1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
23 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
25 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
27 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
29 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
31 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
34 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
39 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
40 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
41 // construct one themselves.
42 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
43 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
44 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
45 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
46 use crate::ln::features::InvoiceFeatures;
47 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
48 use crate::routing::router::{DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, RoutePath, Router};
49 use crate::routing::scoring::ProbabilisticScorer;
51 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
52 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
53 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
55 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
56 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment};
57 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
58 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider, ChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
59 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig};
60 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
61 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
62 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
63 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
64 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
65 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
67 use alloc::collections::BTreeMap;
70 use crate::prelude::*;
72 use core::cell::RefCell;
74 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
75 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
76 use core::time::Duration;
79 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
80 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
82 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
84 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
85 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
86 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
88 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
89 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
90 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
91 // before we forward it.
93 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
94 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
95 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
96 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
97 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
99 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
100 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
102 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
103 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
104 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
105 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
108 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
109 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
110 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
113 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
114 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
118 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
119 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
120 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
121 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
122 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
124 pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
125 /// Sender intended amount to forward or receive (actual amount received
126 /// may overshoot this in either case)
127 pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
128 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
131 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
132 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
133 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
134 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
137 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
138 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
139 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
140 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
141 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
144 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
145 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
147 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
148 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
149 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
152 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
153 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
155 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
156 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
159 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
160 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
163 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
167 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
168 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
169 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
170 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
171 short_channel_id: u64,
173 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
174 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
176 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
177 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
182 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
184 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
185 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
186 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
188 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
189 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
192 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
193 struct ClaimableHTLC {
194 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
196 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
198 /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
199 /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
200 sender_intended_value: u64,
201 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
203 /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
204 /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
205 total_value_received: Option<u64>,
206 /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
210 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
212 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
213 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
214 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
216 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
217 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
222 impl Readable for PaymentId {
223 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
224 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
229 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
231 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
232 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
233 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
235 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
236 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
241 impl Readable for InterceptId {
242 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
243 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
248 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
249 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
250 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
251 PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
252 OutboundRoute { session_priv: SecretKey },
255 pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
257 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
258 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
259 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
261 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
262 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: *session_priv },
266 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
267 (0, PreviousHopData) => {
268 (0, short_channel_id, required),
269 (2, htlc_id, required),
271 (2, OutboundRoute) => {
272 (0, session_priv, required),
277 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
278 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
279 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
280 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
281 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
284 session_priv: SecretKey,
285 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
286 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
287 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
288 payment_id: PaymentId,
291 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
292 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
293 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
295 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
297 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
299 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
302 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
303 payment_id.hash(hasher);
304 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
310 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
312 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
313 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
315 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
316 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
317 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
321 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
322 /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
323 /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
324 pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
325 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
326 *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
328 // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
334 struct ReceiveError {
340 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
341 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
343 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
344 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
345 pub enum FailureCode {
346 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
347 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
348 TemporaryNodeFailure = 0x2000 | 2,
349 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
350 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
351 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing = 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
352 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
353 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
354 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
355 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
356 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails = 0x4000 | 15,
359 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>);
361 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
362 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
363 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
364 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
365 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
367 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
368 err: msgs::LightningError,
369 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
370 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
372 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
374 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
376 err: LightningError {
378 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
379 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
386 shutdown_finish: None,
390 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
391 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
394 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
396 err: LightningError {
398 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
399 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
405 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
406 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
410 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
413 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
415 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
416 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
420 log_level: Level::Warn,
423 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
425 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
427 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
429 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
430 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
438 shutdown_finish: None,
443 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
444 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
445 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
446 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
447 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
449 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
450 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
451 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
452 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
453 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
454 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
455 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
457 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
461 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
462 struct ClaimingPayment {
464 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
465 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
467 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
468 (0, amount_msat, required),
469 (2, payment_purpose, required),
470 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
473 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
474 struct ClaimablePayments {
475 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
476 /// failed/claimed by the user.
478 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
479 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
481 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
482 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
483 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, (events::PaymentPurpose, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>)>,
485 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
486 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
487 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
488 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
491 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
492 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
493 /// quite some time lag.
494 enum BackgroundEvent {
495 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
496 /// commitment transaction.
497 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
501 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
502 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
503 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
504 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
505 /// event can be generated.
506 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
507 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user.
508 EmitEvent { event: events::Event },
511 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
512 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
513 (2, EmitEvent) => { (0, event, upgradable_required) },
516 /// State we hold per-peer.
517 pub(super) struct PeerState<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
518 /// `temporary_channel_id` or `channel_id` -> `channel`.
520 /// Holds all channels where the peer is the counterparty. Once a channel has been assigned a
521 /// `channel_id`, the `temporary_channel_id` key in the map is updated and is replaced by the
523 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
524 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
525 latest_features: InitFeatures,
526 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
527 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
528 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
529 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
530 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
532 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
533 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
534 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
535 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
537 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
538 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
539 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
540 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
541 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
542 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
543 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
544 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
545 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
546 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
550 impl <Signer: ChannelSigner> PeerState<Signer> {
551 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
552 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
553 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
554 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
555 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
558 self.channel_by_id.is_empty() && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
562 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
563 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
565 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
568 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
569 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
570 struct PendingInboundPayment {
571 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
572 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
573 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
574 /// this payment being removed.
576 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
577 user_payment_id: u64,
578 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
579 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
580 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
583 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
584 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
585 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
586 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
587 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
588 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
589 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
590 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
592 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
593 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
601 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
603 Arc<Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>
608 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
609 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
610 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
611 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
612 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
613 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
614 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
615 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
616 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
618 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
619 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<&'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e DefaultRouter<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L, &'h Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>>, &'g L>;
621 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
622 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
624 /// Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
625 /// to individual Channels.
627 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
628 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
629 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
630 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
632 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
633 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
634 /// returning from [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`], with ChannelManagers, writing updates
635 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during
636 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
637 /// [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the
638 /// `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
640 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
641 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
642 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
644 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
645 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
646 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
647 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
648 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
650 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
651 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
652 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
653 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
655 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
656 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
657 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
659 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
660 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
661 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
662 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
663 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
665 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
666 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
667 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
668 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
669 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
670 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
671 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
672 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
675 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
676 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
677 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
678 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
679 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
683 // `total_consistency_lock`
685 // |__`forward_htlcs`
687 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
689 // |__`per_peer_state`
691 // | |__`pending_inbound_payments`
693 // | |__`claimable_payments`
695 // | |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
701 // | |__`short_to_chan_info`
703 // | |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
707 // | |__`pending_events`
709 // | |__`pending_background_events`
711 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
713 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
714 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
715 ES::Target: EntropySource,
716 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
717 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
718 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
722 default_configuration: UserConfig,
723 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
724 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
730 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
732 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
734 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
735 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
737 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
738 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
739 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
740 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
742 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
743 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
745 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
746 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
747 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
748 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
749 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
750 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
751 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
752 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
754 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
756 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
757 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
759 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
761 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
762 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
763 /// and via the classic SCID.
765 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
766 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
768 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
770 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
772 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
773 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
774 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
776 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
777 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
779 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
780 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
782 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
783 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
785 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
786 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
787 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
788 /// active channel list on load.
790 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
791 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
793 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
795 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
796 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
797 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
799 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
800 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
801 /// the handling of the events.
803 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
804 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
807 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
808 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
809 /// would break backwards compatability.
810 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
811 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
812 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
814 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
815 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<[u8; 32], PublicKey>>,
817 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
819 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
820 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
821 /// confirmation depth.
823 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
824 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
825 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
827 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
829 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
831 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
833 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
835 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
837 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
838 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
839 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
841 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
842 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
844 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
845 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
846 /// keeping additional state.
847 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
849 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
850 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
851 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
852 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
854 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
855 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
857 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
858 /// are currently open with that peer.
860 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
861 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
864 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
866 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
867 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
868 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
869 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
870 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
872 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
873 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
874 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
875 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
876 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
877 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
878 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
879 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
880 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
881 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
882 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
884 persistence_notifier: Notifier,
893 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
895 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
896 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
897 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
898 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
899 pub struct ChainParameters {
900 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
901 pub network: Network,
903 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
905 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
906 pub best_block: BestBlock,
909 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
915 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
916 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
917 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
918 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
919 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
920 /// updates are ready for persistence).
922 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
923 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
924 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
925 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
926 persistence_notifier: &'a Notifier,
928 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
929 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
932 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
933 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
934 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
937 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
938 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
940 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
941 persistence_notifier: notifier,
942 should_persist: persist_check,
943 _read_guard: read_guard,
948 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
950 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
951 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
956 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
957 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
959 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
961 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
962 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
963 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
964 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
965 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
967 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
968 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
970 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
972 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
973 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
974 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
975 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
976 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
977 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
978 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
979 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
980 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
981 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
982 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
983 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
984 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
986 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
987 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
989 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
990 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
991 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
992 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
994 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
995 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
996 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
997 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
998 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
999 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1002 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1004 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1005 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1008 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1010 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1011 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1013 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until we time-out the
1014 /// idempotency of payments by [`PaymentId`]. See
1015 /// [`OutboundPayments::remove_stale_resolved_payments`].
