1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
23 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
25 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
27 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
29 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
31 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
34 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
38 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
39 // construct one themselves.
40 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
41 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
42 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
43 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
44 use crate::ln::features::InvoiceFeatures;
45 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
46 use crate::routing::router::{DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, RoutePath, Router};
47 use crate::routing::scoring::ProbabilisticScorer;
49 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
50 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
51 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
53 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
54 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment};
55 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
56 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider, ChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
57 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig};
58 use crate::util::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
59 use crate::util::events;
60 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
61 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
62 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
63 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
64 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
65 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
67 use alloc::collections::BTreeMap;
70 use crate::prelude::*;
72 use core::cell::RefCell;
74 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
75 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
76 use core::time::Duration;
79 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
80 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure};
82 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
84 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
85 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
86 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
88 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
89 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
90 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
91 // before we forward it.
93 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
94 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
95 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
96 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
97 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
99 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
100 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
102 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
103 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
104 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
105 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
108 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
109 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
110 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
113 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
114 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
118 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
119 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
120 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
121 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
122 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
123 pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
124 pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
125 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
128 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
129 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
130 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
131 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
134 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
135 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
136 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
137 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
138 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
141 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
142 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
144 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
145 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
146 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
149 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
150 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
152 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
153 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
156 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
157 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
160 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
164 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
165 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
166 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
167 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
168 short_channel_id: u64,
170 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
171 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
173 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
174 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
179 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
181 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
182 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
183 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
185 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
186 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
189 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
190 struct ClaimableHTLC {
191 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
193 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
195 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
197 /// The sum total of all MPP parts
201 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
202 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
203 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
204 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
206 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
207 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
212 impl Readable for PaymentId {
213 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
214 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
219 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
220 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
221 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
222 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
224 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
225 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
230 impl Readable for InterceptId {
231 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
232 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
237 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
238 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
239 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
240 PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
241 OutboundRoute { session_priv: SecretKey },
244 pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
246 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
247 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
248 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
250 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
251 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: *session_priv },
255 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
256 (0, PreviousHopData) => {
257 (0, short_channel_id, required),
258 (2, htlc_id, required),
260 (2, OutboundRoute) => {
261 (0, session_priv, required),
266 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
267 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
268 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
269 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
270 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
273 session_priv: SecretKey,
274 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
275 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
276 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
277 payment_id: PaymentId,
278 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
281 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
282 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
283 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
285 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
287 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
289 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_secret, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
292 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
293 payment_id.hash(hasher);
294 payment_secret.hash(hasher);
295 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
300 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
303 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
304 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
306 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
307 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
308 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
309 payment_secret: None,
314 struct ReceiveError {
320 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
321 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
323 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
324 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
325 pub enum FailureCode {
326 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
327 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
328 TemporaryNodeFailure = 0x2000 | 2,
329 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
330 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
331 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing = 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
332 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
333 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
334 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
335 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
336 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails = 0x4000 | 15,
339 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>);
341 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
342 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
343 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
344 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
345 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
347 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
348 err: msgs::LightningError,
349 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
350 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
352 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
354 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
356 err: LightningError {
358 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
359 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
366 shutdown_finish: None,
370 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
371 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
374 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
376 err: LightningError {
378 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
379 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
385 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
386 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
390 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
393 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
395 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
396 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
400 log_level: Level::Warn,
403 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
405 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
407 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
409 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
410 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
418 shutdown_finish: None,
423 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
424 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
425 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
426 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
427 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
429 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
430 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
431 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
432 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
433 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
434 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
435 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
437 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
441 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
442 struct ClaimingPayment {
444 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
445 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
447 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
448 (0, amount_msat, required),
449 (2, payment_purpose, required),
450 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
453 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
454 struct ClaimablePayments {
455 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
456 /// failed/claimed by the user.
458 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
459 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
461 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
462 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
463 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, (events::PaymentPurpose, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>)>,
465 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
466 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
467 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
468 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
471 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
472 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
473 /// quite some time lag.
474 enum BackgroundEvent {
475 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
476 /// commitment transaction.
477 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
481 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
482 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
483 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
484 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
485 /// event can be generated.
486 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
487 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user.
488 EmitEvent { event: events::Event },
491 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
492 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
493 (2, EmitEvent) => { (0, event, upgradable_required) },
496 /// State we hold per-peer.
497 pub(super) struct PeerState<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
498 /// `temporary_channel_id` or `channel_id` -> `channel`.
500 /// Holds all channels where the peer is the counterparty. Once a channel has been assigned a
501 /// `channel_id`, the `temporary_channel_id` key in the map is updated and is replaced by the
503 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
504 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
505 latest_features: InitFeatures,
506 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
507 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
508 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
509 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
510 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
512 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
513 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
514 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
515 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
517 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
518 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
519 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
520 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
521 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
522 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
523 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
524 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
525 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
526 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
530 impl <Signer: ChannelSigner> PeerState<Signer> {
531 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
532 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
533 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
534 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
535 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
538 self.channel_by_id.is_empty() && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
542 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
543 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
545 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
548 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
549 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
550 struct PendingInboundPayment {
551 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
552 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
553 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
554 /// this payment being removed.
556 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
557 user_payment_id: u64,
558 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
559 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
560 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
563 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
564 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
565 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
566 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
567 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
568 /// that implements KeysInterface or Router for its keys manager and router, respectively, but this
569 /// type alias chooses the concrete types of KeysManager and DefaultRouter.
571 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
572 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
580 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
582 Arc<Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>
587 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
588 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
589 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
590 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
591 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
592 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
593 /// that implements KeysInterface or Router for its keys manager and router, respectively, but this
594 /// type alias chooses the concrete types of KeysManager and DefaultRouter.
596 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
597 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<&'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e DefaultRouter<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L, &'h Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>>, &'g L>;
599 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
600 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
602 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
603 /// to individual Channels.
605 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
606 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
607 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
608 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
610 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
611 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
612 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
613 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
614 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
615 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
616 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
618 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
619 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
620 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
621 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
624 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
625 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
626 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
627 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
628 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
630 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, ChannelManager limits the number of inbound connections and
631 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
632 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
633 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
635 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
636 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
637 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
639 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
640 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
641 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
642 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
643 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
646 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
647 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
648 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
649 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
650 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
654 // `total_consistency_lock`
656 // |__`forward_htlcs`
658 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
660 // |__`per_peer_state`
662 // | |__`pending_inbound_payments`
664 // | |__`claimable_payments`
666 // | |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
672 // | |__`short_to_chan_info`
674 // | |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
678 // | |__`pending_events`
680 // | |__`pending_background_events`
682 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
684 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
685 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
686 ES::Target: EntropySource,
687 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
688 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
689 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
693 default_configuration: UserConfig,
694 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
695 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
701 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
703 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
705 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
706 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
708 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
709 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
710 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
711 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
713 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
714 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
716 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
717 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
718 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
719 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
720 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
721 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
722 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
723 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
725 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
727 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
728 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
730 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
732 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
733 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
734 /// and via the classic SCID.
736 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
737 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
739 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
741 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
743 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
744 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
745 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
747 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
748 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
750 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
751 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
753 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
754 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
756 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
757 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
758 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
759 /// active channel list on load.
761 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
762 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
764 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
766 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
767 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
768 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
770 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
771 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
772 /// the handling of the events.
774 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
775 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
778 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
779 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
780 /// would break backwards compatability.
781 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
782 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
783 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
785 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
786 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<[u8; 32], PublicKey>>,
788 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
790 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
791 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
792 /// confirmation depth.
794 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
795 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
796 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
798 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
800 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
802 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
804 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
806 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
808 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
809 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
810 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
812 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
813 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
815 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
816 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
817 /// keeping additional state.
818 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
820 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
821 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
822 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
823 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
825 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
826 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
828 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
829 /// are currently open with that peer.
831 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
832 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
835 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
837 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
838 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
839 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
840 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
841 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
843 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
844 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
845 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
846 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
847 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
848 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
849 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
850 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
851 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
852 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
853 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
855 persistence_notifier: Notifier,
864 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
866 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
867 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
868 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
869 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
870 pub struct ChainParameters {
871 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
872 pub network: Network,
874 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
876 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
877 pub best_block: BestBlock,
880 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
886 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
887 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
888 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
889 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
890 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
891 /// updates are ready for persistence).
893 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
894 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
895 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
896 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
897 persistence_notifier: &'a Notifier,
899 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
900 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
903 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
904 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
905 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
908 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
909 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
911 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
912 persistence_notifier: notifier,
913 should_persist: persist_check,
914 _read_guard: read_guard,
919 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
921 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
922 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
927 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
928 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
930 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
932 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
933 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
934 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
935 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
936 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
938 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
939 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
941 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
943 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
944 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
945 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
946 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
947 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
948 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
949 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
950 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
951 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
952 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
953 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
954 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
955 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
957 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
958 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
960 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
961 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
962 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
963 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
965 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
966 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
967 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
968 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
969 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
970 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
973 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
975 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
976 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
979 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
981 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
982 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
984 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until we time-out the
985 /// idempotency of payments by [`PaymentId`]. See
986 /// [`OutboundPayments::remove_stale_resolved_payments`].
987 pub(crate) const IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 7;
989 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
990 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
991 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
992 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
994 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
995 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
996 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
998 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
999 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1000 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1002 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1003 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1004 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1005 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1006 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1007 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1008 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1009 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1010 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1011 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1012 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1015 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1016 /// to better separate parameters.
1017 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1018 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1019 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1020 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1021 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1022 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1023 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1024 pub features: InitFeatures,
1025 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1026 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1027 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1029 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1031 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1032 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1033 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1034 /// payments to us through this channel.
1035 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1036 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1037 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1038 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1039 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1040 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1041 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1044 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
1045 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1046 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1047 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1048 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1049 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1050 /// lifetime of the channel.
1051 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
1052 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1053 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1054 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1055 /// our counterparty already.
1057 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1058 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1059 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1060 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1062 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1063 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1064 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1065 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1067 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1068 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1070 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1071 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1073 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1074 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1075 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1076 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1077 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1078 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1079 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1080 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1081 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1084 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1086 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1087 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1088 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1089 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1090 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1091 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1092 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1094 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1095 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1097 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1098 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1099 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1100 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1101 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1102 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1103 /// this value on chain.
1105 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1107 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1109 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1110 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1111 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or a random value if the channel was
1112 /// inbound. This may be zero for inbound channels serialized with LDK versions prior to
1114 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1115 /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
1116 /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
1118 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
1119 pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
1120 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1121 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1122 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1124 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1125 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1126 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1127 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1129 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1130 pub balance_msat: u64,
1131 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1132 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1133 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1134 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1136 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1138 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1139 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1140 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1141 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1142 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1143 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1144 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1145 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1147 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`] and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1148 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1149 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1150 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1151 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1152 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1153 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1155 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1156 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1157 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1158 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1159 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1160 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1161 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1162 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1163 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1165 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1167 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1168 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1169 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1170 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1171 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1173 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1174 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1175 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1176 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1177 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1178 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1179 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1181 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1182 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1183 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1184 pub is_outbound: bool,
1185 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1186 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1187 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1188 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1189 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1191 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1192 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1193 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1194 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1196 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1197 pub is_usable: bool,
1198 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1199 pub is_public: bool,
1200 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1201 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1202 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1203 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1204 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1205 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1207 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1208 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1211 impl ChannelDetails {
1212 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1213 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1214 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1216 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1217 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1218 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1219 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1222 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1223 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1224 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1226 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1227 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1228 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1229 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1232 fn from_channel<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner>(channel: &Channel<Signer>,
1233 best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures) -> Self {
1235 let balance = channel.get_available_balances();
1236 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1237 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1239 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1240 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1241 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1242 features: latest_features,
1243 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1244 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1245 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1246 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1247 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1248 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1249 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1250 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if channel.have_received_message() {
1251 Some(channel.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1252 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1254 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1255 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1256 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1257 channel_type: if channel.have_received_message() { Some(channel.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1258 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1259 outbound_scid_alias: if channel.is_usable() { Some(channel.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1260 inbound_scid_alias: channel.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1261 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1262 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(channel.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
1263 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1264 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1265 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1266 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1267 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1268 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1269 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1270 confirmations: Some(channel.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1271 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1272 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1273 is_channel_ready: channel.is_usable(),
1274 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1275 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1276 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1277 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1278 config: Some(channel.config()),
1283 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1284 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1285 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1286 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1287 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1289 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1291 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1292 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1293 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1296 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1297 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1298 /// payment is removed from tracking.
