1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
23 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
25 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
27 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
29 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
31 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
34 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
39 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
40 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
41 // construct one themselves.
42 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
43 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
44 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
45 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
46 use crate::ln::features::InvoiceFeatures;
47 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
48 use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, Path, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, Router};
49 use crate::routing::scoring::ProbabilisticScorer;
51 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
52 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
53 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
55 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
56 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment};
57 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
58 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider, ChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
59 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig};
60 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
61 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
62 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
63 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
64 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
65 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
67 use alloc::collections::BTreeMap;
70 use crate::prelude::*;
72 use core::cell::RefCell;
74 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
75 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, AtomicBool, Ordering};
76 use core::time::Duration;
79 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
80 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
82 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
84 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
85 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
86 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
88 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
89 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
90 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
91 // before we forward it.
93 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
94 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
95 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
96 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
97 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
99 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
100 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
102 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
103 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
104 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
105 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
108 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
109 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
110 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
111 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
114 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
115 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
116 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
120 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
121 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
122 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
123 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
124 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
126 pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
127 /// Sender intended amount to forward or receive (actual amount received
128 /// may overshoot this in either case)
129 pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
130 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
133 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
134 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
135 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
136 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
139 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
140 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
141 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
142 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
143 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
146 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
147 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
149 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
150 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
151 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
154 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
155 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
157 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
158 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
161 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
162 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
165 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
169 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
170 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
171 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
172 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
173 short_channel_id: u64,
175 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
176 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
178 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
179 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
184 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
186 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
187 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
188 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
190 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
191 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
194 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
195 struct ClaimableHTLC {
196 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
198 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
200 /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
201 /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
202 sender_intended_value: u64,
203 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
205 /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
206 /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
207 total_value_received: Option<u64>,
208 /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
212 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
214 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
215 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
216 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
218 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
219 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
224 impl Readable for PaymentId {
225 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
226 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
231 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
233 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
234 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
235 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
237 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
238 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
243 impl Readable for InterceptId {
244 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
245 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
250 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
251 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
252 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
253 PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
254 OutboundRoute { session_priv: SecretKey },
257 pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
259 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
260 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
261 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
263 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
264 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: *session_priv },
268 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
269 (0, PreviousHopData) => {
270 (0, short_channel_id, required),
271 (2, htlc_id, required),
273 (2, OutboundRoute) => {
274 (0, session_priv, required),
279 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
280 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
281 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
282 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
283 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
286 session_priv: SecretKey,
287 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
288 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
289 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
290 payment_id: PaymentId,
293 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
294 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
295 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
297 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
299 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
301 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
304 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
305 payment_id.hash(hasher);
306 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
312 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
314 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
315 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
316 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
317 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
318 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
319 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
323 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
324 /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
325 /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
326 pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
327 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
328 *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
330 // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
336 struct ReceiveError {
342 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
343 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
345 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
346 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
347 pub enum FailureCode {
348 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
349 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
350 TemporaryNodeFailure = 0x2000 | 2,
351 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
352 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
353 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing = 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
354 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
355 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
356 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
357 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
358 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails = 0x4000 | 15,
361 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>);
363 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
364 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
365 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
366 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
367 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
369 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
370 err: msgs::LightningError,
371 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
372 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
374 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
376 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
378 err: LightningError {
380 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
381 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
388 shutdown_finish: None,
392 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
393 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
396 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
398 err: LightningError {
400 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
401 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
407 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
408 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
412 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
415 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
417 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
418 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
422 log_level: Level::Warn,
425 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
427 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
429 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
431 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
432 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
440 shutdown_finish: None,
445 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
446 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
447 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
448 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
449 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
451 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
452 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
453 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
454 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
455 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
456 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
457 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
459 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
463 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
464 struct ClaimingPayment {
466 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
467 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
469 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
470 (0, amount_msat, required),
471 (2, payment_purpose, required),
472 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
475 struct ClaimablePayment {
476 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
477 onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
478 htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
481 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
482 struct ClaimablePayments {
483 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
484 /// failed/claimed by the user.
486 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
487 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
489 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
490 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
491 claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
493 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
494 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
495 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
496 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
499 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
500 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
501 /// quite some time lag.
502 enum BackgroundEvent {
503 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
504 /// commitment transaction.
505 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
509 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
510 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
511 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
512 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
513 /// event can be generated.
514 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
515 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user.
516 EmitEvent { event: events::Event },
519 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
520 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
521 (2, EmitEvent) => { (0, event, upgradable_required) },
524 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
525 pub(crate) enum EventCompletionAction {
526 ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
527 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
528 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
531 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(EventCompletionAction,
532 (0, ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate) => {
533 (0, channel_funding_outpoint, required),
534 (2, counterparty_node_id, required),
538 /// State we hold per-peer.
539 pub(super) struct PeerState<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
540 /// `temporary_channel_id` or `channel_id` -> `channel`.
542 /// Holds all channels where the peer is the counterparty. Once a channel has been assigned a
543 /// `channel_id`, the `temporary_channel_id` key in the map is updated and is replaced by the
545 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
546 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
547 latest_features: InitFeatures,
548 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
549 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
550 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
551 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
552 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
554 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
555 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
556 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
557 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
559 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
560 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
561 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
562 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
563 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
564 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
565 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
566 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
567 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
568 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
572 impl <Signer: ChannelSigner> PeerState<Signer> {
573 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
574 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
575 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
576 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
577 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
580 self.channel_by_id.is_empty() && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
584 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
585 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
587 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
590 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
591 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
592 struct PendingInboundPayment {
593 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
594 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
595 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
596 /// this payment being removed.
598 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
599 user_payment_id: u64,
600 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
601 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
602 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
605 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
606 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
607 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
608 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
609 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
610 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
611 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
612 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
614 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
615 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
623 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
625 Arc<Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>
630 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
631 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
632 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
633 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
634 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
635 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
636 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
637 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
638 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
640 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
641 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<&'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e DefaultRouter<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L, &'h Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>>, &'g L>;
643 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`] used in testing.
644 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
645 pub trait AChannelManager {
646 type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer>;
647 type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
648 type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface;
649 type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
650 type EntropySource: EntropySource;
651 type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
652 type NodeSigner: NodeSigner;
653 type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
654 type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner;
655 type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<Signer = Self::Signer>;
656 type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
657 type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator;
658 type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
660 type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
662 type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
663 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
665 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
666 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
667 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
669 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> + Sized,
670 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface + Sized,
671 ES::Target: EntropySource + Sized,
672 NS::Target: NodeSigner + Sized,
673 SP::Target: SignerProvider + Sized,
674 F::Target: FeeEstimator + Sized,
675 R::Target: Router + Sized,
676 L::Target: Logger + Sized,
678 type Watch = M::Target;
680 type Broadcaster = T::Target;
682 type EntropySource = ES::Target;
684 type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
686 type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer;
687 type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
689 type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
691 type Router = R::Target;
693 type Logger = L::Target;
695 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
698 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
699 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
701 /// Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
702 /// to individual Channels.
704 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
705 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
706 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
707 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
709 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
710 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
711 /// returning from [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`], with ChannelManagers, writing updates
712 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during
713 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
714 /// [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the
715 /// `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
717 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
718 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
719 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
721 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
722 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
723 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
724 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
725 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
727 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
728 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
729 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
730 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
732 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
733 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
734 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
736 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
737 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
738 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
739 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
740 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
742 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
743 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
744 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
745 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
746 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
747 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
748 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
749 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
752 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
753 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
754 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
755 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
756 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
760 // `total_consistency_lock`
762 // |__`forward_htlcs`
764 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
766 // |__`per_peer_state`
768 // | |__`pending_inbound_payments`
770 // | |__`claimable_payments`
772 // | |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
778 // | |__`short_to_chan_info`
780 // | |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
784 // | |__`pending_events`
786 // | |__`pending_background_events`
788 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
790 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
791 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
792 ES::Target: EntropySource,
793 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
794 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
795 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
799 default_configuration: UserConfig,
800 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
801 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
807 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
809 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
811 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
812 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
814 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
815 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
816 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
817 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
819 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
820 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
822 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
823 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
824 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
825 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
826 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
827 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
828 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
829 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
831 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
833 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
834 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
836 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
838 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
839 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
840 /// and via the classic SCID.
842 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
843 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
845 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
847 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
849 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
850 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
851 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
853 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
854 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
856 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
857 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
859 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
860 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
862 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
863 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
864 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
865 /// active channel list on load.
867 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
868 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
870 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
872 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
873 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
874 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
876 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
877 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
878 /// the handling of the events.
880 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
881 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
884 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
885 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
886 /// would break backwards compatability.
887 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
888 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
889 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
891 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
892 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<[u8; 32], PublicKey>>,
894 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
896 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
897 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
898 /// confirmation depth.
900 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
901 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
902 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
904 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
906 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
908 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
910 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
912 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
914 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
915 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
916 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
918 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
919 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
921 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
922 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
923 /// keeping additional state.
924 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
926 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
927 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
928 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
929 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
931 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
932 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
934 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
935 /// are currently open with that peer.
937 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
938 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
941 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
943 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
944 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
945 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
946 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
947 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
949 /// The set of events which we need to give to the user to handle. In some cases an event may
950 /// require some further action after the user handles it (currently only blocking a monitor
951 /// update from being handed to the user to ensure the included changes to the channel state
952 /// are handled by the user before they're persisted durably to disk). In that case, the second
953 /// element in the tuple is set to `Some` with further details of the action.
955 /// Note that events MUST NOT be removed from pending_events after deserialization, as they
956 /// could be in the middle of being processed without the direct mutex held.
958 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
959 pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
960 /// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
961 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
962 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
963 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
964 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
965 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
966 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
967 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
968 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
969 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
970 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
972 persistence_notifier: Notifier,
981 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
983 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
984 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
985 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
986 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
987 pub struct ChainParameters {
988 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
989 pub network: Network,
991 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
993 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
994 pub best_block: BestBlock,
997 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
1003 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
1004 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
1005 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
1006 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
1007 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
1008 /// updates are ready for persistence).
1010 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
1011 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
1012 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
1013 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
1014 persistence_notifier: &'a Notifier,
1016 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
1017 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
1020 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
1021 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
1022 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
1025 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1026 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
1028 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1029 persistence_notifier: notifier,
1030 should_persist: persist_check,
1031 _read_guard: read_guard,
1036 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1037 fn drop(&mut self) {
1038 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
1039 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
1044 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1045 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1047 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1049 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1050 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1051 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1052 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1053 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1055 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1056 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1058 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1060 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1061 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1062 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1063 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1064 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1065 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1066 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
1067 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
1068 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
1069 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
1070 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
1071 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
1072 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
1074 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1075 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
1077 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1078 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1079 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1080 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
1082 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1083 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1084 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1085 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1086 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1087 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1090 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1092 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1093 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1096 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1098 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1099 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1101 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until we time-out the
1102 /// idempotency of payments by [`PaymentId`]. See
1103 /// [`OutboundPayments::remove_stale_resolved_payments`].
1104 pub(crate) const IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 7;
1106 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
1107 /// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
1108 pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
1110 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is connected until
1111 /// we mark the channel enabled and gossip the update.
1112 pub(crate) const ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 5;
1114 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
1115 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
1116 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
1117 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1119 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1120 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1121 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1123 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1124 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1125 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1127 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1128 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1129 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1130 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1131 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1132 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1133 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1134 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1135 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1136 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1137 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1140 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1141 /// to better separate parameters.
1142 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1143 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1144 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1145 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1146 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1147 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1148 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1149 pub features: InitFeatures,
1150 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1151 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1152 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1154 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1156 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1157 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1158 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1159 /// payments to us through this channel.
1160 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1161 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1162 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1163 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1164 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1165 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1166 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1169 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
1170 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1171 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1172 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1173 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1174 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1175 /// lifetime of the channel.
1176 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
1177 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1178 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1179 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1180 /// our counterparty already.
