msat: u64, final_cltv_expiry_delta: u32,
3594 liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
3595 ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
3596 let payment_params =
3597 PaymentParameters::from_node_id(node_id, final_cltv_expiry_delta);
3599 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, amount_msat);
3601 self.send_preflight_probes(route_params, liquidity_limit_multiplier)
3604 /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay a route found
3605 /// according to the given [`RouteParameters`].
3607 /// This may be used to send "pre-flight" probes, i.e., to train our scorer before conducting
3608 /// the actual payment. Note this is only useful if there likely is sufficient time for the
3609 /// probe to settle before sending out the actual payment, e.g., when waiting for user
3610 /// confirmation in a wallet UI.
3612 /// Otherwise, there is a chance the probe could take up some liquidity needed to complete the
3613 /// actual payment. Users should therefore be cautious and might avoid sending probes if
3614 /// liquidity is scarce and/or they don't expect the probe to return before they send the
3615 /// payment. To mitigate this issue, channels with available liquidity less than the required
3616 /// amount times the given `liquidity_limit_multiplier` won't be used to send pre-flight
3617 /// probes. If `None` is given as `liquidity_limit_multiplier`, it defaults to `3`.
3618 pub fn send_preflight_probes(
3619 &self, route_params: RouteParameters, liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
3620 ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
3621 let liquidity_limit_multiplier = liquidity_limit_multiplier.unwrap_or(3);
3623 let payer = self.get_our_node_id();
3624 let usable_channels = self.list_usable_channels();
3625 let first_hops = usable_channels.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>();
3626 let inflight_htlcs = self.compute_inflight_htlcs();
3630 .find_route(&payer, &route_params, Some(&first_hops), inflight_htlcs)
3632 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to find path for payment probe: {:?}", e);
3633 ProbeSendFailure::RouteNotFound
3636 let mut used_liquidity_map = HashMap::with_capacity(first_hops.len());
3638 let mut res = Vec::new();
3640 for mut path in route.paths {
3641 // If the last hop is probably an unannounced channel we refrain from probing all the
3642 // way through to the end and instead probe up to the second-to-last channel.
3643 while let Some(last_path_hop) = path.hops.last() {
3644 if last_path_hop.maybe_announced_channel {
3645 // We found a potentially announced last hop.
3648 // Drop the last hop, as it's likely unannounced.
3651 "Avoided sending payment probe all the way to last hop {} as it is likely unannounced.",
3652 last_path_hop.short_channel_id
3654 let final_value_msat = path.final_value_msat();
3656 if let Some(new_last) = path.hops.last_mut() {
3657 new_last.fee_msat += final_value_msat;
3662 if path.hops.len() < 2 {
3665 "Skipped sending payment probe over path with less than two hops."
3670 if let Some(first_path_hop) = path.hops.first() {
3671 if let Some(first_hop) = first_hops.iter().find(|h| {
3672 h.get_outbound_payment_scid() == Some(first_path_hop.short_channel_id)
3674 let path_value = path.final_value_msat() + path.fee_msat();
3675 let used_liquidity =
3676 used_liquidity_map.entry(first_path_hop.short_channel_id).or_insert(0);
3678 if first_hop.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat
3679 < (*used_liquidity + path_value) * liquidity_limit_multiplier
3681 log_debug!(self.logger, "Skipped sending payment probe to avoid putting channel {} under the liquidity limit.", first_path_hop.short_channel_id);
3684 *used_liquidity += path_value;
3689 res.push(self.send_probe(path).map_err(|e| {
3690 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to send pre-flight probe: {:?}", e);
3691 ProbeSendFailure::SendingFailed(e)
3698 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
3699 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
3700 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: FnMut(&OutboundV1Channel<SP>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
3701 &self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, is_batch_funding: bool,
3702 mut find_funding_output: FundingOutput,
3703 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3704 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3705 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3706 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3708 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3709 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3710 let (chan, msg_opt) = match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
3711 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan)) => {
3712 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
3714 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3715 let funding_res = chan.get_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, is_batch_funding, &&logger)
3716 .map_err(|(mut chan, e)| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
3717 let channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
3718 let user_id = chan.context.get_user_id();
3719 let shutdown_res = chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
3720 let channel_capacity = chan.context.get_value_satoshis();
3721 (chan, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None, channel_capacity))
3722 } else { unreachable!(); });
3724 Ok((chan, funding_msg)) => (chan, funding_msg),
3725 Err((chan, err)) => {
3726 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
3727 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3728 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(err), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
3729 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3730 err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
3736 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(*temporary_channel_id, phase);
3737 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3739 "Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is not an unfunded, outbound V1 channel",
3740 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3743 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {err: format!(
3744 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
3745 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3749 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
3750 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
3751 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3755 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
3756 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3757 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
3759 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3760 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
3761 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.context.channel_id(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
3762 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
3764 e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan));
3771 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3772 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, false, |_, tx| {
3773 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
3777 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
3779 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
3780 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
3782 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
3783 /// across the p2p network.
3785 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
3786 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
3788 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
3789 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
3790 /// keys per-channel).
3792 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
3793 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
3794 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
3796 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
3797 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
3798 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
3800 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
3801 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
3802 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
3803 /// for more details.
3805 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
3806 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
3807 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3808 self.batch_funding_transaction_generated(&[(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id)], funding_transaction)
3811 /// Call this upon creation of a batch funding transaction for the given channels.
3813 /// Return values are identical to [`Self::funding_transaction_generated`], respective to
3814 /// each individual channel and transaction output.
3816 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. This batch funding transaction
3817 /// will only be broadcast when we have safely received and persisted the counterparty's
3818 /// signature for each channel.
3820 /// If there is an error, all channels in the batch are to be considered closed.
3821 pub fn batch_funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channels: &[(&ChannelId, &PublicKey)], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3822 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3823 let mut result = Ok(());
3825 if !funding_transaction.is_coin_base() {
3826 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
3827 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
3828 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3829 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
3834 if funding_transaction.output.len() > u16::max_value() as usize {
3835 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3836 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
3840 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3841 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools if their locktime is strictly
3842 // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
3843 // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
3844 // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
3845 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) &&
3846 funding_transaction.lock_time.is_block_height() &&
3847 funding_transaction.lock_time.to_consensus_u32() > height + 1
3849 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3850 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
3855 let txid = funding_transaction.txid();
3856 let is_batch_funding = temporary_channels.len() > 1;
3857 let mut funding_batch_states = if is_batch_funding {
3858 Some(self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap())
3862 let mut funding_batch_state = funding_batch_states.as_mut().and_then(|states| {
3863 match states.entry(txid) {
3864 btree_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3865 result = result.clone().and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3866 err: "Batch funding transaction with the same txid already exists".to_owned()
3870 btree_map::Entry::Vacant(vacant) => Some(vacant.insert(Vec::new())),
3873 for &(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in temporary_channels {
3874 result = result.and_then(|_| self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(
3875 temporary_channel_id,
3876 counterparty_node_id,
3877 funding_transaction.clone(),
3880 let mut output_index = None;
3881 let expected_spk = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
3882 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3883 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.context.get_value_satoshis() {
3884 if output_index.is_some() {
3885 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3886 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
3889 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
3892 if output_index.is_none() {
3893 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3894 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
3897 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() };
3898 if let Some(funding_batch_state) = funding_batch_state.as_mut() {
3899 funding_batch_state.push((outpoint.to_channel_id(), *counterparty_node_id, false));
3905 if let Err(ref e) = result {
3906 // Remaining channels need to be removed on any error.
3907 let e = format!("Error in transaction funding: {:?}", e);
3908 let mut channels_to_remove = Vec::new();
3909 channels_to_remove.extend(funding_batch_states.as_mut()
3910 .and_then(|states| states.remove(&txid))
3911 .into_iter().flatten()
3912 .map(|(chan_id, node_id, _state)| (chan_id, node_id))
3914 channels_to_remove.extend(temporary_channels.iter()
3915 .map(|(&chan_id, &node_id)| (chan_id, node_id))
3917 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
3919 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3920 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in channels_to_remove {
3921 per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3922 .map(|peer_state_mutex| peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap())
3923 .and_then(|mut peer_state| peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id))
3925 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
3926 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context(), ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: e.clone() });
3927 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
3931 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
3932 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
3938 /// Atomically applies partial updates to the [`ChannelConfig`] of the given channels.
3940 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3941 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3942 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3943 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3945 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3946 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3948 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3949 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3951 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3953 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3954 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3955 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3956 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3957 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3958 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3959 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3960 pub fn update_partial_channel_config(
3961 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config_update: &ChannelConfigUpdate,
3962 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3963 if config_update.cltv_expiry_delta.map(|delta| delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA).unwrap_or(false) {
3964 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3965 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
3969 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3970 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3971 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3972 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3973 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3974 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3975 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3976 if !peer_state.has_channel(channel_id) {
3977 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3978 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3982 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3983 if let Some(channel_phase) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
3984 let mut config = channel_phase.context().config();
3985 config.apply(config_update);
3986 if !channel_phase.context_mut().update_config(&config) {
3989 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = channel_phase {
3990 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
3991 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
3992 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
3993 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3994 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4001 // This should not be reachable as we've already checked for non-existence in the previous channel_id loop.
4002 debug_assert!(false);
4003 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4005 "Channel with ID {} for passed counterparty_node_id {} disappeared after we confirmed its existence - this should not be reachable!",
4006 channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4013 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
4015 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
4016 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
4017 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
4018 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
4020 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
4021 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
4023 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
4024 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
4026 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
4028 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4029 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
4030 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
4031 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
4032 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4033 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
4034 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
4035 pub fn update_channel_config(
4036 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config: &ChannelConfig,
4037 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4038 return self.update_partial_channel_config(counterparty_node_id, channel_ids, &(*config).into());
4041 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
4042 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
4044 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
4045 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
4047 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
4048 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
4049 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
4050 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
4051 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
4053 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
4054 /// you from forwarding more than you received. See
4055 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`] for more on forwarding a different amount
4058 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4061 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
4062 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4063 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
4064 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
4065 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
4066 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &ChannelId, next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4067 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4069 let next_hop_scid = {
4070 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4071 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
4072 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
4073 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4074 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4075 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
4076 Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) => {
4077 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
4078 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4079 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", next_hop_channel_id)
4082 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias())
4084 Some(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4085 err: format!("Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is still opening.",
4086 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id)
4089 let error = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
4090 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id);
4091 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(next_node_id), Some(*next_hop_channel_id));
4092 log_error!(logger, "{} when attempting to forward intercepted HTLC", error);
4093 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4100 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4101 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4102 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4105 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
4106 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, blinded, .. } => {
4107 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
4108 onion_packet, blinded, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid
4111 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4113 let skimmed_fee_msat =
4114 payment.forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat.saturating_sub(amt_to_forward_msat);
4115 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
4116 skimmed_fee_msat: if skimmed_fee_msat == 0 { None } else { Some(skimmed_fee_msat) },
4117 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
4120 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
4121 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4122 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4123 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
4124 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
4126 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
4130 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
4131 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
4133 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4136 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4137 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4138 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4140 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4141 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4142 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4145 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
4146 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4147 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4148 user_channel_id: Some(payment.prev_user_channel_id),
4149 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4150 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
4151 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
4152 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4153 blinded_failure: payment.forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
4156 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
4157 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
4158 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4159 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4164 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
4166 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
4167 /// Will likely generate further events.
4168 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
4169 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4171 let mut new_events = VecDeque::new();
4172 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
4173 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
4175 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
4176 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
4178 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
4179 if short_chan_id != 0 {
4180 let mut forwarding_counterparty = None;
4181 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
4183 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4184 match forward_info {
4185 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4186 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4187 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4188 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4189 outgoing_cltv_value, ..
4192 macro_rules! failure_handler {
4193 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
4194 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, forwarding_counterparty, Some(prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()));
4195 log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
4197 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4198 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4199 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4200 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4201 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4202 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4203 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
4204 blinded_failure: routing.blinded_failure(),
4207 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
4208 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
4210 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
4213 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4214 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
4220 macro_rules! fail_forward {
4221 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4223 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
4227 macro_rules! failed_payment {
4228 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4230 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
4234 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref onion_packet, .. } = routing {
4235 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
4236 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.chain_hash) {
4237 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
4238 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(
4239 phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac,
4240 payment_hash, &self.node_signer
4243 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4244 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).to_byte_array();
4245 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
4246 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
4247 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
4249 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
4251 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4252 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
4256 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
4257 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4258 match create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data,
4259 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4260 outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret), false, None,
4261 current_height, self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
4263 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
4264 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
4270 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4273 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4276 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
4277 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
4278 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
4279 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
4280 // problem, not ours.
4286 let chan_info_opt = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id).cloned();
4287 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match chan_info_opt {
4288 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id, chan_id),
4290 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4294 forwarding_counterparty = Some(counterparty_node_id);
4295 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4296 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4297 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
4298 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4301 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4302 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4303 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id) {
4304 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4305 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4306 match forward_info {
4307 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4308 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4309 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4310 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
4311 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
4312 onion_packet, blinded, ..
4313 }, skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4316 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, &payment_hash, short_chan_id);
4317 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4318 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4319 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4320 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4321 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4322 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4323 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
4324 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4325 blinded_failure: blinded.map(|_| BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode),
4327 let next_blinding_point = blinded.and_then(|b| {
4328 let encrypted_tlvs_ss = self.node_signer.ecdh(
4329 Recipient::Node, &b.inbound_blinding_point, None
4330 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
4331 onion_utils::next_hop_pubkey(
4332 &self.secp_ctx, b.inbound_blinding_point, &encrypted_tlvs_ss
4335 if let Err(e) = chan.queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
4336 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
4337 onion_packet, skimmed_fee_msat, next_blinding_point, &self.fee_estimator,
4340 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4341 log_trace!(logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", &payment_hash, msg);
4343 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
4345 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan);
4346 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4347 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
4348 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
4353 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
4354 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
4356 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
4357 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
4358 if let Err(e) = chan.queue_fail_htlc(
4359 htlc_id, err_packet, &&logger
4361 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4362 log_trace!(logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
4364 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
4366 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
4367 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
4368 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
4375 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4379 'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4380 match forward_info {
4381 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4382 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4383 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4384 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat,
4385 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4388 let blinded_failure = routing.blinded_failure();
4389 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
4390 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret, custom_tlvs } => {
4391 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
4392 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret),
4393 payment_metadata, custom_tlvs };
4394 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
4395 Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
4397 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_data, payment_preimage, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, custom_tlvs } => {
4398 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields {
4399 payment_secret: payment_data.as_ref().map(|data| data.payment_secret),
4403 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
4404 payment_data, None, onion_fields)
4407 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
4410 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
4411 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
4412 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4413 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4414 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4415 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4416 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4417 phantom_shared_secret,
4420 // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
4421 // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
4422 // if routing nodes overpay
4423 value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
4424 sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
4426 total_value_received: None,
4427 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
4430 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
4433 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
4435 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
4436 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
4437 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
4438 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4439 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
4440 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
4442 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4443 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
4444 user_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.user_channel_id,
4445 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4446 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
4447 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
4448 phantom_shared_secret,
4449 blinded_failure: None,
4451 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
4452 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
4454 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
4457 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
4458 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4459 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4460 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4461 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4464 macro_rules! check_total_value {
4465 ($purpose: expr) => {{
4466 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
4467 let is_keysend = match $purpose {
4468 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(_) => true,
4469 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { .. } => false,
4471 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4472 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
4473 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4475 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
4476 .entry(payment_hash)
4477 // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
4478 .or_insert_with(|| {
4479 committed_to_claimable = true;
4481 purpose: $purpose.clone(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
4484 if $purpose != claimable_payment.purpose {
4485 let log_keysend = |keysend| if keysend { "keysend" } else { "non-keysend" };
4486 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new {} HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing {} HTLC with the same payment hash", log_keysend(is_keysend), &payment_hash, log_keysend(!is_keysend));
4487 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4489 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && is_keysend && !claimable_payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4490 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash and our config states we don't accept MPP keysend", &payment_hash);
4491 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4493 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
4494 if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
4495 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4498 claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
4500 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
4501 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
4502 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
4503 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
4504 total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
4505 earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
4506 if htlc.total_msat != claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4507 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
4508 &payment_hash, claimable_htlc.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
4509 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
4511 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
4513 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
4514 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
4515 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
4516 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4517 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4518 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
4520 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4521 } else if total_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4522 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4523 committed_to_claimable = true;
4525 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
4526 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4527 let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
4528 htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
4529 let counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat = htlcs.iter()
4530 .map(|htlc| htlc.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)).sum();
4531 debug_assert!(total_value.saturating_sub(amount_msat) <=
4532 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat);
4533 new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
4534 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4538 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
4539 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
4540 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4541 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
4542 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
4544 payment_claimable_generated = true;
4546 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
4547 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
4549 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4550 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4551 committed_to_claimable = true;
4554 payment_claimable_generated
4558 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
4559 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
4560 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
4561 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
4562 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
4563 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
4564 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4565 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
4566 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4567 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4568 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
4569 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4570 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
4571 Ok(result) => result,
4573 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", &payment_hash);
4574 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4577 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
4578 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
4579 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
4580 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
4581 &payment_hash, cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
4582 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4585 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4586 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4587 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4589 check_total_value!(purpose);
4591 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
4592 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
4593 check_total_value!(purpose);
4597 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
4598 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4599 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", &payment_hash);
4600 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4602 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4603 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
4604 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", &payment_hash);
4605 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4606 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
4607 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
4608 &payment_hash, payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
4609 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4611 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4612 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
4613 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4615 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(purpose);
4616 if payment_claimable_generated {
4617 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
4623 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
4624 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
4632 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4633 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
4634 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4635 &self.pending_events, &self.logger, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args));
4637 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
4638 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4640 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
4642 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
4643 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
4644 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
4646 self.check_free_holding_cells();
4648 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
4649 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4650 events.append(&mut new_events);
4653 /// Free the background events, generally called from [`PersistenceNotifierGuard`] constructors.