1300 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1301 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1302 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1304 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1305 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1306 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1308 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1309 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1313 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1315 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
1317 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1318 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1319 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1320 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1322 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1323 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1324 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1327 macro_rules! handle_error {
1328 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
1331 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1332 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1333 // entering the macro.
1334 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1335 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1337 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1339 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1340 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1341 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1342 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1346 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1347 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1348 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1349 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1354 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1355 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1357 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1358 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1359 action: err.action.clone()
1363 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1364 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1365 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1366 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1367 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1371 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1378 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1379 ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {{
1380 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.channel_id());
1381 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1382 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1383 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1385 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1386 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1387 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1388 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1389 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1391 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1392 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1394 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1398 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1399 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1400 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1402 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1403 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1405 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1406 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1408 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1409 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1410 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel);
1411 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1412 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1413 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1419 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1420 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1424 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1426 $entry.remove_entry();
1434 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1435 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1439 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1441 $entry.remove_entry();
1449 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1450 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1452 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1453 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, channel);
1459 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1460 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
1461 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1462 node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1463 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1465 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1466 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1467 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1468 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1469 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1470 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1471 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1472 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1473 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1474 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1479 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
1480 ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1481 if $channel.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
1483 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1484 pending_events.push(events::Event::ChannelReady {
1485 channel_id: $channel.channel_id(),
1486 user_channel_id: $channel.get_user_id(),
1487 counterparty_node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1488 channel_type: $channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
1491 $channel.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
1496 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
1497 ($self: ident, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
1498 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&$self.logger,
1499 &$self.node_signer, $self.genesis_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
1500 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
1501 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
1502 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.is_usable() {
1503 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
1504 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
1505 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
1506 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
1508 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
1509 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
1510 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1516 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
1517 .remove(&$chan.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
1519 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
1520 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
1521 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
1522 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
1523 updates.announcement_sigs);
1524 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
1525 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
1528 let channel_id = $chan.channel_id();
1529 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
1530 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
1532 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
1534 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1535 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1537 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
1538 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1539 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
1540 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
1545 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
1546 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, MANUALLY_REMOVING, $remove: expr) => { {
1547 // update_maps_on_chan_removal needs to be able to take id_to_peer, so make sure we can in
1548 // any case so that it won't deadlock.
1549 debug_assert!($self.id_to_peer.try_lock().is_ok());
1551 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
1552 log_debug!($self.logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
1553 log_bytes!($chan.channel_id()[..]));
1556 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
1557 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure",
1558 log_bytes!($chan.channel_id()[..]));
1559 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $chan);
1560 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(
1561 "ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), $chan.channel_id(),
1562 $chan.get_user_id(), $chan.force_shutdown(false),
1563 $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok()));
1567 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
1568 if ($update_id == 0 || $chan.get_next_monitor_update()
1569 .expect("We can't be processing a monitor update if it isn't queued")
1570 .update_id == $update_id) &&
1571 $chan.get_latest_monitor_update_id() == $update_id
1573 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $update_id, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
1579 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan_entry: expr) => {
1580 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $update_id, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan_entry.get_mut(), MANUALLY_REMOVING, $chan_entry.remove_entry())
1584 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
1586 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
1587 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1588 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1589 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1590 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1591 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1595 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
1597 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1598 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
1600 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1602 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
1603 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
1604 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
1605 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1606 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1607 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1608 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
1609 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
1611 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1612 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1613 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
1618 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1620 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
1621 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1622 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
1623 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1624 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
1625 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1626 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1627 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1629 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
1632 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
1633 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1635 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1637 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1639 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1641 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1642 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1643 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1644 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
1654 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
1655 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1656 &self.default_configuration
1659 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1660 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1661 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
1664 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
1665 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
1667 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
1669 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
1673 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
1678 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1680 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1681 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1682 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
1683 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
1684 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
1686 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1687 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1689 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1690 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1691 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1693 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1694 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1695 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1696 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1697 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1698 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1700 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1701 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1702 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1703 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1704 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1705 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1708 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1709 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1710 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1712 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1714 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
1715 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
1717 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1719 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
1720 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1721 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1722 match Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
1723 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
1724 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
1728 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
1733 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1735 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1736 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1737 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1739 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1741 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1744 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1747 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1748 node_id: their_network_key,
1751 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1754 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1755 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
1756 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
1757 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
1758 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
1759 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
1760 // the same channel.
1761 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
1763 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1764 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1765 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
1766 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1767 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1768 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1769 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel(channel, best_block_height,
1770 peer_state.latest_features.clone());
1778 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
1779 /// more information.
1780 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1781 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1784 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
1785 /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1787 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1788 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1790 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1791 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1792 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1793 // really wanted anyway.
1794 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1797 /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
1798 pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1799 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1800 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1802 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
1803 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1804 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1805 let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1806 return peer_state.channel_by_id
1809 ChannelDetails::from_channel(channel, best_block_height, features.clone()))
1815 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
1816 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1818 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
1819 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
1820 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
1822 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
1823 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
1824 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
1825 .filter_map(|(_, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
1826 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
1827 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
1828 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
1829 total_msat: *total_msat,
1832 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
1833 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
1835 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
1836 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
1838 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
1843 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
1844 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
1845 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1846 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
1847 Some(transaction) => {
1848 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::DiscardFunding { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction })
1852 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1853 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1854 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1855 reason: closure_reason
1859 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1860 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1862 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
1863 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
1864 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1866 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
1867 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
1869 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1870 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1871 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1872 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1873 let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo();
1874 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1875 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut()
1876 .get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?;
1877 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
1879 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
1880 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
1881 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
1882 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1883 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
1887 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
1888 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
1889 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
1890 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update);
1891 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry);
1894 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1895 let channel = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
1896 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
1897 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1901 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1905 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id) })
1909 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1910 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
1911 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
1912 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
1915 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
1919 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1920 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1921 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1923 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
1924 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1926 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
1927 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
1928 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
1929 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
1931 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1933 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1934 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1935 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1936 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1937 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None)
1940 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1941 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1942 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1944 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
1945 /// the channel being closed or not:
1946 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
1947 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
1948 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1949 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
1950 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
1951 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
1952 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
1954 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1956 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1957 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1958 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1959 pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1960 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
1964 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1965 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1966 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1967 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1968 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
1969 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
1970 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
1971 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
1973 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
1974 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
1975 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
1976 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
1977 // ignore the result here.
1978 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
1982 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
1983 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
1984 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
1985 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
1986 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1987 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
1988 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
1990 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1991 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1992 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1993 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
1994 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) });
1996 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1998 remove_channel!(self, chan)
2000 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), peer_node_id) });
2003 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2004 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(broadcast));
2005 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2006 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2007 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2012 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
2015 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2016 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2017 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2018 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2019 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2020 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2021 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2022 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
2023 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2024 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2025 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
2026 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
2037 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2038 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2039 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2041 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2042 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2043 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2046 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2047 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2048 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2050 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2051 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2052 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2053 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2054 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2057 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2058 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2059 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2060 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2061 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2065 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2066 /// local transaction(s).
2067 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2068 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2069 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2073 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(&self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
2074 payment_hash: PaymentHash, amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError>
2076 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2077 if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != cltv_expiry {
2078 return Err(ReceiveError {
2079 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value",
2081 err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
2084 // final_expiry_too_soon
2085 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2086 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2088 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2089 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2090 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2091 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2092 if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= current_height as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2093 let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12);
2094 err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes());
2095 err_data.extend_from_slice(¤t_height.to_be_bytes());
2096 return Err(ReceiveError {
2097 err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data,
2098 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2101 if hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat {
2102 return Err(ReceiveError {
2104 err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
2105 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2109 let routing = match hop_data.format {
2110 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => {
2111 return Err(ReceiveError {
2112 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2113 err_data: Vec::new(),
2114 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2117 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
2118 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
2119 return Err(ReceiveError {
2120 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2121 err_data: Vec::new(),
2122 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2124 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2125 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2127 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2128 phantom_shared_secret,
2130 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2131 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2132 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2133 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2134 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2135 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2136 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2137 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2138 return Err(ReceiveError {
2139 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2140 err_data: Vec::new(),
2141 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2145 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2147 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2150 return Err(ReceiveError {
2151 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2152 err_data: Vec::new(),
2153 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2158 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2161 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2162 incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
2163 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_msat,
2164 outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2168 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
2169 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2170 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2172 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2173 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2174 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2175 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2176 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2177 failure_code: $err_code,
2183 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2184 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2187 let shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(
2188 Recipient::Node, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None
2189 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
2191 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2192 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2193 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2194 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2195 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2196 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2197 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2198 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2200 macro_rules! return_err {
2201 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2203 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2204 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2205 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2206 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2207 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
2208 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
2214 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2216 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2217 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2219 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2220 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2224 let pending_forward_info = match next_hop {
2225 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
2227 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None) {
2229 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
2230 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
2231 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
2232 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
2233 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
2235 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
2238 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
2239 let new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
2240 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2242 public_key: onion_utils::next_hop_packet_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx, new_pubkey, &shared_secret),
2243 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2244 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
2247 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
2248 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2249 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
2250 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2254 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2255 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2256 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2259 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2260 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2261 incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
2262 outgoing_amt_msat: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2263 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2268 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref outgoing_amt_msat, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
2269 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
2270 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
2271 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
2272 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
2273 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
2274 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(short_channel_id).cloned();
2275 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
2276 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2277 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2278 // phantom or an intercept.
2279 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
2280 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)) ||
2281 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)
2285 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2288 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
2290 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
2291 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2292 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
2293 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
2294 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2296 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
2297 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2298 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id) {
2300 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
2301 // have no consistency guarantees.
2302 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2306 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2307 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2308 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2309 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2310 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2312 if chan.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && *short_channel_id != chan.outbound_scid_alias() {
2313 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
2314 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
2315 // we don't have the channel here.
