1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see routing::router::get_route for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
27 use bitcoin::hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
30 use bitcoin::hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
31 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
35 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
36 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
39 use chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, Watch, BestBlock};
40 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator};
41 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
42 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
43 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
44 // construct one themselves.
45 use ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
46 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
47 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
48 use routing::router::{Payee, Route, RouteHop, RoutePath, RouteParameters};
50 use ln::msgs::NetAddress;
52 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, OptionalField};
53 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
54 use util::config::UserConfig;
55 use util::events::{EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
56 use util::{byte_utils, events};
57 use util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer};
58 use util::chacha20::{ChaCha20, ChaChaReader};
59 use util::logger::{Logger, Level};
60 use util::errors::APIError;
65 use core::cell::RefCell;
66 use io::{Cursor, Read};
67 use sync::{Arc, Condvar, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
68 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
69 use core::time::Duration;
70 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
71 use std::time::Instant;
74 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
76 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
77 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
78 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
80 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
81 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
82 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
83 // before we forward it.
85 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
86 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
87 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
88 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
89 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
91 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
92 enum PendingHTLCRouting {
94 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
95 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
98 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
99 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
102 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
103 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
107 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
108 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
109 routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
110 incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
111 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
112 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
113 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
116 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
117 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
118 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
119 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
122 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
123 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
124 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
125 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
126 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
129 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
131 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
133 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
134 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
135 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
137 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
139 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
143 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
147 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
148 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
149 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
150 short_channel_id: u64,
152 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
154 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
155 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
160 /// Contains a total_msat (which may differ from value if this is a Multi-Path Payment) and a
161 /// payment_secret which prevents path-probing attacks and can associate different HTLCs which
162 /// are part of the same payment.
163 Invoice(msgs::FinalOnionHopData),
164 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
165 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
168 struct ClaimableHTLC {
169 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
172 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
175 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
176 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
177 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
178 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
180 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
181 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
186 impl Readable for PaymentId {
187 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
188 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
192 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
193 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
194 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
195 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
196 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
199 session_priv: SecretKey,
200 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
201 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
202 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
203 payment_id: PaymentId,
204 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
205 payee: Option<Payee>,
208 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
209 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
210 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
212 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
214 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
216 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_secret, first_hop_htlc_msat, payee } => {
219 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
220 payment_id.hash(hasher);
221 payment_secret.hash(hasher);
222 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
230 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
231 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
233 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
234 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
235 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
236 payment_secret: None,
242 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
243 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
245 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
253 /// Return value for claim_funds_from_hop
254 enum ClaimFundsFromHop {
256 MonitorUpdateFail(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal, Option<u64>),
261 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
263 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
264 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
265 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
266 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
267 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
269 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
270 err: msgs::LightningError,
271 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u64)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
272 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
274 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
276 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
278 err: LightningError {
280 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
281 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
288 shutdown_finish: None,
292 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
294 err: LightningError {
296 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
299 shutdown_finish: None,
303 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
304 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
307 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u64, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
309 err: LightningError {
311 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
312 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
318 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
319 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
323 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
326 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
328 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
330 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
332 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
334 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
336 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
337 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
343 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => LightningError {
345 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
346 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
354 shutdown_finish: None,
359 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
360 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
361 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
362 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
363 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
365 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
366 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
367 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
368 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
369 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
370 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
371 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
373 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
377 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
378 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<Signer: Sign> {
379 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
380 pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
381 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
382 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
383 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
384 /// ids in the PendingHTLCInfo!
385 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
386 /// Map from payment hash to any HTLCs which are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user.
387 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
388 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
390 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>>,
391 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
392 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
393 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
396 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
397 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
398 /// quite some time lag.
399 enum BackgroundEvent {
400 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
401 /// commitment transaction.
402 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
405 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
406 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
408 latest_features: InitFeatures,
411 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
412 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
414 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
417 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
418 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
419 struct PendingInboundPayment {
420 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
421 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
422 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
423 /// this payment being removed.
425 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
426 user_payment_id: u64,
427 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
428 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
429 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
432 /// Stores the session_priv for each part of a payment that is still pending. For versions 0.0.102
433 /// and later, also stores information for retrying the payment.
434 pub(crate) enum PendingOutboundPayment {
436 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
439 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
440 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
441 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
442 pending_amt_msat: u64,
443 /// Used to track the fee paid. Only present if the payment was serialized on 0.0.103+.
444 pending_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
445 /// The total payment amount across all paths, used to verify that a retry is not overpaying.
447 /// Our best known block height at the time this payment was initiated.
448 starting_block_height: u32,
450 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
451 /// been resolved. This ensures we don't look up pending payments in ChannelMonitors on restart
452 /// and add a pending payment that was already fulfilled.
454 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
455 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
459 impl PendingOutboundPayment {
460 fn is_retryable(&self) -> bool {
462 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { .. } => true,
466 fn is_fulfilled(&self) -> bool {
468 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => true,
472 fn get_pending_fee_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
474 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { pending_fee_msat, .. } => pending_fee_msat.clone(),
479 fn payment_hash(&self) -> Option<PaymentHash> {
481 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None,
482 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
483 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => *payment_hash,
487 fn mark_fulfilled(&mut self) {
488 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
489 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
490 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
491 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
492 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. }
495 let payment_hash = self.payment_hash();
496 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, payment_hash };
499 /// panics if path is None and !self.is_fulfilled
500 fn remove(&mut self, session_priv: &[u8; 32], path: Option<&Vec<RouteHop>>) -> bool {
501 let remove_res = match self {
502 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
503 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
504 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } => {
505 session_privs.remove(session_priv)
509 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
510 let path = path.expect("Fulfilling a payment should always come with a path");
511 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
512 *pending_amt_msat -= path_last_hop.fee_msat;
513 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
514 *fee_msat -= path.get_path_fees();
521 fn insert(&mut self, session_priv: [u8; 32], path: &Vec<RouteHop>) -> bool {
522 let insert_res = match self {
523 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
524 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
525 session_privs.insert(session_priv)
527 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => false
530 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
531 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
532 *pending_amt_msat += path_last_hop.fee_msat;
533 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
534 *fee_msat += path.get_path_fees();
541 fn remaining_parts(&self) -> usize {
543 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
544 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
545 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } => {
552 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
553 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
554 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
555 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
556 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
557 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
558 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
559 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>;
561 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
562 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
563 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
564 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
565 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
566 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
567 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
568 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
569 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, &'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
571 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
572 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
574 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
575 /// to individual Channels.
577 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
578 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
579 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
580 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
582 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
583 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
584 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
585 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
586 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
587 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
588 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
590 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
591 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
592 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
593 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
596 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
597 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
598 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
599 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
600 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
602 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
603 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
604 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
605 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
606 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
607 pub struct ChannelManager<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
608 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
609 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
610 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
611 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
614 default_configuration: UserConfig,
615 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
621 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
623 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
624 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
626 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
627 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
628 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
629 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
631 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
632 /// expose them to users via a PaymentReceived event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
633 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
634 /// after we generate a PaymentReceived upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
635 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
636 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
638 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
639 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
640 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
641 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
642 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
643 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
644 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
645 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
647 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
649 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
650 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment>>,
652 our_network_key: SecretKey,
653 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
655 /// Used to track the last value sent in a node_announcement "timestamp" field. We ensure this
656 /// value increases strictly since we don't assume access to a time source.
657 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize,
659 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
660 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
661 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
662 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
664 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
665 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
666 /// are currently open with that peer.
667 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
668 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
671 /// If also holding `channel_state` lock, must lock `channel_state` prior to `per_peer_state`.
672 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
674 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
675 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
676 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
677 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
678 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
679 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
680 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
681 /// PersistenceNotifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
682 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
684 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier,
691 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
693 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
694 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
695 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
696 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
697 pub struct ChainParameters {
698 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
699 pub network: Network,
701 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
703 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
704 pub best_block: BestBlock,
707 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
713 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
714 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
715 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
716 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
717 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
718 /// updates are ready for persistence).
720 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
721 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
722 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
723 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
724 persistence_notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier,
726 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
727 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
730 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
731 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
732 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
735 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
736 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
738 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
739 persistence_notifier: notifier,
740 should_persist: persist_check,
741 _read_guard: read_guard,
746 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
748 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
749 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
754 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
755 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
757 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
759 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
760 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
761 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
762 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
763 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
765 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
766 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
768 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
770 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
771 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
772 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
773 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
774 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
775 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
776 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
778 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
779 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry` field to at least
781 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
782 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
783 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
784 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 3;
786 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
787 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
788 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
789 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
790 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
791 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
794 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
796 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
797 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
800 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
802 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
803 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
804 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
805 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
806 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
807 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
808 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
809 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
810 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
811 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
812 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
815 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
816 /// to better separate parameters.
817 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
818 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
819 /// The node_id of our counterparty
820 pub node_id: PublicKey,
821 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
822 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
823 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
824 pub features: InitFeatures,
825 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
826 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
827 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
829 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
831 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
832 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
833 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
834 /// payments to us through this channel.
835 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
838 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
839 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
840 pub struct ChannelDetails {
841 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
842 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
843 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
844 /// lifetime of the channel.
845 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
846 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
847 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
848 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
849 /// our counterparty already.
851 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
852 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
853 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
854 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
855 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
856 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
857 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
858 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
859 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
860 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
861 /// this value on chain.
863 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
865 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
867 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
868 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
869 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
870 pub user_channel_id: u64,
871 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
872 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
873 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
875 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
876 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
877 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
878 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
880 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
881 pub balance_msat: u64,
882 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
883 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
884 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
885 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
887 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
889 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
890 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
891 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
892 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
893 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
894 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
895 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
896 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
897 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
899 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
900 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
901 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
902 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
903 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
904 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
905 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
906 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
907 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
909 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
911 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
912 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
913 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
914 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
915 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
916 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
917 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
918 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
919 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
921 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
922 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
923 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
924 pub is_outbound: bool,
925 /// True if the channel is confirmed, funding_locked messages have been exchanged, and the
926 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `funding_locked` message exchange implies the
927 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
928 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
929 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
931 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
932 pub is_funding_locked: bool,
933 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b)
934 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
936 /// This is a strict superset of `is_funding_locked`.
938 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
942 /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
943 /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
945 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
946 pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
947 /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
948 /// send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages sent to peers, and
949 /// once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the payment in full.
950 ParameterError(APIError),
951 /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us
952 /// from attempting to send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages
953 /// sent to peers, and once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the
956 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
958 PathParameterError(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
959 /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
960 /// You can freely retry the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
961 /// paths than the ones selected).
962 AllFailedRetrySafe(Vec<APIError>),
963 /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
964 /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
965 /// in over-/re-payment.
967 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
968 /// send_payment, and any Errs which are not APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed can be safely
969 /// retried (though there is currently no API with which to do so).