4655 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
4656 fn process_background_events(&self) -> NotifyOption {
4657 debug_assert_ne!(self.total_consistency_lock.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::NotHeldByThread);
4659 self.background_events_processed_since_startup.store(true, Ordering::Release);
4661 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
4662 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
4663 if background_events.is_empty() {
4664 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4667 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
4669 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, update)) => {
4670 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
4671 // monitor updating completing.
4672 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4674 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup { counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update } => {
4675 let mut updated_chan = false;
4677 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4678 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4679 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4680 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4681 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4682 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase) => {
4683 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase.get_mut() {
4684 updated_chan = true;
4685 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, update.clone(),
4686 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4688 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't have an update for a non-funded channel");
4691 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {},
4696 // TODO: Track this as in-flight even though the channel is closed.
4697 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4700 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete { counterparty_node_id, channel_id } => {
4701 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4702 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4703 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4704 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4705 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
4706 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4708 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
4709 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
4710 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
4711 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4712 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
4718 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4721 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
4722 /// Process background events, for functional testing
4723 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
4724 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
4725 let _ = self.process_background_events();
4728 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &ChannelId, chan: &mut Channel<SP>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
4729 if !chan.context.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents; }
4731 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4733 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
4734 if new_feerate <= chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4735 if new_feerate != chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4736 log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4737 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4739 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4741 if !chan.context.is_live() {
4742 log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
4743 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4744 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4746 log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4747 &chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4749 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger);
4750 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4754 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
4755 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
4756 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
4757 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
4758 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
4759 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
4760 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4762 let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
4763 let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
4765 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4766 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4767 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4768 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4769 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
4770 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
4772 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4777 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4778 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4786 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
4788 /// This currently includes:
4789 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
4790 /// * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
4791 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
4793 /// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
4794 /// with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
4795 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
4796 /// * Force-closing and removing channels which have not completed establishment in a timely manner.
4797 /// * Forgetting about stale outbound payments, either those that have already been fulfilled
4798 /// or those awaiting an invoice that hasn't been delivered in the necessary amount of time.
4799 /// The latter is determined using the system clock in `std` and the highest seen block time
4800 /// minus two hours in `no-std`.
4802 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
4803 /// estimate fetches.
4805 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4806 /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
4807 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
4808 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
4809 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4811 let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
4812 let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
4814 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
4815 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
4816 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
4817 let mut shutdown_channels = Vec::new();
4819 let mut process_unfunded_channel_tick = |
4820 chan_id: &ChannelId,
4821 context: &mut ChannelContext<SP>,
4822 unfunded_context: &mut UnfundedChannelContext,
4823 pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4824 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
4826 context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4827 if unfunded_context.should_expire_unfunded_channel() {
4828 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, context);
4830 "Force-closing pending channel with ID {} for not establishing in a timely manner", chan_id);
4831 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
4832 self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4833 shutdown_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false));
4834 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4835 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4836 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4837 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
4838 channel_id: *chan_id,
4839 data: "Force-closing pending channel due to timeout awaiting establishment handshake".to_owned(),
4850 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4851 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4852 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4853 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4854 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
4855 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
4856 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, phase| {
4858 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
4859 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4864 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4865 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4867 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
4868 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
4869 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
4870 if needs_close { return false; }
4873 match chan.channel_update_status() {
4874 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
4875 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
4876 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.context.is_live()
4877 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
4878 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.context.is_live()
4879 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
4880 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.context.is_live() => {
4882 if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4883 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
4884 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4885 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4889 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4891 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
4894 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.context.is_live() => {
4896 if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4897 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
4898 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4899 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4903 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4905 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
4911 chan.context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4913 if chan.should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response() {
4914 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4915 log_debug!(logger, "Disconnecting peer {} due to not making any progress on channel {}",
4916 counterparty_node_id, chan_id);
4917 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4918 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4919 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning {
4920 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
4921 channel_id: *chan_id,
4922 data: "Disconnecting due to timeout awaiting response".to_owned(),
4930 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
4931 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
4932 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
4934 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
4935 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
4936 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
4941 for (chan_id, req) in peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.iter_mut() {
4942 if { req.ticks_remaining -= 1 ; req.ticks_remaining } <= 0 {
4943 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(*chan_id));
4944 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing unaccepted inbound channel {} for not accepting in a timely manner", &chan_id);
4945 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
4946 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4947 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4948 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4949 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_id.clone(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
4955 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.retain(|_, req| req.ticks_remaining > 0);
4957 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
4958 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
4963 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
4964 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
4965 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
4966 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
4967 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
4968 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
4969 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
4970 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
4971 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
4972 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
4973 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
4974 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
4975 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
4976 // have no channels to the peer.
4977 let remove_entry = {
4978 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
4979 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
4982 entry.remove_entry();
4985 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
4990 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
4991 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4992 // This should be unreachable
4993 debug_assert!(false);
4996 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
4997 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
4998 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
4999 // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
5000 // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
5001 if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
5002 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
5005 } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
5006 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
5007 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
5009 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
5010 .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
5017 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
5018 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
5019 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
5020 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
5021 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
5024 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5025 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5028 for shutdown_res in shutdown_channels {
5029 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
5032 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
5033 let duration_since_epoch = std::time::SystemTime::now()
5034 .duration_since(std::time::SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH)
5035 .expect("SystemTime::now() should come after SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH");
5036 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
5037 let duration_since_epoch = Duration::from_secs(
5038 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire).saturating_sub(7200) as u64
5041 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_payments(
5042 duration_since_epoch, &self.pending_events
5045 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
5046 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
5047 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
5048 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5049 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5056 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
5057 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
5058 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
5060 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
5061 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
5062 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
5063 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
5065 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
5066 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
5067 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
5068 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
5069 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
5070 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
5073 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
5074 /// reason for the failure.
5076 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
5077 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
5078 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5080 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
5081 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
5082 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5083 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
5084 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5085 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
5086 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5091 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
5092 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
5093 match failure_code {
5094 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
5095 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
5096 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
5097 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5098 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
5099 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), htlc_msat_height_data)
5101 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(data) => {
5102 let fail_data = match data {
5103 Some((typ, offset)) => [BigSize(typ).encode(), offset.encode()].concat(),
5106 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), fail_data)
5111 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5112 /// that we want to return and a channel.
5114 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
5116 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5117 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
5118 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
5119 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
5120 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
5121 let scid_pref = if chan.context.should_announce() {
5122 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
5124 chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.context.get_short_channel_id())
5126 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
5127 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
5129 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5134 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5135 /// that we want to return and a channel.
5136 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5137 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
5138 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
5139 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
5140 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
5141 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
5142 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
5143 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5145 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5146 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5147 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5148 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
5150 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
5151 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
5152 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
5153 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
5154 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5158 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
5159 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
5160 // be surfaced to the user.
5161 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
5162 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: ChannelId,
5163 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
5165 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
5166 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5167 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
5168 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5169 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5170 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
5171 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
5172 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get() {
5173 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan)
5175 // We shouldn't be trying to fail holding cell HTLCs on an unfunded channel.
5176 debug_assert!(false);
5177 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5180 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5182 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
5185 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
5186 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
5187 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
5188 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5192 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
5193 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
5194 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
5195 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
5196 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
5197 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
5198 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
5199 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5200 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
5201 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5204 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
5205 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
5206 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
5209 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5210 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
5211 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5213 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
5214 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
5215 session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
5216 &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
5217 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5219 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5220 ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret,
5221 ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint, ref blinded_failure, ..
5224 WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(outpoint.to_channel_id())),
5225 "Failing {}HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us: {:?}",
5226 if blinded_failure.is_some() { "blinded " } else { "" }, &payment_hash, onion_error
5228 let err_packet = match blinded_failure {
5229 Some(BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode) => {
5230 let blinded_onion_error = HTLCFailReason::reason(INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, vec![0; 32]);
5231 blinded_onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(
5232 incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret
5236 onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret)
5240 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
5241 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5242 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
5243 push_forward_ev = true;
5245 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
5246 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5247 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
5249 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5250 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
5253 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
5254 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5255 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5256 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
5257 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
5258 failed_next_destination: destination,
5264 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
5265 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
5267 /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
5268 /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
5269 /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
5270 /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
5272 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
5273 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
5274 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
5275 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
5277 /// This function will fail the payment if it has custom TLVs with even type numbers, as we
5278 /// will assume they are unknown. If you intend to accept even custom TLVs, you should use
5279 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`].
5281 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5282 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
5283 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
5284 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
5285 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5286 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5287 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`]: Self::claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs
5288 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5289 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, false);
5292 /// This is a variant of [`claim_funds`] that allows accepting a payment with custom TLVs with
5293 /// even type numbers.
5297 /// You MUST check you've understood all even TLVs before using this to
5298 /// claim, otherwise you may unintentionally agree to some protocol you do not understand.
5300 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5301 pub fn claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5302 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, true);
5305 fn claim_payment_internal(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, custom_tlvs_known: bool) {
5306 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).to_byte_array());
5308 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5311 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
5312 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
5313 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
5314 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
5315 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
5316 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
5317 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
5318 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
5323 let htlcs = payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect();
5324 let sender_intended_value = payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat);
5325 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
5326 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
5327 payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id, htlcs, sender_intended_value
5329 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
5330 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
5331 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
5335 if let Some(RecipientOnionFields { ref custom_tlvs, .. }) = payment.onion_fields {
5336 if !custom_tlvs_known && custom_tlvs.iter().any(|(typ, _)| typ % 2 == 0) {
5337 log_info!(self.logger, "Rejecting payment with payment hash {} as we cannot accept payment with unknown even TLVs: {}",
5338 &payment_hash, log_iter!(custom_tlvs.iter().map(|(typ, _)| typ).filter(|typ| *typ % 2 == 0)));
5339 claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5340 mem::drop(claimable_payments);
5341 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5342 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(None), &htlc);
5343 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5344 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5345 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5354 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
5356 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
5357 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
5358 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
5359 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
5360 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
5361 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
5362 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
5363 let mut valid_mpp = true;
5364 let mut errs = Vec::new();
5365 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5366 for htlc in sources.iter() {
5367 if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
5368 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5369 debug_assert!(false);
5373 prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
5375 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
5376 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5377 debug_assert!(false);
5381 expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
5382 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
5384 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5385 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
5386 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5387 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
5390 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
5391 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5392 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
5393 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
5397 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5398 let prev_hop_chan_id = htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
5399 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
5400 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
5401 |_, definitely_duplicate| {
5402 debug_assert!(!definitely_duplicate, "We shouldn't claim duplicatively from a payment");
5403 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash })
5406 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
5407 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
5408 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
5409 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_hop_chan_id));
5410 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
5411 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
5416 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5417 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5418 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
5419 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5420 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
5421 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5422 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5424 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5427 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
5428 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
5429 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5430 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
5434 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>, bool) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
5435 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
5436 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
5437 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
5439 // If we haven't yet run background events assume we're still deserializing and shouldn't
5440 // actually pass `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to users yet. Instead, queue them up as
5441 // `BackgroundEvent`s.
5442 let during_init = !self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5444 // As we may call handle_monitor_update_completion_actions in rather rare cases, check that
5445 // the required mutexes are not held before we start.
5446 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5447 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5450 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5451 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
5452 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
5453 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
5457 let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
5458 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5459 .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
5462 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
5463 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
5464 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5465 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5466 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
5467 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5468 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
5469 let fulfill_res = chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &&logger);
5472 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } => {
5473 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat), false) {
5474 log_trace!(logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
5476 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
5479 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
5480 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5482 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly -
5483 // they probably haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the
5484 // monitor update as a background event.
5485 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5486 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5487 counterparty_node_id,
5488 funding_txo: prev_hop.outpoint,
5489 update: monitor_update.clone(),
5493 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => {
5494 let action = if let Some(action) = completion_action(None, true) {
5499 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5501 log_trace!(logger, "Completing monitor update completion action for channel {} as claim was redundant: {:?}",
5503 let (node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker) =
5504 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5505 downstream_counterparty_node_id: node_id,
5506 downstream_funding_outpoint: funding_outpoint,
5507 blocking_action: blocker,
5509 (node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker)
5511 debug_assert!(false,
5512 "Duplicate claims should always free another channel immediately");
5515 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
5516 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5517 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state
5518 .actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
5519 .get_mut(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
5521 let mut found_blocker = false;
5522 blockers.retain(|iter| {
5523 // Note that we could actually be blocked, in
5524 // which case we need to only remove the one
5525 // blocker which was added duplicatively.
5526 let first_blocker = !found_blocker;
5527 if *iter == blocker { found_blocker = true; }
5528 *iter != blocker || !first_blocker
5530 debug_assert!(found_blocker);
5533 debug_assert!(false);
5542 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5543 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
5544 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5550 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
5551 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
5552 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
5553 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
5554 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
5555 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
5556 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
5557 // again on restart.
5558 log_error!(WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id())), "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
5559 payment_preimage, update_res);
5562 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly - they probably
5563 // haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the monitor update as a background
5565 // Note that while it's safe to use `ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup` here (the
5566 // channel is already closed) we need to ultimately handle the monitor update
5567 // completion action only after we've completed the monitor update. This is the only
5568 // way to guarantee this update *will* be regenerated on startup (otherwise if this was
5569 // from a forwarded HTLC the downstream preimage may be deleted before we claim
5570 // upstream). Thus, we need to transition to some new `BackgroundEvent` type which will
5571 // complete the monitor update completion action from `completion_action`.
5572 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5573 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((
5574 prev_hop.outpoint, preimage_update,
5577 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
5578 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
5579 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
5580 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
5581 // `PaymentForwarded`).
5582 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None, false));
5586 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
5587 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
5590 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
5591 forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, startup_replay: bool,
5592 next_channel_counterparty_node_id: Option<PublicKey>, next_channel_outpoint: OutPoint
5595 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
5596 debug_assert!(self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire),
5597 "We don't support claim_htlc claims during startup - monitors may not be available yet");
5598 if let Some(pubkey) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
5599 debug_assert_eq!(pubkey, path.hops[0].pubkey);
5601 let ev_completion_action = EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
5602 channel_funding_outpoint: next_channel_outpoint,
5603 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
5605 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage,
5606 session_priv, path, from_onchain, ev_completion_action, &self.pending_events,
5609 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
5610 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
5611 let completed_blocker = RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&hop_data);
5612 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5613 let claiming_chan_funding_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
5614 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
5615 |htlc_claim_value_msat, definitely_duplicate| {
5616 let chan_to_release =
5617 if let Some(node_id) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
5618 Some((node_id, next_channel_outpoint, completed_blocker))
5620 // We can only get `None` here if we are processing a
5621 // `ChannelMonitor`-originated event, in which case we
5622 // don't care about ensuring we wake the downstream
5623 // channel's monitor updating - the channel is already
5628 if definitely_duplicate && startup_replay {
5629 // On startup we may get redundant claims which are related to
5630 // monitor updates still in flight. In that case, we shouldn't
5631 // immediately free, but instead let that monitor update complete
5632 // in the background.
5633 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
5634 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
5635 // There should be a `BackgroundEvent` pending...