2316 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2318 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(*short_channel_id, chan).ok();
2320 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2321 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2322 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2323 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2324 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2325 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2326 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2328 if *outgoing_amt_msat < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2329 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
2331 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, *outgoing_amt_msat, *outgoing_cltv_value) {
2332 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
2336 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
2337 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
2338 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
2339 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
2341 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
2348 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2349 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2350 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2351 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2352 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2353 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2355 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2356 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2358 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2359 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2360 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2361 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2362 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2363 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2364 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2365 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2366 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2367 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2373 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
2374 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2375 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2376 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2378 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2379 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2381 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2382 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
2383 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2385 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2386 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2387 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2388 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
2389 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
2390 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
2391 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
2395 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
2400 pending_forward_info
2403 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2404 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2405 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2407 /// Note that in `internal_closing_signed`, this function is called without the `peer_state`
2408 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
2409 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
2410 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2411 if !chan.should_announce() {
2412 return Err(LightningError {
2413 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2414 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2417 if chan.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
2418 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
2420 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2421 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2424 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2425 /// is public (only returning an Err if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id),
2426 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2427 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2429 /// Note that through `internal_closing_signed`, this function is called without the
2430 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
2431 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
2432 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2433 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2434 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
2435 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2439 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
2441 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2442 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2443 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2445 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2446 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2448 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2449 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
2450 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2451 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2452 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
2453 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2454 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2455 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2457 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
2458 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
2459 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
2461 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
2463 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2470 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2471 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2472 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv_bytes)
2475 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2476 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
2477 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2479 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2480 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
2481 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2483 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2484 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected".to_owned()})?;
2485 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2486 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
2487 return Err(APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Route size too large considering onion data".to_owned()});
2489 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
2491 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2492 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2493 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2494 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
2497 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2498 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
2499 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
2500 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2501 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2502 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
2503 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2504 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
2506 let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2507 let send_res = chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
2508 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2510 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2511 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2513 payment_secret: payment_secret.clone(),
2514 }, onion_packet, &self.logger);
2515 match break_chan_entry!(self, send_res, chan) {
2516 Some(monitor_update) => {
2517 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2518 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
2519 if let Err(e) = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
2522 if update_res == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress {
2523 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
2524 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
2525 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
2526 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
2527 // which we do in the send_payment check for
2528 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
2529 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
2535 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
2536 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
2537 // `channel_by_id` map.
2538 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
2539 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
2544 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2545 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2547 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2552 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2554 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
2555 /// fields for more info.
2557 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
2558 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
2560 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
2562 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
2563 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
2564 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
2565 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
2566 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
2568 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
2569 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
2570 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
2571 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
2572 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
2574 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
2575 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
2576 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
2577 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
2579 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
2581 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
2582 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2583 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
2585 /// In general, a path may raise:
2586 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2587 /// node public key) is specified.
2588 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2589 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2591 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2592 /// relevant updates.
2594 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
2595 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2596 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2598 /// # A caution on `payment_secret`
2600 /// `payment_secret` is unrelated to `payment_hash` (or [`PaymentPreimage`]) and exists to
2601 /// authenticate the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization)
2602 /// attacks. For newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one,
2603 /// the [`Route`] must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a
2604 /// recipient-provided `payment_secret`.
2606 /// If a `payment_secret` *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret
2607 /// feature bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the
2608 /// [`Route`], we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
2610 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2611 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2612 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
2613 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
2614 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2615 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2616 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2617 self.pending_outbound_payments
2618 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2619 |path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2620 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2623 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment`], but will automatically find a route based on
2624 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
2625 pub fn send_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
2626 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2627 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2628 self.pending_outbound_payments
2629 .send_payment(payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
2630 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
2631 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
2632 &self.pending_events,
2633 |path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2634 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2638 fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2639 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2640 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2641 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2642 |path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2643 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2647 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
2648 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2649 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
2653 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
2654 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
2655 /// retries are exhausted.
2657 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
2658 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
2660 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
2661 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
2662 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
2664 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event is generated and we restart without this
2665 /// [`ChannelManager`] having been persisted, another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated.
2667 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2668 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2669 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
2670 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2671 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, &self.pending_events);
2674 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2675 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2676 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2677 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2678 /// never reach the recipient.
2680 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
2681 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
2683 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2684 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2686 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2688 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2689 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
2690 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2691 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2692 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
2693 route, payment_preimage, payment_id, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer,
2695 |path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2696 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2699 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
2700 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
2702 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
2705 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
2706 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
2707 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2708 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2709 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, payment_id,
2710 retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
2711 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2712 &self.logger, &self.pending_events,
2713 |path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2714 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2717 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
2718 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
2719 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
2720 pub fn send_probe(&self, hops: Vec<RouteHop>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2721 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2722 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2723 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(hops, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2724 |path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2725 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2728 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
2731 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
2732 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
2735 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2736 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2737 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
2738 &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
2739 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2740 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2741 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2742 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2744 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2745 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2748 match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2750 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2752 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2753 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2754 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2755 } else { unreachable!(); })
2758 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id) }) },
2761 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
2762 Ok(funding_msg) => {
2765 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2766 err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
2771 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2772 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2775 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2776 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2777 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2779 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2780 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
2781 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.channel_id(), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
2782 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
2791 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2792 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2793 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2797 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2799 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2800 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2802 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
2803 /// across the p2p network.
2805 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
2806 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
2808 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2809 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
2810 /// keys per-channel).
2812 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
2813 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
2814 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
2816 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
2817 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
2818 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2820 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
2821 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
2822 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
2823 /// for more details.
2825 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2826 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::util::events::Event::ChannelClosed
2827 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2828 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2830 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
2831 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
2832 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2833 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
2838 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2839 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools at the next block. However, the modules
2840 // constituting our Lightning node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if
2841 // the wallet module is in advance on the LDK view, allow one more block of headroom.
2842 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 2 {
2843 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2844 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
2848 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
2849 let mut output_index = None;
2850 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
2851 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2852 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
2853 if output_index.is_some() {
2854 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2855 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
2858 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
2859 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2860 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
2863 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
2866 if output_index.is_none() {
2867 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2868 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
2871 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
2875 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
2877 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
2878 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
2879 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
2880 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
2882 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
2883 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
2885 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
2886 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
2888 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
2890 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
2891 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
2892 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
2893 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
2894 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2895 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
2896 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
2897 pub fn update_channel_config(
2898 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config: &ChannelConfig,
2899 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2900 if config.cltv_expiry_delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA {
2901 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2902 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
2906 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(
2907 &self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier,
2909 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2910 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2911 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2912 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2913 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2914 for channel_id in channel_ids {
2915 if !peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) {
2916 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2917 err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
2921 for channel_id in channel_ids {
2922 let channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id).unwrap();
2923 if !channel.update_config(config) {
2926 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
2927 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
2928 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
2929 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2930 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2938 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
2939 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
2941 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
2942 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
2944 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
2945 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
2946 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
2947 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
2948 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
2950 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
2951 /// you from forwarding more than you received.
2953 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
2956 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
2957 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
2958 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
2959 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
2960 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &[u8; 32], next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2961 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2963 let next_hop_scid = {
2964 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2965 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
2966 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
2967 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2968 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2969 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
2971 if !chan.is_usable() {
2972 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2973 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id))
2976 chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.outbound_scid_alias())
2978 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2979 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id), next_node_id)
2984 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
2985 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
2986 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
2989 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
2990 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => {
2991 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid }
2993 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
2995 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
2996 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
2999 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
3000 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3001 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3002 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
3003 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
3005 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
3009 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
3010 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
3012 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3015 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3016 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3017 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3019 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3020 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3021 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3024 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
3025 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3026 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3027 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3028 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
3029 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
3030 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3033 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
3034 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
3035 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3036 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3041 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
3043 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
3044 /// Will likely generate further events.
3045 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
3046 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3048 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
3049 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
3050 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
3052 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
3053 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
3055 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
3056 if short_chan_id != 0 {
3057 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
3059 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3060 match forward_info {
3061 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3062 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3063 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3064 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
3065 outgoing_cltv_value, incoming_amt_msat: _
3068 macro_rules! failure_handler {
3069 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
3070 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3072 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3073 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3074 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3075 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3076 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3077 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
3080 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
3081 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
3083 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
3086 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3087 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
3093 macro_rules! fail_forward {
3094 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3096 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
3100 macro_rules! failed_payment {
3101 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3103 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
3107 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
3108 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
3109 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.genesis_hash) {
3110 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
3111 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
3113 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3114 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
3115 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
3116 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
3117 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
3119 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
3121 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3122 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
3126 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
3127 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) {
3128 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
3129 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
3135 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3138 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3141 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3142 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
3143 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
3144 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
3145 // problem, not ours.
3151 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id) {
3152 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3154 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3158 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3159 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3160 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3161 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3164 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3165 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3166 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
3167 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3168 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3171 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3172 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3173 match forward_info {
3174 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3175 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id: _,
3176 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3177 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
3178 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, incoming_amt_msat: _,
3181 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
3182 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3183 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3184 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3185 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3186 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3187 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
3188 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3190 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
3191 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
3192 onion_packet, &self.logger)
3194 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3195 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
3197 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3199 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
3200 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3201 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
3202 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
3207 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3208 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3210 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3211 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3212 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_fail_htlc(
3213 htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger
3215 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3216 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3218 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
3220 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3221 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3222 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3231 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3232 match forward_info {
3233 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3234 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3235 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3236 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, ..
3239 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret) = match routing {
3240 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } => {
3241 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
3242 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data }, Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret)
3244 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
3245 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage), None, None),
3247 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3250 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3251 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3252 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3253 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3254 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3255 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3256 phantom_shared_secret,
3258 value: outgoing_amt_msat,
3260 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
3265 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3266 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
3267 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3268 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3269 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
3271 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3272 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
3273 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3274 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3275 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3276 phantom_shared_secret,
3278 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
3279 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
3283 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
3284 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
3285 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
3286 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
3287 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
3290 macro_rules! check_total_value {
3291 ($payment_data: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{
3292 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
3294 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
3295 payment_preimage: $payment_preimage,
3296 payment_secret: $payment_data.payment_secret,
3299 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3300 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3301 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3304 let (_, htlcs) = claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
3305 .or_insert_with(|| (purpose(), Vec::new()));
3306 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
3307 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3308 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3309 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3313 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.value;
3314 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3315 total_value += htlc.value;
3316 match &htlc.onion_payload {
3317 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3318 if htlc.total_msat != $payment_data.total_msat {
3319 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
3320 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $payment_data.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
3321 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
3323 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
3325 _ => unreachable!(),
3328 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > $payment_data.total_msat {
3329 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
3330 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, $payment_data.total_msat);
3331 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3332 } else if total_value == $payment_data.total_msat {
3333 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3334 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3335 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3336 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3339 amount_msat: total_value,
3340 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3341 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3343 payment_claimable_generated = true;
3345 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
3346 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
3348 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3350 payment_claimable_generated
3354 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
3355 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
3356 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
3357 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
3358 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
3359 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
3360 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3361 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3362 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3363 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3364 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3365 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3366 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
3367 Ok(result) => result,
3369 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3370 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3374 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
3375 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
3376 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
3377 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
3378 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
3379 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3383 check_total_value!(payment_data, payment_preimage);
3385 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
3386 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3387 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3388 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3391 match claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
3392 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3393 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
3394 e.insert((purpose.clone(), vec![claimable_htlc]));
3395 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3396 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3397 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3399 amount_msat: outgoing_amt_msat,
3401 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3402 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3405 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3406 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3407 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3413 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
3414 if payment_data.is_none() {
3415 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3416 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3419 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3420 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
3421 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3422 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3423 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
3424 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
3425 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
3426 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3428 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage);
3429 if payment_claimable_generated {
3430 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
3436 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3437 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
3445 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3446 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
3447 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3448 &self.pending_events, &self.logger,
3449 |path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
3450 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv));
3452 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
3453 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3455 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
3457 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
3458 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
3459 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
3461 self.check_free_holding_cells();
3463 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
3464 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3465 events.append(&mut new_events);
3468 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
3470 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
3471 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
3473 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
3474 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
3475 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
3476 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
3477 if background_events.is_empty() {
3481 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
3483 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
3484 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
3485 // monitor updating completing.