971 /// Any entries which contain Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) or Ok(()) MUST NOT be retried
972 /// as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent (in the
973 /// case of Ok(())) or will send once channel_monitor_updated is called on the next-hop channel
974 /// with the latest update_id.
976 /// The errors themselves, in the same order as the route hops.
977 results: Vec<Result<(), APIError>>,
978 /// If some paths failed without irrevocably committing to the new HTLC(s), this will
979 /// contain a [`RouteParameters`] object which can be used to calculate a new route that
980 /// will pay all remaining unpaid balance.
981 failed_paths_retry: Option<RouteParameters>,
982 /// The payment id for the payment, which is now at least partially pending.
983 payment_id: PaymentId,
987 macro_rules! handle_error {
988 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
991 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
992 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
994 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
995 // entering the macro.
996 assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
997 assert!($self.pending_events.try_lock().is_ok());
1000 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1002 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1003 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1004 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1005 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1009 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1010 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1011 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1012 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1017 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1018 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1020 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1021 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1022 action: err.action.clone()
1026 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1027 $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1030 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1037 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1038 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1039 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1041 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1042 //TODO: Once warning messages are merged, we should send a `warning` message to our
1044 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1046 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1047 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1049 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1050 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1051 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1052 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1054 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1055 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1056 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1058 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => {
1059 log_error!($self.logger, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1060 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1061 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1063 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(false);
1064 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1065 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1071 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1072 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1076 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1078 $entry.remove_entry();
1086 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1087 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1091 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1093 $entry.remove_entry();
1101 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1102 ($channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1104 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1105 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1106 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1113 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
1114 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1115 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1117 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
1119 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1120 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..]));
1121 if let Some(short_id) = $chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1122 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1124 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
1125 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
1126 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
1127 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
1128 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
1129 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
1130 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
1131 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
1132 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
1133 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id, $chan.get_user_id(),
1134 $chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok() ));
1137 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
1138 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards, {} fails, and {} fulfill finalizations",
1139 log_bytes!($chan_id[..]),
1140 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
1141 match $action_type {
1142 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
1143 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
1145 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
1146 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
1148 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
1149 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len(),
1150 (&$failed_finalized_fulfills as &Vec<HTLCSource>).len());
1151 if !$resend_commitment {
1152 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
1155 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
1157 $chan.monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills);
1158 (Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$chan_id)), false)
1162 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr) => { {
1163 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills, $entry.key());
1165 $entry.remove_entry();
1169 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1170 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, Vec::new())
1174 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
1175 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1176 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
1178 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1179 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
1183 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
1184 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
1185 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1186 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
1187 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
1190 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
1195 macro_rules! handle_chan_restoration_locked {
1196 ($self: ident, $channel_lock: expr, $channel_state: expr, $channel_entry: expr,
1197 $raa: expr, $commitment_update: expr, $order: expr, $chanmon_update: expr,
1198 $pending_forwards: expr, $funding_broadcastable: expr, $funding_locked: expr) => { {
1199 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
1200 let counterparty_node_id = $channel_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1202 let chanmon_update: Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> = $chanmon_update; // Force type-checking to resolve
1203 let chanmon_update_is_none = chanmon_update.is_none();
1205 let forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)> = $pending_forwards; // Force type-checking to resolve
1206 if !forwards.is_empty() {
1207 htlc_forwards = Some(($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"),
1208 $channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), forwards));
1211 if chanmon_update.is_some() {
1212 // On reconnect, we, by definition, only resend a funding_locked if there have been
1213 // no commitment updates, so the only channel monitor update which could also be
1214 // associated with a funding_locked would be the funding_created/funding_signed
1215 // monitor update. That monitor update failing implies that we won't send
1216 // funding_locked until it's been updated, so we can't have a funding_locked and a
1217 // monitor update here (so we don't bother to handle it correctly below).
1218 assert!($funding_locked.is_none());
1219 // A channel monitor update makes no sense without either a funding_locked or a
1220 // commitment update to process after it. Since we can't have a funding_locked, we
1221 // only bother to handle the monitor-update + commitment_update case below.
1222 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1225 if let Some(msg) = $funding_locked {
1226 // Similar to the above, this implies that we're letting the funding_locked fly
1227 // before it should be allowed to.
1228 assert!(chanmon_update.is_none());
1229 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
1230 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1233 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = $self.get_announcement_sigs($channel_entry.get()) {
1234 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1235 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1236 msg: announcement_sigs,
1239 $channel_state.short_to_id.insert($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), $channel_entry.get().channel_id());
1242 let funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction> = $funding_broadcastable; // Force type-checking to resolve
1243 if let Some(monitor_update) = chanmon_update {
1244 // We only ever broadcast a funding transaction in response to a funding_signed
1245 // message and the resulting monitor update. Thus, on channel_reestablish
1246 // message handling we can't have a funding transaction to broadcast. When
1247 // processing a monitor update finishing resulting in a funding broadcast, we
1248 // cannot have a second monitor update, thus this case would indicate a bug.
1249 assert!(funding_broadcastable.is_none());
1250 // Given we were just reconnected or finished updating a channel monitor, the
1251 // only case where we can get a new ChannelMonitorUpdate would be if we also
1252 // have some commitment updates to send as well.
1253 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1254 if let Err(e) = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1255 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
1256 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
1257 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
1258 let mut order = $order;
1260 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
1262 break handle_monitor_err!($self, e, $channel_state, $channel_entry, order, $raa.is_some(), true);
1266 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1267 if let Some(update) = $commitment_update {
1268 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1269 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1274 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1275 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = $raa {
1276 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1277 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1278 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1283 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1287 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1292 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
1293 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
1294 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1299 if chanmon_update_is_none {
1300 // If there was no ChannelMonitorUpdate, we should never generate an Err in the res loop
1301 // above. Doing so would imply calling handle_err!() from channel_monitor_updated() which
1302 // should *never* end up calling back to `chain_monitor.update_channel()`.
1303 assert!(res.is_ok());
1306 (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id)
1310 macro_rules! post_handle_chan_restoration {
1311 ($self: ident, $locked_res: expr) => { {
1312 let (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id) = $locked_res;
1314 let _ = handle_error!($self, res, counterparty_node_id);
1316 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1317 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1322 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
1323 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
1324 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1325 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
1326 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1329 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
1331 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1332 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
1334 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1336 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
1338 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
1339 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
1340 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
1341 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1342 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1343 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
1346 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1347 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1348 fee_estimator: fee_est,
1352 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1354 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
1355 by_id: HashMap::new(),
1356 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
1357 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1358 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1359 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
1361 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1362 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1364 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
1365 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
1368 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1369 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1371 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1373 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1374 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1375 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1376 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
1384 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels, as
1385 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1386 &self.default_configuration
1389 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1391 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1392 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1393 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to 0
1394 /// for inbound channels, so you may wish to avoid using 0 for `user_channel_id` here.
1395 /// `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply copied to events and otherwise
1398 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1399 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1401 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1402 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1403 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1405 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1406 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1407 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1408 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1409 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1410 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1412 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1413 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1414 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1415 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u64, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1416 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1417 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1421 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1422 match per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key) {
1423 Some(peer_state) => {
1424 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1425 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1426 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1427 Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, their_features,
1428 channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height())?
1430 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) }),
1433 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1435 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1436 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1437 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1439 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1440 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1441 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1442 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1443 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
1444 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1446 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1449 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1451 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1452 node_id: their_network_key,
1455 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1458 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<Signer>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1459 let mut res = Vec::new();
1461 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1462 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
1463 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1464 let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
1465 let balance_msat = channel.get_balance_msat();
1466 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1467 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1468 res.push(ChannelDetails {
1469 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
1470 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1471 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1472 features: InitFeatures::empty(),
1473 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1474 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1476 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1477 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1478 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1479 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1481 inbound_capacity_msat,
1482 outbound_capacity_msat,
1483 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1484 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1485 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1486 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1487 is_funding_locked: channel.is_usable(),
1488 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1489 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1493 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1494 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
1495 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.counterparty.node_id) {
1496 chan.counterparty.features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
1502 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
1503 /// more information.
1504 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1505 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1508 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
1509 /// get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1511 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1512 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1514 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1515 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1516 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1517 // really wanted anyway.
1518 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1521 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
1522 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
1523 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1524 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
1525 Some(transaction) => {
1526 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::DiscardFunding { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction })
1530 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1531 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1532 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1533 reason: closure_reason
1537 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1538 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1540 let counterparty_node_id;
1541 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
1542 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
1543 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1544 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1545 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1546 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1547 counterparty_node_id = chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1548 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1549 let (shutdown_msg, monitor_update, htlcs) = match per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
1550 Some(peer_state) => {
1551 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1552 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1553 chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown(&self.keys_manager, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?
1555 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", counterparty_node_id) }),
1557 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
1559 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
1560 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
1561 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1562 let (result, is_permanent) =
1563 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_entry.key());
1565 remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
1571 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1572 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1576 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1577 let channel = remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
1578 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
1579 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1583 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1587 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()})
1591 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1592 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1595 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, counterparty_node_id);
1599 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1600 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1601 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1603 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
1604 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1606 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
1607 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
1608 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
1609 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
1611 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1613 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1614 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1615 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1616 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1617 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, None)
1620 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1621 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1622 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1624 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
1625 /// the channel being closed or not:
1626 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
1627 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
1628 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1629 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
1630 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
1631 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
1632 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
1634 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1636 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1637 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1638 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1639 pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1640 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
1644 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1645 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1646 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1647 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1648 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1650 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
1651 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
1652 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
1653 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
1654 // ignore the result here.
1655 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
1659 /// `peer_node_id` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
1660 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
1661 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>, peer_msg: Option<&String>) -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
1663 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1664 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1665 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1666 if let Some(node_id) = peer_node_id {
1667 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *node_id {
1668 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1671 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1672 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1674 if peer_node_id.is_some() {
1675 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
1676 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: peer_msg.to_string() });
1679 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1681 chan.remove_entry().1
1683 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1686 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
1687 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(true));
1688 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
1689 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1690 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1695 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
1698 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
1699 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if channel_id is unknown to the manager.
1700 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1701 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1702 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, None, None) {
1703 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
1704 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1705 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1706 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1707 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
1708 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
1718 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
1719 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
1720 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
1721 for chan in self.list_channels() {
1722 let _ = self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
1726 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>) {
1727 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
1728 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
1730 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1731 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
1732 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1733 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1734 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
1735 failure_code: $err_code,
1736 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1741 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
1742 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
1745 let shared_secret = {
1746 let mut arr = [0; 32];
1747 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
1750 let (rho, mu) = onion_utils::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1752 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
1753 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
1754 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
1755 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
1756 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
1757 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
1758 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
1759 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
1762 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&mu);
1763 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
1764 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash.0[..]);
1765 if !fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
1766 return_malformed_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5);
1769 let mut channel_state = None;
1770 macro_rules! return_err {
1771 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
1773 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1774 if channel_state.is_none() {
1775 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1777 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1778 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1779 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1780 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
1781 })), channel_state.unwrap());
1786 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
1787 let mut chacha_stream = ChaChaReader { chacha: &mut chacha, read: Cursor::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..]) };
1788 let (next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac): (msgs::OnionHopData, _) = {
1789 match <msgs::OnionHopData as Readable>::read(&mut chacha_stream) {
1791 let error_code = match err {
1792 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
1793 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature|
1794 msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue|
1795 msgs::DecodeError::ShortRead => 0x4000 | 22, // invalid_onion_payload
1796 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
1798 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
1801 let mut hmac = [0; 32];
1802 if let Err(_) = chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut hmac[..]) {
1803 return_err!("Unable to decode hop data", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1810 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_hmac == [0; 32] {
1813 // In tests, make sure that the initial onion pcket data is, at least, non-0.
