1 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
3 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
4 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
5 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
7 //! It does not manage routing logic (see ln::router for that) nor does it manage constructing
8 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
9 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
13 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
14 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
15 use bitcoin::util::hash::BitcoinHash;
17 use bitcoin_hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
18 use bitcoin_hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
19 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
20 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
21 use bitcoin_hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
23 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
24 use secp256k1::Secp256k1;
25 use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
28 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ChainListener,FeeEstimator};
29 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
30 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
31 use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, ManyChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
32 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
33 use ln::router::Route;
36 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
37 use chain::keysinterface::{ChannelKeys, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemoryChannelKeys};
38 use util::config::UserConfig;
39 use util::{byte_utils, events};
40 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
41 use util::chacha20::{ChaCha20, ChaChaReader};
42 use util::logger::Logger;
43 use util::errors::APIError;
46 use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map, HashSet};
47 use std::io::{Cursor, Read};
48 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock};
49 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
50 use std::time::Duration;
51 use std::marker::{Sync, Send};
54 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
56 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
57 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
58 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
60 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
61 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
62 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
63 // before we forward it.
65 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
66 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
67 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
68 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
69 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
71 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
72 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
73 onion_packet: Option<msgs::OnionPacket>,
74 incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
75 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
76 short_channel_id: u64,
77 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
78 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
81 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
82 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
83 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
84 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
87 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
88 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
89 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
90 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
94 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
96 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
98 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
102 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
106 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
107 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
108 pub(super) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
109 short_channel_id: u64,
111 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
114 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
115 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
116 pub(super) enum HTLCSource {
117 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
120 session_priv: SecretKey,
121 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
122 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
123 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
128 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
129 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
130 route: Route { hops: Vec::new() },
131 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
132 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
137 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
138 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
140 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
148 /// payment_hash type, use to cross-lock hop
149 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
150 pub struct PaymentHash(pub [u8;32]);
151 /// payment_preimage type, use to route payment between hop
152 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
153 pub struct PaymentPreimage(pub [u8;32]);
155 type ShutdownResult = (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
157 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
158 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
159 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
160 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
161 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
163 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
164 err: msgs::LightningError,
165 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
167 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
169 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
171 err: LightningError {
173 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
174 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
176 data: err.to_string()
180 shutdown_finish: None,
184 fn ignore_no_close(err: &'static str) -> Self {
186 err: LightningError {
188 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
190 shutdown_finish: None,
194 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
195 Self { err, shutdown_finish: None }
198 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32], shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
200 err: LightningError {
202 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
203 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
205 data: err.to_string()
209 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
213 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
216 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
218 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
220 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
222 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
223 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
225 data: msg.to_string()
229 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { msg, .. } => LightningError {
231 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
232 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
234 data: msg.to_string()
239 shutdown_finish: None,
244 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
245 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
246 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
247 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
248 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
250 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
251 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
252 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
253 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
254 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
255 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
256 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
258 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
262 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
263 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> {
264 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<ChanSigner>>,
265 pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
266 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
267 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
268 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
269 /// ids in the PendingHTLCInfo!
270 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
271 /// payment_hash -> Vec<(amount_received, htlc_source)> for tracking things that were to us and
272 /// can be failed/claimed by the user
273 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
274 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
276 pub(super) claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<(u64, HTLCPreviousHopData)>>,
277 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
278 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
279 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>,
282 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
283 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
285 latest_features: InitFeatures,
288 #[cfg(not(any(target_pointer_width = "32", target_pointer_width = "64")))]
289 const ERR: () = "You need at least 32 bit pointers (well, usize, but we'll assume they're the same) for ChannelManager::latest_block_height";
291 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
292 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
293 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
294 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
295 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
296 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
297 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
298 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F> = Arc<ChannelManager<InMemoryChannelKeys, Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>>>;
300 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
301 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
302 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
303 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
304 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
305 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
306 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
307 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
308 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, M, T, F> = ChannelManager<InMemoryChannelKeys, &'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F>;
310 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
311 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
313 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
314 /// to individual Channels.
316 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
317 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
318 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
319 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
321 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
322 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
323 /// returning from ManyChannelMonitor::add_/update_monitor, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
324 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
325 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
326 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
327 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
329 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager), which
330 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
331 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
332 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
335 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
336 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
337 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
338 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
339 /// timer_chan_freshness_every_min roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
341 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
342 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
343 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
344 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
345 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
346 pub struct ChannelManager<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref>
347 where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>,
348 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
349 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
350 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
352 default_configuration: UserConfig,
353 genesis_hash: Sha256dHash,
359 pub(super) latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
361 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
362 last_block_hash: Mutex<Sha256dHash>,
363 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
366 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>,
368 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>,
369 our_network_key: SecretKey,
371 /// Used to track the last value sent in a node_announcement "timestamp" field. We ensure this
372 /// value increases strictly since we don't assume access to a time source.
373 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize,
375 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
376 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
377 /// are currently open with that peer.
378 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
379 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
381 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
383 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
384 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
385 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
386 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
387 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
394 /// The amount of time we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time between when
395 /// we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
396 pub(crate) const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
397 /// The amount of time we're willing to wait to claim money back to us
398 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24 * 7;
400 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
401 /// HTLC's CLTV. This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
402 /// ie the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
403 /// the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
404 /// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
405 const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 12; //TODO?
406 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
408 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
409 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
410 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
411 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
412 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
413 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
416 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
418 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying inbound claim. See
419 // ChannelMontior::would_broadcast_at_height for a description of why this is needed.
422 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
424 macro_rules! secp_call {
425 ( $res: expr, $err: expr ) => {
428 Err(_) => return Err($err),
433 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
434 pub struct ChannelDetails {
435 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
436 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
437 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
438 /// lifetime of the channel.
439 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
440 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
441 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
442 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
443 /// The node_id of our counterparty
444 pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
445 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
446 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
447 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
448 pub counterparty_features: InitFeatures,
449 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
450 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
451 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
453 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
454 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
455 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
456 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
457 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
458 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
459 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
460 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
461 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
462 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
463 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
464 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b)
465 /// the peer is connected, and (c) no monitor update failure is pending resolution.
469 macro_rules! handle_error {
470 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $their_node_id: expr, $locked_channel_state: expr) => {
473 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish }) => {
474 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
475 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
476 if let Some(update) = update_option {
477 $locked_channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
482 log_error!($self, "{}", err.err);
483 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
484 } else { $locked_channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id: $their_node_id, action: err.action.clone() }); }
485 // Return error in case higher-API need one
492 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
493 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
496 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
497 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
499 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
500 log_trace!($self, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
501 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
502 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
503 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
505 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
507 Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { .. }) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
512 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
513 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
516 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
517 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
519 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
520 log_trace!($self, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
521 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
522 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
523 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
525 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
527 Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { msg, update }) => {
528 log_error!($self, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
529 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
530 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
531 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
533 if let Err(e) = $self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update) {
535 // Upstream channel is dead, but we want at least to fail backward HTLCs to save
536 // downstream channels. In case of PermanentFailure, we are not going to be able
537 // to claim back to_remote output on remote commitment transaction. Doesn't
538 // make a difference here, we are concern about HTLCs circuit, not onchain funds.