3486 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
3493 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3494 /// Process background events, for functional testing
3495 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
3496 self.process_background_events();
3499 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
3500 if !chan.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersist; }
3501 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
3502 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
3503 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3504 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
3505 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3507 if !chan.is_live() {
3508 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
3509 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
3510 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3512 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3513 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
3515 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.logger);
3516 NotifyOption::DoPersist
3520 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
3521 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
3522 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
3523 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
3524 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
3525 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3526 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3528 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3530 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3531 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3532 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3533 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3534 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
3535 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3536 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3544 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
3546 /// This currently includes:
3547 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
3548 /// * Broadcasting `ChannelUpdate` messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
3549 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
3551 /// * Expiring a channel's previous `ChannelConfig` if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
3552 /// with the current `ChannelConfig`.
3553 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
3555 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through `chain::Watch::update_channel` calls or feerate
3556 /// estimate fetches.
3557 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
3558 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3559 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3560 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3562 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3564 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
3565 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
3566 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
3568 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3569 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3570 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3571 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3572 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
3573 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
3574 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3575 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3576 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3578 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
3579 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id);
3580 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
3581 if needs_close { return false; }
3584 match chan.channel_update_status() {
3585 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
3586 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
3587 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3588 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3589 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
3590 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3591 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3595 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3596 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3598 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
3599 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3600 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3604 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3605 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3610 chan.maybe_expire_prev_config();
3614 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
3615 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
3620 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
3621 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
3622 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
3623 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
3624 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
3625 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
3626 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
3627 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
3628 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
3629 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
3630 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
3631 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
3632 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
3633 // have no channels to the peer.
3634 let remove_entry = {
3635 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
3636 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
3639 entry.remove_entry();
3642 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
3647 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
3648 if htlcs.is_empty() {
3649 // This should be unreachable
3650 debug_assert!(false);
3653 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3654 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
3655 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
3656 if htlcs[0].total_msat == htlcs.iter().fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.value) {
3658 } else if htlcs.into_iter().any(|htlc| {
3659 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
3660 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
3662 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(htlcs.drain(..).map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
3669 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
3670 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
3671 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
3672 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
3673 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
3676 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3677 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3680 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_resolved_payments(&self.pending_events);
3682 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
3683 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
3684 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
3685 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
3686 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3693 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
3694 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
3695 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
3697 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
3698 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
3699 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
3700 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
3702 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
3703 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
3704 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
3705 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
3706 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
3707 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
3710 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
3711 /// reason for the failure.
3713 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
3714 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
3715 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3717 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
3718 if let Some((_, mut sources)) = removed_source {
3719 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3720 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
3721 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
3722 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
3723 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3728 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
3729 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
3730 match failure_code {
3731 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code as u16),
3732 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code as u16),
3733 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
3734 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3735 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
3736 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code as u16, htlc_msat_height_data)
3741 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3742 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3744 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
3746 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3747 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
3748 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
3749 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
3750 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
3751 let scid_pref = if chan.should_announce() {
3752 chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
3754 chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.get_short_channel_id())
3756 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
3757 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
3759 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3764 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3765 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3766 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3767 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
3768 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
3769 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
3770 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3771 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
3772 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
3773 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3775 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3776 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3777 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3778 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
3780 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
3781 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
3782 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
3783 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
3784 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3788 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
3789 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
3790 // be surfaced to the user.
3791 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
3792 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32],
3793 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
3795 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
3796 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3797 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
3798 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3799 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3800 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3801 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
3802 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
3804 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3806 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
3809 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
3810 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
3811 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
3812 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3816 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
3817 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
3818 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
3819 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
3820 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
3821 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
3822 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
3823 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
3824 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
3827 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
3828 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
3829 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
3832 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3833 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
3834 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3836 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
3837 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
3838 session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
3839 &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
3840 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
3842 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint }) => {
3843 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), onion_error);
3844 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
3846 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
3847 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
3848 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3849 push_forward_ev = true;
3851 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
3852 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3853 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
3855 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3856 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
3859 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
3860 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
3861 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3862 pending_events.push(events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
3863 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
3864 failed_next_destination: destination,
3870 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
3871 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
3873 /// Note that calling this method does *not* guarantee that the payment has been claimed. You
3874 /// *must* wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] event which upon a successful claim will be
3875 /// provided to your [`EventHandler`] when [`process_pending_events`] is next called.
3877 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
3878 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
3879 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
3880 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
3882 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
3883 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
3884 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
3885 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
3886 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
3887 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
3888 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3890 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3893 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3894 if let Some((payment_purpose, sources)) = claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
3895 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
3896 for htlc in sources.iter() {
3897 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
3898 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
3899 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
3900 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
3905 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
3906 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: sources.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
3907 payment_purpose, receiver_node_id,
3909 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
3910 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
3911 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
3912 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3917 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
3919 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we check that all channels which contain a claimable
3920 // HTLC still exist. While this isn't guaranteed to remain true if a channel closes while
3921 // we're claiming (or even after we claim, before the commitment update dance completes),
3922 // it should be a relatively rare race, and we'd rather not claim HTLCs that require us to
3923 // go on-chain (and lose the on-chain fee to do so) than just reject the payment.
3925 // Note that we'll still always get our funds - as long as the generated
3926 // `ChannelMonitorUpdate` makes it out to the relevant monitor we can claim on-chain.
3928 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
3929 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
3930 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
3931 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
3932 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
3934 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
3935 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
3936 let mut valid_mpp = true;
3937 let mut errs = Vec::new();
3938 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3939 for htlc in sources.iter() {
3940 let (counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3941 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3948 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3949 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3954 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3955 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3957 if peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&chan_id).is_none() {
3962 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
3963 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
3964 debug_assert!(false);
3969 expected_amt_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
3970 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = &htlc.onion_payload {
3971 // We don't currently support MPP for spontaneous payments, so just check
3972 // that there's one payment here and move on.
3973 if sources.len() != 1 {
3974 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP spontaneous payment - this should not be reachable!");
3975 debug_assert!(false);
3981 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
3983 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3984 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
3985 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
3986 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
3989 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
3990 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
3991 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
3992 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
3996 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3997 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
3998 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
3999 |_| Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash }))
4001 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
4002 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
4003 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
4004 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
4005 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
4010 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4011 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4012 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
4013 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4014 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
4015 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
4016 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4018 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4021 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
4022 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
4023 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4024 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
4028 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
4029 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
4030 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
4031 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
4033 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4034 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
4035 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
4036 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
4040 let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
4041 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id).map(
4042 |peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap()
4046 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
4047 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
4048 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4049 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4050 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
4051 let fulfill_res = chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger);
4053 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = fulfill_res {
4054 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)) {
4055 log_trace!(self.logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
4056 log_bytes!(chan_id), action);
4057 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
4059 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4060 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update);
4061 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock,
4062 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4063 if let Err(e) = res {
4064 // TODO: This is a *critical* error - we probably updated the outbound edge
4065 // of the HTLC's monitor with a preimage. We should retry this monitor
4066 // update over and over again until morale improves.
4067 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}", payment_preimage);
4068 return Err((counterparty_node_id, e));
4074 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4075 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
4076 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
4080 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
4081 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
4082 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
4083 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
4084 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
4085 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
4086 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
4087 // again on restart.
4088 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4089 payment_preimage, update_res);
4091 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
4092 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
4093 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
4094 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
4095 // `PaymentForwarded`).
4096 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
4100 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
4101 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
4104 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
4106 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
4107 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage, session_priv, path, from_onchain, &self.pending_events, &self.logger);
4109 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
4110 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
4111 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
4112 |htlc_claim_value_msat| {
4113 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
4114 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
4115 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
4118 let prev_channel_id = Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id());
4119 let next_channel_id = Some(next_channel_id);
4121 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEvent { event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
4123 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
4129 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
4130 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4131 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
4137 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
4138 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4139 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
4142 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
4143 for action in actions.into_iter() {
4145 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
4146 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4147 if let Some(ClaimingPayment { amount_msat, payment_purpose: purpose, receiver_node_id }) = payment {
4148 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
4149 payment_hash, purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4153 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEvent { event } => {
4154 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(event);
4160 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
4161 /// update completion.
4162 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4163 channel: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
4164 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
4165 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
4166 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
4167 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
4168 log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
4169 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()),
4170 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
4171 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
4172 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
4173 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
4174 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
4176 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
4178 let counterparty_node_id = channel.get_counterparty_node_id();
4179 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4180 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.outbound_scid_alias()),
4181 channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
4184 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4185 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
4187 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
4188 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4189 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4194 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, channel);
4196 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
4197 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
4198 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4199 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4204 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
4205 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
4206 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4207 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4208 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4213 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
4217 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
4223 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
4224 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
4225 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
4231 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
4232 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
4234 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
4235 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4237 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
4238 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
4239 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4240 match id_to_peer.get(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4241 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4246 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4247 let mut peer_state_lock;
4248 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4249 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
4250 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4251 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4253 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()){
4254 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
4255 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
4258 log_trace!(self.logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}",
4259 highest_applied_update_id, channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id());
4260 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
4263 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, highest_applied_update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel.get_mut());
4266 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
4268 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
4269 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
4272 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4273 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4274 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4276 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
4277 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
4278 /// used to accept such channels.
4280 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4281 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4282 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4283 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
4286 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
4287 /// it as confirmed immediately.
4289 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4290 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4291 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4293 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
4294 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
4296 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
4297 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
4299 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
4300 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
4302 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4303 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4304 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4305 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
4308 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4309 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4311 let peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| !peer.channel_by_id.is_empty());
4312 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4313 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4314 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4315 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4316 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4317 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.len() == 1;
4318 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4319 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
4320 if !channel.get().inbound_is_awaiting_accept() {
4321 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
4324 channel.get_mut().set_0conf();
4325 } else if channel.get().get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4326 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4327 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4328 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4329 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
4332 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4333 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4334 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
4336 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
4337 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
4338 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
4339 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
4340 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4341 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4342 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4343 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
4346 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4347 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4348 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned() });
4352 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4353 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4354 msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4357 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4358 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id) });
4364 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
4365 /// or 0-conf channels.