5636 assert!(background_events.iter().any(|ev| {
5638 // to apply a monitor update that blocked the claiming channel,
5639 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5640 funding_txo, update, ..
5642 if *funding_txo == claiming_chan_funding_outpoint {
5643 assert!(update.updates.iter().any(|upd|
5644 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5645 payment_preimage: update_preimage
5647 payment_preimage == *update_preimage
5653 // or the channel we'd unblock is already closed,
5654 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup(
5655 (funding_txo, monitor_update)
5657 if *funding_txo == next_channel_outpoint {
5658 assert_eq!(monitor_update.updates.len(), 1);
5660 monitor_update.updates[0],
5661 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { .. }
5666 // or the monitor update has completed and will unblock
5667 // immediately once we get going.
5668 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
5671 *channel_id == claiming_chan_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(),
5673 }), "{:?}", *background_events);
5676 } else if definitely_duplicate {
5677 if let Some(other_chan) = chan_to_release {
5678 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5679 downstream_counterparty_node_id: other_chan.0,
5680 downstream_funding_outpoint: other_chan.1,
5681 blocking_action: other_chan.2,
5685 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
5686 if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
5687 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
5690 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5691 event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
5693 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
5694 prev_channel_id: Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
5695 next_channel_id: Some(next_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
5696 outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
5698 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: chan_to_release,
5702 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
5703 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5704 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
5710 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
5711 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
5712 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
5715 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
5716 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5717 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5718 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5720 for action in actions.into_iter() {
5722 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
5723 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5724 if let Some(ClaimingPayment {
5726 payment_purpose: purpose,
5729 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_total_msat,
5731 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
5735 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
5737 sender_intended_total_msat,
5741 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5742 event, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint
5744 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
5745 if let Some((node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker)) = downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint {
5746 self.handle_monitor_update_release(node_id, funding_outpoint, Some(blocker));
5749 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5750 downstream_counterparty_node_id, downstream_funding_outpoint, blocking_action,
5752 self.handle_monitor_update_release(
5753 downstream_counterparty_node_id,
5754 downstream_funding_outpoint,
5755 Some(blocking_action),
5762 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
5763 /// update completion.
5764 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
5765 channel: &mut Channel<SP>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
5766 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
5767 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
5768 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
5769 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
5770 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
5771 log_trace!(logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
5772 &channel.context.channel_id(),
5773 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
5774 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
5775 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
5776 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
5777 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
5779 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
5781 let counterparty_node_id = channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5782 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5783 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.context.outbound_scid_alias()),
5784 channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.context.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
5787 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
5788 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
5790 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
5791 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5792 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5797 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
5798 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
5799 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5800 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5805 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
5806 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
5807 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
5808 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5809 msg: revoke_and_ack,
5814 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
5818 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
5824 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
5825 log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
5826 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
5830 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5831 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
5832 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
5838 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
5839 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
5841 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
5842 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5844 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5845 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
5846 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5847 match id_to_peer.get(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
5848 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5853 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5854 let mut peer_state_lock;
5855 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
5856 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
5857 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5858 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5860 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
5863 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
5864 .remove(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
5865 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5866 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5867 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
5870 let remaining_in_flight =
5871 if let Some(pending) = peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.get_mut(funding_txo) {
5872 pending.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > highest_applied_update_id);
5875 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
5876 log_trace!(logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}. {} pending in-flight updates.",
5877 highest_applied_update_id, channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
5878 remaining_in_flight);
5879 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
5882 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel);
5885 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
5887 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
5888 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
5891 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5892 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5893 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5895 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
5896 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
5897 /// used to accept such channels.
5899 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5900 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5901 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5902 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
5905 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
5906 /// it as confirmed immediately.
5908 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5909 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5910 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5912 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
5913 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
5915 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
5916 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
5918 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
5919 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
5921 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5922 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5923 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5924 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
5927 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5928 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5930 let peers_without_funded_channels =
5931 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| { peer.total_channel_count() > 0 });
5932 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5933 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5934 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
5935 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5936 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5937 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.total_channel_count() == 1;
5939 // Find (and remove) the channel in the unaccepted table. If it's not there, something weird is
5940 // happening and return an error. N.B. that we create channel with an outbound SCID of zero so
5941 // that we can delay allocating the SCID until after we're sure that the checks below will
5943 let mut channel = match peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
5944 Some(unaccepted_channel) => {
5945 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5946 InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
5947 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features,
5948 &unaccepted_channel.open_channel_msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration, best_block_height,
5949 &self.logger, accept_0conf).map_err(|e| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.to_string() })
5951 _ => Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() })
5955 // This should have been correctly configured by the call to InboundV1Channel::new.
5956 debug_assert!(channel.context.minimum_depth().unwrap() == 0);
5957 } else if channel.context.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
5958 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5959 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5960 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
5961 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
5964 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
5965 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
5967 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
5968 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
5969 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
5970 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
5971 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5972 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5973 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
5974 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
5977 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
5978 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned() });
5982 // Now that we know we have a channel, assign an outbound SCID alias.
5983 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
5984 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
5986 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
5987 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5988 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
5991 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(temporary_channel_id.clone(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
5996 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
5997 /// or 0-conf channels.
5999 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
6000 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
6001 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
6002 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<SP>) -> bool {
6003 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
6004 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6006 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6007 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
6008 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6009 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
6010 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
6011 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.total_channel_count() {
6012 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
6016 return peers_without_funded_channels;
6019 fn unfunded_channel_count(
6020 peer: &PeerState<SP>, best_block_height: u32
6022 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
6023 for (_, phase) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
6025 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
6026 // This covers non-zero-conf inbound `Channel`s that we are currently monitoring, but those
6027 // which have not yet had any confirmations on-chain.
6028 if !chan.context.is_outbound() && chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
6029 chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
6031 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6034 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
6035 if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 {
6036 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6039 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
6040 // Outbound channels don't contribute to the unfunded count in the DoS context.
6045 num_unfunded_channels + peer.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
6048 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6049 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
6050 // likely to be lost on restart!
6051 if msg.chain_hash != self.chain_hash {
6052 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6055 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
6056 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6059 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
6060 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
6061 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
6062 let channeled_peers_without_funding =
6063 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.total_channel_count() > 0);
6065 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6066 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6068 debug_assert!(false);
6069 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())
6071 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6072 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6074 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
6075 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
6076 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
6077 if peer_state.total_channel_count() == 0 &&
6078 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
6079 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
6081 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6082 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
6083 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6086 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6087 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
6088 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6089 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
6090 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6093 let channel_id = msg.temporary_channel_id;
6094 let channel_exists = peer_state.has_channel(&channel_id);
6096 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6099 // If we're doing manual acceptance checks on the channel, then defer creation until we're sure we want to accept.
6100 if self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
6101 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6102 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
6103 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
6104 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6105 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
6106 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
6107 channel_type: msg.channel_type.clone().unwrap(),
6109 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.insert(channel_id, InboundChannelRequest {
6110 open_channel_msg: msg.clone(),
6111 ticks_remaining: UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS,
6116 // Otherwise create the channel right now.
6117 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
6118 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
6119 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
6120 let mut channel = match InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
6121 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
6122 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, /*is_0conf=*/false)
6125 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
6130 let channel_type = channel.context.get_channel_type();
6131 if channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
6132 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6134 if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6135 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6138 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
6139 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
6141 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
6142 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6143 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
6145 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(channel_id, ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
6149 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6150 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
6151 // likely to be lost on restart!
6152 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
6153 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6154 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6156 debug_assert!(false);
6157 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
6159 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6160 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6161 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
6162 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut phase) => {
6163 match phase.get_mut() {
6164 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
6165 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), phase);
6166 (chan.context.get_value_satoshis(), chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.context.get_user_id())
6169 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected accept_channel message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id));
6173 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
6176 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6177 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
6178 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
6179 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6180 channel_value_satoshis: value,
6182 user_channel_id: user_id,
6187 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6188 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6190 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6191 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6193 debug_assert!(false);
6194 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
6197 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6198 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6199 let (chan, funding_msg_opt, monitor) =
6200 match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
6201 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan)) => {
6202 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &inbound_chan.context);
6203 match inbound_chan.funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &&logger) {
6205 Err((mut inbound_chan, err)) => {
6206 // We've already removed this inbound channel from the map in `PeerState`
6207 // above so at this point we just need to clean up any lingering entries
6208 // concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
6209 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &inbound_chan.context);
6210 let user_id = inbound_chan.context.get_user_id();
6211 let shutdown_res = inbound_chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
6212 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(format!("{}", err),
6213 msg.temporary_channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None, inbound_chan.context.get_value_satoshis()));
6217 Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(_)) | Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_)) => {
6218 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected funding_created message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id));
6220 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
6223 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
6224 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6225 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6226 "Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(),
6227 chan.context.channel_id()
6230 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6231 let mut id_to_peer_lock = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6232 match id_to_peer_lock.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
6233 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6234 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6235 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
6236 chan.context.channel_id()))
6238 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
6239 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
6240 if let Ok(persist_state) = monitor_res {
6241 i_e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
6242 mem::drop(id_to_peer_lock);
6244 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
6245 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
6246 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
6247 // until we have persisted our monitor.
6248 if let Some(msg) = funding_msg_opt {
6249 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
6250 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6255 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) {
6256 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_state, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
6257 per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
6259 unreachable!("This must be a funded channel as we just inserted it.");
6263 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6264 log_error!(logger, "Persisting initial ChannelMonitor failed, implying the funding outpoint was duplicated");
6265 let channel_id = match funding_msg_opt {
6266 Some(msg) => msg.channel_id,
6267 None => chan.context.channel_id(),
6269 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6270 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
6279 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6280 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6281 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6282 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6284 debug_assert!(false);
6285 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6288 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6289 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6290 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6291 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6292 match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6293 ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) => {
6294 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6295 let monitor = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6296 chan.funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
6297 if let Ok(persist_status) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
6298 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_status, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
6301 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel funding outpoint was a duplicate".to_owned())), chan_phase_entry)
6305 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
6309 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
6313 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6314 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6315 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6316 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6317 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6319 debug_assert!(false);
6320 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6322 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6323 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6324 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6325 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6326 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6327 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6328 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
6329 self.chain_hash, &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
6330 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
6331 log_trace!(logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
6332 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6333 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6334 msg: announcement_sigs,
6336 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
6337 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
6338 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
6339 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
6340 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
6341 // announcement_signatures.
6342 log_trace!(logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
6343 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
6344 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6345 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6352 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6353 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan);
6358 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6359 "Got a channel_ready message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry)
6362 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
6363 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6368 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6369 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
6370 let mut finish_shutdown = None;
6372 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6373 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6375 debug_assert!(false);
6376 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6378 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6379 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6380 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
6381 let phase = chan_phase_entry.get_mut();
6383 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
6384 if !chan.received_shutdown() {
6385 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6386 log_info!(logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
6388 if chan.sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
6391 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6392 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6393 chan.shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
6394 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
6396 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
6397 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
6398 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
6399 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
6400 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
6401 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6405 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
6406 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6407 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
6408 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6411 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
6412 let context = phase.context_mut();
6413 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, context);
6414 log_error!(logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
6415 self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel);
6416 let mut chan = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
6417 finish_shutdown = Some(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
6421 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6424 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
6425 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
6426 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
6427 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
6429 if let Some(shutdown_res) = finish_shutdown {
6430 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
6436 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6437 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6438 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6440 debug_assert!(false);
6441 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6443 let (tx, chan_option, shutdown_result) = {
6444 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6445 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6446 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
6447 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6448 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6449 let (closing_signed, tx, shutdown_result) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
6450 debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
6451 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
6452 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
6453 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6458 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
6459 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
6460 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
6461 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
6462 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
6463 (tx, Some(remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry)), shutdown_result)
6464 } else { (tx, None, shutdown_result) }
6466 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6467 "Got a closing_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6470 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6473 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
6474 let channel_id = chan_option.as_ref().map(|channel| channel.context().channel_id());
6475 log_info!(WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id), "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
6476 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&broadcast_tx]);
6478 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = chan_option {
6479 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6480 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6481 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6482 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6486 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
6488 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6489 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
6490 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
6495 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6496 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
6497 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
6498 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
6500 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
6501 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
6502 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
6503 //but we should prevent it anyway.
6505 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6506 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6508 let decoded_hop_res = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg, counterparty_node_id);
6509 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6510 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6512 debug_assert!(false);
6513 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6515 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6516 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6517 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6518 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6519 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6520 let pending_forward_info = match decoded_hop_res {
6521 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt)) =>
6522 self.construct_pending_htlc_status(
6523 msg, counterparty_node_id, shared_secret, next_hop,
6524 chan.context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_pk_opt,
6526 Err(e) => PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(e)
6528 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<SP>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
6529 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
6530 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
6531 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
6532 match pending_forward_info {
6533 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
6534 ref incoming_shared_secret, ref routing, ..
6536 let reason = if routing.blinded_failure().is_some() {
6537 HTLCFailReason::reason(INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, vec![0; 32])
6538 } else if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
6539 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
6540 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
6542 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
6543 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
6544 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6545 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
6546 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
6549 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
6551 _ => pending_forward_info
6554 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6555 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
6557 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6558 "Got an update_add_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6561 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6566 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6568 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
6569 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6570 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6572 debug_assert!(false);
6573 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6575 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6576 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6577 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6578 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6579 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6580 let res = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
6581 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop) = &res.0 {
6582 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6584 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
6586 peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates.entry(msg.channel_id)
6587 .or_insert_with(Vec::new)
6588 .push(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&prev_hop));
6590 // Note that we do not need to push an `actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates`
6591 // entry here, even though we *do* need to block the next RAA monitor update.
6592 // We do this instead in the `claim_funds_internal` by attaching a
6593 // `ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate` action to the event generated when the
6594 // outbound HTLC is claimed. This is guaranteed to all complete before we
6595 // process the RAA as messages are processed from single peers serially.
6596 funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().expect("We won't accept a fulfill until funded");
6599 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6600 "Got an update_fulfill_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6603 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6606 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, false, Some(*counterparty_node_id), funding_txo);
6610 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6611 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6612 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6613 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6614 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6616 debug_assert!(false);
6617 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6619 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6620 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6621 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6622 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6623 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6624 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan_phase_entry);
6626 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6627 "Got an update_fail_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6630 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6635 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6636 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6637 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6638 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6639 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6641 debug_assert!(false);
6642 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6644 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6645 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6646 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6647 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6648 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
6649 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
6650 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan_phase_entry);
6652 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6653 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan_phase_entry);
6655 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6656 "Got an update_fail_malformed_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6660 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6664 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6665 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6666 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6668 debug_assert!(false);
6669 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6671 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6672 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6673 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6674 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6675 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6676 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6677 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6678 let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.commitment_signed(&msg, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
6679 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6680 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
6681 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6685 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6686 "Got a commitment_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6689 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6694 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
6695 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
6696 let mut push_forward_event = false;
6697 let mut new_intercept_events = VecDeque::new();
6698 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
6699 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
6700 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
6701 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
6702 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6703 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
6704 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
6706 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
6707 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
6709 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6710 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
6711 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
6712 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
6713 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6714 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
6716 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6717 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
6718 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.chain_hash)
6720 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).to_byte_array());
6721 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6722 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
6723 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6724 new_intercept_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
6725 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
6726 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
6727 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
6728 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
6731 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6732 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
6734 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6735 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()));
6736 log_info!(logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
6737 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6738 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
6739 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
6740 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
6741 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
6742 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6743 phantom_shared_secret: None,
6744 blinded_failure: forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
6747 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
6748 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
6749 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
6754 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
6755 // payments are being processed.
6756 if forward_htlcs_empty {
6757 push_forward_event = true;
6759 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6760 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
6767 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
6768 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
6771 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
6772 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6773 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
6775 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
6779 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
6780 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6781 let is_processing_events = self.pending_events_processor.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6782 let num_forward_events = pending_events.iter().filter(|(ev, _)|
6783 if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false }
6785 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued. Processing
6786 // events is done in batches and they are not removed until we're done processing each
6787 // batch. Since handling a `PendingHTLCsForwardable` event will call back into the
6788 // `ChannelManager`, we'll still see the original forwarding event not removed. Phantom
6789 // payments will need an additional forwarding event before being claimed to make them look
6790 // real by taking more time.
6791 if (is_processing_events && num_forward_events <= 1) || num_forward_events < 1 {
6792 pending_events.push_back((Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
6793 time_forwardable: Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
6798 /// Checks whether [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s generated by the receipt of a remote
6799 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] should be held for the given channel until some other action
6800 /// completes. Note that this needs to happen in the same [`PeerState`] mutex as any release of
6801 /// the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in question.