539 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {},
540 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {},
543 let mut shutdown_res = chan.force_shutdown();
544 if shutdown_res.0.len() >= 1 {
545 log_error!($self, "You have a toxic local commitment transaction {} avaible in channel monitor, read comment in ChannelMonitor::get_latest_local_commitment_txn to be informed of manual action to take", shutdown_res.0[0].txid());
547 shutdown_res.0.clear();
548 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
554 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
555 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
556 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
558 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
560 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
561 log_error!($self, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]));
562 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
563 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
564 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
566 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
567 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
568 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
569 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
570 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
571 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
572 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
573 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
574 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
575 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure", channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()));
578 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
579 log_info!($self, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards and {} fails",
580 log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]),
581 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
583 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
584 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
586 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
587 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
589 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
590 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len());
591 if !$resend_commitment {
592 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
595 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
597 $entry.get_mut().monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
598 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor"), *$entry.key()))
604 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
605 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
606 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
608 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
609 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
613 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
614 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
615 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
616 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
617 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
620 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
625 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref> ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>
626 where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>,
627 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
628 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
629 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
631 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
633 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
634 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
636 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
638 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
640 /// Users must provide the current blockchain height from which to track onchain channel
641 /// funding outpoints and send payments with reliable timelocks.
643 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
644 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods.
645 /// However, rather than calling these methods directly, the user should register
646 /// the ChannelManager as a listener to the BlockNotifier and call the BlockNotifier's
647 /// `block_(dis)connected` methods, which will notify all registered listeners in one
649 pub fn new(network: Network, fee_est: F, monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: Arc<Logger>, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, current_blockchain_height: usize) -> Result<ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>, secp256k1::Error> {
650 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
652 let res = ChannelManager {
653 default_configuration: config.clone(),
654 genesis_hash: genesis_block(network).header.bitcoin_hash(),
655 fee_estimator: fee_est,
659 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(current_blockchain_height),
660 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(Default::default()),
663 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
664 by_id: HashMap::new(),
665 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
666 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
667 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
668 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
670 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
672 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(0),
674 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
676 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
677 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
687 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
689 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady and
690 /// FundingBroadcastSafe events to allow tracking of which events correspond with which
691 /// create_channel call. Note that user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you
692 /// may wish to avoid using 0 for user_id here.
694 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel message event, so you should probably poll
695 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
697 /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat is
698 /// greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k or channel_value_satoshis is < 1000.
699 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
700 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
701 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "channel_value must be at least 1000 satoshis" });
704 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
705 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_id, Arc::clone(&self.logger), config)?;
706 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
708 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
709 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
710 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
711 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
712 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
713 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG" });
715 panic!("RNG is bad???");
718 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
720 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
721 node_id: their_network_key,
727 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<ChanSigner>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
728 let mut res = Vec::new();
730 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
731 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
732 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
733 let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
734 res.push(ChannelDetails {
735 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
736 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
737 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
738 counterparty_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
739 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
740 inbound_capacity_msat,
741 outbound_capacity_msat,
742 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
743 is_live: channel.is_live(),
747 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
748 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
749 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.remote_network_id) {
750 chan.counterparty_features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
756 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
757 /// more information.
758 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
759 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
762 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
763 /// Router::get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
765 /// These are guaranteed to have their is_live value set to true, see the documentation for
766 /// ChannelDetails::is_live for more info on exactly what the criteria are.
767 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
768 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
769 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
770 // really wanted anyway.
771 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
774 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
775 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
776 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
778 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
779 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
780 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
782 let (mut failed_htlcs, chan_option) = {
783 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
784 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
785 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
786 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
787 let (shutdown_msg, failed_htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
788 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
789 node_id: chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(),
792 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
793 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
794 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
796 (failed_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
797 } else { (failed_htlcs, None) }
799 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel"})
802 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
803 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
805 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
806 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
811 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
812 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
813 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
822 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
823 let (local_txn, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
824 log_trace!(self, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} transactions to broadcast and {} HTLCs to fail", local_txn.len(), failed_htlcs.len());
825 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
826 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
828 for tx in local_txn {
829 log_trace!(self, "Broadcast onchain {}", log_tx!(tx));
830 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
834 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
835 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel.
836 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) {
837 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
840 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
841 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
842 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id) {
843 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
844 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
851 log_trace!(self, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
852 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown());
853 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
854 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
855 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
861 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
862 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
863 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
864 for chan in self.list_channels() {
865 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
869 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>) {
870 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
871 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
873 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
874 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
875 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
876 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
877 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
878 failure_code: $err_code,
879 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
884 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
885 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
888 let shared_secret = {
889 let mut arr = [0; 32];
890 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
893 let (rho, mu) = onion_utils::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
895 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
896 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
897 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
898 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
899 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
900 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
901 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
902 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
905 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&mu);
906 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
907 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash.0[..]);
908 if !fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
909 return_malformed_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5);
912 let mut channel_state = None;
913 macro_rules! return_err {
914 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
916 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
917 if channel_state.is_none() {
918 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
920 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
921 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
922 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
923 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
924 })), channel_state.unwrap());
929 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
930 let mut chacha_stream = ChaChaReader { chacha: &mut chacha, read: Cursor::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..]) };
931 let (next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac) = {
932 match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut chacha_stream) {
934 let error_code = match err {
935 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
936 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature|
937 msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue|
938 msgs::DecodeError::ShortRead => 0x4000 | 22, // invalid_onion_payload
939 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
941 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
944 let mut hmac = [0; 32];
945 if let Err(_) = chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut hmac[..]) {
946 return_err!("Unable to decode hop data", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
953 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_hmac == [0; 32] {
956 // In tests, make sure that the initial onion pcket data is, at least, non-0.
957 // We could do some fancy randomness test here, but, ehh, whatever.
958 // This checks for the issue where you can calculate the path length given the
959 // onion data as all the path entries that the originator sent will be here
960 // as-is (and were originally 0s).
961 // Of course reverse path calculation is still pretty easy given naive routing
962 // algorithms, but this fixes the most-obvious case.