1814 // We could do some fancy randomness test here, but, ehh, whatever.
1815 // This checks for the issue where you can calculate the path length given the
1816 // onion data as all the path entries that the originator sent will be here
1817 // as-is (and were originally 0s).
1818 // Of course reverse path calculation is still pretty easy given naive routing
1819 // algorithms, but this fixes the most-obvious case.
1820 let mut next_bytes = [0; 32];
1821 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1822 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1823 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1824 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1828 // final_expiry_too_soon
1829 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
1830 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
1831 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
1832 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
1833 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
1834 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) <= self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
1835 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
1837 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
1838 if next_hop_data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
1839 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1841 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
1842 if next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
1843 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1846 let routing = match next_hop_data.format {
1847 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { .. } => return_err!("We require payment_secrets", 0x4000|0x2000|3, &[0;0]),
1848 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => return_err!("Got non final data with an HMAC of 0", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]),
1849 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
1850 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
1851 return_err!("We don't support MPP keysend payments", 0x4000|22, &[0;0]);
1852 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
1853 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
1855 incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
1857 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
1858 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
1859 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
1860 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
1861 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
1862 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
1863 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
1864 if hashed_preimage != msg.payment_hash {
1865 return_err!("Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 0x4000|22, &[0;0]);
1868 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
1870 incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
1873 return_err!("We require payment_secrets", 0x4000|0x2000|3, &[0;0]);
1878 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
1879 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
1880 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
1881 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
1883 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1885 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1886 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1887 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1888 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1891 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
1892 let read_pos = chacha_stream.read(&mut new_packet_data).unwrap();
1893 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1895 // Check two things:
1896 // a) that the behavior of our stream here will return Ok(0) even if the TLV
1897 // read above emptied out our buffer and the unwrap() wont needlessly panic
1898 // b) that we didn't somehow magically end up with extra data.
1900 debug_assert!(chacha_stream.read(&mut t).unwrap() == 0);
1902 // Once we've emptied the set of bytes our peer gave us, encrypt 0 bytes until we
1903 // fill the onion hop data we'll forward to our next-hop peer.
1904 chacha_stream.chacha.process_in_place(&mut new_packet_data[read_pos..]);
1906 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
1908 let blinding_factor = {
1909 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
1910 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
1911 sha.input(&shared_secret);
1912 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
1915 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
1917 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
1919 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
1922 hop_data: new_packet_data,
1923 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
1926 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
1927 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1928 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1929 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
1930 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1934 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1935 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
1936 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
1939 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1940 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1941 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1942 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1946 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1947 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
1948 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
1949 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
1950 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
1951 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
1952 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
1953 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
1954 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
1955 None => { // unknown_next_peer
1956 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
1958 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1961 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
1963 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
1964 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
1965 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
1966 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
1967 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
1970 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
1971 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
1972 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
1973 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
1974 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
1975 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
1976 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1978 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
1979 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1981 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64)
1982 .and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000)
1983 .checked_add(chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat() as u64) });
1984 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
1985 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1987 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta() as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
1988 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1990 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1991 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
1992 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
1993 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
1994 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
1995 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1997 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
1998 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2000 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2001 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2002 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2003 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2004 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2005 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2006 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2007 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2008 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2009 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
2015 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
2016 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2017 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2018 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
2020 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2021 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
2023 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2024 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
2025 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
2027 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
2029 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
2034 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
2037 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2038 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2039 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2041 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2042 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2043 if !chan.should_announce() {
2044 return Err(LightningError {
2045 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2046 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2049 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2050 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2053 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2054 /// is public (only returning an Err if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id),
2055 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2056 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2057 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2058 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2059 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2060 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2061 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2065 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2067 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2068 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2070 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2071 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
2072 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2073 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2074 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Present(chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat()),
2075 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2076 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2077 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2080 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
2081 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
2083 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2089 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
2090 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payee: &Option<Payee>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2091 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2092 let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2093 let session_priv_bytes = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2094 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2096 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2097 .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
2098 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2099 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
2100 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
2102 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
2104 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2106 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2107 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2109 let mut pending_outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2110 let payment_entry = pending_outbounds.entry(payment_id);
2111 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(payment) = &payment_entry {
2112 if !payment.get().is_retryable() {
2113 return Err(APIError::RouteError {
2114 err: "Payment already completed"
2119 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2120 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2121 Some(id) => id.clone(),
2124 macro_rules! insert_outbound_payment {
2126 let payment = payment_entry.or_insert_with(|| PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2127 session_privs: HashSet::new(),
2128 pending_amt_msat: 0,
2129 pending_fee_msat: Some(0),
2130 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2131 payment_secret: *payment_secret,
2132 starting_block_height: self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
2133 total_msat: total_value,
2135 assert!(payment.insert(session_priv_bytes, path));
2139 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2140 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
2142 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
2143 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
2145 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2146 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
2148 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(
2149 htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2151 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2152 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2154 payment_secret: payment_secret.clone(),
2155 payee: payee.clone(),
2156 }, onion_packet, &self.logger),
2157 channel_state, chan)
2159 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
2160 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2161 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
2162 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
2163 // that we will resend the commitment update once monitor updating
2164 // is restored. Therefore, we must return an error indicating that
2165 // it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale, which we do in the
2166 // send_payment check for MonitorUpdateFailed, below.
2167 insert_outbound_payment!(); // Only do this after possibly break'ing on Perm failure above.
2168 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2170 insert_outbound_payment!();
2172 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2173 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2174 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
2175 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2176 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
2177 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2178 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2179 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2185 None => { insert_outbound_payment!(); },
2187 } else { unreachable!(); }
2191 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2192 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2194 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2199 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2201 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
2202 /// fields for more info.
2204 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
2205 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
2206 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
2207 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
2208 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
2209 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
2211 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed.
2213 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
2214 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2215 /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
2217 /// In general, a path may raise:
2218 /// * APIError::RouteError when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2219 /// node public key) is specified.
2220 /// * APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2221 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2223 /// * APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2224 /// relevant updates.
2226 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
2227 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2228 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2230 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
2231 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
2232 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
2233 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
2235 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
2236 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
2237 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
2238 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> Result<PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure> {
2239 self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, None, None, None)
2242 fn send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: Option<PaymentId>, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>) -> Result<PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure> {
2243 if route.paths.len() < 1 {
2244 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
2246 if route.paths.len() > 10 {
2247 // This limit is completely arbitrary - there aren't any real fundamental path-count
2248 // limits. After we support retrying individual paths we should likely bump this, but
2249 // for now more than 10 paths likely carries too much one-path failure.
2250 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "Sending over more than 10 paths is not currently supported"}));
2252 if payment_secret.is_none() && route.paths.len() > 1 {
2253 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Payment secret is required for multi-path payments".to_string()}));
2255 let mut total_value = 0;
2256 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2257 let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
2258 let payment_id = if let Some(id) = payment_id { id } else { PaymentId(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()) };
2259 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
2260 if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
2261 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
2262 continue 'path_check;
2264 for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
2265 if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
2266 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
2267 continue 'path_check;
2270 total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2271 path_errs.push(Ok(()));
2273 if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
2274 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
2276 if let Some(amt_msat) = recv_value_msat {
2277 debug_assert!(amt_msat >= total_value);
2278 total_value = amt_msat;
2281 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2282 let mut results = Vec::new();
2283 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2284 results.push(self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &route.payee, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, &keysend_preimage));
2286 let mut has_ok = false;
2287 let mut has_err = false;
2288 let mut pending_amt_unsent = 0;
2289 let mut max_unsent_cltv_delta = 0;
2290 for (res, path) in results.iter().zip(route.paths.iter()) {
2291 if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
2292 if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
2293 if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = res {
2294 // MonitorUpdateFailed is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
2298 } else if res.is_err() {
2299 pending_amt_unsent += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2300 max_unsent_cltv_delta = cmp::max(max_unsent_cltv_delta, path.last().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta);
2303 if has_err && has_ok {
2304 Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure {
2307 failed_paths_retry: if pending_amt_unsent != 0 {
2308 if let Some(payee) = &route.payee {
2309 Some(RouteParameters {
2310 payee: payee.clone(),
2311 final_value_msat: pending_amt_unsent,
2312 final_cltv_expiry_delta: max_unsent_cltv_delta,
2318 // If we failed to send any paths, we shouldn't have inserted the new PaymentId into
2319 // our `pending_outbound_payments` map at all.
2320 debug_assert!(self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().get(&payment_id).is_none());
2321 Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
2327 /// Retries a payment along the given [`Route`].
2329 /// Errors returned are a superset of those returned from [`send_payment`], so see
2330 /// [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on errors. This method will also error if the
2331 /// retry amount puts the payment more than 10% over the payment's total amount, or if the payment
2332 /// for the given `payment_id` cannot be found (likely due to timeout or success).
2334 /// [`send_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::send_payment`]
2335 pub fn retry_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2336 const RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE: u64 = 10;
2337 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2338 if path.len() == 0 {
2339 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2340 err: "length-0 path in route".to_string()
2345 let (total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret) = {
2346 let outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2347 if let Some(payment) = outbounds.get(&payment_id) {
2349 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2350 total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret, pending_amt_msat, ..
2352 let retry_amt_msat: u64 = route.paths.iter().map(|path| path.last().unwrap().fee_msat).sum();
2353 if retry_amt_msat + *pending_amt_msat > *total_msat * (100 + RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE) / 100 {
2354 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2355 err: format!("retry_amt_msat of {} will put pending_amt_msat (currently: {}) more than 10% over total_payment_amt_msat of {}", retry_amt_msat, pending_amt_msat, total_msat).to_string()
2358 (*total_msat, *payment_hash, *payment_secret)
2360 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => {
2361 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2362 err: "Unable to retry payments that were initially sent on LDK versions prior to 0.0.102".to_string()
2365 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {
2366 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError {
2367 err: "Payment already completed"
2372 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2373 err: format!("Payment with ID {} not found", log_bytes!(payment_id.0)),
2377 return self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &payment_secret, None, Some(payment_id), Some(total_msat)).map(|_| ())
2380 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2381 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2382 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2383 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2384 /// never reach the recipient.