1182 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1183 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1184 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1185 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1187 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1188 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1189 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1190 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1192 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1193 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1195 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1196 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1198 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1199 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1200 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1201 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1202 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1203 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1204 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1205 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1206 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1209 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1211 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1212 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1213 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1214 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1215 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1216 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1217 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1219 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1220 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1222 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1223 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1224 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1225 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1226 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1227 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1228 /// this value on chain.
1230 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1232 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1234 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1235 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1236 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or a random value if the channel was
1237 /// inbound. This may be zero for inbound channels serialized with LDK versions prior to
1239 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1240 /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
1241 /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
1243 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
1244 pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
1245 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1246 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1247 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1249 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1250 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1251 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1252 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1254 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1255 pub balance_msat: u64,
1256 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1257 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1258 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1259 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1261 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1263 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1264 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1265 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1266 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1267 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1268 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1269 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1270 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1272 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`] and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1273 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1274 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1275 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1276 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1277 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1278 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1280 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1281 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1282 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1283 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1284 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1285 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1286 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1287 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1288 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1290 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1292 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1293 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1294 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1295 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1296 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1298 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1299 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1300 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1301 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1302 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1303 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1304 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1306 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1307 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1308 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1309 pub is_outbound: bool,
1310 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1311 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1312 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1313 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1314 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1316 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1317 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1318 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1319 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1321 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1322 pub is_usable: bool,
1323 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1324 pub is_public: bool,
1325 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1326 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1327 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1328 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1329 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1330 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1332 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1333 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1336 impl ChannelDetails {
1337 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1338 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1339 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1341 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1342 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1343 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1344 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1347 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1348 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1349 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1351 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1352 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1353 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1354 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1357 fn from_channel<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner>(channel: &Channel<Signer>,
1358 best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures) -> Self {
1360 let balance = channel.get_available_balances();
1361 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1362 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1364 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1365 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1366 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1367 features: latest_features,
1368 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1369 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1370 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1371 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1372 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1373 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1374 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1375 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if channel.have_received_message() {
1376 Some(channel.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1377 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1379 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1380 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1381 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1382 channel_type: if channel.have_received_message() { Some(channel.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1383 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1384 outbound_scid_alias: if channel.is_usable() { Some(channel.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1385 inbound_scid_alias: channel.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1386 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1387 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(channel.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
1388 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1389 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1390 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1391 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1392 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1393 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1394 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1395 confirmations: Some(channel.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1396 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1397 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1398 is_channel_ready: channel.is_usable(),
1399 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1400 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1401 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1402 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1403 config: Some(channel.config()),
1408 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1409 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1410 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1411 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1412 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1414 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1416 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1417 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1418 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1421 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1422 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1423 /// payment is removed from tracking.
1425 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1426 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1427 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1429 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1430 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1431 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1433 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1434 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1438 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1440 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
1442 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1443 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1444 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1445 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1447 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1448 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1449 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1452 macro_rules! handle_error {
1453 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
1454 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1455 // entering the macro.
1456 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1457 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1461 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1462 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1464 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1465 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1466 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1467 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1471 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1472 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1473 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1474 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1479 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1480 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1482 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1483 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1484 action: err.action.clone()
1488 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1489 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1490 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1491 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1492 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1496 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1503 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1504 ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {{
1505 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.channel_id());
1506 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1507 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1508 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1510 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1511 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1512 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1513 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1514 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1516 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1517 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1519 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1523 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1524 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1525 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1527 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1528 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1530 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1531 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1533 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1534 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1535 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel);
1536 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1537 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1538 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1544 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1545 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1549 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1551 $entry.remove_entry();
1559 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1560 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1564 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1566 $entry.remove_entry();
1574 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1575 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1577 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1578 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, channel);
1584 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1585 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
1586 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1587 node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1588 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1590 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1591 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1592 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1593 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1594 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1595 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1596 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1597 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1598 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1599 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1604 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
1605 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1606 if $channel.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
1607 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelPending {
1608 channel_id: $channel.channel_id(),
1609 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.temporary_channel_id(),
1610 counterparty_node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1611 user_channel_id: $channel.get_user_id(),
1612 funding_txo: $channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
1614 $channel.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
1619 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
1620 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1621 if $channel.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
1622 debug_assert!($channel.channel_pending_event_emitted());
1623 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelReady {
1624 channel_id: $channel.channel_id(),
1625 user_channel_id: $channel.get_user_id(),
1626 counterparty_node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1627 channel_type: $channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
1629 $channel.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
1634 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
1635 ($self: ident, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
1636 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&$self.logger,
1637 &$self.node_signer, $self.genesis_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
1638 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
1639 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
1640 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.is_usable() {
1641 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
1642 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
1643 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
1644 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
1646 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
1647 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
1648 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1654 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
1655 .remove(&$chan.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
1657 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
1658 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
1659 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
1660 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
1661 updates.announcement_sigs);
1662 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
1663 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
1666 let channel_id = $chan.channel_id();
1667 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
1668 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
1670 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
1672 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1673 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1675 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
1676 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1677 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
1678 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
1683 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
1684 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, MANUALLY_REMOVING, $remove: expr) => { {
1685 // update_maps_on_chan_removal needs to be able to take id_to_peer, so make sure we can in
1686 // any case so that it won't deadlock.
1687 debug_assert_ne!($self.id_to_peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1689 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
1690 log_debug!($self.logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
1691 log_bytes!($chan.channel_id()[..]));
1694 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
1695 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure",
1696 log_bytes!($chan.channel_id()[..]));
1697 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $chan);
1698 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(
1699 "ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), $chan.channel_id(),
1700 $chan.get_user_id(), $chan.force_shutdown(false),
1701 $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok()));
1705 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
1706 $chan.complete_one_mon_update($update_id);
1707 if $chan.no_monitor_updates_pending() {
1708 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $update_id, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
1714 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan_entry: expr) => {
1715 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $update_id, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan_entry.get_mut(), MANUALLY_REMOVING, $chan_entry.remove_entry())
1719 macro_rules! process_events_body {
1720 ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
1721 let mut processed_all_events = false;
1722 while !processed_all_events {
1723 if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
1727 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
1730 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
1731 // persists happen while processing monitor events.
1732 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1734 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
1735 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
1736 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
1737 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
1741 let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
1742 let num_events = pending_events.len();
1743 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
1744 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
1747 let mut post_event_actions = Vec::new();
1749 for (event, action_opt) in pending_events {
1750 $event_to_handle = event;
1752 if let Some(action) = action_opt {
1753 post_event_actions.push(action);
1758 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1759 pending_events.drain(..num_events);
1760 processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
1761 $self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
1764 if !post_event_actions.is_empty() {
1765 $self.handle_post_event_actions(post_event_actions);
1766 // If we had some actions, go around again as we may have more events now
1767 processed_all_events = false;
1770 if result == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
1771 $self.persistence_notifier.notify();
1777 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
1779 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
1780 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1781 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1782 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1783 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1784 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1788 /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
1790 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1791 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
1793 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1795 /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
1796 /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
1797 /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
1800 /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
1801 /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
1802 /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
1803 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1804 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1805 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1806 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
1807 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
1809 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1810 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1811 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
1816 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1818 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
1819 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1820 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
1821 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1822 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
1823 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1824 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1825 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1827 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
1830 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
1831 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1833 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1835 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1837 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1839 pending_events: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
1840 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
1841 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1842 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1843 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
1853 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
1854 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1855 &self.default_configuration
1858 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1859 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1860 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
1863 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
1864 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
1866 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
1868 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
1872 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
1877 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1879 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1880 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1881 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
1882 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
1883 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
1885 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1886 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1888 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1889 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1890 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1892 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1893 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1894 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1895 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1896 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1897 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1899 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1900 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1901 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1902 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1903 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1904 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1907 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1908 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1909 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1911 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1913 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
1914 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
1916 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1918 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
1919 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1920 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1921 match Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
1922 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
1923 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
1927 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
1932 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1934 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1935 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1936 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1938 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1940 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1943 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1946 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1947 node_id: their_network_key,
1950 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1953 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1954 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
1955 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
1956 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
1957 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
1958 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
1959 // the same channel.
1960 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
1962 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1963 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1964 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
1965 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1966 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1967 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1968 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel(channel, best_block_height,
1969 peer_state.latest_features.clone());
1977 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
1978 /// more information.
1979 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1980 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1983 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
1984 /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1986 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1987 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1989 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1990 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1991 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1992 // really wanted anyway.
1993 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1996 /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
1997 pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1998 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1999 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2001 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
2002 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2003 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2004 let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2005 return peer_state.channel_by_id
2008 ChannelDetails::from_channel(channel, best_block_height, features.clone()))
2014 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
2015 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
2017 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
2018 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
2019 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
2021 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2022 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
2023 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
2024 .filter_map(|(_, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
2025 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
2026 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
2027 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2028 total_msat: *total_msat,
2031 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
2032 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2034 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
2035 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2037 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
2042 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
2043 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
2044 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2045 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
2046 Some(transaction) => {
2047 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::DiscardFunding {
2048 channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction
2053 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
2054 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
2055 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
2056 reason: closure_reason
2060 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2061 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2063 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
2064 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
2065 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2067 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2068 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2070 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2071 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2072 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2073 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2074 let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo();
2075 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2076 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut()
2077 .get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?;
2078 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
2080 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
2081 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
2082 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
2083 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2084 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
2088 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
2089 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
2090 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2091 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update);
2092 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry);
2095 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
2096 let channel = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
2097 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
2098 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2102 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2106 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id) })
2110 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2111 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2112 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
2113 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
2116 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
2120 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2121 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2122 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2124 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
2125 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2127 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
2128 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
2129 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
2130 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
2132 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2134 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2135 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2136 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2137 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2138 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2139 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None)
2142 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2143 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2144 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2146 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
2147 /// the channel being closed or not:
2148 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
2149 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
2150 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2151 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
2152 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
2153 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
2154 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
2156 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2158 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2159 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2160 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2161 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2162 pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2163 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
2167 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
2168 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
2169 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
2170 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2171 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
2172 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2173 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2174 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
2176 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
2177 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2178 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2179 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2180 // ignore the result here.
2181 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
2185 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2186 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2187 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
2188 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2189 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2190 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2191 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
2193 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2194 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2195 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2196 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2197 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) });
2199 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2201 remove_channel!(self, chan)
2203 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), peer_node_id) });
2206 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2207 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(broadcast));
2208 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2209 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2210 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2215 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
2218 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2219 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2220 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2221 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2222 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2223 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2224 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2225 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
2226 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2227 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2228 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
2229 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
2240 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2241 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2242 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2244 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2245 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2246 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2249 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2250 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2251 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2253 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2254 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2255 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2256 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2257 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2260 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2261 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2262 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2263 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2264 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2268 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2269 /// local transaction(s).
2270 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2271 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2272 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2276 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(&self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
2277 payment_hash: PaymentHash, amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError>
2279 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2280 if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value > cltv_expiry {
2281 return Err(ReceiveError {
2282 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to less than the CLTV set by the sender",
2284 err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
2287 // final_expiry_too_soon
2288 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2289 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2291 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2292 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2293 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2294 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2295 if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= current_height as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2296 let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12);
2297 err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes());
2298 err_data.extend_from_slice(¤t_height.to_be_bytes());
2299 return Err(ReceiveError {
2300 err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data,
2301 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2304 if hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat {
2305 return Err(ReceiveError {
2307 err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
2308 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2312 let routing = match hop_data.format {
2313 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => {
2314 return Err(ReceiveError {
2315 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2316 err_data: Vec::new(),
2317 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2320 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage, payment_metadata } => {
2321 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
2322 return Err(ReceiveError {
2323 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2324 err_data: Vec::new(),
2325 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2327 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2328 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2331 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2332 phantom_shared_secret,
2334 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2335 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2336 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2337 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2338 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2339 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2340 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2341 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2342 return Err(ReceiveError {
2343 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2344 err_data: Vec::new(),
2345 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2349 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2352 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2355 return Err(ReceiveError {
2356 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2357 err_data: Vec::new(),
2358 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2363 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2366 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2367 incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
2368 outgoing_amt_msat: hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2369 outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2373 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
2374 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2375 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2377 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2378 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2379 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2380 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2381 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2382 failure_code: $err_code,
2388 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2389 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2392 let shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(
2393 Recipient::Node, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None
2394 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
2396 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2397 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2398 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2399 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2400 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2401 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2402 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2403 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2405 macro_rules! return_err {
2406 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2408 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2409 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2410 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2411 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2412 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
2413 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
2419 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2421 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2422 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2424 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2425 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2429 let pending_forward_info = match next_hop {
2430 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
2432 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None) {
2434 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
2435 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
2436 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
2437 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
2438 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
2440 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
2443 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
2444 let new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
2445 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2447 public_key: onion_utils::next_hop_packet_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx, new_pubkey, &shared_secret),
2448 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2449 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
2452 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
2453 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2454 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
2455 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2459 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2460 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2461 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2464 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2465 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2466 incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
2467 outgoing_amt_msat: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2468 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2473 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref outgoing_amt_msat, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
2474 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
2475 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
2476 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
2477 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
2478 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
2479 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(short_channel_id).cloned();
2480 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
2481 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2482 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2483 // phantom or an intercept.