1016 pub(crate) const IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 7;
1018 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
1019 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
1020 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
1021 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1023 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1024 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1025 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1027 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1028 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1029 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1031 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1032 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1033 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1034 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1035 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1036 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1037 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1038 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1039 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1040 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1041 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1044 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1045 /// to better separate parameters.
1046 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1047 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1048 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1049 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1050 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1051 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1052 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1053 pub features: InitFeatures,
1054 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1055 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1056 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1058 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1060 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1061 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1062 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1063 /// payments to us through this channel.
1064 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1065 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1066 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1067 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1068 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1069 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1070 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1073 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
1074 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1075 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1076 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1077 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1078 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1079 /// lifetime of the channel.
1080 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
1081 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1082 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1083 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1084 /// our counterparty already.
1086 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1087 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1088 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1089 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1091 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1092 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1093 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1094 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1096 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1097 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1099 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1100 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1102 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1103 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1104 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1105 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1106 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1107 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1108 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1109 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1110 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1113 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1115 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1116 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1117 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1118 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1119 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1120 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1121 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1123 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1124 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1126 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1127 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1128 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1129 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1130 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1131 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1132 /// this value on chain.
1134 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1136 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1138 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1139 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1140 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or a random value if the channel was
1141 /// inbound. This may be zero for inbound channels serialized with LDK versions prior to
1143 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1144 /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
1145 /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
1147 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
1148 pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
1149 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1150 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1151 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1153 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1154 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1155 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1156 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1158 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1159 pub balance_msat: u64,
1160 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1161 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1162 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1163 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1165 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1167 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1168 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1169 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1170 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1171 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1172 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1173 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1174 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1176 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`] and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1177 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1178 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1179 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1180 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1181 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1182 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1184 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1185 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1186 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1187 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1188 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1189 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1190 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1191 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1192 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1194 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1196 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1197 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1198 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1199 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1200 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1202 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1203 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1204 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1205 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1206 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1207 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1208 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1210 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1211 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1212 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1213 pub is_outbound: bool,
1214 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1215 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1216 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1217 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1218 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1220 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1221 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1222 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1223 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1225 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1226 pub is_usable: bool,
1227 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1228 pub is_public: bool,
1229 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1230 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1231 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1232 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1233 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1234 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1236 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1237 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1240 impl ChannelDetails {
1241 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1242 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1243 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1245 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1246 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1247 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1248 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1251 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1252 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1253 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1255 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1256 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1257 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1258 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1261 fn from_channel<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner>(channel: &Channel<Signer>,
1262 best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures) -> Self {
1264 let balance = channel.get_available_balances();
1265 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1266 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1268 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1269 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1270 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1271 features: latest_features,
1272 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1273 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1274 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1275 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1276 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1277 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1278 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1279 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if channel.have_received_message() {
1280 Some(channel.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1281 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1283 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1284 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1285 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1286 channel_type: if channel.have_received_message() { Some(channel.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1287 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1288 outbound_scid_alias: if channel.is_usable() { Some(channel.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1289 inbound_scid_alias: channel.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1290 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1291 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(channel.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
1292 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1293 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1294 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1295 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1296 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1297 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1298 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1299 confirmations: Some(channel.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1300 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1301 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1302 is_channel_ready: channel.is_usable(),
1303 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1304 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1305 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1306 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1307 config: Some(channel.config()),
1312 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1313 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1314 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1315 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1316 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1318 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1320 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1321 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1322 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1325 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1326 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1327 /// payment is removed from tracking.
1329 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1330 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1331 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1333 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1334 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1335 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1337 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1338 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1342 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1344 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
1346 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1347 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1348 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1349 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1351 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1352 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1353 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1356 macro_rules! handle_error {
1357 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
1358 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1359 // entering the macro.
1360 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1361 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1365 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1366 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1368 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1369 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1370 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1371 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1375 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1376 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1377 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1378 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1383 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1384 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1386 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1387 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1388 action: err.action.clone()
1392 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1393 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1394 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1395 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1396 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1400 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1407 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1408 ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {{
1409 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.channel_id());
1410 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1411 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1412 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1414 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1415 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1416 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1417 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1418 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1420 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1421 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1423 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1427 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1428 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1429 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1431 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1432 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1434 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1435 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1437 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1438 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1439 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel);
1440 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1441 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1442 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1448 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1449 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1453 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1455 $entry.remove_entry();
1463 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1464 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1468 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1470 $entry.remove_entry();
1478 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1479 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1481 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1482 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, channel);
1488 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1489 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
1490 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1491 node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1492 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1494 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1495 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1496 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1497 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1498 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1499 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1500 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1501 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1502 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1503 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1508 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
1509 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1510 if $channel.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
1511 $locked_events.push(events::Event::ChannelPending {
1512 channel_id: $channel.channel_id(),
1513 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.temporary_channel_id(),
1514 counterparty_node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1515 user_channel_id: $channel.get_user_id(),
1516 funding_txo: $channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
1518 $channel.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
1523 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
1524 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1525 if $channel.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
1526 debug_assert!($channel.channel_pending_event_emitted());
1527 $locked_events.push(events::Event::ChannelReady {
1528 channel_id: $channel.channel_id(),
1529 user_channel_id: $channel.get_user_id(),
1530 counterparty_node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1531 channel_type: $channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
1533 $channel.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
1538 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
1539 ($self: ident, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
1540 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&$self.logger,
1541 &$self.node_signer, $self.genesis_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
1542 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
1543 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
1544 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.is_usable() {
1545 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
1546 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
1547 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
1548 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
1550 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
1551 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
1552 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1558 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
1559 .remove(&$chan.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
1561 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
1562 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
1563 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
1564 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
1565 updates.announcement_sigs);
1566 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
1567 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
1570 let channel_id = $chan.channel_id();
1571 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
1572 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
1574 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
1576 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1577 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1579 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
1580 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1581 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
1582 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
1587 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
1588 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, MANUALLY_REMOVING, $remove: expr) => { {
1589 // update_maps_on_chan_removal needs to be able to take id_to_peer, so make sure we can in
1590 // any case so that it won't deadlock.
1591 debug_assert!($self.id_to_peer.try_lock().is_ok());
1593 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
1594 log_debug!($self.logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
1595 log_bytes!($chan.channel_id()[..]));
1598 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
1599 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure",
1600 log_bytes!($chan.channel_id()[..]));
1601 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $chan);
1602 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(
1603 "ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), $chan.channel_id(),
1604 $chan.get_user_id(), $chan.force_shutdown(false),
1605 $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok()));
1609 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
1610 if ($update_id == 0 || $chan.get_next_monitor_update()
1611 .expect("We can't be processing a monitor update if it isn't queued")
1612 .update_id == $update_id) &&
1613 $chan.get_latest_monitor_update_id() == $update_id
1615 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $update_id, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
1621 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan_entry: expr) => {
1622 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $update_id, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan_entry.get_mut(), MANUALLY_REMOVING, $chan_entry.remove_entry())
1626 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
1628 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
1629 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1630 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1631 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1632 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1633 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1637 /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
1639 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1640 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
1642 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1644 /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
1645 /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
1646 /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
1649 /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
1650 /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
1651 /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
1652 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1653 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1654 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1655 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
1656 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
1658 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1659 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1660 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
1665 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1667 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
1668 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1669 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
1670 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1671 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
1672 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1673 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1674 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1676 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
1679 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
1680 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1682 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1684 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1686 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1688 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1689 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1690 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1691 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
1701 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
1702 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1703 &self.default_configuration
1706 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1707 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1708 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
1711 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
1712 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
1714 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
1716 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
1720 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
1725 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1727 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1728 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1729 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
1730 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
1731 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
1733 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1734 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1736 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1737 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1738 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1740 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1741 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1742 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1743 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1744 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1745 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1747 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1748 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1749 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1750 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1751 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1752 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1755 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1756 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1757 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1759 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1761 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
1762 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
1764 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1766 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
1767 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1768 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1769 match Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
1770 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
1771 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
1775 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
1780 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1782 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1783 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1784 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1786 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1788 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1791 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1794 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1795 node_id: their_network_key,
1798 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1801 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1802 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
1803 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
1804 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
1805 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
1806 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
1807 // the same channel.
1808 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
1810 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1811 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1812 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
1813 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1814 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1815 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1816 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel(channel, best_block_height,
1817 peer_state.latest_features.clone());
1825 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
1826 /// more information.
1827 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1828 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1831 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
1832 /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1834 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1835 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1837 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1838 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1839 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1840 // really wanted anyway.