2386 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function.
2388 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2389 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2391 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2393 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2394 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2395 let preimage = match payment_preimage {
2397 None => PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()),
2399 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0).into_inner());
2400 match self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &None, Some(preimage), None, None) {
2401 Ok(payment_id) => Ok((payment_hash, payment_id)),
2406 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2407 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2408 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>
2409 (&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2411 let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2413 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2415 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2416 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2417 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2418 } else { unreachable!(); })
2421 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "No such channel".to_owned() }) },
2423 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
2424 Ok(funding_msg) => {
2427 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2428 err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
2433 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2434 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2435 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2438 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2439 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2440 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2442 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2450 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2451 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2452 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2456 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2458 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2459 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2461 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
2463 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2464 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
2465 /// keys per-channel).
2467 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
2468 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
2469 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
2471 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
2472 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
2473 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2475 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2476 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2477 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2479 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
2480 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
2481 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2482 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
2486 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
2487 let mut output_index = None;
2488 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
2489 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2490 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
2491 if output_index.is_some() {
2492 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2493 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
2496 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
2497 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2498 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
2501 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
2504 if output_index.is_none() {
2505 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2506 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
2509 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
2513 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
2514 if !chan.should_announce() {
2515 log_trace!(self.logger, "Can't send announcement_signatures for private channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2519 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
2521 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
2523 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2524 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2526 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
2527 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
2528 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
2529 node_signature: our_node_sig,
2530 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
2535 // Messages of up to 64KB should never end up more than half full with addresses, as that would
2536 // be absurd. We ensure this by checking that at least 500 (our stated public contract on when
2537 // broadcast_node_announcement panics) of the maximum-length addresses would fit in a 64KB
2539 const HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS: u32 = ::core::u16::MAX as u32 / (NetAddress::MAX_LEN as u32 + 1) / 2;
2542 // ...by failing to compile if the number of addresses that would be half of a message is
2543 // smaller than 500:
2544 const STATIC_ASSERT: u32 = Self::HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS - 500;
2546 /// Regenerates channel_announcements and generates a signed node_announcement from the given
2547 /// arguments, providing them in corresponding events via
2548 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`], if at least one public channel has been confirmed
2549 /// on-chain. This effectively re-broadcasts all channel announcements and sends our node
2550 /// announcement to ensure that the lightning P2P network is aware of the channels we have and
2551 /// our network addresses.
2553 /// `rgb` is a node "color" and `alias` is a printable human-readable string to describe this
2554 /// node to humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning.
2556 /// `addresses` represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node
2557 /// accepts incoming connections. These will be included in the node_announcement, publicly
2558 /// tying these addresses together and to this node. If you wish to preserve user privacy,
2559 /// addresses should likely contain only Tor Onion addresses.
2561 /// Panics if `addresses` is absurdly large (more than 500).
2563 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
2564 pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], mut addresses: Vec<NetAddress>) {
2565 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2567 if addresses.len() > 500 {
2568 panic!("More than half the message size was taken up by public addresses!");
2571 // While all existing nodes handle unsorted addresses just fine, the spec requires that
2572 // addresses be sorted for future compatibility.
2573 addresses.sort_by_key(|addr| addr.get_id());
2575 let announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
2576 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
2577 timestamp: self.last_node_announcement_serial.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32,
2578 node_id: self.get_our_node_id(),
2579 rgb, alias, addresses,
2580 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
2581 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2583 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2584 let node_announce_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2586 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2587 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2589 let mut announced_chans = false;
2590 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
2591 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.our_network_key, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
2592 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2594 update_msg: match self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
2599 announced_chans = true;
2601 // If the channel is not public or has not yet reached funding_locked, check the
2602 // next channel. If we don't yet have any public channels, we'll skip the broadcast
2603 // below as peers may not accept it without channels on chain first.
2607 if announced_chans {
2608 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement {
2609 msg: msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
2610 signature: node_announce_sig,
2611 contents: announcement
2617 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
2619 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
2620 /// Will likely generate further events.
2621 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
2622 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2624 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2625 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
2626 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
2628 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2629 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2631 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
2632 if short_chan_id != 0 {
2633 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
2634 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
2636 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
2637 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2638 match forward_info {
2639 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info,
2640 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2641 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2642 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2643 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2644 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2645 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
2647 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
2648 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() }
2651 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
2652 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
2653 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
2654 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
2655 // problem, not ours.
2662 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
2663 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
2664 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
2665 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2666 match forward_info {
2667 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
2668 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2670 }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
2671 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2672 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
2673 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2674 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2675 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2676 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2677 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
2679 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet, &self.logger) {
2681 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
2682 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
2684 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
2686 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap();
2687 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
2688 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }
2694 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
2696 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
2697 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
2698 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
2699 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
2700 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
2701 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
2702 // this channel currently :/.
2708 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
2709 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
2711 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
2712 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
2713 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger) {
2715 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
2716 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
2718 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
2720 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
2721 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
2722 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
2725 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
2727 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
2728 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
2729 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
2730 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
2731 // messages when we can.
2732 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
2733 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
2734 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
2741 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
2742 let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) {
2745 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
2746 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
2747 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
2748 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
2749 ChannelError::Ignore(_) | ChannelError::Warn(_) => {
2750 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
2752 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
2753 log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
2754 let (channel_id, mut channel) = chan.remove_entry();
2755 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2756 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2758 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us.
2759 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, channel.get_user_id(), channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel).ok()))
2761 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
2763 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, err));
2767 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2768 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
2771 log_debug!(self.logger, "Forwarding HTLCs resulted in a commitment update with {} HTLCs added and {} HTLCs failed for channel {}",
2772 add_htlc_msgs.len(), fail_htlc_msgs.len(), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2773 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2774 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
2775 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2776 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
2777 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2778 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
2779 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2781 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
2789 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2790 match forward_info {
2791 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
2792 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. },
2793 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2794 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload) = match routing {
2795 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
2796 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice(payment_data)),
2797 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
2798 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage)),
2800 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
2803 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
2804 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
2805 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2806 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2807 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2808 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
2810 value: amt_to_forward,
2815 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
2817 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc.value).to_vec();
2818 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
2819 &byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()),
2821 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2822 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
2823 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2824 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
2825 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
2827 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data }
2832 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
2833 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
2834 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
2835 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
2836 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
2837 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
2838 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2839 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
2840 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
2841 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
2842 OnionPayload::Invoice(_) => {
2843 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we didn't have a corresponding inbound payment.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2844 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2846 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
2847 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
2848 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2849 e.insert(vec![claimable_htlc]);
2850 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
2852 amt: amt_to_forward,
2853 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage),
2856 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2857 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2858 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2864 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
2866 if let OnionPayload::Invoice(ref data) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
2869 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2870 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2873 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
2874 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2875 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2876 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
2877 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
2878 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
2879 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2881 let mut total_value = 0;
2882 let htlcs = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
2883 .or_insert(Vec::new());
2884 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
2885 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
2886 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2887 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2891 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
2892 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
2893 total_value += htlc.value;
2894 match &htlc.onion_payload {
2895 OnionPayload::Invoice(htlc_payment_data) => {
2896 if htlc_payment_data.total_msat != payment_data.total_msat {
2897 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
2898 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, htlc_payment_data.total_msat);
2899 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
2901 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
2903 _ => unreachable!(),
2906 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > payment_data.total_msat {
2907 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
2908 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, payment_data.total_msat);
2909 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
2912 } else if total_value == payment_data.total_msat {
2913 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
2915 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
2916 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
2917 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
2921 // Only ever generate at most one PaymentReceived
2922 // per registered payment_hash, even if it isn't
2924 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
2926 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
2927 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
2934 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
2935 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
2943 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
2944 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason);
2947 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
2948 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
2951 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
2952 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2953 events.append(&mut new_events);
2956 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
2958 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
2959 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
2961 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
2962 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
2963 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
2964 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
2965 if background_events.is_empty() {
2969 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
2971 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
2972 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
2973 // monitor updating completing.
2974 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update);
2981 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
2982 /// Process background events, for functional testing
2983 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
2984 self.process_background_events();
2987 fn update_channel_fee(&self, short_to_id: &mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> (bool, NotifyOption, Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal>) {
2988 if !chan.is_outbound() { return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(())); }
2989 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
2990 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate() {
2991 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
2992 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
2993 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
2995 if !chan.is_live() {
2996 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
2997 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
2998 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
3000 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3001 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3003 let mut retain_channel = true;
3004 let res = match chan.send_update_fee_and_commit(new_feerate, &self.logger) {
3007 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, chan_id);
3008 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
3012 let ret_err = match res {
3013 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update))) => {
3014 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3015 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_id);
3016 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
3019 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3020 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3021 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3022 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3023 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3024 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3025 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3026 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
3036 (retain_channel, NotifyOption::DoPersist, ret_err)
3040 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
3041 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
3042 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
3043 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
3044 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
3045 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3046 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3048 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3050 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3052 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3053 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3054 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3055 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3056 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3057 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3058 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3060 handle_errors.push(err);
3070 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
3072 /// This currently includes:
3073 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
3074 /// * Broadcasting `ChannelUpdate` messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
3075 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
3078 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through `chain::Watch::update_channel` calls or feerate
3079 /// estimate fetches.
3080 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
3081 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3082 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3083 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3085 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3087 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3089 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3090 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3091 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3092 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3093 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3094 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
3095 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3096 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3098 handle_errors.push((err, counterparty_node_id));
3100 if !retain_channel { return false; }
3102 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
3103 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, chan_id);
3104 handle_errors.push((Err(err), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()));
3105 if needs_close { return false; }
3108 match chan.channel_update_status() {
3109 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
3110 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
3111 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3112 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3113 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
3114 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3115 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3119 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3120 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3122 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
3123 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3124 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3128 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3129 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3138 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3139 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3145 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
3146 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
3147 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
3148 /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
3149 /// HTLC backwards has been started.
3150 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) -> bool {
3151 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3153 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
3154 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
3155 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
3156 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3157 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
3158 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3159 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
3160 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
3161 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
3162 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_hash,
3163 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
3169 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
3170 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
3171 // be surfaced to the user.
3172 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(&self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
3173 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
3175 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { .. }) => {
3176 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
3177 match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3178 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
3179 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(&chan_entry.get()) {
3180 (0x1000|7, upd.encode_with_len())
3182 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3185 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3187 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3188 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state,
3189 htlc_src, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: onion_failure_data});
3191 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, payee, .. } => {
3192 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3193 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3194 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3195 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3196 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) && !payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3197 let retry = if let Some(payee_data) = payee {
3198 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
3199 Some(RouteParameters {
3201 final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat,
3202 final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta,
3205 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
3206 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3207 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3209 rejected_by_dest: false,
3210 network_update: None,
3211 all_paths_failed: payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0,
3213 short_channel_id: None,
3223 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3230 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
3231 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
3232 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
3233 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
3234 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
3235 /// still-available channels.