963 let mut next_bytes = [0; 32];
964 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
965 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
966 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
967 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
971 // final_expiry_too_soon
972 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + (CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
973 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
975 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
976 if next_hop_data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
977 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
979 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
980 if next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
981 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
984 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
985 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
986 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
987 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
989 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
991 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
993 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
994 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
995 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
998 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
999 let read_pos = chacha_stream.read(&mut new_packet_data).unwrap();
1000 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1002 // Check two things:
1003 // a) that the behavior of our stream here will return Ok(0) even if the TLV
1004 // read above emptied out our buffer and the unwrap() wont needlessly panic
1005 // b) that we didn't somehow magically end up with extra data.
1007 debug_assert!(chacha_stream.read(&mut t).unwrap() == 0);
1009 // Once we've emptied the set of bytes our peer gave us, encrypt 0 bytes until we
1010 // fill the onion hop data we'll forward to our next-hop peer.
1011 chacha_stream.chacha.process_in_place(&mut new_packet_data[read_pos..]);
1013 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
1015 let blinding_factor = {
1016 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
1017 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
1018 sha.input(&shared_secret);
1019 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
1022 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
1024 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
1026 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
1029 hop_data: new_packet_data,
1030 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
1033 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
1034 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1035 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1036 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode => {
1037 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1041 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1042 onion_packet: Some(outgoing_packet),
1043 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1044 short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
1045 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1046 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1047 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1051 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1052 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref onion_packet, ref short_channel_id, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
1053 if onion_packet.is_some() { // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject them in the body here
1054 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
1055 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
1056 None => { // unknown_next_peer
1057 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
1059 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1061 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
1062 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
1064 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
1065 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
1066 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
1067 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
1068 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
1069 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
1070 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1072 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_their_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
1073 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1075 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
1076 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
1077 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1079 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
1080 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1082 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1083 // We want to have at least LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS to fail prior to going on chain CLAIM_BUFFER blocks before expiration
1084 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
1085 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1087 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
1088 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
1093 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
1094 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
1095 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
1096 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1098 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
1099 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1101 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
1102 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(chan_update.contents.flags));
1104 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1106 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
1111 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
1114 /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
1115 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1116 fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel<ChanSigner>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
1117 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1118 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established", action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
1122 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_their_node_id().serialize()[..];
1124 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1125 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
1126 short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
1127 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
1128 flags: (!were_node_one) as u16 | ((!chan.is_live() as u16) << 1),
1129 cltv_expiry_delta: CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
1130 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(),
1131 fee_base_msat: chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&self.fee_estimator),
1132 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
1133 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1136 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
1137 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
1139 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
1145 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
1147 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
1148 /// fields for more info.
1150 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
1151 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
1152 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
1153 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
1154 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
1155 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
1157 /// May generate a SendHTLCs message event on success, which should be relayed.
1159 /// Raises APIError::RoutError when invalid route or forward parameter
1160 /// (cltv_delta, fee, node public key) is specified.
1161 /// Raises APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
1162 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update failure).
1163 /// Raised APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
1164 /// relevant updates.
1166 /// In case of APIError::RouteError/APIError::ChannelUnavailable, the payment send has failed
1167 /// and you may wish to retry via a different route immediately.
1168 /// In case of APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed, the commitment update has been irrevocably
1169 /// committed on our end and we're just waiting for a monitor update to send it. Do NOT retry
1170 /// the payment via a different route unless you intend to pay twice!
1171 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1172 if route.hops.len() < 1 || route.hops.len() > 20 {
1173 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"});
1175 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1176 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate() {
1177 if idx != route.hops.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
1178 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"});
1182 let (session_priv, prng_seed) = self.keys_manager.get_onion_rand();
1184 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1186 let onion_keys = secp_call!(onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv),
1187 APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"});
1188 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height)?;
1189 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
1190 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
1192 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, &payment_hash);
1194 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1196 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1197 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
1199 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&route.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1200 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!"}),
1201 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1204 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
1205 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
1207 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1208 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1210 if !chan.get().is_live() {
1211 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!"});
1213 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1214 route: route.clone(),
1215 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1216 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
1217 }, onion_packet), channel_state, chan)
1219 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
1220 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1221 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
1222 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
1223 // that we will resent the commitment update once we unfree monitor
1224 // updating, so we have to take special care that we don't return
1225 // something else in case we will resend later!
1226 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1229 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1230 node_id: route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1231 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1232 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1233 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1234 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1235 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1243 } else { unreachable!(); }
1247 match handle_error!(self, err, route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey, channel_lock) {
1248 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
1249 Err(e) => { Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err }) }
1253 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
1255 /// Note that ALL inputs in the transaction pointed to by funding_txo MUST spend SegWit outputs
1256 /// or your counterparty can steal your funds!
1258 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
1260 /// May panic if the funding_txo is duplicative with some other channel (note that this should
1261 /// be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction keys per-channel).
1262 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_txo: OutPoint) {
1263 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1265 let (mut chan, msg, chan_monitor) = {
1266 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1267 let (res, chan) = match channel_state.by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
1269 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo)
1270 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
1271 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.force_shutdown(), None)
1272 } else { unreachable!(); })
1277 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_their_node_id(), channel_state) {
1278 Ok(funding_msg) => {
1279 (chan, funding_msg.0, funding_msg.1)
1281 Err(_) => { return; }
1284 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
1285 // lock before add_monitor
1286 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1288 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1290 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1291 match handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure", *temporary_channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), None)), chan.get_their_node_id(), channel_state) {
1292 Err(_) => { return; },
1293 Ok(()) => unreachable!(),
1297 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
1298 // Its completely fine to continue with a FundingCreated until the monitor
1299 // update is persisted, as long as we don't generate the FundingBroadcastSafe
1300 // until the monitor has been safely persisted (as funding broadcast is not,
1302 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new());
1307 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1308 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
1309 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1312 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
1313 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1314 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
1316 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1322 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel<ChanSigner>) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
1323 if !chan.should_announce() {
1324 log_trace!(self, "Can't send announcement_signatures for private channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
1328 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
1330 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
1332 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1333 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1335 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
1336 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
1337 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
1338 node_signature: our_node_sig,
1339 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
1344 // Messages of up to 64KB should never end up more than half full with addresses, as that would
1345 // be absurd. We ensure this by checking that at least 500 (our stated public contract on when
1346 // broadcast_node_announcement panics) of the maximum-length addresses would fit in a 64KB
1348 const HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS: u32 = ::std::u16::MAX as u32 / (msgs::NetAddress::MAX_LEN as u32 + 1) / 2;
1351 // ...by failing to compile if the number of addresses that would be half of a message is
1352 // smaller than 500:
1353 const STATIC_ASSERT: u32 = Self::HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS - 500;
1355 /// Generates a signed node_announcement from the given arguments and creates a
1356 /// BroadcastNodeAnnouncement event. Note that such messages will be ignored unless peers have
1357 /// seen a channel_announcement from us (ie unless we have public channels open).