1841 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1844 /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
1845 pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1846 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1847 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1849 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
1850 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1851 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1852 let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1853 return peer_state.channel_by_id
1856 ChannelDetails::from_channel(channel, best_block_height, features.clone()))
1862 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
1863 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1865 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
1866 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
1867 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
1869 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
1870 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
1871 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
1872 .filter_map(|(_, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
1873 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
1874 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
1875 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
1876 total_msat: *total_msat,
1879 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
1880 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
1882 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
1883 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
1885 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
1890 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
1891 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
1892 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1893 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
1894 Some(transaction) => {
1895 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::DiscardFunding { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction })
1899 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1900 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1901 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1902 reason: closure_reason
1906 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1907 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1909 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
1910 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
1911 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1913 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
1914 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
1916 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1917 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1918 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1919 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1920 let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo();
1921 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1922 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut()
1923 .get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?;
1924 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
1926 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
1927 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
1928 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
1929 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1930 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
1934 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
1935 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
1936 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
1937 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update);
1938 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry);
1941 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1942 let channel = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
1943 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
1944 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1948 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1952 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id) })
1956 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1957 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
1958 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
1959 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
1962 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
1966 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1967 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1968 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1970 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
1971 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1973 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
1974 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
1975 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
1976 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
1978 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
1980 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1981 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1982 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1983 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
1984 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1985 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None)
1988 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1989 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1990 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1992 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
1993 /// the channel being closed or not:
1994 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
1995 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
1996 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1997 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
1998 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
1999 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
2000 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
2002 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2004 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2005 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2006 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2007 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2008 pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2009 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
2013 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
2014 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
2015 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
2016 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2017 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
2018 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2019 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2020 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
2022 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
2023 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2024 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2025 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2026 // ignore the result here.
2027 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
2031 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2032 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2033 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
2034 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2035 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2036 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2037 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
2039 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2040 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2041 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2042 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2043 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) });
2045 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2047 remove_channel!(self, chan)
2049 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), peer_node_id) });
2052 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2053 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(broadcast));
2054 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2055 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2056 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2061 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
2064 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2065 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2066 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2067 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2068 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2069 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2070 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2071 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
2072 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2073 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2074 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
2075 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
2086 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2087 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2088 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2090 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2091 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2092 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2095 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2096 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2097 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2099 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2100 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2101 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2102 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2103 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2106 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2107 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2108 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2109 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2110 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2114 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2115 /// local transaction(s).
2116 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2117 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2118 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2122 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(&self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
2123 payment_hash: PaymentHash, amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError>
2125 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2126 if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value > cltv_expiry {
2127 return Err(ReceiveError {
2128 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to less than the CLTV set by the sender",
2130 err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
2133 // final_expiry_too_soon
2134 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2135 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2137 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2138 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2139 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2140 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2141 if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= current_height as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2142 let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12);
2143 err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes());
2144 err_data.extend_from_slice(¤t_height.to_be_bytes());
2145 return Err(ReceiveError {
2146 err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data,
2147 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2150 if hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat {
2151 return Err(ReceiveError {
2153 err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
2154 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2158 let routing = match hop_data.format {
2159 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => {
2160 return Err(ReceiveError {
2161 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2162 err_data: Vec::new(),
2163 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2166 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
2167 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
2168 return Err(ReceiveError {
2169 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2170 err_data: Vec::new(),
2171 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2173 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2174 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2176 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2177 phantom_shared_secret,
2179 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2180 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2181 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2182 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2183 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2184 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2185 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2186 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2187 return Err(ReceiveError {
2188 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2189 err_data: Vec::new(),
2190 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2194 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2196 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2199 return Err(ReceiveError {
2200 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2201 err_data: Vec::new(),
2202 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2207 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2210 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2211 incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
2212 outgoing_amt_msat: hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2213 outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2217 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
2218 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2219 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2221 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2222 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2223 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2224 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2225 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2226 failure_code: $err_code,
2232 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2233 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2236 let shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(
2237 Recipient::Node, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None
2238 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
2240 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2241 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2242 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2243 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2244 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2245 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2246 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2247 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2249 macro_rules! return_err {
2250 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2252 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2253 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2254 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2255 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2256 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
2257 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
2263 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2265 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2266 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2268 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2269 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2273 let pending_forward_info = match next_hop {
2274 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
2276 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None) {
2278 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
2279 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
2280 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
2281 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
2282 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
2284 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
2287 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
2288 let new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
2289 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2291 public_key: onion_utils::next_hop_packet_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx, new_pubkey, &shared_secret),
2292 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2293 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
2296 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
2297 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2298 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
2299 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2303 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2304 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2305 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2308 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2309 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2310 incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
2311 outgoing_amt_msat: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2312 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2317 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref outgoing_amt_msat, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
2318 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
2319 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
2320 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
2321 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
2322 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
2323 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(short_channel_id).cloned();
2324 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
2325 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2326 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2327 // phantom or an intercept.
2328 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
2329 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)) ||
2330 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)
2334 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2337 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
2339 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
2340 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2341 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
2342 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
2343 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2345 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
2346 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2347 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id) {
2349 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
2350 // have no consistency guarantees.
2351 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2355 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2356 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2357 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2358 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2359 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2361 if chan.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && *short_channel_id != chan.outbound_scid_alias() {
2362 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
2363 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
2364 // we don't have the channel here.
2365 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2367 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(*short_channel_id, chan).ok();
2369 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2370 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2371 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2372 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2373 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2374 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2375 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2377 if *outgoing_amt_msat < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2378 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
2380 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, *outgoing_amt_msat, *outgoing_cltv_value) {
2381 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
2385 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
2386 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
2387 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
2388 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
2390 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
2397 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2398 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2399 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2400 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2401 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2402 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2404 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2405 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2407 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2408 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2409 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2410 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2411 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2412 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2413 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2414 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2415 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2416 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2422 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
2423 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2424 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2425 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2427 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2428 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2430 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2431 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
2432 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2434 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2435 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2436 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2437 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
2438 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
2439 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
2440 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
2444 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
2449 pending_forward_info
2452 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2453 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2454 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2456 /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
2457 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
2458 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
2460 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2461 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
2462 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2463 if !chan.should_announce() {
2464 return Err(LightningError {
2465 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2466 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2469 if chan.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
2470 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
2472 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2473 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2476 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2477 /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
2478 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2479 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2481 /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
2482 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
2483 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
2485 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2486 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
2487 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2488 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2489 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
2490 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2494 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
2496 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2497 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2498 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2500 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2501 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2503 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2504 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
2505 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2506 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2507 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
2508 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2509 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2510 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2512 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
2513 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
2514 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
2516 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
2518 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2525 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2526 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2527 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv_bytes)
2530 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2531 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
2532 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2534 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2535 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
2536 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2538 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2539 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected".to_owned()})?;
2540 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2541 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
2542 return Err(APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Route size too large considering onion data".to_owned()});
2544 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
2546 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2547 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2548 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2549 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
2552 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2553 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
2554 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
2555 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2556 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2557 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
2558 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2559 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
2561 let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2562 let send_res = chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
2563 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2565 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2566 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2568 }, onion_packet, &self.logger);
2569 match break_chan_entry!(self, send_res, chan) {
2570 Some(monitor_update) => {
2571 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2572 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
2573 if let Err(e) = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
2576 if update_res == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress {
2577 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
2578 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
2579 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
2580 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
2581 // which we do in the send_payment check for
2582 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
2583 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
2589 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
2590 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
2591 // `channel_by_id` map.
2592 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
2593 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
2598 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2599 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2601 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2606 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2608 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
2609 /// fields for more info.
2611 /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
2612 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
2614 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
2616 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
2617 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
2618 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
2619 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
2620 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
2622 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
2623 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
2624 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
2625 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
2626 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
2628 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
2629 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
2630 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
2631 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
2633 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
2635 /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
2636 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2637 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
2639 /// In general, a path may raise:
2640 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2641 /// node public key) is specified.
2642 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2643 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2645 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2646 /// relevant updates.
2648 /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
2649 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2650 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2652 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2653 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2654 /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
2655 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
2656 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
2657 pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2658 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2659 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2660 self.pending_outbound_payments
2661 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2662 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2663 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2666 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment`], but will automatically find a route based on
2667 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
2668 pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
2669 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2670 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2671 self.pending_outbound_payments
2672 .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
2673 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
2674 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
2675 &self.pending_events,
2676 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2677 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2681 pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2682 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2683 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2684 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2685 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2686 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2690 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
2691 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2692 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
2696 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
2697 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
2698 /// retries are exhausted.
2700 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
2701 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
2703 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
2704 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
2705 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
2707 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event is generated and we restart without this
2708 /// [`ChannelManager`] having been persisted, another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated.
2710 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2711 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2712 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
2713 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2714 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
2717 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2718 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2719 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2720 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2721 /// never reach the recipient.
