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[rust-lightning] / lightning / src / ln / channelmanager.rs
1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
2 // history.
3 //
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
8 // licenses.
9
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
11 //!
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
15 //!
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see routing::router::get_route for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
19 //!
20
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
25
26 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
27 use bitcoin::hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
30 use bitcoin::hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
31 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
32
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
35 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
36 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
37
38 use chain;
39 use chain::{Confirm, Watch, BestBlock};
40 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator};
41 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
42 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
43 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
44 // construct one themselves.
45 use ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
46 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
47 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
48 use routing::router::{Route, RouteHop};
49 use ln::msgs;
50 use ln::msgs::NetAddress;
51 use ln::onion_utils;
52 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, OptionalField};
53 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
54 use util::config::UserConfig;
55 use util::events::{EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
56 use util::{byte_utils, events};
57 use util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer};
58 use util::chacha20::{ChaCha20, ChaChaReader};
59 use util::logger::{Logger, Level};
60 use util::errors::APIError;
61
62 use io;
63 use prelude::*;
64 use core::{cmp, mem};
65 use core::cell::RefCell;
66 use io::{Cursor, Read};
67 use sync::{Arc, Condvar, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
68 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
69 use core::time::Duration;
70 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
71 use std::time::Instant;
72 use core::ops::Deref;
73
74 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
75 //
76 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
77 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
78 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
79 //
80 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
81 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
82 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
83 // before we forward it.
84 //
85 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
86 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
87 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
88 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
89 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
90
91 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
92 enum PendingHTLCRouting {
93         Forward {
94                 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
95                 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
96         },
97         Receive {
98                 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
99                 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
100         },
101         ReceiveKeysend {
102                 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
103                 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
104         },
105 }
106
107 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
108 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
109         routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
110         incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
111         payment_hash: PaymentHash,
112         pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
113         pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
114 }
115
116 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
117 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
118         Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
119         Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
120 }
121
122 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
123 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
124 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
125         Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
126         Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
127 }
128
129 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
130         AddHTLC {
131                 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
132
133                 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
134                 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
135                 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
136                 // HTLCs.
137                 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
138                 prev_htlc_id: u64,
139                 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
140         },
141         FailHTLC {
142                 htlc_id: u64,
143                 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
144         },
145 }
146
147 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
148 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
149 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
150         short_channel_id: u64,
151         htlc_id: u64,
152         incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
153
154         // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
155         // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
156         outpoint: OutPoint,
157 }
158
159 enum OnionPayload {
160         /// Contains a total_msat (which may differ from value if this is a Multi-Path Payment) and a
161         /// payment_secret which prevents path-probing attacks and can associate different HTLCs which
162         /// are part of the same payment.
163         Invoice(msgs::FinalOnionHopData),
164         /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
165         Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
166 }
167
168 struct ClaimableHTLC {
169         prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
170         cltv_expiry: u32,
171         value: u64,
172         onion_payload: OnionPayload,
173 }
174
175 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
176 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
177 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
178
179 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
180         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
181                 self.0.write(w)
182         }
183 }
184
185 impl Readable for PaymentId {
186         fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
187                 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
188                 Ok(PaymentId(buf))
189         }
190 }
191 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
192 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
193 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
194         PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
195         OutboundRoute {
196                 path: Vec<RouteHop>,
197                 session_priv: SecretKey,
198                 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
199                 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
200                 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
201                 payment_id: PaymentId,
202         },
203 }
204 #[cfg(test)]
205 impl HTLCSource {
206         pub fn dummy() -> Self {
207                 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
208                         path: Vec::new(),
209                         session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
210                         first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
211                         payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
212                 }
213         }
214 }
215
216 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
217 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
218         LightningError {
219                 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
220         },
221         Reason {
222                 failure_code: u16,
223                 data: Vec<u8>,
224         }
225 }
226
227 /// Return value for claim_funds_from_hop
228 enum ClaimFundsFromHop {
229         PrevHopForceClosed,
230         MonitorUpdateFail(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal, Option<u64>),
231         Success(u64),
232         DuplicateClaim,
233 }
234
235 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
236
237 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
238 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
239 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
240 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
241 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
242
243 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
244         err: msgs::LightningError,
245         chan_id: Option<[u8; 32]>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
246         shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
247 }
248 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
249         #[inline]
250         fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
251                 Self {
252                         err: LightningError {
253                                 err: err.clone(),
254                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
255                                         msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
256                                                 channel_id,
257                                                 data: err
258                                         },
259                                 },
260                         },
261                         chan_id: None,
262                         shutdown_finish: None,
263                 }
264         }
265         #[inline]
266         fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
267                 Self {
268                         err: LightningError {
269                                 err,
270                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
271                         },
272                         chan_id: None,
273                         shutdown_finish: None,
274                 }
275         }
276         #[inline]
277         fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
278                 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
279         }
280         #[inline]
281         fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
282                 Self {
283                         err: LightningError {
284                                 err: err.clone(),
285                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
286                                         msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
287                                                 channel_id,
288                                                 data: err
289                                         },
290                                 },
291                         },
292                         chan_id: Some(channel_id),
293                         shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
294                 }
295         }
296         #[inline]
297         fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
298                 Self {
299                         err: match err {
300                                 ChannelError::Warn(msg) =>  LightningError {
301                                         err: msg,
302                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
303                                 },
304                                 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
305                                         err: msg,
306                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
307                                 },
308                                 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
309                                         err: msg.clone(),
310                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
311                                                 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
312                                                         channel_id,
313                                                         data: msg
314                                                 },
315                                         },
316                                 },
317                                 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => LightningError {
318                                         err: msg.clone(),
319                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
320                                                 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
321                                                         channel_id,
322                                                         data: msg
323                                                 },
324                                         },
325                                 },
326                         },
327                         chan_id: None,
328                         shutdown_finish: None,
329                 }
330         }
331 }
332
333 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
334 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
335 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
336 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
337 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
338
339 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
340 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
341 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
342 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
343 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
344 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
345         /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
346         CommitmentFirst,
347         /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
348         RevokeAndACKFirst,
349 }
350
351 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
352 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<Signer: Sign> {
353         pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
354         pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
355         /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
356         /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
357         /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
358         /// ids in the PendingHTLCInfo!
359         pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
360         /// Map from payment hash to any HTLCs which are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user.
361         /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
362         /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
363         /// go to read them!
364         claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>>,
365         /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
366         /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
367         pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
368 }
369
370 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
371 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
372 /// quite some time lag.
373 enum BackgroundEvent {
374         /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
375         /// commitment transaction.
376         ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
377 }
378
379 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
380 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
381 struct PeerState {
382         latest_features: InitFeatures,
383 }
384
385 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
386 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
387 ///
388 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
389 /// here.
390 struct PendingInboundPayment {
391         /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
392         payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
393         /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
394         /// this payment being removed.
395         expiry_time: u64,
396         /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
397         user_payment_id: u64,
398         // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
399         payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
400         min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
401 }
402
403 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
404 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
405 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
406 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
407 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
408 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
409 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
410 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>;
411
412 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
413 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
414 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
415 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
416 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
417 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
418 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
419 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
420 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, &'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
421
422 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
423 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
424 ///
425 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
426 /// to individual Channels.
427 ///
428 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
429 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
430 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
431 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
432 ///
433 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
434 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
435 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
436 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
437 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
438 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
439 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
440 ///
441 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
442 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
443 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
444 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
445 /// object!
446 ///
447 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
448 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
449 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
450 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
451 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
452 ///
453 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
454 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
455 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
456 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
457 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
458 pub struct ChannelManager<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
459         where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
460         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
461         K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
462         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
463                                 L::Target: Logger,
464 {
465         default_configuration: UserConfig,
466         genesis_hash: BlockHash,
467         fee_estimator: F,
468         chain_monitor: M,
469         tx_broadcaster: T,
470
471         #[cfg(test)]
472         pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
473         #[cfg(not(test))]
474         best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
475         secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
476
477         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
478         pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
479         #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
480         channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
481
482         /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
483         /// expose them to users via a PaymentReceived event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
484         /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
485         /// after we generate a PaymentReceived upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
486         /// Locked *after* channel_state.
487         pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
488
489         /// The session_priv bytes of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
490         /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
491         /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
492         /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
493         /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
494         /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
495         /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
496         /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
497         ///
498         /// Each payment has each of its MPP part's session_priv bytes in the HashSet of the map (even
499         /// payments over a single path).
500         ///
501         /// Locked *after* channel_state.
502         pending_outbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>>,
503
504         our_network_key: SecretKey,
505         our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
506
507         /// Used to track the last value sent in a node_announcement "timestamp" field. We ensure this
508         /// value increases strictly since we don't assume access to a time source.
509         last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize,
510
511         /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
512         /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
513         /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
514         highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
515
516         /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
517         /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
518         /// are currently open with that peer.
519         /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
520         /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
521         /// new channel.
522         ///
523         /// If also holding `channel_state` lock, must lock `channel_state` prior to `per_peer_state`.
524         per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
525
526         pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
527         pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
528         /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
529         /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
530         /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
531         /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
532         /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
533         /// PersistenceNotifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
534         total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
535
536         persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier,
537
538         keys_manager: K,
539
540         logger: L,
541 }
542
543 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
544 ///
545 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
546 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
547 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
548 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
549 pub struct ChainParameters {
550         /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
551         pub network: Network,
552
553         /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
554         ///
555         /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
556         pub best_block: BestBlock,
557 }
558
559 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
560 enum NotifyOption {
561         DoPersist,
562         SkipPersist,
563 }
564
565 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
566 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
567 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
568 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
569 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
570 /// updates are ready for persistence).
571 ///
572 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
573 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
574 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
575 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
576         persistence_notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier,
577         should_persist: F,
578         // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
579         _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
580 }
581
582 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
583         fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
584                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
585         }
586
587         fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
588                 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
589
590                 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
591                         persistence_notifier: notifier,
592                         should_persist: persist_check,
593                         _read_guard: read_guard,
594                 }
595         }
596 }
597
598 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
599         fn drop(&mut self) {
600                 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
601                         self.persistence_notifier.notify();
602                 }
603         }
604 }
605
606 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
607 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
608 ///
609 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
610 ///
611 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
612 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
613 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
614 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
615 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
616
617 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
618 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
619 ///
620 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
621 ///
622 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
623 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
624 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
625 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
626 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
627 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
628 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
629
630 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
631 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry` field to at least
632 /// this value.
633 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
634 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
635 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
636 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 3;
637
638 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
639 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
640 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
641 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
642 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
643 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
644 #[deny(const_err)]
645 #[allow(dead_code)]
646 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
647
648 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
649 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
650 #[deny(const_err)]
651 #[allow(dead_code)]
652 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
653
654 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
655 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
656 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
657         /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
658         pub fee_base_msat: u32,
659         /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
660         pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
661         /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
662         /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
663         /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
664         pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
665 }
666
667 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
668 /// to better separate parameters.
669 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
670 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
671         /// The node_id of our counterparty
672         pub node_id: PublicKey,
673         /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
674         /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
675         /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
676         pub features: InitFeatures,
677         /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
678         /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
679         /// claiming at least this value on chain.
680         ///
681         /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
682         ///
683         /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
684         pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
685         /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
686         /// payments to us through this channel.
687         pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
688 }
689
690 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
691 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
692 pub struct ChannelDetails {
693         /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
694         /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
695         /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
696         /// lifetime of the channel.
697         pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
698         /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
699         pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
700         /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
701         /// our counterparty already.
702         ///
703         /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
704         /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
705         pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
706         /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
707         /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
708         pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
709         /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
710         pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
711         /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
712         /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
713         /// this value on chain.
714         ///
715         /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
716         ///
717         /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
718         ///
719         /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
720         pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
721         /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
722         pub user_id: u64,
723         /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
724         /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
725         /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
726         /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
727         ///
728         /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
729         /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
730         /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
731         pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
732         /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
733         /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
734         /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
735         /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
736         /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
737         ///
738         /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
739         /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
740         /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
741         pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
742         /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
743         /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
744         /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
745         /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
746         /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
747         ///
748         /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
749         ///
750         /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
751         /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
752         /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
753         pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
754         /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
755         /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
756         /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
757         /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
758         /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
759         ///
760         /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
761         pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
762         /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
763         pub is_outbound: bool,
764         /// True if the channel is confirmed, funding_locked messages have been exchanged, and the
765         /// channel is not currently being shut down. `funding_locked` message exchange implies the
766         /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
767         /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
768         /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
769         ///
770         /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
771         pub is_funding_locked: bool,
772         /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b)
773         /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
774         ///
775         /// This is a strict superset of `is_funding_locked`.
776         pub is_usable: bool,
777         /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
778         pub is_public: bool,
779 }
780
781 /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
782 /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
783 /// states for more.
784 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
785 pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
786         /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
787         /// send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages sent to peers, and
788         /// once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the payment in full.
789         ParameterError(APIError),
790         /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us
791         /// from attempting to send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages
792         /// sent to peers, and once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the
793         /// payment in full.
794         ///
795         /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
796         /// send_payment.
797         PathParameterError(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
798         /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
799         /// You can freely retry the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
800         /// paths than the ones selected).
801         AllFailedRetrySafe(Vec<APIError>),
802         /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
803         /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
804         /// in over-/re-payment.
805         ///
806         /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
807         /// send_payment, and any Errs which are not APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed can be safely
808         /// retried (though there is currently no API with which to do so).
809         ///
810         /// Any entries which contain Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) or Ok(()) MUST NOT be retried
811         /// as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent (in the
812         /// case of Ok(())) or will send once channel_monitor_updated is called on the next-hop channel
813         /// with the latest update_id.
814         PartialFailure(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
815 }
816
817 macro_rules! handle_error {
818         ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
819                 match $internal {
820                         Ok(msg) => Ok(msg),
821                         Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
822                                 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
823                                 {
824                                         // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
825                                         // entering the macro.
826                                         assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
827                                         assert!($self.pending_events.try_lock().is_ok());
828                                 }
829
830                                 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
831
832                                 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
833                                         $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
834                                         if let Some(update) = update_option {
835                                                 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
836                                                         msg: update
837                                                 });
838                                         }
839                                         if let Some(channel_id) = chan_id {
840                                                 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed { channel_id,  reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() } });
841                                         }
842                                 }
843
844                                 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
845                                 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
846                                 } else {
847                                         msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
848                                                 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
849                                                 action: err.action.clone()
850                                         });
851                                 }
852
853                                 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
854                                         $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
855                                 }
856
857                                 // Return error in case higher-API need one
858                                 Err(err)
859                         },
860                 }
861         }
862 }
863
864 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
865 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
866         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
867                 match $err {
868                         ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
869                                 //TODO: Once warning messages are merged, we should send a `warning` message to our
870                                 //peer here.
