1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see routing::router::get_route for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
27 use bitcoin::hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
30 use bitcoin::hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
31 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
35 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
36 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
39 use chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, Watch, BestBlock};
40 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator};
41 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
42 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
43 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
44 // construct one themselves.
45 use ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
46 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
47 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
48 use routing::router::{Payee, Route, RouteHop, RoutePath, RouteParameters};
50 use ln::msgs::NetAddress;
52 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, OptionalField};
53 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
54 use util::config::UserConfig;
55 use util::events::{EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
56 use util::{byte_utils, events};
57 use util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer};
58 use util::chacha20::{ChaCha20, ChaChaReader};
59 use util::logger::{Logger, Level};
60 use util::errors::APIError;
65 use core::cell::RefCell;
66 use io::{Cursor, Read};
67 use sync::{Arc, Condvar, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
68 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
69 use core::time::Duration;
70 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
71 use std::time::Instant;
74 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
76 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
77 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
78 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
80 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
81 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
82 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
83 // before we forward it.
85 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
86 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
87 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
88 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
89 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
91 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
92 enum PendingHTLCRouting {
94 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
95 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
98 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
99 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
102 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
103 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
107 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
108 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
109 routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
110 incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
111 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
112 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
113 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
116 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
117 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
118 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
119 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
122 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
123 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
124 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
125 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
126 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
129 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
131 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
133 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
134 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
135 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
137 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
139 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
143 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
147 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
148 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
149 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
150 short_channel_id: u64,
152 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
154 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
155 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
160 /// Contains a total_msat (which may differ from value if this is a Multi-Path Payment) and a
161 /// payment_secret which prevents path-probing attacks and can associate different HTLCs which
162 /// are part of the same payment.
163 Invoice(msgs::FinalOnionHopData),
164 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
165 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
168 struct ClaimableHTLC {
169 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
172 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
175 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
176 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
177 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
178 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
180 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
181 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
186 impl Readable for PaymentId {
187 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
188 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
192 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
193 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
194 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
195 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
196 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
199 session_priv: SecretKey,
200 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
201 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
202 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
203 payment_id: PaymentId,
204 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
205 payee: Option<Payee>,
208 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
209 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
210 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
212 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
214 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
216 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_secret, first_hop_htlc_msat, payee } => {
219 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
220 payment_id.hash(hasher);
221 payment_secret.hash(hasher);
222 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
230 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
231 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
233 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
234 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
235 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
236 payment_secret: None,
242 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
243 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
245 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
253 /// Return value for claim_funds_from_hop
254 enum ClaimFundsFromHop {
256 MonitorUpdateFail(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal, Option<u64>),
261 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
263 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
264 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
265 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
266 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
267 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
269 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
270 err: msgs::LightningError,
271 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u64)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
272 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
274 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
276 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
278 err: LightningError {
280 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
281 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
288 shutdown_finish: None,
292 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
294 err: LightningError {
296 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
299 shutdown_finish: None,
303 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
304 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
307 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u64, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
309 err: LightningError {
311 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
312 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
318 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
319 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
323 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
326 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
328 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
330 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
332 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
334 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
336 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
337 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
343 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => LightningError {
345 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
346 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
354 shutdown_finish: None,
359 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
360 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
361 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
362 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
363 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
365 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
366 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
367 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
368 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
369 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
370 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
371 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
373 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
377 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
378 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<Signer: Sign> {
379 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
380 pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
381 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
382 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
383 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
384 /// ids in the PendingHTLCInfo!
385 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
386 /// Map from payment hash to any HTLCs which are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user.
387 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
388 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
390 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>>,
391 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
392 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
393 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
396 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
397 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
398 /// quite some time lag.
399 enum BackgroundEvent {
400 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
401 /// commitment transaction.
402 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
405 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
406 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
408 latest_features: InitFeatures,
411 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
412 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
414 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
417 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
418 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
419 struct PendingInboundPayment {
420 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
421 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
422 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
423 /// this payment being removed.
425 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
426 user_payment_id: u64,
427 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
428 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
429 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
432 /// Stores the session_priv for each part of a payment that is still pending. For versions 0.0.102
433 /// and later, also stores information for retrying the payment.
434 pub(crate) enum PendingOutboundPayment {
436 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
439 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
440 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
441 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
442 pending_amt_msat: u64,
443 /// Used to track the fee paid. Only present if the payment was serialized on 0.0.103+.
444 pending_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
445 /// The total payment amount across all paths, used to verify that a retry is not overpaying.
447 /// Our best known block height at the time this payment was initiated.
448 starting_block_height: u32,
450 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
451 /// been resolved. This ensures we don't look up pending payments in ChannelMonitors on restart
452 /// and add a pending payment that was already fulfilled.
454 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
458 impl PendingOutboundPayment {
459 fn is_retryable(&self) -> bool {
461 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { .. } => true,
465 fn is_fulfilled(&self) -> bool {
467 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => true,
471 fn get_pending_fee_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
473 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { pending_fee_msat, .. } => pending_fee_msat.clone(),
478 fn mark_fulfilled(&mut self) {
479 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
480 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
481 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
482 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
483 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs }
486 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs };
489 /// panics if path is None and !self.is_fulfilled
490 fn remove(&mut self, session_priv: &[u8; 32], path: Option<&Vec<RouteHop>>) -> bool {
491 let remove_res = match self {
492 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
493 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
494 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs } => {
495 session_privs.remove(session_priv)
499 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
500 let path = path.expect("Fulfilling a payment should always come with a path");
501 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
502 *pending_amt_msat -= path_last_hop.fee_msat;
503 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
504 *fee_msat -= path.get_path_fees();
511 fn insert(&mut self, session_priv: [u8; 32], path: &Vec<RouteHop>) -> bool {
512 let insert_res = match self {
513 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
514 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
515 session_privs.insert(session_priv)
517 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => false
520 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
521 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
522 *pending_amt_msat += path_last_hop.fee_msat;
523 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
524 *fee_msat += path.get_path_fees();
531 fn remaining_parts(&self) -> usize {
533 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
534 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
535 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs } => {
542 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
543 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
544 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
545 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
546 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
547 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
548 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
549 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>;
551 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
552 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
553 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
554 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
555 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
556 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
557 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
558 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
559 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, &'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
561 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
562 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
564 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
565 /// to individual Channels.
567 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
568 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
569 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
570 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
572 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
573 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
574 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
575 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
576 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
577 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
578 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
580 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
581 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
582 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
583 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
586 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
587 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
588 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
589 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
590 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
592 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
593 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
594 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
595 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
596 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
597 pub struct ChannelManager<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
598 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
599 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
600 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
601 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
604 default_configuration: UserConfig,
605 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
611 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
613 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
614 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
616 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
617 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
618 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
619 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
621 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
622 /// expose them to users via a PaymentReceived event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
623 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
624 /// after we generate a PaymentReceived upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
625 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
626 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
628 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
629 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
630 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
631 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
632 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
633 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
634 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
635 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
637 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
639 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
640 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment>>,
642 our_network_key: SecretKey,
643 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
645 /// Used to track the last value sent in a node_announcement "timestamp" field. We ensure this
646 /// value increases strictly since we don't assume access to a time source.
647 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize,
649 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
650 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
651 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
652 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
654 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
655 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
656 /// are currently open with that peer.
657 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
658 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
661 /// If also holding `channel_state` lock, must lock `channel_state` prior to `per_peer_state`.
662 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
664 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
665 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
666 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
667 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
668 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
669 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
670 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
671 /// PersistenceNotifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
672 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
674 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier,
681 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
683 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
684 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
685 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
686 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
687 pub struct ChainParameters {
688 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
689 pub network: Network,
691 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
693 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
694 pub best_block: BestBlock,
697 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
703 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
704 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
705 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
706 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
707 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
708 /// updates are ready for persistence).
710 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
711 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
712 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
713 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
714 persistence_notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier,
716 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
717 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
720 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
721 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
722 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
725 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
726 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
728 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
729 persistence_notifier: notifier,
730 should_persist: persist_check,
731 _read_guard: read_guard,
736 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
738 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
739 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
744 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
745 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
747 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
749 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
750 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
751 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
752 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
753 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
755 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
756 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
758 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
760 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
761 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
762 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
763 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
764 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
765 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
766 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
768 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
769 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry` field to at least
771 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
772 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
773 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
774 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 3;
776 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
777 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
778 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
779 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
780 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
781 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
784 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
786 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
787 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
790 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
792 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
793 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
794 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
795 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
796 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
797 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
798 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
799 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
800 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
801 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
802 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
805 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
806 /// to better separate parameters.
807 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
808 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
809 /// The node_id of our counterparty
810 pub node_id: PublicKey,
811 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
812 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
813 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
814 pub features: InitFeatures,
815 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
816 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
817 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
819 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
821 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
822 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
823 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
824 /// payments to us through this channel.
825 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
828 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
829 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
830 pub struct ChannelDetails {
831 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
832 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
833 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
834 /// lifetime of the channel.
835 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
836 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
837 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
838 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
839 /// our counterparty already.
841 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
842 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
843 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
844 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
845 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
846 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
847 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
848 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
849 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
850 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
851 /// this value on chain.
853 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
855 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
857 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
858 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
859 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
860 pub user_channel_id: u64,
861 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
862 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
863 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
864 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
866 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
867 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
868 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
869 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
870 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
871 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
872 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
873 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
874 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
876 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
877 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
878 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
879 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
880 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
881 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
882 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
883 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
884 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
886 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
888 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
889 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
890 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
891 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
892 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
893 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
894 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
895 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
896 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
898 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
899 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
900 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
901 pub is_outbound: bool,
902 /// True if the channel is confirmed, funding_locked messages have been exchanged, and the
903 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `funding_locked` message exchange implies the
904 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
905 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
906 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
908 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
909 pub is_funding_locked: bool,
910 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b)
911 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
913 /// This is a strict superset of `is_funding_locked`.
915 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
919 /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
920 /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
922 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
923 pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
924 /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
925 /// send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages sent to peers, and
926 /// once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the payment in full.
927 ParameterError(APIError),
928 /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us
929 /// from attempting to send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages
930 /// sent to peers, and once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the
933 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
935 PathParameterError(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
936 /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
937 /// You can freely retry the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
938 /// paths than the ones selected).
939 AllFailedRetrySafe(Vec<APIError>),
940 /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
941 /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
942 /// in over-/re-payment.
944 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
945 /// send_payment, and any Errs which are not APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed can be safely
946 /// retried (though there is currently no API with which to do so).
948 /// Any entries which contain Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) or Ok(()) MUST NOT be retried
949 /// as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent (in the
950 /// case of Ok(())) or will send once channel_monitor_updated is called on the next-hop channel
951 /// with the latest update_id.
953 /// The errors themselves, in the same order as the route hops.