2484 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
2485 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)) ||
2486 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)
2490 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2493 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
2495 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
2496 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2497 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
2498 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
2499 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2501 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
2502 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2503 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id) {
2505 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
2506 // have no consistency guarantees.
2507 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2511 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2512 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2513 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2514 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2515 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2517 if chan.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && *short_channel_id != chan.outbound_scid_alias() {
2518 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
2519 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
2520 // we don't have the channel here.
2521 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2523 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(*short_channel_id, chan).ok();
2525 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2526 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2527 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2528 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2529 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2530 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2531 // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
2532 // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
2533 // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
2534 if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
2535 break Some(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2537 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
2540 if *outgoing_amt_msat < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2541 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
2543 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, *outgoing_amt_msat, *outgoing_cltv_value) {
2544 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
2548 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
2549 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
2550 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
2551 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
2553 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
2560 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2561 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2562 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2563 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2564 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2565 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2567 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2568 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2570 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2571 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2572 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2573 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2574 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2575 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2576 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2577 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2578 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2579 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2585 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
2586 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2587 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2588 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2590 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2591 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2593 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2594 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
2595 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2597 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2598 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2599 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2600 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
2601 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
2602 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
2603 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
2607 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
2612 pending_forward_info
2615 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2616 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2617 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2619 /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
2620 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
2621 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
2623 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2624 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
2625 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2626 if !chan.should_announce() {
2627 return Err(LightningError {
2628 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2629 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2632 if chan.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
2633 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
2635 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2636 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2639 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2640 /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
2641 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2642 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2644 /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
2645 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
2646 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
2648 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2649 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
2650 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2651 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2652 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
2653 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2657 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
2659 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2660 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2661 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2663 let enabled = chan.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
2664 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
2665 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
2666 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
2667 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => false,
2670 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2671 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2673 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2674 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
2675 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2676 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2677 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
2678 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2679 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2680 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2682 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
2683 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
2684 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
2686 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
2688 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2695 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2696 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2697 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv_bytes)
2700 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2701 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
2702 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2704 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2705 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
2706 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2708 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2709 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected".to_owned()})?;
2710 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2711 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
2712 return Err(APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Route size too large considering onion data".to_owned()});
2714 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
2716 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2717 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2718 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2719 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
2722 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2723 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
2724 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
2725 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2726 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2727 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
2728 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2729 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
2731 let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2732 let send_res = chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
2733 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2735 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2736 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2738 }, onion_packet, &self.logger);
2739 match break_chan_entry!(self, send_res, chan) {
2740 Some(monitor_update) => {
2741 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2742 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
2743 if let Err(e) = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
2746 if update_res == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress {
2747 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
2748 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
2749 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
2750 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
2751 // which we do in the send_payment check for
2752 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
2753 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
2759 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
2760 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
2761 // `channel_by_id` map.
2762 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
2763 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
2768 match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2769 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2771 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2776 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2778 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
2779 /// fields for more info.
2781 /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
2782 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
2784 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
2786 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
2787 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
2788 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
2789 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
2790 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
2792 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
2793 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
2794 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
2795 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
2796 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
2798 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
2799 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
2800 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
2801 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
2803 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
2805 /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
2806 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2807 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
2809 /// In general, a path may raise:
2810 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2811 /// node public key) is specified.
2812 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2813 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2815 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2816 /// relevant updates.
2818 /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
2819 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2820 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2822 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2823 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2824 /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
2825 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
2826 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
2827 pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2828 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2829 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2830 self.pending_outbound_payments
2831 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2832 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2833 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2836 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment`], but will automatically find a route based on
2837 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
2838 pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
2839 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2840 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2841 self.pending_outbound_payments
2842 .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
2843 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
2844 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
2845 &self.pending_events,
2846 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2847 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2851 pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2852 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2853 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2854 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2855 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2856 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2860 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
2861 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2862 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
2866 pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
2867 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
2871 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
2872 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
2873 /// retries are exhausted.
2875 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
2876 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
2878 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
2879 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
2880 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
2882 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event is generated and we restart without this
2883 /// [`ChannelManager`] having been persisted, another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated.
2885 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2886 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2887 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
2888 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2889 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
2892 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2893 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2894 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2895 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2896 /// never reach the recipient.
2898 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
2899 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
2901 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2902 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2904 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2906 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2907 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
2908 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2909 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2910 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
2911 route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
2912 &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2913 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2914 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2917 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
2918 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
2920 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
2923 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
2924 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
2925 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2926 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2927 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
2928 payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
2929 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2930 &self.logger, &self.pending_events,
2931 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2932 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2935 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
2936 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
2937 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
2938 pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2939 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2940 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2941 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2942 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2943 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2946 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
2949 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
2950 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
2953 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2954 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2955 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
2956 &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
2957 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2958 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2959 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2960 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2962 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2963 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2964 let (msg, chan) = match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2966 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2968 let funding_res = chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2969 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2970 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2971 } else { unreachable!(); });
2973 Ok(funding_msg) => (funding_msg, chan),
2975 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
2976 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
2978 let _ = handle_error!(self, funding_res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id());
2979 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2980 err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
2986 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2988 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
2989 log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
2994 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2995 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2998 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2999 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3000 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
3002 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3003 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
3004 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.channel_id(), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
3005 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
3014 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3015 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
3016 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
3020 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
3022 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
3023 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
3025 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
3026 /// across the p2p network.
3028 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
3029 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
3031 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
3032 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
3033 /// keys per-channel).
3035 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
3036 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
3037 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
3039 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
3040 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
3041 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
3043 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
3044 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
3045 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
3046 /// for more details.
3048 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
3049 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
3050 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3051 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3053 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
3054 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
3055 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3056 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
3061 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3062 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools if their locktime is strictly
3063 // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
3064 // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
3065 // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
3066 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 1 {
3067 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3068 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
3072 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
3073 let mut output_index = None;
3074 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
3075 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3076 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
3077 if output_index.is_some() {
3078 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3079 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
3082 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
3083 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3084 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
3087 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
3090 if output_index.is_none() {
3091 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3092 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
3095 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
3099 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
3101 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3102 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3103 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3104 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3106 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3107 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3109 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3110 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3112 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3114 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3115 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3116 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3117 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3118 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3119 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3120 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3121 pub fn update_channel_config(
3122 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config: &ChannelConfig,
3123 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3124 if config.cltv_expiry_delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA {
3125 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3126 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
3130 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(
3131 &self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier,
3133 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3134 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3135 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3136 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3137 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3138 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3139 if !peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) {
3140 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3141 err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
3145 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3146 let channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id).unwrap();
3147 if !channel.update_config(config) {
3150 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
3151 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
3152 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
3153 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3154 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3162 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
3163 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
3165 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
3166 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
3168 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
3169 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
3170 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
3171 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
3172 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
3174 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
3175 /// you from forwarding more than you received.
3177 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3180 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
3181 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3182 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
3183 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
3184 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &[u8; 32], next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3185 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3187 let next_hop_scid = {
3188 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3189 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
3190 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
3191 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3192 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3193 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
3195 if !chan.is_usable() {
3196 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3197 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id))
3200 chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.outbound_scid_alias())
3202 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3203 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id), next_node_id)
3208 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3209 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3210 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3213 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
3214 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => {
3215 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid }
3217 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3219 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
3220 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
3223 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
3224 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3225 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3226 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
3227 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
3229 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
3233 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
3234 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
3236 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3239 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3240 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3241 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3243 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3244 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3245 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3248 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
3249 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3250 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3251 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3252 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
3253 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
3254 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3257 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
3258 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
3259 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3260 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3265 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
3267 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
3268 /// Will likely generate further events.
3269 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
3270 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3272 let mut new_events = VecDeque::new();
3273 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
3274 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
3276 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
3277 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
3279 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
3280 if short_chan_id != 0 {
3281 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
3283 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3284 match forward_info {
3285 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3286 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3287 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3288 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
3289 outgoing_cltv_value, incoming_amt_msat: _
3292 macro_rules! failure_handler {
3293 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
3294 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3296 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3297 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3298 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3299 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3300 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3301 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
3304 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
3305 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
3307 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
3310 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3311 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
3317 macro_rules! fail_forward {
3318 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3320 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
3324 macro_rules! failed_payment {
3325 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3327 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
3331 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
3332 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
3333 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.genesis_hash) {
3334 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
3335 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
3337 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3338 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
3339 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
3340 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
3341 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
3343 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
3345 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3346 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
3350 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
3351 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) {
3352 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
3353 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
3359 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3362 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3365 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3366 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
3367 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
3368 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
3369 // problem, not ours.
3375 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id) {
3376 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3378 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3382 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3383 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3384 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3385 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3388 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3389 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3390 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
3391 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3392 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3395 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3396 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3397 match forward_info {
3398 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3399 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id: _,
3400 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3401 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
3402 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, incoming_amt_msat: _,
3405 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
3406 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3407 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3408 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3409 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3410 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3411 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
3412 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3414 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
3415 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
3416 onion_packet, &self.logger)
3418 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3419 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
3421 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3423 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
3424 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3425 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
3426 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
3431 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3432 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3434 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3435 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3436 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_fail_htlc(
3437 htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger
3439 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3440 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3442 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
3444 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3445 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3446 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3455 'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3456 match forward_info {
3457 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3458 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3459 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3460 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat, ..