6802 fn raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
6803 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: &BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
6804 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
6806 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
6807 .get(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).map(|v| !v.is_empty()).unwrap_or(false)
6808 || self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().iter().any(|(_, action)| {
6809 action == &Some(EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
6810 channel_funding_outpoint,
6811 counterparty_node_id,
6816 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6817 pub(crate) fn test_raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
6818 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_id: ChannelId
6820 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6821 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
6822 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6823 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
6825 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&channel_id) {
6826 return self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
6827 chan.context().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), counterparty_node_id);
6833 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6834 let htlcs_to_fail = {
6835 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6836 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6838 debug_assert!(false);
6839 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6840 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
6841 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6842 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6843 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6844 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6845 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6846 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6847 let mon_update_blocked = if let Some(funding_txo) = funding_txo_opt {
6848 self.raa_monitor_updates_held(
6849 &peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates, funding_txo,
6850 *counterparty_node_id)
6852 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6853 chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger, mon_update_blocked), chan_phase_entry);
6854 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6855 let funding_txo = funding_txo_opt
6856 .expect("Funding outpoint must have been set for RAA handling to succeed");
6857 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update,
6858 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6862 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6863 "Got a revoke_and_ack message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6866 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6869 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
6873 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6874 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6875 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6877 debug_assert!(false);
6878 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6880 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6881 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6882 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6883 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6884 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6885 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6886 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
6888 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6889 "Got an update_fee message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6892 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6897 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6898 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6899 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6901 debug_assert!(false);
6902 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6904 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6905 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6906 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6907 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6908 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6909 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
6910 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
6913 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
6914 msg: try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.announcement_signatures(
6915 &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
6916 msg, &self.default_configuration
6917 ), chan_phase_entry),
6918 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
6919 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
6920 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan).unwrap()),
6923 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6924 "Got an announcement_signatures message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6927 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6932 /// Returns DoPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersistNoEvents or an Err.
6933 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6934 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
6935 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
6937 // It's not a local channel
6938 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
6941 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6942 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
6943 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
6944 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
6946 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6947 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6948 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
6949 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6950 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6951 if chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6952 if chan.context.should_announce() {
6953 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
6954 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
6955 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
6956 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
6958 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
6960 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
6961 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
6962 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
6963 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
6965 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6966 log_debug!(logger, "Received channel_update {:?} for channel {}.", msg, chan_id);
6967 let did_change = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_update(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
6968 // If nothing changed after applying their update, we don't need to bother
6971 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
6975 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6976 "Got a channel_update for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6979 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
6981 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
6984 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6986 let need_lnd_workaround = {
6987 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6989 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6991 debug_assert!(false);
6992 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6993 format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id),
6997 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id));
6998 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6999 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7000 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7001 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7002 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7003 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
7004 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
7005 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
7006 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
7007 let responses = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_reestablish(
7008 msg, &&logger, &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash,
7009 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan_phase_entry);
7010 let mut channel_update = None;
7011 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
7012 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
7013 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7016 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
7017 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
7018 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
7019 // they have the latest channel parameters.
7020 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
7021 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
7022 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7027 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
7028 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
7029 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
7030 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
7031 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
7032 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
7036 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7037 "Got a channel_reestablish message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7040 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
7041 log_debug!(logger, "Sending bogus ChannelReestablish for unknown channel {} to force channel closure",
7042 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id.0));
7043 // Unfortunately, lnd doesn't force close on errors
7044 // (https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/blob/abb1e3463f3a83bbb843d5c399869dbe930ad94f/htlcswitch/link.go#L2119).
7045 // One of the few ways to get an lnd counterparty to force close is by
7046 // replicating what they do when restoring static channel backups (SCBs). They
7047 // send an invalid `ChannelReestablish` with `0` commitment numbers and an
7048 // invalid `your_last_per_commitment_secret`.
7050 // Since we received a `ChannelReestablish` for a channel that doesn't exist, we
7051 // can assume it's likely the channel closed from our point of view, but it
7052 // remains open on the counterparty's side. By sending this bogus
7053 // `ChannelReestablish` message now as a response to theirs, we trigger them to
7054 // force close broadcasting their latest state. If the closing transaction from
7055 // our point of view remains unconfirmed, it'll enter a race with the
7056 // counterparty's to-be-broadcast latest commitment transaction.
7057 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
7058 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7059 msg: msgs::ChannelReestablish {
7060 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
7061 next_local_commitment_number: 0,
7062 next_remote_commitment_number: 0,
7063 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [1u8; 32],
7064 my_current_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_slice(&[2u8; 33]).unwrap(),
7065 next_funding_txid: None,
7068 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7069 format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}",
7070 counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7076 let mut persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
7077 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
7078 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
7079 persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7082 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
7083 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
7088 /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
7089 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
7090 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
7092 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
7093 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
7094 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
7095 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
7096 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
7097 match monitor_event {
7098 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
7099 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, counterparty_node_id, Some(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()));
7100 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
7101 log_trace!(logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", preimage);
7102 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, false, counterparty_node_id, funding_outpoint);
7104 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", &htlc_update.payment_hash);
7105 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
7106 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
7107 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
7110 MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(funding_outpoint) => {
7111 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
7112 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
7114 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
7115 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
7116 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7117 id_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).cloned()
7120 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
7121 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7122 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7123 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7124 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7125 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7126 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
7127 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
7128 failed_channels.push(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
7129 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7130 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7134 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
7135 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
7136 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7137 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
7138 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.context.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() })
7146 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
7147 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
7153 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7154 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
7157 has_pending_monitor_events
7160 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
7161 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
7162 /// update events as a separate process method here.
7164 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
7165 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7166 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
7169 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
7170 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
7171 /// update was applied.
7172 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
7173 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
7174 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
7176 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
7177 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
7178 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
7179 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
7181 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7182 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7184 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7185 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7186 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
7187 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
7189 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
7190 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
7191 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
7192 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.fee_estimator, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context));
7193 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
7194 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
7196 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
7197 has_monitor_update = true;
7199 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update,
7200 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7201 continue 'peer_loop;
7210 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty();
7211 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7212 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
7218 /// When a call to a [`ChannelSigner`] method returns an error, this indicates that the signer
7219 /// is (temporarily) unavailable, and the operation should be retried later.
7221 /// This method allows for that retry - either checking for any signer-pending messages to be
7222 /// attempted in every channel, or in the specifically provided channel.
7224 /// [`ChannelSigner`]: crate::sign::ChannelSigner
7225 #[cfg(test)] // This is only implemented for one signer method, and should be private until we
7226 // actually finish implementing it fully.
7227 pub fn signer_unblocked(&self, channel_opt: Option<(PublicKey, ChannelId)>) {
7228 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7230 let unblock_chan = |phase: &mut ChannelPhase<SP>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>| {
7231 let node_id = phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id();
7232 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
7233 let msgs = chan.signer_maybe_unblocked(&self.logger);
7234 if let Some(updates) = msgs.commitment_update {
7235 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
7240 if let Some(msg) = msgs.funding_signed {
7241 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
7246 if let Some(msg) = msgs.funding_created {
7247 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
7252 if let Some(msg) = msgs.channel_ready {
7253 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, chan, msg);
7258 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7259 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, channel_id)) = channel_opt {
7260 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7261 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7262 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7263 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
7264 unblock_chan(chan, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
7268 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7269 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7270 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7271 for (_, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
7272 unblock_chan(chan, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
7278 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
7279 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
7280 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
7281 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
7282 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
7283 let mut has_update = false;
7284 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
7286 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7288 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7289 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7290 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7291 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7292 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, phase| {
7294 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
7295 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7296 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &&logger) {
7297 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt, shutdown_result_opt)) => {
7298 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
7300 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
7301 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
7304 debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result_opt.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
7305 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result_opt {
7306 shutdown_results.push(shutdown_result);
7308 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
7309 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
7310 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
7311 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7312 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7317 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
7319 log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
7320 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
7321 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
7327 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
7328 handle_errors.push((chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
7333 _ => true, // Retain unfunded channels if present.
7339 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
7340 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
7343 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
7344 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
7350 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
7351 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
7353 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
7354 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7355 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
7356 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
7357 // reorganized out of the main chain.
7358 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
7359 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
7360 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
7361 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
7362 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = failure.monitor_update.take() {
7363 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
7364 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
7365 assert!(should_broadcast);
7366 } else { unreachable!(); }
7367 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
7368 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
7369 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
7372 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
7376 /// Creates an [`OfferBuilder`] such that the [`Offer`] it builds is recognized by the
7377 /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`InvoiceRequest`] messages for the offer. The offer will
7378 /// not have an expiration unless otherwise set on the builder.
7382 /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the offer with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the
7383 /// introduction node and a derived signing pubkey for recipient privacy. As such, currently,
7384 /// the node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction
7385 /// node in order to send the [`InvoiceRequest`].
7389 /// Requires a direct connection to the introduction node in the responding [`InvoiceRequest`]'s
7392 /// This is not exported to bindings users as builder patterns don't map outside of move semantics.
7394 /// [`Offer`]: crate::offers::offer::Offer
7395 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
7396 pub fn create_offer_builder(
7397 &self, description: String
7398 ) -> OfferBuilder<DerivedMetadata, secp256k1::All> {
7399 let node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
7400 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7401 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7402 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7403 let path = self.create_one_hop_blinded_path();
7405 OfferBuilder::deriving_signing_pubkey(description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx)
7406 .chain_hash(self.chain_hash)
7410 /// Creates a [`RefundBuilder`] such that the [`Refund`] it builds is recognized by the
7411 /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`Bolt12Invoice`] messages for the refund.
7415 /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the refund.
7416 /// See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has been sent.
7418 /// The builder will have the provided expiration set. Any changes to the expiration on the
7419 /// returned builder will not be honored by [`ChannelManager`]. For `no-std`, the highest seen
7420 /// block time minus two hours is used for the current time when determining if the refund has
7423 /// To revoke the refund, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
7424 /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received before expiration, the payment will fail
7425 /// with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
7427 /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
7428 /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
7432 /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the refund with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as
7433 /// the introduction node and a derived payer id for payer privacy. As such, currently, the
7434 /// node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction node
7435 /// in order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
7439 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in the responding
7440 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
7444 /// Errors if a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link
7445 /// or if `amount_msats` is invalid.
7447 /// This is not exported to bindings users as builder patterns don't map outside of move semantics.
7449 /// [`Refund`]: crate::offers::refund::Refund
7450 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7451 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
7452 pub fn create_refund_builder(
7453 &self, description: String, amount_msats: u64, absolute_expiry: Duration,
7454 payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry, max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
7455 ) -> Result<RefundBuilder<secp256k1::All>, Bolt12SemanticError> {
7456 let node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
7457 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7458 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7459 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7460 let path = self.create_one_hop_blinded_path();
7462 let builder = RefundBuilder::deriving_payer_id(
7463 description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, amount_msats, payment_id
7465 .chain_hash(self.chain_hash)
7466 .absolute_expiry(absolute_expiry)
7469 let expiration = StaleExpiration::AbsoluteTimeout(absolute_expiry);
7470 self.pending_outbound_payments
7471 .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
7472 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat,
7474 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
7479 /// Pays for an [`Offer`] using the given parameters by creating an [`InvoiceRequest`] and
7480 /// enqueuing it to be sent via an onion message. [`ChannelManager`] will pay the actual
7481 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`] once it is received.
7483 /// Uses [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`] such that the [`InvoiceRequest`] it builds is recognized by
7484 /// the [`ChannelManager`] when handling a [`Bolt12Invoice`] message in response to the request.
7485 /// The optional parameters are used in the builder, if `Some`:
7486 /// - `quantity` for [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`] which must be set if
7487 /// [`Offer::expects_quantity`] is `true`.
7488 /// - `amount_msats` if overpaying what is required for the given `quantity` is desired, and
7489 /// - `payer_note` for [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`].
7491 /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
7492 /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
7496 /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the request
7497 /// when received. See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has
7500 /// To revoke the request, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
7501 /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received in a reasonable amount of time, the
7502 /// payment will fail with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
7506 /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the reply path with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`]
7507 /// as the introduction node and a derived payer id for payer privacy. As such, currently, the
7508 /// node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction node
7509 /// in order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
7513 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Offer::paths`] or to
7514 /// [`Offer::signing_pubkey`], if empty. A similar restriction applies to the responding
7515 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
7519 /// Errors if a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link
7520 /// or if the provided parameters are invalid for the offer.
7522 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
7523 /// [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::quantity
7524 /// [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::payer_note
7525 /// [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequestBuilder
7526 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7527 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
7528 /// [Avoiding Duplicate Payments]: #avoiding-duplicate-payments
7529 pub fn pay_for_offer(
7530 &self, offer: &Offer, quantity: Option<u64>, amount_msats: Option<u64>,
7531 payer_note: Option<String>, payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry,
7532 max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
7533 ) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
7534 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7535 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7536 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7539 .request_invoice_deriving_payer_id(expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, payment_id)?
7540 .chain_hash(self.chain_hash)?;
7541 let builder = match quantity {
7543 Some(quantity) => builder.quantity(quantity)?,
7545 let builder = match amount_msats {
7547 Some(amount_msats) => builder.amount_msats(amount_msats)?,
7549 let builder = match payer_note {
7551 Some(payer_note) => builder.payer_note(payer_note),
7554 let invoice_request = builder.build_and_sign()?;
7555 let reply_path = self.create_one_hop_blinded_path();
7557 let expiration = StaleExpiration::TimerTicks(1);
7558 self.pending_outbound_payments
7559 .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
7560 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat
7562 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
7564 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
7565 if offer.paths().is_empty() {
7566 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7567 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request),
7568 Destination::Node(offer.signing_pubkey()),
7571 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7573 // Send as many invoice requests as there are paths in the offer (with an upper bound).
7574 // Using only one path could result in a failure if the path no longer exists. But only
7575 // one invoice for a given payment id will be paid, even if more than one is received.
7576 const REQUEST_LIMIT: usize = 10;
7577 for path in offer.paths().into_iter().take(REQUEST_LIMIT) {
7578 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7579 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request.clone()),
7580 Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
7581 Some(reply_path.clone()),
7583 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7590 /// Creates a [`Bolt12Invoice`] for a [`Refund`] and enqueues it to be sent via an onion
7593 /// The resulting invoice uses a [`PaymentHash`] recognized by the [`ChannelManager`] and a
7594 /// [`BlindedPath`] containing the [`PaymentSecret`] needed to reconstruct the corresponding
7595 /// [`PaymentPreimage`].
7599 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Refund::paths`] or to
7600 /// [`Refund::payer_id`], if empty. This request is best effort; an invoice will be sent to each
7601 /// node meeting the aforementioned criteria, but there's no guarantee that they will be
7602 /// received and no retries will be made.
7604 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7605 pub fn request_refund_payment(&self, refund: &Refund) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
7606 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7607 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7608 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7610 let amount_msats = refund.amount_msats();
7611 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
7613 match self.create_inbound_payment(Some(amount_msats), relative_expiry, None) {
7614 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => {
7615 let payment_paths = vec![
7616 self.create_one_hop_blinded_payment_path(payment_secret),
7618 #[cfg(not(feature = "no-std"))]
7619 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys(
7620 payment_paths, payment_hash, expanded_key, entropy
7622 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
7623 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
7624 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
7626 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
7627 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
7628 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at, expanded_key, entropy
7630 let invoice = builder.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)?;
7631 let reply_path = self.create_one_hop_blinded_path();
7633 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
7634 if refund.paths().is_empty() {
7635 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7636 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice),
7637 Destination::Node(refund.payer_id()),
7640 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7642 for path in refund.paths() {
7643 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7644 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice.clone()),
7645 Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
7646 Some(reply_path.clone()),
7648 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7654 Err(()) => Err(Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount),
7658 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
7661 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
7662 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
7664 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
7665 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
7666 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
7667 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
7669 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
7671 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
7672 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
7676 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
7677 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
7679 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
7681 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
7682 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
7684 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
7685 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
7686 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
7687 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
7688 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
7689 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
7690 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
7691 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
7692 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
7693 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
7694 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
7697 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
7698 /// stored external to LDK.