1359 /// RGB is a node "color" and alias is a printable human-readable string to describe this node
1360 /// to humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning.
1362 /// addresses represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node accepts
1363 /// incoming connections. These will be broadcast to the network, publicly tying these
1364 /// addresses together. If you wish to preserve user privacy, addresses should likely contain
1365 /// only Tor Onion addresses.
1367 /// Panics if addresses is absurdly large (more than 500).
1368 pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], addresses: Vec<msgs::NetAddress>) {
1369 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1371 if addresses.len() > 500 {
1372 panic!("More than half the message size was taken up by public addresses!");
1375 let announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
1376 features: NodeFeatures::supported(),
1377 timestamp: self.last_node_announcement_serial.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32,
1378 node_id: self.get_our_node_id(),
1379 rgb, alias, addresses,
1380 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
1381 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1383 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1385 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1386 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement {
1387 msg: msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
1388 signature: self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key),
1389 contents: announcement
1394 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
1396 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
1397 /// Will likely generate further events.
1398 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
1399 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1401 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1402 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
1403 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
1405 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1406 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1408 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
1409 if short_chan_id != 0 {
1410 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
1411 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1413 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
1414 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1415 match forward_info {
1416 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } => {
1417 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1418 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1419 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1420 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1422 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x4000 | 10, None));
1424 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
1425 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
1426 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
1427 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
1428 // problem, not ours.
1435 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
1436 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1437 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1438 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1439 match forward_info {
1440 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } => {
1441 log_trace!(self, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", log_bytes!(forward_info.payment_hash.0), prev_short_channel_id, short_chan_id);
1442 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1443 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1444 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1445 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1447 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(forward_info.amt_to_forward, forward_info.payment_hash, forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), forward_info.onion_packet.unwrap()) {
1449 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
1450 log_trace!(self, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(forward_info.payment_hash.0), msg);
1452 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
1454 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap();
1455 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x1000 | 7, Some(chan_update)));
1460 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1462 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1463 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
1464 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
1465 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
1466 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
1467 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
1468 // this channel currently :/.
1474 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
1475 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} after delay", short_chan_id);
1476 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet) {
1478 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
1479 log_trace!(self, "Failed to fail backwards to short_id {}: {}", short_chan_id, msg);
1481 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
1483 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
1484 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
1485 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
1488 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1490 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1491 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
1492 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
1493 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
1494 // messages when we can.
1495 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
1496 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
1497 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
1504 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
1505 let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment() {
1508 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
1509 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
1510 let their_node_id = chan.get().get_their_node_id();
1511 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
1512 ChannelError::Ignore(_) => {
1513 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
1515 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1516 log_trace!(self, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
1517 let (channel_id, mut channel) = chan.remove_entry();
1518 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1519 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1521 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, channel.force_shutdown(), self.get_channel_update(&channel).ok()))
1523 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { .. } => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
1525 match handle_error!(self, err, their_node_id, channel_state) {
1526 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
1527 Err(_) => { continue; },
1531 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1532 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_their_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
1535 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1536 node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
1537 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1538 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
1539 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1540 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
1541 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1543 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1551 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1552 match forward_info {
1553 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } => {
1554 let prev_hop_data = HTLCPreviousHopData {
1555 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1556 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1557 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1559 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(forward_info.payment_hash) {
1560 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => entry.get_mut().push((forward_info.amt_to_forward, prev_hop_data)),
1561 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(vec![(forward_info.amt_to_forward, prev_hop_data)]); },
1563 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1564 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
1565 amt: forward_info.amt_to_forward,
1568 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
1569 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
1577 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_code, update) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
1579 None => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: Vec::new() }),
1580 Some(chan_update) => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }),
1584 if handle_errors.len() > 0 {
1585 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1586 for (their_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
1587 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
1591 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
1592 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1593 events.append(&mut new_events);
1596 /// If a peer is disconnected we mark any channels with that peer as 'disabled'.
1597 /// After some time, if channels are still disabled we need to broadcast a ChannelUpdate
1598 /// to inform the network about the uselessness of these channels.
1600 /// This method handles all the details, and must be called roughly once per minute.
1601 pub fn timer_chan_freshness_every_min(&self) {
1602 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1603 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1604 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1605 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter_mut() {
1606 if chan.is_disabled_staged() && !chan.is_live() {
1607 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1608 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1613 } else if chan.is_disabled_staged() && chan.is_live() {
1615 } else if chan.is_disabled_marked() {
1616 chan.to_disabled_staged();
1621 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
1622 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
1623 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
1624 /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
1625 /// HTLC backwards has been started.
1626 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) -> bool {
1627 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1629 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1630 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
1631 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1632 for (recvd_value, htlc_with_hash) in sources.drain(..) {
1633 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1634 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
1635 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_hash,
1636 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: byte_utils::be64_to_array(recvd_value).to_vec() });
1642 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
1643 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
1644 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
1645 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
1646 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
1647 /// still-available channels.
1648 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
1649 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
1650 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
1651 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
1654 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, .. } => {
1655 log_trace!(self, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
1656 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1657 match &onion_error {
1658 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
1660 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, onion_error_code) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
1662 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
1663 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
1664 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
1665 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
1666 if let Some(update) = channel_update {
1667 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1668 events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate {
1673 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
1674 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1675 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1676 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
1678 error_code: onion_error_code
1682 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
1686 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
1687 // TODO: We'd like to generate a PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate for temporary
1688 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as Router::get_route
1689 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
1691 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
1692 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
1693 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
1694 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1695 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1696 rejected_by_dest: route.hops.len() == 1,
1698 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
1704 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret }) => {
1705 let err_packet = match onion_error {
1706 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
1707 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
1708 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
1709 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
1711 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
1712 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
1713 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
1717 let mut forward_event = None;
1718 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
1719 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
1721 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
1722 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1723 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
1725 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1726 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
1729 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1730 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
1731 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1732 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
1733 time_forwardable: time
1740 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
1741 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
1742 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
1744 /// You must specify the expected amounts for this HTLC, and we will only claim HTLCs
1745 /// available within a few percent of the expected amount. This is critical for several
1746 /// reasons : a) it avoids providing senders with `proof-of-payment` (in the form of the
1747 /// payment_preimage without having provided the full value and b) it avoids certain
1748 /// privacy-breaking recipient-probing attacks which may reveal payment activity to
1749 /// motivated attackers.