3463 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
3464 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } => {
3465 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
3467 RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret), payment_metadata };
3468 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
3469 Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
3471 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry } => {
3472 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: None, payment_metadata };
3473 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
3474 None, None, onion_fields)
3477 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3480 let mut claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3481 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3482 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3483 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3484 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3485 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3486 phantom_shared_secret,
3488 // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
3489 // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
3490 // if routing nodes overpay
3491 value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
3492 sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
3494 total_value_received: None,
3495 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
3500 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
3502 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3503 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
3504 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
3505 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3506 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3507 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
3509 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3510 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
3511 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3512 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3513 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3514 phantom_shared_secret,
3516 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
3517 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
3519 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
3522 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
3523 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
3524 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
3525 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
3526 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
3529 macro_rules! check_total_value {
3530 ($payment_data: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{
3531 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
3533 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
3534 payment_preimage: $payment_preimage,
3535 payment_secret: $payment_data.payment_secret,
3538 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3539 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3540 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3542 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
3543 .entry(payment_hash)
3544 // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
3545 .or_insert_with(|| {
3546 committed_to_claimable = true;
3548 purpose: purpose(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
3551 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
3552 if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
3553 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3556 claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
3558 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
3559 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
3560 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3561 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3562 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3565 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
3566 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
3567 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3568 total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
3569 earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
3570 match &htlc.onion_payload {
3571 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3572 if htlc.total_msat != $payment_data.total_msat {
3573 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
3574 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $payment_data.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
3575 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
3577 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
3579 _ => unreachable!(),
3582 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
3583 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
3584 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
3585 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3586 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= $payment_data.total_msat {
3587 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
3588 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3589 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3590 } else if total_value >= $payment_data.total_msat {
3591 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
3592 committed_to_claimable = true;
3594 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3595 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3596 let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
3597 htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
3598 new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3599 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3603 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3604 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3605 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
3606 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
3608 payment_claimable_generated = true;
3610 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
3611 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
3613 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3614 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
3615 committed_to_claimable = true;
3618 payment_claimable_generated
3622 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
3623 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
3624 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
3625 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
3626 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
3627 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
3628 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3629 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3630 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3631 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3632 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3633 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3634 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
3635 Ok(result) => result,
3637 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3638 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3641 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
3642 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
3643 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
3644 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
3645 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
3646 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3649 check_total_value!(payment_data, payment_preimage);
3651 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
3652 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3653 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3654 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3656 match claimable_payments.claimable_payments.entry(payment_hash) {
3657 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3658 let amount_msat = claimable_htlc.value;
3659 claimable_htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat);
3660 let claim_deadline = Some(claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER);
3661 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
3662 e.insert(ClaimablePayment {
3663 purpose: purpose.clone(),
3664 onion_fields: Some(onion_fields.clone()),
3665 htlcs: vec![claimable_htlc],
3667 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3668 new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3669 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3673 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3674 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3676 onion_fields: Some(onion_fields),
3679 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3680 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3681 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3687 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
3688 if payment_data.is_none() {
3689 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3690 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3692 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3693 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
3694 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3695 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3696 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
3697 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
3698 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
3699 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3701 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage);
3702 if payment_claimable_generated {
3703 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
3709 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3710 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
3718 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3719 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
3720 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3721 &self.pending_events, &self.logger,
3722 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
3723 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv));
3725 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
3726 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3728 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
3730 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
3731 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
3732 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
3734 self.check_free_holding_cells();
3736 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
3737 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3738 events.append(&mut new_events);
3741 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
3743 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
3744 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
3746 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
3747 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
3748 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
3749 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
3750 if background_events.is_empty() {
3754 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
3756 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
3757 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
3758 // monitor updating completing.
3759 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
3766 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3767 /// Process background events, for functional testing
3768 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
3769 self.process_background_events();
3772 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
3773 if !chan.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersist; }
3774 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
3775 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
3776 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3777 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
3778 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3780 if !chan.is_live() {
3781 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
3782 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
3783 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3785 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3786 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
3788 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.logger);
3789 NotifyOption::DoPersist
3793 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
3794 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
3795 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
3796 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
3797 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
3798 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3799 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3801 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3803 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3804 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3805 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3806 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3807 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
3808 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3809 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3817 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
3819 /// This currently includes:
3820 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
3821 /// * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
3822 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
3824 /// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
3825 /// with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
3826 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
3828 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
3829 /// estimate fetches.
3831 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3832 /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
3833 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
3834 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3835 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3836 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3838 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3840 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
3841 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
3842 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
3844 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3845 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3846 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3847 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3848 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
3849 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
3850 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3851 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3852 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3854 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
3855 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id);
3856 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
3857 if needs_close { return false; }
3860 match chan.channel_update_status() {
3861 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
3862 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
3863 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.is_live()
3864 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3865 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.is_live()
3866 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3867 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.is_live() => {
3869 if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
3870 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3871 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3872 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3876 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3878 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
3881 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.is_live() => {
3883 if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
3884 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3885 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3886 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3890 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3892 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
3898 chan.maybe_expire_prev_config();
3902 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
3903 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
3908 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
3909 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
3910 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
3911 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
3912 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
3913 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
3914 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
3915 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
3916 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
3917 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
3918 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
3919 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
3920 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
3921 // have no channels to the peer.
3922 let remove_entry = {
3923 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
3924 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
3927 entry.remove_entry();
3930 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
3935 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
3936 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
3937 // This should be unreachable
3938 debug_assert!(false);
3941 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3942 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
3943 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
3944 // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
3945 // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
3946 if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
3947 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
3950 } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
3951 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
3952 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
3954 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
3955 .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
3962 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
3963 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
3964 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
3965 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
3966 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
3969 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3970 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3973 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_resolved_payments(&self.pending_events);
3975 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
3976 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
3977 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
3978 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
3979 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3986 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
3987 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
3988 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
3990 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
3991 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
3992 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
3993 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
3995 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
3996 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
3997 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
3998 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
3999 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
4000 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
4003 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
4004 /// reason for the failure.
4006 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
4007 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
4008 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4010 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
4011 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
4012 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
4013 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
4014 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4015 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
4016 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4021 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
4022 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
4023 match failure_code {
4024 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code as u16),
4025 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code as u16),
4026 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
4027 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4028 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
4029 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code as u16, htlc_msat_height_data)
4034 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
4035 /// that we want to return and a channel.
4037 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
4039 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
4040 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
4041 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
4042 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
4043 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
4044 let scid_pref = if chan.should_announce() {
4045 chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
4047 chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.get_short_channel_id())
4049 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
4050 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
4052 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4057 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
4058 /// that we want to return and a channel.
4059 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
4060 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
4061 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
4062 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
4063 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
4064 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
4065 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
4066 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4068 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4069 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4070 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4071 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
4073 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
4074 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
4075 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
4076 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
4077 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4081 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
4082 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
4083 // be surfaced to the user.
4084 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
4085 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32],
4086 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
4088 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
4089 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4090 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
4091 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4092 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4093 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
4094 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
4095 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
4097 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4099 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
4102 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
4103 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
4104 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
4105 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4109 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
4110 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
4111 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
4112 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
4113 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
4114 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
4115 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
4116 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
4117 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
4120 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
4121 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
4122 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
4125 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4126 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
4127 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4129 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
4130 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
4131 session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
4132 &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
4133 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
4135 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint }) => {
4136 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), onion_error);
4137 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
4139 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
4140 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4141 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
4142 push_forward_ev = true;
4144 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
4145 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4146 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
4148 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4149 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
4152 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
4153 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
4154 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4155 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
4156 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
4157 failed_next_destination: destination,
4163 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
4164 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
4166 /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
4167 /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
4168 /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
4169 /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
4171 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
4172 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
4173 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
4174 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
4176 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
4177 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
4178 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
4179 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
4180 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
4181 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
4182 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
4183 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4185 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4188 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4189 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
4190 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4191 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
4192 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4193 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4194 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4195 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
4200 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
4201 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
4202 payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id,
4204 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
4205 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
4206 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
4207 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4212 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
4214 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
4215 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
4216 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
4217 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
4218 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
4219 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
4220 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
4221 let mut valid_mpp = true;
4222 let mut errs = Vec::new();
4223 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4224 for htlc in sources.iter() {
4225 if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
4226 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4227 debug_assert!(false);
4231 prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
4233 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
4234 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4235 debug_assert!(false);
4239 expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
4241 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = &htlc.onion_payload {
4242 // We don't currently support MPP for spontaneous payments, so just check
4243 // that there's one payment here and move on.
4244 if sources.len() != 1 {
4245 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP spontaneous payment - this should not be reachable!");
4246 debug_assert!(false);
4252 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
4254 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4255 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
4256 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4257 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
4260 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
4261 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4262 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
4263 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
4267 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4268 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
4269 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
4270 |_| Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash }))
4272 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
4273 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
4274 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
4275 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
4276 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
4281 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4282 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4283 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
4284 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4285 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
4286 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
4287 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4289 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4292 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
4293 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
4294 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4295 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
4299 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
4300 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
4301 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
4302 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
4305 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4306 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
4307 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
4308 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
4312 let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
4313 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4314 .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
4317 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
4318 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
4319 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4320 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4321 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
4322 let fulfill_res = chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger);
4324 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = fulfill_res {
4325 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)) {
4326 log_trace!(self.logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
4327 log_bytes!(chan_id), action);
4328 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
4330 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4331 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update);
4332 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock,
4333 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4334 if let Err(e) = res {
4335 // TODO: This is a *critical* error - we probably updated the outbound edge
4336 // of the HTLC's monitor with a preimage. We should retry this monitor
4337 // update over and over again until morale improves.
4338 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}", payment_preimage);
4339 return Err((counterparty_node_id, e));
4346 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4347 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
4348 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
4352 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
4353 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
4354 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
4355 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
4356 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
4357 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
4358 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
4359 // again on restart.
4360 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4361 payment_preimage, update_res);
4363 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
4364 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
4365 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
4366 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
4367 // `PaymentForwarded`).
4368 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
4372 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
4373 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
4376 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
4378 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
4379 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage, session_priv, path, from_onchain, &self.pending_events, &self.logger);
4381 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
4382 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
4383 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
4384 |htlc_claim_value_msat| {
4385 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
4386 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
4387 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
4390 let prev_channel_id = Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id());
4391 let next_channel_id = Some(next_channel_id);
4393 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEvent { event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
4395 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
4398 outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
4402 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
4403 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4404 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
4410 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
4411 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4412 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
4415 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
4416 for action in actions.into_iter() {
4418 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
4419 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4420 if let Some(ClaimingPayment { amount_msat, payment_purpose: purpose, receiver_node_id }) = payment {
4421 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
4422 payment_hash, purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4426 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEvent { event } => {
4427 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
4433 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
4434 /// update completion.
4435 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4436 channel: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
4437 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
4438 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
4439 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
4440 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
4441 log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
4442 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()),
4443 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
4444 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
4445 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
4446 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
4447 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
4449 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
4451 let counterparty_node_id = channel.get_counterparty_node_id();
4452 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4453 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.outbound_scid_alias()),
4454 channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
4457 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4458 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
4460 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
4461 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4462 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4467 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
4468 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
4469 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4470 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4475 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
4476 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
4477 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4478 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4479 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4484 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
4488 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
4494 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
4495 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
4496 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
4500 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4501 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
4502 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
4508 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
4509 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
4511 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
4512 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4514 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
4515 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
4516 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4517 match id_to_peer.get(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4518 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4523 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4524 let mut peer_state_lock;
4525 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4526 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
4527 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4528 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4530 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()){
4531 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
4532 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
4535 log_trace!(self.logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}",
4536 highest_applied_update_id, channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id());
4537 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
4540 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, highest_applied_update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel.get_mut());
4543 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
4545 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
4546 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
4549 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4550 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4551 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4553 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
4554 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
4555 /// used to accept such channels.
4557 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4558 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4559 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4560 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
4563 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
4564 /// it as confirmed immediately.
4566 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4567 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4568 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4570 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
4571 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
4573 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
4574 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
4576 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
4577 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
4579 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4580 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4581 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4582 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
4585 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4586 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4588 let peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| !peer.channel_by_id.is_empty());
4589 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4590 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4591 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4592 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4593 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4594 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.len() == 1;
4595 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4596 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
4597 if !channel.get().inbound_is_awaiting_accept() {
4598 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
4601 channel.get_mut().set_0conf();
4602 } else if channel.get().get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4603 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4604 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4605 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4606 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
4609 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4610 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4611 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
4613 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
4614 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
4615 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
4616 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
4617 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4618 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4619 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4620 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
4623 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4624 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4625 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned() });
4629 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4630 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4631 msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4634 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4635 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id) });
4641 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
4642 /// or 0-conf channels.