7700 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
7701 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
7702 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
7704 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
7705 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
7708 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
7709 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
7710 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
7711 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
7713 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
7714 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
7715 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
7716 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
7717 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
7719 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
7720 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
7721 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
7722 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
7723 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
7725 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
7726 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
7728 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
7729 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
7733 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
7734 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
7736 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
7738 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
7739 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
7741 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
7742 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
7743 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
7744 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
7745 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
7746 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
7747 min_final_cltv_expiry)
7750 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
7751 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
7753 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
7754 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
7755 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
7758 /// Creates a one-hop blinded path with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction
7760 fn create_one_hop_blinded_path(&self) -> BlindedPath {
7761 let entropy_source = self.entropy_source.deref();
7762 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7763 BlindedPath::one_hop_for_message(self.get_our_node_id(), entropy_source, secp_ctx).unwrap()
7766 /// Creates a one-hop blinded path with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction
7768 fn create_one_hop_blinded_payment_path(
7769 &self, payment_secret: PaymentSecret
7770 ) -> (BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath) {
7771 let entropy_source = self.entropy_source.deref();
7772 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7774 let payee_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
7775 let max_cltv_expiry = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
7776 let payee_tlvs = ReceiveTlvs {
7778 payment_constraints: PaymentConstraints {
7780 htlc_minimum_msat: 1,
7783 // TODO: Err for overflow?
7784 BlindedPath::one_hop_for_payment(
7785 payee_node_id, payee_tlvs, entropy_source, secp_ctx
7789 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
7790 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
7792 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
7793 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
7794 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7795 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
7797 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
7798 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
7799 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
7800 Some(_) => continue,
7801 None => return scid_candidate
7806 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
7808 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
7809 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
7811 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
7812 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
7813 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
7817 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
7818 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
7819 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
7821 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
7822 /// times to get a unique scid.
7823 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
7824 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7825 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
7827 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
7828 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
7829 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
7830 return scid_candidate
7834 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
7835 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
7836 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
7837 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
7839 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7840 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7841 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7842 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7843 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(
7844 |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
7846 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
7847 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
7848 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
7857 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
7858 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
7859 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
7860 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
7861 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
7865 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
7866 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
7867 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7868 events.push_back((event, None));
7872 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
7873 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7874 events.pop_front().map(|(e, _)| e)
7878 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
7879 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
7883 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
7884 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
7887 /// When something which was blocking a channel from updating its [`ChannelMonitor`] (e.g. an
7888 /// [`Event`] being handled) completes, this should be called to restore the channel to normal
7889 /// operation. It will double-check that nothing *else* is also blocking the same channel from
7890 /// making progress and then let any blocked [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s fly.
7891 fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, mut completed_blocker: Option<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>) {
7892 let logger = WithContext::from(
7893 &self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
7896 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7897 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7898 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
7899 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
7900 if let Some(blocker) = completed_blocker.take() {
7901 // Only do this on the first iteration of the loop.
7902 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
7903 .get_mut(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
7905 blockers.retain(|iter| iter != &blocker);
7909 if self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
7910 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id) {
7911 // Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have anything else
7912 // blocking monitor updates for this channel. If we do, release the monitor
7913 // update(s) when those blockers complete.
7914 log_trace!(logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another channel's mon update needs to complete first",
7915 &channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
7919 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
7920 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7921 debug_assert_eq!(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
7922 if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
7923 log_debug!(logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
7924 channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
7925 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update,
7926 peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7927 if further_update_exists {
7928 // If there are more `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to process, restart at the
7933 log_trace!(logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
7934 channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
7940 "Got a release post-RAA monitor update for peer {} but the channel is gone",
7941 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
7947 fn handle_post_event_actions(&self, actions: Vec<EventCompletionAction>) {
7948 for action in actions {
7950 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
7951 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id
7953 self.handle_monitor_update_release(counterparty_node_id, channel_funding_outpoint, None);
7959 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
7960 /// using the given event handler.
7962 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
7963 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
7967 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
7971 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7973 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
7974 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7975 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7976 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7977 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7978 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7982 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
7983 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
7984 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
7985 /// is always placed next to each other.
7987 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
7988 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
7989 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
7990 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
7992 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
7993 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
7994 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
7995 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
7996 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
7997 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
7998 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
8000 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
8001 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
8002 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
8003 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8006 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
8007 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8009 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
8010 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8013 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
8014 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8015 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8016 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8017 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8018 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
8019 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
8023 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
8024 events.replace(pending_events);
8033 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8035 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8036 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8037 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8038 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8039 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8040 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8044 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
8046 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
8047 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
8048 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
8050 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
8054 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8056 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8057 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8058 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8059 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8060 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8061 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8065 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
8067 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
8068 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
8069 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
8070 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
8071 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
8074 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
8075 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
8078 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
8079 let _persistence_guard =
8080 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8081 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8082 let new_height = height - 1;
8084 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
8085 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
8086 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
8087 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
8088 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
8089 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
8092 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
8096 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8098 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8099 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8100 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8101 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8102 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8103 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8107 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
8108 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8109 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8110 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8112 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
8113 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
8115 let _persistence_guard =
8116 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8117 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8118 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context))
8119 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
8121 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
8122 if height < last_best_block_height {
8123 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
8124 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
8128 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
8129 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8130 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8131 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8133 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
8134 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
8136 let _persistence_guard =
8137 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8138 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8139 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
8141 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
8143 macro_rules! max_time {
8144 ($timestamp: expr) => {
8146 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
8147 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
8148 // having an explicit local time source.
8149 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
8150 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
8151 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
8152 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
8153 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
8159 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
8160 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
8161 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
8162 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
8166 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, u32, Option<BlockHash>)> {
8167 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
8168 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
8169 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8170 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8171 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(|phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }) {
8172 let txid_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
8173 let height_opt = chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmation_height();
8174 let hash_opt = chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in();
8175 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(conf_height), Some(block_hash)) = (txid_opt, height_opt, hash_opt) {
8176 res.push((funding_txo.txid, conf_height, Some(block_hash)));
8183 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
8184 let _persistence_guard =
8185 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8186 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8187 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
8188 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
8189 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
8190 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
8191 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
8192 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
8197 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8199 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8200 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8201 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8202 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8203 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8204 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8208 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
8209 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
8211 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<SP>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
8212 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
8213 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8214 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8215 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8217 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
8218 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
8220 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8221 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8222 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8223 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8224 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8225 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
8227 // Retain unfunded channels.
8228 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => true,
8229 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
8230 let res = f(channel);
8231 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
8232 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
8233 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
8234 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
8235 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.context.channel_id() }));
8237 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
8238 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
8239 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
8240 if channel.context.is_usable() {
8241 log_trace!(logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8242 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
8243 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
8244 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8249 log_trace!(logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8254 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8255 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
8258 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
8259 log_trace!(logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8260 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
8261 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8262 msg: announcement_sigs,
8264 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
8265 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
8266 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
8268 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
8269 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
8270 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
8275 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
8276 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
8277 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
8278 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
8279 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
8280 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
8281 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
8282 // is always consistent.
8283 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
8284 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
8285 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()),
8286 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
8287 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
8290 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
8291 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &channel.context);
8292 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
8293 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
8294 failed_channels.push(channel.context.force_shutdown(true));
8295 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
8296 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
8300 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
8301 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel.context, reason);
8302 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
8303 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8304 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
8305 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage {
8306 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
8307 data: reason_message,
8320 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
8321 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
8322 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
8323 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
8324 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
8325 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
8326 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
8327 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
8328 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
8329 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
8331 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
8332 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
8333 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
8337 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
8340 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
8341 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
8342 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
8343 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
8344 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
8345 user_channel_id: Some(htlc.prev_user_channel_id),
8346 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
8347 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
8348 phantom_shared_secret: None,
8349 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
8350 blinded_failure: htlc.forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
8353 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
8354 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
8355 _ => unreachable!(),
8357 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
8358 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
8359 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
8360 let logger = WithContext::from(
8361 &self.logger, None, Some(htlc.prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
8363 log_trace!(logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
8369 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
8371 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
8372 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
8376 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] may need to be persisted or
8377 /// may have events that need processing.
8379 /// In order to check if this [`ChannelManager`] needs persisting, call
8380 /// [`Self::get_and_clear_needs_persistence`].
8382 /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
8383 /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
8384 pub fn get_event_or_persistence_needed_future(&self) -> Future {
8385 self.event_persist_notifier.get_future()
8388 /// Returns true if this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
8389 pub fn get_and_clear_needs_persistence(&self) -> bool {
8390 self.needs_persist_flag.swap(false, Ordering::AcqRel)
8393 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
8394 pub fn get_event_or_persist_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
8395 self.event_persist_notifier.notify_pending()
8398 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
8399 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
8400 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
8401 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
8404 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8405 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8406 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
8407 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
8410 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8411 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8413 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
8414 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
8415 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
8416 pub fn bolt11_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
8417 provided_bolt11_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
8420 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8421 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8422 fn bolt12_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
8423 provided_bolt12_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
8426 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8427 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8428 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
8429 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
8432 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8433 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8434 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
8435 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
8438 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8439 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8440 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
8441 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
8445 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8446 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8448 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8449 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8450 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8451 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8452 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8453 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8457 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
8458 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8459 // open_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
8460 // change to the contents.
8461 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8462 let res = self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8463 let persist = match &res {
8464 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => {
8465 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't close a new channel");
8466 NotifyOption::DoPersist
8468 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8470 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8475 fn handle_open_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2) {
8476 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8477 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8478 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8481 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
8482 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8483 // accept_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
8484 // change to the contents.
8485 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8486 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8487 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents
8491 fn handle_accept_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannelV2) {
8492 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8493 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8494 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8497 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
8498 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8499 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8502 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
8503 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8504 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8507 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
8508 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8509 // channel_ready message - while the channel's state will change, any channel_ready message
8510 // will ultimately be re-sent on startup and the `ChannelMonitor` won't be updated so we
8511 // will not force-close the channel on startup.
8512 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8513 let res = self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8514 let persist = match &res {
8515 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8516 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8518 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8523 fn handle_stfu(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Stfu) {
8524 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8525 "Quiescence not supported".to_owned(),
8526 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8529 fn handle_splice(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Splice) {
8530 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8531 "Splicing not supported".to_owned(),
8532 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8535 fn handle_splice_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::SpliceAck) {
8536 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8537 "Splicing not supported (splice_ack)".to_owned(),
8538 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8541 fn handle_splice_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::SpliceLocked) {
8542 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8543 "Splicing not supported (splice_locked)".to_owned(),
8544 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8547 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
8548 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8549 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8552 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
8553 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8554 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8557 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
8558 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8559 // update_add_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8560 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8561 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8562 let res = self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8563 let persist = match &res {
8564 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8565 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8566 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8568 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8573 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
8574 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8575 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8578 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
8579 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8580 // update_fail_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8581 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8582 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8583 let res = self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8584 let persist = match &res {
8585 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8586 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8587 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8589 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8594 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
8595 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8596 // update_fail_malformed_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state
8597 // only the `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8598 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8599 let res = self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8600 let persist = match &res {
8601 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8602 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8603 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8605 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8610 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
8611 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8612 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8615 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
8616 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8617 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8620 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
8621 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8622 // update_fee message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8623 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8624 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8625 let res = self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8626 let persist = match &res {
8627 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8628 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8629 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8631 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8636 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
8637 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8638 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8641 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
8642 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8643 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
8646 NotifyOption::DoPersist
8651 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
8652 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8653 let res = self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8654 let persist = match &res {
8655 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8656 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8657 Ok(persist) => *persist,
8659 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8664 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
8665 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(
8666 self, || NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents);
8667 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
8668 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
8671 WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), None),
8672 "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
8673 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id)
8675 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
8676 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8677 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8678 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8679 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
8680 let context = match phase {
8681 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
8682 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
8683 if chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok() {
8684 // We only retain funded channels that are not shutdown.
8689 // Unfunded channels will always be removed.
8690 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
8693 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
8697 // Clean up for removal.
8698 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
8699 self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
8700 failed_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false));
8703 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
8704 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
8705 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
8706 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
8708 // V1 Channel Establishment
8709 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
8710 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
8711 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
8712 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
8713 // V2 Channel Establishment
8714 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannelV2 { .. } => false,
8715 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 { .. } => false,
8716 // Common Channel Establishment
8717 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
8718 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
8720 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendStfu { .. } => false,
8722 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSplice { .. } => false,
8723 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSpliceAck { .. } => false,
8724 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSpliceLocked { .. } => false,
8725 // Interactive Transaction Construction
8726 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddInput { .. } => false,
8727 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddOutput { .. } => false,
8728 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveInput { .. } => false,
8729 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveOutput { .. } => false,
8730 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxComplete { .. } => false,
8731 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxSignatures { .. } => false,
8732 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxInitRbf { .. } => false,
8733 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAckRbf { .. } => false,
8734 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAbort { .. } => false,
8735 // Channel Operations
8736 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
8737 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
8738 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
8739 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
8740 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
8741 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
8743 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
8744 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
8745 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
8746 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
8747 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
8748 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
8749 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
8750 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
8751 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
8754 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
8755 peer_state.is_connected = false;
8756 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
8757 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
8760 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
8762 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
8764 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
8765 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
8769 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
8770 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), None);
8771 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
8772 log_debug!(logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8776 let mut res = Ok(());
8778 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8779 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
8780 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
8781 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
8782 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
8783 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
8784 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
8787 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
8788 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
8789 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
8790 if inbound_peer_limited {
8792 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
8794 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
8795 channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8796 inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8797 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
8798 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
8799 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8800 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
8801 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8805 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
8806 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
8807 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
8809 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
8810 if inbound_peer_limited &&
8811 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
8812 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
8815 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
8818 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
8819 peer_state.is_connected = true;
8824 log_debug!(logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8826 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8827 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
8828 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8829 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8830 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8832 peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(|(_, phase)|
8833 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else {
8834 // Since unfunded channel maps are cleared upon disconnecting a peer, and they're not persisted
8835 // (so won't be recovered after a crash), they shouldn't exist here and we would never need to
8836 // worry about closing and removing them.
8837 debug_assert!(false);
8841 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
8842 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
8843 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8844 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger),
8849 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
8850 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
8855 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
8856 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8858 match &msg.data as &str {
8859 "cannot co-op close channel w/ active htlcs"|
8860 "link failed to shutdown" =>
8862 // LND hasn't properly handled shutdown messages ever, and force-closes any time we
8863 // send one while HTLCs are still present. The issue is tracked at
8864 // https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/6039 and has had multiple patches
8865 // to fix it but none so far have managed to land upstream. The issue appears to be
8866 // very low priority for the LND team despite being marked "P1".
8867 // We're not going to bother handling this in a sensible way, instead simply
8868 // repeating the Shutdown message on repeat until morale improves.