3236 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
3237 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
3238 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
3239 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
3242 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3243 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
3244 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3246 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, session_priv, payment_id, ref payee, .. } => {
3247 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3248 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3249 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3250 let mut all_paths_failed = false;
3251 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3252 if !payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
3253 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3256 if payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3257 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received failure of HTLC with payment_hash {} after payment completion", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3260 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3261 all_paths_failed = true;
3264 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3267 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3268 let retry = if let Some(payee_data) = payee {
3269 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
3270 Some(RouteParameters {
3271 payee: payee_data.clone(),
3272 final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat,
3273 final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta,
3276 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3277 match &onion_error {
3278 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
3280 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
3282 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
3283 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
3284 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
3285 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
3286 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
3287 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3288 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3289 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3290 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
3297 error_code: onion_error_code,
3299 error_data: onion_error_data
3303 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3309 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
3310 // TODO: We'd like to generate a NetworkUpdate for temporary
3311 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as get_route
3312 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
3314 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
3315 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
3316 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
3317 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3318 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3319 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3320 rejected_by_dest: path.len() == 1,
3321 network_update: None,
3324 short_channel_id: Some(path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id),
3327 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
3329 error_data: Some(data.clone()),
3335 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, .. }) => {
3336 let err_packet = match onion_error {
3337 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
3338 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
3339 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
3340 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
3342 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
3343 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3344 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
3348 let mut forward_event = None;
3349 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3350 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
3352 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
3353 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3354 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
3356 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3357 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
3360 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3361 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
3362 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3363 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
3364 time_forwardable: time
3371 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
3372 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
3373 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
3375 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
3376 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentReceived`
3377 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
3378 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
3380 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
3382 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
3383 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
3384 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> bool {
3385 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3387 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3389 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
3390 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
3391 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
3392 assert!(!sources.is_empty());
3394 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we have to take special care to ensure that each
3395 // channel exists before claiming all of the payments (inside one lock).
3396 // Note that channel existance is sufficient as we should always get a monitor update
3397 // which will take care of the real HTLC claim enforcement.
3399 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
3400 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
3401 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
3402 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
3403 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
3405 let mut valid_mpp = true;
3406 for htlc in sources.iter() {
3407 if let None = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3413 let mut errs = Vec::new();
3414 let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
3415 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3417 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
3418 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3419 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
3420 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
3421 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
3422 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash,
3423 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
3425 match self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state.as_mut().unwrap(), htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
3426 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) => {
3427 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
3428 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
3429 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
3430 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
3431 claimed_any_htlcs = true;
3432 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
3434 ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"),
3435 ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim => {
3436 // While we should never get here in most cases, if we do, it likely
3437 // indicates that the HTLC was timed out some time ago and is no longer
3438 // available to be claimed. Thus, it does not make sense to set
3439 // `claimed_any_htlcs`.
3441 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(_) => claimed_any_htlcs = true,
3446 // Now that we've done the entire above loop in one lock, we can handle any errors
3447 // which were generated.
3448 channel_state.take();
3450 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
3451 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
3452 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
3459 fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> ClaimFundsFromHop {
3460 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
3461 let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock;
3462 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3463 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
3465 return ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed
3469 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
3470 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
3471 Ok(msgs_monitor_option) => {
3472 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { msgs, htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = msgs_monitor_option {
3473 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3474 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Debug },
3475 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
3476 payment_preimage, e);
3477 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(
3478 chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3479 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err(),
3480 Some(htlc_value_msat)
3483 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
3484 log_debug!(self.logger, "Claiming funds for HTLC with preimage {} resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}",
3485 log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3486 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3487 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3488 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3489 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3490 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
3491 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3492 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3498 return ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(htlc_value_msat);
3500 return ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim;
3503 Err((e, monitor_update)) => {
3504 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3505 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Info },
3506 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?} immediately prior to force-close: {:?}",
3507 payment_preimage, e);
3509 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3510 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan.get_mut(), &chan_id);
3512 chan.remove_entry();
3514 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(counterparty_node_id, res, None);
3517 } else { unreachable!(); }
3520 fn finalize_claims(&self, mut sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
3521 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3522 for source in sources.drain(..) {
3523 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } = source {
3524 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3525 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3526 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3527 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3528 assert!(payment.get().is_fulfilled());
3529 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, None) {
3530 pending_events.push(
3531 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
3533 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash(),
3538 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3546 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool) {
3548 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
3549 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3550 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3551 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3552 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3553 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3554 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3555 if !payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3556 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3557 let fee_paid_msat = payment.get().get_pending_fee_msat();
3558 pending_events.push(
3559 events::Event::PaymentSent {
3560 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3566 payment.get_mut().mark_fulfilled();
3570 // We currently immediately remove HTLCs which were fulfilled on-chain.
3571 // This could potentially lead to removing a pending payment too early,
3572 // with a reorg of one block causing us to re-add the fulfilled payment on
3574 // TODO: We should have a second monitor event that informs us of payments
3575 // irrevocably fulfilled.
3576 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
3577 let payment_hash = Some(PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner()));
3578 pending_events.push(
3579 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
3587 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3592 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fulfill for HTLC with payment_preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0));
3595 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
3596 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
3597 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage);
3598 let claimed_htlc = if let ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim = res { false } else { true };
3599 let htlc_claim_value_msat = match res {
3600 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(_, _, amt_opt) => amt_opt,
3601 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(amt) => Some(amt),
3604 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed = res {
3605 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3606 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
3607 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
3608 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
3611 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
3612 // receiving an offchain preimage event from the forward link (the
3613 // event being update_fulfill_htlc).
3614 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_outpoint, preimage_update) {
3615 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
3616 payment_preimage, e);
3618 // Note that we do *not* set `claimed_htlc` to false here. In fact, this
3619 // totally could be a duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing
3620 // without interrogating the `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above
3621 // update to. Instead, we simply document in `PaymentForwarded` that this
3624 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3625 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) = res {
3626 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
3627 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
3631 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
3632 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
3633 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
3636 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3637 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
3639 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
3647 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
3648 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
3649 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
3652 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
3653 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3655 let chan_restoration_res;
3656 let (mut pending_failures, finalized_claims) = {
3657 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3658 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3659 let mut channel = match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
3660 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
3661 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
3663 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
3667 let updates = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger);
3668 let channel_update = if updates.funding_locked.is_some() && channel.get().is_usable() && !channel.get().should_announce() {
3669 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
3670 // funding_locked and the channel is in a usable state. Further, we rely on the
3671 // normal announcement_signatures process to send a channel_update for public
3672 // channels, only generating a unicast channel_update if this is a private channel.
3673 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3674 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3675 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel.get()).unwrap(),
3678 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_lock, channel_state, channel, updates.raa, updates.commitment_update, updates.order, None, updates.accepted_htlcs, updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.funding_locked);
3679 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
3680 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
3682 (updates.failed_htlcs, updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs)
3684 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
3685 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claims);
3686 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
3687 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
3691 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3692 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
3693 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
3696 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
3697 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
3700 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3701 &their_features, msg, 0, &self.default_configuration, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.logger)
3702 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
3703 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3704 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3705 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
3706 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
3707 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3708 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
3709 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3710 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
3712 entry.insert(channel);
3718 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3719 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
3720 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3721 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3722 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
3723 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3724 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3725 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
3727 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration, &their_features), channel_state, chan);
3728 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
3730 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
3733 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3734 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
3735 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
3736 channel_value_satoshis: value,
3738 user_channel_id: user_id,
3743 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3744 let ((funding_msg, monitor), mut chan) = {
3745 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
3746 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3747 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3748 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
3749 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3750 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3751 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
3753 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.logger), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
3755 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
3758 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
3759 // lock before watch_channel
3760 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
3762 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
3763 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
3764 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
3765 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
3766 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
3767 // We do not do a force-close here as that would generate a monitor update for
3768 // a monitor that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we
3769 // don't respond with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
3770 let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(true);
3771 assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
3772 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
3774 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
3775 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
3776 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
3777 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our funding_locked
3778 // until we have persisted our monitor.
3779 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3783 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3784 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3785 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
3786 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3787 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
3789 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3790 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
3791 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3800 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3802 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
3803 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3804 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3805 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3806 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3807 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3808 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3810 let (monitor, funding_tx) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.logger) {
3811 Ok(update) => update,
3812 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
3814 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
3815 let mut res = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, false, false);
3816 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
3817 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
3818 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
3819 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
3820 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
3821 shutdown_finish.0.take();
3828 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3831 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid());
3832 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
3836 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3837 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3838 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3839 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3840 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3841 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3842 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3844 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3845 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
3846 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for {} in response to funding_locked", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3847 // If we see locking block before receiving remote funding_locked, we broadcast our
3848 // announcement_sigs at remote funding_locked reception. If we receive remote
3849 // funding_locked before seeing locking block, we broadcast our announcement_sigs at locking
3850 // block connection. We should guanrantee to broadcast announcement_sigs to our peer whatever
3851 // the order of the events but our peer may not receive it due to disconnection. The specs
3852 // lacking an acknowledgement for announcement_sigs we may have to re-send them at peer
3853 // connection in the future if simultaneous misses by both peers due to network/hardware
3854 // failures is an issue. Note, to achieve its goal, only one of the announcement_sigs needs
3855 // to be received, from then sigs are going to be flood to the whole network.
3856 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
3857 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3858 msg: announcement_sigs,
3860 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
3861 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3862 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3863 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
3868 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3872 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3873 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
3874 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
3875 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3876 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3878 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
3879 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
3880 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3881 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3884 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
3885 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
3886 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
3887 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
3890 let (shutdown, monitor_update, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.keys_manager, &their_features, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
3891 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
3893 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
3894 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
3895 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3896 let (result, is_permanent) =
3897 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_entry.key());
3899 remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
3905 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
3906 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
3907 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
3914 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3917 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
3918 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
3921 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
3925 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3926 let (tx, chan_option) = {
3927 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3928 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3929 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
3930 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
3931 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3932 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3934 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
3935 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
3936 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
3937 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3942 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
3943 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
3944 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
3945 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
3946 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
3947 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
3948 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3950 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
3951 } else { (tx, None) }
3953 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3956 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
3957 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
3958 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
3960 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
3961 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3962 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3963 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3967 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
3972 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3973 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
3974 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
3975 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
3977 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
3978 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
3979 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
3980 //but we should prevent it anyway.
3982 let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
3983 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3985 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3986 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3987 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3988 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3991 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
3992 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
3993 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
3994 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
3995 match pending_forward_info {
3996 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
3997 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
3998 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
3999 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &{
4000 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
4001 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
4002 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
4003 res.extend_from_slice(&upd.encode_with_len()[..]);
4007 // The only case where we'd be unable to
4008 // successfully get a channel update is if the
4009 // channel isn't in the fully-funded state yet,
4010 // implying our counterparty is trying to route
4011 // payments over the channel back to themselves
4012 // (because no one else should know the short_id
4013 // is a lightning channel yet). We should have
4014 // no problem just calling this
4015 // unknown_next_peer (0x4000|10).