871                                 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
872                         },
873                         ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
874                                 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
875                         },
876                         ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
877                                 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
878                                 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
879                                         $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
880                                 }
881                                 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
882                                 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
883                         },
884                         ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => {
885                                 log_error!($self.logger, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
886                                 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
887                                         $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
888                                 }
889                                 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(false);
890                                 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
891                         }
892                 }
893         }
894 }
895
896 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
897         ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
898                 match $res {
899                         Ok(res) => res,
900                         Err(e) => {
901                                 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
902                                 if drop {
903                                         $entry.remove_entry();
904                                 }
905                                 break Err(res);
906                         }
907                 }
908         }
909 }
910
911 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
912         ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
913                 match $res {
914                         Ok(res) => res,
915                         Err(e) => {
916                                 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
917                                 if drop {
918                                         $entry.remove_entry();
919                                 }
920                                 return Err(res);
921                         }
922                 }
923         }
924 }
925
926 macro_rules! remove_channel {
927         ($channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
928                 {
929                         let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
930                         if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
931                                 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
932                         }
933                         channel
934                 }
935         }
936 }
937
938 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
939         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
940                 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
941         };
942         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
943                 match $err {
944                         ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
945                                 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..]));
946                                 if let Some(short_id) = $chan.get_short_channel_id() {
947                                         $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
948                                 }
949                                 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
950                                 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
951                                 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
952                                 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
953                                 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
954                                 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
955                                 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
956                                 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
957                                 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
958                                 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id,
959                                                 $chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok() ));
960                                 (res, true)
961                         },
962                         ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
963                                 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards and {} fails",
964                                                 log_bytes!($chan_id[..]),
965                                                 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
966                                                                 match $action_type {
967                                                                         RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
968                                                                         RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
969                                                                 }
970                                                         } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
971                                                         else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
972                                                         else { "nothing" },
973                                                 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
974                                                 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len());
975                                 if !$resend_commitment {
976                                         debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
977                                 }
978                                 if !$resend_raa {
979                                         debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
980                                 }
981                                 $chan.monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
982                                 (Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$chan_id)), false)
983                         },
984                 }
985         };
986         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => { {
987                 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $entry.key());
988                 if drop {
989                         $entry.remove_entry();
990                 }
991                 res
992         } };
993 }
994
995 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
996         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
997                 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
998         };
999         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1000                 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
1001         }
1002 }
1003
1004 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
1005 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
1006         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1007                 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
1008                         (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
1009                                 break e;
1010                         },
1011                         (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
1012                 }
1013         }
1014 }
1015
1016 macro_rules! handle_chan_restoration_locked {
1017         ($self: ident, $channel_lock: expr, $channel_state: expr, $channel_entry: expr,
1018          $raa: expr, $commitment_update: expr, $order: expr, $chanmon_update: expr,
1019          $pending_forwards: expr, $funding_broadcastable: expr, $funding_locked: expr) => { {
1020                 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
1021                 let counterparty_node_id = $channel_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1022
1023                 let chanmon_update: Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> = $chanmon_update; // Force type-checking to resolve
1024                 let chanmon_update_is_none = chanmon_update.is_none();
1025                 let res = loop {
1026                         let forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)> = $pending_forwards; // Force type-checking to resolve
1027                         if !forwards.is_empty() {
1028                                 htlc_forwards = Some(($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"),
1029                                         $channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), forwards));
1030                         }
1031
1032                         if chanmon_update.is_some() {
1033                                 // On reconnect, we, by definition, only resend a funding_locked if there have been
1034                                 // no commitment updates, so the only channel monitor update which could also be
1035                                 // associated with a funding_locked would be the funding_created/funding_signed
1036                                 // monitor update. That monitor update failing implies that we won't send
1037                                 // funding_locked until it's been updated, so we can't have a funding_locked and a
1038                                 // monitor update here (so we don't bother to handle it correctly below).
1039                                 assert!($funding_locked.is_none());
1040                                 // A channel monitor update makes no sense without either a funding_locked or a
1041                                 // commitment update to process after it. Since we can't have a funding_locked, we
1042                                 // only bother to handle the monitor-update + commitment_update case below.
1043                                 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1044                         }
1045
1046                         if let Some(msg) = $funding_locked {
1047                                 // Similar to the above, this implies that we're letting the funding_locked fly
1048                                 // before it should be allowed to.
1049                                 assert!(chanmon_update.is_none());
1050                                 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
1051                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1052                                         msg,
1053                                 });
1054                                 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = $self.get_announcement_sigs($channel_entry.get()) {
1055                                         $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1056                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1057                                                 msg: announcement_sigs,
1058                                         });
1059                                 }
1060                                 $channel_state.short_to_id.insert($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), $channel_entry.get().channel_id());
1061                         }
1062
1063                         let funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction> = $funding_broadcastable; // Force type-checking to resolve
1064                         if let Some(monitor_update) = chanmon_update {
1065                                 // We only ever broadcast a funding transaction in response to a funding_signed
1066                                 // message and the resulting monitor update. Thus, on channel_reestablish
1067                                 // message handling we can't have a funding transaction to broadcast. When
1068                                 // processing a monitor update finishing resulting in a funding broadcast, we
1069                                 // cannot have a second monitor update, thus this case would indicate a bug.
1070                                 assert!(funding_broadcastable.is_none());
1071                                 // Given we were just reconnected or finished updating a channel monitor, the
1072                                 // only case where we can get a new ChannelMonitorUpdate would be if we also
1073                                 // have some commitment updates to send as well.
1074                                 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1075                                 if let Err(e) = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1076                                         // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
1077                                         // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
1078                                         // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
1079                                         let mut order = $order;
1080                                         if $raa.is_none() {
1081                                                 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
1082                                         }
1083                                         break handle_monitor_err!($self, e, $channel_state, $channel_entry, order, $raa.is_some(), true);
1084                                 }
1085                         }
1086
1087                         macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1088                                 if let Some(update) = $commitment_update {
1089                                         $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1090                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1091                                                 updates: update,
1092                                         });
1093                                 }
1094                         } }
1095                         macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1096                                 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = $raa {
1097                                         $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1098                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1099                                                 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1100                                         });
1101                                 }
1102                         } }
1103                         match $order {
1104                                 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1105                                         handle_cs!();
1106                                         handle_raa!();
1107                                 },
1108                                 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1109                                         handle_raa!();
1110                                         handle_cs!();
1111                                 },
1112                         }
1113                         if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
1114                                 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
1115                                 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1116                         }
1117                         break Ok(());
1118                 };
1119
1120                 if chanmon_update_is_none {
1121                         // If there was no ChannelMonitorUpdate, we should never generate an Err in the res loop
1122                         // above. Doing so would imply calling handle_err!() from channel_monitor_updated() which
1123                         // should *never* end up calling back to `chain_monitor.update_channel()`.
1124                         assert!(res.is_ok());
1125                 }
1126
1127                 (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id)
1128         } }
1129 }
1130
1131 macro_rules! post_handle_chan_restoration {
1132         ($self: ident, $locked_res: expr) => { {
1133                 let (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id) = $locked_res;
1134
1135                 let _ = handle_error!($self, res, counterparty_node_id);
1136
1137                 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1138                         $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1139                 }
1140         } }
1141 }
1142
1143 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
1144         where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
1145         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1146         K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
1147         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1148         L::Target: Logger,
1149 {
1150         /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
1151         ///
1152         /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1153         /// ChannelMessageHandler.
1154         ///
1155         /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1156         ///
1157         /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
1158         ///
1159         /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
1160         /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
1161         /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
1162         pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1163                 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1164                 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
1165
1166                 ChannelManager {
1167                         default_configuration: config.clone(),
1168                         genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1169                         fee_estimator: fee_est,
1170                         chain_monitor,
1171                         tx_broadcaster,
1172
1173                         best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1174
1175                         channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
1176                                 by_id: HashMap::new(),
1177                                 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
1178                                 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1179                                 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1180                                 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
1181                         }),
1182                         pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1183                         pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1184
1185                         our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
1186                         our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
1187                         secp_ctx,
1188
1189                         last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1190                         highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1191
1192                         per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1193
1194                         pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1195                         pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1196                         total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1197                         persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
1198
1199                         keys_manager,
1200
1201                         logger,
1202                 }
1203         }
1204
1205         /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels,  as
1206         pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1207                 &self.default_configuration
1208         }
1209
1210         /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1211         ///
1212         /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady events to allow
1213         /// tracking of which events correspond with which create_channel call. Note that the
1214         /// user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you may wish to avoid using 0 for
1215         /// user_id here. user_id has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply copied to events and
1216         /// otherwise ignored.
1217         ///
1218         /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel message event, so you should probably poll
1219         /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
1220         ///
1221         /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat is
1222         /// greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k or channel_value_satoshis is < 1000.
1223         ///
1224         /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1225         /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1226         /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten.
1227         pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1228                 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1229                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1230                 }
1231
1232                 let channel = {
1233                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1234                         match per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key) {
1235                                 Some(peer_state) => {
1236                                         let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1237                                         let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1238                                         let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1239                                         Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_id, config)?
1240                                 },
1241                                 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) }),
1242                         }
1243                 };
1244                 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1245
1246                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1247                 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1248                 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1249
1250                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1251                 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
1252                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1253                                 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
1254                                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1255                                 } else {
1256                                         panic!("RNG is bad???");
1257                                 }
1258                         },
1259                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1260                 }
1261                 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1262                         node_id: their_network_key,
1263                         msg: res,
1264                 });
1265                 Ok(())
1266         }
1267
1268         fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<Signer>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1269                 let mut res = Vec::new();
1270                 {
1271                         let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1272                         res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
1273                         for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1274                                 let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
1275                                 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1276                                         channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1277                                 res.push(ChannelDetails {
1278                                         channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
1279                                         counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1280                                                 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1281                                                 features: InitFeatures::empty(),
1282                                                 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1283                                                 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1284                                         },
1285                                         funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1286                                         short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1287                                         channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1288                                         unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1289                                         inbound_capacity_msat,
1290                                         outbound_capacity_msat,
1291                                         user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1292                                         confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1293                                         force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1294                                         is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1295                                         is_funding_locked: channel.is_usable(),
1296                                         is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1297                                         is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1298                                 });
1299                         }
1300                 }
1301                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1302                 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
1303                         if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.counterparty.node_id) {
1304                                 chan.counterparty.features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
1305                         }
1306                 }
1307                 res
1308         }
1309
1310         /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
1311         /// more information.
1312         pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1313                 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1314         }
1315
1316         /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
1317         /// get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1318         ///
1319         /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1320         /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1321         /// are.
1322         pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1323                 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1324                 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1325                 // really wanted anyway.
1326                 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1327         }
1328
1329         fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1330                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1331
1332                 let counterparty_node_id;
1333                 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
1334                 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
1335                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1336                         let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1337                         match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1338                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1339                                         counterparty_node_id = chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1340                                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1341                                         let (shutdown_msg, monitor_update, htlcs) = match per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
1342                                                 Some(peer_state) => {
1343                                                         let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1344                                                         let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1345                                                         chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown(&self.keys_manager, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?
1346                                                 },
1347                                                 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", counterparty_node_id) }),
1348                                         };
1349                                         failed_htlcs = htlcs;
1350
1351                                         // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
1352                                         if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
1353                                                 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1354                                                         let (result, is_permanent) =
1355                                                                 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_entry.key());
1356                                                         if is_permanent {
1357                                                                 remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
1358                                                                 break result;
1359                                                         }
1360                                                 }
1361                                         }
1362
1363                                         channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1364                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1365                                                 msg: shutdown_msg
1366                                         });
1367
1368                                         if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1369                                                 let channel = remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
1370                                                 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
1371                                                         channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1372                                                                 msg: channel_update
1373                                                         });
1374                                                 }
1375                                                 if let Ok(mut pending_events_lock) = self.pending_events.lock() {
1376                                                         pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1377                                                                 channel_id: *channel_id,
1378                                                                 reason: ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
1379                                                         });
1380                                                 }
1381                                         }
1382                                         break Ok(());
1383                                 },
1384                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()})
1385                         }
1386                 };
1387
1388                 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1389                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1390                 }
1391
1392                 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, counterparty_node_id);
1393                 Ok(())
1394         }
1395
1396         /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1397         /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1398         /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1399         ///
1400         ///  * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
1401         ///    [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1402         ///    estimate.
1403         ///  * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
1404         ///    transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
1405         ///    would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
1406         ///    counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
1407         ///
1408         /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1409         ///
1410         /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1411         /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1412         /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1413         pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1414                 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, None)
1415         }
1416
1417         /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1418         /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1419         /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1420         ///
1421         /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
1422         /// the channel being closed or not:
1423         ///  * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
1424         ///    transaction. The upper-bound is set by
1425         ///    [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1426         ///    estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
1427         ///  * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
1428         ///    transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
1429         ///    will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
1430         ///
1431         /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1432         ///
1433         /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1434         /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1435         /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1436         pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1437                 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
1438         }
1439
1440         #[inline]
1441         fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1442                 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1443                 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1444                 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1445                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1446                 }
1447                 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
1448                         // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
1449                         // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
1450                         // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
1451                         // ignore the result here.
1452                         let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
1453                 }
1454         }
1455
1456         /// `peer_node_id` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
1457         /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
1458         fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>, peer_msg: Option<&String>) -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
1459                 let mut chan = {
1460                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1461                         let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1462                         if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1463                                 if let Some(node_id) = peer_node_id {
1464                                         if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *node_id {
1465                                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1466                                         }
1467                                 }
1468                                 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1469                                         channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1470                                 }
1471                                 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1472                                 if peer_node_id.is_some() {
1473                                         if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
1474                                                 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed { channel_id: *channel_id, reason: ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: peer_msg.to_string() } });
1475                                         }
1476                                 } else {
1477                                         pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed { channel_id: *channel_id, reason: ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed });
1478                                 }
1479                                 chan.remove_entry().1
1480                         } else {
1481                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1482                         }
1483                 };
1484                 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
1485                 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(true));
1486                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
1487                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1488                         channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1489                                 msg: update
1490                         });
1491                 }
1492
1493                 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
1494         }
1495
1496         /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
1497         /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if channel_id is unknown to the manager.
1498         pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1499                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1500                 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, None, None) {
1501                         Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
1502                                 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1503                                         events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1504                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1505                                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
1506                                                         msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
1507                                                 },
1508                                         }
1509                                 );
1510                                 Ok(())
1511                         },
1512                         Err(e) => Err(e)
1513                 }
1514         }
1515
1516         /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
1517         /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
1518         pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
1519                 for chan in self.list_channels() {
1520                         let _ = self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
1521                 }
1522         }
1523
1524         fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>) {
1525                 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
1526                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
1527                                 {
1528                                         log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1529                                         return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
1530                                                 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1531                                                 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1532                                                 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
1533                                                 failure_code: $err_code,
1534                                         })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1535                                 }
1536                         }
1537                 }
1538
1539                 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
1540                         return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
1541                 }
1542
1543                 let shared_secret = {
1544                         let mut arr = [0; 32];
1545                         arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
1546                         arr
1547                 };
1548                 let (rho, mu) = onion_utils::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1549
1550                 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
1551                         //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
1552                         //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
1553                         //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
1554                         //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
1555                         //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
1556                         //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
1557                         return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
1558                 }
1559
1560                 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&mu);
1561                 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
1562                 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash.0[..]);
1563                 if !fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
1564                         return_malformed_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5);
1565                 }
1566
1567                 let mut channel_state = None;
1568                 macro_rules! return_err {
1569                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
1570                                 {
1571                                         log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1572                                         if channel_state.is_none() {
1573                                                 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1574                                         }
1575                                         return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1576                                                 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1577                                                 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1578                                                 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
1579                                         })), channel_state.unwrap());
1580                                 }
1581                         }
1582                 }
1583
1584                 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
1585                 let mut chacha_stream = ChaChaReader { chacha: &mut chacha, read: Cursor::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..]) };
1586                 let (next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac): (msgs::OnionHopData, _) = {
1587                         match <msgs::OnionHopData as Readable>::read(&mut chacha_stream) {
1588                                 Err(err) => {
1589                                         let error_code = match err {
1590                                                 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
1591                                                 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature|
1592                                                 msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue|
1593                                                 msgs::DecodeError::ShortRead => 0x4000 | 22, // invalid_onion_payload
1594                                                 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
1595                                         };
1596                                         return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
1597                                 },
1598                                 Ok(msg) => {
1599                                         let mut hmac = [0; 32];
1600                                         if let Err(_) = chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut hmac[..]) {
1601                                                 return_err!("Unable to decode hop data", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1602                                         }
1603                                         (msg, hmac)
1604                                 },
1605                         }
1606                 };
1607
1608                 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_hmac == [0; 32] {
1609                         #[cfg(test)]
1610                         {
1611                                 // In tests, make sure that the initial onion pcket data is, at least, non-0.
1612                                 // We could do some fancy randomness test here, but, ehh, whatever.
1613                                 // This checks for the issue where you can calculate the path length given the
1614                                 // onion data as all the path entries that the originator sent will be here
1615                                 // as-is (and were originally 0s).
1616                                 // Of course reverse path calculation is still pretty easy given naive routing
1617                                 // algorithms, but this fixes the most-obvious case.
1618                                 let mut next_bytes = [0; 32];
1619                                 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1620                                 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1621                                 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1622                                 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1623                         }
1624
1625                         // OUR PAYMENT!