2723 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
2724 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
2726 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2727 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2729 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2731 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2732 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
2733 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2734 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2735 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
2736 route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
2737 &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2738 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2739 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2742 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
2743 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
2745 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
2748 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
2749 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
2750 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2751 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2752 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
2753 payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
2754 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2755 &self.logger, &self.pending_events,
2756 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2757 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2760 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
2761 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
2762 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
2763 pub fn send_probe(&self, hops: Vec<RouteHop>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2764 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2765 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2766 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(hops, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2767 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2768 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2771 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
2774 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
2775 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
2778 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2779 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2780 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
2781 &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
2782 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2783 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2784 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2785 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2787 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2788 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2789 let (msg, chan) = match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2791 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2793 let funding_res = chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2794 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2795 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2796 } else { unreachable!(); });
2798 Ok(funding_msg) => (funding_msg, chan),
2800 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
2801 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
2803 let _ = handle_error!(self, funding_res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id());
2804 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2805 err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
2811 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2813 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
2814 log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
2819 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2820 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2823 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2824 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2825 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2827 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2828 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
2829 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.channel_id(), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
2830 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
2839 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2840 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2841 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2845 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2847 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2848 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2850 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
2851 /// across the p2p network.
2853 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
2854 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
2856 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2857 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
2858 /// keys per-channel).
2860 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
2861 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
2862 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
2864 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
2865 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
2866 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2868 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
2869 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
2870 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
2871 /// for more details.
2873 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2874 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
2875 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2876 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2878 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
2879 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
2880 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2881 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
2886 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2887 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools at the next block. However, the modules
2888 // constituting our Lightning node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if
2889 // the wallet module is in advance on the LDK view, allow one more block of headroom.
2890 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 2 {
2891 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2892 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
2896 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
2897 let mut output_index = None;
2898 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
2899 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2900 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
2901 if output_index.is_some() {
2902 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2903 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
2906 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
2907 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2908 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
2911 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
2914 if output_index.is_none() {
2915 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2916 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
2919 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
2923 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
2925 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
2926 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
2927 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
2928 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
2930 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
2931 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
2933 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
2934 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
2936 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
2938 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
2939 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
2940 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
2941 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
2942 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2943 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
2944 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
2945 pub fn update_channel_config(
2946 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config: &ChannelConfig,
2947 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2948 if config.cltv_expiry_delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA {
2949 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2950 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
2954 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(
2955 &self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier,
2957 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2958 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2959 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2960 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2961 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2962 for channel_id in channel_ids {
2963 if !peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) {
2964 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2965 err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
2969 for channel_id in channel_ids {
2970 let channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id).unwrap();
2971 if !channel.update_config(config) {
2974 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
2975 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
2976 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
2977 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2978 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2986 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
2987 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
2989 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
2990 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
2992 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
2993 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
2994 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
2995 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
2996 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
2998 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
2999 /// you from forwarding more than you received.
3001 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3004 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
3005 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3006 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
3007 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
3008 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &[u8; 32], next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3009 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3011 let next_hop_scid = {
3012 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3013 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
3014 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
3015 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3016 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3017 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
3019 if !chan.is_usable() {
3020 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3021 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id))
3024 chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.outbound_scid_alias())
3026 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3027 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id), next_node_id)
3032 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3033 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3034 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3037 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
3038 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => {
3039 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid }
3041 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3043 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
3044 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
3047 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
3048 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3049 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3050 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
3051 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
3053 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
3057 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
3058 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
3060 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3063 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3064 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3065 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3067 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3068 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3069 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3072 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
3073 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3074 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3075 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3076 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
3077 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
3078 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3081 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
3082 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
3083 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3084 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3089 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
3091 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
3092 /// Will likely generate further events.
3093 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
3094 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3096 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
3097 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
3098 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
3100 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
3101 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
3103 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
3104 if short_chan_id != 0 {
3105 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
3107 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3108 match forward_info {
3109 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3110 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3111 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3112 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
3113 outgoing_cltv_value, incoming_amt_msat: _
3116 macro_rules! failure_handler {
3117 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
3118 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3120 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3121 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3122 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3123 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3124 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3125 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
3128 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
3129 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
3131 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
3134 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3135 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
3141 macro_rules! fail_forward {
3142 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3144 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
3148 macro_rules! failed_payment {
3149 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3151 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
3155 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
3156 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
3157 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.genesis_hash) {
3158 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
3159 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
3161 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3162 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
3163 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
3164 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
3165 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
3167 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
3169 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3170 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
3174 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
3175 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) {
3176 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
3177 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
3183 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3186 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3189 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3190 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
3191 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
3192 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
3193 // problem, not ours.
3199 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id) {
3200 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3202 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3206 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3207 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3208 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3209 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3212 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3213 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3214 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
3215 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3216 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3219 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3220 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3221 match forward_info {
3222 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3223 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id: _,
3224 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3225 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
3226 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, incoming_amt_msat: _,
3229 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
3230 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3231 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3232 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3233 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3234 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3235 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
3236 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3238 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
3239 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
3240 onion_packet, &self.logger)
3242 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3243 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
3245 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3247 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
3248 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3249 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
3250 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
3255 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3256 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3258 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3259 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3260 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_fail_htlc(
3261 htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger
3263 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3264 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3266 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
3268 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3269 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3270 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3279 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3280 match forward_info {
3281 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3282 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3283 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3284 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat, ..
3287 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret) = match routing {
3288 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } => {
3289 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
3290 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data }, Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret)
3292 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
3293 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage), None, None),
3295 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3298 let mut claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3299 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3300 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3301 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3302 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3303 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3304 phantom_shared_secret,
3306 // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
3307 // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
3308 // if routing nodes overpay
3309 value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
3310 sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
3312 total_value_received: None,
3313 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
3318 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3319 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
3320 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3321 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3322 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
3324 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3325 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
3326 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3327 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3328 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3329 phantom_shared_secret,
3331 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
3332 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
3336 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
3337 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
3338 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
3339 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
3340 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
3343 macro_rules! check_total_value {
3344 ($payment_data: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{
3345 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
3347 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
3348 payment_preimage: $payment_preimage,
3349 payment_secret: $payment_data.payment_secret,
3352 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3353 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3354 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3357 let (_, ref mut htlcs) = claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
3358 .or_insert_with(|| (purpose(), Vec::new()));
3359 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
3360 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3361 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3362 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3366 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
3367 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
3368 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3369 total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
3370 earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
3371 match &htlc.onion_payload {
3372 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3373 if htlc.total_msat != $payment_data.total_msat {
3374 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
3375 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $payment_data.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
3376 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
3378 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
3380 _ => unreachable!(),
3383 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
3384 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
3385 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
3386 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3387 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= $payment_data.total_msat {
3388 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
3389 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3390 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3391 } else if total_value >= $payment_data.total_msat {
3392 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3393 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3394 let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
3395 htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
3396 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3397 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3401 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3402 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3403 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
3405 payment_claimable_generated = true;
3407 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
3408 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
3410 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3412 payment_claimable_generated
3416 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
3417 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
3418 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
3419 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
3420 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
3421 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
3422 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3423 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3424 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3425 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3426 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3427 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3428 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
3429 Ok(result) => result,
3431 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3432 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3436 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
3437 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
3438 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
3439 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
3440 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
3441 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3445 check_total_value!(payment_data, payment_preimage);
3447 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
3448 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3449 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3450 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3453 match claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
3454 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3455 let amount_msat = claimable_htlc.value;
3456 claimable_htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat);
3457 let claim_deadline = Some(claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER);
3458 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
3459 e.insert((purpose.clone(), vec![claimable_htlc]));
3460 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3461 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3462 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3466 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3467 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3471 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3472 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3473 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3479 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
3480 if payment_data.is_none() {
3481 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3482 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3485 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3486 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
3487 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3488 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3489 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
3490 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
3491 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
3492 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3494 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage);
3495 if payment_claimable_generated {
3496 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
3502 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3503 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
3511 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3512 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
3513 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3514 &self.pending_events, &self.logger,
3515 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
3516 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv));
3518 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
3519 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3521 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
3523 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
3524 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
3525 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
3527 self.check_free_holding_cells();
3529 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
3530 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3531 events.append(&mut new_events);
3534 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
3536 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
3537 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
3539 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
3540 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
3541 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
3542 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
3543 if background_events.is_empty() {
3547 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
3549 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
3550 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
3551 // monitor updating completing.
3552 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
3559 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3560 /// Process background events, for functional testing
3561 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
3562 self.process_background_events();
3565 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
3566 if !chan.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersist; }
3567 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
3568 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
3569 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3570 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
3571 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3573 if !chan.is_live() {
3574 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
3575 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
3576 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3578 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3579 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
3581 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.logger);
3582 NotifyOption::DoPersist
3586 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
3587 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
3588 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
3589 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
3590 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
3591 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3592 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3594 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3596 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3597 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3598 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3599 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3600 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
3601 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3602 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3610 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
3612 /// This currently includes:
3613 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
3614 /// * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
3615 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
3617 /// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
3618 /// with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
3619 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
3621 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
3622 /// estimate fetches.
3624 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3625 /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
3626 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
3627 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3628 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3629 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3631 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3633 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
3634 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
3635 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
3637 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3638 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3639 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3640 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3641 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
3642 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
3643 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3644 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3645 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3647 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
3648 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id);
3649 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
3650 if needs_close { return false; }
3653 match chan.channel_update_status() {
3654 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
3655 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
3656 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3657 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3658 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
3659 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3660 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3664 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3665 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3667 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
3668 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3669 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3673 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3674 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3679 chan.maybe_expire_prev_config();
3683 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
3684 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
3689 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
3690 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
3691 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
3692 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
3693 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
3694 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
3695 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
3696 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
3697 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
3698 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
3699 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
3700 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
3701 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
3702 // have no channels to the peer.