4644 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
4645 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
4646 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
4647 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> bool {
4648 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
4649 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4651 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4652 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
4653 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
4654 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
4655 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
4656 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.channel_by_id.len() {
4657 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
4661 return peers_without_funded_channels;
4664 fn unfunded_channel_count(
4665 peer: &PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, best_block_height: u32
4667 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
4668 for (_, chan) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
4669 if !chan.is_outbound() && chan.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
4670 chan.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
4672 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
4675 num_unfunded_channels
4678 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4679 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
4680 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4683 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
4684 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4687 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
4688 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
4689 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
4690 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
4692 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
4693 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
4694 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
4695 let channeled_peers_without_funding = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| !node.channel_by_id.is_empty());
4697 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4698 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4700 debug_assert!(false);
4701 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())
4703 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4704 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4706 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
4707 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
4708 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
4709 if peer_state.channel_by_id.is_empty() &&
4710 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
4711 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
4713 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4714 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
4715 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4718 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4719 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
4720 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4721 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
4722 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4725 let mut channel = match Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
4726 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
4727 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias)
4730 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4731 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
4735 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
4736 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4737 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4738 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
4740 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4741 if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
4742 if channel.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4743 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4745 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4746 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4747 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4750 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4751 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
4752 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
4753 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4754 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
4755 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
4756 channel_type: channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
4760 entry.insert(channel);
4766 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4767 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
4768 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4769 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4771 debug_assert!(false);
4772 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
4774 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4775 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4776 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4777 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4778 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), chan);
4779 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
4781 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4784 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4785 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
4786 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
4787 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4788 channel_value_satoshis: value,
4790 user_channel_id: user_id,
4795 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4796 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4798 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4799 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4801 debug_assert!(false);
4802 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
4805 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4806 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4807 let ((funding_msg, monitor), chan) =
4808 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4809 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4810 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan), chan.remove())
4812 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4815 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
4816 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4817 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
4819 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4820 match self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().entry(chan.channel_id()) {
4821 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4822 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4823 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
4824 funding_msg.channel_id))
4826 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
4827 i_e.insert(chan.get_counterparty_node_id());
4831 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
4832 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
4833 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
4834 // until we have persisted our monitor.
4835 let new_channel_id = funding_msg.channel_id;
4836 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
4837 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4841 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
4843 let chan = e.insert(chan);
4844 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, monitor_res, 0, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
4845 per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING, { peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&new_channel_id) });
4847 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
4848 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
4849 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
4850 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
4851 // We do not propagate the monitor update to the user as it would be for a monitor
4852 // that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we don't respond
4853 // with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
4854 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { shutdown_finish: Some((res, _)), .. }) = &mut res {
4862 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4863 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4864 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4865 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4867 debug_assert!(false);
4868 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4871 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4872 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4873 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4874 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4875 let monitor = try_chan_entry!(self,
4876 chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan);
4877 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor);
4878 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, 0, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4879 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
4880 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
4881 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
4882 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
4883 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
4884 shutdown_finish.0.take();
4889 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4893 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4894 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4895 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4897 debug_assert!(false);
4898 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4900 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4901 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4902 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4903 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4904 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
4905 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan);
4906 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
4907 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4908 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4909 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4910 msg: announcement_sigs,
4912 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4913 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
4914 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
4915 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
4916 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
4917 // announcement_signatures.
4918 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4919 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
4920 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4921 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4928 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4929 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan.get_mut());
4934 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4938 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4939 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
4940 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
4941 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4942 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4944 debug_assert!(false);
4945 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4947 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4948 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4949 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4950 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4952 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
4953 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
4954 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
4955 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
4958 let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo();
4959 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self,
4960 chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_entry);
4961 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
4963 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4964 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
4965 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
4966 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
4967 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4968 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4973 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
4974 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
4975 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4976 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update);
4977 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry);
4981 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4984 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
4985 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
4986 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
4987 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
4993 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4994 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4995 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4997 debug_assert!(false);
4998 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5000 let (tx, chan_option) = {
5001 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5002 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5003 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
5004 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
5005 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_entry);
5006 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
5007 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5008 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5013 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
5014 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
5015 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
5016 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
5017 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
5018 (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, chan_entry)))
5019 } else { (tx, None) }
5021 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5024 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
5025 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
5026 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
5028 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
5029 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5030 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5031 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5032 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5036 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5041 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5042 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
5043 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
5044 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
5046 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
5047 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
5048 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
5049 //but we should prevent it anyway.
5051 let pending_forward_info = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
5052 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5053 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5055 debug_assert!(false);
5056 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5058 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5059 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5060 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5061 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5063 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
5064 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
5065 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
5066 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
5067 match pending_forward_info {
5068 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
5069 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
5070 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
5071 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
5073 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
5074 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
5075 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
5076 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
5077 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
5080 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
5082 _ => pending_forward_info
5085 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), chan);
5087 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5092 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5093 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
5094 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5095 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5097 debug_assert!(false);
5098 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5100 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5101 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5102 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5103 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5104 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan)
5106 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5109 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, msg.channel_id);
5113 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5114 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5115 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5117 debug_assert!(false);
5118 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5120 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5121 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5122 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5123 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5124 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan);
5126 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5131 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5132 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5133 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5135 debug_assert!(false);
5136 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5138 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5139 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5140 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5141 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5142 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
5143 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
5144 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan);
5146 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan);
5149 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5153 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5154 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5155 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5157 debug_assert!(false);
5158 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5160 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5161 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5162 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5163 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5164 let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo();
5165 let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
5166 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
5167 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update);
5168 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5169 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock,
5170 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan)
5173 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5178 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
5179 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
5180 let mut push_forward_event = false;
5181 let mut new_intercept_events = VecDeque::new();
5182 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
5183 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5184 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
5185 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
5186 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
5187 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
5188 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
5190 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
5191 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
5193 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5194 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
5195 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
5196 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5197 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5198 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
5200 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5201 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
5202 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.genesis_hash)
5204 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).into_inner());
5205 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5206 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
5207 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5208 new_intercept_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
5209 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
5210 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
5211 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
5212 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
5215 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5216 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
5218 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
5219 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
5220 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5221 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
5222 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
5223 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
5224 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
5225 phantom_shared_secret: None,
5228 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
5229 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
5230 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
5235 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
5236 // payments are being processed.
5237 if forward_htlcs_empty {
5238 push_forward_event = true;
5240 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5241 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
5248 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
5249 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
5252 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
5253 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5254 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
5256 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
5260 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued.
5261 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
5262 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5263 let forward_ev_exists = pending_events.iter()
5264 .find(|(ev, _)| if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false })
5266 if !forward_ev_exists {
5267 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
5269 Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
5274 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5275 let (htlcs_to_fail, res) = {
5276 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5277 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5279 debug_assert!(false);
5280 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5281 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
5282 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5283 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5284 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5285 let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo();
5286 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
5287 let res = if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
5288 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update);
5289 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5290 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id,
5291 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan)
5293 (htlcs_to_fail, res)
5295 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5298 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
5302 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5303 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5304 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5306 debug_assert!(false);
5307 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5309 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5310 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5311 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5312 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5313 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan);
5315 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5320 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5321 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5322 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5324 debug_assert!(false);
5325 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5327 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5328 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5329 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5330 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5331 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
5332 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
5335 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5336 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
5337 &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
5338 msg, &self.default_configuration
5340 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5341 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5342 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap()),
5345 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5350 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
5351 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5352 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
5353 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
5355 // It's not a local channel
5356 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5359 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5360 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
5361 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
5362 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5364 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5365 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5366 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5367 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5368 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5369 if chan.get().should_announce() {
5370 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
5371 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
5372 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
5373 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5375 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
5377 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
5378 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
5379 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
5380 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5382 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", log_bytes!(chan_id));
5383 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), chan);
5386 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5388 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
5391 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5393 let need_lnd_workaround = {
5394 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5396 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5398 debug_assert!(false);
5399 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5401 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5402 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5403 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5404 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5405 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
5406 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
5407 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
5408 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
5409 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
5410 msg, &self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash,
5411 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan);
5412 let mut channel_update = None;
5413 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
5414 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5415 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5418 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
5419 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
5420 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
5421 // they have the latest channel parameters.
5422 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
5423 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5424 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
5429 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
5430 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
5431 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get_mut(), responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
5432 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
5433 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
5434 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
5438 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5442 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
5443 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
5446 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
5447 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
5452 /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
5453 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
5454 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
5456 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5457 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
5458 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
5459 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
5460 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
5461 match monitor_event {
5462 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
5463 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
5464 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
5465 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
5467 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
5468 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
5469 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
5470 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5473 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
5474 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
5475 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
5476 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
5478 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5479 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
5480 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5481 id_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).cloned()
5484 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
5485 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5486 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
5487 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5488 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5489 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5490 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
5491 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
5492 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
5493 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5494 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5498 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
5499 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
5501 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
5503 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
5504 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5505 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5506 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5507 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5514 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
5515 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
5521 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5522 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5525 has_pending_monitor_events
5528 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
5529 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
5530 /// update events as a separate process method here.
5532 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
5533 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5534 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5535 NotifyOption::DoPersist
5537 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
5542 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
5543 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
5544 /// update was applied.
5545 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
5546 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
5547 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5548 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
5550 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
5551 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
5552 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
5553 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
5555 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5556 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5558 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5559 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5560 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
5561 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
5562 let funding_txo = chan.get_funding_txo();
5563 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
5564 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger);
5565 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
5566 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
5568 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
5569 has_monitor_update = true;
5571 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(
5572 funding_txo.expect("channel is live"), monitor_update);
5573 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5574 let channel_id: [u8; 32] = *channel_id;
5575 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id,
5576 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING,
5577 peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id));
5579 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, res));
5581 continue 'peer_loop;
5590 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
5591 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
5592 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
5595 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5596 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5602 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
5603 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
5604 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
5605 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
5606 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
5607 let mut has_update = false;
5609 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5611 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5612 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5613 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5614 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5615 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5616 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
5617 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
5618 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
5620 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5621 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
5624 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
5625 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
5626 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
5627 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5628 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5633 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5635 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
5636 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
5637 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
5643 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
5644 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5652 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5653 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5659 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
5660 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
5662 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
5663 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5664 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
5665 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
5666 // reorganized out of the main chain.
5667 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
5668 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
5669 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
5670 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
5671 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
5672 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
5673 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
5674 assert!(should_broadcast);
5675 } else { unreachable!(); }
5676 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
5678 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5682 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5683 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
5685 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
5686 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("min_value_msat of {} greater than total 21 million bitcoin supply", min_value_msat.unwrap()) });
5689 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5691 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5692 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5693 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5694 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5695 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
5696 payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
5697 user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
5698 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
5699 // it's updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
5700 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
5701 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
5702 // never fail a payment too early.
5703 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
5705 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
5708 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
5713 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
5716 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
5717 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
5719 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
5720 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
5721 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
5722 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
5724 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
5726 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5727 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5731 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5732 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5734 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5736 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
5737 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
5739 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5740 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5741 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
5742 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
5743 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
5744 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5745 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
5746 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
5747 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
5748 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
5749 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
5752 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5753 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5755 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5758 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5760 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5762 pub fn create_inbound_payment_legacy(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), APIError> {
5763 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5764 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5765 let payment_secret = self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)?;
5766 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret))
5769 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
5770 /// stored external to LDK.
5772 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
5773 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
5774 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
5776 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
5777 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
5780 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
5781 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
5782 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
5783 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
5785 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
5786 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
5787 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
5788 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
5789 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
5791 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
5792 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
5793 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
5794 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
5795 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
5797 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
5798 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
5800 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5801 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5805 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5806 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5808 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5810 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
5811 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
5813 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5814 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5815 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
5816 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
5817 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
5818 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
5819 min_final_cltv_expiry)
5822 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5823 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5825 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5828 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5830 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5832 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5833 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
5836 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
5837 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
5839 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5840 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
5841 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
5844 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
5845 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
5847 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5848 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5849 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5850 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5852 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
5853 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5854 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
5855 Some(_) => continue,
5856 None => return scid_candidate
5861 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
5863 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5864 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
5866 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
5867 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
5868 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
5872 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
5873 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
5874 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
5876 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
5877 /// times to get a unique scid.
5878 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5879 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5880 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5882 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
5883 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5884 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
5885 return scid_candidate
5889 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
5890 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
5891 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
5892 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
5894 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5895 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5896 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5897 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5898 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
5899 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
5900 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
5901 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
5910 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5911 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
5912 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5913 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
5914 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
5918 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
5919 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
5920 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5921 events.push_back((event, None));
5925 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
5926 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5927 events.pop_front().map(|(e, _)| e)
5931 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
5932 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
5936 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
5937 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
5940 fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint) {
5941 let mut errors = Vec::new();
5943 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5944 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
5945 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5946 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
5947 if self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().iter()
5948 .any(|(_ev, action_opt)| action_opt == &Some(EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
5949 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id
5952 // Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have another event
5953 // blocking any monitor updates for this channel. If we do, let those
5954 // events be the ones that ultimately release the monitor update(s).