1626                         // final_expiry_too_soon
1627                         // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
1628                         // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
1629                         // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
1630                         // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
1631                         // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
1632                         if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) <= self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
1633                                 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
1634                         }
1635                         // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
1636                         if next_hop_data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
1637                                 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1638                         }
1639                         // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
1640                         if next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
1641                                 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1642                         }
1643
1644                         let routing = match next_hop_data.format {
1645                                 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { .. } => return_err!("We require payment_secrets", 0x4000|0x2000|3, &[0;0]),
1646                                 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => return_err!("Got non final data with an HMAC of 0", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]),
1647                                 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
1648                                         if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
1649                                                 return_err!("We don't support MPP keysend payments", 0x4000|22, &[0;0]);
1650                                         } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
1651                                                 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
1652                                                         payment_data: data,
1653                                                         incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
1654                                                 }
1655                                         } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
1656                                                 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
1657                                                 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
1658                                                 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
1659                                                 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
1660                                                 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
1661                                                 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
1662                                                 if hashed_preimage != msg.payment_hash {
1663                                                         return_err!("Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 0x4000|22, &[0;0]);
1664                                                 }
1665
1666                                                 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
1667                                                         payment_preimage,
1668                                                         incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
1669                                                 }
1670                                         } else {
1671                                                 return_err!("We require payment_secrets", 0x4000|0x2000|3, &[0;0]);
1672                                         }
1673                                 },
1674                         };
1675
1676                         // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
1677                         // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
1678                         // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
1679                         // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
1680
1681                         PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1682                                 routing,
1683                                 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1684                                 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1685                                 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1686                                 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1687                         })
1688                 } else {
1689                         let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
1690                         let read_pos = chacha_stream.read(&mut new_packet_data).unwrap();
1691                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1692                         {
1693                                 // Check two things:
1694                                 // a) that the behavior of our stream here will return Ok(0) even if the TLV
1695                                 //    read above emptied out our buffer and the unwrap() wont needlessly panic
1696                                 // b) that we didn't somehow magically end up with extra data.
1697                                 let mut t = [0; 1];
1698                                 debug_assert!(chacha_stream.read(&mut t).unwrap() == 0);
1699                         }
1700                         // Once we've emptied the set of bytes our peer gave us, encrypt 0 bytes until we
1701                         // fill the onion hop data we'll forward to our next-hop peer.
1702                         chacha_stream.chacha.process_in_place(&mut new_packet_data[read_pos..]);
1703
1704                         let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
1705
1706                         let blinding_factor = {
1707                                 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
1708                                 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
1709                                 sha.input(&shared_secret);
1710                                 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
1711                         };
1712
1713                         let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
1714                                 Err(e)
1715                         } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
1716
1717                         let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
1718                                 version: 0,
1719                                 public_key,
1720                                 hop_data: new_packet_data,
1721                                 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
1722                         };
1723
1724                         let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
1725                                 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1726                                 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1727                                 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
1728                                         return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1729                                 },
1730                         };
1731
1732                         PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1733                                 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
1734                                         onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
1735                                         short_channel_id,
1736                                 },
1737                                 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1738                                 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1739                                 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1740                                 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1741                         })
1742                 };
1743
1744                 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1745                 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
1746                         // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
1747                         // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
1748                         // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
1749                         if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
1750                                 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
1751                                 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
1752                                         let forwarding_id = match id_option {
1753                                                 None => { // unknown_next_peer
1754                                                         break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
1755                                                 },
1756                                                 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1757                                         };
1758
1759                                         let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
1760
1761                                         if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
1762                                                 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
1763                                                 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
1764                                                 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
1765                                                 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
1766                                         }
1767
1768                                         // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
1769                                         // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
1770                                         // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
1771                                         // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
1772                                         // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
1773                                         if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
1774                                                 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1775                                         }
1776                                         if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
1777                                                 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1778                                         }
1779                                         let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64)
1780                                                 .and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000)
1781                                                 .checked_add(chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat() as u64) });
1782                                         if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
1783                                                 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1784                                         }
1785                                         if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta() as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
1786                                                 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1787                                         }
1788                                         let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1789                                         // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now, but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty
1790                                         // packet sanitization (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rational)
1791                                         if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
1792                                                 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1793                                         }
1794                                         if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
1795                                                 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
1796                                         }
1797                                         // In theory, we would be safe against unintentional channel-closure, if we only required a margin of LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1798                                         // But, to be safe against policy reception, we use a longer delay.
1799                                         if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER) as u64 {
1800                                                 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1801                                         }
1802
1803                                         break None;
1804                                 }
1805                                 {
1806                                         let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
1807                                         if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
1808                                                 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
1809                                                         res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1810                                                 }
1811                                                 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
1812                                                         res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1813                                                 }
1814                                                 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
1815                                                         // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
1816                                                         res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
1817                                                 }
1818                                                 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1819                                         }
1820                                         return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
1821                                 }
1822                         }
1823                 }
1824
1825                 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
1826         }
1827
1828         /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
1829         /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
1830         /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
1831         ///
1832         /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1833         fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
1834                 if !chan.should_announce() {
1835                         return Err(LightningError {
1836                                 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
1837                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
1838                         });
1839                 }
1840                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
1841                 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
1842         }
1843
1844         /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
1845         /// is public (only returning an Err if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id),
1846         /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
1847         /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
1848         /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1849         fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
1850                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
1851                 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1852                         None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
1853                         Some(id) => id,
1854                 };
1855
1856                 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
1857
1858                 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1859                         chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
1860                         short_channel_id,
1861                         timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
1862                         flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
1863                         cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
1864                         htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
1865                         htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Present(chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat()),
1866                         fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
1867                         fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
1868                         excess_data: Vec::new(),
1869                 };
1870
1871                 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
1872                 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
1873
1874                 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
1875                         signature: sig,
1876                         contents: unsigned
1877                 })
1878         }
1879
1880         // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
1881         pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1882                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
1883                 let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
1884                 let session_priv_bytes = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
1885                 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
1886
1887                 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
1888                         .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
1889                 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
1890                 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
1891                         return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
1892                 }
1893                 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
1894
1895                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1896                 let mut pending_outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
1897                 let sessions = pending_outbounds.entry(payment_id).or_insert(HashSet::new());
1898                 assert!(sessions.insert(session_priv_bytes));
1899
1900                 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
1901                         let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1902                         let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1903                                 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
1904                                 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1905                         };
1906
1907                         let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
1908                         if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
1909                                 match {
1910                                         if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1911                                                 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1912                                         }
1913                                         if !chan.get().is_live() {
1914                                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
1915                                         }
1916                                         break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1917                                                 path: path.clone(),
1918                                                 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1919                                                 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
1920                                                 payment_id,
1921                                         }, onion_packet, &self.logger), channel_state, chan)
1922                                 } {
1923                                         Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
1924                                                 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1925                                                         maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
1926                                                         // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
1927                                                         // that we will resend the commitment update once monitor updating
1928                                                         // is restored. Therefore, we must return an error indicating that
1929                                                         // it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale, which we do in the
1930                                                         // send_payment check for MonitorUpdateFailed, below.
1931                                                         return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1932                                                 }
1933
1934                                                 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
1935                                                 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1936                                                         node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1937                                                         updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1938                                                                 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1939                                                                 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1940                                                                 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1941                                                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1942                                                                 update_fee: None,
1943                                                                 commitment_signed,
1944                                                         },
1945                                                 });
1946                                         },
1947                                         None => {},
1948                                 }
1949                         } else { unreachable!(); }
1950                         return Ok(());
1951                 };
1952
1953                 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
1954                         Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
1955                         Err(e) => {
1956                                 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
1957                         },
1958                 }
1959         }
1960
1961         /// Sends a payment along a given route.
1962         ///
1963         /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
1964         /// fields for more info.
1965         ///
1966         /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
1967         /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
1968         /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
1969         /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
1970         /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
1971         /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
1972         ///
1973         /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed.
1974         ///
1975         /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
1976         /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
1977         /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
1978         ///
1979         /// In general, a path may raise:
1980         ///  * APIError::RouteError when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
1981         ///    node public key) is specified.
1982         ///  * APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
1983         ///    (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
1984         ///    failure).
1985         ///  * APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
1986         ///    relevant updates.
1987         ///
1988         /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
1989         /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
1990         /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
1991         ///
1992         /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
1993         /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
1994         /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
1995         /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
1996         /// payment_secret.
1997         /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
1998         /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
1999         /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
2000         pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> Result<PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure> {
2001                 self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, None, None)
2002         }
2003
2004         fn send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: Option<PaymentId>) -> Result<PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure> {
2005                 if route.paths.len() < 1 {
2006                         return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
2007                 }
2008                 if route.paths.len() > 10 {
2009                         // This limit is completely arbitrary - there aren't any real fundamental path-count
2010                         // limits. After we support retrying individual paths we should likely bump this, but
2011                         // for now more than 10 paths likely carries too much one-path failure.
2012                         return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "Sending over more than 10 paths is not currently supported"}));
2013                 }
2014                 if payment_secret.is_none() && route.paths.len() > 1 {
2015                         return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Payment secret is required for multi-path payments".to_string()}));
2016                 }
2017                 let mut total_value = 0;
2018                 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2019                 let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
2020                 let payment_id = if let Some(id) = payment_id { id } else { PaymentId(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()) };
2021                 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
2022                         if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
2023                                 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
2024                                 continue 'path_check;
2025                         }
2026                         for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
2027                                 if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
2028                                         path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
2029                                         continue 'path_check;
2030                                 }
2031                         }
2032                         total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2033                         path_errs.push(Ok(()));
2034                 }
2035                 if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
2036                         return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
2037                 }
2038
2039                 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2040                 let mut results = Vec::new();
2041                 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2042                         results.push(self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, &keysend_preimage));
2043                 }
2044                 let mut has_ok = false;
2045                 let mut has_err = false;
2046                 for res in results.iter() {
2047                         if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
2048                         if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
2049                         if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = res {
2050                                 // MonitorUpdateFailed is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
2051                                 // PartialFailure.
2052                                 has_err = true;
2053                                 has_ok = true;
2054                                 break;
2055                         }
2056                 }
2057                 if has_err && has_ok {
2058                         Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure(results))
2059                 } else if has_err {
2060                         Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
2061                 } else {
2062                         Ok(payment_id)
2063                 }
2064         }
2065
2066         /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2067         /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2068         /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2069         /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2070         /// never reach the recipient.
2071         ///
2072         /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function.
2073         ///
2074         /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2075         /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2076         ///
2077         /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2078         ///
2079         /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2080         pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2081                 let preimage = match payment_preimage {
2082                         Some(p) => p,
2083                         None => PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()),
2084                 };
2085                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0).into_inner());
2086                 match self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &None, Some(preimage), None) {
2087                         Ok(payment_id) => Ok((payment_hash, payment_id)),
2088                         Err(e) => Err(e)
2089                 }
2090         }
2091
2092         /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2093         /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2094         fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>
2095                         (&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2096                 let (chan, msg) = {
2097                         let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2098                                 Some(mut chan) => {
2099                                         let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2100
2101                                         (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2102                                                 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2103                                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2104                                                 } else { unreachable!(); })
2105                                         , chan)
2106                                 },
2107                                 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "No such channel".to_owned() }) },
2108                         };
2109                         match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
2110                                 Ok(funding_msg) => {
2111                                         (chan, funding_msg)
2112                                 },
2113                                 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2114                                         err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
2115                                 }) },
2116                         }
2117                 };
2118
2119                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2120                 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2121                         node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2122                         msg,
2123                 });
2124                 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2125                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2126                                 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2127                         },
2128                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2129                                 e.insert(chan);
2130                         }
2131                 }
2132                 Ok(())
2133         }
2134
2135         #[cfg(test)]
2136         pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2137                 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2138                         Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2139                 })
2140         }
2141
2142         /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2143         ///
2144         /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2145         /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2146         ///
2147         /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
2148         ///
2149         /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2150         /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
2151         /// keys per-channel).
2152         ///
2153         /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
2154         /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
2155         /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
2156         ///
2157         /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
2158         /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
2159         /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2160         ///
2161         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2162         pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2163                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2164
2165                 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
2166                         if inp.witness.is_empty() {
2167                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2168                                         err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
2169                                 });
2170                         }
2171                 }
2172                 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
2173                         let mut output_index = None;
2174                         let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
2175                         for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2176                                 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
2177                                         if output_index.is_some() {
2178                                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2179                                                         err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
2180                                                 });
2181                                         }
2182                                         if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
2183                                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2184                                                         err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
2185                                                 });
2186                                         }
2187                                         output_index = Some(idx as u16);
2188                                 }
2189                         }
2190                         if output_index.is_none() {
2191                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2192                                         err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
2193                                 });
2194                         }
2195                         Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
2196                 })
2197         }
2198
2199         fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
2200                 if !chan.should_announce() {
2201                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Can't send announcement_signatures for private channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2202                         return None
2203                 }
2204
2205                 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
2206                         Ok(res) => res,
2207                         Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
2208                 };
2209                 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2210                 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2211
2212                 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
2213                         channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
2214                         short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
2215                         node_signature: our_node_sig,
2216                         bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
2217                 })
2218         }
2219
2220         #[allow(dead_code)]
2221         // Messages of up to 64KB should never end up more than half full with addresses, as that would
2222         // be absurd. We ensure this by checking that at least 500 (our stated public contract on when
2223         // broadcast_node_announcement panics) of the maximum-length addresses would fit in a 64KB
2224         // message...
2225         const HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS: u32 = ::core::u16::MAX as u32 / (NetAddress::MAX_LEN as u32 + 1) / 2;
2226         #[deny(const_err)]
2227         #[allow(dead_code)]
2228         // ...by failing to compile if the number of addresses that would be half of a message is
2229         // smaller than 500:
2230         const STATIC_ASSERT: u32 = Self::HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS - 500;
2231
2232         /// Regenerates channel_announcements and generates a signed node_announcement from the given
2233         /// arguments, providing them in corresponding events via
2234         /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`], if at least one public channel has been confirmed
2235         /// on-chain. This effectively re-broadcasts all channel announcements and sends our node
2236         /// announcement to ensure that the lightning P2P network is aware of the channels we have and
2237         /// our network addresses.
2238         ///
2239         /// `rgb` is a node "color" and `alias` is a printable human-readable string to describe this
2240         /// node to humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning.
2241         ///
2242         /// `addresses` represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node
2243         /// accepts incoming connections. These will be included in the node_announcement, publicly
2244         /// tying these addresses together and to this node. If you wish to preserve user privacy,
2245         /// addresses should likely contain only Tor Onion addresses.
2246         ///
2247         /// Panics if `addresses` is absurdly large (more than 500).
2248         ///
2249         /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
2250         pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], mut addresses: Vec<NetAddress>) {
2251                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2252
2253                 if addresses.len() > 500 {
2254                         panic!("More than half the message size was taken up by public addresses!");
2255                 }
2256
2257                 // While all existing nodes handle unsorted addresses just fine, the spec requires that
2258                 // addresses be sorted for future compatibility.
2259                 addresses.sort_by_key(|addr| addr.get_id());
2260
2261                 let announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
2262                         features: NodeFeatures::known(),
2263                         timestamp: self.last_node_announcement_serial.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32,
2264                         node_id: self.get_our_node_id(),
2265                         rgb, alias, addresses,
2266                         excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
2267                         excess_data: Vec::new(),
2268                 };
2269                 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2270                 let node_announce_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2271
2272                 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2273                 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2274
2275                 let mut announced_chans = false;
2276                 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
2277                         if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.our_network_key, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
2278                                 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2279                                         msg,
2280                                         update_msg: match self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
2281                                                 Ok(msg) => msg,
2282                                                 Err(_) => continue,
2283                                         },
2284                                 });
2285                                 announced_chans = true;
2286                         } else {
2287                                 // If the channel is not public or has not yet reached funding_locked, check the
2288                                 // next channel. If we don't yet have any public channels, we'll skip the broadcast
2289                                 // below as peers may not accept it without channels on chain first.
2290                         }
2291                 }
2292
2293                 if announced_chans {
2294                         channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement {
2295                                 msg: msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
2296                                         signature: node_announce_sig,
2297                                         contents: announcement
2298                                 },
2299                         });
2300                 }
2301         }
2302
2303         /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
2304         ///
2305         /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
2306         /// Will likely generate further events.
2307         pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
2308                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2309
2310                 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2311                 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
2312                 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
2313                 {
2314                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2315                         let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2316
2317                         for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
2318                                 if short_chan_id != 0 {
2319                                         let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
2320                                                 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
2321                                                 None => {
2322                                                         failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
2323                                                         for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2324                                                                 match forward_info {
2325                                                                         HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info,
2326                                                                                                    prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2327                                                                                 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2328                                                                                         short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2329                                                                                         outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2330                                                                                         htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2331                                                                                         incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
2332                                                                                 });
2333                                                                                 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
2334                                                                                         HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() }
2335                                                                                 ));
2336                                                                         },
2337                                                                         HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
2338                                                                                 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
2339                                                                                 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
2340                                                                                 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
2341                                                                                 // problem, not ours.
2342                                                                         }
2343                                                                 }
2344                                                         }
2345                                                         continue;
2346                                                 }
2347                                         };
2348                                         if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
2349                                                 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
2350                                                 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
2351                                                 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2352                                                         match forward_info {
2353                                                                 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
2354                                                                                 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2355                                                                                         onion_packet, ..