3703 let remove_entry = {
3704 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
3705 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
3708 entry.remove_entry();
3711 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
3716 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
3717 if htlcs.is_empty() {
3718 // This should be unreachable
3719 debug_assert!(false);
3722 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3723 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
3724 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
3725 // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
3726 // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
3727 if htlcs[0].total_msat <= htlcs.iter().fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value) {
3729 } else if htlcs.into_iter().any(|htlc| {
3730 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
3731 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
3733 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(htlcs.drain(..).map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
3740 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
3741 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
3742 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
3743 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
3744 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
3747 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3748 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3751 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_resolved_payments(&self.pending_events);
3753 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
3754 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
3755 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
3756 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
3757 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3764 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
3765 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
3766 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
3768 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
3769 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
3770 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
3771 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
3773 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
3774 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
3775 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
3776 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
3777 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
3778 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
3781 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
3782 /// reason for the failure.
3784 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
3785 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
3786 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3788 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
3789 if let Some((_, mut sources)) = removed_source {
3790 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3791 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
3792 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
3793 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
3794 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3799 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
3800 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
3801 match failure_code {
3802 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code as u16),
3803 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code as u16),
3804 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
3805 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3806 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
3807 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code as u16, htlc_msat_height_data)
3812 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3813 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3815 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
3817 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3818 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
3819 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
3820 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
3821 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
3822 let scid_pref = if chan.should_announce() {
3823 chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
3825 chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.get_short_channel_id())
3827 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
3828 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
3830 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3835 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3836 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3837 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3838 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
3839 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
3840 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
3841 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3842 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
3843 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
3844 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3846 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3847 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3848 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3849 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
3851 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
3852 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
3853 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
3854 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
3855 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3859 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
3860 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
3861 // be surfaced to the user.
3862 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
3863 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32],
3864 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
3866 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
3867 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3868 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
3869 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3870 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3871 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3872 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
3873 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
3875 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3877 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
3880 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
3881 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
3882 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
3883 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3887 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
3888 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
3889 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
3890 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
3891 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
3892 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
3893 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
3894 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
3895 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
3898 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
3899 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
3900 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
3903 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3904 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
3905 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3907 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
3908 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
3909 session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
3910 &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
3911 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
3913 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint }) => {
3914 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), onion_error);
3915 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
3917 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
3918 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
3919 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3920 push_forward_ev = true;
3922 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
3923 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3924 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
3926 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3927 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
3930 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
3931 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
3932 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3933 pending_events.push(events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
3934 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
3935 failed_next_destination: destination,
3941 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
3942 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
3944 /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
3945 /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
3946 /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
3947 /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
3949 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
3950 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
3951 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
3952 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
3954 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
3955 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
3956 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
3957 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
3958 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
3959 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
3960 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
3961 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3963 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3966 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3967 if let Some((payment_purpose, sources)) = claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
3968 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
3969 for htlc in sources.iter() {
3970 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
3971 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
3972 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
3973 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
3978 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
3979 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: sources.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
3980 payment_purpose, receiver_node_id,
3982 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
3983 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
3984 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
3985 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3990 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
3992 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
3993 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
3994 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
3995 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
3996 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
3997 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
3998 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
3999 let mut valid_mpp = true;
4000 let mut errs = Vec::new();
4001 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4002 for htlc in sources.iter() {
4003 if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
4004 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4005 debug_assert!(false);
4009 prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
4011 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
4012 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4013 debug_assert!(false);
4017 expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
4019 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = &htlc.onion_payload {
4020 // We don't currently support MPP for spontaneous payments, so just check
4021 // that there's one payment here and move on.
4022 if sources.len() != 1 {
4023 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP spontaneous payment - this should not be reachable!");
4024 debug_assert!(false);
4030 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
4032 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4033 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
4034 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4035 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
4038 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
4039 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4040 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
4041 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
4045 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4046 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
4047 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
4048 |_| Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash }))
4050 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
4051 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
4052 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
4053 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
4054 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
4059 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4060 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4061 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
4062 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4063 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
4064 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
4065 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4067 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4070 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
4071 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
4072 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4073 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
4077 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
4078 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
4079 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
4080 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
4083 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4084 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
4085 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
4086 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
4090 let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
4091 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4092 .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
4095 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
4096 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
4097 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4098 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4099 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
4100 let fulfill_res = chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger);
4102 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = fulfill_res {
4103 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)) {
4104 log_trace!(self.logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
4105 log_bytes!(chan_id), action);
4106 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
4108 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4109 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update);
4110 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock,
4111 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4112 if let Err(e) = res {
4113 // TODO: This is a *critical* error - we probably updated the outbound edge
4114 // of the HTLC's monitor with a preimage. We should retry this monitor
4115 // update over and over again until morale improves.
4116 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}", payment_preimage);
4117 return Err((counterparty_node_id, e));
4124 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4125 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
4126 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
4130 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
4131 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
4132 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
4133 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
4134 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
4135 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
4136 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
4137 // again on restart.
4138 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4139 payment_preimage, update_res);
4141 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
4142 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
4143 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
4144 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
4145 // `PaymentForwarded`).
4146 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
4150 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
4151 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
4154 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
4156 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
4157 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage, session_priv, path, from_onchain, &self.pending_events, &self.logger);
4159 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
4160 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
4161 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
4162 |htlc_claim_value_msat| {
4163 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
4164 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
4165 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
4168 let prev_channel_id = Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id());
4169 let next_channel_id = Some(next_channel_id);
4171 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEvent { event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
4173 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
4176 outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
4180 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
4181 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4182 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
4188 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
4189 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4190 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
4193 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
4194 for action in actions.into_iter() {
4196 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
4197 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4198 if let Some(ClaimingPayment { amount_msat, payment_purpose: purpose, receiver_node_id }) = payment {
4199 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
4200 payment_hash, purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4204 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEvent { event } => {
4205 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(event);
4211 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
4212 /// update completion.
4213 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4214 channel: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
4215 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
4216 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
4217 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
4218 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
4219 log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
4220 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()),
4221 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
4222 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
4223 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
4224 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
4225 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
4227 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
4229 let counterparty_node_id = channel.get_counterparty_node_id();
4230 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4231 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.outbound_scid_alias()),
4232 channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
4235 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4236 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
4238 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
4239 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4240 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4245 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
4246 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
4247 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4248 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4253 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
4254 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
4255 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4256 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4257 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4262 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
4266 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
4272 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
4273 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
4274 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
4278 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4279 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
4280 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
4286 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
4287 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
4289 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
4290 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4292 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
4293 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
4294 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4295 match id_to_peer.get(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4296 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4301 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4302 let mut peer_state_lock;
4303 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4304 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
4305 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4306 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4308 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()){
4309 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
4310 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
4313 log_trace!(self.logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}",
4314 highest_applied_update_id, channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id());
4315 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
4318 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, highest_applied_update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel.get_mut());
4321 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
4323 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
4324 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
4327 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4328 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4329 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4331 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
4332 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
4333 /// used to accept such channels.
4335 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4336 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4337 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4338 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
4341 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
4342 /// it as confirmed immediately.
4344 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4345 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4346 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4348 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
4349 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
4351 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
4352 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
4354 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
4355 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
4357 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4358 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4359 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4360 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
4363 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4364 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4366 let peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| !peer.channel_by_id.is_empty());
4367 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4368 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4369 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4370 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4371 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4372 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.len() == 1;
4373 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4374 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
4375 if !channel.get().inbound_is_awaiting_accept() {
4376 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
4379 channel.get_mut().set_0conf();
4380 } else if channel.get().get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4381 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4382 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4383 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4384 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
4387 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4388 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4389 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
4391 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
4392 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
4393 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
4394 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
4395 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4396 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4397 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4398 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
4401 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4402 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4403 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned() });
4407 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4408 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4409 msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4412 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4413 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id) });
4419 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
4420 /// or 0-conf channels.