4367 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
4368 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
4369 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
4370 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> bool {
4371 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
4372 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4374 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4375 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
4376 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
4377 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
4378 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
4379 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.channel_by_id.len() {
4380 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
4384 return peers_without_funded_channels;
4387 fn unfunded_channel_count(
4388 peer: &PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, best_block_height: u32
4390 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
4391 for (_, chan) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
4392 if !chan.is_outbound() && chan.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
4393 chan.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
4395 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
4398 num_unfunded_channels
4401 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4402 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
4403 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4406 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
4407 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4410 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
4411 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
4412 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
4413 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
4415 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
4416 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
4417 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
4418 let channeled_peers_without_funding = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| !node.channel_by_id.is_empty());
4420 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4421 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4423 debug_assert!(false);
4424 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())
4426 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4427 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4429 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
4430 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
4431 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
4432 if peer_state.channel_by_id.is_empty() &&
4433 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
4434 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
4436 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4437 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
4438 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4441 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4442 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
4443 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4444 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
4445 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4448 let mut channel = match Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
4449 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
4450 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias)
4453 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4454 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
4458 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
4459 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4460 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4461 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
4463 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4464 if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
4465 if channel.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4466 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4468 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4469 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4470 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4473 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4474 pending_events.push(
4475 events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
4476 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
4477 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4478 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
4479 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
4480 channel_type: channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
4485 entry.insert(channel);
4491 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4492 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
4493 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4494 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4496 debug_assert!(false);
4497 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
4499 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4500 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4501 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4502 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4503 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), chan);
4504 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
4506 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4509 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4510 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
4511 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
4512 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4513 channel_value_satoshis: value,
4515 user_channel_id: user_id,
4520 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4521 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4523 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4524 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4526 debug_assert!(false);
4527 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
4530 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4531 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4532 let ((funding_msg, monitor), chan) =
4533 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4534 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4535 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan), chan.remove())
4537 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4540 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
4541 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4542 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
4544 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4545 match self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().entry(chan.channel_id()) {
4546 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4547 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4548 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
4549 funding_msg.channel_id))
4551 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
4552 i_e.insert(chan.get_counterparty_node_id());
4556 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
4557 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
4558 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
4559 // until we have persisted our monitor.
4560 let new_channel_id = funding_msg.channel_id;
4561 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
4562 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4566 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
4568 let chan = e.insert(chan);
4569 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, monitor_res, 0, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
4570 per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING, { peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&new_channel_id) });
4572 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
4573 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
4574 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
4575 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
4576 // We do not propagate the monitor update to the user as it would be for a monitor
4577 // that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we don't respond
4578 // with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
4579 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { shutdown_finish: Some((res, _)), .. }) = &mut res {
4587 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4588 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4589 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4590 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4592 debug_assert!(false);
4593 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4596 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4597 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4598 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4599 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4600 let monitor = try_chan_entry!(self,
4601 chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan);
4602 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor);
4603 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, 0, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4604 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
4605 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
4606 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
4607 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
4608 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
4609 shutdown_finish.0.take();
4614 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4618 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4619 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4620 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4622 debug_assert!(false);
4623 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4625 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4626 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4627 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4628 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4629 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
4630 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan);
4631 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
4632 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4633 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4634 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4635 msg: announcement_sigs,
4637 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4638 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
4639 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
4640 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
4641 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
4642 // announcement_signatures.
4643 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4644 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
4645 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4646 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4652 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, chan.get_mut());
4656 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4660 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4661 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
4662 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
4663 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4664 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4666 debug_assert!(false);
4667 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4669 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4670 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4671 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4672 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4674 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
4675 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
4676 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
4677 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
4680 let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo();
4681 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self,
4682 chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_entry);
4683 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
4685 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4686 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
4687 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
4688 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
4689 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4690 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4695 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
4696 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
4697 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4698 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update);
4699 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry);
4703 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4706 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
4707 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
4708 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
4709 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
4715 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4716 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4717 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4719 debug_assert!(false);
4720 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4722 let (tx, chan_option) = {
4723 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4724 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4725 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4726 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4727 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_entry);
4728 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
4729 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4730 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4735 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
4736 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
4737 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
4738 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
4739 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
4740 (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, chan_entry)))
4741 } else { (tx, None) }
4743 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4746 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
4747 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
4748 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
4750 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
4751 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4752 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4753 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4754 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4758 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4763 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4764 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
4765 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
4766 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
4768 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
4769 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
4770 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
4771 //but we should prevent it anyway.
4773 let pending_forward_info = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
4774 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4775 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4777 debug_assert!(false);
4778 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4780 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4781 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4782 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4783 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4785 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
4786 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
4787 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
4788 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
4789 match pending_forward_info {
4790 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
4791 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
4792 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
4793 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
4795 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
4796 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
4797 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4798 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
4799 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
4802 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
4804 _ => pending_forward_info
4807 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), chan);
4809 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4814 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4815 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
4816 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4817 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4819 debug_assert!(false);
4820 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4822 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4823 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4824 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4825 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4826 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan)
4828 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4831 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, msg.channel_id);
4835 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4836 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4837 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4839 debug_assert!(false);
4840 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4842 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4843 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4844 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4845 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4846 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan);
4848 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4853 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4854 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4855 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4857 debug_assert!(false);
4858 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4860 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4861 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4862 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4863 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4864 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
4865 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
4866 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan);
4868 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan);
4871 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4875 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4876 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4877 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4879 debug_assert!(false);
4880 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4882 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4883 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4884 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4885 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4886 let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo();
4887 let monitor_update = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
4888 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update);
4889 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4890 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock,
4891 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan)
4893 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4898 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
4899 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
4900 let mut push_forward_event = false;
4901 let mut new_intercept_events = Vec::new();
4902 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
4903 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4904 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4905 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
4906 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
4907 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
4908 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
4910 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
4911 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
4913 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4914 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
4915 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
4916 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4917 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4918 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
4920 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4921 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
4922 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.genesis_hash)
4924 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).into_inner());
4925 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4926 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
4927 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4928 new_intercept_events.push(events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
4929 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
4930 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
4931 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
4932 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
4935 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4936 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
4938 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4939 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
4940 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4941 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4942 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4943 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4944 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
4945 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4948 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
4949 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
4950 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
4955 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
4956 // payments are being processed.
4957 if forward_htlcs_empty {
4958 push_forward_event = true;
4960 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4961 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
4968 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
4969 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4972 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
4973 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4974 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
4976 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
4980 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued.
4981 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
4982 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4983 let forward_ev_exists = pending_events.iter()
4984 .find(|ev| if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false })
4986 if !forward_ev_exists {
4987 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
4989 Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
4994 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4995 let (htlcs_to_fail, res) = {
4996 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4997 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4999 debug_assert!(false);
5000 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5001 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
5002 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5003 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5004 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5005 let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo();
5006 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
5007 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update);
5008 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5009 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id,
5010 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5011 (htlcs_to_fail, res)
5013 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5016 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
5020 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5021 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5022 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5024 debug_assert!(false);
5025 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5027 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5028 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5029 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5030 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5031 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan);
5033 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5038 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5039 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5040 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5042 debug_assert!(false);
5043 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5045 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5046 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5047 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5048 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5049 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
5050 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
5053 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5054 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
5055 &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
5056 msg, &self.default_configuration
5058 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5059 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5060 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap()),
5063 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5068 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
5069 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5070 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
5071 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
5073 // It's not a local channel
5074 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5077 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5078 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
5079 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
5080 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5082 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5083 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5084 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5085 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5086 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5087 if chan.get().should_announce() {
5088 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
5089 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
5090 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
5091 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5093 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
5095 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
5096 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
5097 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
5098 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5100 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", log_bytes!(chan_id));
5101 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), chan);
5104 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5106 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
5109 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5111 let need_lnd_workaround = {
5112 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5114 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5116 debug_assert!(false);
5117 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5119 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5120 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5121 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5122 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5123 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
5124 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
5125 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
5126 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
5127 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
5128 msg, &self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash,
5129 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan);
5130 let mut channel_update = None;
5131 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
5132 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5133 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5136 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
5137 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
5138 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
5139 // they have the latest channel parameters.
5140 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
5141 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5142 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
5147 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
5148 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
5149 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get_mut(), responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
5150 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
5151 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
5152 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
5156 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5160 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
5161 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
5164 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
5165 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
5170 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed.
5171 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
5172 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
5174 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5175 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
5176 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
5177 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
5178 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
5179 match monitor_event {
5180 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
5181 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
5182 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
5183 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
5185 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
5186 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
5187 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
5188 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5191 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
5192 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
5193 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
5194 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
5196 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5197 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
5198 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5199 id_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).cloned()
5202 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
5203 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5204 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
5205 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5206 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5207 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5208 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
5209 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
5210 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
5211 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5212 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5216 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
5217 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
5219 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
5221 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
5222 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5223 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5224 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5225 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5232 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
5233 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
5239 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5240 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5243 has_pending_monitor_events
5246 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
5247 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
5248 /// update events as a separate process method here.
5250 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
5251 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5252 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5253 NotifyOption::DoPersist
5255 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
5260 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
5261 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
5262 /// update was applied.
5263 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
5264 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
5265 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5266 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
5268 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
5269 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
5270 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
5271 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
5273 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5274 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5276 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5277 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5278 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
5279 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
5280 let funding_txo = chan.get_funding_txo();
5281 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
5282 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger);
5283 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
5284 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
5286 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
5287 has_monitor_update = true;
5289 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(
5290 funding_txo.expect("channel is live"), monitor_update);
5291 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5292 let channel_id: [u8; 32] = *channel_id;
5293 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id,
5294 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING,
5295 peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id));
5297 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, res));
5299 continue 'peer_loop;
5308 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
5309 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
5310 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
5313 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5314 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5320 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
5321 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
5322 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
5323 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
5324 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
5325 let mut has_update = false;
5327 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5329 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5330 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5331 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5332 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5333 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5334 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
5335 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
5336 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
5338 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5339 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
5342 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
5343 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
5344 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
5345 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5346 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5351 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5353 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
5354 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
5355 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
5361 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
5362 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5370 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5371 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5377 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
5378 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
5380 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
5381 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5382 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
5383 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
5384 // reorganized out of the main chain.
5385 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
5386 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
5387 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
5388 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
5389 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
5390 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
5391 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
5392 assert!(should_broadcast);
5393 } else { unreachable!(); }
5394 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
5396 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5400 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5401 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
5403 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
5404 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("min_value_msat of {} greater than total 21 million bitcoin supply", min_value_msat.unwrap()) });
5407 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5409 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5410 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5411 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5412 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5413 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
5414 payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
5415 user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
5416 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
5417 // it's updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
5418 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
5419 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
5420 // never fail a payment too early.
5421 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
5423 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
5426 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
5431 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
5434 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
5435 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
5437 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
5438 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
5439 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
5440 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
5442 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
5444 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5445 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5449 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5450 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5452 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5454 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
5455 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
5457 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5458 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5459 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
5460 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
5461 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
5462 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5463 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
5464 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
5465 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
5466 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
5467 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
5470 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5471 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5473 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5476 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5478 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5480 pub fn create_inbound_payment_legacy(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), APIError> {
5481 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5482 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5483 let payment_secret = self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)?;
5484 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret))
5487 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
5488 /// stored external to LDK.
5490 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
5491 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
5492 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
5494 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
5495 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
5498 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
5499 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
5500 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
5501 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
5503 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
5504 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
5505 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
5506 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
5507 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
5509 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
5510 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
5511 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
5512 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
5513 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
5515 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
5516 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
5518 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5519 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5523 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5524 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5526 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5528 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
5529 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
5531 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5532 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5533 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
5534 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
5535 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
5536 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
5537 min_final_cltv_expiry)
5540 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5541 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5543 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5546 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5548 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5550 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5551 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
5554 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
5555 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
5557 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5558 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
5559 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
5562 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
5563 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
5565 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5566 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5567 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5568 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5570 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
5571 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5572 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
5573 Some(_) => continue,
5574 None => return scid_candidate
5579 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
5581 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5582 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
5584 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
5585 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
5586 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
5590 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
5591 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
5592 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
5594 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
5595 /// times to get a unique scid.