954 results: Vec<Result<(), APIError>>,
955 /// If some paths failed without irrevocably committing to the new HTLC(s), this will
956 /// contain a [`RouteParameters`] object which can be used to calculate a new route that
957 /// will pay all remaining unpaid balance.
958 failed_paths_retry: Option<RouteParameters>,
959 /// The payment id for the payment, which is now at least partially pending.
960 payment_id: PaymentId,
964 macro_rules! handle_error {
965 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
968 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
969 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
971 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
972 // entering the macro.
973 assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
974 assert!($self.pending_events.try_lock().is_ok());
977 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
979 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
980 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
981 if let Some(update) = update_option {
982 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
986 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
987 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
988 channel_id, user_channel_id,
989 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
994 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
995 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
997 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
998 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
999 action: err.action.clone()
1003 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1004 $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1007 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1014 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1015 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1016 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1018 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1019 //TODO: Once warning messages are merged, we should send a `warning` message to our
1021 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1023 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1024 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1026 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1027 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1028 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1029 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1031 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1032 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1033 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1035 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => {
1036 log_error!($self.logger, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1037 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1038 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1040 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(false);
1041 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1042 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1048 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1049 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1053 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1055 $entry.remove_entry();
1063 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1064 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1068 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1070 $entry.remove_entry();
1078 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1079 ($channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1081 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1082 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1083 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1090 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
1091 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1092 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1094 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
1096 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1097 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..]));
1098 if let Some(short_id) = $chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1099 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1101 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
1102 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
1103 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
1104 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
1105 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
1106 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
1107 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
1108 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
1109 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
1110 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id, $chan.get_user_id(),
1111 $chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok() ));
1114 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
1115 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards, {} fails, and {} fulfill finalizations",
1116 log_bytes!($chan_id[..]),
1117 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
1118 match $action_type {
1119 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
1120 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
1122 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
1123 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
1125 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
1126 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len(),
1127 (&$failed_finalized_fulfills as &Vec<HTLCSource>).len());
1128 if !$resend_commitment {
1129 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
1132 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
1134 $chan.monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills);
1135 (Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$chan_id)), false)
1139 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr) => { {
1140 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills, $entry.key());
1142 $entry.remove_entry();
1146 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1147 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, Vec::new())
1151 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
1152 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1153 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
1155 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1156 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
1160 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
1161 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
1162 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1163 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
1164 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
1167 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
1172 macro_rules! handle_chan_restoration_locked {
1173 ($self: ident, $channel_lock: expr, $channel_state: expr, $channel_entry: expr,
1174 $raa: expr, $commitment_update: expr, $order: expr, $chanmon_update: expr,
1175 $pending_forwards: expr, $funding_broadcastable: expr, $funding_locked: expr) => { {
1176 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
1177 let counterparty_node_id = $channel_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1179 let chanmon_update: Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> = $chanmon_update; // Force type-checking to resolve
1180 let chanmon_update_is_none = chanmon_update.is_none();
1182 let forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)> = $pending_forwards; // Force type-checking to resolve
1183 if !forwards.is_empty() {
1184 htlc_forwards = Some(($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"),
1185 $channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), forwards));
1188 if chanmon_update.is_some() {
1189 // On reconnect, we, by definition, only resend a funding_locked if there have been
1190 // no commitment updates, so the only channel monitor update which could also be
1191 // associated with a funding_locked would be the funding_created/funding_signed
1192 // monitor update. That monitor update failing implies that we won't send
1193 // funding_locked until it's been updated, so we can't have a funding_locked and a
1194 // monitor update here (so we don't bother to handle it correctly below).
1195 assert!($funding_locked.is_none());
1196 // A channel monitor update makes no sense without either a funding_locked or a
1197 // commitment update to process after it. Since we can't have a funding_locked, we
1198 // only bother to handle the monitor-update + commitment_update case below.
1199 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1202 if let Some(msg) = $funding_locked {
1203 // Similar to the above, this implies that we're letting the funding_locked fly
1204 // before it should be allowed to.
1205 assert!(chanmon_update.is_none());
1206 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
1207 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1210 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = $self.get_announcement_sigs($channel_entry.get()) {
1211 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1212 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1213 msg: announcement_sigs,
1216 $channel_state.short_to_id.insert($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), $channel_entry.get().channel_id());
1219 let funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction> = $funding_broadcastable; // Force type-checking to resolve
1220 if let Some(monitor_update) = chanmon_update {
1221 // We only ever broadcast a funding transaction in response to a funding_signed
1222 // message and the resulting monitor update. Thus, on channel_reestablish
1223 // message handling we can't have a funding transaction to broadcast. When
1224 // processing a monitor update finishing resulting in a funding broadcast, we
1225 // cannot have a second monitor update, thus this case would indicate a bug.
1226 assert!(funding_broadcastable.is_none());
1227 // Given we were just reconnected or finished updating a channel monitor, the
1228 // only case where we can get a new ChannelMonitorUpdate would be if we also
1229 // have some commitment updates to send as well.
1230 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1231 if let Err(e) = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1232 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
1233 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
1234 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
1235 let mut order = $order;
1237 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
1239 break handle_monitor_err!($self, e, $channel_state, $channel_entry, order, $raa.is_some(), true);
1243 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1244 if let Some(update) = $commitment_update {
1245 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1246 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1251 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1252 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = $raa {
1253 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1254 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1255 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1260 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1264 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1269 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
1270 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
1271 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1276 if chanmon_update_is_none {
1277 // If there was no ChannelMonitorUpdate, we should never generate an Err in the res loop
1278 // above. Doing so would imply calling handle_err!() from channel_monitor_updated() which
1279 // should *never* end up calling back to `chain_monitor.update_channel()`.
1280 assert!(res.is_ok());
1283 (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id)
1287 macro_rules! post_handle_chan_restoration {
1288 ($self: ident, $locked_res: expr) => { {
1289 let (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id) = $locked_res;
1291 let _ = handle_error!($self, res, counterparty_node_id);
1293 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1294 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1299 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
1300 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
1301 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1302 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
1303 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1306 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
1308 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1309 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
1311 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1313 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
1315 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
1316 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
1317 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
1318 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1319 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1320 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
1323 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1324 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1325 fee_estimator: fee_est,
1329 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1331 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
1332 by_id: HashMap::new(),
1333 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
1334 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1335 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1336 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
1338 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1339 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1341 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
1342 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
1345 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1346 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1348 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1350 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1351 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1352 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1353 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
1361 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels, as
1362 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1363 &self.default_configuration
1366 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1368 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1369 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1370 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to 0
1371 /// for inbound channels, so you may wish to avoid using 0 for `user_channel_id` here.
1372 /// `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply copied to events and otherwise
1375 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1376 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1378 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1379 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1380 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1382 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1383 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1384 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1385 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1386 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1387 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1389 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1390 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1391 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1392 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u64, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1393 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1394 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1398 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1399 match per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key) {
1400 Some(peer_state) => {
1401 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1402 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1403 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1404 Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, their_features,
1405 channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height())?
1407 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) }),
1410 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1412 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1413 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1414 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1416 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1417 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1418 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1419 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1420 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
1421 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1423 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1426 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1428 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1429 node_id: their_network_key,
1432 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1435 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<Signer>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1436 let mut res = Vec::new();
1438 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1439 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
1440 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1441 let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
1442 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1443 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1444 res.push(ChannelDetails {
1445 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
1446 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1447 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1448 features: InitFeatures::empty(),
1449 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1450 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1452 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1453 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1454 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1455 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1456 inbound_capacity_msat,
1457 outbound_capacity_msat,
1458 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1459 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1460 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1461 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1462 is_funding_locked: channel.is_usable(),
1463 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1464 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1468 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1469 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
1470 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.counterparty.node_id) {
1471 chan.counterparty.features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
1477 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
1478 /// more information.
1479 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1480 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1483 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
1484 /// get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1486 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1487 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1489 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1490 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1491 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1492 // really wanted anyway.
1493 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1496 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
1497 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
1498 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1499 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
1500 Some(transaction) => {
1501 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::DiscardFunding { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction })
1505 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1506 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1507 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1508 reason: closure_reason
1512 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1513 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1515 let counterparty_node_id;
1516 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
1517 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
1518 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1519 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1520 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1521 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1522 counterparty_node_id = chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1523 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1524 let (shutdown_msg, monitor_update, htlcs) = match per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
1525 Some(peer_state) => {
1526 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1527 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1528 chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown(&self.keys_manager, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?
1530 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", counterparty_node_id) }),
1532 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
1534 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
1535 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
1536 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1537 let (result, is_permanent) =
1538 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_entry.key());
1540 remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
1546 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1547 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1551 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1552 let channel = remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
1553 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
1554 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1558 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1562 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()})
1566 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1567 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1570 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, counterparty_node_id);
1574 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1575 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1576 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1578 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
1579 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1581 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
1582 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
1583 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
1584 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
1586 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1588 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1589 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1590 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1591 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1592 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, None)
1595 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1596 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1597 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1599 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
1600 /// the channel being closed or not:
1601 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
1602 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
1603 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1604 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
1605 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
1606 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
1607 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
1609 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1611 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1612 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1613 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1614 pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1615 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
1619 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1620 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1621 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1622 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1623 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1625 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
1626 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
1627 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
1628 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
1629 // ignore the result here.
1630 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
1634 /// `peer_node_id` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
1635 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
1636 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>, peer_msg: Option<&String>) -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
1638 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1639 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1640 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1641 if let Some(node_id) = peer_node_id {
1642 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *node_id {
1643 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1646 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1647 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1649 if peer_node_id.is_some() {
1650 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
1651 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: peer_msg.to_string() });
1654 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1656 chan.remove_entry().1
1658 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1661 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
1662 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(true));
1663 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
1664 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1665 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1670 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
1673 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
1674 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if channel_id is unknown to the manager.
1675 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1676 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1677 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, None, None) {
1678 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
1679 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1680 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1681 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1682 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
1683 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
1693 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
1694 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
1695 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
1696 for chan in self.list_channels() {
1697 let _ = self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
1701 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>) {
1702 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
1703 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
1705 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1706 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
1707 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1708 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1709 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
1710 failure_code: $err_code,
1711 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1716 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
1717 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
1720 let shared_secret = {
1721 let mut arr = [0; 32];
1722 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
1725 let (rho, mu) = onion_utils::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1727 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
1728 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
1729 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
1730 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
1731 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
1732 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
1733 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
1734 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
1737 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&mu);
1738 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
1739 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash.0[..]);
1740 if !fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
1741 return_malformed_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5);
1744 let mut channel_state = None;
1745 macro_rules! return_err {
1746 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
1748 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1749 if channel_state.is_none() {
1750 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1752 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1753 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1754 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1755 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
1756 })), channel_state.unwrap());
1761 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
1762 let mut chacha_stream = ChaChaReader { chacha: &mut chacha, read: Cursor::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..]) };
1763 let (next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac): (msgs::OnionHopData, _) = {
1764 match <msgs::OnionHopData as Readable>::read(&mut chacha_stream) {
1766 let error_code = match err {
1767 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
1768 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature|
1769 msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue|
1770 msgs::DecodeError::ShortRead => 0x4000 | 22, // invalid_onion_payload
1771 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
1773 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
1776 let mut hmac = [0; 32];
1777 if let Err(_) = chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut hmac[..]) {
1778 return_err!("Unable to decode hop data", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1785 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_hmac == [0; 32] {
1788 // In tests, make sure that the initial onion pcket data is, at least, non-0.