4016 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
4019 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &[])
4021 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4022 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
4023 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
4026 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
4028 _ => pending_forward_info
4031 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4033 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4038 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4039 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4040 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
4041 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4042 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4043 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4044 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4045 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4047 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
4049 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4052 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false);
4056 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4057 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4058 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4059 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4060 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4061 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4062 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4064 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
4066 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4071 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4072 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4073 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4074 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4075 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4076 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4077 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4079 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
4080 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
4081 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
4083 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
4086 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4090 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4091 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4092 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4093 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4094 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4095 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4096 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4098 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, monitor_update) =
4099 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger) {
4100 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
4101 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
4102 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
4103 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
4104 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan);
4109 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4110 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
4112 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4113 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4114 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4116 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
4117 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4118 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4119 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4120 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4121 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4122 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4123 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4125 commitment_signed: msg,
4131 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4136 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
4137 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
4138 let mut forward_event = None;
4139 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4140 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4141 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
4142 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
4144 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4145 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.routing {
4146 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
4147 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
4148 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
4150 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4151 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4152 prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
4154 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4155 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4156 prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
4161 match forward_event {
4163 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4164 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
4165 time_forwardable: time
4173 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4174 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
4176 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4177 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4178 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4179 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4180 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4181 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4183 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
4184 let raa_updates = break_chan_entry!(self,
4185 chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4186 htlcs_to_fail = raa_updates.holding_cell_failed_htlcs;
4187 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), raa_updates.monitor_update) {
4188 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
4189 assert!(raa_updates.commitment_update.is_none());
4190 assert!(raa_updates.accepted_htlcs.is_empty());
4191 assert!(raa_updates.failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4192 assert!(raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs.is_empty());
4193 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
4195 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan,
4196 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false,
4197 raa_updates.commitment_update.is_some(),
4198 raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4199 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs) {
4201 } else { unreachable!(); }
4204 if let Some(updates) = raa_updates.commitment_update {
4205 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4206 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4210 break Ok((raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4211 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs,
4212 chan.get().get_short_channel_id()
4213 .expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"),
4214 chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap()))
4216 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4219 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id);
4221 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, finalized_claim_htlcs,
4222 short_channel_id, channel_outpoint)) =>
4224 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4225 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
4227 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, pending_forwards)]);
4228 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claim_htlcs);
4235 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4236 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4237 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4238 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4239 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4240 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4241 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4243 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
4245 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4250 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4251 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4252 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4254 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4255 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4256 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4257 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4259 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
4260 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
4263 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
4264 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(&self.our_network_key, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), msg), channel_state, chan),
4265 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
4266 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
4267 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
4270 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4275 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
4276 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4277 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4278 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4279 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
4280 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
4282 // It's not a local channel
4283 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
4286 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4287 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4288 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4289 if chan.get().should_announce() {
4290 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
4291 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
4292 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
4293 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
4295 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
4297 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
4298 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
4299 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
4300 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
4302 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), channel_state, chan);
4305 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => unreachable!()
4307 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
4310 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4311 let chan_restoration_res;
4312 let (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround) = {
4313 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4314 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4316 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4317 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4318 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4319 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4321 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
4322 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
4323 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
4324 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
4325 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, monitor_update_opt, order, htlcs_failed_forward, shutdown) =
4326 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4327 let mut channel_update = None;
4328 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4329 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4330 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4333 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4334 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
4335 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
4336 // they have the latest channel parameters.
4337 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4338 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4339 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
4342 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
4343 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_state_lock, channel_state, chan, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, order, monitor_update_opt, Vec::new(), None, funding_locked);
4344 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
4345 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
4347 (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround)
4349 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4352 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
4353 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_failed_forward, msg.channel_id);
4355 if let Some(funding_locked_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
4356 self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, &funding_locked_msg)?;
4361 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed.
4362 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
4363 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
4364 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
4365 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
4366 for monitor_event in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
4367 match monitor_event {
4368 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
4369 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
4370 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
4371 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.onchain_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true);
4373 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
4374 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
4377 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
4378 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
4379 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4380 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4381 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4382 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4383 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4384 if let Some(mut chan) = by_id.remove(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
4385 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
4386 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4388 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
4389 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4390 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4394 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
4395 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
4397 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
4399 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
4400 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4401 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4402 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4403 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
4408 MonitorEvent::UpdateCompleted { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
4409 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id);
4414 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
4415 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
4418 has_pending_monitor_events
4421 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
4422 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
4423 /// update events as a separate process method here.
4424 #[cfg(feature = "fuzztarget")]
4425 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
4426 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
4429 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
4430 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
4431 /// update was applied.
4433 /// This should only apply to HTLCs which were added to the holding cell because we were
4434 /// waiting on a monitor update to finish. In that case, we don't want to free the holding cell
4435 /// directly in `channel_monitor_updated` as it may introduce deadlocks calling back into user
4436 /// code to inform them of a channel monitor update.
4437 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
4438 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
4439 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4440 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
4442 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4443 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4444 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4445 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4446 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4448 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
4449 match chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger) {
4450 Ok((commitment_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
4451 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
4452 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id));
4454 if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt {
4455 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4456 has_monitor_update = true;
4457 let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), channel_id);
4458 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res));
4459 if close_channel { return false; }
4461 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4462 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4463 updates: commitment_update,
4470 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
4471 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
4472 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us
4479 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
4480 for (failures, channel_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
4481 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id);
4484 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4485 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4491 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
4492 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
4493 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
4494 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
4495 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
4496 let mut has_update = false;
4498 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4499 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4500 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4501 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4502 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4504 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
4505 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
4506 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
4507 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
4509 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4510 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
4513 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
4514 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
4515 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
4516 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
4517 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4520 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4521 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4526 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4528 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
4529 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
4535 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
4536 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
4543 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4544 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4550 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
4551 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
4553 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
4554 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
4555 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
4556 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
4557 // reorganized out of the main chain.
4558 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
4559 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
4560 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
4561 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
4562 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
4563 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
4564 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
4565 assert!(should_broadcast);
4566 } else { unreachable!(); }
4567 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
4569 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
4573 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
4574 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
4576 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
4578 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4579 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4580 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
4581 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4582 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
4583 payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
4584 user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
4585 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
4586 // its updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
4587 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
4588 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
4589 // never fail a payment too early.
4590 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
4592 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
4595 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
4600 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
4603 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
4604 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you, returning the first and storing the second.
4606 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentReceived`], which
4607 /// will have the [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
4608 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
4610 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
4612 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
4613 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
4614 /// [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::payment_preimage
4615 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
4616 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> (PaymentHash, PaymentSecret) {
4617 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
4618 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4621 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
4622 .expect("RNG Generated Duplicate PaymentHash"))
4625 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
4626 /// stored external to LDK.
4628 /// A [`PaymentReceived`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
4629 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
4630 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
4632 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) must be globally unique. This
4633 /// method may return an Err if another payment with the same payment_hash is still pending.
4635 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
4636 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
4637 /// before a [`PaymentReceived`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
4638 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
4640 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
4641 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
4642 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
4643 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
4644 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
4646 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
4647 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
4648 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentReceived`] event for some time after the expiry.
4649 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
4650 /// [`PaymentReceived`].
4652 /// Pending inbound payments are stored in memory and in serialized versions of this
4653 /// [`ChannelManager`]. If potentially unbounded numbers of inbound payments may exist and
4654 /// space is limited, you may wish to rate-limit inbound payment creation.
4656 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
4658 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry`
4659 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY`].
4661 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
4662 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
4663 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
4664 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
4667 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget", feature = "_test_utils"))]
4668 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
4669 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
4670 let event_handler = |event: &events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event.clone());
4671 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
4676 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
4677 !self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().is_empty()
4681 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
4682 self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().clear()
4686 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4687 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4688 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4689 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4690 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4693 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
4694 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
4695 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4696 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4698 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
4699 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
4700 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
4701 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4704 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
4705 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4707 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
4708 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4711 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
4712 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4713 mem::swap(&mut pending_events, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
4715 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
4716 events.replace(pending_events);
4725 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4727 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4728 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4729 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4730 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4733 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
4735 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
4736 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
4738 /// Pending events are persisted as part of [`ChannelManager`]. While these events are cleared
4739 /// when processed, an [`EventHandler`] must be able to handle previously seen events when
4740 /// restarting from an old state.
4741 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
4742 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4743 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4745 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
4746 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
4747 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
4748 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4751 let mut pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
4752 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
4753 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4756 for event in pending_events.drain(..) {
4757 handler.handle_event(&event);
4765 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4767 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4768 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4769 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4770 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4773 fn block_connected(&self, block: &Block, height: u32) {
4775 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4776 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), block.header.prev_blockhash,
4777 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
4778 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
4779 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
4782 let txdata: Vec<_> = block.txdata.iter().enumerate().collect();
4783 self.transactions_confirmed(&block.header, &txdata, height);
4784 self.best_block_updated(&block.header, height);
4787 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
4788 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4789 let new_height = height - 1;
4791 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
4792 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
4793 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
4794 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
4795 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
4796 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
4799 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, &self.logger));
4803 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4805 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4806 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4807 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4808 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4811 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
4812 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4813 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
4814 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4816 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
4817 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
4819 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4820 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, &self.logger).map(|a| (a, Vec::new())));
4823 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
4824 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4825 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
4826 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4828 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
4829 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
4831 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4833 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
4835 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, &self.logger));
4837 macro_rules! max_time {
4838 ($timestamp: expr) => {
4840 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
4841 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
4842 // having an explicit local time source.
4843 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
4844 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
4845 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
4846 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
4847 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
4853 max_time!(self.last_node_announcement_serial);
4854 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
4855 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4856 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
4857 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
4860 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4861 outbounds.retain(|_, payment| {
4862 const PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
4863 if payment.remaining_parts() != 0 { return true }
4864 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { starting_block_height, .. } = payment {
4865 return *starting_block_height + PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS > height
4871 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
4872 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4873 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.short_to_id.len());
4874 for chan in channel_state.by_id.values() {
4875 if let Some(funding_txo) = chan.get_funding_txo() {
4876 res.push(funding_txo.txid);
4882 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
4883 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4884 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
4885 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
4886 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
4887 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|_| (None, Vec::new()))
4888 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
4889 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
4894 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4896 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4897 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4898 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4899 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4902 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
4903 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
4905 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ClosureReason>>
4906 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
4907 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4908 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
4909 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4911 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
4912 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
4914 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4915 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4916 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4917 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4918 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
4919 let res = f(channel);
4920 if let Ok((chan_res, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs)) = res {
4921 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
4922 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(&channel).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
4923 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason {
4924 failure_code: 0x1000 | 14, // expiry_too_soon, or at least it is now
4928 if let Some(funding_locked) = chan_res {
4929 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
4930 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4931 msg: funding_locked,
4933 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
4934 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked and announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
4935 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4936 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4937 msg: announcement_sigs,
4939 } else if channel.is_usable() {
4940 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures but with private channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
4941 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4942 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4943 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel).unwrap(),
4946 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
4948 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
4950 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
4951 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
4952 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4954 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
4955 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
4956 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
4957 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
4958 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4962 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
4963 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
4964 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4965 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4966 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
4967 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
4968 data: reason_message,
4976 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
4977 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, htlcs| {
4978 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
4979 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
4980 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
4981 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
4982 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
4983 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
4984 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
4985 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(height));
4986 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(), HTLCFailReason::Reason {
4987 failure_code: 0x4000 | 15,
4988 data: htlc_msat_height_data
4993 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
4998 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
5000 for (source, payment_hash, reason) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
5001 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, reason);
5005 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
5006 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
5007 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
5009 /// Note that the feature `allow_wallclock_use` must be enabled to use this function.