5596 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5597 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5598 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5600 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
5601 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5602 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
5603 return scid_candidate
5607 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
5608 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
5609 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
5610 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
5612 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5613 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5614 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5615 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5616 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
5617 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
5618 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
5619 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
5628 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5629 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
5630 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5631 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
5632 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
5636 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
5637 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
5638 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5643 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
5644 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5645 if events.is_empty() { None } else { Some(events.remove(0)) }
5649 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
5650 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
5654 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
5655 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
5658 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
5659 /// using the given event handler.
5661 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
5662 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
5665 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock until the returned future completes so that
5666 // we can be sure no other persists happen while processing events.
5667 let _read_guard = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
5669 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5671 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5672 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5673 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5674 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5677 let pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5678 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5679 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5682 for event in pending_events {
5683 handler(event).await;
5686 if result == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
5687 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
5692 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5694 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5695 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5696 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5697 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5698 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5699 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5703 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
5704 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
5705 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
5706 /// is always placed next to each other.
5708 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
5709 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
5710 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
5711 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
5713 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
5714 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
5715 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
5716 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
5717 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5718 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5719 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5721 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5722 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5723 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5724 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5727 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5728 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5730 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
5731 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5734 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
5735 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5736 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5737 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5738 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5739 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
5740 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
5744 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5745 events.replace(pending_events);
5754 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5756 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5757 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5758 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5759 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5760 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5761 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5765 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
5767 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
5768 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
5769 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
5770 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5771 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5773 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5774 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5775 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5776 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5779 let pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5780 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5781 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5784 for event in pending_events {
5785 handler.handle_event(event);
5793 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5795 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5796 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5797 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5798 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5799 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5800 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5804 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5806 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5807 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
5808 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
5809 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
5810 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
5813 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
5814 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
5817 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5818 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5819 let new_height = height - 1;
5821 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
5822 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
5823 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
5824 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
5825 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
5826 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
5829 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
5833 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5835 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5836 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5837 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5838 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5839 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5840 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5844 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5845 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5846 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5847 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5849 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5850 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
5852 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5853 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)
5854 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
5856 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5857 if height < last_best_block_height {
5858 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5859 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
5863 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5864 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5865 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5866 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5868 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5869 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
5871 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5873 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
5875 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
5877 macro_rules! max_time {
5878 ($timestamp: expr) => {
5880 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
5881 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
5882 // having an explicit local time source.
5883 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
5884 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
5885 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5886 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
5887 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
5893 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
5894 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5895 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
5896 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
5900 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
5901 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
5902 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
5903 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5904 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5905 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
5906 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(block_hash)) = (chan.get_funding_txo(), chan.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
5907 res.push((funding_txo.txid, Some(block_hash)));
5914 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
5915 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5916 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
5917 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
5918 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
5919 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
5920 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5921 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5926 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5928 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5929 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5930 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5931 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5932 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5933 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5937 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
5938 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
5940 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
5941 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
5942 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5943 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5944 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5946 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5947 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5949 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5950 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5951 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5952 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5953 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5954 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
5955 let res = f(channel);
5956 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
5957 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
5958 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
5959 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
5960 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.channel_id() }));
5962 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
5963 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
5964 if channel.is_usable() {
5965 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5966 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
5967 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5968 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5973 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5977 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, channel);
5979 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
5980 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5981 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5982 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5983 msg: announcement_sigs,
5985 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
5986 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
5987 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5989 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5990 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5991 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
5996 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
5997 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
5998 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
5999 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
6000 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
6001 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
6002 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
6003 // is always consistent.
6004 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
6005 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
6006 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()),
6007 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
6008 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
6011 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
6012 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, channel);
6013 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
6014 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
6015 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
6016 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
6017 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6021 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
6022 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
6023 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6024 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6025 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
6026 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
6027 data: reason_message,
6037 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6038 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
6039 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
6040 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
6041 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
6042 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
6043 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
6044 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6045 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
6046 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
6048 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
6049 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
6050 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
6054 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
6057 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6058 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
6059 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6060 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6061 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
6062 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
6063 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6064 phantom_shared_secret: None,
6065 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
6068 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
6069 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6070 _ => unreachable!(),
6072 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
6073 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
6074 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
6075 log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
6081 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
6083 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
6084 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
6088 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
6089 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
6090 /// [`await_persistable_update`], [`await_persistable_update_timeout`], or a future returned by
6091 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`] is guaranteed to be woken up.
6093 /// Note that this method is not available with the `no-std` feature.
6095 /// [`await_persistable_update`]: Self::await_persistable_update
6096 /// [`await_persistable_update_timeout`]: Self::await_persistable_update_timeout
6097 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`]: Self::get_persistable_update_future
6098 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
6099 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
6100 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
6103 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
6104 /// [`await_persistable_update`], `await_persistable_update_timeout`, or a future returned by
6105 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`] is guaranteed to be woken up.
6107 /// [`await_persistable_update`]: Self::await_persistable_update
6108 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`]: Self::get_persistable_update_future
6109 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
6110 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
6113 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when a persistable update is available. Note that
6114 /// callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this [`ChannelManager`] and
6115 /// should instead register actions to be taken later.
6116 pub fn get_persistable_update_future(&self) -> Future {
6117 self.persistence_notifier.get_future()
6120 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6121 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
6122 self.persistence_notifier.notify_pending()
6125 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
6126 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
6127 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
6128 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
6131 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6132 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6133 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6134 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
6137 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6138 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6140 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6141 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6142 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6143 pub fn invoice_features(&self) -> InvoiceFeatures {
6144 provided_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
6147 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6148 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6149 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
6150 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
6153 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6154 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6155 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6156 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
6159 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6160 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6161 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
6162 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
6166 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
6167 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6169 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6170 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6171 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6172 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6173 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6174 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6178 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
6179 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6180 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6183 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
6184 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6185 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6188 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
6189 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6190 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6193 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
6194 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6195 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6198 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
6199 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6200 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6203 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
6204 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6205 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6208 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
6209 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6210 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6213 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
6214 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6215 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6218 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
6219 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6220 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6223 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
6224 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6225 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6228 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
6229 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6230 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6233 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
6234 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6235 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6238 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
6239 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6240 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6243 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
6244 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6245 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6248 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
6249 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6250 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6253 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
6254 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6255 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
6258 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
6263 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
6264 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6265 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6268 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
6269 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6270 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6271 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6273 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
6274 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6275 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
6276 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6277 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6278 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6279 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6280 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
6281 if chan.is_shutdown() {
6282 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
6283 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
6288 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
6290 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
6291 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
6292 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
6293 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
6294 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
6295 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
6296 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
6297 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
6298 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
6299 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
6300 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
6301 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
6302 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6303 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
6304 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6305 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
6306 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
6307 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
6308 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
6309 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
6310 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
6313 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
6314 peer_state.is_connected = false;
6315 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
6316 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
6319 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
6321 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6323 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6324 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6328 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
6329 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
6330 log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6334 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6336 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
6337 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
6338 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
6339 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
6340 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
6341 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
6344 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6345 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
6346 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6347 if inbound_peer_limited {
6350 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
6351 channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
6352 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
6353 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
6354 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
6358 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
6359 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
6360 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
6362 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6363 if inbound_peer_limited &&
6364 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
6365 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
6370 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
6371 peer_state.is_connected = true;
6376 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6378 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6379 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6380 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6381 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6382 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6383 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6384 let retain = if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
6385 if !chan.have_received_message() {
6386 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
6387 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
6388 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
6392 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
6393 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6394 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
6399 if retain && chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6400 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.default_configuration) {
6401 if let Ok(update_msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
6402 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement {
6403 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6412 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
6416 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
6417 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6419 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
6420 let channel_ids: Vec<[u8; 32]> = {
6421 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6422 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
6423 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
6424 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6425 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6426 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
6428 for channel_id in channel_ids {
6429 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6430 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6434 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
6435 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6436 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
6437 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
6438 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6439 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6440 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
6441 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash) {
6442 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
6443 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6451 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6452 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6456 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6457 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
6460 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
6461 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
6465 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6466 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6467 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
6468 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6471 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6472 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6474 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6475 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6476 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6477 pub(crate) fn provided_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InvoiceFeatures {
6478 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6481 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6482 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6483 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
6484 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6487 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6488 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6489 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6490 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
6493 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6494 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6495 pub fn provided_init_features(_config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
6496 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
6497 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the ChannelMessageHandler impl for
6498 // ErroringMessageHandler.
6499 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
6500 features.set_data_loss_protect_optional();
6501 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
6502 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
6503 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
6504 features.set_payment_secret_required();
6505 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
6506 features.set_wumbo_optional();
6507 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
6508 features.set_channel_type_optional();
6509 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
6510 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
6512 { // Attributes are not allowed on if expressions on our current MSRV of 1.41.
6513 if _config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
6514 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
6520 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6521 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6523 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
6524 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
6525 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
6526 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
6529 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
6530 (2, node_id, required),
6531 (4, features, required),
6532 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
6533 (8, forwarding_info, option),
6534 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6535 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6538 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
6539 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6540 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6541 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6542 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
6543 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
6544 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6545 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
6546 (2, self.channel_id, required),
6547 (3, self.channel_type, option),
6548 (4, self.counterparty, required),
6549 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
6550 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
6551 (7, self.config, option),
6552 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
6553 (9, self.confirmations, option),
6554 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
6555 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6556 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6557 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
6558 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6559 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6560 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6561 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6562 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6563 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
6564 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
6565 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
6566 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
6567 (30, self.is_usable, required),
6568 (32, self.is_public, required),
6569 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6570 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6571 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6572 (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
6578 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
6579 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6580 _init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6581 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
6582 (2, channel_id, required),
6583 (3, channel_type, option),
6584 (4, counterparty, required),
6585 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6586 (6, funding_txo, option),
6587 (7, config, option),
6588 (8, short_channel_id, option),
6589 (9, confirmations, option),
6590 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
6591 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6592 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6593 (16, balance_msat, required),
6594 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6595 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6596 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6597 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6598 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6599 (22, confirmations_required, option),
6600 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
6601 (26, is_outbound, required),
6602 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
6603 (30, is_usable, required),
6604 (32, is_public, required),
6605 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6606 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6607 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6608 (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
6611 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6612 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6613 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
6614 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
6615 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
6619 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
6621 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
6622 outbound_scid_alias,
6626 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
6627 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
6629 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
6630 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
6631 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
6632 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
6633 confirmations_required,
6635 force_close_spend_delay,
6636 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
6637 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
6638 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
6639 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
6640 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
6641 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
6642 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
6647 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
6648 (2, channels, vec_type),
6649 (4, phantom_scid, required),
6650 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
6653 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
6655 (0, onion_packet, required),
6656 (2, short_channel_id, required),
6659 (0, payment_data, required),
6660 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6661 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6663 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
6664 (0, payment_preimage, required),
6665 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6669 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
6670 (0, routing, required),
6671 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
6672 (4, payment_hash, required),
6673 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
6674 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
6675 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
6679 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6680 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6682 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
6684 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6685 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6686 reason.write(writer)?;
6688 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6689 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
6692 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6693 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6694 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
6695 failure_code.write(writer)?;
6702 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6703 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6704 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6707 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6708 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6709 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6710 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
6714 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6715 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6716 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6717 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
6718 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
6721 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
6722 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
6723 // messages contained in the variants.