1789 // We could do some fancy randomness test here, but, ehh, whatever.
1790 // This checks for the issue where you can calculate the path length given the
1791 // onion data as all the path entries that the originator sent will be here
1792 // as-is (and were originally 0s).
1793 // Of course reverse path calculation is still pretty easy given naive routing
1794 // algorithms, but this fixes the most-obvious case.
1795 let mut next_bytes = [0; 32];
1796 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1797 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1798 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1799 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1803 // final_expiry_too_soon
1804 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
1805 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
1806 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
1807 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
1808 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
1809 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) <= self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
1810 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
1812 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
1813 if next_hop_data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
1814 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1816 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
1817 if next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
1818 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1821 let routing = match next_hop_data.format {
1822 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { .. } => return_err!("We require payment_secrets", 0x4000|0x2000|3, &[0;0]),
1823 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => return_err!("Got non final data with an HMAC of 0", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]),
1824 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
1825 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
1826 return_err!("We don't support MPP keysend payments", 0x4000|22, &[0;0]);
1827 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
1828 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
1830 incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
1832 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
1833 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
1834 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
1835 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
1836 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
1837 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
1838 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
1839 if hashed_preimage != msg.payment_hash {
1840 return_err!("Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 0x4000|22, &[0;0]);
1843 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
1845 incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
1848 return_err!("We require payment_secrets", 0x4000|0x2000|3, &[0;0]);
1853 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
1854 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
1855 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
1856 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
1858 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1860 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1861 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1862 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1863 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1866 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
1867 let read_pos = chacha_stream.read(&mut new_packet_data).unwrap();
1868 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1870 // Check two things:
1871 // a) that the behavior of our stream here will return Ok(0) even if the TLV
1872 // read above emptied out our buffer and the unwrap() wont needlessly panic
1873 // b) that we didn't somehow magically end up with extra data.
1875 debug_assert!(chacha_stream.read(&mut t).unwrap() == 0);
1877 // Once we've emptied the set of bytes our peer gave us, encrypt 0 bytes until we
1878 // fill the onion hop data we'll forward to our next-hop peer.
1879 chacha_stream.chacha.process_in_place(&mut new_packet_data[read_pos..]);
1881 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
1883 let blinding_factor = {
1884 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
1885 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
1886 sha.input(&shared_secret);
1887 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
1890 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
1892 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
1894 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
1897 hop_data: new_packet_data,
1898 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
1901 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
1902 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1903 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1904 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
1905 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1909 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1910 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
1911 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
1914 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1915 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1916 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1917 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1921 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1922 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
1923 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
1924 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
1925 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
1926 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
1927 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
1928 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
1929 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
1930 None => { // unknown_next_peer
1931 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
1933 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1936 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
1938 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
1939 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
1940 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
1941 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
1942 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
1945 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
1946 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
1947 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
1948 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
1949 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
1950 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
1951 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1953 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
1954 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1956 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64)
1957 .and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000)
1958 .checked_add(chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat() as u64) });
1959 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
1960 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1962 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta() as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
1963 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1965 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1966 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
1967 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
1968 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
1969 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
1970 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1972 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
1973 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
1975 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
1976 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
1977 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
1978 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
1979 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
1980 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
1981 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
1982 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
1983 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
1984 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1990 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
1991 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
1992 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
1993 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1995 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
1996 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1998 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
1999 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
2000 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
2002 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
2004 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
2009 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
2012 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2013 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2014 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2016 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2017 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2018 if !chan.should_announce() {
2019 return Err(LightningError {
2020 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2021 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2024 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2025 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2028 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2029 /// is public (only returning an Err if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id),
2030 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2031 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2032 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2033 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2034 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2035 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2036 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2040 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2042 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2043 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2045 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2046 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
2047 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2048 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2049 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Present(chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat()),
2050 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2051 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2052 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2055 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
2056 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
2058 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2064 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
2065 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payee: &Option<Payee>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2066 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2067 let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2068 let session_priv_bytes = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2069 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2071 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2072 .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
2073 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2074 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
2075 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
2077 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
2079 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2081 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2082 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2084 let mut pending_outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2085 let payment_entry = pending_outbounds.entry(payment_id);
2086 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(payment) = &payment_entry {
2087 if !payment.get().is_retryable() {
2088 return Err(APIError::RouteError {
2089 err: "Payment already completed"
2094 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2095 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2096 Some(id) => id.clone(),
2099 macro_rules! insert_outbound_payment {
2101 let payment = payment_entry.or_insert_with(|| PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2102 session_privs: HashSet::new(),
2103 pending_amt_msat: 0,
2104 pending_fee_msat: Some(0),
2105 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2106 payment_secret: *payment_secret,
2107 starting_block_height: self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
2108 total_msat: total_value,
2110 assert!(payment.insert(session_priv_bytes, path));
2114 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2115 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
2117 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
2118 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
2120 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2121 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
2123 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(
2124 htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2126 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2127 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2129 payment_secret: payment_secret.clone(),
2130 payee: payee.clone(),
2131 }, onion_packet, &self.logger),
2132 channel_state, chan)
2134 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
2135 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2136 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
2137 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
2138 // that we will resend the commitment update once monitor updating
2139 // is restored. Therefore, we must return an error indicating that
2140 // it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale, which we do in the
2141 // send_payment check for MonitorUpdateFailed, below.
2142 insert_outbound_payment!(); // Only do this after possibly break'ing on Perm failure above.
2143 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2145 insert_outbound_payment!();
2147 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2148 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2149 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
2150 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2151 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
2152 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2153 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2154 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2160 None => { insert_outbound_payment!(); },
2162 } else { unreachable!(); }
2166 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2167 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2169 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2174 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2176 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
2177 /// fields for more info.
2179 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
2180 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
2181 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
2182 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
2183 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
2184 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
2186 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed.
2188 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
2189 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2190 /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
2192 /// In general, a path may raise:
2193 /// * APIError::RouteError when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2194 /// node public key) is specified.
2195 /// * APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2196 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2198 /// * APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2199 /// relevant updates.
2201 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
2202 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2203 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2205 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
2206 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
2207 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
2208 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
2210 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
2211 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
2212 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
2213 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> Result<PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure> {
2214 self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, None, None, None)
2217 fn send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: Option<PaymentId>, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>) -> Result<PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure> {
2218 if route.paths.len() < 1 {
2219 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
2221 if route.paths.len() > 10 {
2222 // This limit is completely arbitrary - there aren't any real fundamental path-count
2223 // limits. After we support retrying individual paths we should likely bump this, but
2224 // for now more than 10 paths likely carries too much one-path failure.
2225 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "Sending over more than 10 paths is not currently supported"}));
2227 if payment_secret.is_none() && route.paths.len() > 1 {
2228 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Payment secret is required for multi-path payments".to_string()}));
2230 let mut total_value = 0;
2231 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2232 let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
2233 let payment_id = if let Some(id) = payment_id { id } else { PaymentId(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()) };
2234 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
2235 if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
2236 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
2237 continue 'path_check;
2239 for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
2240 if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
2241 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
2242 continue 'path_check;
2245 total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2246 path_errs.push(Ok(()));
2248 if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
2249 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
2251 if let Some(amt_msat) = recv_value_msat {
2252 debug_assert!(amt_msat >= total_value);
2253 total_value = amt_msat;
2256 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2257 let mut results = Vec::new();
2258 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2259 results.push(self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &route.payee, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, &keysend_preimage));
2261 let mut has_ok = false;
2262 let mut has_err = false;
2263 let mut pending_amt_unsent = 0;
2264 let mut max_unsent_cltv_delta = 0;
2265 for (res, path) in results.iter().zip(route.paths.iter()) {
2266 if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
2267 if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
2268 if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = res {
2269 // MonitorUpdateFailed is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
2273 } else if res.is_err() {
2274 pending_amt_unsent += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2275 max_unsent_cltv_delta = cmp::max(max_unsent_cltv_delta, path.last().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta);
2278 if has_err && has_ok {
2279 Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure {
2282 failed_paths_retry: if pending_amt_unsent != 0 {
2283 if let Some(payee) = &route.payee {
2284 Some(RouteParameters {
2285 payee: payee.clone(),
2286 final_value_msat: pending_amt_unsent,
2287 final_cltv_expiry_delta: max_unsent_cltv_delta,
2293 // If we failed to send any paths, we shouldn't have inserted the new PaymentId into
2294 // our `pending_outbound_payments` map at all.
2295 debug_assert!(self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().get(&payment_id).is_none());
2296 Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
2302 /// Retries a payment along the given [`Route`].
2304 /// Errors returned are a superset of those returned from [`send_payment`], so see
2305 /// [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on errors. This method will also error if the
2306 /// retry amount puts the payment more than 10% over the payment's total amount, or if the payment
2307 /// for the given `payment_id` cannot be found (likely due to timeout or success).
2309 /// [`send_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::send_payment`]
2310 pub fn retry_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2311 const RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE: u64 = 10;
2312 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2313 if path.len() == 0 {
2314 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2315 err: "length-0 path in route".to_string()
2320 let (total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret) = {
2321 let outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2322 if let Some(payment) = outbounds.get(&payment_id) {
2324 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2325 total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret, pending_amt_msat, ..
2327 let retry_amt_msat: u64 = route.paths.iter().map(|path| path.last().unwrap().fee_msat).sum();
2328 if retry_amt_msat + *pending_amt_msat > *total_msat * (100 + RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE) / 100 {
2329 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2330 err: format!("retry_amt_msat of {} will put pending_amt_msat (currently: {}) more than 10% over total_payment_amt_msat of {}", retry_amt_msat, pending_amt_msat, total_msat).to_string()
2333 (*total_msat, *payment_hash, *payment_secret)
2335 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => {
2336 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2337 err: "Unable to retry payments that were initially sent on LDK versions prior to 0.0.102".to_string()
2340 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {
2341 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError {
2342 err: "Payment already completed"
2347 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2348 err: format!("Payment with ID {} not found", log_bytes!(payment_id.0)),
2352 return self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &payment_secret, None, Some(payment_id), Some(total_msat)).map(|_| ())
2355 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2356 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2357 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2358 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2359 /// never reach the recipient.
2361 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function.