4422 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
4423 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
4424 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
4425 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> bool {
4426 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
4427 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4429 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4430 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
4431 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
4432 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
4433 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
4434 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.channel_by_id.len() {
4435 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
4439 return peers_without_funded_channels;
4442 fn unfunded_channel_count(
4443 peer: &PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, best_block_height: u32
4445 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
4446 for (_, chan) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
4447 if !chan.is_outbound() && chan.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
4448 chan.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
4450 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
4453 num_unfunded_channels
4456 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4457 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
4458 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4461 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
4462 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4465 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
4466 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
4467 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
4468 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
4470 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
4471 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
4472 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
4473 let channeled_peers_without_funding = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| !node.channel_by_id.is_empty());
4475 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4476 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4478 debug_assert!(false);
4479 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())
4481 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4482 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4484 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
4485 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
4486 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
4487 if peer_state.channel_by_id.is_empty() &&
4488 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
4489 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
4491 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4492 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
4493 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4496 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4497 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
4498 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4499 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
4500 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4503 let mut channel = match Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
4504 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
4505 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias)
4508 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4509 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
4513 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
4514 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4515 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4516 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
4518 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4519 if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
4520 if channel.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4521 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4523 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4524 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4525 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4528 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4529 pending_events.push(
4530 events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
4531 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
4532 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4533 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
4534 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
4535 channel_type: channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
4540 entry.insert(channel);
4546 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4547 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
4548 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4549 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4551 debug_assert!(false);
4552 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
4554 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4555 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4556 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4557 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4558 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), chan);
4559 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
4561 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4564 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4565 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
4566 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
4567 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4568 channel_value_satoshis: value,
4570 user_channel_id: user_id,
4575 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4576 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4578 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4579 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4581 debug_assert!(false);
4582 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
4585 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4586 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4587 let ((funding_msg, monitor), chan) =
4588 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4589 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4590 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan), chan.remove())
4592 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4595 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
4596 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4597 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
4599 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4600 match self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().entry(chan.channel_id()) {
4601 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4602 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4603 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
4604 funding_msg.channel_id))
4606 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
4607 i_e.insert(chan.get_counterparty_node_id());
4611 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
4612 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
4613 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
4614 // until we have persisted our monitor.
4615 let new_channel_id = funding_msg.channel_id;
4616 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
4617 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4621 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
4623 let chan = e.insert(chan);
4624 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, monitor_res, 0, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
4625 per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING, { peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&new_channel_id) });
4627 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
4628 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
4629 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
4630 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
4631 // We do not propagate the monitor update to the user as it would be for a monitor
4632 // that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we don't respond
4633 // with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
4634 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { shutdown_finish: Some((res, _)), .. }) = &mut res {
4642 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4643 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4644 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4645 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4647 debug_assert!(false);
4648 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4651 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4652 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4653 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4654 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4655 let monitor = try_chan_entry!(self,
4656 chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan);
4657 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor);
4658 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, 0, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4659 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
4660 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
4661 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
4662 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
4663 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
4664 shutdown_finish.0.take();
4669 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4673 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4674 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4675 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4677 debug_assert!(false);
4678 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4680 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4681 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4682 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4683 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4684 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
4685 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan);
4686 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
4687 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4688 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4689 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4690 msg: announcement_sigs,
4692 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4693 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
4694 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
4695 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
4696 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
4697 // announcement_signatures.
4698 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4699 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
4700 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4701 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4708 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4709 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan.get_mut());
4714 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4718 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4719 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
4720 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
4721 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4722 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4724 debug_assert!(false);
4725 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4727 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4728 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4729 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4730 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4732 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
4733 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
4734 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
4735 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
4738 let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo();
4739 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self,
4740 chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_entry);
4741 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
4743 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4744 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
4745 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
4746 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
4747 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4748 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4753 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
4754 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
4755 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4756 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update);
4757 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry);
4761 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4764 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
4765 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
4766 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
4767 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
4773 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4774 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4775 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4777 debug_assert!(false);
4778 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4780 let (tx, chan_option) = {
4781 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4782 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4783 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4784 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4785 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_entry);
4786 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
4787 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4788 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4793 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
4794 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
4795 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
4796 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
4797 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
4798 (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, chan_entry)))
4799 } else { (tx, None) }
4801 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4804 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
4805 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
4806 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
4808 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
4809 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4810 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4811 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4812 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4816 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4821 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4822 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
4823 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
4824 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
4826 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
4827 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
4828 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
4829 //but we should prevent it anyway.
4831 let pending_forward_info = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
4832 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4833 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4835 debug_assert!(false);
4836 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4838 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4839 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4840 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4841 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4843 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
4844 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
4845 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
4846 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
4847 match pending_forward_info {
4848 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
4849 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
4850 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
4851 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
4853 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
4854 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
4855 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4856 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
4857 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
4860 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
4862 _ => pending_forward_info
4865 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), chan);
4867 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4872 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4873 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
4874 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4875 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4877 debug_assert!(false);
4878 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4880 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4881 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4882 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4883 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4884 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan)
4886 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4889 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, msg.channel_id);
4893 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4894 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4895 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4897 debug_assert!(false);
4898 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4900 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4901 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4902 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4903 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4904 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan);
4906 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4911 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4912 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4913 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4915 debug_assert!(false);
4916 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4918 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4919 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4920 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4921 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4922 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
4923 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
4924 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan);
4926 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan);
4929 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4933 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4934 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4935 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4937 debug_assert!(false);
4938 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4940 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4941 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4942 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4943 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4944 let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo();
4945 let monitor_update = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
4946 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update);
4947 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4948 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock,
4949 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan)
4951 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4956 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
4957 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
4958 let mut push_forward_event = false;
4959 let mut new_intercept_events = Vec::new();
4960 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
4961 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4962 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4963 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
4964 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
4965 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
4966 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
4968 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
4969 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
4971 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4972 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
4973 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
4974 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4975 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4976 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
4978 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4979 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
4980 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.genesis_hash)
4982 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).into_inner());
4983 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4984 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
4985 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4986 new_intercept_events.push(events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
4987 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
4988 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
4989 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
4990 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
4993 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4994 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
4996 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4997 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
4998 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4999 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
5000 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
5001 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
5002 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
5003 phantom_shared_secret: None,
5006 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
5007 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
5008 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
5013 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
5014 // payments are being processed.
5015 if forward_htlcs_empty {
5016 push_forward_event = true;
5018 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5019 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
5026 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
5027 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
5030 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
5031 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5032 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
5034 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
5038 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued.
5039 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
5040 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5041 let forward_ev_exists = pending_events.iter()
5042 .find(|ev| if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false })
5044 if !forward_ev_exists {
5045 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
5047 Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
5052 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5053 let (htlcs_to_fail, res) = {
5054 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5055 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5057 debug_assert!(false);
5058 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5059 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
5060 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5061 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5062 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5063 let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo();
5064 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
5065 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update);
5066 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5067 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id,
5068 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5069 (htlcs_to_fail, res)
5071 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5074 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
5078 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5079 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5080 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5082 debug_assert!(false);
5083 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5085 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5086 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5087 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5088 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5089 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan);
5091 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5096 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5097 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5098 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5100 debug_assert!(false);
5101 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5103 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5104 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5105 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5106 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5107 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
5108 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
5111 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5112 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
5113 &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
5114 msg, &self.default_configuration
5116 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5117 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5118 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap()),
5121 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5126 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
5127 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5128 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
5129 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
5131 // It's not a local channel
5132 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5135 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5136 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
5137 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
5138 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5140 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5141 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5142 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5143 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5144 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5145 if chan.get().should_announce() {
5146 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
5147 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
5148 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
5149 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5151 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
5153 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
5154 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
5155 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
5156 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5158 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", log_bytes!(chan_id));
5159 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), chan);
5162 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5164 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
5167 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5169 let need_lnd_workaround = {
5170 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5172 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5174 debug_assert!(false);
5175 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5177 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5178 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5179 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5180 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5181 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
5182 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
5183 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
5184 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
5185 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
5186 msg, &self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash,
5187 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan);
5188 let mut channel_update = None;
5189 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
5190 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5191 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5194 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
5195 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
5196 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
5197 // they have the latest channel parameters.
5198 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
5199 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5200 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
5205 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
5206 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
5207 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get_mut(), responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
5208 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
5209 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
5210 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
5214 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5218 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
5219 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
5222 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
5223 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
5228 /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
5229 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
5230 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
5232 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5233 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
5234 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
5235 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
5236 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
5237 match monitor_event {
5238 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
5239 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
5240 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
5241 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
5243 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
5244 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
5245 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
5246 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5249 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
5250 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
5251 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
5252 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
5254 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5255 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
5256 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5257 id_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).cloned()
5260 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
5261 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5262 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
5263 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5264 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5265 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5266 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
5267 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
5268 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
5269 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5270 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5274 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
5275 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
5277 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
5279 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
5280 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5281 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5282 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5283 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5290 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
5291 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
5297 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5298 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5301 has_pending_monitor_events
5304 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
5305 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
5306 /// update events as a separate process method here.
5308 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
5309 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5310 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5311 NotifyOption::DoPersist
5313 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
5318 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
5319 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
5320 /// update was applied.
5321 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
5322 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
5323 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5324 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
5326 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
5327 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
5328 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
5329 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
5331 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5332 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5334 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5335 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5336 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
5337 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
5338 let funding_txo = chan.get_funding_txo();
5339 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
5340 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger);
5341 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
5342 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
5344 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
5345 has_monitor_update = true;
5347 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(
5348 funding_txo.expect("channel is live"), monitor_update);
5349 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5350 let channel_id: [u8; 32] = *channel_id;
5351 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id,
5352 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING,
5353 peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id));
5355 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, res));
5357 continue 'peer_loop;
5366 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
5367 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
5368 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
5371 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5372 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5378 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
5379 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
5380 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
5381 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
5382 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
5383 let mut has_update = false;
5385 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5387 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5388 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5389 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5390 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5391 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5392 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
5393 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
5394 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
5396 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5397 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
5400 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
5401 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
5402 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
5403 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5404 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5409 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5411 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
5412 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
5413 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
5419 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
5420 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5428 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5429 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5435 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
5436 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
5438 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
5439 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5440 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
5441 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
5442 // reorganized out of the main chain.