2356                                                                                 }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
2357                                                                                 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2358                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
2359                                                                         let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2360                                                                                 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2361                                                                                 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2362                                                                                 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2363                                                                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
2364                                                                         });
2365                                                                         match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet) {
2366                                                                                 Err(e) => {
2367                                                                                         if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
2368                                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
2369                                                                                         } else {
2370                                                                                                 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
2371                                                                                         }
2372                                                                                         let chan_update = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap();
2373                                                                                         failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
2374                                                                                                 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }
2375                                                                                         ));
2376                                                                                         continue;
2377                                                                                 },
2378                                                                                 Ok(update_add) => {
2379                                                                                         match update_add {
2380                                                                                                 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
2381                                                                                                 None => {
2382                                                                                                         // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
2383                                                                                                         // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
2384                                                                                                         // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
2385                                                                                                         // commitment_signed messages when we can.
2386                                                                                                         // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
2387                                                                                                         // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
2388                                                                                                         // this channel currently :/.
2389                                                                                                 }
2390                                                                                         }
2391                                                                                 }
2392                                                                         }
2393                                                                 },
2394                                                                 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
2395                                                                         panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
2396                                                                 },
2397                                                                 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
2398                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
2399                                                                         match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger) {
2400                                                                                 Err(e) => {
2401                                                                                         if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
2402                                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
2403                                                                                         } else {
2404                                                                                                 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
2405                                                                                         }
2406                                                                                         // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
2407                                                                                         // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
2408                                                                                         // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
2409                                                                                         continue;
2410                                                                                 },
2411                                                                                 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
2412                                                                                 Ok(None) => {
2413                                                                                         // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
2414                                                                                         // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
2415                                                                                         // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
2416                                                                                         // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
2417                                                                                         // messages when we can.
2418                                                                                         // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
2419                                                                                         // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
2420                                                                                         // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
2421                                                                                 }
2422                                                                         }
2423                                                                 },
2424                                                         }
2425                                                 }
2426
2427                                                 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
2428                                                         let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) {
2429                                                                 Ok(res) => res,
2430                                                                 Err(e) => {
2431                                                                         // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
2432                                                                         // close channel and then send error message to peer.
2433                                                                         let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
2434                                                                         let err: Result<(), _>  = match e {
2435                                                                                 ChannelError::Ignore(_) | ChannelError::Warn(_) => {
2436                                                                                         panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
2437                                                                                 }
2438                                                                                 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
2439                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
2440                                                                                         let (channel_id, mut channel) = chan.remove_entry();
2441                                                                                         if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2442                                                                                                 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2443                                                                                         }
2444                                                                                         // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us.
2445                                                                                         Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel).ok()))
2446                                                                                 },
2447                                                                                 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
2448                                                                         };
2449                                                                         handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, err));
2450                                                                         continue;
2451                                                                 }
2452                                                         };
2453                                                         if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2454                                                                 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
2455                                                                 continue;
2456                                                         }
2457                                                         log_debug!(self.logger, "Forwarding HTLCs resulted in a commitment update with {} HTLCs added and {} HTLCs failed for channel {}",
2458                                                                 add_htlc_msgs.len(), fail_htlc_msgs.len(), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2459                                                         channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2460                                                                 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
2461                                                                 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2462                                                                         update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
2463                                                                         update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2464                                                                         update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
2465                                                                         update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2466                                                                         update_fee: None,
2467                                                                         commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
2468                                                                 },
2469                                                         });
2470                                                 }
2471                                         } else {
2472                                                 unreachable!();
2473                                         }
2474                                 } else {
2475                                         for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2476                                                 match forward_info {
2477                                                         HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
2478                                                                         routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. },
2479                                                                         prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2480                                                                 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload) = match routing {
2481                                                                         PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
2482                                                                                 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice(payment_data)),
2483                                                                         PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
2484                                                                                 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage)),
2485                                                                         _ => {
2486                                                                                 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
2487                                                                         }
2488                                                                 };
2489                                                                 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
2490                                                                         prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
2491                                                                                 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2492                                                                                 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2493                                                                                 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2494                                                                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
2495                                                                         },
2496                                                                         value: amt_to_forward,
2497                                                                         cltv_expiry,
2498                                                                         onion_payload,
2499                                                                 };
2500
2501                                                                 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
2502                                                                         ($htlc: expr) => {
2503                                                                                 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc.value).to_vec();
2504                                                                                 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
2505                                                                                         &byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()),
2506                                                                                 );
2507                                                                                 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2508                                                                                                 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
2509                                                                                                 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2510                                                                                                 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
2511                                                                                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
2512                                                                                         }), payment_hash,
2513                                                                                         HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data }
2514                                                                                 ));
2515                                                                         }
2516                                                                 }
2517
2518                                                                 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
2519                                                                 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
2520                                                                 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
2521                                                                 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
2522                                                                 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
2523                                                                 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
2524                                                                 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2525                                                                 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
2526                                                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
2527                                                                                 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
2528                                                                                         OnionPayload::Invoice(_) => {
2529                                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we didn't have a corresponding inbound payment.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2530                                                                                                 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2531                                                                                         },
2532                                                                                         OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
2533                                                                                                 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
2534                                                                                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2535                                                                                                                 e.insert(vec![claimable_htlc]);
2536                                                                                                                 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
2537                                                                                                                         payment_hash,
2538                                                                                                                         amt: amt_to_forward,
2539                                                                                                                         purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage),
2540                                                                                                                 });
2541                                                                                                         },
2542                                                                                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2543                                                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2544                                                                                                                 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2545                                                                                                         }
2546                                                                                                 }
2547                                                                                         }
2548                                                                                 }
2549                                                                         },
2550                                                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
2551                                                                                 let payment_data =
2552                                                                                         if let OnionPayload::Invoice(ref data) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
2553                                                                                                 data.clone()
2554                                                                                         } else {
2555                                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2556                                                                                                 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2557                                                                                                 continue
2558                                                                                         };
2559                                                                                 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
2560                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2561                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2562                                                                                 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
2563                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
2564                                                                                                 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
2565                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2566                                                                                 } else {
2567                                                                                         let mut total_value = 0;
2568                                                                                         let htlcs = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
2569                                                                                                 .or_insert(Vec::new());
2570                                                                                         if htlcs.len() == 1 {
2571                                                                                                 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
2572                                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2573                                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2574                                                                                                         continue
2575                                                                                                 }
2576                                                                                         }
2577                                                                                         htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
2578                                                                                         for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
2579                                                                                                 total_value += htlc.value;
2580                                                                                                 match &htlc.onion_payload {
2581                                                                                                         OnionPayload::Invoice(htlc_payment_data) => {
2582                                                                                                                 if htlc_payment_data.total_msat != payment_data.total_msat {
2583                                                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
2584                                                                                                                                                                  log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, htlc_payment_data.total_msat);
2585                                                                                                                         total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
2586                                                                                                                 }
2587                                                                                                                 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
2588                                                                                                         },
2589                                                                                                         _ => unreachable!(),
2590                                                                                                 }
2591                                                                                         }
2592                                                                                         if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > payment_data.total_msat {
2593                                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
2594                                                                                                         log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, payment_data.total_msat);
2595                                                                                                 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
2596                                                                                                         fail_htlc!(htlc);
2597                                                                                                 }
2598                                                                                         } else if total_value == payment_data.total_msat {
2599                                                                                                 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
2600                                                                                                         payment_hash,
2601                                                                                                         purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
2602                                                                                                                 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
2603                                                                                                                 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
2604                                                                                                                 user_payment_id: inbound_payment.get().user_payment_id,
2605                                                                                                         },
2606                                                                                                         amt: total_value,
2607                                                                                                 });
2608                                                                                                 // Only ever generate at most one PaymentReceived
2609                                                                                                 // per registered payment_hash, even if it isn't
2610                                                                                                 // claimed.
2611                                                                                                 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
2612                                                                                         } else {
2613                                                                                                 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
2614                                                                                                 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
2615                                                                                                 // MPP parts.
2616                                                                                         }
2617                                                                                 }
2618                                                                         },
2619                                                                 };
2620                                                         },
2621                                                         HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
2622                                                                 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
2623                                                         }
2624                                                 }
2625                                         }
2626                                 }
2627                         }
2628                 }
2629
2630                 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
2631                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason);
2632                 }
2633
2634                 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
2635                         let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
2636                 }
2637
2638                 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
2639                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2640                 events.append(&mut new_events);
2641         }
2642
2643         /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
2644         ///
2645         /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
2646         /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
2647         ///
2648         /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
2649         fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
2650                 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
2651                 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
2652                 if background_events.is_empty() {
2653                         return false;
2654                 }
2655
2656                 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
2657                         match event {
2658                                 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
2659                                         // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
2660                                         // monitor updating completing.
2661                                         let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update);
2662                                 },
2663                         }
2664                 }
2665                 true
2666         }
2667
2668         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
2669         /// Process background events, for functional testing
2670         pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
2671                 self.process_background_events();
2672         }
2673
2674         fn update_channel_fee(&self, short_to_id: &mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> (bool, NotifyOption, Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal>) {
2675                 if !chan.is_outbound() { return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(())); }
2676                 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
2677                 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate() {
2678                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
2679                                 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
2680                         return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
2681                 }
2682                 if !chan.is_live() {
2683                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
2684                                 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
2685                         return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
2686                 }
2687                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
2688                         log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
2689
2690                 let mut retain_channel = true;
2691                 let res = match chan.send_update_fee_and_commit(new_feerate, &self.logger) {
2692                         Ok(res) => Ok(res),
2693                         Err(e) => {
2694                                 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, chan_id);
2695                                 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
2696                                 Err(res)
2697                         }
2698                 };
2699                 let ret_err = match res {
2700                         Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update))) => {
2701                                 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2702                                         let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_id);
2703                                         if drop { retain_channel = false; }
2704                                         res
2705                                 } else {
2706                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2707                                                 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2708                                                 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2709                                                         update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2710                                                         update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2711                                                         update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2712                                                         update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2713                                                         update_fee: Some(update_fee),
2714                                                         commitment_signed,
2715                                                 },
2716                                         });
2717                                         Ok(())
2718                                 }
2719                         },
2720                         Ok(None) => Ok(()),
2721                         Err(e) => Err(e),
2722                 };
2723                 (retain_channel, NotifyOption::DoPersist, ret_err)
2724         }
2725
2726         #[cfg(fuzzing)]
2727         /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
2728         /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
2729         /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
2730         /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
2731         pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
2732                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
2733                         let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
2734
2735                         let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
2736
2737                         let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
2738                         {
2739                                 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2740                                 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2741                                 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2742                                 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
2743                                 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
2744                                         let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
2745                                         if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
2746                                         if err.is_err() {
2747                                                 handle_errors.push(err);
2748                                         }
2749                                         retain_channel
2750                                 });
2751                         }
2752
2753                         should_persist
2754                 });
2755         }
2756
2757         /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
2758         ///
2759         /// This currently includes:
2760         ///  * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
2761         ///  * Broadcasting `ChannelUpdate` messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
2762         ///    than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
2763         ///    the channel.
2764         ///
2765         /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through `chain::Watch::update_channel` calls or feerate
2766         /// estimate fetches.
2767         pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
2768                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
2769                         let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
2770                         if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
2771
2772                         let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
2773
2774                         let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
2775                         {
2776                                 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2777                                 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2778                                 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2779                                 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
2780                                 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
2781                                         let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
2782                                         let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
2783                                         if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
2784                                         if err.is_err() {
2785                                                 handle_errors.push((err, counterparty_node_id));
2786                                         }
2787                                         if !retain_channel { return false; }
2788
2789                                         if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
2790                                                 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, chan_id);
2791                                                 handle_errors.push((Err(err), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()));
2792                                                 if needs_close { return false; }
2793                                         }
2794
2795                                         match chan.channel_update_status() {
2796                                                 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
2797                                                 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
2798                                                 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
2799                                                 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
2800                                                 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
2801                                                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2802                                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2803                                                                         msg: update
2804                                                                 });
2805                                                         }
2806                                                         should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2807                                                         chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
2808                                                 },
2809                                                 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
2810                                                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2811                                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2812                                                                         msg: update
2813                                                                 });
2814                                                         }
2815                                                         should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2816                                                         chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
2817                                                 },
2818                                                 _ => {},
2819                                         }
2820
2821                                         true
2822                                 });
2823                         }
2824
2825                         for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
2826                                 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
2827                         }
2828                         should_persist
2829                 });
2830         }
2831
2832         /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
2833         /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
2834         /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
2835         /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
2836         /// HTLC backwards has been started.
2837         pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) -> bool {
2838                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2839
2840                 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2841                 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
2842                 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
2843                         for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
2844                                 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
2845                                 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
2846                                 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
2847                                                 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
2848                                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
2849                                                 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_hash,
2850                                                 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
2851                         }
2852                         true
2853                 } else { false }
2854         }
2855
2856         // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
2857         // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
2858         // be surfaced to the user.
2859         fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(&self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
2860                 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
2861                         match htlc_src {
2862                                 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { .. }) => {
2863                                         let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
2864                                                 match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
2865                                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
2866                                                                 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(&chan_entry.get()) {
2867                                                                         (0x1000|7, upd.encode_with_len())
2868                                                                 } else {
2869                                                                         (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
2870                                                                 }
2871                                                         },
2872                                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
2873                                                 };
2874                                         let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2875                                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state,
2876                                                 htlc_src, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: onion_failure_data});
2877                                 },
2878                                 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
2879                                         let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
2880                                         session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
2881                                         let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2882                                         if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut sessions) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
2883                                                 if sessions.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes) {
2884                                                         self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
2885                                                                 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
2886                                                                         payment_hash,
2887                                                                         rejected_by_dest: false,
2888                                                                         network_update: None,
2889                                                                         all_paths_failed: sessions.get().len() == 0,
2890                                                                         path: path.clone(),
2891                                                                         #[cfg(test)]
2892                                                                         error_code: None,
2893                                                                         #[cfg(test)]
2894                                                                         error_data: None,
2895                                                                 }
2896                                                         );
2897                                                         if sessions.get().len() == 0 {
2898                                                                 sessions.remove();
2899                                                         }
2900                                                 }
2901                                         } else {
2902                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2903                                         }
2904                                 },
2905                         };
2906                 }
2907         }
2908
2909         /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
2910         /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
2911         /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
2912         /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
2913         /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
2914         /// still-available channels.
2915         fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
2916                 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
2917                 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
2918                 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
2919                 //timer handling.
2920
2921                 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
2922                 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
2923                 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
2924                 match source {
2925                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, session_priv, payment_id, .. } => {
2926                                 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
2927                                 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
2928                                 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2929                                 let mut all_paths_failed = false;
2930                                 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut sessions) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
2931                                         if !sessions.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes) {
2932                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2933                                                 return;
2934                                         }
2935                                         if sessions.get().len() == 0 {
2936                                                 all_paths_failed = true;
2937                                                 sessions.remove();
2938                                         }
2939                                 } else {
2940                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2941                                         return;
2942                                 }
2943                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2944                                 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2945                                 match &onion_error {
2946                                         &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
2947 #[cfg(test)]
2948                                                 let (network_update, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
2949 #[cfg(not(test))]
2950                                                 let (network_update, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
2951                                                 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
2952                                                 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
2953                                                 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
2954                                                 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
2955                                                         events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
2956                                                                 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
2957                                                                 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
2958                                                                 network_update,
2959                                                                 all_paths_failed,
2960                                                                 path: path.clone(),
2961 #[cfg(test)]
2962                                                                 error_code: onion_error_code,
2963 #[cfg(test)]
2964                                                                 error_data: onion_error_data
2965                                                         }
2966                                                 );
2967                                         },
2968                                         &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
2969 #[cfg(test)]
2970                                                         ref failure_code,
2971 #[cfg(test)]
2972                                                         ref data,
2973                                                         .. } => {
2974                                                 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
2975                                                 // TODO: We'd like to generate a NetworkUpdate for temporary
2976                                                 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as get_route
2977                                                 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
2978                                                 // ChannelDetails.