1751 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
1752 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, expected_amount: u64) -> bool {
1753 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
1755 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1757 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1758 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
1759 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1760 for (received_amount, htlc_with_hash) in sources.drain(..) {
1761 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1762 if received_amount < expected_amount || received_amount > expected_amount * 2 {
1763 let mut htlc_msat_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(received_amount).to_vec();
1764 let mut height_data = byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).to_vec();
1765 htlc_msat_data.append(&mut height_data);
1766 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
1767 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), &payment_hash,
1768 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_data });
1770 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_preimage);
1776 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
1777 let (their_node_id, err) = loop {
1779 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1780 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1781 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1782 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
1786 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, .. }) => {
1787 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
1788 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1790 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1791 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1793 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1794 // learn the preimage as the channel already hit the chain and that's
1795 // why it's missing.
1800 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
1801 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
1802 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, payment_preimage) {
1803 Ok((msgs, monitor_option)) => {
1804 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_option {
1805 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1806 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
1807 assert!(msgs.is_none());
1809 break (chan.get().get_their_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()));
1813 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
1814 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1815 node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
1816 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1817 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1818 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
1819 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1820 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1828 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1829 // learn the preimage as the channel may be about to hit the chain.
1830 //TODO: Do something with e?
1834 } else { unreachable!(); }
1840 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
1843 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
1844 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1845 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key)
1848 /// Restores a single, given channel to normal operation after a
1849 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
1852 /// All ChannelMonitor updates up to and including highest_applied_update_id must have been
1853 /// fully committed in every copy of the given channels' ChannelMonitors.
1855 /// Note that there is no effect to calling with a highest_applied_update_id other than the
1856 /// current latest ChannelMonitorUpdate and one call to this function after multiple
1857 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures is fine. The highest_applied_update_id field
1858 /// exists largely only to prevent races between this and concurrent update_monitor calls.
1860 /// Thus, the anticipated use is, at a high level:
1861 /// 1) You register a ManyChannelMonitor with this ChannelManager,
1862 /// 2) it stores each update to disk, and begins updating any remote (eg watchtower) copies of
1863 /// said ChannelMonitors as it can, returning ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures
1864 /// any time it cannot do so instantly,
1865 /// 3) update(s) are applied to each remote copy of a ChannelMonitor,
1866 /// 4) once all remote copies are updated, you call this function with the update_id that
1867 /// completed, and once it is the latest the Channel will be re-enabled.
1868 pub fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
1869 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1871 let mut close_results = Vec::new();
1872 let mut htlc_forwards = Vec::new();
1873 let mut htlc_failures = Vec::new();
1874 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
1877 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1878 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
1879 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
1880 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
1881 let channel = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
1885 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
1889 let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, needs_broadcast_safe, funding_locked) = channel.monitor_updating_restored();
1890 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
1891 htlc_forwards.push((channel.get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"), pending_forwards));
1893 htlc_failures.append(&mut pending_failures);
1895 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1896 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
1897 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1898 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1903 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1904 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
1905 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1906 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1907 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1912 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1916 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1921 if needs_broadcast_safe {
1922 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
1923 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap(),
1924 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1927 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
1928 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
1929 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1932 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
1933 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1934 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1935 msg: announcement_sigs,
1938 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
1942 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().append(&mut pending_events);
1944 for failure in htlc_failures.drain(..) {
1945 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
1947 self.forward_htlcs(&mut htlc_forwards[..]);
1949 for res in close_results.drain(..) {
1950 self.finish_force_close_channel(res);
1954 fn internal_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1955 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
1956 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
1959 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_node_id.clone(), their_features, msg, 0, Arc::clone(&self.logger), &self.default_configuration)
1960 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
1961 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1962 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1963 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
1964 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
1965 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1966 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
1967 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1968 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
1970 entry.insert(channel);
1976 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1977 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
1978 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1979 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
1980 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1981 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1982 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1983 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1985 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration, their_features), channel_state, chan);
1986 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
1988 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1991 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1992 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
1993 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1994 channel_value_satoshis: value,
1995 output_script: output_script,
1996 user_channel_id: user_id,
2001 fn internal_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2002 let ((funding_msg, monitor_update), mut chan) = {
2003 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2004 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2005 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
2006 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2007 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2008 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
2010 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
2012 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
2015 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
2016 // lock before add_monitor
2017 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_monitor(monitor_update.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2019 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
2020 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
2021 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
2022 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
2023 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
2024 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure", funding_msg.channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), None));
2026 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
2027 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
2028 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
2029 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our funding_locked
2030 // until we have persisted our monitor.
2031 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2035 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2036 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2037 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
2038 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2039 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id", funding_msg.channel_id))
2041 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2042 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
2043 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2052 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2053 let (funding_txo, user_id) = {
2054 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2055 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2056 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2057 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2058 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2059 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2061 let monitor_update = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg) {
2062 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
2063 Err((Some(monitor_update), e)) => {
2064 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
2065 let _ = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
2066 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan);
2069 Ok(update) => update,
2071 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2072 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, false, false);
2074 (chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get().get_user_id())
2076 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2079 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2080 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
2081 funding_txo: funding_txo,
2082 user_channel_id: user_id,
2087 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2088 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2089 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2090 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2091 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2092 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2093 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2095 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg), channel_state, chan);
2096 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
2097 log_trace!(self, "Sending announcement_signatures for {} in response to funding_locked", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2098 // If we see locking block before receiving remote funding_locked, we broadcast our
2099 // announcement_sigs at remote funding_locked reception. If we receive remote
2100 // funding_locked before seeing locking block, we broadcast our announcement_sigs at locking
2101 // block connection. We should guanrantee to broadcast announcement_sigs to our peer whatever
2102 // the order of the events but our peer may not receive it due to disconnection. The specs
2103 // lacking an acknowledgement for announcement_sigs we may have to re-send them at peer
2104 // connection in the future if simultaneous misses by both peers due to network/hardware
2105 // failures is an issue. Note, to achieve its goal, only one of the announcement_sigs needs
2106 // to be received, from then sigs are going to be flood to the whole network.
2107 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2108 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2109 msg: announcement_sigs,
2114 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2118 fn internal_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2119 let (mut dropped_htlcs, chan_option) = {
2120 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2121 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2123 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
2124 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2125 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2126 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2128 let (shutdown, closing_signed, dropped_htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
2129 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
2130 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2131 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2135 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2136 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2137 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2141 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
2142 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
2143 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2145 (dropped_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
2146 } else { (dropped_htlcs, None) }
2148 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2151 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
2152 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2154 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
2155 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2156 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2157 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2165 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2166 let (tx, chan_option) = {
2167 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2168 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2169 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
2170 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2171 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2172 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2174 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
2175 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2176 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2177 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2182 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
2183 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
2184 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
2185 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
2186 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
2187 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
2188 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2190 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
2191 } else { (tx, None) }
2193 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2196 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
2197 log_trace!(self, "Broadcast onchain {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
2198 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
2200 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
2201 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2202 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2203 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2211 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2212 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
2213 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
2214 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
2216 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
2217 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
2218 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
2219 //but we should prevent it anyway.