5010 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
5011 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
5012 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
5015 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
5016 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
5018 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
5019 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
5022 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5023 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
5024 let mutcond = &self.persistence_notifier.persistence_lock;
5025 let &(ref mtx, _) = mutcond;
5026 let guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
5030 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
5031 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
5032 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
5033 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
5037 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref , T: Deref , K: Deref , F: Deref , L: Deref >
5038 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5039 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5040 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5041 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5042 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5045 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
5046 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5047 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5050 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
5051 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5052 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5055 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
5056 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5057 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5060 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
5061 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5062 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5065 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) {
5066 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5067 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5070 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
5071 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5072 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5075 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
5076 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5077 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5080 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
5081 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5082 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5085 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
5086 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5087 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5090 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
5091 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5092 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5095 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
5096 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5097 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5100 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
5101 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5102 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5105 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
5106 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5107 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5110 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
5111 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5112 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5115 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
5116 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5117 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5120 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
5121 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5122 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
5125 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
5130 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
5131 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5132 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5135 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
5136 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5137 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5138 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
5140 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5141 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5142 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
5143 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5144 if no_connection_possible {
5145 log_debug!(self.logger, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
5146 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5147 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5148 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
5149 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
5151 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(true));
5152 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5153 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5157 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
5164 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
5165 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5166 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5167 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
5168 if chan.is_shutdown() {
5169 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
5170 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
5172 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
5175 no_channels_remain = false;
5181 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
5183 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5184 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5185 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5186 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5187 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5188 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5189 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5190 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5191 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5192 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5193 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5194 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
5195 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
5196 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
5197 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5198 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5199 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
5200 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
5201 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
5205 if no_channels_remain {
5206 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id);
5209 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5210 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5214 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) {
5215 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
5217 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5220 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
5221 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
5222 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5223 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
5224 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
5227 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
5228 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
5233 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5234 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5235 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5236 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5237 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5238 if !chan.have_received_message() {
5239 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
5240 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
5241 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
5245 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
5246 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5247 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
5253 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
5256 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
5257 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5259 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
5260 for chan in self.list_channels() {
5261 if chan.counterparty.node_id == *counterparty_node_id {
5262 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
5263 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(&msg.data));
5267 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
5268 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(&msg.data));
5273 /// Used to signal to the ChannelManager persister that the manager needs to be re-persisted to
5274 /// disk/backups, through `await_persistable_update_timeout` and `await_persistable_update`.
5275 struct PersistenceNotifier {
5276 /// Users won't access the persistence_lock directly, but rather wait on its bool using
5277 /// `wait_timeout` and `wait`.
5278 persistence_lock: (Mutex<bool>, Condvar),
5281 impl PersistenceNotifier {
5284 persistence_lock: (Mutex::new(false), Condvar::new()),
5290 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
5291 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
5296 guard = cvar.wait(guard).unwrap();
5297 let result = *guard;
5305 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
5306 fn wait_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
5307 let current_time = Instant::now();
5309 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
5310 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
5315 guard = cvar.wait_timeout(guard, max_wait).unwrap().0;
5316 // Due to spurious wakeups that can happen on `wait_timeout`, here we need to check if the
5317 // desired wait time has actually passed, and if not then restart the loop with a reduced wait
5318 // time. Note that this logic can be highly simplified through the use of
5319 // `Condvar::wait_while` and `Condvar::wait_timeout_while`, if and when our MSRV is raised to
5321 let elapsed = current_time.elapsed();
5322 let result = *guard;
5323 if result || elapsed >= max_wait {
5327 match max_wait.checked_sub(elapsed) {
5328 None => return result,
5334 // Signal to the ChannelManager persister that there are updates necessitating persisting to disk.
5336 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &self.persistence_lock;
5337 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5338 *persistence_lock = true;
5339 mem::drop(persistence_lock);
5344 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
5345 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
5347 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
5349 (0, onion_packet, required),
5350 (2, short_channel_id, required),
5353 (0, payment_data, required),
5354 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
5356 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
5357 (0, payment_preimage, required),
5358 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
5362 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
5363 (0, routing, required),
5364 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
5365 (4, payment_hash, required),
5366 (6, amt_to_forward, required),
5367 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required)
5371 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
5372 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5374 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
5376 channel_id.write(writer)?;
5377 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
5378 reason.write(writer)?;
5380 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
5381 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
5384 channel_id.write(writer)?;
5385 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
5386 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
5387 failure_code.write(writer)?;
5394 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
5395 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5396 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5399 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
5400 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5401 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5402 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
5406 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
5407 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5408 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5409 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
5410 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
5413 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
5414 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
5415 // messages contained in the variants.
5416 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
5417 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
5418 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
5420 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
5421 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
5422 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
5423 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
5424 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
5427 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
5428 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
5429 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
5430 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
5431 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
5433 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
5438 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
5443 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
5444 (0, short_channel_id, required),
5445 (2, outpoint, required),
5446 (4, htlc_id, required),
5447 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
5450 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
5451 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5452 let payment_data = match &self.onion_payload {
5453 OnionPayload::Invoice(data) => Some(data.clone()),
5456 let keysend_preimage = match self.onion_payload {
5457 OnionPayload::Invoice(_) => None,
5458 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => Some(preimage.clone()),
5463 (0, self.prev_hop, required), (2, self.value, required),
5464 (4, payment_data, option), (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
5465 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
5471 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
5472 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5473 let mut prev_hop = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
5475 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
5476 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
5477 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
5481 (0, prev_hop, required), (2, value, required),
5482 (4, payment_data, option), (6, cltv_expiry, required),
5483 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
5485 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
5487 if payment_data.is_some() {
5488 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
5490 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
5493 if payment_data.is_none() {
5494 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
5496 OnionPayload::Invoice(payment_data.unwrap())
5500 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
5508 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
5509 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5510 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5513 let mut session_priv: ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper<SecretKey> = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
5514 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
5515 let mut path = Some(Vec::new());
5516 let mut payment_id = None;
5517 let mut payment_secret = None;
5518 let mut payee = None;
5519 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
5520 (0, session_priv, required),
5521 (1, payment_id, option),
5522 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
5523 (3, payment_secret, option),
5524 (4, path, vec_type),
5527 if payment_id.is_none() {
5528 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
5530 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
5532 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
5533 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
5534 first_hop_htlc_msat: first_hop_htlc_msat,
5535 path: path.unwrap(),
5536 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
5541 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
5542 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
5547 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
5548 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::io::Error> {
5550 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id, payment_secret, payee } => {
5552 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
5553 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
5554 (0, session_priv, required),
5555 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
5556 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
5557 (3, payment_secret, option),
5558 (4, path, vec_type),
5562 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
5564 field.write(writer)?;
5571 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCFailReason,
5572 (0, LightningError) => {
5576 (0, failure_code, required),
5577 (2, data, vec_type),
5581 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
5583 (0, forward_info, required),
5584 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
5585 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
5586 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
5589 (0, htlc_id, required),
5590 (2, err_packet, required),
5594 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
5595 (0, payment_secret, required),
5596 (2, expiry_time, required),
5597 (4, user_payment_id, required),
5598 (6, payment_preimage, required),
5599 (8, min_value_msat, required),
5602 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(PendingOutboundPayment,
5604 (0, session_privs, required),
5607 (0, session_privs, required),
5608 (1, payment_hash, option),
5611 (0, session_privs, required),
5612 (1, pending_fee_msat, option),
5613 (2, payment_hash, required),
5614 (4, payment_secret, option),
5615 (6, total_msat, required),
5616 (8, pending_amt_msat, required),
5617 (10, starting_block_height, required),
5621 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5622 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5623 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5624 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5625 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5628 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5629 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
5631 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
5633 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
5635 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5636 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
5637 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
5640 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5641 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
5642 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
5643 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
5644 unfunded_channels += 1;
5647 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
5648 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
5649 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
5650 channel.write(writer)?;
5654 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5655 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
5656 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
5657 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5658 for forward in pending_forwards {
5659 forward.write(writer)?;
5663 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5664 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
5665 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
5666 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5667 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
5668 htlc.write(writer)?;
5672 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
5673 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5674 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5675 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
5676 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5677 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
5680 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5681 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5682 for event in events.iter() {
5683 event.write(writer)?;
5686 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
5687 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5688 for event in background_events.iter() {
5690 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
5692 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
5693 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
5698 (self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
5699 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
5701 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5702 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5703 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
5704 hash.write(writer)?;
5705 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
5708 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5709 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
5710 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
5711 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
5712 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() {
5713 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
5716 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
5717 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
5719 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
5720 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
5721 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
5722 session_priv.write(writer)?;
5725 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
5729 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
5730 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
5731 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
5733 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
5734 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
5735 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
5740 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
5741 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
5742 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
5749 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
5751 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
5753 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
5754 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
5755 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
5756 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
5757 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
5758 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
5759 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
5760 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
5761 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
5762 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
5763 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
5764 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
5765 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
5767 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
5768 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
5770 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
5771 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
5773 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
5774 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
5775 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
5776 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
5777 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
5778 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
5780 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
5781 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
5782 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5783 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5784 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5785 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5788 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
5789 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
5791 pub keys_manager: K,
5793 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
5795 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
5796 pub fee_estimator: F,
5797 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
5799 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
5800 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
5801 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
5802 pub chain_monitor: M,
5804 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
5805 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
5806 /// force-closed during deserialization.
5807 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
5808 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
5809 /// deserialization.