2979                                                 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
2980                                                 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
2981                                                 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
2982                                                         events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
2983                                                                 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
2984                                                                 rejected_by_dest: path.len() == 1,
2985                                                                 network_update: None,
2986                                                                 all_paths_failed,
2987                                                                 path: path.clone(),
2988 #[cfg(test)]
2989                                                                 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
2990 #[cfg(test)]
2991                                                                 error_data: Some(data.clone()),
2992                                                         }
2993                                                 );
2994                                         }
2995                                 }
2996                         },
2997                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, .. }) => {
2998                                 let err_packet = match onion_error {
2999                                         HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
3000                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
3001                                                 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
3002                                                 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
3003                                         },
3004                                         HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
3005                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3006                                                 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
3007                                         }
3008                                 };
3009
3010                                 let mut forward_event = None;
3011                                 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3012                                         forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
3013                                 }
3014                                 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
3015                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3016                                                 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
3017                                         },
3018                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3019                                                 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
3020                                         }
3021                                 }
3022                                 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3023                                 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
3024                                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3025                                         pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
3026                                                 time_forwardable: time
3027                                         });
3028                                 }
3029                         },
3030                 }
3031         }
3032
3033         /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
3034         /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
3035         /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
3036         ///
3037         /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
3038         /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentReceived`
3039         /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
3040         /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
3041         ///
3042         /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
3043         ///
3044         /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
3045         /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
3046         pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> bool {
3047                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3048
3049                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3050
3051                 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
3052                 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
3053                 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
3054                         assert!(!sources.is_empty());
3055
3056                         // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we have to take special care to ensure that each
3057                         // channel exists before claiming all of the payments (inside one lock).
3058                         // Note that channel existance is sufficient as we should always get a monitor update
3059                         // which will take care of the real HTLC claim enforcement.
3060                         //
3061                         // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
3062                         // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
3063                         // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
3064                         // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
3065                         // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
3066                         // it.
3067                         let mut valid_mpp = true;
3068                         for htlc in sources.iter() {
3069                                 if let None = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3070                                         valid_mpp = false;
3071                                         break;
3072                                 }
3073                         }
3074
3075                         let mut errs = Vec::new();
3076                         let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
3077                         for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3078                                 if !valid_mpp {
3079                                         if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
3080                                         let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3081                                         htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
3082                                                         self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
3083                                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
3084                                                                          HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash,
3085                                                                          HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
3086                                 } else {
3087                                         match self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state.as_mut().unwrap(), htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
3088                                                 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) => {
3089                                                         if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
3090                                                                 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
3091                                                                 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
3092                                                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
3093                                                                 claimed_any_htlcs = true;
3094                                                         } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
3095                                                 },
3096                                                 ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"),
3097                                                 ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim => {
3098                                                         // While we should never get here in most cases, if we do, it likely
3099                                                         // indicates that the HTLC was timed out some time ago and is no longer
3100                                                         // available to be claimed. Thus, it does not make sense to set
3101                                                         // `claimed_any_htlcs`.
3102                                                 },
3103                                                 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(_) => claimed_any_htlcs = true,
3104                                         }
3105                                 }
3106                         }
3107
3108                         // Now that we've done the entire above loop in one lock, we can handle any errors
3109                         // which were generated.
3110                         channel_state.take();
3111
3112                         for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
3113                                 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
3114                                 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
3115                         }
3116
3117                         claimed_any_htlcs
3118                 } else { false }
3119         }
3120
3121         fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> ClaimFundsFromHop {
3122                 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
3123                 let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock;
3124                 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3125                         Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
3126                         None => {
3127                                 return ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed
3128                         }
3129                 };
3130
3131                 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
3132                         match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
3133                                 Ok(msgs_monitor_option) => {
3134                                         if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { msgs, htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = msgs_monitor_option {
3135                                                 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3136                                                         log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Debug },
3137                                                                 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
3138                                                                 payment_preimage, e);
3139                                                         return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(
3140                                                                 chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3141                                                                 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err(),
3142                                                                 Some(htlc_value_msat)
3143                                                         );
3144                                                 }
3145                                                 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
3146                                                         log_debug!(self.logger, "Claiming funds for HTLC with preimage {} resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}",
3147                                                                 log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3148                                                         channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3149                                                                 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3150                                                                 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3151                                                                         update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3152                                                                         update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
3153                                                                         update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3154                                                                         update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3155                                                                         update_fee: None,
3156                                                                         commitment_signed,
3157                                                                 }
3158                                                         });
3159                                                 }
3160                                                 return ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(htlc_value_msat);
3161                                         } else {
3162                                                 return ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim;
3163                                         }
3164                                 },
3165                                 Err((e, monitor_update)) => {
3166                                         if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3167                                                 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Info },
3168                                                         "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?} immediately prior to force-close: {:?}",
3169                                                         payment_preimage, e);
3170                                         }
3171                                         let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3172                                         let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan.get_mut(), &chan_id);
3173                                         if drop {
3174                                                 chan.remove_entry();
3175                                         }
3176                                         return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(counterparty_node_id, res, None);
3177                                 },
3178                         }
3179                 } else { unreachable!(); }
3180         }
3181
3182         fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool) {
3183                 match source {
3184                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, .. } => {
3185                                 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3186                                 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3187                                 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3188                                 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3189                                 let found_payment = if let Some(mut sessions) = outbounds.remove(&payment_id) {
3190                                         sessions.remove(&session_priv_bytes)
3191                                 } else { false };
3192                                 if found_payment {
3193                                         self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
3194                                                 events::Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage }
3195                                         );
3196                                 } else {
3197                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fulfill for HTLC with payment_preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0));
3198                                 }
3199                         },
3200                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
3201                                 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
3202                                 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage);
3203                                 let claimed_htlc = if let ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim = res { false } else { true };
3204                                 let htlc_claim_value_msat = match res {
3205                                         ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(_, _, amt_opt) => amt_opt,
3206                                         ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(amt) => Some(amt),
3207                                         _ => None,
3208                                 };
3209                                 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed = res {
3210                                         let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3211                                                 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
3212                                                 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
3213                                                         payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
3214                                                 }],
3215                                         };
3216                                         // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
3217                                         // receiving an offchain preimage event from the forward link (the
3218                                         // event being update_fulfill_htlc).
3219                                         if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_outpoint, preimage_update) {
3220                                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
3221                                                                                          payment_preimage, e);
3222                                         }
3223                                         // Note that we do *not* set `claimed_htlc` to false here. In fact, this
3224                                         // totally could be a duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing
3225                                         // without interrogating the `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above
3226                                         // update to. Instead, we simply document in `PaymentForwarded` that this
3227                                         // can happen.
3228                                 }
3229                                 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3230                                 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) = res {
3231                                         let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
3232                                         let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
3233                                 }
3234
3235                                 if claimed_htlc {
3236                                         if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
3237                                                 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
3238                                                         Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
3239                                                 } else { None };
3240
3241                                                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3242                                                 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
3243                                                         fee_earned_msat,
3244                                                         claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
3245                                                 });
3246                                         }
3247                                 }
3248                         },
3249                 }
3250         }
3251
3252         /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
3253         pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
3254                 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
3255         }
3256
3257         /// Restores a single, given channel to normal operation after a
3258         /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
3259         /// operation.
3260         ///
3261         /// All ChannelMonitor updates up to and including highest_applied_update_id must have been
3262         /// fully committed in every copy of the given channels' ChannelMonitors.
3263         ///
3264         /// Note that there is no effect to calling with a highest_applied_update_id other than the
3265         /// current latest ChannelMonitorUpdate and one call to this function after multiple
3266         /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures is fine. The highest_applied_update_id field
3267         /// exists largely only to prevent races between this and concurrent update_monitor calls.
3268         ///
3269         /// Thus, the anticipated use is, at a high level:
3270         ///  1) You register a chain::Watch with this ChannelManager,
3271         ///  2) it stores each update to disk, and begins updating any remote (eg watchtower) copies of
3272         ///     said ChannelMonitors as it can, returning ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures
3273         ///     any time it cannot do so instantly,
3274         ///  3) update(s) are applied to each remote copy of a ChannelMonitor,
3275         ///  4) once all remote copies are updated, you call this function with the update_id that
3276         ///     completed, and once it is the latest the Channel will be re-enabled.
3277         pub fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
3278                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3279
3280                 let chan_restoration_res;
3281                 let mut pending_failures = {
3282                         let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3283                         let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3284                         let mut channel = match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
3285                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
3286                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
3287                         };
3288                         if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
3289                                 return;
3290                         }
3291
3292                         let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, pending_failures, funding_broadcastable, funding_locked) = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger);
3293                         let channel_update = if funding_locked.is_some() && channel.get().is_usable() && !channel.get().should_announce() {
3294                                 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
3295                                 // funding_locked and the channel is in a usable state. Further, we rely on the
3296                                 // normal announcement_signatures process to send a channel_update for public
3297                                 // channels, only generating a unicast channel_update if this is a private channel.
3298                                 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3299                                         node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3300                                         msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel.get()).unwrap(),
3301                                 })
3302                         } else { None };
3303                         chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_lock, channel_state, channel, raa, commitment_update, order, None, pending_forwards, funding_broadcastable, funding_locked);
3304                         if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
3305                                 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
3306                         }
3307                         pending_failures
3308                 };
3309                 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
3310                 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
3311                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
3312                 }
3313         }
3314
3315         fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3316                 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
3317                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
3318                 }
3319
3320                 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, counterparty_node_id.clone(), &their_features, msg, 0, &self.default_configuration)
3321                         .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
3322                 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3323                 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3324                 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
3325                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
3326                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3327                                 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
3328                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3329                                         msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
3330                                 });
3331                                 entry.insert(channel);
3332                         }
3333                 }
3334                 Ok(())
3335         }
3336
3337         fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3338                 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
3339                         let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3340                         let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3341                         match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
3342                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3343                                         if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3344                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
3345                                         }
3346                                         try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration, &their_features), channel_state, chan);
3347                                         (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
3348                                 },
3349                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
3350                         }
3351                 };
3352                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3353                 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
3354                         temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
3355                         channel_value_satoshis: value,
3356                         output_script,
3357                         user_channel_id: user_id,
3358                 });
3359                 Ok(())
3360         }
3361
3362         fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3363                 let ((funding_msg, monitor), mut chan) = {
3364                         let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
3365                         let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3366                         let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3367                         match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
3368                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3369                                         if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3370                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
3371                                         }
3372                                         (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.logger), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
3373                                 },
3374                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
3375                         }
3376                 };
3377                 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
3378                 // lock before watch_channel
3379                 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
3380                         match e {
3381                                 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
3382                                         // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
3383                                         // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
3384                                         // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
3385                                         // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
3386                                         // We do not do a force-close here as that would generate a monitor update for
3387                                         // a monitor that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we
3388                                         // don't respond with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
3389                                         let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(true);
3390                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
3391                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
3392                                 },
3393                                 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
3394                                         // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
3395                                         // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
3396                                         // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our funding_locked
3397                                         // until we have persisted our monitor.
3398                                         chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3399                                 },
3400                         }
3401                 }
3402                 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3403                 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3404                 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
3405                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3406                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
3407                         },
3408                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3409                                 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
3410                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3411                                         msg: funding_msg,
3412                                 });
3413                                 e.insert(chan);
3414                         }
3415                 }
3416                 Ok(())
3417         }
3418
3419         fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3420                 let funding_tx = {
3421                         let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
3422                         let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3423                         let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3424                         match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3425                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3426                                         if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3427                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3428                                         }
3429                                         let (monitor, funding_tx) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.logger) {
3430                                                 Ok(update) => update,
3431                                                 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
3432                                         };
3433                                         if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
3434                                                 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, false, false);
3435                                         }
3436                                         funding_tx
3437                                 },
3438                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3439                         }
3440                 };
3441                 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid());
3442                 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
3443                 Ok(())
3444         }
3445
3446         fn internal_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3447                 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3448                 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3449                 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3450                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3451                                 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3452                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3453                                 }
3454                                 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3455                                 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
3456                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for {} in response to funding_locked", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3457                                         // If we see locking block before receiving remote funding_locked, we broadcast our
3458                                         // announcement_sigs at remote funding_locked reception. If we receive remote
3459                                         // funding_locked before seeing locking block, we broadcast our announcement_sigs at locking
3460                                         // block connection. We should guanrantee to broadcast announcement_sigs to our peer whatever
3461                                         // the order of the events but our peer may not receive it due to disconnection. The specs
3462                                         // lacking an acknowledgement for announcement_sigs we may have to re-send them at peer
3463                                         // connection in the future if simultaneous misses by both peers due to network/hardware
3464                                         // failures is an issue. Note, to achieve its goal, only one of the announcement_sigs needs
3465                                         // to be received, from then sigs are going to be flood to the whole network.
3466                                         channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
3467                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3468                                                 msg: announcement_sigs,
3469                                         });
3470                                 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
3471                                         channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3472                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3473                                                 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
3474                                         });
3475                                 }
3476                                 Ok(())
3477                         },
3478                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3479                 }
3480         }
3481
3482         fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3483                 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
3484                 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
3485                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3486                         let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3487
3488                         match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
3489                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
3490                                         if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3491                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3492                                         }
3493
3494                                         if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
3495                                                 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
3496                                                         log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
3497                                                         if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
3498                                         }
3499
3500                                         let (shutdown, monitor_update, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.keys_manager, &their_features, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
3501                                         dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
3502
3503                                         // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
3504                                         if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
3505                                                 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3506                                                         let (result, is_permanent) =
3507                                                                 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_entry.key());
3508                                                         if is_permanent {
3509                                                                 remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
3510                                                                 break result;
3511                                                         }
3512                                                 }
3513                                         }
3514
3515                                         if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
3516                                                 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
3517                                                         node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
3518                                                         msg,
3519                                                 });
3520                                         }
3521
3522                                         break Ok(());
3523                                 },
3524                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3525                         }
3526                 };
3527                 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
3528                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
3529                 }
3530
3531                 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
3532                 Ok(())
3533         }
3534
3535         fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3536                 let (tx, chan_option) = {
3537                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3538                         let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3539                         match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
3540                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
3541                                         if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3542                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3543                                         }
3544                                         let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
3545                                         if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
3546                                                 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
3547                                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3548                                                         msg,
3549                                                 });
3550                                         }
3551                                         if tx.is_some() {
3552                                                 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
3553                                                 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
3554                                                 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
3555                                                 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
3556                                                 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
3557                                                 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
3558                                                         channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3559                                                 }
3560                                                 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
3561                                         } else { (tx, None) }
3562                                 },
3563                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3564                         }
3565                 };
3566                 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
3567                         log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
3568                         self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
3569                 }
3570                 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
3571                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3572                                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3573                                 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3574                                         msg: update
3575                                 });
3576                         }
3577                         self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed { channel_id: msg.channel_id,  reason: ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure });
3578                 }
3579                 Ok(())
3580         }
3581
3582         fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3583                 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
3584                 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
3585                 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
3586                 //
3587                 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
3588                 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
3589                 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
3590                 //but we should prevent it anyway.
3591
3592                 let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
3593                 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3594
3595                 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3596                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3597                                 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3598                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3599                                 }
3600
3601                                 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
3602                                         // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
3603                                         // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
3604                                         // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
3605                                         match pending_forward_info {
3606                                                 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
3607                                                         let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
3608                                                                 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
3609                                                                         onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &{
3610                                                                                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
3611                                                                                 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
3612                                                                                 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
3613                                                                                 res.extend_from_slice(&upd.encode_with_len()[..]);
3614                                                                                 res
3615                                                                         }[..])
3616                                                                 } else {
3617                                                                         // The only case where we'd be unable to
3618                                                                         // successfully get a channel update is if the
3619                                                                         // channel isn't in the fully-funded state yet,
3620                                                                         // implying our counterparty is trying to route
3621                                                                         // payments over the channel back to themselves
3622                                                                         // (because no one else should know the short_id
3623                                                                         // is a lightning channel yet). We should have
3624                                                                         // no problem just calling this
3625                                                                         // unknown_next_peer (0x4000|10).