5955 log_trace!(self.logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another event is pending",
5956 log_bytes!(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
5959 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
5960 debug_assert_eq!(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
5961 if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.get_mut().unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
5962 log_debug!(self.logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
5963 log_bytes!(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
5964 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update);
5965 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5966 if let Err(e) = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id,
5967 peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan)
5969 errors.push((e, counterparty_node_id));
5971 if further_update_exists {
5972 // If there are more `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to process, restart at the
5977 log_trace!(self.logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
5978 log_bytes!(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
5982 log_debug!(self.logger,
5983 "Got a release post-RAA monitor update for peer {} but the channel is gone",
5984 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
5988 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in errors {
5989 let res = Err::<(), _>(err);
5990 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
5994 fn handle_post_event_actions(&self, actions: Vec<EventCompletionAction>) {
5995 for action in actions {
5997 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
5998 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id
6000 self.handle_monitor_update_release(counterparty_node_id, channel_funding_outpoint);
6006 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
6007 /// using the given event handler.
6009 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
6010 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
6014 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
6018 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6020 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6021 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6022 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6023 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6024 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6025 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6029 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
6030 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
6031 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
6032 /// is always placed next to each other.
6034 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
6035 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
6036 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
6037 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
6039 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
6040 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
6041 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
6042 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
6043 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
6044 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6045 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
6047 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
6048 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
6049 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
6050 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6053 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
6054 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6056 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
6057 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6060 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
6061 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6062 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6063 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6064 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6065 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
6066 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
6070 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
6071 events.replace(pending_events);
6080 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6082 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6083 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6084 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6085 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6086 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6087 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6091 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
6093 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
6094 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
6095 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
6097 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
6101 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6103 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6104 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6105 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6106 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6107 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6108 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6112 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
6114 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6115 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
6116 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
6117 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
6118 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
6121 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
6122 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
6125 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
6126 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6127 let new_height = height - 1;
6129 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
6130 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
6131 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
6132 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
6133 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
6134 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
6137 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
6141 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6143 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6144 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6145 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6146 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6147 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6148 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6152 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
6153 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6154 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6155 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6157 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
6158 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
6160 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6161 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)
6162 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
6164 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6165 if height < last_best_block_height {
6166 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6167 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
6171 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
6172 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6173 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6174 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6176 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
6177 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
6179 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6181 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
6183 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
6185 macro_rules! max_time {
6186 ($timestamp: expr) => {
6188 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
6189 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
6190 // having an explicit local time source.
6191 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
6192 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
6193 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6194 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
6195 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
6201 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
6202 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6203 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
6204 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
6208 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
6209 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
6210 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
6211 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6212 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6213 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
6214 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(block_hash)) = (chan.get_funding_txo(), chan.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
6215 res.push((funding_txo.txid, Some(block_hash)));
6222 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
6223 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6224 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
6225 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
6226 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
6227 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
6228 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
6229 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
6234 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6236 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6237 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6238 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6239 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6240 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6241 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6245 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
6246 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
6248 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
6249 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
6250 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6251 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6252 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6254 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6255 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
6257 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6258 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6259 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6260 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6261 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6262 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
6263 let res = f(channel);
6264 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
6265 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
6266 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
6267 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
6268 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.channel_id() }));
6270 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
6271 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
6272 if channel.is_usable() {
6273 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6274 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
6275 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6276 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6281 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6286 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6287 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
6290 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
6291 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6292 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6293 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6294 msg: announcement_sigs,
6296 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6297 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
6298 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
6300 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
6301 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
6302 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
6307 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
6308 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
6309 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
6310 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
6311 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
6312 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
6313 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
6314 // is always consistent.
6315 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
6316 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
6317 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()),
6318 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
6319 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
6322 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
6323 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, channel);
6324 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
6325 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
6326 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
6327 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
6328 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6332 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
6333 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
6334 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6335 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6336 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
6337 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
6338 data: reason_message,
6348 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6349 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
6350 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
6351 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
6352 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
6353 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
6354 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
6355 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6356 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
6357 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
6359 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
6360 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
6361 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
6365 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
6368 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6369 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
6370 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6371 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6372 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
6373 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
6374 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6375 phantom_shared_secret: None,
6376 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
6379 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
6380 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6381 _ => unreachable!(),
6383 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
6384 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
6385 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
6386 log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
6392 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
6394 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
6395 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
6399 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
6401 /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
6402 /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
6404 pub fn get_persistable_update_future(&self) -> Future {
6405 self.persistence_notifier.get_future()
6408 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6409 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
6410 self.persistence_notifier.notify_pending()
6413 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
6414 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
6415 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
6416 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
6419 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6420 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6421 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6422 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
6425 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6426 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6428 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6429 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6430 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6431 pub fn invoice_features(&self) -> InvoiceFeatures {
6432 provided_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
6435 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6436 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6437 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
6438 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
6441 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6442 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6443 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6444 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
6447 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6448 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6449 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
6450 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
6454 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
6455 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6457 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6458 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6459 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6460 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6461 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6462 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6466 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
6467 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6468 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6471 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
6472 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6473 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6476 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
6477 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6478 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6481 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
6482 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6483 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6486 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
6487 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6488 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6491 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
6492 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6493 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6496 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
6497 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6498 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6501 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
6502 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6503 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6506 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
6507 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6508 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6511 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
6512 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6513 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6516 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
6517 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6518 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6521 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
6522 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6523 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6526 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
6527 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6528 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6531 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
6532 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6533 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6536 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
6537 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6538 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6541 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
6542 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6543 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
6546 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
6551 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
6552 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6553 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6556 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
6557 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6558 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6559 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6561 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
6562 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6563 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
6564 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6565 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6566 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6567 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6568 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
6569 if chan.is_shutdown() {
6570 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
6571 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
6576 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
6578 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
6579 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
6580 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
6581 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
6582 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
6583 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
6584 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
6585 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
6586 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
6587 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
6588 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
6589 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
6590 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6591 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
6592 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6593 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
6594 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
6595 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
6596 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
6597 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
6598 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
6601 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
6602 peer_state.is_connected = false;
6603 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
6604 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
6607 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
6609 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6611 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6612 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6616 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
6617 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
6618 log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6622 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6624 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
6625 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
6626 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
6627 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
6628 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
6629 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
6632 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6633 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
6634 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6635 if inbound_peer_limited {
6638 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
6639 channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
6640 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
6641 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
6642 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
6646 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
6647 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
6648 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
6650 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6651 if inbound_peer_limited &&
6652 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
6653 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
6658 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
6659 peer_state.is_connected = true;
6664 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6666 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6667 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6668 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6669 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6670 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6671 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6672 let retain = if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
6673 if !chan.have_received_message() {
6674 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
6675 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
6676 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
6680 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
6681 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6682 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
6687 if retain && chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6688 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.default_configuration) {
6689 if let Ok(update_msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
6690 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement {
6691 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6700 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
6704 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
6705 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6707 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
6708 let channel_ids: Vec<[u8; 32]> = {
6709 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6710 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
6711 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
6712 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6713 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6714 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
6716 for channel_id in channel_ids {
6717 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6718 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6722 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
6723 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6724 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
6725 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
6726 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6727 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6728 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
6729 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash) {
6730 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
6731 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6739 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6740 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6744 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6745 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
6748 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
6749 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
6753 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6754 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6755 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
6756 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6759 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6760 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6762 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6763 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6764 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6765 pub(crate) fn provided_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InvoiceFeatures {
6766 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6769 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6770 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6771 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
6772 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6775 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6776 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6777 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6778 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
6781 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6782 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6783 pub fn provided_init_features(_config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
6784 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
6785 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
6786 // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
6787 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
6788 features.set_data_loss_protect_optional();
6789 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
6790 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
6791 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
6792 features.set_payment_secret_required();
6793 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
6794 features.set_wumbo_optional();
6795 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
6796 features.set_channel_type_optional();
6797 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
6798 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
6800 { // Attributes are not allowed on if expressions on our current MSRV of 1.41.
6801 if _config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
6802 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
6808 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6809 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6811 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
6812 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
6813 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
6814 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
6817 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
6818 (2, node_id, required),
6819 (4, features, required),
6820 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
6821 (8, forwarding_info, option),
6822 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6823 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6826 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
6827 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6828 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6829 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6830 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
6831 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
6832 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6833 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
6834 (2, self.channel_id, required),
6835 (3, self.channel_type, option),
6836 (4, self.counterparty, required),
6837 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
6838 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
6839 (7, self.config, option),
6840 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
6841 (9, self.confirmations, option),
6842 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
6843 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6844 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6845 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
6846 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6847 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6848 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6849 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6850 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6851 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
6852 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
6853 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
6854 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
6855 (30, self.is_usable, required),
6856 (32, self.is_public, required),
6857 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6858 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6859 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6860 (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
6866 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
6867 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6868 _init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6869 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
6870 (2, channel_id, required),
6871 (3, channel_type, option),
6872 (4, counterparty, required),
6873 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6874 (6, funding_txo, option),
6875 (7, config, option),
6876 (8, short_channel_id, option),
6877 (9, confirmations, option),
6878 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
6879 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6880 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6881 (16, balance_msat, required),
6882 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6883 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6884 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6885 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6886 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6887 (22, confirmations_required, option),
6888 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
6889 (26, is_outbound, required),
6890 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
6891 (30, is_usable, required),
6892 (32, is_public, required),
6893 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6894 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6895 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6896 (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
6899 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6900 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6901 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
6902 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
6903 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
6907 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
6909 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
6910 outbound_scid_alias,
6914 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
6915 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
6917 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
6918 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
6919 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
6920 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
6921 confirmations_required,
6923 force_close_spend_delay,
6924 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
6925 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
6926 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
6927 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
6928 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
6929 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
6930 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
6935 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
6936 (2, channels, vec_type),
6937 (4, phantom_scid, required),
6938 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
6941 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
6943 (0, onion_packet, required),
6944 (2, short_channel_id, required),
6947 (0, payment_data, required),
6948 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6949 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6950 (3, payment_metadata, option),
6952 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
6953 (0, payment_preimage, required),
6954 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6955 (3, payment_metadata, option),
6959 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
6960 (0, routing, required),
6961 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
6962 (4, payment_hash, required),
6963 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
6964 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
6965 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
6969 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6970 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6972 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
6974 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6975 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6976 reason.write(writer)?;
6978 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6979 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
6982 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6983 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6984 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
6985 failure_code.write(writer)?;
6992 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6993 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6994 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6997 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6998 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6999 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7000 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
7004 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
7005 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7006 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7007 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
7008 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
7011 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
7012 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
7013 // messages contained in the variants.