2363 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2364 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2366 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2368 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2369 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2370 let preimage = match payment_preimage {
2372 None => PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()),
2374 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0).into_inner());
2375 match self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &None, Some(preimage), None, None) {
2376 Ok(payment_id) => Ok((payment_hash, payment_id)),
2381 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2382 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2383 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>
2384 (&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2386 let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2388 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2390 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2391 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2392 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2393 } else { unreachable!(); })
2396 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "No such channel".to_owned() }) },
2398 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
2399 Ok(funding_msg) => {
2402 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2403 err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
2408 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2409 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2410 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2413 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2414 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2415 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2417 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2425 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2426 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2427 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2431 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2433 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2434 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2436 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
2438 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2439 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
2440 /// keys per-channel).
2442 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
2443 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
2444 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
2446 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
2447 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
2448 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2450 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2451 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2452 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2454 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
2455 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
2456 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2457 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
2461 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
2462 let mut output_index = None;
2463 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
2464 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2465 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
2466 if output_index.is_some() {
2467 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2468 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
2471 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
2472 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2473 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
2476 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
2479 if output_index.is_none() {
2480 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2481 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
2484 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
2488 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
2489 if !chan.should_announce() {
2490 log_trace!(self.logger, "Can't send announcement_signatures for private channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2494 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
2496 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
2498 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2499 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2501 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
2502 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
2503 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
2504 node_signature: our_node_sig,
2505 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
2510 // Messages of up to 64KB should never end up more than half full with addresses, as that would
2511 // be absurd. We ensure this by checking that at least 500 (our stated public contract on when
2512 // broadcast_node_announcement panics) of the maximum-length addresses would fit in a 64KB
2514 const HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS: u32 = ::core::u16::MAX as u32 / (NetAddress::MAX_LEN as u32 + 1) / 2;
2517 // ...by failing to compile if the number of addresses that would be half of a message is
2518 // smaller than 500:
2519 const STATIC_ASSERT: u32 = Self::HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS - 500;
2521 /// Regenerates channel_announcements and generates a signed node_announcement from the given
2522 /// arguments, providing them in corresponding events via
2523 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`], if at least one public channel has been confirmed
2524 /// on-chain. This effectively re-broadcasts all channel announcements and sends our node
2525 /// announcement to ensure that the lightning P2P network is aware of the channels we have and
2526 /// our network addresses.
2528 /// `rgb` is a node "color" and `alias` is a printable human-readable string to describe this
2529 /// node to humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning.
2531 /// `addresses` represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node
2532 /// accepts incoming connections. These will be included in the node_announcement, publicly
2533 /// tying these addresses together and to this node. If you wish to preserve user privacy,
2534 /// addresses should likely contain only Tor Onion addresses.
2536 /// Panics if `addresses` is absurdly large (more than 500).
2538 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
2539 pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], mut addresses: Vec<NetAddress>) {
2540 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2542 if addresses.len() > 500 {
2543 panic!("More than half the message size was taken up by public addresses!");
2546 // While all existing nodes handle unsorted addresses just fine, the spec requires that
2547 // addresses be sorted for future compatibility.
2548 addresses.sort_by_key(|addr| addr.get_id());
2550 let announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
2551 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
2552 timestamp: self.last_node_announcement_serial.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32,
2553 node_id: self.get_our_node_id(),
2554 rgb, alias, addresses,
2555 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
2556 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2558 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2559 let node_announce_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2561 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2562 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2564 let mut announced_chans = false;
2565 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
2566 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.our_network_key, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
2567 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2569 update_msg: match self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
2574 announced_chans = true;
2576 // If the channel is not public or has not yet reached funding_locked, check the
2577 // next channel. If we don't yet have any public channels, we'll skip the broadcast
2578 // below as peers may not accept it without channels on chain first.
2582 if announced_chans {
2583 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement {
2584 msg: msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
2585 signature: node_announce_sig,
2586 contents: announcement
2592 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
2594 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
2595 /// Will likely generate further events.
2596 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
2597 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2599 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2600 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
2601 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
2603 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2604 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2606 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
2607 if short_chan_id != 0 {
2608 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
2609 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
2611 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
2612 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2613 match forward_info {
2614 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info,
2615 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2616 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2617 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2618 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2619 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2620 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
2622 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
2623 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() }
2626 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
2627 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
2628 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
2629 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
2630 // problem, not ours.
2637 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
2638 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
2639 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
2640 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2641 match forward_info {
2642 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
2643 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2645 }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
2646 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2647 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
2648 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2649 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2650 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2651 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2652 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
2654 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet) {
2656 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
2657 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
2659 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
2661 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap();
2662 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
2663 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }
2669 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
2671 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
2672 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
2673 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
2674 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
2675 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
2676 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
2677 // this channel currently :/.
2683 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
2684 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
2686 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
2687 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
2688 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger) {
2690 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
2691 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
2693 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
2695 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
2696 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
2697 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
2700 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
2702 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
2703 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
2704 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
2705 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
2706 // messages when we can.
2707 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
2708 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
2709 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
2716 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
2717 let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) {
2720 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
2721 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
2722 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
2723 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
2724 ChannelError::Ignore(_) | ChannelError::Warn(_) => {
2725 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
2727 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
2728 log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
2729 let (channel_id, mut channel) = chan.remove_entry();
2730 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2731 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2733 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us.
2734 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, channel.get_user_id(), channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel).ok()))
2736 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
2738 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, err));
2742 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2743 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
2746 log_debug!(self.logger, "Forwarding HTLCs resulted in a commitment update with {} HTLCs added and {} HTLCs failed for channel {}",
2747 add_htlc_msgs.len(), fail_htlc_msgs.len(), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2748 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2749 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
2750 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2751 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
2752 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2753 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
2754 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2756 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
2764 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2765 match forward_info {
2766 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
2767 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. },
2768 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2769 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload) = match routing {
2770 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
2771 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice(payment_data)),
2772 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
2773 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage)),
2775 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
2778 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
2779 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
2780 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2781 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2782 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2783 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
2785 value: amt_to_forward,
2790 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
2792 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc.value).to_vec();
2793 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
2794 &byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()),
2796 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2797 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
2798 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2799 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
2800 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
2802 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data }
2807 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
2808 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
2809 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
2810 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
2811 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
2812 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
2813 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2814 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
2815 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
2816 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
2817 OnionPayload::Invoice(_) => {
2818 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we didn't have a corresponding inbound payment.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2819 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2821 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
2822 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
2823 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2824 e.insert(vec![claimable_htlc]);
2825 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
2827 amt: amt_to_forward,
2828 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage),
2831 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2832 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2833 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2839 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
2841 if let OnionPayload::Invoice(ref data) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
2844 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2845 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2848 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
2849 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2850 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2851 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
2852 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
2853 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
2854 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2856 let mut total_value = 0;
2857 let htlcs = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
2858 .or_insert(Vec::new());
2859 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
2860 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
2861 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2862 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2866 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
2867 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
2868 total_value += htlc.value;
2869 match &htlc.onion_payload {
2870 OnionPayload::Invoice(htlc_payment_data) => {
2871 if htlc_payment_data.total_msat != payment_data.total_msat {
2872 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
2873 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, htlc_payment_data.total_msat);
2874 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
2876 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
2878 _ => unreachable!(),
2881 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > payment_data.total_msat {
2882 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
2883 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, payment_data.total_msat);
2884 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
2887 } else if total_value == payment_data.total_msat {
2888 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
2890 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
2891 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
2892 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
2896 // Only ever generate at most one PaymentReceived
2897 // per registered payment_hash, even if it isn't
2899 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
2901 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
2902 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
2909 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
2910 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
2918 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
2919 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason);
2922 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
2923 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
2926 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
2927 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2928 events.append(&mut new_events);
2931 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
2933 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
2934 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
2936 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
2937 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
2938 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
2939 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
2940 if background_events.is_empty() {
2944 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
2946 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
2947 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
2948 // monitor updating completing.
2949 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update);
2956 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
2957 /// Process background events, for functional testing
2958 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
2959 self.process_background_events();
2962 fn update_channel_fee(&self, short_to_id: &mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> (bool, NotifyOption, Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal>) {
2963 if !chan.is_outbound() { return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(())); }
2964 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
2965 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate() {
2966 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
2967 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
2968 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
2970 if !chan.is_live() {
2971 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
2972 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
2973 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
2975 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
2976 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
2978 let mut retain_channel = true;
2979 let res = match chan.send_update_fee_and_commit(new_feerate, &self.logger) {
2982 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, chan_id);
2983 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
2987 let ret_err = match res {
2988 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update))) => {
2989 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2990 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_id);
2991 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
2994 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2995 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2996 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2997 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2998 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2999 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3000 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3001 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
3011 (retain_channel, NotifyOption::DoPersist, ret_err)
3015 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
3016 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
3017 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
3018 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
3019 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
3020 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3021 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3023 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3025 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3027 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3028 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3029 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3030 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3031 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3032 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3033 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3035 handle_errors.push(err);
3045 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
3047 /// This currently includes:
3048 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
3049 /// * Broadcasting `ChannelUpdate` messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
3050 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
3053 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through `chain::Watch::update_channel` calls or feerate
3054 /// estimate fetches.
3055 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
3056 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3057 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3058 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3060 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3062 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3064 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3065 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3066 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3067 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3068 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3069 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
3070 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3071 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3073 handle_errors.push((err, counterparty_node_id));
3075 if !retain_channel { return false; }
3077 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
3078 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, chan_id);
3079 handle_errors.push((Err(err), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()));
3080 if needs_close { return false; }
3083 match chan.channel_update_status() {
3084 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
3085 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
3086 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3087 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3088 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
3089 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3090 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3094 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3095 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3097 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
3098 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3099 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3103 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3104 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3113 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3114 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3120 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
3121 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
3122 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
3123 /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
3124 /// HTLC backwards has been started.
3125 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) -> bool {
3126 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3128 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
3129 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
3130 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
3131 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3132 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
3133 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3134 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
3135 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
3136 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
3137 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_hash,
3138 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
3144 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
3145 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
3146 // be surfaced to the user.
3147 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(&self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
3148 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
3150 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { .. }) => {
3151 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
3152 match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3153 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
3154 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(&chan_entry.get()) {
3155 (0x1000|7, upd.encode_with_len())
3157 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3160 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3162 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3163 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state,
3164 htlc_src, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: onion_failure_data});
3166 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, payee, .. } => {
3167 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3168 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3169 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3170 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3171 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) && !payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3172 let retry = if let Some(payee_data) = payee {
3173 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
3174 Some(RouteParameters {
3176 final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat,
3177 final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta,
3180 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
3181 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3182 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3184 rejected_by_dest: false,
3185 network_update: None,
3186 all_paths_failed: payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0,
3188 short_channel_id: None,
3198 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3205 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
3206 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
3207 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
3208 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
3209 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
3210 /// still-available channels.