3626                                                                         onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
3627                                                                 }
3628                                                         } else {
3629                                                                 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &[])
3630                                                         };
3631                                                         let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3632                                                                 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3633                                                                 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3634                                                                 reason
3635                                                         };
3636                                                         PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
3637                                                 },
3638                                                 _ => pending_forward_info
3639                                         }
3640                                 };
3641                                 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3642                         },
3643                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3644                 }
3645                 Ok(())
3646         }
3647
3648         fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3649                 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3650                 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
3651                         let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3652                         match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3653                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3654                                         if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3655                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3656                                         }
3657                                         try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
3658                                 },
3659                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3660                         }
3661                 };
3662                 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false);
3663                 Ok(())
3664         }
3665
3666         fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3667                 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3668                 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3669                 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3670                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3671                                 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3672                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3673                                 }
3674                                 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
3675                         },
3676                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3677                 }
3678                 Ok(())
3679         }
3680
3681         fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3682                 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3683                 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3684                 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3685                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3686                                 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3687                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3688                                 }
3689                                 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
3690                                         let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
3691                                         try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
3692                                 }
3693                                 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
3694                                 Ok(())
3695                         },
3696                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3697                 }
3698         }
3699
3700         fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3701                 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3702                 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3703                 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3704                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3705                                 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3706                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3707                                 }
3708                                 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, monitor_update) =
3709                                         match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger) {
3710                                                 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
3711                                                 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
3712                                                         assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
3713                                                         let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
3714                                                         try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan);
3715                                                         unreachable!();
3716                                                 },
3717                                                 Ok(res) => res
3718                                         };
3719                                 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3720                                         return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
3721                                 }
3722                                 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
3723                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3724                                         msg: revoke_and_ack,
3725                                 });
3726                                 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
3727                                         channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3728                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3729                                                 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3730                                                         update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3731                                                         update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3732                                                         update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3733                                                         update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3734                                                         update_fee: None,
3735                                                         commitment_signed: msg,
3736                                                 },
3737                                         });
3738                                 }
3739                                 Ok(())
3740                         },
3741                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3742                 }
3743         }
3744
3745         #[inline]
3746         fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
3747                 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
3748                         let mut forward_event = None;
3749                         if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
3750                                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3751                                 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3752                                         forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
3753                                 }
3754                                 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3755                                         match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.routing {
3756                                                         PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
3757                                                         PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
3758                                                         PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
3759                                         }) {
3760                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3761                                                         entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
3762                                                                                                         prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
3763                                                 },
3764                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3765                                                         entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
3766                                                                                                      prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
3767                                                 }
3768                                         }
3769                                 }
3770                         }
3771                         match forward_event {
3772                                 Some(time) => {
3773                                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3774                                         pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
3775                                                 time_forwardable: time
3776                                         });
3777                                 }
3778                                 None => {},
3779                         }
3780                 }
3781         }
3782
3783         fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3784                 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3785                 let res = loop {
3786                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3787                         let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3788                         match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3789                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3790                                         if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3791                                                 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3792                                         }
3793                                         let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
3794                                         let (commitment_update, pending_forwards, pending_failures, monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail_in) =
3795                                                 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3796                                         htlcs_to_fail = htlcs_to_fail_in;
3797                                         if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3798                                                 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
3799                                                         assert!(commitment_update.is_none() && pending_forwards.is_empty() && pending_failures.is_empty());
3800                                                         break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
3801                                                 } else {
3802                                                         if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, commitment_update.is_some(), pending_forwards, pending_failures) {
3803                                                                 break Err(e);
3804                                                         } else { unreachable!(); }
3805                                                 }
3806                                         }
3807                                         if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
3808                                                 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3809                                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3810                                                         updates,
3811                                                 });
3812                                         }
3813                                         break Ok((pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"), chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap()))
3814                                 },
3815                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3816                         }
3817                 };
3818                 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id);
3819                 match res {
3820                         Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, short_channel_id, channel_outpoint)) => {
3821                                 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
3822                                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
3823                                 }
3824                                 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, pending_forwards)]);
3825                                 Ok(())
3826                         },
3827                         Err(e) => Err(e)
3828                 }
3829         }
3830
3831         fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3832                 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3833                 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3834                 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3835                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3836                                 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3837                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3838                                 }
3839                                 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
3840                         },
3841                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3842                 }
3843                 Ok(())
3844         }
3845
3846         fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3847                 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3848                 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3849
3850                 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3851                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3852                                 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3853                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3854                                 }
3855                                 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
3856                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
3857                                 }
3858
3859                                 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
3860                                         msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(&self.our_network_key, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), msg), channel_state, chan),
3861                                         // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
3862                                         // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
3863                                         update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
3864                                 });
3865                         },
3866                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3867                 }
3868                 Ok(())
3869         }
3870
3871         /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
3872         fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3873                 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3874                 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3875                 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
3876                         Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
3877                         None => {
3878                                 // It's not a local channel
3879                                 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
3880                         }
3881                 };
3882                 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
3883                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3884                                 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3885                                         if chan.get().should_announce() {
3886                                                 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
3887                                                 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
3888                                                 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
3889                                                 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
3890                                         }
3891                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
3892                                 }
3893                                 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
3894                                 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
3895                                 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
3896                                         return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
3897                                 } else {
3898                                         try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), channel_state, chan);
3899                                 }
3900                         },
3901                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => unreachable!()
3902                 }
3903                 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
3904         }
3905
3906         fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3907                 let chan_restoration_res;
3908                 let (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround) = {
3909                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3910                         let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3911
3912                         match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3913                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3914                                         if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3915                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3916                                         }
3917                                         // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
3918                                         // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
3919                                         // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
3920                                         // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
3921                                         let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, monitor_update_opt, order, htlcs_failed_forward, shutdown) =
3922                                                 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3923                                         let mut channel_update = None;
3924                                         if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
3925                                                 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
3926                                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3927                                                         msg,
3928                                                 });
3929                                         } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
3930                                                 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
3931                                                 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
3932                                                 // they have the latest channel parameters.
3933                                                 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3934                                                         node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3935                                                         msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
3936                                                 });
3937                                         }
3938                                         let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
3939                                         chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_state_lock, channel_state, chan, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, order, monitor_update_opt, Vec::new(), None, funding_locked);
3940                                         if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
3941                                                 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
3942                                         }
3943                                         (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround)
3944                                 },
3945                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3946                         }
3947                 };
3948                 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
3949                 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_failed_forward, msg.channel_id);
3950
3951                 if let Some(funding_locked_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
3952                         self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, &funding_locked_msg)?;
3953                 }
3954                 Ok(())
3955         }
3956
3957         /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed.
3958         fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
3959                 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
3960                 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
3961                 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
3962                 for monitor_event in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
3963                         match monitor_event {
3964                                 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
3965                                         if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
3966                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
3967                                                 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.onchain_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true);
3968                                         } else {
3969                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
3970                                                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
3971                                         }
3972                                 },
3973                                 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) => {
3974                                         let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3975                                         let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3976                                         let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
3977                                         let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3978                                         let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3979                                         if let Some(mut chan) = by_id.remove(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
3980                                                 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
3981                                                         short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3982                                                 }
3983                                                 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
3984                                                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3985                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3986                                                                 msg: update
3987                                                         });
3988                                                 }
3989                                                 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed { channel_id: chan.channel_id(),  reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed });
3990                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
3991                                                         node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3992                                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
3993                                                                 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
3994                                                         },
3995                                                 });
3996                                         }
3997                                 },
3998                         }
3999                 }
4000
4001                 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
4002                         self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
4003                 }
4004
4005                 has_pending_monitor_events
4006         }
4007
4008         /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
4009         /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
4010         /// update was applied.
4011         ///
4012         /// This should only apply to HTLCs which were added to the holding cell because we were
4013         /// waiting on a monitor update to finish. In that case, we don't want to free the holding cell
4014         /// directly in `channel_monitor_updated` as it may introduce deadlocks calling back into user
4015         /// code to inform them of a channel monitor update.
4016         fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
4017                 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
4018                 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4019                 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
4020                 {
4021                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4022                         let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4023                         let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4024                         let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4025                         let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4026
4027                         by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
4028                                 match chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger) {
4029                                         Ok((commitment_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
4030                                                 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
4031                                                         failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id));
4032                                                 }
4033                                                 if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt {
4034                                                         if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4035                                                                 has_monitor_update = true;
4036                                                                 let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), channel_id);
4037                                                                 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res));
4038                                                                 if close_channel { return false; }
4039                                                         } else {
4040                                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4041                                                                         node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4042                                                                         updates: commitment_update,
4043                                                                 });
4044                                                         }
4045                                                 }
4046                                                 true
4047                                         },
4048                                         Err(e) => {
4049                                                 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
4050                                                 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
4051                                                 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us
4052                                                 !close_channel
4053                                         }
4054                                 }
4055                         });
4056                 }
4057
4058                 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
4059                 for (failures, channel_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
4060                         self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id);
4061                 }
4062
4063                 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4064                         let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4065                 }
4066
4067                 has_update
4068         }
4069
4070         /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
4071         /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
4072         /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
4073         fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
4074                 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
4075                 let mut has_update = false;
4076                 {
4077                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4078                         let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4079                         let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4080                         let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4081                         let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4082
4083                         by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
4084                                 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
4085                                         Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
4086                                                 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
4087                                                         has_update = true;
4088                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4089                                                                 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
4090                                                         });
4091                                                 }
4092                                                 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
4093                                                         // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
4094                                                         // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
4095                                                         if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
4096                                                                 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4097                                                         }
4098
4099                                                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4100                                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4101                                                                         msg: update
4102                                                                 });
4103                                                         }
4104
4105                                                         if let Ok(mut pending_events_lock) = self.pending_events.lock() {
4106                                                                 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
4107                                                                         channel_id: *channel_id,
4108                                                                         reason: ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure
4109                                                                 });
4110                                                         }
4111
4112                                                         log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
4113                                                         self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
4114                                                         false
4115                                                 } else { true }
4116                                         },
4117                                         Err(e) => {
4118                                                 has_update = true;
4119                                                 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
4120                                                 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
4121                                                 !close_channel
4122                                         }
4123                                 }
4124                         });
4125                 }
4126
4127                 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4128                         let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4129                 }
4130
4131                 has_update
4132         }
4133
4134         /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
4135         /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
4136         /// Channel object.
4137         fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
4138                 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
4139                         // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
4140                         // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
4141                         // reorganized out of the main chain.
4142                         // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
4143                         // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
4144                         // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
4145                         // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
4146                         if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
4147                                 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
4148                                 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
4149                                         assert!(should_broadcast);
4150                                 } else { unreachable!(); }
4151                                 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
4152                         }
4153                         self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
4154                 }
4155         }
4156
4157         fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
4158                 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
4159
4160                 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
4161
4162                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4163                 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4164                 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
4165                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4166                                 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
4167                                         payment_secret, min_value_msat, user_payment_id, payment_preimage,
4168                                         // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
4169                                         // its updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
4170                                         // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
4171                                         // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
4172                                         // never fail a payment too early.
4173                                         // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
4174                                         // timestamps.
4175                                         expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
4176                                 });
4177                         },
4178                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
4179                 }
4180                 Ok(payment_secret)
4181         }
4182
4183         /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
4184         /// to pay us.
4185         ///
4186         /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
4187         /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you, returning the first and storing the second.
4188         ///
4189         /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentReceived`], which
4190         /// will have the [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
4191         /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
4192         ///
4193         /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
4194         ///
4195         /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
4196         /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
4197         /// [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::payment_preimage
4198         /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
4199         pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> (PaymentHash, PaymentSecret) {
4200                 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
4201                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4202
4203                 (payment_hash,
4204                         self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, user_payment_id)
4205                                 .expect("RNG Generated Duplicate PaymentHash"))
4206         }
4207
4208         /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
4209         /// stored external to LDK.
4210         ///
4211         /// A [`PaymentReceived`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
4212         /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
4213         /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
4214         ///
4215         /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) must be globally unique. This
4216         /// method may return an Err if another payment with the same payment_hash is still pending.
4217         ///
4218         /// `user_payment_id` will be provided back in [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::user_payment_id`] events to
4219         /// allow tracking of which events correspond with which calls to this and
4220         /// [`create_inbound_payment`]. `user_payment_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply
4221         /// copied to events and otherwise ignored. It may be used to correlate PaymentReceived events
4222         /// with invoice metadata stored elsewhere.
4223         ///
4224         /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
4225         /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
4226         /// before a [`PaymentReceived`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
4227         /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
4228         ///
4229         /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
4230         /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
4231         /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
4232         /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
4233         /// invoices when no timeout is set.
4234         ///
4235         /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
4236         /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
4237         /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentReceived`] event for some time after the expiry.
4238         /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
4239         /// [`PaymentReceived`].
4240         ///
4241         /// Pending inbound payments are stored in memory and in serialized versions of this
4242         /// [`ChannelManager`]. If potentially unbounded numbers of inbound payments may exist and
4243         /// space is limited, you may wish to rate-limit inbound payment creation.
4244         ///
4245         /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
4246         ///
4247         /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry`
4248         /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY`].
4249         ///
4250         /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
4251         /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
4252         /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::user_payment_id`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::user_payment_id
4253         pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
4254                 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, user_payment_id)
4255         }
4256
4257         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget", feature = "_test_utils"))]
4258         pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
4259                 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
4260                 let event_handler = |event: &events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event.clone());
4261                 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
4262                 events.into_inner()
4263         }
4264 }
4265
4266 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4267         where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4268         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4269         K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4270         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4271                                 L::Target: Logger,
4272 {
4273         fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
4274                 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
4275                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4276                         let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4277
4278                         // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
4279                         // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
4280                         if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
4281                                 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4282                         }
4283
4284                         if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
4285                                 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4286                         }
4287                         if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
4288                                 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4289                         }
4290
4291                         let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
4292                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4293                         mem::swap(&mut pending_events, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
4294
4295                         if !pending_events.is_empty() {
4296                                 events.replace(pending_events);
4297                         }
4298
4299                         result
4300                 });
4301                 events.into_inner()
4302         }
4303 }
4304
4305 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4306 where
4307         M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4308         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4309         K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4310         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4311         L::Target: Logger,
4312 {
4313         /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
4314         ///
4315         /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
4316         /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
4317         ///
4318         /// Pending events are persisted as part of [`ChannelManager`]. While these events are cleared
4319         /// when processed, an [`EventHandler`] must be able to handle previously seen events when
4320         /// restarting from an old state.
4321         fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
4322                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4323                         let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4324
4325                         // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
4326                         // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
4327                         if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
4328                                 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4329                         }
4330
4331                         let mut pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
4332                         if !pending_events.is_empty() {
4333                                 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4334                         }
4335
4336                         for event in pending_events.drain(..) {
4337                                 handler.handle_event(&event);
4338                         }
4339
4340                         result
4341                 });
4342         }
4343 }
4344
4345 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4346 where
4347         M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4348         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4349         K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4350         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4351         L::Target: Logger,
4352 {
4353         fn block_connected(&self, block: &Block, height: u32) {
4354                 {
4355                         let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4356                         assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), block.header.prev_blockhash,
4357                                 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
4358                         assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
4359                                 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
4360                 }
4361
4362                 let txdata: Vec<_> = block.txdata.iter().enumerate().collect();
4363                 self.transactions_confirmed(&block.header, &txdata, height);
4364                 self.best_block_updated(&block.header, height);
4365         }
4366
4367         fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
4368                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4369                 let new_height = height - 1;
4370                 {
4371                         let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
4372                         assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
4373                                 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
4374                         assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
4375                                 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
4376                         *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
4377                 }
4378
4379                 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, &self.logger));
4380         }
4381 }
4382
4383 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4384 where
4385         M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4386         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4387         K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4388         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4389         L::Target: Logger,
4390 {
4391         fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
4392                 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4393                 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
4394                 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4395
4396                 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
4397                 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
4398
4399                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4400                 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, &self.logger).map(|a| (a, Vec::new())));
4401         }
4402
4403         fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
4404                 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4405                 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
4406                 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4407
4408                 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
4409                 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
4410
4411                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4412
4413                 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
4414
4415                 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, &self.logger));
4416
4417                 macro_rules! max_time {
4418                         ($timestamp: expr) => {
4419                                 loop {
4420                                         // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
4421                                         // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
4422                                         // having an explicit local time source.
4423                                         // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
4424                                         // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
4425                                         let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
4426                                         if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
4427                                         if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
4428                                                 break;
4429                                         }
4430                                 }
4431                         }
4432                 }
4433                 max_time!(self.last_node_announcement_serial);
4434                 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
4435                 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4436                 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
4437                         inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
4438                 });
4439         }
4440
4441         fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
4442                 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4443                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.short_to_id.len());
4444                 for chan in channel_state.by_id.values() {
4445                         if let Some(funding_txo) = chan.get_funding_txo() {
4446                                 res.push(funding_txo.txid);
4447                         }
4448                 }
4449                 res
4450         }
4451
4452         fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
4453                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4454                 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
4455                         if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
4456                                 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
4457                                         channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|_| (None, Vec::new()))
4458                                 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
4459                         } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
4460                 });
4461         }
4462 }
4463
4464 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4465 where
4466         M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4467         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4468         K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4469         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4470         L::Target: Logger,
4471 {
4472         /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
4473         /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
4474         /// the function.