6724 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
6725 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
6726 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
6728 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6729 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6730 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6731 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6732 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
6735 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6736 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6737 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6738 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6739 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
6741 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6746 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
6751 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
6752 (0, short_channel_id, required),
6753 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6754 (2, outpoint, required),
6755 (4, htlc_id, required),
6756 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
6759 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
6760 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6761 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
6762 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
6763 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
6765 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6766 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
6767 (1, self.total_msat, required),
6768 (2, self.value, required),
6769 (4, payment_data, option),
6770 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
6771 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
6777 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
6778 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6779 let mut prev_hop = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
6781 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
6782 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
6783 let mut total_msat = None;
6784 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
6785 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6786 (0, prev_hop, required),
6787 (1, total_msat, option),
6788 (2, value, required),
6789 (4, payment_data, option),
6790 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
6791 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
6793 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
6795 if payment_data.is_some() {
6796 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6798 if total_msat.is_none() {
6799 total_msat = Some(value);
6801 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
6804 if total_msat.is_none() {
6805 if payment_data.is_none() {
6806 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6808 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
6810 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
6814 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
6817 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
6824 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
6825 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6826 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6829 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
6830 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
6831 let mut path: Option<Vec<RouteHop>> = Some(Vec::new());
6832 let mut payment_id = None;
6833 let mut payment_secret = None;
6834 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
6835 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6836 (0, session_priv, required),
6837 (1, payment_id, option),
6838 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6839 (3, payment_secret, option),
6840 (4, path, vec_type),
6841 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
6843 if payment_id.is_none() {
6844 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
6846 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
6848 if path.is_none() || path.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
6849 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6851 let path = path.unwrap();
6852 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
6853 if params.final_cltv_expiry_delta == 0 {
6854 params.final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.last().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta;
6857 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
6858 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
6859 first_hop_htlc_msat,
6861 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
6865 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6866 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6871 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
6872 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
6874 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id, payment_secret } => {
6876 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
6877 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6878 (0, session_priv, required),
6879 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
6880 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6881 (3, payment_secret, option),
6882 (4, *path, vec_type),
6883 (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
6886 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
6888 field.write(writer)?;
6895 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
6896 (0, forward_info, required),
6897 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
6898 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
6899 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
6900 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
6903 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
6905 (0, htlc_id, required),
6906 (2, err_packet, required),
6911 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
6912 (0, payment_secret, required),
6913 (2, expiry_time, required),
6914 (4, user_payment_id, required),
6915 (6, payment_preimage, required),
6916 (8, min_value_msat, required),
6919 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6921 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6922 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6923 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6924 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6925 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6926 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6930 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6931 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
6933 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6935 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
6937 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6938 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
6939 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
6942 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
6944 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6945 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
6946 let mut number_of_channels = 0;
6947 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6948 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6949 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6950 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
6951 serializable_peer_count += 1;
6953 number_of_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.len();
6954 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
6955 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6956 unfunded_channels += 1;
6961 ((number_of_channels - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
6963 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6964 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6965 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6966 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
6967 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6968 channel.write(writer)?;
6975 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6976 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6977 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
6978 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6979 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6980 for forward in pending_forwards {
6981 forward.write(writer)?;
6986 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6988 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6989 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
6990 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6992 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
6993 (claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6994 for (payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops)) in claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
6995 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6996 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6997 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
6998 htlc.write(writer)?;
7000 htlc_purposes.push(purpose);
7003 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
7004 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
7005 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7006 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
7007 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
7008 // per_peer_state lock at all.
7009 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
7012 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
7013 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
7014 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
7015 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
7016 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
7018 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
7019 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
7020 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
7021 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
7022 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
7023 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
7024 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
7029 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7030 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7031 for event in events.iter() {
7032 event.write(writer)?;
7035 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
7036 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7037 for event in background_events.iter() {
7039 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
7041 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
7042 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
7047 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
7048 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
7049 // likely to be identical.
7050 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
7051 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
7053 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7054 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
7055 hash.write(writer)?;
7056 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
7059 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
7060 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
7061 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7062 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
7063 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
7066 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
7067 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7069 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7070 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7071 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
7072 session_priv.write(writer)?;
7075 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
7076 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
7080 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
7081 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
7082 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7084 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7085 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7086 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
7092 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
7093 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7094 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
7095 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
7098 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
7099 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
7100 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
7101 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
7102 pending_claiming_payments = None;
7105 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7106 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
7107 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7108 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
7109 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
7110 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
7111 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
7112 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
7113 (9, htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7114 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
7121 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
7123 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
7125 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7126 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
7127 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
7128 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
7129 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
7130 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
7131 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
7132 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
7133 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7134 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
7135 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
7136 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
7137 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
7139 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
7140 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
7142 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
7143 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
7145 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
7146 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
7147 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
7148 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
7149 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
7150 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
7152 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
7153 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7155 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7156 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7157 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7158 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7159 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7160 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7164 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
7165 pub entropy_source: ES,
7167 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
7168 pub node_signer: NS,
7170 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
7171 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
7173 pub signer_provider: SP,
7175 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7177 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
7178 pub fee_estimator: F,
7179 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7181 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
7182 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
7183 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
7184 pub chain_monitor: M,
7186 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
7187 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
7188 /// force-closed during deserialization.
7189 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
7190 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
7191 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
7193 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
7195 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
7196 /// deserialization.
7198 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
7199 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
7200 pub default_config: UserConfig,
7202 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
7203 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
7205 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
7206 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
7207 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
7208 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
7210 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
7213 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
7214 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>,
7217 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7218 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7220 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7221 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7222 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7223 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7224 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7225 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7229 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
7230 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
7231 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
7232 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
7233 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>) -> Self {
7235 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
7236 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
7241 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
7242 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
7243 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7244 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
7246 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7247 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7248 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7249 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7250 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7251 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7255 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7256 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
7257 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
7261 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7262 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
7264 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7265 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7266 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7267 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7268 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7269 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7273 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7274 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7276 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7277 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7278 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7280 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
7282 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7283 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7284 let mut peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7285 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7286 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7287 let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
7288 for _ in 0..channel_count {
7289 let mut channel: Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (
7290 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
7292 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7293 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
7294 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
7295 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7296 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7297 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7298 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7299 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
7300 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
7301 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7302 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7303 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7304 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7305 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7306 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7307 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7308 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7309 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7310 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7311 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7312 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
7313 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
7314 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
7315 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7316 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7317 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
7318 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
7319 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
7320 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7321 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7322 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7323 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
7325 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
7326 let mut found_htlc = false;
7327 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
7328 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
7331 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
7332 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
7333 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
7334 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
7335 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
7336 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
7337 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
7338 log_info!(args.logger,
7339 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
7340 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7341 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7345 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7346 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
7347 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7349 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7350 id_to_peer.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel.get_counterparty_node_id());
7352 match peer_channels.entry(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
7353 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7354 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
7355 by_id_map.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
7357 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7358 let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
7359 by_id_map.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
7360 entry.insert(by_id_map);
7364 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
7365 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
7366 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
7367 // safely discard the channel.
7368 let _ = channel.force_shutdown(false);
7369 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7370 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7371 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7372 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
7375 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7376 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7377 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7378 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7379 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7380 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7384 for (funding_txo, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
7385 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
7386 log_info!(args.logger, "Broadcasting latest holder commitment transaction for closed channel {}", log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
7387 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
7391 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
7392 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7393 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7394 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
7395 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7396 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7397 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
7398 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
7399 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
7401 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
7404 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7405 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7406 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
7407 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7408 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7409 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
7410 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
7411 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
7413 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
7416 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7417 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>)>()));
7418 for _ in 0..peer_count {
7419 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7420 let peer_state = PeerState {
7421 channel_by_id: peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new()),
7422 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
7423 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
7424 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
7425 is_connected: false,
7427 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
7430 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7431 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
7432 for _ in 0..event_count {
7433 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
7434 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
7439 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7440 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
7441 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
7442 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7443 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
7444 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7448 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
7449 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7451 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7452 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
7453 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
7454 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
7455 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7459 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7460 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
7461 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
7462 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
7463 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
7464 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
7465 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
7467 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
7468 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7472 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
7473 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
7474 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
7475 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
7476 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
7477 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7478 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7479 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
7480 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
7481 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = Some(Vec::new());
7482 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7483 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
7484 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7485 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
7486 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
7487 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
7488 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
7489 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
7490 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7491 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
7493 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
7494 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7497 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
7498 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7501 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
7502 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
7505 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
7506 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
7507 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
7508 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
7509 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
7510 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
7512 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
7514 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
7515 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
7516 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
7520 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
7521 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
7522 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
7523 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
7524 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
7525 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
7526 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
7528 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7529 if id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
7530 for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
7531 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, payment_secret, .. } = htlc_source {
7532 if path.is_empty() {
7533 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
7534 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7537 let path_amt = path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
7538 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
7539 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
7540 match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
7541 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7542 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
7543 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
7544 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
7546 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7547 let path_fee = path.get_path_fees();
7548 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
7549 retry_strategy: None,
7550 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
7551 payment_params: None,
7552 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
7553 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
7555 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
7556 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
7557 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
7558 total_msat: path_amt,
7559 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
7561 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
7562 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
7567 for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
7569 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
7570 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
7571 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
7572 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
7574 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
7575 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
7576 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
7577 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
7578 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
7579 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
7580 forwards.retain(|forward| {
7581 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
7582 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
7583 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
7584 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
7589 !forwards.is_empty()
7591 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
7592 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
7593 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
7594 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
7595 pending_events_read.retain(|event| {
7596 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
7597 intercepted_id != ev_id
7604 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
7605 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
7606 let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
7607 // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
7608 // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
7609 // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
7610 // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
7611 // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
7612 // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
7613 // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
7614 // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
7615 pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv, path, false, &pending_events, &args.logger);
7616 pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
7625 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
7626 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
7627 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
7628 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
7629 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
7630 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
7631 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
7632 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
7636 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
7637 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
7639 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
7640 if let Some(mut purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
7641 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
7642 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7644 for (purpose, (payment_hash, previous_hops)) in purposes.drain(..).zip(claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..)) {
7645 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7648 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
7649 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
7650 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
7651 if previous_hops.is_empty() {
7652 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7654 let purpose = match &previous_hops[0].onion_payload {
7655 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
7656 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
7657 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
7658 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
7659 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
7660 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
7661 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
7663 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7664 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7668 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
7670 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
7672 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
7673 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
7675 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7679 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7680 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7682 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
7684 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7686 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
7687 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
7688 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
7689 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7693 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
7694 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
7695 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7696 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7697 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
7698 if chan.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
7699 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
7701 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
7702 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
7703 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
7705 chan.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
7706 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias()) {
7707 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7708 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7709 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7710 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7712 if chan.is_usable() {
7713 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
7714 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7715 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7716 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7717 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7723 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
7725 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7726 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
7727 if let Some((payment_purpose, claimable_htlcs)) = claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
7728 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7729 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
7730 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
7731 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
7732 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
7733 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
7734 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
7735 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
7737 for claimable_htlc in claimable_htlcs {
7738 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
7740 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
7741 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
7742 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
7743 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
7745 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
7746 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
7747 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
7748 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
7750 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
7751 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
7752 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
7753 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
7755 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
7756 if let Some(peer_node_id) = id_to_peer.get(&previous_channel_id){
7757 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
7758 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7759 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7760 if let Some(channel) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
7761 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
7764 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
7765 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
7768 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
7771 purpose: payment_purpose,
7772 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
7778 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
7779 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get_mut(&node_id) {
7780 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
7782 log_error!(args.logger, "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
7783 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7787 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
7789 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
7790 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
7791 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
7792 router: args.router,
7794 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
7796 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
7797 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
7798 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
7799 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
7801 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
7802 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_htlcs, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
7803 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
7804 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
7805 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
7806 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
7808 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
7813 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
7815 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
7817 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
7818 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
7819 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
7820 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
7822 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
7823 node_signer: args.node_signer,
7824 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
7826 logger: args.logger,
7827 default_configuration: args.default_config,
7830 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7831 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
7832 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
7833 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
7834 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
7837 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
7838 //connection or two.