7014 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
7015 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
7016 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
7018 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
7019 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
7020 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
7021 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
7022 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
7025 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
7026 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
7027 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
7028 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
7029 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
7031 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
7036 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
7041 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
7042 (0, short_channel_id, required),
7043 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
7044 (2, outpoint, required),
7045 (4, htlc_id, required),
7046 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
7049 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
7050 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7051 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
7052 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
7053 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
7055 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7056 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
7057 (1, self.total_msat, required),
7058 (2, self.value, required),
7059 (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
7060 (4, payment_data, option),
7061 (5, self.total_value_received, option),
7062 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
7063 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
7069 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
7070 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7071 let mut prev_hop = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
7073 let mut sender_intended_value = None;
7074 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
7075 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
7076 let mut total_value_received = None;
7077 let mut total_msat = None;
7078 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
7079 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7080 (0, prev_hop, required),
7081 (1, total_msat, option),
7082 (2, value, required),
7083 (3, sender_intended_value, option),
7084 (4, payment_data, option),
7085 (5, total_value_received, option),
7086 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
7087 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
7089 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
7091 if payment_data.is_some() {
7092 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7094 if total_msat.is_none() {
7095 total_msat = Some(value);
7097 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
7100 if total_msat.is_none() {
7101 if payment_data.is_none() {
7102 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7104 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
7106 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
7110 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
7113 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
7114 total_value_received,
7115 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
7122 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
7123 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7124 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7127 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
7128 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
7129 let mut path_hops: Option<Vec<RouteHop>> = Some(Vec::new());
7130 let mut payment_id = None;
7131 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
7132 let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
7133 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7134 (0, session_priv, required),
7135 (1, payment_id, option),
7136 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
7137 (4, path_hops, vec_type),
7138 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
7139 (6, blinded_tail, option),
7141 if payment_id.is_none() {
7142 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
7144 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
7146 let path = Path { hops: path_hops.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?, blinded_tail };
7147 if path.hops.len() == 0 {
7148 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7150 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
7151 if params.final_cltv_expiry_delta == 0 {
7152 params.final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.final_cltv_expiry_delta().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7155 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
7156 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
7157 first_hop_htlc_msat,
7159 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
7162 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
7163 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
7168 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
7169 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
7171 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
7173 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
7174 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7175 (0, session_priv, required),
7176 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
7177 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
7178 // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
7179 (4, path.hops, vec_type),
7180 (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
7181 (6, path.blinded_tail, option),
7184 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
7186 field.write(writer)?;
7193 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
7194 (0, forward_info, required),
7195 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
7196 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
7197 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
7198 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
7201 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
7203 (0, htlc_id, required),
7204 (2, err_packet, required),
7209 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
7210 (0, payment_secret, required),
7211 (2, expiry_time, required),
7212 (4, user_payment_id, required),
7213 (6, payment_preimage, required),
7214 (8, min_value_msat, required),
7217 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7219 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7220 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7221 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7222 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7223 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7224 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7228 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7229 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
7231 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7233 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
7235 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
7236 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
7237 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
7240 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
7242 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7243 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
7244 let mut number_of_channels = 0;
7245 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7246 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7247 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7248 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
7249 serializable_peer_count += 1;
7251 number_of_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.len();
7252 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
7253 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7254 unfunded_channels += 1;
7259 ((number_of_channels - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
7261 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7262 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7263 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7264 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
7265 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7266 channel.write(writer)?;
7273 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7274 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7275 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
7276 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
7277 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7278 for forward in pending_forwards {
7279 forward.write(writer)?;
7284 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
7286 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7287 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
7288 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7290 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
7291 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
7292 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7293 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
7294 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7295 (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7296 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
7297 htlc.write(writer)?;
7299 htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
7300 htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
7303 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
7304 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
7305 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7306 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
7307 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
7308 // per_peer_state lock at all.
7309 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
7312 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
7313 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
7314 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
7315 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
7316 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
7318 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
7319 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
7320 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
7321 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
7322 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
7323 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
7324 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
7329 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7330 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.115 don't support post-event actions, thus if there's no
7331 // actions at all, skip writing the required TLV. Otherwise, pre-0.0.115 versions will
7332 // refuse to read the new ChannelManager.
7333 let events_not_backwards_compatible = events.iter().any(|(_, action)| action.is_some());
7334 if events_not_backwards_compatible {
7335 // If we're gonna write a even TLV that will overwrite our events anyway we might as
7336 // well save the space and not write any events here.
7337 0u64.write(writer)?;
7339 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7340 for (event, _) in events.iter() {
7341 event.write(writer)?;
7345 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
7346 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7347 for event in background_events.iter() {
7349 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
7351 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
7352 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
7357 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
7358 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
7359 // likely to be identical.
7360 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
7361 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
7363 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7364 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
7365 hash.write(writer)?;
7366 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
7369 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
7370 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
7371 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7372 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
7373 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
7376 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
7377 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7379 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7380 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7381 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
7382 session_priv.write(writer)?;
7385 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
7386 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
7390 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
7391 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
7392 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7394 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7395 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7396 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
7402 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
7403 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7404 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
7405 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
7408 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
7409 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
7410 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
7411 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
7412 pending_claiming_payments = None;
7415 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7416 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
7417 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7418 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
7419 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
7420 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
7421 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
7422 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
7423 (8, if events_not_backwards_compatible { Some(&*events) } else { None }, option),
7424 (9, htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7425 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
7426 (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
7433 impl Writeable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
7434 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7435 (self.len() as u64).write(w)?;
7436 for (event, action) in self.iter() {
7439 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
7440 // Events are MaybeReadable, in some cases indicating that they shouldn't actually
7441 // be persisted and are regenerated on restart. However, if such an event has a
7442 // post-event-handling action we'll write nothing for the event and would have to
7443 // either forget the action or fail on deserialization (which we do below). Thus,
7444 // check that the event is sane here.
7445 let event_encoded = event.encode();
7446 let event_read: Option<Event> =
7447 MaybeReadable::read(&mut &event_encoded[..]).unwrap();
7448 if action.is_some() { assert!(event_read.is_some()); }
7454 impl Readable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
7455 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7456 let len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7457 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 1024 * 16;
7458 let mut events: Self = VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(
7459 MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>() as u64,
7462 let ev_opt = MaybeReadable::read(reader)?;
7463 let action = Readable::read(reader)?;
7464 if let Some(ev) = ev_opt {
7465 events.push_back((ev, action));
7466 } else if action.is_some() {
7467 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7474 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
7476 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
7478 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7479 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
7480 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
7481 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
7482 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
7483 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
7484 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
7485 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
7486 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7487 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
7488 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
7489 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
7490 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
7492 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
7493 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
7495 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
7496 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
7498 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
7499 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
7500 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
7501 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
7502 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
7503 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
7505 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
7506 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7508 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7509 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7510 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7511 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7512 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7513 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7517 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
7518 pub entropy_source: ES,
7520 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
7521 pub node_signer: NS,
7523 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
7524 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
7526 pub signer_provider: SP,
7528 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7530 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
7531 pub fee_estimator: F,
7532 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7534 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
7535 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
7536 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
7537 pub chain_monitor: M,
7539 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
7540 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
7541 /// force-closed during deserialization.
7542 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
7543 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
7544 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
7546 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
7548 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
7549 /// deserialization.
7551 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
7552 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
7553 pub default_config: UserConfig,
7555 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
7556 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
7558 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
7559 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
7560 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
7561 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
7563 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
7566 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
7567 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>,
7570 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7571 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7573 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7574 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7575 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7576 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7577 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7578 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7582 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
7583 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
7584 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
7585 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
7586 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>) -> Self {
7588 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
7589 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
7594 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
7595 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
7596 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7597 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
7599 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7600 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7601 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7602 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7603 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7604 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7608 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7609 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
7610 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
7614 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7615 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
7617 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7618 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7619 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7620 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7621 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7622 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7626 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7627 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7629 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7630 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7631 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7633 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
7635 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7636 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7637 let mut peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7638 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7639 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7640 let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
7641 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
7642 for _ in 0..channel_count {
7643 let mut channel: Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (
7644 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
7646 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7647 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
7648 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
7649 if channel.get_latest_complete_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7650 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
7651 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
7652 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7653 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_complete_monitor_update_id());
7654 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7655 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7656 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7657 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7658 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7659 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7660 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7661 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7662 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7663 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
7664 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
7665 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
7666 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7667 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7668 let (monitor_update, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
7669 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
7670 pending_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate(monitor_update));
7672 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
7673 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7674 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7675 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7676 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
7678 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
7679 let mut found_htlc = false;
7680 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
7681 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
7684 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
7685 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
7686 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
7687 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
7688 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
7689 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
7690 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
7691 log_info!(args.logger,
7692 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
7693 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7694 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7698 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7699 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
7700 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7702 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7703 id_to_peer.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel.get_counterparty_node_id());
7705 match peer_channels.entry(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
7706 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7707 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
7708 by_id_map.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
7710 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7711 let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
7712 by_id_map.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
7713 entry.insert(by_id_map);
7717 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
7718 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
7719 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
7720 // safely discard the channel.
7721 let _ = channel.force_shutdown(false);
7722 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7723 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7724 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7725 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
7728 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7729 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7730 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7731 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7732 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7733 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7737 for (funding_txo, _) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7738 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
7739 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
7740 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
7741 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
7743 pending_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((*funding_txo, monitor_update)));
7747 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
7748 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7749 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7750 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
7751 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7752 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7753 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
7754 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
7755 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
7757 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
7760 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7761 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7762 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
7763 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7764 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7765 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
7766 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
7767 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
7769 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
7772 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7773 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>)>()));
7774 for _ in 0..peer_count {
7775 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7776 let peer_state = PeerState {
7777 channel_by_id: peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new()),
7778 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
7779 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
7780 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
7781 is_connected: false,
7783 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
7786 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7787 let mut pending_events_read: VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> =
7788 VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>()));
7789 for _ in 0..event_count {
7790 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
7791 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push_back((event, None)),
7796 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7797 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
7798 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7800 let (funding_txo, monitor_update): (OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate) = (Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?);
7801 if pending_background_events.iter().find(|e| {
7802 let BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((pending_funding_txo, pending_monitor_update)) = e;
7803 *pending_funding_txo == funding_txo && *pending_monitor_update == monitor_update
7805 pending_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)));
7808 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7812 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
7813 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7815 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7816 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
7817 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
7818 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
7819 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7823 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7824 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
7825 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
7826 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
7827 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
7828 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
7829 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
7831 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
7832 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7836 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
7837 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
7838 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
7839 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
7840 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
7841 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7842 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7843 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
7844 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
7845 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
7846 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = Some(Vec::new());
7847 let mut events_override = None;
7848 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7849 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
7850 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7851 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
7852 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
7853 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
7854 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
7855 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
7856 (8, events_override, option),
7857 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7858 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
7859 (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
7861 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
7862 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7865 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
7866 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7869 if let Some(events) = events_override {
7870 pending_events_read = events;
7873 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
7874 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
7877 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
7878 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
7879 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
7880 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
7881 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
7882 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
7884 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
7886 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
7887 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
7888 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
7892 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
7893 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
7894 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
7895 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
7896 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
7897 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
7898 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
7900 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7901 if id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
7902 for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
7903 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
7904 if path.hops.is_empty() {
7905 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
7906 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7909 let path_amt = path.final_value_msat();
7910 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
7911 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
7912 match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
7913 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7914 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
7915 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
7916 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
7918 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7919 let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
7920 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
7921 retry_strategy: None,
7922 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
7923 payment_params: None,
7924 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
7925 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
7926 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
7927 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
7928 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
7929 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
7930 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
7931 total_msat: path_amt,
7932 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
7934 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
7935 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
7940 for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
7942 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
7943 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
7944 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
7945 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
7947 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
7948 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
7949 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
7950 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
7951 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
7952 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
7953 forwards.retain(|forward| {
7954 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
7955 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
7956 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
7957 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
7962 !forwards.is_empty()
7964 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
7965 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
7966 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
7967 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
7968 pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
7969 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
7970 intercepted_id != ev_id
7977 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
7978 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
7979 let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
7980 // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
7981 // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
7982 // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
7983 // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
7984 // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
7985 // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
7986 // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
7987 // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
7988 pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv, path, false, &pending_events, &args.logger);
7989 pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
7998 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
7999 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
8000 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
8001 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
8002 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
8003 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
8004 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
8005 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
8009 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
8010 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
8012 let mut claimable_payments = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
8013 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
8014 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
8015 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8017 if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
8018 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
8019 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8021 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
8022 purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
8024 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
8025 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
8027 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
8030 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
8031 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
8032 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
8034 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
8038 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
8039 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
8040 for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
8041 if htlcs.is_empty() {
8042 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8044 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
8045 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
8046 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
8047 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
8048 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
8049 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
8050 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
8051 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
8053 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
8054 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8058 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
8060 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
8062 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
8063 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
8065 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
8066 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
8071 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8072 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
8074 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
8076 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
8078 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
8079 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
8080 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
8081 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8085 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
8086 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
8087 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8088 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8089 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
8090 if chan.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
8091 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
8093 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
8094 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
8095 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
8097 chan.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
8098 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias()) {
8099 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
8100 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
8101 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
8102 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8104 if chan.is_usable() {
8105 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
8106 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
8107 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
8108 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
8109 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8115 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
8117 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
8118 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
8119 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
8120 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
8121 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
8122 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
8123 let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
8124 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
8125 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
8126 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
8127 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
8129 for claimable_htlc in payment.htlcs {
8130 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
8132 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
8133 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
8134 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
8135 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
8137 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
8138 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
8139 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
8140 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
8142 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
8143 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
8144 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
8145 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
8147 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
8148 if let Some(peer_node_id) = id_to_peer.get(&previous_channel_id){
8149 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
8150 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8151 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8152 if let Some(channel) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
8153 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
8156 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
8157 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
8160 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
8163 purpose: payment.purpose,
8164 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
8170 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
8171 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get_mut(&node_id) {
8172 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
8174 log_error!(args.logger, "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
8175 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8179 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
8181 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
8182 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
8183 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
8184 router: args.router,
8186 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
8188 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
8189 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
8190 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
8191 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
8193 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
8194 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
8195 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
8196 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
8197 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
8198 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
8200 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
8205 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
8207 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
8209 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
8210 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
8211 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
8212 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
8213 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
8215 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
8216 node_signer: args.node_signer,
8217 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
8219 logger: args.logger,
8220 default_configuration: args.default_config,
8223 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
8224 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
8225 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
8226 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
8227 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
8230 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
8231 //connection or two.