3211 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
3212 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
3213 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
3214 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
3217 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3218 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
3219 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3221 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, session_priv, payment_id, ref payee, .. } => {
3222 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3223 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3224 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3225 let mut all_paths_failed = false;
3226 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3227 if !payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
3228 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3231 if payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3232 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received failure of HTLC with payment_hash {} after payment completion", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3235 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3236 all_paths_failed = true;
3239 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3242 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3243 let retry = if let Some(payee_data) = payee {
3244 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
3245 Some(RouteParameters {
3246 payee: payee_data.clone(),
3247 final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat,
3248 final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta,
3251 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3252 match &onion_error {
3253 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
3255 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
3257 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
3258 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
3259 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
3260 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
3261 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
3262 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3263 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3264 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3265 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
3272 error_code: onion_error_code,
3274 error_data: onion_error_data
3278 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3284 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
3285 // TODO: We'd like to generate a NetworkUpdate for temporary
3286 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as get_route
3287 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
3289 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
3290 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
3291 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
3292 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3293 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3294 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3295 rejected_by_dest: path.len() == 1,
3296 network_update: None,
3299 short_channel_id: Some(path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id),
3302 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
3304 error_data: Some(data.clone()),
3310 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, .. }) => {
3311 let err_packet = match onion_error {
3312 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
3313 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
3314 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
3315 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
3317 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
3318 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3319 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
3323 let mut forward_event = None;
3324 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3325 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
3327 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
3328 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3329 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
3331 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3332 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
3335 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3336 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
3337 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3338 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
3339 time_forwardable: time
3346 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
3347 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
3348 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
3350 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
3351 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentReceived`
3352 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
3353 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
3355 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
3357 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
3358 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
3359 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> bool {
3360 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3362 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3364 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
3365 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
3366 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
3367 assert!(!sources.is_empty());
3369 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we have to take special care to ensure that each
3370 // channel exists before claiming all of the payments (inside one lock).
3371 // Note that channel existance is sufficient as we should always get a monitor update
3372 // which will take care of the real HTLC claim enforcement.
3374 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
3375 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
3376 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
3377 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
3378 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
3380 let mut valid_mpp = true;
3381 for htlc in sources.iter() {
3382 if let None = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3388 let mut errs = Vec::new();
3389 let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
3390 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3392 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
3393 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3394 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
3395 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
3396 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
3397 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash,
3398 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
3400 match self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state.as_mut().unwrap(), htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
3401 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) => {
3402 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
3403 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
3404 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
3405 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
3406 claimed_any_htlcs = true;
3407 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
3409 ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"),
3410 ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim => {
3411 // While we should never get here in most cases, if we do, it likely
3412 // indicates that the HTLC was timed out some time ago and is no longer
3413 // available to be claimed. Thus, it does not make sense to set
3414 // `claimed_any_htlcs`.
3416 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(_) => claimed_any_htlcs = true,
3421 // Now that we've done the entire above loop in one lock, we can handle any errors
3422 // which were generated.
3423 channel_state.take();
3425 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
3426 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
3427 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
3434 fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> ClaimFundsFromHop {
3435 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
3436 let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock;
3437 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3438 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
3440 return ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed
3444 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
3445 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
3446 Ok(msgs_monitor_option) => {
3447 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { msgs, htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = msgs_monitor_option {
3448 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3449 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Debug },
3450 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
3451 payment_preimage, e);
3452 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(
3453 chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3454 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err(),
3455 Some(htlc_value_msat)
3458 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
3459 log_debug!(self.logger, "Claiming funds for HTLC with preimage {} resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}",
3460 log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3461 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3462 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3463 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3464 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3465 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
3466 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3467 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3473 return ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(htlc_value_msat);
3475 return ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim;
3478 Err((e, monitor_update)) => {
3479 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3480 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Info },
3481 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?} immediately prior to force-close: {:?}",
3482 payment_preimage, e);
3484 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3485 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan.get_mut(), &chan_id);
3487 chan.remove_entry();
3489 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(counterparty_node_id, res, None);
3492 } else { unreachable!(); }
3495 fn finalize_claims(&self, mut sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
3496 for source in sources.drain(..) {
3497 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, .. } = source {
3498 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3499 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3500 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3501 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3502 assert!(payment.get().is_fulfilled());
3503 payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, None);
3504 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3512 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool) {
3514 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
3515 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3516 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3517 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3518 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3519 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3520 let found_payment = !payment.get().is_fulfilled();
3521 let fee_paid_msat = payment.get().get_pending_fee_msat();
3522 payment.get_mut().mark_fulfilled();
3524 // We currently immediately remove HTLCs which were fulfilled on-chain.
3525 // This could potentially lead to removing a pending payment too early,
3526 // with a reorg of one block causing us to re-add the fulfilled payment on
3528 // TODO: We should have a second monitor event that informs us of payments
3529 // irrevocably fulfilled.
3530 payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path));
3531 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3536 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3537 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
3538 events::Event::PaymentSent {
3539 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3541 payment_hash: payment_hash,
3547 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fulfill for HTLC with payment_preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0));
3550 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
3551 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
3552 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage);
3553 let claimed_htlc = if let ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim = res { false } else { true };
3554 let htlc_claim_value_msat = match res {
3555 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(_, _, amt_opt) => amt_opt,
3556 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(amt) => Some(amt),
3559 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed = res {
3560 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3561 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
3562 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
3563 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
3566 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
3567 // receiving an offchain preimage event from the forward link (the
3568 // event being update_fulfill_htlc).
3569 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_outpoint, preimage_update) {
3570 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
3571 payment_preimage, e);
3573 // Note that we do *not* set `claimed_htlc` to false here. In fact, this
3574 // totally could be a duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing
3575 // without interrogating the `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above
3576 // update to. Instead, we simply document in `PaymentForwarded` that this
3579 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3580 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) = res {
3581 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
3582 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
3586 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
3587 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
3588 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
3591 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3592 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
3594 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
3602 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
3603 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
3604 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
3607 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
3608 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3610 let chan_restoration_res;
3611 let (mut pending_failures, finalized_claims) = {
3612 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3613 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3614 let mut channel = match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
3615 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
3616 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
3618 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
3622 let updates = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger);
3623 let channel_update = if updates.funding_locked.is_some() && channel.get().is_usable() && !channel.get().should_announce() {
3624 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
3625 // funding_locked and the channel is in a usable state. Further, we rely on the
3626 // normal announcement_signatures process to send a channel_update for public
3627 // channels, only generating a unicast channel_update if this is a private channel.
3628 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3629 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3630 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel.get()).unwrap(),
3633 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_lock, channel_state, channel, updates.raa, updates.commitment_update, updates.order, None, updates.accepted_htlcs, updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.funding_locked);
3634 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
3635 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
3637 (updates.failed_htlcs, updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs)
3639 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
3640 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claims);
3641 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
3642 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
3646 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3647 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
3648 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
3651 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
3652 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
3655 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3656 &their_features, msg, 0, &self.default_configuration, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height())
3657 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
3658 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3659 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3660 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
3661 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
3662 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3663 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
3664 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3665 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
3667 entry.insert(channel);
3673 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3674 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
3675 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3676 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3677 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
3678 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3679 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3680 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
3682 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration, &their_features), channel_state, chan);
3683 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
3685 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
3688 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3689 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
3690 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
3691 channel_value_satoshis: value,
3693 user_channel_id: user_id,
3698 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3699 let ((funding_msg, monitor), mut chan) = {
3700 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
3701 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3702 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3703 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
3704 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3705 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3706 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
3708 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.logger), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
3710 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
3713 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
3714 // lock before watch_channel
3715 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
3717 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
3718 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
3719 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
3720 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
3721 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
3722 // We do not do a force-close here as that would generate a monitor update for
3723 // a monitor that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we
3724 // don't respond with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
3725 let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(true);
3726 assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
3727 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
3729 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
3730 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
3731 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
3732 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our funding_locked
3733 // until we have persisted our monitor.
3734 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3738 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3739 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3740 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
3741 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3742 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
3744 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3745 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
3746 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3755 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3757 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
3758 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3759 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3760 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3761 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3762 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3763 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3765 let (monitor, funding_tx) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.logger) {
3766 Ok(update) => update,
3767 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
3769 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
3770 let mut res = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, false, false);
3771 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
3772 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
3773 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
3774 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
3775 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
3776 shutdown_finish.0.take();
3783 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3786 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid());
3787 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
3791 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3792 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3793 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3794 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3795 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3796 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3797 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3799 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3800 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
3801 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for {} in response to funding_locked", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3802 // If we see locking block before receiving remote funding_locked, we broadcast our
3803 // announcement_sigs at remote funding_locked reception. If we receive remote
3804 // funding_locked before seeing locking block, we broadcast our announcement_sigs at locking
3805 // block connection. We should guanrantee to broadcast announcement_sigs to our peer whatever
3806 // the order of the events but our peer may not receive it due to disconnection. The specs
3807 // lacking an acknowledgement for announcement_sigs we may have to re-send them at peer
3808 // connection in the future if simultaneous misses by both peers due to network/hardware
3809 // failures is an issue. Note, to achieve its goal, only one of the announcement_sigs needs
3810 // to be received, from then sigs are going to be flood to the whole network.
3811 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
3812 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3813 msg: announcement_sigs,
3815 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
3816 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3817 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3818 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
3823 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3827 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3828 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
3829 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
3830 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3831 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3833 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
3834 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
3835 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3836 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3839 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
3840 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
3841 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
3842 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
3845 let (shutdown, monitor_update, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.keys_manager, &their_features, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
3846 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
3848 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
3849 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
3850 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3851 let (result, is_permanent) =
3852 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_entry.key());
3854 remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
3860 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
3861 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
3862 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
3869 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3872 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
3873 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
3876 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
3880 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3881 let (tx, chan_option) = {
3882 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3883 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3884 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
3885 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
3886 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3887 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3889 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
3890 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
3891 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
3892 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3897 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
3898 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
3899 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
3900 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
3901 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
3902 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
3903 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3905 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
3906 } else { (tx, None) }
3908 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3911 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
3912 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
3913 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
3915 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
3916 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3917 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3918 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3922 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
3927 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3928 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
3929 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
3930 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
3932 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
3933 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
3934 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
3935 //but we should prevent it anyway.
3937 let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
3938 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3940 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3941 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3942 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3943 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3946 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
3947 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
3948 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
3949 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
3950 match pending_forward_info {
3951 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
3952 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
3953 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
3954 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &{
3955 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
3956 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
3957 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
3958 res.extend_from_slice(&upd.encode_with_len()[..]);
3962 // The only case where we'd be unable to
3963 // successfully get a channel update is if the
3964 // channel isn't in the fully-funded state yet,
3965 // implying our counterparty is trying to route
3966 // payments over the channel back to themselves
3967 // (because no one else should know the short_id
3968 // is a lightning channel yet). We should have
3969 // no problem just calling this
3970 // unknown_next_peer (0x4000|10).