5811 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
5812 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
5813 pub default_config: UserConfig,
5815 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
5816 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
5818 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
5819 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
5820 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
5821 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
5823 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
5826 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
5827 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>,
5830 impl<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
5831 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5832 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5833 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5834 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5835 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5838 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
5839 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
5840 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
5841 pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
5842 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>) -> Self {
5844 keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config,
5845 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
5850 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
5851 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
5852 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
5853 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>>)
5854 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5855 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5856 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5857 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5860 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5861 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
5862 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
5866 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
5867 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)
5868 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5869 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5870 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5871 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5874 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5875 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
5877 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
5878 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5879 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
5881 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5883 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5884 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
5885 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
5886 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
5887 let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
5888 for _ in 0..channel_count {
5889 let mut channel: Channel<Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (&args.keys_manager, best_block_height))?;
5890 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
5891 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
5892 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
5893 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
5894 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
5895 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
5896 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
5897 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
5898 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
5899 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
5900 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
5901 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
5902 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
5903 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
5904 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/rust-bitcoin/rust-lightning");
5905 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
5906 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
5907 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
5908 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
5909 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
5910 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
5911 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
5912 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
5913 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
5914 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
5915 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
5916 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
5917 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
5918 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
5919 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
5920 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
5921 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
5924 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5925 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
5926 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
5928 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
5931 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5932 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
5933 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
5934 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
5935 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/rust-bitcoin/rust-lightning");
5936 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
5940 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
5941 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
5942 log_info!(args.logger, "Broadcasting latest holder commitment transaction for closed channel {}", log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
5943 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
5947 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
5948 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5949 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
5950 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
5951 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
5952 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5953 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
5954 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
5955 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
5957 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
5960 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5961 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
5962 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
5963 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
5964 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5965 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
5966 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
5967 previous_hops.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
5969 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
5972 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5973 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>)>()));
5974 for _ in 0..peer_count {
5975 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
5976 let peer_state = PeerState {
5977 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
5979 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
5982 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5983 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
5984 for _ in 0..event_count {
5985 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
5986 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
5990 if forward_htlcs_count > 0 {
5991 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
5992 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
5993 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
5994 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
5995 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
5996 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
5997 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
6001 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6002 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
6003 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
6004 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6005 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
6006 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6010 let last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6011 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6013 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6014 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
6015 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
6016 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
6017 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6021 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6022 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
6023 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
6024 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
6025 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
6026 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
6027 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
6029 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
6030 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6034 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
6035 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
6036 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
6037 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6038 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
6039 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
6041 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
6042 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
6043 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
6044 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
6045 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
6046 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
6048 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
6050 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
6051 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
6052 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
6053 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
6054 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
6055 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
6056 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
6058 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors {
6059 if by_id.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
6060 for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_pending_outbound_htlcs() {
6061 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, payment_secret, .. } = htlc_source {
6062 if path.is_empty() {
6063 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
6064 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6066 let path_amt = path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
6067 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
6068 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
6069 match pending_outbound_payments.as_mut().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
6070 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
6071 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
6072 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
6073 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
6075 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6076 let path_fee = path.get_path_fees();
6077 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
6078 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
6079 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
6081 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
6082 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
6083 total_msat: path_amt,
6084 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
6086 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
6087 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
6096 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6097 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
6099 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
6100 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
6103 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
6105 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
6106 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
6107 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
6109 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
6111 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
6116 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
6118 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
6119 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
6121 our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
6122 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &args.keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
6125 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(last_node_announcement_serial as usize),
6126 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
6128 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
6130 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
6131 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
6132 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
6133 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
6135 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
6136 logger: args.logger,
6137 default_configuration: args.default_config,
6140 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
6141 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_manager.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
6144 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
6145 //connection or two.
6147 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
6153 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
6154 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
6155 use core::time::Duration;
6156 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
6157 use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure};
6158 use ln::features::InitFeatures;
6159 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
6161 use ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
6162 use routing::router::{Payee, RouteParameters, find_route};
6163 use util::errors::APIError;
6164 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
6165 use util::test_utils;
6167 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
6169 fn test_wait_timeout() {
6170 use ln::channelmanager::PersistenceNotifier;
6172 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, Ordering};
6175 let persistence_notifier = Arc::new(PersistenceNotifier::new());
6176 let thread_notifier = Arc::clone(&persistence_notifier);
6178 let exit_thread = Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false));
6179 let exit_thread_clone = exit_thread.clone();
6180 thread::spawn(move || {
6182 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &thread_notifier.persistence_lock;
6183 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6184 *persistence_lock = true;
6187 if exit_thread_clone.load(Ordering::SeqCst) {
6193 // Check that we can block indefinitely until updates are available.
6194 let _ = persistence_notifier.wait();
6196 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration if updates are
6199 if persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
6204 exit_thread.store(true, Ordering::SeqCst);
6206 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration even if no updates
6209 if !persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
6216 fn test_notify_limits() {
6217 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
6218 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
6219 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6220 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6221 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6222 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6224 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
6225 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
6226 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6227 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6228 assert!(nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6230 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6232 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
6233 // to connect messages with new values
6234 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
6235 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
6236 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
6237 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
6239 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
6240 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6241 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6242 // ... but the last node should not.
6243 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6244 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
6245 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6246 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6248 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
6249 // about the channel.
6250 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
6251 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
6252 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6254 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
6256 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
6257 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
6258 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
6259 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
6260 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6261 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6263 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
6264 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
6265 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
6267 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
6268 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
6269 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
6270 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
6271 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
6272 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
6274 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
6275 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
6276 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
6277 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
6278 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6279 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6280 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
6281 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
6283 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
6284 // the channel info has updated.
6285 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
6286 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
6287 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6288 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6289 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
6290 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
6294 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
6295 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
6297 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6298 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6299 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6300 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6301 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6303 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
6304 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
6305 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
6306 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
6307 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
6308 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
6309 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payee, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
6310 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6311 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6312 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6313 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
6315 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
6316 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
6317 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6318 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6319 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6320 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
6321 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
6322 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6323 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6324 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6325 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6326 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6327 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6328 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6329 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6330 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6331 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6332 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6333 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6334 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6335 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
6336 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
6338 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
6339 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payee, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
6340 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6341 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6342 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6343 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
6345 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
6346 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
6347 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
6348 // lightning messages manually.
6349 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
6350 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6351 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6352 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6353 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
6354 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6355 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6356 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
6357 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6358 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6359 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
6360 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6361 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6362 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6363 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
6364 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6365 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6366 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
6367 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6368 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6369 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
6370 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6371 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
6372 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6373 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6374 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
6375 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6377 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
6378 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
6379 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6380 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
6382 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
6383 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
6384 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
6385 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
6387 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6390 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
6391 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
6392 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
6393 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
6395 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6398 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
6399 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
6400 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
6401 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
6403 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6408 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
6409 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
6410 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
6411 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
6412 // fails as expected.
6413 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6414 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6415 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6416 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6417 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6418 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
6420 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
6421 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
6422 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
6424 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
6425 let params = RouteParameters {
6426 payee: Payee::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id()),
6427 final_value_msat: 100_000,
6428 final_cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
6430 let route = find_route(
6431 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), ¶ms, nodes[0].network_graph, None,
6432 nodes[0].logger, &scorer
6434 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
6435 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6436 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6437 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6438 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
6439 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
6440 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6441 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6442 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6443 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6444 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6445 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6446 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6447 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6448 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6449 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6450 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6451 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6452 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6453 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
6454 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
6456 // Finally, claim the original payment.
6457 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
6459 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
6460 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
6461 let route = find_route(
6462 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), ¶ms, nodes[0].network_graph, None,
6463 nodes[0].logger, &scorer
6465 let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
6466 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6467 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6468 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6469 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
6470 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
6471 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
6473 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
6474 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
6475 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
6476 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6477 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6478 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6479 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
6480 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
6481 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6482 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6483 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6484 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6485 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6486 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6487 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6488 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6489 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6490 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6491 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6492 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6493 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6494 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
6495 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
6497 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
6498 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
6502 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
6503 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
6504 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
6505 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6506 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6507 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6508 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6510 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
6511 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
6512 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
6513 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
6515 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6516 let params = RouteParameters {
6517 payee: Payee::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
6518 final_value_msat: 10000,
6519 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
6521 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
6522 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
6523 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
6524 let route = find_route(
6525 &payer_pubkey, ¶ms, network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
6526 nodes[0].logger, &scorer
6529 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
6530 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
6531 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage), None, None).unwrap();
6532 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6534 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6535 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
6536 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6537 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6538 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6539 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6540 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6542 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash".to_string(), 1);
6546 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
6547 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
6548 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6549 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6550 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6551 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6553 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
6554 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
6555 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
6556 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
6558 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6559 let params = RouteParameters {
6560 payee: Payee::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
6561 final_value_msat: 10000,
6562 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
6564 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
6565 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
6566 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
6567 let route = find_route(
6568 &payer_pubkey, ¶ms, network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
6569 nodes[0].logger, &scorer
6572 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
6573 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
6574 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
6575 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage), None, None).unwrap();
6576 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6578 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6579 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
6580 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6581 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6582 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6583 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6584 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6586 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "We don't support MPP keysend payments".to_string(), 1);
6590 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
6591 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
6592 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
6593 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
6594 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6596 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
6597 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
6598 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
6599 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
6601 // Marshall an MPP route.
6602 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
6603 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
6604 route.paths.push(path);
6605 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
6606 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
6607 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
6608 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
6609 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
6610 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
6612 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None).unwrap_err() {
6613 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
6614 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err)) },
6615 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
6620 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "unstable"))]
6623 use chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
6624 use chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
6625 use ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
6626 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures};
6627 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
6628 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
6629 use routing::network_graph::NetworkGraph;
6630 use routing::router::{Payee, get_route};
6631 use routing::scoring::Scorer;
6632 use util::test_utils;
6633 use util::config::UserConfig;
6634 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PaymentPurpose};
6636 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
6637 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
6638 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, Transaction, TxOut};
6640 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
6644 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
6645 node: &'a ChannelManager<InMemorySigner,
6646 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
6647 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
6648 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
6649 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager,
6650 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestLogger>
6655 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
6656 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
6659 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
6660 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
6661 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
6663 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
6664 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
6666 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
6667 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
6669 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
6670 config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
6672 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
6673 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
6674 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
6675 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
6676 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
6678 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
6680 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
6682 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
6683 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
6684 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
6685 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
6686 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
6688 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
6690 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
6692 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
6693 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
6694 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
6695 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
6696 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
6699 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
6700 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
6701 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
6703 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
6704 } else { panic!(); }
6706 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
6707 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
6709 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
6712 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
6715 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
6716 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
6718 node_a.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
6719 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6720 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
6721 match msg_events[0] {
6722 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref msg, .. } => {
6723 node_b.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
6724 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
6728 match msg_events[1] {
6729 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
6733 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash);
6735 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
6736 macro_rules! send_payment {
6737 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
6738 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
6739 let payee = Payee::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id())
6740 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
6741 let scorer = Scorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
6742 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payee, &dummy_graph,
6743 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a, &scorer).unwrap();
6745 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
6746 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
6748 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
6749 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
6751 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
6752 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
6753 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6754 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
6755 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
6756 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6757 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
6758 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
6760 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
6761 expect_payment_received!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
6762 assert!($node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
6764 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
6765 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
6766 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
6767 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6768 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
6770 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
6773 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
6774 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6775 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
6776 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
6778 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
6783 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
6784 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);