8233 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
8239 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
8240 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
8241 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
8242 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
8243 use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
8244 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
8245 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
8246 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
8247 use crate::ln::msgs;
8248 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
8249 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
8250 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
8251 use crate::util::test_utils;
8252 use crate::util::config::ChannelConfig;
8253 use crate::chain::keysinterface::EntropySource;
8256 fn test_notify_limits() {
8257 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
8258 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
8259 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8260 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8261 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8262 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8264 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
8265 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
8266 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8267 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8268 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8270 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8272 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
8273 // to connect messages with new values
8274 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
8275 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
8276 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
8277 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
8278 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
8279 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
8281 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
8282 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8283 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8284 // ... but the last node should not.
8285 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8286 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
8287 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8288 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8290 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
8291 // about the channel.
8292 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
8293 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
8294 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8296 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
8298 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
8299 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
8300 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
8301 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
8302 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8303 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8305 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
8306 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
8307 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
8309 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
8310 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
8311 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
8312 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
8313 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
8314 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
8316 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
8317 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
8318 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
8319 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
8320 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8321 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8322 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
8323 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
8325 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
8326 // the channel info has updated.
8327 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
8328 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
8329 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8330 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8331 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
8332 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
8336 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
8337 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
8339 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8340 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8341 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8342 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8343 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8345 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
8346 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8347 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
8348 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
8350 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
8351 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
8352 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
8353 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
8354 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
8355 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
8356 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
8357 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
8358 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8359 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8360 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8361 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
8363 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
8364 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
8365 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8366 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8367 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8368 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8369 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8370 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8371 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8372 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8373 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8374 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8375 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
8376 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8377 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8378 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8379 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8380 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8381 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8382 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8383 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8384 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8385 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
8387 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
8388 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
8389 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
8390 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8391 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8392 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8393 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
8395 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
8396 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
8397 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
8398 // lightning messages manually.
8399 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8400 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
8401 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8403 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8404 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8405 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
8406 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8407 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8408 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
8409 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8410 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8411 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
8412 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8413 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8414 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8415 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
8416 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8417 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8418 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
8419 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8420 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8421 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
8422 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8423 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
8424 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8425 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8426 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
8427 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8429 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
8430 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
8431 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8432 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
8434 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
8435 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
8436 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
8437 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
8439 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8442 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
8443 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
8444 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
8445 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
8447 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8450 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
8451 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
8452 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
8453 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
8455 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8460 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
8461 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
8462 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
8463 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
8464 // fails as expected.
8465 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8466 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8467 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8468 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8469 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8470 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8471 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8473 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
8474 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
8475 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
8477 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
8478 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8479 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV),
8480 final_value_msat: 100_000,
8482 let route = find_route(
8483 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
8484 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8486 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
8487 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8488 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8489 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8490 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8491 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8492 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8493 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8494 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8495 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8496 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
8497 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
8498 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8499 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
8500 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8501 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8502 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8503 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8504 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8505 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8506 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8507 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8508 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8509 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
8511 // Finally, claim the original payment.
8512 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
8514 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
8515 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8516 let route = find_route(
8517 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
8518 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8520 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
8521 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8522 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8523 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8524 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8525 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
8526 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
8527 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
8529 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
8530 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8531 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
8532 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8533 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8534 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8535 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8536 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8537 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8538 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8539 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8540 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8541 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8542 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
8543 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8544 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8545 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8546 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8547 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8548 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8549 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8550 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8551 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8552 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
8554 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
8555 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
8559 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
8560 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
8561 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
8562 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8563 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8564 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8565 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8567 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8568 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8570 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
8571 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8572 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
8573 final_value_msat: 10_000,
8575 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
8576 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
8577 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8578 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8579 let route = find_route(
8580 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
8581 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8584 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8585 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
8586 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
8587 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
8588 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
8589 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
8590 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8592 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8593 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8594 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8595 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8596 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8597 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8598 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8600 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
8604 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
8605 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
8606 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8607 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8608 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8609 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8611 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8612 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8614 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
8615 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8616 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
8617 final_value_msat: 10_000,
8619 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
8620 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
8621 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8622 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8623 let route = find_route(
8624 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
8625 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8628 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8629 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8630 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
8631 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
8632 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
8633 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
8634 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
8635 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
8636 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8638 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8639 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8640 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8641 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8642 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8643 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8644 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8646 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
8650 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
8651 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8652 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8653 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8654 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8656 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8657 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8658 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8659 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8661 // Marshall an MPP route.
8662 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8663 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8664 route.paths.push(path);
8665 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8666 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8667 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8668 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8669 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8670 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8672 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
8673 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
8675 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
8676 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
8678 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
8683 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
8684 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8685 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8686 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8687 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8689 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8691 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8692 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8694 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8695 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8696 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8697 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8700 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
8701 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
8702 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8703 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
8704 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
8705 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
8708 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
8711 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
8712 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
8717 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
8718 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
8719 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8720 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8721 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8722 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8724 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
8725 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
8727 total_msat: 100_000,
8730 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
8731 // payment verification fails as expected.
8732 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
8733 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
8734 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
8735 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
8737 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
8741 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
8742 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
8746 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
8747 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
8748 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
8749 // the channel is successfully closed.
8750 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8751 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8752 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8753 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8755 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8756 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8757 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
8758 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8759 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
8761 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
8762 let channel_id = &tx.txid().into_inner();
8764 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
8765 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
8766 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8767 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8770 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8772 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8773 // as it has the funding transaction.
8774 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8775 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8776 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8779 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8781 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8783 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8785 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8786 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8787 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8789 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8792 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8793 // as it has the funding transaction.
8794 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8795 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8796 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8798 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8799 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8800 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
8801 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8802 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8803 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
8804 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
8805 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
8807 nodes[0].node.close_channel(channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8808 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8809 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8810 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
8812 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8813 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
8815 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
8816 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
8817 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
8818 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
8819 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8820 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8821 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8825 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
8826 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
8827 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
8828 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
8829 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8830 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8831 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8834 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8836 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
8837 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
8838 // closing transaction).
8839 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
8840 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
8841 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8843 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
8844 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
8845 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8846 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8847 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8850 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8852 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
8854 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
8855 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
8856 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8858 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8860 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8861 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8864 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
8865 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
8866 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
8869 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
8870 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
8871 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
8874 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
8876 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
8877 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
8879 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
8880 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
8882 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
8883 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
8888 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
8889 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
8890 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
8891 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
8892 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8893 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
8894 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
8895 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
8898 let channel_id = [4; 32];
8899 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8900 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
8902 // Test the API functions.
8903 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None), unkown_public_key);
8905 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
8907 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8909 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8911 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8913 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
8915 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
8919 fn test_connection_limiting() {
8920 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
8921 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8922 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8923 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8924 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8926 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
8928 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8929 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8931 let mut funding_tx = None;
8932 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
8933 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8934 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8937 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
8938 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
8939 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
8940 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
8941 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8943 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8944 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8945 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8947 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8949 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
8950 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8951 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8953 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8956 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
8957 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8958 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8959 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
8960 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8962 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
8963 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
8965 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
8966 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
8967 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
8968 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
8969 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
8970 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8971 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8973 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
8974 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
8975 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8976 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap_err();
8978 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
8979 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
8980 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8981 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8982 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
8983 for ev in chan_closed_events {
8984 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
8986 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8987 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8988 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
8989 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap_err();
8991 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
8992 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
8993 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
8994 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8996 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
8997 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
8999 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
9000 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
9001 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
9002 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
9003 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9005 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
9006 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
9007 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9009 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
9010 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9011 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
9013 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
9014 // "protected" and can connect again.
9015 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
9016 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
9017 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
9018 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9020 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
9022 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
9023 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
9027 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
9028 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
9029 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9030 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9031 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9032 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9034 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
9036 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9037 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9039 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
9040 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9041 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9042 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9045 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
9047 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9048 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
9049 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9051 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
9052 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9053 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9055 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
9056 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9057 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
9058 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9062 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
9063 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
9064 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
9065 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9066 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9067 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
9068 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
9069 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
9070 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9072 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
9074 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9075 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9077 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
9078 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
9079 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
9080 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
9081 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
9082 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
9084 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
9085 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9087 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
9088 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
9090 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9092 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
9093 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9096 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
9097 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
9098 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
9099 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
9100 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
9101 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
9102 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9104 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
9105 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
9106 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
9107 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
9111 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9113 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
9114 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9116 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
9117 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
9118 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9120 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
9121 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
9123 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9125 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
9130 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
9131 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
9132 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
9133 // the channel without the anchors feature.
9134 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9135 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9136 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
9137 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
9138 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
9139 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
9140 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9142 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None).unwrap();
9143 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9144 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
9146 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9147 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9149 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
9150 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
9152 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9155 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9156 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
9158 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9159 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
9161 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
9165 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
9167 use crate::chain::Listen;
9168 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
9169 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
9170 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
9171 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
9172 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
9173 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
9174 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
9175 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
9176 use crate::util::test_utils;
9177 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
9179 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
9180 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
9181 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
9183 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
9187 type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
9188 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
9189 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
9190 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
9191 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
9192 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
9193 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
9195 struct ANodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
9196 node: &'a Manager<'a, P>,
9198 impl<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'a, P> {
9199 type CM = Manager<'a, P>;
9201 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'a, P> { self.node }
9203 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
9208 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
9209 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
9212 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
9213 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
9214 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
9216 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
9218 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
9219 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
9220 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
9221 let scorer = Mutex::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
9222 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &scorer);
9224 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
9225 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
9227 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
9228 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
9229 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
9230 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
9232 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
9234 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
9236 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
9237 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
9238 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
9239 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
9240 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
9242 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
9244 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
9246 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: node_b.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
9247 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: node_a.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
9248 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9249 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
9250 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
9253 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
9254 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
9255 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
9257 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9258 } else { panic!(); }
9260 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
9261 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9262 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
9264 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
9265 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
9267 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9270 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
9271 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9272 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
9274 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
9275 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
9277 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9280 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
9283 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
9286 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
9287 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
9289 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
9290 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9291 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
9292 match msg_events[0] {
9293 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
9294 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
9295 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
9299 match msg_events[1] {
9300 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9304 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9305 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
9307 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
9308 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
9310 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9313 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9314 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
9316 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
9317 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
9319 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9322 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
9323 macro_rules! send_payment {
9324 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
9325 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
9326 .with_features($node_b.invoice_features());
9327 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
9328 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
9330 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
9331 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
9333 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
9334 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), RouteParameters {
9335 payment_params, final_value_msat: 10_000,
9336 }, Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
9337 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
9338 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9339 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
9340 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
9341 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
9342 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
9343 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
9345 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
9346 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
9347 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
9348 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
9350 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
9351 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
9352 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
9353 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
9354 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
9356 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
9359 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
9360 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
9361 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
9362 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
9364 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
9369 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
9370 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);