2221 let (mut pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
2222 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2224 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2225 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2226 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2227 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2229 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
2230 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
2231 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
2232 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
2233 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { incoming_shared_secret, .. }) = pending_forward_info {
2234 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan.get());
2235 pending_forward_info = PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2236 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2237 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2238 reason: if let Ok(update) = chan_update {
2239 // TODO: Note that |20 is defined as "channel FROM the processing
2240 // node has been disabled" (emphasis mine), which seems to imply
2241 // that we can't return |20 for an inbound channel being disabled.
2242 // This probably needs a spec update but should definitely be
2244 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x1000|20, &{
2245 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
2246 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(update.contents.flags));
2247 res.extend_from_slice(&update.encode_with_len()[..]);
2251 // This can only happen if the channel isn't in the fully-funded
2252 // state yet, implying our counterparty is trying to route payments
2253 // over the channel back to themselves (cause no one else should
2254 // know the short_id is a lightning channel yet). We should have no
2255 // problem just calling this unknown_next_peer
2256 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
2261 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info), channel_state, chan);
2263 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2268 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2269 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2271 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2272 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2273 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2274 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2275 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2277 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
2279 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2282 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone());
2286 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2287 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2288 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2289 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2290 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2291 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2292 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2294 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
2296 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2301 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2302 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2303 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2304 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2305 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2306 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2307 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2309 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
2310 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set");
2311 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
2313 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
2316 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2320 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2321 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2322 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2323 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2324 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2325 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2326 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2328 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, closing_signed, monitor_update) =
2329 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.fee_estimator) {
2330 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
2331 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
2332 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
2333 let _ = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
2334 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan);
2339 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2340 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
2341 //TODO: Rebroadcast closing_signed if present on monitor update restoration
2343 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2344 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2345 msg: revoke_and_ack,
2347 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
2348 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2349 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2350 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2351 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2352 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2353 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2354 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2356 commitment_signed: msg,
2360 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2361 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2362 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2368 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2373 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
2374 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
2375 let mut forward_event = None;
2376 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
2377 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2378 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
2379 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
2381 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2382 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(forward_info.short_channel_id) {
2383 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2384 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
2386 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2387 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
2392 match forward_event {
2394 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2395 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
2396 time_forwardable: time
2404 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2405 let (pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, short_channel_id) = {
2406 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2407 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2408 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2409 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2410 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2411 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2413 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
2414 let (commitment_update, pending_forwards, pending_failures, closing_signed, monitor_update) =
2415 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator), channel_state, chan);
2416 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2417 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
2418 assert!(commitment_update.is_none() && closing_signed.is_none() && pending_forwards.is_empty() && pending_failures.is_empty());
2419 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA"));
2421 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, commitment_update.is_some(), pending_forwards, pending_failures);
2424 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2425 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2426 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2430 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2431 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2432 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2436 (pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"))
2438 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2441 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
2442 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
2444 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, pending_forwards)]);
2449 fn internal_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2450 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2451 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2452 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2453 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2454 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2455 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2457 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
2459 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2464 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2465 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2466 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2468 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2469 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2470 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2471 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2473 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
2474 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it", action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
2477 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2478 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) =
2479 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone()), channel_state, chan);
2481 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
2482 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2483 if self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 }).is_err() ||
2484 self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 }).is_err() {
2485 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Bad announcement_signatures node_signature");
2486 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
2489 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2491 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2492 msg: msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
2493 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
2494 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
2495 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
2496 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
2497 contents: announcement,
2499 update_msg: self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap(), // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
2502 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2507 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2508 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2509 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2511 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2512 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2513 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2514 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2516 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, monitor_update_opt, mut order, shutdown) =
2517 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg), channel_state, chan);
2518 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
2519 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2520 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
2521 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
2522 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
2523 if revoke_and_ack.is_none() {
2524 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
2526 if commitment_update.is_none() {
2527 order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
2529 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, order, revoke_and_ack.is_some(), commitment_update.is_some());
2530 //TODO: Resend the funding_locked if needed once we get the monitor running again
2533 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
2534 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2535 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2539 macro_rules! send_raa { () => {
2540 if let Some(msg) = revoke_and_ack {
2541 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2542 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2547 macro_rules! send_cu { () => {
2548 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2549 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2550 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2556 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
2560 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
2565 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
2566 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2567 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2573 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2577 /// Begin Update fee process. Allowed only on an outbound channel.
2578 /// If successful, will generate a UpdateHTLCs event, so you should probably poll
2579 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
2580 /// Note: This API is likely to change!
2582 pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2583 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2584 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2586 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2587 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2589 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id) {
2590 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel"}),
2591 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2592 if !chan.get().is_outbound() {
2593 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "update_fee cannot be sent for an inbound channel"});
2595 if chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
2596 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2598 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2599 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel is either not yet fully established or peer is currently disconnected"});
2601 their_node_id = chan.get().get_their_node_id();
2602 if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) =
2603 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw), channel_state, chan)
2605 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2608 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2609 node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
2610 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2611 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2612 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2613 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2614 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2615 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
2625 match handle_error!(self, err, their_node_id, channel_state_lock) {
2626 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2627 Err(e) => { Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: e.err })}
2632 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref> events::MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>
2633 where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>,
2634 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2635 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
2636 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2638 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<events::MessageSendEvent> {
2639 // TODO: Event release to users and serialization is currently race-y: it's very easy for a
2640 // user to serialize a ChannelManager with pending events in it and lose those events on
2641 // restart. This is doubly true for the fail/fulfill-backs from monitor events!
2643 //TODO: This behavior should be documented.
2644 for htlc_update in self.monitor.get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated() {
2645 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
2646 log_trace!(self, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
2647 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
2649 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
2650 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2655 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2656 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2657 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
2662 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref> events::EventsProvider for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>
2663 where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>,
2664 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2665 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
2666 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2668 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
2669 // TODO: Event release to users and serialization is currently race-y: it's very easy for a
2670 // user to serialize a ChannelManager with pending events in it and lose those events on
2671 // restart. This is doubly true for the fail/fulfill-backs from monitor events!
2673 //TODO: This behavior should be documented.