7840 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
7846 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7847 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7848 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
7849 use core::time::Duration;
7850 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
7851 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
7852 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, InterceptId};
7853 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
7854 use crate::ln::msgs;
7855 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
7856 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
7857 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7858 use crate::util::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
7859 use crate::util::test_utils;
7860 use crate::util::config::ChannelConfig;
7861 use crate::chain::keysinterface::EntropySource;
7864 fn test_notify_limits() {
7865 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
7866 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
7867 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7868 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7869 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7870 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7872 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
7873 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
7874 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7875 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7876 assert!(nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7878 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7880 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
7881 // to connect messages with new values
7882 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7883 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7884 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
7885 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
7886 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
7887 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
7889 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
7890 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7891 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7892 // ... but the last node should not.
7893 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7894 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
7895 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7896 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7898 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
7899 // about the channel.
7900 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7901 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7902 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7904 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
7906 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7907 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7908 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7909 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7910 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7911 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7913 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
7914 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7915 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7917 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
7918 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
7919 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
7920 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
7921 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
7922 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
7924 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
7925 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
7926 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7927 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7928 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7929 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7930 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7931 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7933 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
7934 // the channel info has updated.
7935 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7936 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7937 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7938 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7939 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7940 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7944 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
7945 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
7947 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7948 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7949 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7950 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7951 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7953 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
7954 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
7955 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
7956 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
7958 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
7959 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
7960 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
7961 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
7962 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
7963 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
7964 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7965 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7966 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7967 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
7969 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
7970 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
7971 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7972 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7973 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7974 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7975 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7976 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7977 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7978 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7979 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7980 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
7981 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7982 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7983 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7984 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7985 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7986 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7987 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7988 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7989 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7990 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
7992 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
7993 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
7994 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7995 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7996 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7997 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
7999 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
8000 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
8001 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
8002 // lightning messages manually.
8003 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8004 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
8005 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8007 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8008 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8009 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
8010 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8011 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8012 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
8013 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8014 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8015 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
8016 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8017 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8018 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8019 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
8020 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8021 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8022 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
8023 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8024 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8025 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
8026 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8027 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
8028 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8029 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8030 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
8031 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8033 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
8034 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
8035 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8036 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
8038 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
8039 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
8040 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
8041 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
8043 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8046 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
8047 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
8048 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
8049 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
8051 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8054 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
8055 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
8056 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
8057 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
8059 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8064 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
8065 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
8066 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
8067 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
8068 // fails as expected.
8069 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8070 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8071 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8072 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8073 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8074 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8075 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8077 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
8078 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
8079 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
8081 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
8082 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8083 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV),
8084 final_value_msat: 100_000,
8086 let route = find_route(
8087 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
8088 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8090 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8091 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8092 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8093 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8094 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8095 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8096 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8097 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8098 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8099 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
8100 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
8101 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8102 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
8103 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8104 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8105 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8106 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8107 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8108 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8109 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8110 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8111 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8112 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
8114 // Finally, claim the original payment.
8115 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
8117 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
8118 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8119 let route = find_route(
8120 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
8121 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8123 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8124 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8125 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8126 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8127 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
8128 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
8129 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
8131 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
8132 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8133 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8134 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8135 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8136 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8137 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8138 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8139 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8140 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8141 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8142 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8143 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
8144 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8145 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8146 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8147 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8148 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8149 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8150 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8151 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8152 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8153 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
8155 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
8156 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
8160 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
8161 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
8162 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
8163 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8164 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8165 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8166 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8168 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8169 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8171 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
8172 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8173 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
8174 final_value_msat: 10_000,
8176 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
8177 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
8178 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8179 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8180 let route = find_route(
8181 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
8182 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8185 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8186 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
8187 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash, None, PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
8188 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
8189 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8191 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8192 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8193 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8194 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8195 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8196 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8197 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8199 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash".to_string(), 1);
8203 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
8204 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
8205 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8206 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8207 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8208 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8210 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8211 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8213 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
8214 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8215 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
8216 final_value_msat: 10_000,
8218 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
8219 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
8220 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8221 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8222 let route = find_route(
8223 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
8224 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8227 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8228 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8229 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
8230 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, Some(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
8231 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
8232 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8234 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8235 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8236 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8237 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8238 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8239 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8240 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8242 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "We don't support MPP keysend payments".to_string(), 1);
8246 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
8247 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8248 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8249 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8250 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8252 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8253 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8254 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8255 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8257 // Marshall an MPP route.
8258 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8259 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8260 route.paths.push(path);
8261 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8262 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8263 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8264 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8265 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8266 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8268 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None, PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap_err() {
8269 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
8270 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err)) },
8271 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
8276 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
8277 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8278 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8279 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8280 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8282 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8284 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8285 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8287 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8288 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8289 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8290 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8293 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
8294 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
8295 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8296 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
8297 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
8298 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
8301 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
8304 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
8305 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
8310 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
8311 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
8312 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8313 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8314 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8315 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8317 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
8318 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
8320 total_msat: 100_000,
8323 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
8324 // payment verification fails as expected.
8325 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
8326 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
8327 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
8328 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
8330 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment".to_string(), "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash".to_string(), 1);
8334 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
8335 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
8339 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
8340 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
8341 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
8342 // the channel is successfully closed.
8343 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8344 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8345 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8346 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8348 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8349 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8350 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
8351 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8352 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
8354 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
8355 let channel_id = &tx.txid().into_inner();
8357 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
8358 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
8359 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8360 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8363 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8365 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8366 // as it has the funding transaction.
8367 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8368 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8369 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8372 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8374 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8376 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8378 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8379 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8380 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8384 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8385 // as it has the funding transaction.
8386 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8387 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8388 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8390 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8391 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8392 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
8393 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8394 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
8395 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
8396 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
8398 nodes[0].node.close_channel(channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8399 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8400 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8401 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
8403 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8404 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
8406 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
8407 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
8408 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
8409 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
8410 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8411 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8412 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8416 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
8417 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
8418 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
8419 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
8420 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8421 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8422 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8425 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8427 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
8428 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
8429 // closing transaction).
8430 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
8431 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
8432 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8434 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
8435 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
8436 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8437 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8438 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8441 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8443 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
8445 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
8446 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
8447 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8449 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8451 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8452 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8455 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
8456 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
8457 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
8460 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
8461 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
8462 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
8465 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
8467 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
8468 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
8470 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
8471 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
8473 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
8474 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
8479 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
8480 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
8481 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
8482 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
8483 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8484 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
8485 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
8486 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
8489 let channel_id = [4; 32];
8490 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8491 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
8493 // Test the API functions.
8494 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None), unkown_public_key);
8496 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
8498 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8500 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8502 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8504 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
8506 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
8510 fn test_connection_limiting() {
8511 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
8512 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8513 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8514 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8515 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8517 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
8519 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8520 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8522 let mut funding_tx = None;
8523 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
8524 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8525 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8528 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
8529 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
8530 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
8531 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
8532 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8534 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8535 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8536 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8538 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
8539 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8541 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8544 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
8545 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8546 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8547 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
8548 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8550 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
8551 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
8553 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
8554 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
8555 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
8556 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
8557 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
8558 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8559 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8561 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
8562 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
8563 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8564 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap_err();
8566 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
8567 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
8568 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8569 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8570 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
8571 for ev in chan_closed_events {
8572 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
8574 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8575 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8576 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
8577 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap_err();
8579 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
8580 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
8581 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
8582 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8584 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
8585 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
8587 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
8588 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
8589 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
8590 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
8591 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8593 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8594 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
8595 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8597 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
8598 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8599 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
8601 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
8602 // "protected" and can connect again.
8603 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
8604 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
8605 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8606 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8608 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
8610 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8611 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
8615 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
8616 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
8617 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8618 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8619 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8620 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8622 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
8624 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8625 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8627 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
8628 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8629 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8630 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8633 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
8635 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8636 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
8637 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8639 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
8640 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8641 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8643 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
8644 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8645 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
8646 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8650 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
8651 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
8652 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
8653 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8654 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8655 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
8656 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8657 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
8658 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8660 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
8662 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8663 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8665 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
8666 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
8667 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
8668 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
8669 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8670 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8672 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8673 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8675 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8676 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
8678 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8680 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
8681 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8684 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
8685 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
8686 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
8687 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8688 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8689 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8690 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8692 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8693 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
8694 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
8695 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
8699 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8701 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
8702 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8704 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
8705 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8706 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8708 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8709 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
8711 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8713 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
8718 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
8719 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
8720 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
8721 // the channel without the anchors feature.
8722 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8723 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8724 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
8725 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
8726 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8727 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
8728 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8730 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None).unwrap();
8731 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8732 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8734 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8735 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8737 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8738 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8740 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8743 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8744 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
8746 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8747 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8749 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8753 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
8755 use crate::chain::Listen;
8756 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
8757 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{EntropySource, KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
8758 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId};
8759 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
8760 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
8761 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
8762 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, get_route};
8763 use crate::util::test_utils;
8764 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
8765 use crate::util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
8767 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
8768 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
8769 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
8771 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
8775 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
8776 node: &'a ChannelManager<
8777 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
8778 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
8779 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
8780 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
8781 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
8782 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>,
8787 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
8788 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
8791 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
8792 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
8793 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
8795 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
8797 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
8798 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
8799 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
8800 let scorer = Mutex::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
8801 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &scorer);
8803 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
8804 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
8806 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
8807 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
8808 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
8809 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
8811 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
8813 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
8815 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
8816 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
8817 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
8818 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
8819 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
8821 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
8823 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
8825 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: node_b.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8826 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: node_a.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
8827 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8828 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8829 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8832 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
8833 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8834 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
8836 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8837 } else { panic!(); }
8839 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8840 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8842 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
8845 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
8848 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
8849 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
8851 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8852 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8853 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
8854 match msg_events[0] {
8855 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
8856 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
8857 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
8861 match msg_events[1] {
8862 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8866 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8867 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
8869 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8870 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
8872 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8875 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8876 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
8878 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8879 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
8881 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8884 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a);
8886 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
8887 macro_rules! send_payment {
8888 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
8889 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
8890 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
8891 .with_features($node_b.invoice_features());
8892 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8893 let seed = [3u8; 32];
8894 let keys_manager = KeysManager::new(&seed, 42, 42);
8895 let random_seed_bytes = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8896 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &dummy_graph.read_only(),
8897 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
8899 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
8900 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
8902 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
8903 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
8905 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8906 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
8907 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8908 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
8909 let (raa, cs) = do_get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
8910 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
8911 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
8912 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8914 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
8915 expect_payment_claimable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
8916 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8917 expect_payment_claimed!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
8919 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
8920 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
8921 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
8922 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8923 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
8925 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
8928 let (raa, cs) = do_get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
8929 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
8930 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
8931 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8933 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
8938 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
8939 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);