5443 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
5444 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
5445 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
5446 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
5447 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
5448 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
5449 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
5450 assert!(should_broadcast);
5451 } else { unreachable!(); }
5452 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
5454 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5458 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5459 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
5461 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
5462 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("min_value_msat of {} greater than total 21 million bitcoin supply", min_value_msat.unwrap()) });
5465 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5467 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5468 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5469 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5470 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5471 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
5472 payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
5473 user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
5474 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
5475 // it's updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
5476 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
5477 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
5478 // never fail a payment too early.
5479 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
5481 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
5484 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
5489 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
5492 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
5493 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
5495 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
5496 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
5497 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
5498 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
5500 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
5502 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5503 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5507 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5508 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5510 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5512 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
5513 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
5515 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5516 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5517 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
5518 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
5519 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
5520 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5521 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
5522 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
5523 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
5524 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
5525 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
5528 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5529 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5531 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5534 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5536 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5538 pub fn create_inbound_payment_legacy(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), APIError> {
5539 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5540 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5541 let payment_secret = self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)?;
5542 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret))
5545 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
5546 /// stored external to LDK.
5548 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
5549 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
5550 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
5552 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
5553 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
5556 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
5557 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
5558 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
5559 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
5561 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
5562 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
5563 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
5564 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
5565 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
5567 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
5568 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
5569 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
5570 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
5571 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
5573 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
5574 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
5576 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5577 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5581 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5582 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5584 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5586 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
5587 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
5589 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5590 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5591 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
5592 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
5593 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
5594 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
5595 min_final_cltv_expiry)
5598 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5599 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5601 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5604 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5606 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5608 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5609 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
5612 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
5613 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
5615 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5616 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
5617 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
5620 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
5621 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
5623 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5624 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5625 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5626 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5628 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
5629 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5630 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
5631 Some(_) => continue,
5632 None => return scid_candidate
5637 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
5639 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5640 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
5642 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
5643 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
5644 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
5648 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
5649 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
5650 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
5652 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
5653 /// times to get a unique scid.
5654 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5655 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5656 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5658 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
5659 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5660 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
5661 return scid_candidate
5665 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
5666 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
5667 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
5668 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
5670 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5671 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5672 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5673 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5674 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
5675 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
5676 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
5677 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
5686 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5687 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
5688 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5689 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
5690 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
5694 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
5695 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
5696 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5701 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
5702 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5703 if events.is_empty() { None } else { Some(events.remove(0)) }
5707 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
5708 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
5712 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
5713 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
5716 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
5717 /// using the given event handler.
5719 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
5720 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
5723 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock until the returned future completes so that
5724 // we can be sure no other persists happen while processing events.
5725 let _read_guard = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
5727 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5729 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5730 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5731 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5732 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5735 let pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5736 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5737 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5740 for event in pending_events {
5741 handler(event).await;
5744 if result == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
5745 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
5750 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5752 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5753 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5754 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5755 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5756 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5757 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5761 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
5762 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
5763 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
5764 /// is always placed next to each other.
5766 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
5767 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
5768 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
5769 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
5771 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
5772 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
5773 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
5774 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
5775 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5776 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5777 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5779 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5780 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5781 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5782 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5785 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5786 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5788 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
5789 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5792 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
5793 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5794 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5795 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5796 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5797 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
5798 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
5802 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5803 events.replace(pending_events);
5812 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5814 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5815 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5816 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5817 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5818 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5819 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5823 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
5825 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
5826 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
5827 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
5828 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5829 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5831 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5832 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5833 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5834 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5837 let pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5838 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5839 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5842 for event in pending_events {
5843 handler.handle_event(event);
5851 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5853 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5854 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5855 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5856 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5857 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5858 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5862 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5864 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5865 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
5866 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
5867 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
5868 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
5871 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
5872 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
5875 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5876 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5877 let new_height = height - 1;
5879 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
5880 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
5881 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
5882 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
5883 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
5884 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
5887 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
5891 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5893 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5894 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5895 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5896 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5897 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5898 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5902 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5903 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5904 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5905 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5907 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5908 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
5910 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5911 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)
5912 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
5914 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5915 if height < last_best_block_height {
5916 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5917 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
5921 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5922 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5923 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5924 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5926 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5927 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
5929 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5931 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
5933 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
5935 macro_rules! max_time {
5936 ($timestamp: expr) => {
5938 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
5939 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
5940 // having an explicit local time source.
5941 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
5942 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
5943 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5944 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
5945 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
5951 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
5952 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5953 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
5954 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
5958 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
5959 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
5960 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
5961 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5962 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5963 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
5964 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(block_hash)) = (chan.get_funding_txo(), chan.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
5965 res.push((funding_txo.txid, Some(block_hash)));
5972 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
5973 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5974 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
5975 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
5976 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
5977 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
5978 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5979 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5984 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5986 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5987 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5988 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5989 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5990 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5991 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5995 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
5996 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
5998 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
5999 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
6000 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6001 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6002 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6004 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6005 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
6007 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6008 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6009 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6010 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6011 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6012 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
6013 let res = f(channel);
6014 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
6015 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
6016 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
6017 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
6018 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.channel_id() }));
6020 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
6021 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
6022 if channel.is_usable() {
6023 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6024 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
6025 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6026 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6031 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6036 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6037 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
6040 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
6041 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6042 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6043 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6044 msg: announcement_sigs,
6046 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6047 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
6048 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
6050 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
6051 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
6052 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
6057 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
6058 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
6059 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
6060 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
6061 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
6062 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
6063 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
6064 // is always consistent.
6065 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
6066 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
6067 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()),
6068 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
6069 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
6072 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
6073 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, channel);
6074 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
6075 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
6076 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
6077 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
6078 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6082 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
6083 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
6084 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6085 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6086 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
6087 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
6088 data: reason_message,
6098 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6099 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
6100 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
6101 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
6102 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
6103 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
6104 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
6105 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6106 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
6107 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
6109 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
6110 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
6111 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
6115 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
6118 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6119 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
6120 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6121 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6122 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
6123 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
6124 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6125 phantom_shared_secret: None,
6126 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
6129 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
6130 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6131 _ => unreachable!(),
6133 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
6134 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
6135 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
6136 log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
6142 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
6144 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
6145 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
6149 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
6151 /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
6152 /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
6154 pub fn get_persistable_update_future(&self) -> Future {
6155 self.persistence_notifier.get_future()
6158 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6159 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
6160 self.persistence_notifier.notify_pending()
6163 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
6164 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
6165 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
6166 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
6169 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6170 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6171 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6172 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
6175 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6176 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6178 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6179 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6180 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6181 pub fn invoice_features(&self) -> InvoiceFeatures {
6182 provided_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
6185 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6186 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6187 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
6188 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
6191 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6192 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6193 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6194 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
6197 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6198 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6199 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
6200 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
6204 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
6205 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6207 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6208 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6209 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6210 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6211 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6212 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6216 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
6217 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6218 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6221 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
6222 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6223 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6226 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
6227 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6228 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6231 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
6232 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6233 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6236 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
6237 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6238 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6241 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
6242 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6243 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6246 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
6247 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6248 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6251 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
6252 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6253 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6256 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
6257 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6258 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6261 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
6262 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6263 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6266 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
6267 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6268 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6271 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
6272 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6273 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6276 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
6277 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6278 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6281 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
6282 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6283 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6286 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
6287 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6288 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6291 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
6292 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6293 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
6296 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
6301 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
6302 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6303 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6306 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
6307 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6308 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6309 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6311 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
6312 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6313 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
6314 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6315 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6316 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6317 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6318 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
6319 if chan.is_shutdown() {
6320 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
6321 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
6326 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
6328 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
6329 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
6330 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
6331 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
6332 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
6333 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
6334 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
6335 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
6336 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
6337 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
6338 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
6339 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
6340 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6341 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
6342 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6343 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
6344 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
6345 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
6346 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
6347 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
6348 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
6351 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
6352 peer_state.is_connected = false;
6353 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
6354 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
6357 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
6359 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6361 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6362 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6366 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
6367 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
6368 log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6372 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6374 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
6375 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
6376 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
6377 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
6378 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
6379 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
6382 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6383 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
6384 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6385 if inbound_peer_limited {
6388 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
6389 channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
6390 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
6391 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
6392 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
6396 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
6397 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
6398 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
6400 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6401 if inbound_peer_limited &&
6402 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
6403 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
6408 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
6409 peer_state.is_connected = true;
6414 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6416 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6417 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6418 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6419 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6420 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6421 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6422 let retain = if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
6423 if !chan.have_received_message() {
6424 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
6425 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
6426 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
6430 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
6431 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6432 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
6437 if retain && chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6438 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.default_configuration) {
6439 if let Ok(update_msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
6440 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement {
6441 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6450 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
6454 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
6455 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6457 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
6458 let channel_ids: Vec<[u8; 32]> = {
6459 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6460 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
6461 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
6462 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6463 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6464 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
6466 for channel_id in channel_ids {
6467 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6468 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6472 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
6473 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6474 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
6475 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
6476 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6477 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6478 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
6479 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash) {
6480 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
6481 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6489 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6490 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6494 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6495 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
6498 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
6499 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
6503 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6504 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6505 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
6506 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6509 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6510 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6512 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6513 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6514 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6515 pub(crate) fn provided_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InvoiceFeatures {
6516 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6519 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6520 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6521 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
6522 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6525 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6526 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6527 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6528 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
6531 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6532 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6533 pub fn provided_init_features(_config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
6534 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
6535 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
6536 // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
6537 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
6538 features.set_data_loss_protect_optional();
6539 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
6540 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
6541 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
6542 features.set_payment_secret_required();
6543 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
6544 features.set_wumbo_optional();
6545 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
6546 features.set_channel_type_optional();
6547 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
6548 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
6550 { // Attributes are not allowed on if expressions on our current MSRV of 1.41.