2674 for htlc_update in self.monitor.get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated() {
2675 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
2676 log_trace!(self, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
2677 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
2679 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
2680 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2685 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2686 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2687 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
2692 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref + Sync + Send, T: Deref + Sync + Send, K: Deref + Sync + Send, F: Deref + Sync + Send>
2693 ChainListener for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>
2694 where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>,
2695 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2696 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
2697 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2699 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
2700 let header_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
2701 log_trace!(self, "Block {} at height {} connected with {} txn matched", header_hash, height, txn_matched.len());
2702 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2703 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2705 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2706 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2707 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
2708 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2709 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
2710 let chan_res = channel.block_connected(header, height, txn_matched, indexes_of_txn_matched);
2711 if let Ok(Some(funding_locked)) = chan_res {
2712 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2713 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2714 msg: funding_locked,
2716 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
2717 log_trace!(self, "Sending funding_locked and announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
2718 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2719 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2720 msg: announcement_sigs,
2723 log_trace!(self, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
2725 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
2726 } else if let Err(e) = chan_res {
2727 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2728 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2729 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: e },
2733 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
2734 for tx in txn_matched {
2735 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
2736 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
2737 log_trace!(self, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
2738 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2739 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2741 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain. We go ahead and
2742 // broadcast our latest local state as well here, just in case its
2743 // some kind of SPV attack, though we expect these to be dropped.
2744 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2745 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2746 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2755 if channel.is_funding_initiated() && channel.channel_monitor().would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
2756 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2757 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2759 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2760 // If would_broadcast_at_height() is true, the channel_monitor will broadcast
2761 // the latest local tx for us, so we should skip that here (it doesn't really
2762 // hurt anything, but does make tests a bit simpler).
2763 failed_channels.last_mut().unwrap().0 = Vec::new();
2764 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2765 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2774 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2775 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2777 self.latest_block_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release);
2778 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header_hash;
2780 // Update last_node_announcement_serial to be the max of its current value and the
2781 // block timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
2782 // having an explicit local time source.
2783 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully update
2784 // last_node_announcement_serial or decide we don't need to.
2785 let old_serial = self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire);
2786 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
2787 if self.last_node_announcement_serial.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
2793 /// We force-close the channel without letting our counterparty participate in the shutdown
2794 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, _: u32) {
2795 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2796 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2798 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2799 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2800 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
2801 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2802 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, v| {
2803 if v.block_disconnected(header) {
2804 if let Some(short_id) = v.get_short_channel_id() {
2805 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2807 failed_channels.push(v.force_shutdown());
2808 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&v) {
2809 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2819 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2820 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2822 self.latest_block_height.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
2823 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header.bitcoin_hash();
2827 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref + Sync + Send, T: Deref + Sync + Send, K: Deref + Sync + Send, F: Deref + Sync + Send>
2828 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>
2829 where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>,
2830 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2831 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
2832 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2834 fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
2835 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2836 let res = self.internal_open_channel(their_node_id, their_features, msg);
2838 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2839 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2843 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
2844 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2845 let res = self.internal_accept_channel(their_node_id, their_features, msg);
2847 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2848 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2852 fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
2853 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2854 let res = self.internal_funding_created(their_node_id, msg);
2856 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2857 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2861 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
2862 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2863 let res = self.internal_funding_signed(their_node_id, msg);
2865 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2866 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2870 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) {
2871 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2872 let res = self.internal_funding_locked(their_node_id, msg);
2874 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2875 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2879 fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
2880 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2881 let res = self.internal_shutdown(their_node_id, msg);
2883 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2884 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2888 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
2889 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2890 let res = self.internal_closing_signed(their_node_id, msg);
2892 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2893 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2897 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
2898 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2899 let res = self.internal_update_add_htlc(their_node_id, msg);
2901 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2902 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2906 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
2907 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2908 let res = self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(their_node_id, msg);
2910 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2911 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2915 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
2916 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2917 let res = self.internal_update_fail_htlc(their_node_id, msg);
2919 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2920 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2924 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
2925 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2926 let res = self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(their_node_id, msg);
2928 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2929 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2933 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
2934 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2935 let res = self.internal_commitment_signed(their_node_id, msg);
2937 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2938 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2942 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
2943 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2944 let res = self.internal_revoke_and_ack(their_node_id, msg);
2946 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2947 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2951 fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
2952 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2953 let res = self.internal_update_fee(their_node_id, msg);
2955 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2956 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2960 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
2961 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2962 let res = self.internal_announcement_signatures(their_node_id, msg);
2964 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2965 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2969 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
2970 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2971 let res = self.internal_channel_reestablish(their_node_id, msg);
2973 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2974 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2978 fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
2979 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2980 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2981 let mut failed_payments = Vec::new();
2982 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
2984 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2985 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2986 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
2987 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2988 if no_connection_possible {
2989 log_debug!(self, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2990 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2991 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2992 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2993 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2995 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown());
2996 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2997 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3007 log_debug!(self, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
3008 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
3009 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
3010 let failed_adds = chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused();
3011 chan.to_disabled_marked();
3012 if !failed_adds.is_empty() {
3013 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&chan).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
3014 failed_payments.push((chan_update, failed_adds));
3016 if chan.is_shutdown() {
3017 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
3018 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3022 no_channels_remain = false;
3028 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
3030 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3031 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3032 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3033 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3034 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3035 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3036 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3037 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3038 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3039 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3040 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3041 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
3042 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
3043 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
3044 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3045 &events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => true,
3049 if no_channels_remain {
3050 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(their_node_id);
3053 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
3054 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
3056 for (chan_update, mut htlc_sources) in failed_payments {
3057 for (htlc_source, payment_hash) in htlc_sources.drain(..) {
3058 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.clone() });
3063 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) {
3064 log_debug!(self, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
3066 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3069 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
3070 match peer_state_lock.entry(their_node_id.clone()) {
3071 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3072 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
3073 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
3076 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
3077 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
3082 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3083 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3084 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3085 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
3086 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
3087 if !chan.have_received_message() {
3088 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
3089 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
3090 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
3094 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
3095 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
3096 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(),
3102 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
3105 fn handle_error(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
3106 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3108 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
3109 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3110 if chan.remote_network_id == *their_node_id {
3111 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
3115 self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
3120 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
3121 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
3123 impl Writeable for PendingHTLCInfo {
3124 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3125 self.onion_packet.write(writer)?;