4475         fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), msgs::ErrorMessage>>
4476                         (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
4477                 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4478                 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
4479                 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4480
4481                 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
4482                 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
4483                 {
4484                         let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4485                         let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4486                         let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4487                         let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4488                         channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
4489                                 let res = f(channel);
4490                                 if let Ok((chan_res, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs)) = res {
4491                                         for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
4492                                                 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(&channel).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
4493                                                 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash,  HTLCFailReason::Reason {
4494                                                         failure_code: 0x1000 | 14, // expiry_too_soon, or at least it is now
4495                                                         data: chan_update,
4496                                                 }));
4497                                         }
4498                                         if let Some(funding_locked) = chan_res {
4499                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
4500                                                         node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4501                                                         msg: funding_locked,
4502                                                 });
4503                                                 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
4504                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked and announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
4505                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4506                                                                 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4507                                                                 msg: announcement_sigs,
4508                                                         });
4509                                                 } else if channel.is_usable() {
4510                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures but with private channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
4511                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4512                                                                 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4513                                                                 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel).unwrap(),
4514                                                         });
4515                                                 } else {
4516                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
4517                                                 }
4518                                                 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
4519                                         }
4520                                 } else if let Err(e) = res {
4521                                         if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
4522                                                 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4523                                         }
4524                                         // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
4525                                         // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
4526                                         failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
4527                                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
4528                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4529                                                         msg: update
4530                                                 });
4531                                         }
4532                                         self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed { channel_id: channel.channel_id(),  reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed });
4533                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4534                                                 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4535                                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: e },
4536                                         });
4537                                         return false;
4538                                 }
4539                                 true
4540                         });
4541
4542                         if let Some(height) = height_opt {
4543                                 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, htlcs| {
4544                                         htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
4545                                                 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
4546                                                 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
4547                                                 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
4548                                                 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
4549                                                 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
4550                                                         let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
4551                                                         htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(height));
4552                                                         timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(), HTLCFailReason::Reason {
4553                                                                 failure_code: 0x4000 | 15,
4554                                                                 data: htlc_msat_height_data
4555                                                         }));
4556                                                         false
4557                                                 } else { true }
4558                                         });
4559                                         !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
4560                                 });
4561                         }
4562                 }
4563
4564                 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
4565
4566                 for (source, payment_hash, reason) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
4567                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, reason);
4568                 }
4569         }
4570
4571         /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
4572         /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
4573         /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
4574         /// up.
4575         /// Note that the feature `allow_wallclock_use` must be enabled to use this function.
4576         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
4577         pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
4578                 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
4579         }
4580
4581         /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
4582         /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
4583         /// up.
4584         pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
4585                 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
4586         }
4587
4588         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
4589         pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
4590                 let mutcond = &self.persistence_notifier.persistence_lock;
4591                 let &(ref mtx, _) = mutcond;
4592                 let guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
4593                 *guard
4594         }
4595
4596         /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
4597         /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
4598         pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
4599                 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
4600         }
4601 }
4602
4603 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref , T: Deref , K: Deref , F: Deref , L: Deref >
4604         ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4605         where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4606         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4607         K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4608         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4609         L::Target: Logger,
4610 {
4611         fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
4612                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4613                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4614         }
4615
4616         fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
4617                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4618                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4619         }
4620
4621         fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
4622                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4623                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4624         }
4625
4626         fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
4627                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4628                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4629         }
4630
4631         fn handle_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) {
4632                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4633                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4634         }
4635
4636         fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
4637                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4638                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4639         }
4640
4641         fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
4642                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4643                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4644         }
4645
4646         fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
4647                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4648                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4649         }
4650
4651         fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
4652                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4653                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4654         }
4655
4656         fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
4657                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4658                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4659         }
4660
4661         fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
4662                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4663                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4664         }
4665
4666         fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
4667                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4668                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4669         }
4670
4671         fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
4672                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4673                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4674         }
4675
4676         fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
4677                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4678                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4679         }
4680
4681         fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
4682                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4683                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4684         }
4685
4686         fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
4687                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4688                         if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
4689                                 persist
4690                         } else {
4691                                 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
4692                         }
4693                 });
4694         }
4695
4696         fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
4697                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4698                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4699         }
4700
4701         fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
4702                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4703                 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
4704                 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
4705                 {
4706                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4707                         let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4708                         let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4709                         let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4710                         if no_connection_possible {
4711                                 log_debug!(self.logger, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
4712                                 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
4713                                         if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
4714                                                 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
4715                                                         short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4716                                                 }
4717                                                 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(true));
4718                                                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4719                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4720                                                                 msg: update
4721                                                         });
4722                                                 }
4723                                                 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed { channel_id: chan.channel_id(),  reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer });
4724                                                 false
4725                                         } else {
4726                                                 true
4727                                         }
4728                                 });
4729                         } else {
4730                                 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
4731                                 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
4732                                         if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
4733                                                 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
4734                                                 if chan.is_shutdown() {
4735                                                         if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
4736                                                                 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4737                                                         }
4738                                                         self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed { channel_id: chan.channel_id(),  reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer });
4739                                                         return false;
4740                                                 } else {
4741                                                         no_channels_remain = false;
4742                                                 }
4743                                         }
4744                                         true
4745                                 })
4746                         }
4747                         pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
4748                                 match msg {
4749                                         &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4750                                         &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4751                                         &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4752                                         &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4753                                         &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4754                                         &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4755                                         &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4756                                         &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4757                                         &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4758                                         &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4759                                         &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4760                                         &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
4761                                         &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
4762                                         &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
4763                                         &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4764                                         &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4765                                         &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
4766                                         &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
4767                                         &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
4768                                 }
4769                         });
4770                 }
4771                 if no_channels_remain {
4772                         self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id);
4773                 }
4774
4775                 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
4776                         self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
4777                 }
4778         }
4779
4780         fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) {
4781                 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
4782
4783                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4784
4785                 {
4786                         let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
4787                         match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
4788                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4789                                         e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
4790                                                 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
4791                                         }));
4792                                 },
4793                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
4794                                         e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
4795                                 },
4796                         }
4797                 }
4798
4799                 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4800                 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4801                 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4802                 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
4803                         if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
4804                                 if !chan.have_received_message() {
4805                                         // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
4806                                         // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
4807                                         // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
4808                                         // drop it.
4809                                         false
4810                                 } else {
4811                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
4812                                                 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4813                                                 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
4814                                         });
4815                                         true
4816                                 }
4817                         } else { true }
4818                 });
4819                 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
4820         }
4821
4822         fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
4823                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4824
4825                 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
4826                         for chan in self.list_channels() {
4827                                 if chan.counterparty.node_id == *counterparty_node_id {
4828                                         // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
4829                                         let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(&msg.data));
4830                                 }
4831                         }
4832                 } else {
4833                         // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
4834                         let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(&msg.data));
4835                 }
4836         }
4837 }
4838
4839 /// Used to signal to the ChannelManager persister that the manager needs to be re-persisted to
4840 /// disk/backups, through `await_persistable_update_timeout` and `await_persistable_update`.
4841 struct PersistenceNotifier {
4842         /// Users won't access the persistence_lock directly, but rather wait on its bool using
4843         /// `wait_timeout` and `wait`.
4844         persistence_lock: (Mutex<bool>, Condvar),
4845 }
4846
4847 impl PersistenceNotifier {
4848         fn new() -> Self {
4849                 Self {
4850                         persistence_lock: (Mutex::new(false), Condvar::new()),
4851                 }
4852         }
4853
4854         fn wait(&self) {
4855                 loop {
4856                         let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
4857                         let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
4858                         if *guard {
4859                                 *guard = false;
4860                                 return;
4861                         }
4862                         guard = cvar.wait(guard).unwrap();
4863                         let result = *guard;
4864                         if result {
4865                                 *guard = false;
4866                                 return
4867                         }
4868                 }
4869         }
4870
4871         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
4872         fn wait_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
4873                 let current_time = Instant::now();
4874                 loop {
4875                         let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
4876                         let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
4877                         if *guard {
4878                                 *guard = false;
4879                                 return true;
4880                         }
4881                         guard = cvar.wait_timeout(guard, max_wait).unwrap().0;
4882                         // Due to spurious wakeups that can happen on `wait_timeout`, here we need to check if the
4883                         // desired wait time has actually passed, and if not then restart the loop with a reduced wait
4884                         // time. Note that this logic can be highly simplified through the use of
4885                         // `Condvar::wait_while` and `Condvar::wait_timeout_while`, if and when our MSRV is raised to
4886                         // 1.42.0.
4887                         let elapsed = current_time.elapsed();
4888                         let result = *guard;
4889                         if result || elapsed >= max_wait {
4890                                 *guard = false;
4891                                 return result;
4892                         }
4893                         match max_wait.checked_sub(elapsed) {
4894                                 None => return result,
4895                                 Some(_) => continue
4896                         }
4897                 }
4898         }
4899
4900         // Signal to the ChannelManager persister that there are updates necessitating persisting to disk.
4901         fn notify(&self) {
4902                 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &self.persistence_lock;
4903                 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
4904                 *persistence_lock = true;
4905                 mem::drop(persistence_lock);
4906                 cnd.notify_all();
4907         }
4908 }
4909
4910 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
4911 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
4912
4913 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
4914         (0, Forward) => {
4915                 (0, onion_packet, required),
4916                 (2, short_channel_id, required),
4917         },
4918         (1, Receive) => {
4919                 (0, payment_data, required),
4920                 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
4921         },
4922         (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
4923                 (0, payment_preimage, required),
4924                 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
4925         },
4926 ;);
4927
4928 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
4929         (0, routing, required),
4930         (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
4931         (4, payment_hash, required),
4932         (6, amt_to_forward, required),
4933         (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required)
4934 });
4935
4936
4937 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
4938         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
4939                 match self {
4940                         HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
4941                                 0u8.write(writer)?;
4942                                 channel_id.write(writer)?;
4943                                 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4944                                 reason.write(writer)?;
4945                         },
4946                         HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
4947                                 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
4948                         }) => {
4949                                 1u8.write(writer)?;
4950                                 channel_id.write(writer)?;
4951                                 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4952                                 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
4953                                 failure_code.write(writer)?;
4954                         },
4955                 }
4956                 Ok(())
4957         }
4958 }
4959
4960 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
4961         fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4962                 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4963                 match id {
4964                         0 => {
4965                                 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4966                                         channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4967                                         htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4968                                         reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
4969                                 }))
4970                         },
4971                         1 => {
4972                                 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
4973                                         channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4974                                         htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4975                                         sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
4976                                         failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
4977                                 }))
4978                         },
4979                         // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
4980                         // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
4981                         // messages contained in the variants.
4982                         // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
4983                         // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
4984                         // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
4985                         2 => {
4986                                 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
4987                                 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
4988                                 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
4989                                 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
4990                                 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
4991                         },
4992                         3 => {
4993                                 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
4994                                 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
4995                                 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
4996                                 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
4997                                 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
4998                         },
4999                         _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
5000                 }
5001         }
5002 }
5003
5004 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
5005         (0, Forward),
5006         (1, Fail),
5007 );
5008
5009 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
5010         (0, short_channel_id, required),
5011         (2, outpoint, required),
5012         (4, htlc_id, required),
5013         (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
5014 });
5015
5016 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
5017         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5018                 let payment_data = match &self.onion_payload {
5019                         OnionPayload::Invoice(data) => Some(data.clone()),
5020                         _ => None,
5021                 };
5022                 let keysend_preimage = match self.onion_payload {
5023                         OnionPayload::Invoice(_) => None,
5024                         OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => Some(preimage.clone()),
5025                 };
5026                 write_tlv_fields!
5027                 (writer,
5028                  {
5029                    (0, self.prev_hop, required), (2, self.value, required),
5030                    (4, payment_data, option), (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
5031                          (8, keysend_preimage, option),
5032                  });
5033                 Ok(())
5034         }
5035 }
5036
5037 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
5038         fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5039                 let mut prev_hop = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
5040                 let mut value = 0;
5041                 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
5042                 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
5043                 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
5044                 read_tlv_fields!
5045                 (reader,
5046                  {
5047                    (0, prev_hop, required), (2, value, required),
5048                    (4, payment_data, option), (6, cltv_expiry, required),
5049                          (8, keysend_preimage, option)
5050                  });
5051                 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
5052                         Some(p) => {
5053                                 if payment_data.is_some() {
5054                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
5055                                 }
5056                                 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
5057                         },
5058                         None => {
5059                                 if payment_data.is_none() {
5060                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
5061                                 }
5062                                 OnionPayload::Invoice(payment_data.unwrap())
5063                         },
5064                 };
5065                 Ok(Self {
5066                         prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
5067                         value,
5068                         onion_payload,
5069                         cltv_expiry,
5070                 })
5071         }
5072 }
5073
5074 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
5075         fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5076                 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5077                 match id {
5078                         0 => {
5079                                 let mut session_priv: ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper<SecretKey> = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
5080                                 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
5081                                 let mut path = Some(Vec::new());
5082                                 let mut payment_id = None;
5083                                 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
5084                                         (0, session_priv, required),
5085                                         (1, payment_id, option),
5086                                         (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
5087                                         (4, path, vec_type),
5088                                 });
5089                                 if payment_id.is_none() {
5090                                         // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
5091                                         // instead.
5092                                         payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
5093                                 }
5094                                 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
5095                                         session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
5096                                         first_hop_htlc_msat: first_hop_htlc_msat,
5097                                         path: path.unwrap(),
5098                                         payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
5099                                 })
5100                         }
5101                         1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
5102                         _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
5103                 }
5104         }
5105 }
5106
5107 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
5108         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::io::Error> {
5109                 match self {
5110                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
5111                                 0u8.write(writer)?;
5112                                 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
5113                                 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
5114                                         (0, session_priv, required),
5115                                         (1, payment_id_opt, option),
5116                                         (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
5117                                         (4, path, vec_type),
5118                                  });
5119                         }
5120                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
5121                                 1u8.write(writer)?;
5122                                 field.write(writer)?;
5123                         }
5124                 }
5125                 Ok(())
5126         }
5127 }
5128
5129 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCFailReason,
5130         (0, LightningError) => {
5131                 (0, err, required),
5132         },
5133         (1, Reason) => {
5134                 (0, failure_code, required),
5135                 (2, data, vec_type),
5136         },
5137 ;);
5138
5139 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
5140         (0, AddHTLC) => {
5141                 (0, forward_info, required),
5142                 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
5143                 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
5144                 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
5145         },
5146         (1, FailHTLC) => {
5147                 (0, htlc_id, required),
5148                 (2, err_packet, required),
5149         },
5150 ;);
5151
5152 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
5153         (0, payment_secret, required),
5154         (2, expiry_time, required),
5155         (4, user_payment_id, required),
5156         (6, payment_preimage, required),
5157         (8, min_value_msat, required),
5158 });
5159
5160 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5161         where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5162         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5163         K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5164         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5165         L::Target: Logger,
5166 {
5167         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5168                 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
5169
5170                 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
5171
5172                 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
5173                 {
5174                         let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5175                         best_block.height().write(writer)?;
5176                         best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
5177                 }
5178
5179                 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5180                 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
5181                 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
5182                         if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
5183                                 unfunded_channels += 1;
5184                         }
5185                 }
5186                 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
5187                 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
5188                         if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
5189                                 channel.write(writer)?;
5190                         }
5191                 }
5192
5193                 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5194                 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
5195                         short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
5196                         (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5197                         for forward in pending_forwards {
5198                                 forward.write(writer)?;
5199                         }
5200                 }
5201
5202                 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5203                 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
5204                         payment_hash.write(writer)?;
5205                         (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5206                         for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
5207                                 htlc.write(writer)?;
5208                         }
5209                 }
5210
5211                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
5212                 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5213                 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5214                         peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
5215                         let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5216                         peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
5217                 }
5218
5219                 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5220                 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5221                 for event in events.iter() {
5222                         event.write(writer)?;
5223                 }
5224
5225                 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
5226                 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5227                 for event in background_events.iter() {
5228                         match event {
5229                                 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
5230                                         0u8.write(writer)?;
5231                                         funding_txo.write(writer)?;
5232                                         monitor_update.write(writer)?;
5233                                 },
5234                         }
5235                 }
5236
5237                 (self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
5238                 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
5239
5240                 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5241                 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5242                 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
5243                         hash.write(writer)?;
5244                         pending_payment.write(writer)?;
5245                 }
5246
5247                 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5248                 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
5249                 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
5250                 for (_, outbounds) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
5251                         num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbounds.len() as u64;
5252                 }
5253                 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
5254                 for (_, outbounds) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
5255                         for outbound in outbounds.iter() {
5256                                 outbound.write(writer)?;
5257                         }
5258                 }
5259
5260                 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
5261                         (1, pending_outbound_payments, required),
5262                 });
5263
5264                 Ok(())
5265         }
5266 }
5267
5268 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
5269 ///
5270 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
5271 /// is:
5272 /// 1) Deserialize all stored ChannelMonitors.