8869 if !msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
8870 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8871 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
8872 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
8873 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
8874 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&msg.channel_id) {
8875 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_outbound_shutdown() {
8876 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
8877 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
8881 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
8882 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
8883 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
8884 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
8885 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
8886 data: "You appear to be exhibiting LND bug 6039, we'll keep sending you shutdown messages until you handle them correctly".to_owned()
8888 log_level: Level::Trace,
8898 if msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
8899 let channel_ids: Vec<ChannelId> = {
8900 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8901 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
8902 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
8903 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
8904 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8905 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
8906 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
8907 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
8908 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
8910 for channel_id in channel_ids {
8911 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
8912 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
8916 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
8917 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8918 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
8919 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
8920 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
8921 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8922 if let Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
8923 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.chain_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
8924 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
8925 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
8933 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
8934 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
8938 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
8939 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
8942 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
8943 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
8946 fn get_chain_hashes(&self) -> Option<Vec<ChainHash>> {
8947 Some(vec![self.chain_hash])
8950 fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddInput) {
8951 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8952 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8953 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8956 fn handle_tx_add_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddOutput) {
8957 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8958 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8959 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8962 fn handle_tx_remove_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveInput) {
8963 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8964 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8965 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8968 fn handle_tx_remove_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveOutput) {
8969 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8970 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8971 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8974 fn handle_tx_complete(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxComplete) {
8975 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8976 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8977 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8980 fn handle_tx_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxSignatures) {
8981 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8982 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8983 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8986 fn handle_tx_init_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxInitRbf) {
8987 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8988 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8989 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8992 fn handle_tx_ack_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAckRbf) {
8993 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8994 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8995 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8998 fn handle_tx_abort(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAbort) {
8999 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9000 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9001 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9005 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9006 OffersMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9008 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9009 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9010 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9011 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9012 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9013 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9017 fn handle_message(&self, message: OffersMessage) -> Option<OffersMessage> {
9018 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
9019 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
9022 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request) => {
9023 let amount_msats = match InvoiceBuilder::<DerivedSigningPubkey>::amount_msats(
9026 Ok(amount_msats) => Some(amount_msats),
9027 Err(error) => return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
9029 let invoice_request = match invoice_request.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
9030 Ok(invoice_request) => invoice_request,
9032 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidMetadata;
9033 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
9036 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
9038 match self.create_inbound_payment(amount_msats, relative_expiry, None) {
9039 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) if invoice_request.keys.is_some() => {
9040 let payment_paths = vec![
9041 self.create_one_hop_blinded_payment_path(payment_secret),
9043 #[cfg(not(feature = "no-std"))]
9044 let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys(
9045 payment_paths, payment_hash
9047 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
9048 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
9049 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
9051 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
9052 let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
9053 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
9055 match builder.and_then(|b| b.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)) {
9056 Ok(invoice) => Some(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
9057 Err(error) => Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
9060 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => {
9061 let payment_paths = vec![
9062 self.create_one_hop_blinded_payment_path(payment_secret),
9064 #[cfg(not(feature = "no-std"))]
9065 let builder = invoice_request.respond_with(payment_paths, payment_hash);
9066 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
9067 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
9068 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
9070 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
9071 let builder = invoice_request.respond_with_no_std(
9072 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
9074 let response = builder.and_then(|builder| builder.allow_mpp().build())
9075 .map_err(|e| OffersMessage::InvoiceError(e.into()))
9077 match invoice.sign(|invoice| self.node_signer.sign_bolt12_invoice(invoice)) {
9078 Ok(invoice) => Ok(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
9079 Err(SignError::Signing(())) => Err(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(
9080 InvoiceError::from_string("Failed signing invoice".to_string())
9082 Err(SignError::Verification(_)) => Err(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(
9083 InvoiceError::from_string("Failed invoice signature verification".to_string())
9087 Ok(invoice) => Some(invoice),
9088 Err(error) => Some(error),
9092 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount.into()))
9096 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice) => {
9097 match invoice.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
9099 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(InvoiceError::from_string("Unrecognized invoice".to_owned())))
9101 Ok(_) if invoice.invoice_features().requires_unknown_bits_from(&self.bolt12_invoice_features()) => {
9102 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(Bolt12SemanticError::UnknownRequiredFeatures.into()))
9105 if let Err(e) = self.send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&invoice, payment_id) {
9106 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed paying invoice: {:?}", e);
9107 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(InvoiceError::from_string(format!("{:?}", e))))
9114 OffersMessage::InvoiceError(invoice_error) => {
9115 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received invoice_error: {}", invoice_error);
9121 fn release_pending_messages(&self) -> Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>> {
9122 core::mem::take(&mut self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap())
9126 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9127 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9128 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
9129 let mut node_features = provided_init_features(config).to_context();
9130 node_features.set_keysend_optional();
9134 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9135 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9137 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
9138 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
9139 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
9140 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt11_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
9141 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9144 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9145 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9146 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt12_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
9147 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9150 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9151 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9152 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
9153 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9156 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9157 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9158 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
9159 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
9162 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9163 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9164 pub fn provided_init_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
9165 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
9166 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
9167 // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
9168 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
9169 features.set_data_loss_protect_required();
9170 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
9171 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
9172 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
9173 features.set_payment_secret_required();
9174 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
9175 features.set_wumbo_optional();
9176 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
9177 features.set_channel_type_optional();
9178 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
9179 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
9180 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
9181 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
9186 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
9187 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
9189 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
9190 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
9191 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
9192 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
9195 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
9196 (2, node_id, required),
9197 (4, features, required),
9198 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
9199 (8, forwarding_info, option),
9200 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9201 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9204 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
9205 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9206 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
9207 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
9208 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
9209 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
9210 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9211 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
9212 (2, self.channel_id, required),
9213 (3, self.channel_type, option),
9214 (4, self.counterparty, required),
9215 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
9216 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
9217 (7, self.config, option),
9218 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
9219 (9, self.confirmations, option),
9220 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
9221 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
9222 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
9223 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
9224 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
9225 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required),
9226 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
9227 (21, self.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, required),
9228 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
9229 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
9230 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
9231 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
9232 (30, self.is_usable, required),
9233 (32, self.is_public, required),
9234 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9235 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9236 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
9237 (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
9238 (41, self.channel_shutdown_state, option),
9244 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
9245 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9246 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9247 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
9248 (2, channel_id, required),
9249 (3, channel_type, option),
9250 (4, counterparty, required),
9251 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
9252 (6, funding_txo, option),
9253 (7, config, option),
9254 (8, short_channel_id, option),
9255 (9, confirmations, option),
9256 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
9257 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
9258 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
9259 (16, balance_msat, required),
9260 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
9261 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
9262 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
9263 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
9264 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
9265 (21, next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, (default_value, 0)),
9266 (22, confirmations_required, option),
9267 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
9268 (26, is_outbound, required),
9269 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
9270 (30, is_usable, required),
9271 (32, is_public, required),
9272 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9273 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9274 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
9275 (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
9276 (41, channel_shutdown_state, option),
9279 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
9280 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
9281 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
9282 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
9283 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
9287 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
9289 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
9290 outbound_scid_alias,
9294 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
9295 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
9297 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
9298 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
9299 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
9300 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat.0.unwrap(),
9301 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
9302 confirmations_required,
9304 force_close_spend_delay,
9305 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
9306 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
9307 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
9308 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
9309 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
9310 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
9311 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
9312 channel_shutdown_state,
9317 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
9318 (2, channels, required_vec),
9319 (4, phantom_scid, required),
9320 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
9323 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(BlindedForward, {
9324 (0, inbound_blinding_point, required),
9327 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
9329 (0, onion_packet, required),
9330 (1, blinded, option),
9331 (2, short_channel_id, required),
9334 (0, payment_data, required),
9335 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
9336 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
9337 (3, payment_metadata, option),
9338 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
9340 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
9341 (0, payment_preimage, required),
9342 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
9343 (3, payment_metadata, option),
9344 (4, payment_data, option), // Added in 0.0.116
9345 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
9349 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
9350 (0, routing, required),
9351 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
9352 (4, payment_hash, required),
9353 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
9354 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
9355 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
9356 (10, skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9360 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
9361 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9363 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
9365 channel_id.write(writer)?;
9366 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
9367 reason.write(writer)?;
9369 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
9370 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
9373 channel_id.write(writer)?;
9374 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
9375 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
9376 failure_code.write(writer)?;
9383 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
9384 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9385 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9388 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
9389 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9390 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9391 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
9395 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
9396 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9397 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9398 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
9399 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
9402 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
9403 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
9404 // messages contained in the variants.
9405 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
9406 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
9407 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
9409 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
9410 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
9411 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
9412 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
9413 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
9416 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
9417 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
9418 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
9419 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
9420 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
9422 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
9427 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
9432 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(BlindedFailure,
9433 (0, FromIntroductionNode) => {}, ;
9436 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
9437 (0, short_channel_id, required),
9438 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
9439 (2, outpoint, required),
9440 (3, blinded_failure, option),
9441 (4, htlc_id, required),
9442 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required),
9443 (7, user_channel_id, option),
9446 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
9447 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9448 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
9449 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
9450 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
9452 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9453 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
9454 (1, self.total_msat, required),
9455 (2, self.value, required),
9456 (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
9457 (4, payment_data, option),
9458 (5, self.total_value_received, option),
9459 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
9460 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
9461 (10, self.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9467 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
9468 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9469 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9470 (0, prev_hop, required),
9471 (1, total_msat, option),
9472 (2, value_ser, required),
9473 (3, sender_intended_value, option),
9474 (4, payment_data_opt, option),
9475 (5, total_value_received, option),
9476 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
9477 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
9478 (10, counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9480 let payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = payment_data_opt;
9481 let value = value_ser.0.unwrap();
9482 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
9484 if payment_data.is_some() {
9485 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9487 if total_msat.is_none() {
9488 total_msat = Some(value);
9490 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
9493 if total_msat.is_none() {
9494 if payment_data.is_none() {
9495 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9497 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
9499 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
9503 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
9506 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
9507 total_value_received,
9508 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
9510 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry.0.unwrap(),
9511 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
9516 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
9517 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9518 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9521 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
9522 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
9523 let mut path_hops = Vec::new();
9524 let mut payment_id = None;
9525 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
9526 let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
9527 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9528 (0, session_priv, required),
9529 (1, payment_id, option),
9530 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
9531 (4, path_hops, required_vec),
9532 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
9533 (6, blinded_tail, option),
9535 if payment_id.is_none() {
9536 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
9538 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
9540 let path = Path { hops: path_hops, blinded_tail };
9541 if path.hops.len() == 0 {
9542 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9544 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
9545 if let Payee::Clear { ref mut final_cltv_expiry_delta, .. } = params.payee {
9546 if final_cltv_expiry_delta == &0 {
9547 *final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.final_cltv_expiry_delta().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9551 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
9552 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
9553 first_hop_htlc_msat,
9555 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
9558 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
9559 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
9564 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
9565 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
9567 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
9569 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
9570 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9571 (0, session_priv, required),
9572 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
9573 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
9574 // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
9575 (4, path.hops, required_vec),
9576 (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
9577 (6, path.blinded_tail, option),
9580 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
9582 field.write(writer)?;
9589 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
9590 (0, forward_info, required),
9591 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
9592 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
9593 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
9594 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
9597 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
9599 (0, htlc_id, required),
9600 (2, err_packet, required),
9605 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
9606 (0, payment_secret, required),
9607 (2, expiry_time, required),
9608 (4, user_payment_id, required),
9609 (6, payment_preimage, required),
9610 (8, min_value_msat, required),
9613 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9615 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9616 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9617 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9618 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9619 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9620 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9624 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9625 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
9627 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
9629 self.chain_hash.write(writer)?;
9631 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
9632 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
9633 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
9636 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
9638 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9639 let mut number_of_funded_channels = 0;
9640 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9641 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9642 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9643 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
9644 serializable_peer_count += 1;
9647 number_of_funded_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(
9648 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { chan.context.is_funding_broadcast() } else { false }
9652 (number_of_funded_channels as u64).write(writer)?;
9654 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9655 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9656 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9657 for channel in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter_map(
9658 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = phase {
9659 if channel.context.is_funding_broadcast() { Some(channel) } else { None }
9662 channel.write(writer)?;
9668 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
9669 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9670 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
9671 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
9672 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9673 for forward in pending_forwards {
9674 forward.write(writer)?;
9679 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
9681 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
9682 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
9683 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
9685 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
9686 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
9687 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9688 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
9689 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
9690 (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9691 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
9692 htlc.write(writer)?;
9694 htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
9695 htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
9698 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
9699 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
9700 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9701 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
9702 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
9703 // per_peer_state lock at all.
9704 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
9707 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
9708 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
9709 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
9710 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
9711 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
9713 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
9714 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
9715 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
9716 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
9717 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
9718 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
9719 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
9724 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
9725 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.115 don't support post-event actions, thus if there's no
9726 // actions at all, skip writing the required TLV. Otherwise, pre-0.0.115 versions will
9727 // refuse to read the new ChannelManager.
9728 let events_not_backwards_compatible = events.iter().any(|(_, action)| action.is_some());
9729 if events_not_backwards_compatible {
9730 // If we're gonna write a even TLV that will overwrite our events anyway we might as
9731 // well save the space and not write any events here.
9732 0u64.write(writer)?;
9734 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9735 for (event, _) in events.iter() {
9736 event.write(writer)?;
9740 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote the `pending_background_events`
9741 // `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here, however there was never a reason to do so -
9742 // the closing monitor updates were always effectively replayed on startup (either directly
9743 // by calling `broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn` on a `ChannelMonitor` during
9744 // deserialization or, in 0.0.115, by regenerating the monitor update itself).
9745 0u64.write(writer)?;
9747 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
9748 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
9749 // likely to be identical.
9750 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
9751 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
9753 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9754 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
9755 hash.write(writer)?;
9756 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
9759 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
9760 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
9761 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
9762 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
9763 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
9766 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
9767 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
9769 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
9770 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
9771 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
9772 session_priv.write(writer)?;
9775 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {},
9776 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {},
9777 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
9778 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
9782 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
9783 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
9784 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
9786 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
9787 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
9788 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
9794 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
9795 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
9796 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
9797 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
9800 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
9801 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
9802 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
9803 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
9804 pending_claiming_payments = None;
9807 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(&PublicKey, &OutPoint), &Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
9808 for ((counterparty_id, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
9809 for (funding_outpoint, updates) in peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.iter() {
9810 if !updates.is_empty() {
9811 if in_flight_monitor_updates.is_none() { in_flight_monitor_updates = Some(HashMap::new()); }
9812 in_flight_monitor_updates.as_mut().unwrap().insert((counterparty_id, funding_outpoint), updates);
9817 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9818 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
9819 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
9820 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
9821 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
9822 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
9823 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
9824 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
9825 (8, if events_not_backwards_compatible { Some(&*events) } else { None }, option),
9826 (9, htlc_purposes, required_vec),
9827 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
9828 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
9829 (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
9836 impl Writeable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
9837 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9838 (self.len() as u64).write(w)?;
9839 for (event, action) in self.iter() {
9842 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
9843 // Events are MaybeReadable, in some cases indicating that they shouldn't actually
9844 // be persisted and are regenerated on restart. However, if such an event has a
9845 // post-event-handling action we'll write nothing for the event and would have to
9846 // either forget the action or fail on deserialization (which we do below). Thus,
9847 // check that the event is sane here.
9848 let event_encoded = event.encode();
9849 let event_read: Option<Event> =
9850 MaybeReadable::read(&mut &event_encoded[..]).unwrap();
9851 if action.is_some() { assert!(event_read.is_some()); }
9857 impl Readable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
9858 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9859 let len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9860 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 1024 * 16;
9861 let mut events: Self = VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(
9862 MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>() as u64,
9865 let ev_opt = MaybeReadable::read(reader)?;
9866 let action = Readable::read(reader)?;
9867 if let Some(ev) = ev_opt {
9868 events.push_back((ev, action));
9869 } else if action.is_some() {
9870 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9877 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(ChannelShutdownState,
9878 (0, NotShuttingDown) => {},
9879 (2, ShutdownInitiated) => {},
9880 (4, ResolvingHTLCs) => {},
9881 (6, NegotiatingClosingFee) => {},
9882 (8, ShutdownComplete) => {}, ;
9885 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
9887 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
9889 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
9890 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
9891 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
9892 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
9893 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
9894 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
9895 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
9896 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
9897 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
9898 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
9899 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
9900 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
9901 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
9903 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
9904 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
9906 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
9907 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
9909 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
9910 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
9911 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
9912 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
9913 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
9914 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
9916 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
9917 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9919 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9920 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9921 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9922 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9923 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9924 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9928 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
9929 pub entropy_source: ES,
9931 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
9932 pub node_signer: NS,
9934 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
9935 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
9937 pub signer_provider: SP,
9939 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
9941 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
9942 pub fee_estimator: F,
9943 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
9945 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
9946 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
9947 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
9948 pub chain_monitor: M,
9950 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
9951 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
9952 /// force-closed during deserialization.
9953 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
9954 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
9955 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
9957 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
9959 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
9960 /// deserialization.
9962 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
9963 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
9964 pub default_config: UserConfig,
9966 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
9967 /// value.context.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
9969 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
9970 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
9971 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
9972 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
9974 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
9977 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
9978 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>>,
9981 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9982 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9984 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9985 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9986 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9987 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9988 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9989 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9993 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
9994 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
9995 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
9996 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
9997 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>>) -> Self {
9999 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
10000 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
10005 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
10006 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
10007 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10008 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
10010 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10011 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10012 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10013 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10014 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10015 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10019 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10020 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
10021 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
10025 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10026 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
10028 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10029 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10030 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10031 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10032 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10033 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10037 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10038 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
10040 let chain_hash: ChainHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10041 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10042 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10044 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
10046 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10047 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10048 let mut funded_peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10049 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10050 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10051 let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
10052 let mut close_background_events = Vec::new();
10053 for _ in 0..channel_count {
10054 let mut channel: Channel<SP> = Channel::read(reader, (
10055 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
10057 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &channel.context);
10058 let funding_txo = channel.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
10059 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
10060 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
10061 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
10062 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
10063 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
10064 channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
10065 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
10066 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
10067 log_error!(logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
10068 if channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
10069 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
10070 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
10072 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() {
10073 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at holder commitment number {} but the ChannelManager is at holder commitment number {}.",
10074 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number());
10076 if channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() {
10077 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at revoked counterparty transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at revoked counterparty transaction number {}.",
10078 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
10080 if channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() {
10081 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at counterparty commitment transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at counterparty commitment transaction number {}.",
10082 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
10084 let mut shutdown_result = channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
10085 if shutdown_result.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid.is_some() {
10086 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10088 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = shutdown_result.monitor_update {
10089 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
10090 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
10093 failed_htlcs.append(&mut shutdown_result.dropped_outbound_htlcs);
10094 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
10095 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
10096 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
10097 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager,
10098 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
10099 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
10101 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
10102 let mut found_htlc = false;
10103 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
10104 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
10107 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
10108 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
10109 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
10110 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
10111 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
10112 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
10113 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
10115 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
10116 &channel.context.channel_id(), &payment_hash);
10117 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
10121 log_info!(logger, "Successfully loaded channel {} at update_id {} against monitor at update id {}",
10122 &channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
10123 monitor.get_latest_update_id());
10124 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
10125 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
10127 if channel.context.is_funding_broadcast() {
10128 id_to_peer.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
10130 match funded_peer_channels.entry(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
10131 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
10132 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
10133 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
10135 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
10136 let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
10137 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
10138 entry.insert(by_id_map);
10142 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
10143 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
10144 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
10145 // safely discard the channel.