3971 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
3974 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &[])
3976 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3977 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3978 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3981 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
3983 _ => pending_forward_info
3986 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3988 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3993 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3994 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3995 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
3996 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3997 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3998 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3999 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4000 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4002 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
4004 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4007 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false);
4011 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4012 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4013 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4014 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4015 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4016 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4017 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4019 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
4021 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4026 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4027 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4028 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4029 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4030 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4031 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4032 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4034 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
4035 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
4036 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
4038 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
4041 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4045 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4046 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4047 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4048 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4049 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4050 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4051 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4053 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, monitor_update) =
4054 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger) {
4055 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
4056 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
4057 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
4058 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
4059 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan);
4064 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4065 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
4067 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4068 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4069 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4071 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
4072 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4073 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4074 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4075 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4076 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4077 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4078 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4080 commitment_signed: msg,
4086 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4091 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
4092 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
4093 let mut forward_event = None;
4094 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4095 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4096 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
4097 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
4099 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4100 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.routing {
4101 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
4102 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
4103 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
4105 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4106 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4107 prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
4109 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4110 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4111 prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
4116 match forward_event {
4118 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4119 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
4120 time_forwardable: time
4128 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4129 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
4131 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4132 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4133 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4134 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4135 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4136 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4138 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
4139 let raa_updates = break_chan_entry!(self,
4140 chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4141 htlcs_to_fail = raa_updates.holding_cell_failed_htlcs;
4142 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), raa_updates.monitor_update) {
4143 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
4144 assert!(raa_updates.commitment_update.is_none());
4145 assert!(raa_updates.accepted_htlcs.is_empty());
4146 assert!(raa_updates.failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4147 assert!(raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs.is_empty());
4148 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
4150 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan,
4151 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false,
4152 raa_updates.commitment_update.is_some(),
4153 raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4154 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs) {
4156 } else { unreachable!(); }
4159 if let Some(updates) = raa_updates.commitment_update {
4160 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4161 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4165 break Ok((raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4166 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs,
4167 chan.get().get_short_channel_id()
4168 .expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"),
4169 chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap()))
4171 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4174 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id);
4176 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, finalized_claim_htlcs,
4177 short_channel_id, channel_outpoint)) =>
4179 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4180 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
4182 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, pending_forwards)]);
4183 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claim_htlcs);
4190 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4191 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4192 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4193 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4194 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4195 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4196 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4198 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
4200 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4205 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4206 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4207 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4209 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4210 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4211 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4212 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4214 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
4215 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
4218 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
4219 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(&self.our_network_key, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), msg), channel_state, chan),
4220 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
4221 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
4222 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
4225 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4230 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
4231 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4232 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4233 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4234 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
4235 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
4237 // It's not a local channel
4238 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
4241 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4242 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4243 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4244 if chan.get().should_announce() {
4245 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
4246 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
4247 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
4248 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
4250 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
4252 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
4253 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
4254 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
4255 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
4257 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), channel_state, chan);
4260 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => unreachable!()
4262 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
4265 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4266 let chan_restoration_res;
4267 let (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround) = {
4268 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4269 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4271 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4272 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4273 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4274 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4276 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
4277 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
4278 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
4279 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
4280 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, monitor_update_opt, order, htlcs_failed_forward, shutdown) =
4281 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4282 let mut channel_update = None;
4283 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4284 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4285 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4288 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4289 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
4290 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
4291 // they have the latest channel parameters.
4292 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4293 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4294 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
4297 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
4298 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_state_lock, channel_state, chan, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, order, monitor_update_opt, Vec::new(), None, funding_locked);
4299 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
4300 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
4302 (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround)
4304 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4307 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
4308 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_failed_forward, msg.channel_id);
4310 if let Some(funding_locked_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
4311 self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, &funding_locked_msg)?;
4316 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed.
4317 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
4318 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
4319 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
4320 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
4321 for monitor_event in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
4322 match monitor_event {
4323 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
4324 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
4325 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
4326 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.onchain_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true);
4328 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
4329 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
4332 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
4333 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
4334 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4335 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4336 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4337 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4338 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4339 if let Some(mut chan) = by_id.remove(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
4340 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
4341 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4343 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
4344 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4345 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4349 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
4350 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
4352 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
4354 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
4355 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4356 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4357 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4358 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
4363 MonitorEvent::UpdateCompleted { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
4364 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id);
4369 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
4370 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
4373 has_pending_monitor_events
4376 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
4377 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
4378 /// update events as a separate process method here.
4379 #[cfg(feature = "fuzztarget")]
4380 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
4381 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
4384 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
4385 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
4386 /// update was applied.
4388 /// This should only apply to HTLCs which were added to the holding cell because we were
4389 /// waiting on a monitor update to finish. In that case, we don't want to free the holding cell
4390 /// directly in `channel_monitor_updated` as it may introduce deadlocks calling back into user
4391 /// code to inform them of a channel monitor update.
4392 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
4393 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
4394 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4395 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
4397 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4398 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4399 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4400 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4401 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4403 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
4404 match chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger) {
4405 Ok((commitment_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
4406 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
4407 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id));
4409 if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt {
4410 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4411 has_monitor_update = true;
4412 let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), channel_id);
4413 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res));
4414 if close_channel { return false; }
4416 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4417 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4418 updates: commitment_update,
4425 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
4426 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
4427 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us
4434 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
4435 for (failures, channel_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
4436 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id);
4439 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4440 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4446 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
4447 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
4448 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
4449 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
4450 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
4451 let mut has_update = false;
4453 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4454 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4455 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4456 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4457 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4459 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
4460 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
4461 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
4462 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
4464 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4465 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
4468 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
4469 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
4470 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
4471 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
4472 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4475 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4476 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4481 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4483 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
4484 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
4490 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
4491 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
4498 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4499 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4505 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
4506 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
4508 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
4509 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
4510 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
4511 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
4512 // reorganized out of the main chain.
4513 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
4514 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
4515 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
4516 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
4517 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
4518 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
4519 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
4520 assert!(should_broadcast);
4521 } else { unreachable!(); }
4522 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
4524 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
4528 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
4529 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
4531 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
4533 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4534 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4535 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
4536 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4537 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
4538 payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
4539 user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
4540 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
4541 // its updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
4542 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
4543 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
4544 // never fail a payment too early.
4545 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
4547 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
4550 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
4555 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
4558 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
4559 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you, returning the first and storing the second.
4561 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentReceived`], which
4562 /// will have the [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
4563 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
4565 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
4567 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
4568 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
4569 /// [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::payment_preimage
4570 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
4571 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> (PaymentHash, PaymentSecret) {
4572 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
4573 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4576 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
4577 .expect("RNG Generated Duplicate PaymentHash"))
4580 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
4581 /// stored external to LDK.
4583 /// A [`PaymentReceived`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
4584 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
4585 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
4587 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) must be globally unique. This
4588 /// method may return an Err if another payment with the same payment_hash is still pending.
4590 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
4591 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
4592 /// before a [`PaymentReceived`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
4593 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
4595 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
4596 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
4597 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
4598 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
4599 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
4601 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
4602 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
4603 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentReceived`] event for some time after the expiry.
4604 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
4605 /// [`PaymentReceived`].
4607 /// Pending inbound payments are stored in memory and in serialized versions of this
4608 /// [`ChannelManager`]. If potentially unbounded numbers of inbound payments may exist and
4609 /// space is limited, you may wish to rate-limit inbound payment creation.
4611 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
4613 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry`
4614 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY`].
4616 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
4617 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
4618 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
4619 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
4622 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget", feature = "_test_utils"))]
4623 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
4624 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
4625 let event_handler = |event: &events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event.clone());
4626 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
4631 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
4632 !self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().is_empty()
4636 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4637 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4638 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4639 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4640 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4643 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
4644 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
4645 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4646 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4648 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
4649 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
4650 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
4651 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4654 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
4655 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4657 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
4658 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4661 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
4662 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4663 mem::swap(&mut pending_events, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
4665 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
4666 events.replace(pending_events);
4675 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4677 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4678 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4679 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4680 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4683 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
4685 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
4686 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
4688 /// Pending events are persisted as part of [`ChannelManager`]. While these events are cleared
4689 /// when processed, an [`EventHandler`] must be able to handle previously seen events when
4690 /// restarting from an old state.
4691 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
4692 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4693 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4695 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
4696 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
4697 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
4698 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4701 let mut pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
4702 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
4703 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4706 for event in pending_events.drain(..) {
4707 handler.handle_event(&event);
4715 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4717 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4718 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4719 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4720 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4723 fn block_connected(&self, block: &Block, height: u32) {
4725 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4726 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), block.header.prev_blockhash,
4727 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
4728 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
4729 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
4732 let txdata: Vec<_> = block.txdata.iter().enumerate().collect();
4733 self.transactions_confirmed(&block.header, &txdata, height);
4734 self.best_block_updated(&block.header, height);
4737 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
4738 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4739 let new_height = height - 1;
4741 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
4742 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
4743 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
4744 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
4745 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
4746 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
4749 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, &self.logger));
4753 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4755 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4756 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4757 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4758 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4761 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
4762 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4763 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
4764 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4766 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
4767 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
4769 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4770 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, &self.logger).map(|a| (a, Vec::new())));
4773 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
4774 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4775 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
4776 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4778 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
4779 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
4781 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4783 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
4785 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, &self.logger));
4787 macro_rules! max_time {
4788 ($timestamp: expr) => {
4790 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
4791 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
4792 // having an explicit local time source.
4793 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
4794 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
4795 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
4796 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
4797 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
4803 max_time!(self.last_node_announcement_serial);
4804 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
4805 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4806 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
4807 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
4810 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4811 outbounds.retain(|_, payment| {
4812 const PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
4813 if payment.remaining_parts() != 0 { return true }
4814 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { starting_block_height, .. } = payment {
4815 return *starting_block_height + PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS > height
4821 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
4822 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4823 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.short_to_id.len());
4824 for chan in channel_state.by_id.values() {
4825 if let Some(funding_txo) = chan.get_funding_txo() {
4826 res.push(funding_txo.txid);
4832 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
4833 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4834 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
4835 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
4836 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
4837 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|_| (None, Vec::new()))
4838 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
4839 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
4844 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4846 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4847 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4848 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4849 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4852 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
4853 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
4855 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ClosureReason>>
4856 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
4857 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4858 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
4859 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4861 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
4862 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
4864 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4865 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4866 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4867 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4868 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
4869 let res = f(channel);
4870 if let Ok((chan_res, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs)) = res {
4871 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
4872 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(&channel).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
4873 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason {
4874 failure_code: 0x1000 | 14, // expiry_too_soon, or at least it is now
4878 if let Some(funding_locked) = chan_res {
4879 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
4880 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4881 msg: funding_locked,
4883 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
4884 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked and announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
4885 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4886 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4887 msg: announcement_sigs,
4889 } else if channel.is_usable() {
4890 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures but with private channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
4891 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4892 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4893 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel).unwrap(),
4896 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
4898 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
4900 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
4901 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
4902 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4904 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
4905 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
4906 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
4907 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
4908 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4912 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
4913 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
4914 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4915 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4916 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
4917 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
4918 data: reason_message,
4926 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
4927 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, htlcs| {
4928 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
4929 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
4930 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
4931 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
4932 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
4933 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
4934 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
4935 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(height));
4936 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(), HTLCFailReason::Reason {
4937 failure_code: 0x4000 | 15,
4938 data: htlc_msat_height_data
4943 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
4948 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
4950 for (source, payment_hash, reason) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
4951 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, reason);
4955 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
4956 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
4957 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
4959 /// Note that the feature `allow_wallclock_use` must be enabled to use this function.