5273 /// 2) Deserialize the ChannelManager by filling in this struct and calling:
5274 ///    <(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)
5275 ///    This may result in closing some Channels if the ChannelMonitor is newer than the stored
5276 ///    ChannelManager state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
5277 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant ChannelMonitor outpoints the same
5278 ///    way you would handle a `chain::Filter` call using ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch() and
5279 ///    ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo().
5280 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your ChannelMonitors.
5281 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the ChannelManager.
5282 /// 6) Move the ChannelMonitors into your local chain::Watch.
5283 ///
5284 /// Note that the ordering of #4-6 is not of importance, however all three must occur before you
5285 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized ChannelManager.
5286 ///
5287 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
5288 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
5289 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
5290 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
5291 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
5292 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
5293 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
5294         where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5295         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5296         K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5297         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5298         L::Target: Logger,
5299 {
5300         /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
5301         /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
5302         /// signing data.
5303         pub keys_manager: K,
5304
5305         /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
5306         ///
5307         /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
5308         pub fee_estimator: F,
5309         /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
5310         ///
5311         /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
5312         /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
5313         /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
5314         pub chain_monitor: M,
5315
5316         /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
5317         /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
5318         /// force-closed during deserialization.
5319         pub tx_broadcaster: T,
5320         /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
5321         /// deserialization.
5322         pub logger: L,
5323         /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
5324         /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
5325         pub default_config: UserConfig,
5326
5327         /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
5328         /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
5329         ///
5330         /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
5331         /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
5332         /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
5333         /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
5334         ///
5335         /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
5336         /// this struct.
5337         ///
5338         /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
5339         pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>,
5340 }
5341
5342 impl<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
5343                 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5344         where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5345                 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5346                 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5347                 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5348                 L::Target: Logger,
5349         {
5350         /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
5351         /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
5352         /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
5353         pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
5354                         mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>) -> Self {
5355                 Self {
5356                         keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config,
5357                         channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
5358                 }
5359         }
5360 }
5361
5362 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
5363 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
5364 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
5365         ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>>)
5366         where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5367         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5368         K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5369         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5370         L::Target: Logger,
5371 {
5372         fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5373                 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
5374                 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
5375         }
5376 }
5377
5378 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
5379         ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)
5380         where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5381         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5382         K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5383         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5384         L::Target: Logger,
5385 {
5386         fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5387                 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
5388
5389                 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
5390                 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5391                 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
5392
5393                 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5394
5395                 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5396                 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
5397                 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
5398                 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
5399                 let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
5400                 for _ in 0..channel_count {
5401                         let mut channel: Channel<Signer> = Channel::read(reader, &args.keys_manager)?;
5402                         let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
5403                         funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
5404                         if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
5405                                 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
5406                                                 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
5407                                                 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
5408                                                 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
5409                                         // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
5410                                         log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
5411                                         log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
5412                                                 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
5413                                         log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
5414                                         log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
5415                                         log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
5416                                         log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/rust-bitcoin/rust-lightning");
5417                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
5418                                 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
5419                                                 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
5420                                                 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
5421                                                 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
5422                                         // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
5423                                         log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
5424                                         log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
5425                                         log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
5426                                                 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
5427                                         let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
5428                                         failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
5429                                         monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
5430                                         channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
5431                                                 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
5432                                                 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
5433                                         });
5434                                 } else {
5435                                         if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
5436                                                 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
5437                                         }
5438                                         by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
5439                                 }
5440                         } else {
5441                                 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5442                                 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
5443                                 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
5444                                 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
5445                                 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/rust-bitcoin/rust-lightning");
5446                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
5447                         }
5448                 }
5449
5450                 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
5451                         if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
5452                                 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
5453                         }
5454                 }
5455
5456                 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
5457                 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5458                 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
5459                 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
5460                         let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
5461                         let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5462                         let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
5463                         for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
5464                                 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
5465                         }
5466                         forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
5467                 }
5468
5469                 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5470                 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
5471                 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
5472                         let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
5473                         let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5474                         let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
5475                         for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
5476                                 previous_hops.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
5477                         }
5478                         claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
5479                 }
5480
5481                 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5482                 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>)>()));
5483                 for _ in 0..peer_count {
5484                         let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
5485                         let peer_state = PeerState {
5486                                 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
5487                         };
5488                         per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
5489                 }
5490
5491                 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5492                 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
5493                 for _ in 0..event_count {
5494                         match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
5495                                 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
5496                                 None => continue,
5497                         }
5498                 }
5499
5500                 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5501                 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
5502                 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
5503                         match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
5504                                 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
5505                                 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
5506                         }
5507                 }
5508
5509                 let last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5510                 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5511
5512                 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5513                 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
5514                 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
5515                         if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
5516                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
5517                         }
5518                 }
5519
5520                 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5521                 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> =
5522                         HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
5523                 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
5524                         let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
5525                         if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()).is_some() {
5526                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
5527                         };
5528                 }
5529
5530                 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
5531                 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
5532                         (1, pending_outbound_payments, option),
5533                 });
5534                 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
5535                         pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
5536                 }
5537
5538                 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5539                 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5540
5541                 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
5542                         pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
5543                 }
5544
5545                 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
5546                         genesis_hash,
5547                         fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
5548                         chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
5549                         tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
5550
5551                         best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
5552
5553                         channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
5554                                 by_id,
5555                                 short_to_id,
5556                                 forward_htlcs,
5557                                 claimable_htlcs,
5558                                 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
5559                         }),
5560                         pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
5561                         pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
5562
5563                         our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
5564                         our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &args.keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
5565                         secp_ctx,
5566
5567                         last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(last_node_announcement_serial as usize),
5568                         highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
5569
5570                         per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
5571
5572                         pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
5573                         pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
5574                         total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
5575                         persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
5576
5577                         keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
5578                         logger: args.logger,
5579                         default_configuration: args.default_config,
5580                 };
5581
5582                 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
5583                         channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_manager.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
5584                 }
5585
5586                 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
5587                 //connection or two.
5588
5589                 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
5590         }
5591 }
5592
5593 #[cfg(test)]
5594 mod tests {
5595         use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
5596         use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
5597         use core::time::Duration;
5598         use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
5599         use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure};
5600         use ln::features::{InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures};
5601         use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
5602         use ln::msgs;
5603         use ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
5604         use routing::router::{get_keysend_route, get_route};
5605         use util::errors::APIError;
5606         use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
5607         use util::test_utils;
5608
5609         #[cfg(feature = "std")]
5610         #[test]
5611         fn test_wait_timeout() {
5612                 use ln::channelmanager::PersistenceNotifier;
5613                 use sync::Arc;
5614                 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, Ordering};
5615                 use std::thread;
5616
5617                 let persistence_notifier = Arc::new(PersistenceNotifier::new());
5618                 let thread_notifier = Arc::clone(&persistence_notifier);
5619
5620                 let exit_thread = Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false));
5621                 let exit_thread_clone = exit_thread.clone();
5622                 thread::spawn(move || {
5623                         loop {
5624                                 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &thread_notifier.persistence_lock;
5625                                 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5626                                 *persistence_lock = true;
5627                                 cnd.notify_all();
5628
5629                                 if exit_thread_clone.load(Ordering::SeqCst) {
5630                                         break
5631                                 }
5632                         }
5633                 });
5634
5635                 // Check that we can block indefinitely until updates are available.
5636                 let _ = persistence_notifier.wait();
5637
5638                 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration if updates are
5639                 // available.
5640                 loop {
5641                         if persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
5642                                 break
5643                         }
5644                 }
5645
5646                 exit_thread.store(true, Ordering::SeqCst);
5647
5648                 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration even if no updates
5649                 // are available.
5650                 loop {
5651                         if !persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
5652                                 break
5653                         }
5654                 }
5655         }
5656
5657         #[test]
5658         fn test_notify_limits() {
5659                 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
5660                 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
5661                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5662                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5663                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5664                 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5665
5666                 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
5667                 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
5668                 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5669                 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5670                 assert!(nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5671
5672                 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5673
5674                 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
5675                 // to connect messages with new values
5676                 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
5677                 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
5678                 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
5679                 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
5680
5681                 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
5682                 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5683                 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5684                 // ... but the last node should not.
5685                 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5686                 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
5687                 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5688                 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5689
5690                 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
5691                 // about the channel.
5692                 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
5693                 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
5694                 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5695
5696                 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
5697                 // parties.
5698                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
5699                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
5700                 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
5701                 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
5702                 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5703                 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5704
5705                 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
5706                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
5707                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
5708
5709                 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
5710                 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
5711                 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
5712                 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
5713                 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
5714                 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
5715
5716                 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
5717                 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
5718                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
5719                 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
5720                 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5721                 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5722                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
5723                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
5724
5725                 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
5726                 // the channel info has updated.
5727                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
5728                 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
5729                 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5730                 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5731                 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
5732                 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
5733         }
5734
5735         #[test]
5736         fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
5737                 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
5738                 // expected.
5739                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5740                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5741                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5742                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5743                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5744                 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
5745
5746                 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
5747                 let net_graph_msg_handler = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler;
5748                 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), 100_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
5749                 let (payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[1]);
5750                 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
5751                 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
5752                 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
5753                 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
5754                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
5755                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5756                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5757                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5758                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
5759
5760                 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
5761                 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
5762                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5763                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5764                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5765                 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
5766                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
5767                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
5768                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
5769                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
5770                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5771                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5772                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5773                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5774                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5775                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5776                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5777                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5778                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
5779                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5780                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
5781                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5782
5783                 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
5784                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
5785                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5786                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5787                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5788                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
5789
5790                 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
5791                 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
5792                 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
5793                 // lightning messages manually.
5794                 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
5795                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
5796                 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5797                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5798                 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
5799                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5800                 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5801                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
5802                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5803                 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5804                 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
5805                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5806                 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5807                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5808                 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
5809                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5810                 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5811                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
5812                 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5813                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5814                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
5815                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5816                 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
5817                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5818                 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5819                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
5820                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5821
5822                 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate 1 event upon the first path's success. No
5823                 // further events will be generated for subsequence path successes.
5824                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5825                 match events[0] {
5826                         Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage: ref preimage } => {
5827                                 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
5828                         },
5829                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5830                 }
5831         }
5832
5833         #[test]
5834         fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
5835                 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
5836                 //      outbound regular payment fails as expected.
5837                 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
5838                 //      fails as expected.
5839                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5840                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5841                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5842                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5843                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5844                 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
5845
5846                 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
5847                 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
5848                 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
5849
5850                 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
5851                 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), 100_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
5852                 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
5853                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5854                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5855                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5856                 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
5857                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
5858                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
5859                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
5860                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
5861                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5862                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5863                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5864                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5865                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5866                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5867                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5868                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5869                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
5870                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5871                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
5872                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
5873
5874                 // Finally, claim the original payment.
5875                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
5876
5877                 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
5878                 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
5879                 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), 100_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
5880                 let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
5881                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5882                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5883                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5884                 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
5885                 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
5886                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
5887
5888                 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
5889                 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
5890                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
5891                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5892                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5893                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5894                 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
5895                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
5896                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
5897                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
5898                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
5899                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5900                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5901                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5902                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5903                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5904                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5905                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5906                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5907                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
5908                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5909                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
5910                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
5911
5912                 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
5913                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
5914         }
5915
5916         #[test]
5917         fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
5918                 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
5919                 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
5920                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5921                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5922                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5923                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5924
5925                 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
5926                 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
5927                 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
5928                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
5929
5930                 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5931                 let network_graph = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph;
5932                 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
5933                 let route = get_keysend_route(&payer_pubkey, network_graph, &payee_pubkey,
5934                                   Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()), &vec![], 10000, 40,
5935                                   nodes[0].logger).unwrap();
5936
5937                 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
5938                 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
5939                 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage), None).unwrap();
5940                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5941
5942                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5943                 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
5944                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5945                 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5946                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5947                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
5948                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
5949
5950                 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash".to_string(), 1);
5951         }
5952
5953         #[test]
5954         fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
5955                 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
5956                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5957                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5958                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5959                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5960
5961                 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
5962                 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
5963                 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
5964                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
5965
5966                 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5967                 let network_graph = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph;
5968                 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
5969                 let route = get_keysend_route(&payer_pubkey, network_graph, &payee_pubkey,
5970                                   Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()), &vec![], 10000, 40,
5971                                   nodes[0].logger).unwrap();
5972
5973                 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
5974                 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
5975                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
5976                 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage), None).unwrap();
5977                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5978
5979                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5980                 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
5981                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5982                 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5983                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5984                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
5985                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
5986
5987                 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "We don't support MPP keysend payments".to_string(), 1);
5988         }
5989
5990         #[test]
5991         fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
5992                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
5993                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
5994                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
5995                 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5996
5997                 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
5998                 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
5999                 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
6000                 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
6001                 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
6002
6003                 // Marshall an MPP route.
6004                 let (_, payment_hash, _) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[3]);
6005                 let net_graph_msg_handler = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler;
6006                 let mut route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &[], 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
6007                 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
6008                 route.paths.push(path);
6009                 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
6010                 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
6011                 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
6012                 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
6013                 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
6014                 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
6015
6016                 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None).unwrap_err() {
6017                         PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
6018                                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))                        },
6019                         _ => panic!("unexpected error")
6020                 }
6021         }
6022 }
6023
6024 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "unstable"))]
6025 pub mod bench {
6026         use chain::Listen;
6027         use chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor;
6028         use chain::channelmonitor::Persist;
6029         use chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
6030         use ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
6031         use ln::features::{InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures};
6032         use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
6033         use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
6034         use routing::network_graph::NetworkGraph;
6035         use routing::router::get_route;
6036         use util::test_utils;
6037         use util::config::UserConfig;
6038         use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PaymentPurpose};
6039
6040         use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
6041         use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
6042         use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, Transaction, TxOut};
6043
6044         use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
6045
6046         use test::Bencher;
6047
6048         struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
6049                 node: &'a ChannelManager<InMemorySigner,
6050                         &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
6051                                 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
6052                                 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
6053                         &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager,
6054                         &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestLogger>
6055         }
6056
6057         #[cfg(test)]
6058         #[bench]
6059         fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
6060                 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
6061         }
6062
6063         pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
6064                 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
6065                 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
6066                 // calls per node.
6067                 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
6068                 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
6069
6070                 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
6071                 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
6072
6073                 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
6074                 config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
6075
6076                 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
6077                 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
6078                 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
6079                 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
6080                 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
6081                         network,
6082                         best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
6083                 });
6084                 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
6085
6086                 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
6087                 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
6088                 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
6089                 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
6090                 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
6091                         network,
6092                         best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
6093                 });
6094                 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
6095
6096                 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
6097                 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
6098                 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
6099                 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
6100                 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
6101
6102                 let tx;
6103                 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
6104                         tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
6105                                 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
6106                         }]};
6107                         node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
6108                 } else { panic!(); }
6109
6110                 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
6111                 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
6112
6113                 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
6114
6115                 let block = Block {
6116                         header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
6117                         txdata: vec![tx],
6118                 };
6119                 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
6120                 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
6121
6122                 node_a.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
6123                 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6124                 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
6125                 match msg_events[0] {
6126                         MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref msg, .. } => {
6127                                 node_b.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
6128                                 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
6129                         },
6130                         _ => panic!(),
6131                 }
6132                 match msg_events[1] {
6133                         MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
6134                         _ => panic!(),
6135                 }
6136
6137                 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash);
6138
6139                 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
6140                 macro_rules! send_payment {
6141                         ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
6142                                 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
6143                                 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &dummy_graph, &$node_b.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()),
6144                                         Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), &[], 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a).unwrap();
6145
6146                                 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
6147                                 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
6148                                 payment_count += 1;
6149                                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
6150                                 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, 0).unwrap();
6151
6152                                 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
6153                                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
6154                                 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6155                                 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
6156                                 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
6157                                 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6158                                 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
6159                                 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
6160
6161                                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
6162                                 expect_payment_received!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
6163                                 assert!($node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
6164
6165                                 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
6166                                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
6167                                                 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
6168                                                 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6169                                                 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
6170                                         },
6171                                         _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
6172                                 }
6173
6174                                 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
6175                                 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6176                                 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
6177                                 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
6178
6179                                 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
6180                         }
6181                 }
6182
6183                 bench.iter(|| {
6184                         send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
6185                         send_payment!(node_b, node_a);
6186                 });
6187         }
6188 }