10146 let _ = channel.context.force_shutdown(false);
10147 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
10148 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
10149 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
10150 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
10151 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
10152 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
10155 log_error!(logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", &channel.context.channel_id());
10156 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10157 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10158 log_error!(logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10159 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10160 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10164 for (funding_txo, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
10165 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
10166 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&args.logger, monitor);
10167 log_info!(logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
10168 &funding_txo.to_channel_id());
10169 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
10170 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
10171 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
10173 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, monitor_update)));
10177 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
10178 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10179 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
10180 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
10181 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
10182 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10183 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
10184 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
10185 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
10187 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
10190 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10191 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
10192 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
10193 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10194 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10195 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
10196 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
10197 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
10199 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
10202 let peer_state_from_chans = |channel_by_id| {
10205 inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
10206 latest_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
10207 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
10208 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
10209 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
10210 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
10211 is_connected: false,
10215 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10216 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>)>()));
10217 for _ in 0..peer_count {
10218 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
10219 let peer_chans = funded_peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new());
10220 let mut peer_state = peer_state_from_chans(peer_chans);
10221 peer_state.latest_features = Readable::read(reader)?;
10222 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
10225 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10226 let mut pending_events_read: VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> =
10227 VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>()));
10228 for _ in 0..event_count {
10229 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
10230 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push_back((event, None)),
10235 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10236 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
10237 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
10239 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote pending `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here,
10240 // however we really don't (and never did) need them - we regenerate all
10241 // on-startup monitor updates.
10242 let _: OutPoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
10243 let _: ChannelMonitorUpdate = Readable::read(reader)?;
10245 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
10249 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
10250 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10252 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10253 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
10254 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
10255 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
10256 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10260 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10261 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
10262 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
10263 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
10264 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
10265 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
10266 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
10268 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
10269 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10273 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
10274 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
10275 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
10276 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
10277 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
10278 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
10279 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
10280 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
10281 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
10282 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
10283 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer: Option<Vec<(_, BTreeMap<_, Vec<_>>)>> = Some(Vec::new());
10284 let mut events_override = None;
10285 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(PublicKey, OutPoint), Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
10286 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
10287 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
10288 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
10289 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
10290 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
10291 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
10292 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
10293 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
10294 (8, events_override, option),
10295 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, optional_vec),
10296 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
10297 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
10298 (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
10300 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
10301 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10304 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
10305 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10308 if let Some(events) = events_override {
10309 pending_events_read = events;
10312 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
10313 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
10316 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
10317 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
10318 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
10319 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
10320 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
10321 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
10323 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
10325 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
10326 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
10327 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
10330 // We have to replay (or skip, if they were completed after we wrote the `ChannelManager`)
10331 // each `ChannelMonitorUpdate` in `in_flight_monitor_updates`. After doing so, we have to
10332 // check that each channel we have isn't newer than the latest `ChannelMonitorUpdate`(s) we
10333 // replayed, and for each monitor update we have to replay we have to ensure there's a
10334 // `ChannelMonitor` for it.
10336 // In order to do so we first walk all of our live channels (so that we can check their
10337 // state immediately after doing the update replays, when we have the `update_id`s
10338 // available) and then walk any remaining in-flight updates.
10340 // Because the actual handling of the in-flight updates is the same, it's macro'ized here:
10341 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
10342 macro_rules! handle_in_flight_updates {
10343 ($counterparty_node_id: expr, $chan_in_flight_upds: expr, $funding_txo: expr,
10344 $monitor: expr, $peer_state: expr, $logger: expr, $channel_info_log: expr
10346 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = 0;
10347 $chan_in_flight_upds.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > $monitor.get_latest_update_id());
10348 for update in $chan_in_flight_upds.iter() {
10349 log_trace!($logger, "Replaying ChannelMonitorUpdate {} for {}channel {}",
10350 update.update_id, $channel_info_log, &$funding_txo.to_channel_id());
10351 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id, update.update_id);
10352 pending_background_events.push(
10353 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
10354 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
10355 funding_txo: $funding_txo,
10356 update: update.clone(),
10359 if $chan_in_flight_upds.is_empty() {
10360 // We had some updates to apply, but it turns out they had completed before we
10361 // were serialized, we just weren't notified of that. Thus, we may have to run
10362 // the completion actions for any monitor updates, but otherwise are done.
10363 pending_background_events.push(
10364 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
10365 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
10366 channel_id: $funding_txo.to_channel_id(),
10369 if $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.insert($funding_txo, $chan_in_flight_upds).is_some() {
10370 log_error!($logger, "Duplicate in-flight monitor update set for the same channel!");
10371 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10373 max_in_flight_update_id
10377 for (counterparty_id, peer_state_mtx) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
10378 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
10379 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10380 for phase in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
10381 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
10382 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &chan.context);
10384 // Channels that were persisted have to be funded, otherwise they should have been
10386 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
10387 let monitor = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo)
10388 .expect("We already checked for monitor presence when loading channels");
10389 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = monitor.get_latest_update_id();
10390 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = &mut in_flight_monitor_updates {
10391 if let Some(mut chan_in_flight_upds) = in_flight_upds.remove(&(*counterparty_id, funding_txo)) {
10392 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id,
10393 handle_in_flight_updates!(*counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_upds,
10394 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, logger, ""));
10397 if chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id() > max_in_flight_update_id {
10398 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
10399 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
10400 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} with update_id through {} in-flight",
10401 chan.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), max_in_flight_update_id);
10402 log_error!(logger, " but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.", chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id());
10403 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10404 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10405 log_error!(logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10406 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10407 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10410 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
10411 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
10412 debug_assert!(false);
10413 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10418 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = in_flight_monitor_updates {
10419 for ((counterparty_id, funding_txo), mut chan_in_flight_updates) in in_flight_upds {
10420 let logger = WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(counterparty_id), Some(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
10421 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
10422 // Now that we've removed all the in-flight monitor updates for channels that are
10423 // still open, we need to replay any monitor updates that are for closed channels,
10424 // creating the neccessary peer_state entries as we go.
10425 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_id).or_insert_with(|| {
10426 Mutex::new(peer_state_from_chans(HashMap::new()))
10428 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10429 handle_in_flight_updates!(counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_updates,
10430 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, logger, "closed ");
10432 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelMonitor is missing even though we have in-flight updates for it! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
10433 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is missing.",
10434 &funding_txo.to_channel_id());
10435 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10436 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10437 log_error!(logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10438 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10439 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10444 // Note that we have to do the above replays before we push new monitor updates.
10445 pending_background_events.append(&mut close_background_events);
10447 // If there's any preimages for forwarded HTLCs hanging around in ChannelMonitors we
10448 // should ensure we try them again on the inbound edge. We put them here and do so after we
10449 // have a fully-constructed `ChannelManager` at the end.
10450 let mut pending_claims_to_replay = Vec::new();
10453 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
10454 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
10455 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
10456 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
10457 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
10458 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
10459 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
10461 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
10462 let counterparty_opt = id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
10463 let chan_id = monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id();
10464 if counterparty_opt.is_none() {
10465 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&args.logger, monitor);
10466 for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
10467 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
10468 if path.hops.is_empty() {
10469 log_error!(logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
10470 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10473 let path_amt = path.final_value_msat();
10474 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
10475 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
10476 match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
10477 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
10478 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
10479 log_info!(logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
10480 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
10482 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
10483 let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
10484 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
10485 retry_strategy: None,
10486 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
10487 payment_params: None,
10488 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
10489 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
10490 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10491 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10492 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10493 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(), // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10494 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
10495 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
10496 total_msat: path_amt,
10497 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
10498 remaining_max_total_routing_fee_msat: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10500 log_info!(logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
10501 path_amt, &htlc.payment_hash, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
10506 for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
10507 match htlc_source {
10508 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
10509 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
10510 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
10511 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
10513 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
10514 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
10515 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
10516 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
10517 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
10518 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
10519 forwards.retain(|forward| {
10520 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
10521 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
10522 log_info!(logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
10523 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
10528 !forwards.is_empty()
10530 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
10531 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
10532 log_info!(logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
10533 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
10534 pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
10535 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
10536 intercepted_id != ev_id
10543 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
10544 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
10545 let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
10546 // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
10547 // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
10548 // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
10549 // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
10550 // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
10551 // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
10552 // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
10553 // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
10555 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
10556 channel_funding_outpoint: monitor.get_funding_txo().0,
10557 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
10559 pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv,
10560 path, false, compl_action, &pending_events, &&logger);
10561 pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
10568 // Whether the downstream channel was closed or not, try to re-apply any payment
10569 // preimages from it which may be needed in upstream channels for forwarded
10571 let outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter = monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs()
10573 .filter_map(|(htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt))| {
10574 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(_) = htlc_source {
10575 if let Some(payment_preimage) = preimage_opt {
10576 Some((htlc_source, payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat,
10577 // Check if `counterparty_opt.is_none()` to see if the
10578 // downstream chan is closed (because we don't have a
10579 // channel_id -> peer map entry).
10580 counterparty_opt.is_none(),
10581 counterparty_opt.cloned().or(monitor.get_counterparty_node_id()),
10582 monitor.get_funding_txo().0))
10585 // If it was an outbound payment, we've handled it above - if a preimage
10586 // came in and we persisted the `ChannelManager` we either handled it and
10587 // are good to go or the channel force-closed - we don't have to handle the
10588 // channel still live case here.
10592 for tuple in outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter {
10593 pending_claims_to_replay.push(tuple);
10598 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
10599 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
10600 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
10601 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
10602 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
10603 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
10604 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
10605 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
10609 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
10610 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
10612 let mut claimable_payments = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
10613 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
10614 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
10615 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10617 if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
10618 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
10619 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10621 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
10622 purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
10624 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
10625 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
10627 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
10630 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
10631 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
10632 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
10634 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
10638 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
10639 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
10640 for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
10641 if htlcs.is_empty() {
10642 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10644 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
10645 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
10646 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
10647 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
10648 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
10649 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
10650 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
10651 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
10653 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", &payment_hash);
10654 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10658 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
10660 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
10662 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
10663 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
10665 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
10666 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
10671 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10672 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10674 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
10676 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10678 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
10679 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
10680 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
10681 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10685 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
10686 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
10687 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10688 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10689 for (chan_id, phase) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
10690 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
10691 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &chan.context);
10692 if chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
10693 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
10695 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
10696 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &chain_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
10697 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
10699 chan.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
10700 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias()) {
10701 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
10702 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
10703 log_error!(logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
10704 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10706 if chan.context.is_usable() {
10707 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
10708 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
10709 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
10710 log_error!(logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
10711 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10715 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
10716 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
10717 debug_assert!(false);
10718 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10723 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
10725 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
10726 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
10727 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
10728 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", &payment_hash);
10729 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
10730 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
10731 let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
10732 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
10733 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
10734 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
10735 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
10737 for claimable_htlc in &payment.htlcs {
10738 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
10740 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
10741 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
10742 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
10743 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
10745 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
10746 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
10747 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
10748 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
10750 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
10751 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
10752 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
10753 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
10755 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
10756 if let Some(peer_node_id) = id_to_peer.get(&previous_channel_id){
10757 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
10758 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10759 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10760 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(channel)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
10761 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &channel.context);
10762 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &&logger);
10765 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
10766 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&args.logger, previous_hop_monitor);
10767 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &&logger);
10770 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
10773 purpose: payment.purpose,
10774 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
10775 htlcs: payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect(),
10776 sender_intended_total_msat: payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat),
10782 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
10783 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
10784 for (channel_id, actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions.iter() {
10785 let logger = WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(node_id), Some(*channel_id));
10786 for action in actions.iter() {
10787 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
10788 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
10789 Some((blocked_node_id, blocked_channel_outpoint, blocking_action)), ..
10791 if let Some(blocked_peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&blocked_node_id) {
10793 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
10794 blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id());
10795 blocked_peer_state.lock().unwrap().actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
10796 .entry(blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id())
10797 .or_insert_with(Vec::new).push(blocking_action.clone());
10799 // If the channel we were blocking has closed, we don't need to
10800 // worry about it - the blocked monitor update should never have
10801 // been released from the `Channel` object so it can't have
10802 // completed, and if the channel closed there's no reason to bother
10806 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately { .. } = action {
10807 debug_assert!(false, "Non-event-generating channel freeing should not appear in our queue");
10811 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
10813 log_error!(WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(node_id), None), "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
10814 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10818 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
10820 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
10821 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
10822 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
10823 router: args.router,
10825 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
10827 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
10828 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
10829 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
10830 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
10832 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
10833 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
10834 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
10835 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
10836 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
10837 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
10839 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
10841 our_network_pubkey,
10844 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
10846 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
10848 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
10849 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
10850 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
10851 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
10852 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
10854 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
10855 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
10857 funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
10859 pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
10861 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
10862 node_signer: args.node_signer,
10863 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
10865 logger: args.logger,
10866 default_configuration: args.default_config,
10869 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
10870 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
10871 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
10872 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
10873 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
10876 for (source, preimage, downstream_value, downstream_closed, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding) in pending_claims_to_replay {
10877 // We use `downstream_closed` in place of `from_onchain` here just as a guess - we
10878 // don't remember in the `ChannelMonitor` where we got a preimage from, but if the
10879 // channel is closed we just assume that it probably came from an on-chain claim.
10880 channel_manager.claim_funds_internal(source, preimage, Some(downstream_value),
10881 downstream_closed, true, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding);
10884 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
10885 //connection or two.
10887 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
10893 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
10894 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
10895 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
10896 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
10897 use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
10898 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
10899 use crate::ln::ChannelId;
10900 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{create_recv_pending_htlc_info, inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
10901 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
10902 use crate::ln::msgs::{self, ErrorAction};
10903 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
10904 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
10905 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
10906 use crate::util::test_utils;
10907 use crate::util::config::{ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
10908 use crate::sign::EntropySource;
10911 fn test_notify_limits() {
10912 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
10913 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
10914 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
10915 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
10916 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
10917 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10919 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
10920 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
10921 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10922 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10923 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10925 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
10927 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
10928 // to connect messages with new values
10929 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
10930 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
10931 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
10932 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
10933 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
10934 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
10936 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
10937 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10938 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10939 // ... but the last node should not.
10940 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10941 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
10942 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10943 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10945 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
10946 // about the channel.
10947 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
10948 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
10949 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10951 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
10953 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
10954 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
10955 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
10956 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
10957 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10958 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10960 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
10961 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
10962 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
10964 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
10965 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
10966 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
10967 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
10968 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
10969 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
10971 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
10972 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
10973 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
10974 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
10975 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10976 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10977 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
10978 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
10980 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
10981 // the channel info has updated.
10982 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
10983 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
10984 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10985 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10986 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
10987 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
10991 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
10992 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
10994 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10995 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10996 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10997 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10998 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11000 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
11001 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
11002 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
11003 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
11005 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
11006 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
11007 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
11008 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
11009 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
11010 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
11011 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
11012 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
11013 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11014 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11015 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11016 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
11018 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
11019 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11020 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11021 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11022 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11023 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11024 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11025 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11026 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11027 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11028 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11029 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11030 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
11031 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11032 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11033 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11034 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11035 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11036 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11037 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11038 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11039 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11040 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
11042 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
11043 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
11044 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
11045 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11046 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11047 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11048 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
11050 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
11051 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
11052 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
11053 // lightning messages manually.