4960 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
4961 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
4962 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
4965 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
4966 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
4968 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
4969 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
4972 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
4973 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
4974 let mutcond = &self.persistence_notifier.persistence_lock;
4975 let &(ref mtx, _) = mutcond;
4976 let guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
4980 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
4981 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
4982 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
4983 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
4987 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref , T: Deref , K: Deref , F: Deref , L: Deref >
4988 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4989 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4990 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4991 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4992 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4995 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
4996 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4997 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5000 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
5001 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5002 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5005 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
5006 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5007 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5010 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
5011 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5012 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5015 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) {
5016 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5017 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5020 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
5021 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5022 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5025 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
5026 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5027 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5030 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
5031 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5032 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5035 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
5036 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5037 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5040 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
5041 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5042 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5045 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
5046 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5047 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5050 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
5051 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5052 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5055 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
5056 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5057 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5060 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
5061 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5062 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5065 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
5066 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5067 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5070 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
5071 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5072 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
5075 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
5080 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
5081 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5082 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5085 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
5086 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5087 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5088 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
5090 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5091 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5092 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
5093 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5094 if no_connection_possible {
5095 log_debug!(self.logger, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
5096 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5097 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5098 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
5099 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
5101 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(true));
5102 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5103 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5107 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
5114 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
5115 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5116 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5117 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
5118 if chan.is_shutdown() {
5119 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
5120 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
5122 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
5125 no_channels_remain = false;
5131 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
5133 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5134 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5135 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5136 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5137 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5138 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5139 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5140 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5141 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5142 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5143 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5144 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
5145 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
5146 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
5147 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5148 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5149 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
5150 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
5151 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
5155 if no_channels_remain {
5156 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id);
5159 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5160 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5164 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) {
5165 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
5167 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5170 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
5171 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
5172 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5173 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
5174 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
5177 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
5178 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
5183 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5184 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5185 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5186 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5187 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5188 if !chan.have_received_message() {
5189 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
5190 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
5191 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
5195 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
5196 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5197 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
5203 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
5206 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
5207 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5209 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
5210 for chan in self.list_channels() {
5211 if chan.counterparty.node_id == *counterparty_node_id {
5212 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
5213 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(&msg.data));
5217 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
5218 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(&msg.data));
5223 /// Used to signal to the ChannelManager persister that the manager needs to be re-persisted to
5224 /// disk/backups, through `await_persistable_update_timeout` and `await_persistable_update`.
5225 struct PersistenceNotifier {
5226 /// Users won't access the persistence_lock directly, but rather wait on its bool using
5227 /// `wait_timeout` and `wait`.
5228 persistence_lock: (Mutex<bool>, Condvar),
5231 impl PersistenceNotifier {
5234 persistence_lock: (Mutex::new(false), Condvar::new()),
5240 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
5241 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
5246 guard = cvar.wait(guard).unwrap();
5247 let result = *guard;
5255 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
5256 fn wait_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
5257 let current_time = Instant::now();
5259 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
5260 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
5265 guard = cvar.wait_timeout(guard, max_wait).unwrap().0;
5266 // Due to spurious wakeups that can happen on `wait_timeout`, here we need to check if the
5267 // desired wait time has actually passed, and if not then restart the loop with a reduced wait
5268 // time. Note that this logic can be highly simplified through the use of
5269 // `Condvar::wait_while` and `Condvar::wait_timeout_while`, if and when our MSRV is raised to
5271 let elapsed = current_time.elapsed();
5272 let result = *guard;
5273 if result || elapsed >= max_wait {
5277 match max_wait.checked_sub(elapsed) {
5278 None => return result,
5284 // Signal to the ChannelManager persister that there are updates necessitating persisting to disk.
5286 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &self.persistence_lock;
5287 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5288 *persistence_lock = true;
5289 mem::drop(persistence_lock);
5294 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
5295 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
5297 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
5299 (0, onion_packet, required),
5300 (2, short_channel_id, required),
5303 (0, payment_data, required),
5304 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
5306 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
5307 (0, payment_preimage, required),
5308 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
5312 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
5313 (0, routing, required),
5314 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
5315 (4, payment_hash, required),
5316 (6, amt_to_forward, required),
5317 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required)
5321 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
5322 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5324 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
5326 channel_id.write(writer)?;
5327 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
5328 reason.write(writer)?;
5330 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
5331 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
5334 channel_id.write(writer)?;
5335 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
5336 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
5337 failure_code.write(writer)?;
5344 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
5345 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5346 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5349 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
5350 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5351 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5352 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
5356 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
5357 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5358 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5359 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
5360 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
5363 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
5364 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
5365 // messages contained in the variants.
5366 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
5367 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
5368 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
5370 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
5371 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
5372 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
5373 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
5374 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
5377 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
5378 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
5379 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
5380 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
5381 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
5383 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
5388 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
5393 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
5394 (0, short_channel_id, required),
5395 (2, outpoint, required),
5396 (4, htlc_id, required),
5397 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
5400 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
5401 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5402 let payment_data = match &self.onion_payload {
5403 OnionPayload::Invoice(data) => Some(data.clone()),
5406 let keysend_preimage = match self.onion_payload {
5407 OnionPayload::Invoice(_) => None,
5408 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => Some(preimage.clone()),
5413 (0, self.prev_hop, required), (2, self.value, required),
5414 (4, payment_data, option), (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
5415 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
5421 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
5422 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5423 let mut prev_hop = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
5425 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
5426 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
5427 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
5431 (0, prev_hop, required), (2, value, required),
5432 (4, payment_data, option), (6, cltv_expiry, required),
5433 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
5435 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
5437 if payment_data.is_some() {
5438 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
5440 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
5443 if payment_data.is_none() {
5444 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
5446 OnionPayload::Invoice(payment_data.unwrap())
5450 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
5458 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
5459 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5460 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5463 let mut session_priv: ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper<SecretKey> = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
5464 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
5465 let mut path = Some(Vec::new());
5466 let mut payment_id = None;
5467 let mut payment_secret = None;
5468 let mut payee = None;
5469 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
5470 (0, session_priv, required),
5471 (1, payment_id, option),
5472 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
5473 (3, payment_secret, option),
5474 (4, path, vec_type),
5477 if payment_id.is_none() {
5478 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
5480 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
5482 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
5483 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
5484 first_hop_htlc_msat: first_hop_htlc_msat,
5485 path: path.unwrap(),
5486 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
5491 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
5492 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
5497 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
5498 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::io::Error> {
5500 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id, payment_secret, payee } => {
5502 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
5503 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
5504 (0, session_priv, required),
5505 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
5506 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
5507 (3, payment_secret, option),
5508 (4, path, vec_type),
5512 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
5514 field.write(writer)?;
5521 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCFailReason,
5522 (0, LightningError) => {
5526 (0, failure_code, required),
5527 (2, data, vec_type),
5531 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
5533 (0, forward_info, required),
5534 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
5535 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
5536 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
5539 (0, htlc_id, required),
5540 (2, err_packet, required),
5544 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
5545 (0, payment_secret, required),
5546 (2, expiry_time, required),
5547 (4, user_payment_id, required),
5548 (6, payment_preimage, required),
5549 (8, min_value_msat, required),
5552 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(PendingOutboundPayment,
5554 (0, session_privs, required),
5557 (0, session_privs, required),
5560 (0, session_privs, required),
5561 (1, pending_fee_msat, option),
5562 (2, payment_hash, required),
5563 (4, payment_secret, option),
5564 (6, total_msat, required),
5565 (8, pending_amt_msat, required),
5566 (10, starting_block_height, required),
5570 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5571 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5572 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5573 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5574 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5577 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5578 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
5580 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
5582 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
5584 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5585 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
5586 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
5589 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5590 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
5591 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
5592 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
5593 unfunded_channels += 1;
5596 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
5597 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
5598 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
5599 channel.write(writer)?;
5603 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5604 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
5605 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
5606 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5607 for forward in pending_forwards {
5608 forward.write(writer)?;
5612 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5613 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
5614 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
5615 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5616 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
5617 htlc.write(writer)?;
5621 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
5622 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5623 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5624 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
5625 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5626 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
5629 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5630 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5631 for event in events.iter() {
5632 event.write(writer)?;
5635 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
5636 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5637 for event in background_events.iter() {
5639 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
5641 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
5642 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
5647 (self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
5648 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
5650 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5651 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5652 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
5653 hash.write(writer)?;
5654 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
5657 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5658 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
5659 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
5660 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
5661 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() {
5662 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
5665 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
5666 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
5668 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
5669 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
5670 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
5671 session_priv.write(writer)?;
5674 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
5678 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
5679 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
5680 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
5682 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
5683 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
5684 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
5689 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
5690 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
5691 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
5698 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
5700 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
5702 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
5703 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
5704 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
5705 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
5706 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
5707 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
5708 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
5709 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
5710 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
5711 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
5712 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
5713 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
5714 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
5716 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
5717 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
5719 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
5720 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
5722 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
5723 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
5724 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
5725 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
5726 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
5727 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
5729 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
5730 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
5731 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5732 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5733 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5734 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5737 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
5738 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
5740 pub keys_manager: K,
5742 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
5744 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
5745 pub fee_estimator: F,
5746 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
5748 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
5749 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
5750 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
5751 pub chain_monitor: M,
5753 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
5754 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
5755 /// force-closed during deserialization.
5756 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
5757 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
5758 /// deserialization.