3126 self.incoming_shared_secret.write(writer)?;
3127 self.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
3128 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
3129 self.amt_to_forward.write(writer)?;
3130 self.outgoing_cltv_value.write(writer)?;
3135 impl Readable for PendingHTLCInfo {
3136 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, DecodeError> {
3137 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
3138 onion_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
3139 incoming_shared_secret: Readable::read(reader)?,
3140 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
3141 short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3142 amt_to_forward: Readable::read(reader)?,
3143 outgoing_cltv_value: Readable::read(reader)?,
3148 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
3149 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3151 &HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(ref fail_msg) => {
3153 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3155 &HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(ref fail_msg) => {
3157 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3164 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
3165 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailureMsg, DecodeError> {
3166 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3167 0 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3168 1 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3169 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3174 impl Writeable for PendingHTLCStatus {
3175 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3177 &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(ref forward_info) => {
3179 forward_info.write(writer)?;
3181 &PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(ref fail_msg) => {
3183 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3190 impl Readable for PendingHTLCStatus {
3191 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingHTLCStatus, DecodeError> {
3192 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3193 0 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3194 1 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3195 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3200 impl_writeable!(HTLCPreviousHopData, 0, {
3203 incoming_packet_shared_secret
3206 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
3207 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3209 &HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref hop_data) => {
3211 hop_data.write(writer)?;
3213 &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
3215 route.write(writer)?;
3216 session_priv.write(writer)?;
3217 first_hop_htlc_msat.write(writer)?;
3224 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
3225 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCSource, DecodeError> {
3226 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3227 0 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3228 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3229 route: Readable::read(reader)?,
3230 session_priv: Readable::read(reader)?,
3231 first_hop_htlc_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
3233 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3238 impl Writeable for HTLCFailReason {
3239 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3241 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
3245 &HTLCFailReason::Reason { ref failure_code, ref data } => {
3247 failure_code.write(writer)?;
3248 data.write(writer)?;
3255 impl Readable for HTLCFailReason {
3256 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailReason, DecodeError> {
3257 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3258 0 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: Readable::read(reader)? }),
3259 1 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3260 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
3261 data: Readable::read(reader)?,
3263 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3268 impl Writeable for HTLCForwardInfo {
3269 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3271 &HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { ref prev_short_channel_id, ref prev_htlc_id, ref forward_info } => {
3273 prev_short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
3274 prev_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3275 forward_info.write(writer)?;
3277 &HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3279 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3280 err_packet.write(writer)?;
3287 impl Readable for HTLCForwardInfo {
3288 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCForwardInfo, DecodeError> {
3289 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3290 0 => Ok(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC {
3291 prev_short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3292 prev_htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3293 forward_info: Readable::read(reader)?,
3295 1 => Ok(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC {
3296 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3297 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
3299 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3304 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Writeable, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>
3305 where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>,
3306 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3307 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
3308 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3310 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3311 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
3313 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
3314 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
3316 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
3317 (self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
3318 self.last_block_hash.lock().unwrap().write(writer)?;
3320 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3321 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
3322 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
3323 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
3324 unfunded_channels += 1;
3327 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
3328 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
3329 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
3330 channel.write(writer)?;
3334 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3335 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
3336 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
3337 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3338 for forward in pending_forwards {
3339 forward.write(writer)?;
3343 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3344 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
3345 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
3346 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3347 for &(recvd_amt, ref previous_hop) in previous_hops.iter() {
3348 recvd_amt.write(writer)?;
3349 previous_hop.write(writer)?;
3353 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
3354 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3355 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3356 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
3357 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3358 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
3361 (self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
3367 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
3369 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
3371 /// 1) Deserialize all stored ChannelMonitors.
3372 /// 2) Deserialize the ChannelManager by filling in this struct and calling <(Sha256dHash,
3373 /// ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args).
3374 /// This may result in closing some Channels if the ChannelMonitor is newer than the stored
3375 /// ChannelManager state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
3376 /// 3) Register all relevant ChannelMonitor outpoints with your chain watch mechanism using
3377 /// ChannelMonitor::get_monitored_outpoints and ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo().
3378 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your ChannelMonitors.
3379 /// 5) Move the ChannelMonitors into your local ManyChannelMonitor.
3380 /// 6) Disconnect/connect blocks on the ChannelManager.
3381 /// 7) Register the new ChannelManager with your ChainWatchInterface.
3382 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner: 'a + ChannelKeys, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref>
3383 where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>,
3384 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3385 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
3386 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3389 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
3390 /// deserialization.
3391 pub keys_manager: K,
3393 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3395 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
3396 pub fee_estimator: F,
3397 /// The ManyChannelMonitor for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3399 /// No calls to the ManyChannelMonitor will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
3400 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
3401 /// ManyChannelMonitor after deserializing this ChannelManager.
3404 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
3405 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
3406 /// force-closed during deserialization.
3407 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
3408 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
3409 /// deserialization.
3410 pub logger: Arc<Logger>,
3411 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
3412 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
3413 pub default_config: UserConfig,
3415 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
3416 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
3418 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
3419 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
3420 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
3421 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
3423 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
3425 pub channel_monitors: &'a mut HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>>,
3428 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
3429 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
3430 impl<'a, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref>
3431 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>> for (Sha256dHash, Arc<ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>>)
3432 where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>,
3433 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3434 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
3435 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3437 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
3438 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>)>::read(reader, args)?;
3439 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
3443 impl<'a, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref>
3444 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>)
3445 where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>,
3446 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3447 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
3448 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3450 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
3451 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3452 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3453 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
3454 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
3457 let genesis_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3458 let latest_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3459 let last_block_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3461 let mut closed_channels = Vec::new();
3463 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3464 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3465 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3466 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3467 for _ in 0..channel_count {
3468 let mut channel: Channel<ChanSigner> = ReadableArgs::read(reader, args.logger.clone())?;
3469 if channel.last_block_connected != Default::default() && channel.last_block_connected != last_block_hash {
3470 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3473 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
3474 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
3475 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
3476 if channel.get_cur_local_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_cur_local_commitment_number() ||
3477 channel.get_revoked_remote_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
3478 channel.get_cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_cur_remote_commitment_number() ||
3479 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
3480 let mut force_close_res = channel.force_shutdown();
3481 force_close_res.0 = monitor.get_latest_local_commitment_txn();
3482 closed_channels.push(force_close_res);
3484 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
3485 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
3487 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
3490 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3494 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
3495 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
3496 closed_channels.push((monitor.get_latest_local_commitment_txn(), Vec::new()));
3500 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3501 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
3502 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
3503 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
3504 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3505 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, 128));
3506 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
3507 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
3509 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
3512 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3513 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
3514 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
3515 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3516 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3517 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, 2));
3518 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
3519 previous_hops.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
3521 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
3524 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3525 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, 128));
3526 for _ in 0..peer_count {
3527 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
3528 let peer_state = PeerState {
3529 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
3531 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
3534 let last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3536 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
3538 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
3539 monitor: args.monitor,
3540 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
3542 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(latest_block_height as usize),
3543 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(last_block_hash),
3544 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
3546 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
3551 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
3553 our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
3555 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(last_node_announcement_serial as usize),
3557 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
3559 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
3560 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
3561 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
3562 logger: args.logger,
3563 default_configuration: args.default_config,
3566 for close_res in closed_channels.drain(..) {
3567 channel_manager.finish_force_close_channel(close_res);
3568 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
3569 //connection or two.
3572 Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))