11054 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
11055 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
11056 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
11058 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11059 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
11060 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
11061 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
11062 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11063 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11064 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
11065 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11066 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11067 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
11068 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11069 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11070 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
11071 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
11072 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11073 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11074 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
11075 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11076 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11077 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
11078 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11079 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
11080 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11081 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11082 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
11083 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11085 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
11086 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
11087 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11088 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
11090 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
11091 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
11092 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
11093 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
11095 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11098 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
11099 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
11100 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
11101 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
11103 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11108 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
11109 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(false);
11110 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(true);
11113 fn do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(accept_mpp_keysend: bool) {
11114 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
11115 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
11116 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
11117 // fails as expected.
11118 // (3): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend
11119 // payment fails as expected. When `accept_mpp_keysend` is false, this tests that we
11120 // reject MPP keysend payments, since in this case where the payment has no payment
11121 // secret, a keysend payment with a duplicate hash is basically an MPP keysend. If
11122 // `accept_mpp_keysend` is true, this tests that we only accept MPP keysends with
11123 // payment secrets and reject otherwise.
11124 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11125 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11126 let mut mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
11127 mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = accept_mpp_keysend;
11128 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
11129 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11130 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11131 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11132 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11134 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
11135 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
11136 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
11138 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
11139 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11140 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(),
11141 TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false), 100_000);
11142 let route = find_route(
11143 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11144 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11146 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11147 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11148 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11149 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11150 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11151 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11152 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11153 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11154 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11155 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11156 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
11157 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
11158 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11159 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11160 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11161 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11162 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11163 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11164 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11165 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11166 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11167 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11168 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11169 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11171 // Finally, claim the original payment.
11172 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11174 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
11175 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11176 let route = find_route(
11177 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11178 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11180 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11181 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11182 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11183 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11184 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11185 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
11186 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
11187 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
11189 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
11190 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
11191 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
11192 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
11193 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11194 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11195 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11196 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11197 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11198 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11199 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11200 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11201 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11202 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11203 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11204 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11205 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11206 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11207 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11208 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11209 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11210 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11211 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11212 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11214 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
11215 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11217 // To start (3), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
11218 let payment_id_1 = PaymentId([44; 32]);
11219 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11220 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_1).unwrap();
11221 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11222 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11223 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11224 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
11225 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
11226 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
11228 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
11229 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11230 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
11233 let route = find_route(
11234 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11235 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11237 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId([45; 32]);
11238 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11239 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_2).unwrap();
11240 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11241 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11242 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11243 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11244 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11245 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11246 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11247 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11248 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11249 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11250 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11251 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11252 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11253 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11254 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11255 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11256 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11257 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11258 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11259 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11261 // Finally, claim the original payment.
11262 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11266 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
11267 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
11268 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
11269 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11270 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11271 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11272 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11274 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
11275 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11277 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
11278 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11279 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
11280 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
11281 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
11282 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11283 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11284 let route = find_route(
11285 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
11286 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11289 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11290 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
11291 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
11292 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
11293 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
11294 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
11295 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11297 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11298 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
11299 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11300 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
11301 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11302 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11303 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
11305 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
11309 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
11310 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment
11311 // secret when we don't support MPP keysend.
11312 let mut reject_mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
11313 reject_mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = false;
11314 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11315 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11316 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(reject_mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
11317 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11319 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
11320 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11322 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
11323 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11324 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
11325 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
11326 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
11327 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11328 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11329 let route = find_route(
11330 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
11331 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11334 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11335 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
11336 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).to_byte_array());
11337 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
11338 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
11339 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
11340 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
11341 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
11342 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11344 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11345 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
11346 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11347 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
11348 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11349 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11350 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
11352 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
11356 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
11357 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
11358 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
11359 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
11360 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11362 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11363 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11364 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11365 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11367 // Marshall an MPP route.
11368 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
11369 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
11370 route.paths.push(path);
11371 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11372 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
11373 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
11374 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
11375 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
11376 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
11378 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
11379 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
11381 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
11382 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
11384 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
11389 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
11390 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11391 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11392 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11393 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11395 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11397 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11398 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11400 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
11401 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
11402 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11403 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
11406 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
11407 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
11408 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
11409 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
11410 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
11411 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
11414 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
11417 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
11418 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
11423 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
11424 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
11425 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11426 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11427 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11428 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11430 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
11431 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
11433 total_msat: 100_000,
11436 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
11437 // payment verification fails as expected.
11438 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
11439 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
11440 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
11441 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
11443 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
11447 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
11448 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
11452 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
11453 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
11454 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
11455 // the channel is successfully closed.
11456 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11457 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11458 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11459 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11461 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11462 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11463 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
11464 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11465 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
11467 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
11468 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes(tx.txid().to_byte_array());
11470 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
11471 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
11472 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11473 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11476 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
11478 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
11479 // as it has the funding transaction.
11480 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11481 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
11482 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11485 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11487 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11489 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
11491 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11492 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
11493 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11495 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11498 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
11499 // as it has the funding transaction.
11500 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11501 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
11502 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11504 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11505 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11506 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
11507 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11508 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11509 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
11510 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
11511 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
11513 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
11514 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
11515 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11516 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
11518 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11519 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
11521 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
11522 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
11523 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
11524 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
11525 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11526 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
11527 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11531 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
11532 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
11533 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
11534 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
11535 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11536 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
11537 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11540 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
11542 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
11543 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
11544 // closing transaction).
11545 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
11546 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
11547 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11549 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
11550 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
11551 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11552 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
11553 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11556 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11558 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
11560 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
11561 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
11562 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11564 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11566 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
11567 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
11570 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
11571 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
11572 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11575 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
11576 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
11577 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11580 fn check_channel_unavailable_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_channel_id: ChannelId, peer_node_id: PublicKey) {
11581 let expected_message = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_channel_id, peer_node_id);
11582 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11585 fn check_api_misuse_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
11586 let expected_message = "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_string();
11587 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11590 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
11592 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
11593 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
11595 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
11596 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
11598 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
11599 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
11604 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
11605 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
11606 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
11607 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
11608 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11609 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
11610 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
11611 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11614 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
11615 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
11616 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
11618 // Test the API functions.
11619 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None), unkown_public_key);
11621 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
11623 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
11625 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
11627 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
11629 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
11631 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
11635 fn test_api_calls_with_unavailable_channel() {
11636 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` and a `channel_id`
11637 // as input, behaves as expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is a known peer in the
11638 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map, but the peer state doesn't contain a channel with
11639 // the given `channel_id`.
11640 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11641 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
11642 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
11643 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11645 let counterparty_node_id = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11648 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
11650 // Test the API functions.
11651 check_api_misuse_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, 42));
11653 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11655 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11657 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11659 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(InterceptId([0; 32]), &channel_id, counterparty_node_id, 1_000_000), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11661 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&counterparty_node_id, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11665 fn test_connection_limiting() {
11666 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
11667 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11668 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11669 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11670 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11672 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
11674 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11675 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11677 let mut funding_tx = None;
11678 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
11679 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11680 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11683 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
11684 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
11685 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
11686 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
11687 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11689 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
11690 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11691 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11693 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11695 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
11696 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11697 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11699 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11702 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
11703 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11704 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11705 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
11706 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11708 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
11709 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
11711 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
11712 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
11713 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11714 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11715 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
11716 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11717 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11720 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11721 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11722 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11723 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11724 }, true).unwrap_err();
11726 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
11727 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
11728 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11729 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11730 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
11731 for ev in chan_closed_events {
11732 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
11734 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11735 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11737 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
11738 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11739 }, true).unwrap_err();
11741 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
11742 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
11743 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11744 }, false).unwrap();
11745 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11747 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
11748 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
11750 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
11751 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
11752 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
11753 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
11754 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11756 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11757 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
11758 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11760 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
11761 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11762 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
11764 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
11765 // "protected" and can connect again.
11766 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
11767 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
11768 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11770 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11772 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
11774 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11775 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
11779 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
11780 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
11781 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11782 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11783 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11784 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11786 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
11788 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11789 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11791 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
11792 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11793 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11794 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11797 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
11799 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11800 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
11801 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11803 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
11804 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11805 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11807 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
11808 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11809 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
11810 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11814 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
11815 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
11816 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
11817 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11818 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11819 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
11820 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
11821 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
11822 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11824 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
11826 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11827 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11829 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
11830 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
11831 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11832 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11833 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11834 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11837 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11838 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11840 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
11841 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
11843 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11845 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
11846 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11849 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
11850 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11851 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11852 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11853 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11855 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11856 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11858 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
11859 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
11860 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
11861 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
11865 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11867 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
11868 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11870 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
11871 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11872 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11874 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
11875 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
11877 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11879 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
11883 fn reject_excessively_underpaying_htlcs() {
11884 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
11885 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
11886 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
11887 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11888 let sender_intended_amt_msat = 100;
11889 let extra_fee_msat = 10;
11890 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
11892 outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
11893 payment_metadata: None,
11894 keysend_preimage: None,
11895 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
11896 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
11898 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
11900 // Check that if the amount we received + the penultimate hop extra fee is less than the sender
11901 // intended amount, we fail the payment.
11902 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
11903 if let Err(crate::ln::channelmanager::InboundOnionErr { err_code, .. }) =
11904 create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
11905 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat - 1, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat),
11906 current_height, node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
11908 assert_eq!(err_code, 19);
11909 } else { panic!(); }
11911 // If amt_received + extra_fee is equal to the sender intended amount, we're fine.
11912 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { // This is the same payload as above, InboundOnionPayload doesn't implement Clone
11914 outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
11915 payment_metadata: None,
11916 keysend_preimage: None,
11917 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
11918 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
11920 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
11922 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
11923 assert!(create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
11924 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat),
11925 current_height, node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend).is_ok());
11929 fn test_final_incorrect_cltv(){
11930 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
11931 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
11932 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
11933 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11935 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
11936 let result = create_recv_pending_htlc_info(msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
11938 outgoing_cltv_value: 22,
11939 payment_metadata: None,
11940 keysend_preimage: None,
11941 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
11942 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: 100,
11944 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
11945 }, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]), 100, 23, None, true, None, current_height,
11946 node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend);
11948 // Should not return an error as this condition:
11949 // https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/4dcc377209509b13cf89a4b91fde7d478f5b46d8/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L334
11950 // is not satisfied.
11951 assert!(result.is_ok());
11955 fn test_inbound_anchors_manual_acceptance() {
11956 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
11957 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
11958 let mut anchors_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
11959 anchors_cfg.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
11961 let mut anchors_manual_accept_cfg = anchors_cfg.clone();
11962 anchors_manual_accept_cfg.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
11964 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
11965 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
11966 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs,
11967 &[Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_manual_accept_cfg.clone())]);
11968 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11970 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11971 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11973 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11974 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
11975 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11976 match &msg_events[0] {
11977 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } => {
11978 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11980 ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } =>
11981 assert_eq!(msg.data, "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned()),
11982 _ => panic!("Unexpected error action"),
11985 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11988 nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11989 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11991 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } =>
11992 nodes[2].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap(),
11993 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11995 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11999 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
12000 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
12001 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
12002 // the channel without the anchors feature.
12003 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12004 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12005 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
12006 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
12007 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
12008 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
12009 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12011 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None, None).unwrap();
12012 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12013 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
12015 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12016 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12018 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
12019 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
12021 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12024 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12025 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
12027 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12028 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
12030 // Since nodes[1] should not have accepted the channel, it should
12031 // not have generated any events.
12032 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
12036 fn test_update_channel_config() {
12037 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12038 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
12039 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
12040 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
12041 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12042 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12043 let channel = &nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0];
12045 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
12046 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12047 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
12049 user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat += 10;
12050 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
12051 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_base_msat, user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat);
12052 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12053 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12055 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12056 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
12059 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate::default()).unwrap();
12060 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12061 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
12063 let new_cltv_expiry_delta = user_config.channel_config.cltv_expiry_delta + 6;
12064 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
12065 cltv_expiry_delta: Some(new_cltv_expiry_delta),
12066 ..Default::default()
12068 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
12069 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12070 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12072 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12073 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
12076 let new_fee = user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths + 100;
12077 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
12078 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
12079 ..Default::default()
12081 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
12082 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, new_fee);
12083 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12084 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12086 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12087 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
12090 // If we provide a channel_id not associated with the peer, we should get an error and no updates
12091 // should be applied to ensure update atomicity as specified in the API docs.
12092 let bad_channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_txid(&[10; 32], 10);
12093 let current_fee = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths;
12094 let new_fee = current_fee + 100;
12097 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id, bad_channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
12098 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
12099 ..Default::default()
12101 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: _ }),
12104 // Check that the fee hasn't changed for the channel that exists.
12105 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, current_fee);
12106 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12107 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
12111 fn test_payment_display() {
12112 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
12113 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_id), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
12114 let payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
12115 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_hash), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
12116 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
12117 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_preimage), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
12121 fn test_trigger_lnd_force_close() {
12122 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12123 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
12124 let user_config = test_default_channel_config();
12125 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
12126 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12128 // Open a channel, immediately disconnect each other, and broadcast Alice's latest state.
12129 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12130 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12131 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12132 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
12133 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
12134 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
12135 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12137 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
12138 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
12139 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
12142 // Since they're disconnected, Bob won't receive Alice's `Error` message. Reconnect them
12143 // such that Bob sends a `ChannelReestablish` to Alice since the channel is still open from
12145 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12146 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12148 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12149 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12150 }, false).unwrap();
12151 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
12152 let channel_reestablish = get_event_msg!(
12153 nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()
12155 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channel_reestablish);
12157 // Alice should respond with an error since the channel isn't known, but a bogus
12158 // `ChannelReestablish` should be sent first, such that we actually trigger Bob to force
12159 // close even if it was an lnd node.
12160 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12161 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
12162 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { node_id, msg } = &msg_events[0] {
12163 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12164 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 0);
12165 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0);
12166 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
12167 } else { panic!() };
12168 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[1], 1, true);
12169 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
12170 let expected_close_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError {
12171 err: "Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_string()
12173 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, expected_close_reason, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12175 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
12176 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
12177 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
12184 use crate::chain::Listen;
12185 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
12186 use crate::sign::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
12187 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
12188 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
12189 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
12190 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
12191 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
12192 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
12193 use crate::util::test_utils;
12194 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
12196 use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
12197 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
12198 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
12199 use bitcoin::{Block, Transaction, TxOut};
12201 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock};
12203 use criterion::Criterion;
12205 type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
12206 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
12207 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
12208 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
12209 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
12210 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
12211 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
12213 struct ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
12214 node: &'node_cfg Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>,
12216 impl<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg, P> {
12217 type CM = Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>;
12219 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P> { self.node }
12221 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
12224 pub fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Criterion) {
12225 bench_two_sends(bench, "bench_sends", test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
12228 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Criterion, bench_name: &str, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
12229 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
12230 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
12232 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
12233 let genesis_block = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network);
12235 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
12236 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
12237 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
12238 let scorer = RwLock::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
12239 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &scorer);
12241 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
12242 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(5_000_000 / 253);
12243 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
12245 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
12246 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
12247 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
12248 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
12250 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
12251 }, genesis_block.header.time);
12252 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
12254 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
12255 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
12256 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
12257 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
12258 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
12260 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
12261 }, genesis_block.header.time);
12262 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
12264 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
12265 features: node_b.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12267 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
12268 features: node_a.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12269 }, false).unwrap();
12270 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12271 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12272 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12275 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
12276 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
12277 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
12279 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
12280 } else { panic!(); }
12282 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12283 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12284 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
12285 match events_b[0] {
12286 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12287 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12289 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12292 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12293 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12294 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
12295 match events_a[0] {
12296 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12297 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
12299 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12302 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
12304 let block = create_dummy_block(BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash(), 42, vec![tx]);
12305 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
12306 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
12308 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12309 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12310 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
12311 match msg_events[0] {
12312 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
12313 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
12314 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12318 match msg_events[1] {
12319 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12323 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12324 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
12325 match events_a[0] {
12326 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12327 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
12329 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12332 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12333 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
12334 match events_b[0] {
12335 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12336 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12338 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12341 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
12342 macro_rules! send_payment {
12343 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
12344 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
12345 .with_bolt11_features($node_b.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
12346 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
12347 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
12348 payment_count += 1;
12349 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array());
12350 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
12352 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
12353 PaymentId(payment_hash.0),
12354 RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 10_000),
12355 Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
12356 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
12357 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
12358 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
12359 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
12360 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
12361 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
12362 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12364 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
12365 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
12366 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
12367 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
12369 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
12370 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
12371 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
12372 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
12373 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
12375 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
12378 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
12379 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
12380 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
12381 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12383 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
12387 bench.bench_function(bench_name, |b| b.iter(|| {
12388 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
12389 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);