5760 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
5761 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
5762 pub default_config: UserConfig,
5764 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
5765 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
5767 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
5768 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
5769 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
5770 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
5772 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
5775 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
5776 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>,
5779 impl<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
5780 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5781 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5782 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5783 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5784 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5787 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
5788 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
5789 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
5790 pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
5791 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>) -> Self {
5793 keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config,
5794 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
5799 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
5800 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
5801 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
5802 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>>)
5803 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5804 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5805 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5806 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5809 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5810 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
5811 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
5815 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
5816 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)
5817 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5818 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5819 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5820 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5823 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5824 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
5826 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
5827 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5828 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
5830 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5832 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5833 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
5834 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
5835 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
5836 let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
5837 for _ in 0..channel_count {
5838 let mut channel: Channel<Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (&args.keys_manager, best_block_height))?;
5839 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
5840 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
5841 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
5842 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
5843 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
5844 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
5845 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
5846 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
5847 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
5848 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
5849 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
5850 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
5851 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
5852 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
5853 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/rust-bitcoin/rust-lightning");
5854 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
5855 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
5856 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
5857 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
5858 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
5859 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
5860 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
5861 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
5862 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
5863 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
5864 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
5865 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
5866 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
5867 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
5868 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
5869 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
5870 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
5873 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
5874 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
5876 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
5879 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5880 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
5881 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
5882 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
5883 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/rust-bitcoin/rust-lightning");
5884 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
5888 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
5889 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
5890 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
5894 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
5895 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5896 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
5897 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
5898 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
5899 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5900 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
5901 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
5902 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
5904 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
5907 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5908 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
5909 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
5910 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
5911 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5912 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
5913 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
5914 previous_hops.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
5916 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
5919 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5920 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>)>()));
5921 for _ in 0..peer_count {
5922 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
5923 let peer_state = PeerState {
5924 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
5926 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
5929 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5930 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
5931 for _ in 0..event_count {
5932 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
5933 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
5937 if forward_htlcs_count > 0 {
5938 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
5939 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
5940 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
5941 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
5942 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
5943 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
5944 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
5948 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5949 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
5950 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
5951 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
5952 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
5953 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
5957 let last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5958 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5960 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5961 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
5962 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
5963 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
5964 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
5968 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5969 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
5970 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
5971 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
5972 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
5973 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
5974 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
5976 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
5977 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
5981 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
5982 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
5983 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
5984 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
5985 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
5986 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
5988 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
5989 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
5990 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
5991 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
5992 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
5993 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
5995 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
5997 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
5998 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
5999 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
6000 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
6001 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
6002 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
6003 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
6005 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors {
6006 if by_id.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
6007 for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_pending_outbound_htlcs() {
6008 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, payment_secret, .. } = htlc_source {
6009 if path.is_empty() {
6010 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
6011 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6013 let path_amt = path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
6014 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
6015 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
6016 match pending_outbound_payments.as_mut().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
6017 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
6018 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
6019 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
6020 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
6022 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6023 let path_fee = path.get_path_fees();
6024 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
6025 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
6026 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
6028 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
6029 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
6030 total_msat: path_amt,
6031 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
6033 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
6034 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
6043 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6044 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
6046 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
6047 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
6050 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
6052 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
6053 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
6054 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
6056 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
6058 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
6063 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
6065 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
6066 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
6068 our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
6069 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &args.keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
6072 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(last_node_announcement_serial as usize),
6073 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
6075 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
6077 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
6078 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
6079 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
6080 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
6082 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
6083 logger: args.logger,
6084 default_configuration: args.default_config,
6087 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
6088 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_manager.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
6091 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
6092 //connection or two.
6094 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
6100 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
6101 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
6102 use core::time::Duration;
6103 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
6104 use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure};
6105 use ln::features::InitFeatures;
6106 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
6108 use ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
6109 use routing::router::{Payee, RouteParameters, find_route};
6110 use util::errors::APIError;
6111 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
6112 use util::test_utils;
6114 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
6116 fn test_wait_timeout() {
6117 use ln::channelmanager::PersistenceNotifier;
6119 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, Ordering};
6122 let persistence_notifier = Arc::new(PersistenceNotifier::new());
6123 let thread_notifier = Arc::clone(&persistence_notifier);
6125 let exit_thread = Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false));
6126 let exit_thread_clone = exit_thread.clone();
6127 thread::spawn(move || {
6129 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &thread_notifier.persistence_lock;
6130 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6131 *persistence_lock = true;
6134 if exit_thread_clone.load(Ordering::SeqCst) {
6140 // Check that we can block indefinitely until updates are available.
6141 let _ = persistence_notifier.wait();
6143 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration if updates are
6146 if persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
6151 exit_thread.store(true, Ordering::SeqCst);
6153 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration even if no updates
6156 if !persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
6163 fn test_notify_limits() {
6164 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
6165 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
6166 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6167 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6168 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6169 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6171 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
6172 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
6173 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6174 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6175 assert!(nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6177 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6179 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
6180 // to connect messages with new values
6181 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
6182 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
6183 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
6184 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
6186 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
6187 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6188 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6189 // ... but the last node should not.
6190 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6191 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
6192 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6193 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6195 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
6196 // about the channel.
6197 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
6198 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
6199 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6201 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
6203 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
6204 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
6205 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
6206 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
6207 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6208 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6210 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
6211 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
6212 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
6214 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
6215 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
6216 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
6217 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
6218 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
6219 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
6221 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
6222 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
6223 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
6224 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
6225 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6226 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6227 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
6228 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
6230 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
6231 // the channel info has updated.
6232 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
6233 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
6234 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6235 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6236 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
6237 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
6241 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
6242 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
6244 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6245 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6246 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6247 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6248 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6250 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
6251 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
6252 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
6253 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
6254 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
6255 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
6256 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payee, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
6257 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6258 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6259 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6260 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
6262 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
6263 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
6264 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6265 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6266 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6267 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
6268 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
6269 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6270 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6271 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6272 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6273 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6274 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6275 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6276 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6277 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6278 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6279 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6280 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6281 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6282 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
6283 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
6285 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
6286 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payee, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
6287 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6288 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6289 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6290 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
6292 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
6293 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
6294 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
6295 // lightning messages manually.
6296 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
6297 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6298 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6299 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6300 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
6301 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6302 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6303 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
6304 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6305 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6306 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
6307 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6308 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6309 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6310 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
6311 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6312 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6313 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
6314 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6315 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6316 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
6317 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6318 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
6319 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6320 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6321 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
6322 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6324 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate 1 event upon the first path's success. No
6325 // further events will be generated for subsequence path successes.
6326 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6328 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
6329 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
6330 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
6331 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
6333 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6338 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
6339 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
6340 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
6341 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
6342 // fails as expected.
6343 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6344 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6345 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6346 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6347 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6348 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
6350 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
6351 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
6352 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
6354 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
6355 let params = RouteParameters {
6356 payee: Payee::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id()),
6357 final_value_msat: 100_000,
6358 final_cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
6360 let route = find_route(
6361 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), ¶ms, nodes[0].network_graph, None,
6362 nodes[0].logger, &scorer
6364 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
6365 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6366 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6367 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6368 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
6369 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
6370 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6371 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6372 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6373 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6374 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6375 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6376 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6377 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6378 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6379 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6380 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6381 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6382 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6383 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
6384 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
6386 // Finally, claim the original payment.
6387 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
6389 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
6390 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
6391 let route = find_route(
6392 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), ¶ms, nodes[0].network_graph, None,
6393 nodes[0].logger, &scorer
6395 let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
6396 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6397 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6398 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6399 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
6400 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
6401 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
6403 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
6404 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
6405 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
6406 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6407 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6408 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6409 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
6410 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
6411 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6412 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6413 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6414 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6415 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6416 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6417 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6418 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6419 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6420 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6421 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6422 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6423 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6424 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
6425 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
6427 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
6428 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
6432 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
6433 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
6434 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
6435 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6436 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6437 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6438 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6440 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
6441 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
6442 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
6443 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
6445 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6446 let params = RouteParameters {
6447 payee: Payee::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
6448 final_value_msat: 10000,
6449 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
6451 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
6452 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
6453 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
6454 let route = find_route(
6455 &payer_pubkey, ¶ms, network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
6456 nodes[0].logger, &scorer
6459 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
6460 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
6461 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage), None, None).unwrap();
6462 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6464 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6465 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
6466 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6467 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6468 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6469 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6470 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6472 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash".to_string(), 1);
6476 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
6477 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
6478 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6479 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6480 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6481 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6483 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
6484 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
6485 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
6486 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
6488 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6489 let params = RouteParameters {
6490 payee: Payee::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
6491 final_value_msat: 10000,
6492 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
6494 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
6495 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
6496 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
6497 let route = find_route(
6498 &payer_pubkey, ¶ms, network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
6499 nodes[0].logger, &scorer
6502 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
6503 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
6504 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
6505 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage), None, None).unwrap();
6506 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6508 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6509 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
6510 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6511 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6512 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6513 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6514 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6516 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "We don't support MPP keysend payments".to_string(), 1);
6520 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
6521 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
6522 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
6523 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
6524 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6526 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
6527 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
6528 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
6529 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
6531 // Marshall an MPP route.
6532 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
6533 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
6534 route.paths.push(path);
6535 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
6536 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
6537 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
6538 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
6539 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
6540 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
6542 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None).unwrap_err() {
6543 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
6544 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err)) },
6545 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
6550 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "unstable"))]
6553 use chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
6554 use chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
6555 use ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
6556 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures};
6557 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
6558 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
6559 use routing::network_graph::NetworkGraph;
6560 use routing::router::{Payee, get_route};
6561 use routing::scoring::Scorer;
6562 use util::test_utils;
6563 use util::config::UserConfig;
6564 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PaymentPurpose};
6566 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
6567 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
6568 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, Transaction, TxOut};
6570 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
6574 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
6575 node: &'a ChannelManager<InMemorySigner,
6576 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
6577 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
6578 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
6579 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager,
6580 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestLogger>
6585 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
6586 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
6589 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
6590 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
6591 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
6593 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
6594 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
6596 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
6597 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
6599 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
6600 config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
6602 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
6603 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
6604 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
6605 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
6606 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
6608 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
6610 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
6612 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
6613 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
6614 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
6615 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
6616 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
6618 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
6620 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
6622 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
6623 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
6624 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
6625 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
6626 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
6629 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
6630 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
6631 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
6633 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
6634 } else { panic!(); }
6636 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
6637 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
6639 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
6642 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
6645 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
6646 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
6648 node_a.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
6649 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6650 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
6651 match msg_events[0] {
6652 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref msg, .. } => {
6653 node_b.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
6654 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
6658 match msg_events[1] {
6659 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
6663 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash);
6665 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
6666 macro_rules! send_payment {
6667 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
6668 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
6669 let payee = Payee::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id())
6670 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
6671 let scorer = Scorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
6672 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payee, &dummy_graph,
6673 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a, &scorer).unwrap();
6675 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
6676 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
6678 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
6679 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
6681 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
6682 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
6683 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6684 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
6685 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
6686 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6687 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
6688 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
6690 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
6691 expect_payment_received!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
6692 assert!($node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
6694 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
6695 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
6696 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
6697 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6698 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
6700 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
6703 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
6704 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6705 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
6706 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
6708 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
6713 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
6714 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);