6551 if _config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
6552 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
6558 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6559 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6561 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
6562 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
6563 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
6564 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
6567 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
6568 (2, node_id, required),
6569 (4, features, required),
6570 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
6571 (8, forwarding_info, option),
6572 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6573 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6576 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
6577 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6578 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6579 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6580 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
6581 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
6582 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6583 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
6584 (2, self.channel_id, required),
6585 (3, self.channel_type, option),
6586 (4, self.counterparty, required),
6587 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
6588 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
6589 (7, self.config, option),
6590 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
6591 (9, self.confirmations, option),
6592 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
6593 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6594 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6595 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
6596 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6597 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6598 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6599 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6600 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6601 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
6602 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
6603 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
6604 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
6605 (30, self.is_usable, required),
6606 (32, self.is_public, required),
6607 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6608 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6609 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6610 (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
6616 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
6617 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6618 _init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6619 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
6620 (2, channel_id, required),
6621 (3, channel_type, option),
6622 (4, counterparty, required),
6623 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6624 (6, funding_txo, option),
6625 (7, config, option),
6626 (8, short_channel_id, option),
6627 (9, confirmations, option),
6628 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
6629 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6630 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6631 (16, balance_msat, required),
6632 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6633 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6634 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6635 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6636 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6637 (22, confirmations_required, option),
6638 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
6639 (26, is_outbound, required),
6640 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
6641 (30, is_usable, required),
6642 (32, is_public, required),
6643 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6644 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6645 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6646 (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
6649 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6650 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6651 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
6652 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
6653 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
6657 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
6659 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
6660 outbound_scid_alias,
6664 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
6665 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
6667 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
6668 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
6669 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
6670 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
6671 confirmations_required,
6673 force_close_spend_delay,
6674 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
6675 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
6676 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
6677 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
6678 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
6679 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
6680 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
6685 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
6686 (2, channels, vec_type),
6687 (4, phantom_scid, required),
6688 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
6691 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
6693 (0, onion_packet, required),
6694 (2, short_channel_id, required),
6697 (0, payment_data, required),
6698 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6699 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6701 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
6702 (0, payment_preimage, required),
6703 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6707 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
6708 (0, routing, required),
6709 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
6710 (4, payment_hash, required),
6711 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
6712 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
6713 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
6717 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6718 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6720 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
6722 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6723 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6724 reason.write(writer)?;
6726 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6727 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
6730 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6731 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6732 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
6733 failure_code.write(writer)?;
6740 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6741 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6742 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6745 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6746 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6747 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6748 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
6752 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6753 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6754 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6755 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
6756 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
6759 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
6760 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
6761 // messages contained in the variants.
6762 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
6763 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
6764 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
6766 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6767 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6768 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6769 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6770 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
6773 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6774 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6775 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6776 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6777 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
6779 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6784 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
6789 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
6790 (0, short_channel_id, required),
6791 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6792 (2, outpoint, required),
6793 (4, htlc_id, required),
6794 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
6797 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
6798 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6799 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
6800 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
6801 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
6803 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6804 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
6805 (1, self.total_msat, required),
6806 (2, self.value, required),
6807 (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
6808 (4, payment_data, option),
6809 (5, self.total_value_received, option),
6810 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
6811 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
6817 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
6818 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6819 let mut prev_hop = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
6821 let mut sender_intended_value = None;
6822 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
6823 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
6824 let mut total_value_received = None;
6825 let mut total_msat = None;
6826 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
6827 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6828 (0, prev_hop, required),
6829 (1, total_msat, option),
6830 (2, value, required),
6831 (3, sender_intended_value, option),
6832 (4, payment_data, option),
6833 (5, total_value_received, option),
6834 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
6835 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
6837 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
6839 if payment_data.is_some() {
6840 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6842 if total_msat.is_none() {
6843 total_msat = Some(value);
6845 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
6848 if total_msat.is_none() {
6849 if payment_data.is_none() {
6850 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6852 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
6854 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
6858 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
6861 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
6862 total_value_received,
6863 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
6870 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
6871 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6872 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6875 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
6876 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
6877 let mut path: Option<Vec<RouteHop>> = Some(Vec::new());
6878 let mut payment_id = None;
6879 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
6880 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6881 (0, session_priv, required),
6882 (1, payment_id, option),
6883 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6884 (4, path, vec_type),
6885 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
6887 if payment_id.is_none() {
6888 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
6890 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
6892 if path.is_none() || path.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
6893 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6895 let path = path.unwrap();
6896 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
6897 if params.final_cltv_expiry_delta == 0 {
6898 params.final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.last().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta;
6901 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
6902 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
6903 first_hop_htlc_msat,
6905 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
6908 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6909 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6914 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
6915 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
6917 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
6919 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
6920 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6921 (0, session_priv, required),
6922 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
6923 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6924 // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
6925 (4, *path, vec_type),
6926 (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
6929 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
6931 field.write(writer)?;
6938 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
6939 (0, forward_info, required),
6940 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
6941 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
6942 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
6943 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
6946 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
6948 (0, htlc_id, required),
6949 (2, err_packet, required),
6954 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
6955 (0, payment_secret, required),
6956 (2, expiry_time, required),
6957 (4, user_payment_id, required),
6958 (6, payment_preimage, required),
6959 (8, min_value_msat, required),
6962 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6964 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6965 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6966 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6967 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6968 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6969 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6973 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6974 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
6976 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6978 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
6980 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6981 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
6982 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
6985 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
6987 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6988 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
6989 let mut number_of_channels = 0;
6990 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6991 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6992 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6993 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
6994 serializable_peer_count += 1;
6996 number_of_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.len();
6997 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
6998 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6999 unfunded_channels += 1;
7004 ((number_of_channels - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
7006 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7007 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7008 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7009 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
7010 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7011 channel.write(writer)?;
7018 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7019 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7020 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
7021 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
7022 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7023 for forward in pending_forwards {
7024 forward.write(writer)?;
7029 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
7031 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7032 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
7033 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7035 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
7036 (claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7037 for (payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops)) in claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
7038 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7039 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7040 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
7041 htlc.write(writer)?;
7043 htlc_purposes.push(purpose);
7046 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
7047 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
7048 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7049 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
7050 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
7051 // per_peer_state lock at all.
7052 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
7055 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
7056 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
7057 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
7058 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
7059 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
7061 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
7062 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
7063 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
7064 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
7065 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
7066 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
7067 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
7072 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7073 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7074 for event in events.iter() {
7075 event.write(writer)?;
7078 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
7079 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7080 for event in background_events.iter() {
7082 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
7084 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
7085 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
7090 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
7091 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
7092 // likely to be identical.
7093 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
7094 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
7096 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7097 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
7098 hash.write(writer)?;
7099 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
7102 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
7103 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
7104 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7105 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
7106 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
7109 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
7110 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7112 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7113 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7114 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
7115 session_priv.write(writer)?;
7118 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
7119 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
7123 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
7124 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
7125 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7127 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7128 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7129 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
7135 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
7136 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7137 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
7138 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
7141 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
7142 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
7143 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
7144 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
7145 pending_claiming_payments = None;
7148 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7149 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
7150 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7151 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
7152 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
7153 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
7154 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
7155 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
7156 (9, htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7157 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
7164 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
7166 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
7168 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7169 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
7170 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
7171 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
7172 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
7173 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
7174 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
7175 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
7176 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7177 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
7178 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
7179 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
7180 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
7182 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
7183 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
7185 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
7186 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
7188 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
7189 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
7190 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
7191 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
7192 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
7193 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
7195 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
7196 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7198 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7199 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7200 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7201 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7202 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7203 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7207 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
7208 pub entropy_source: ES,
7210 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
7211 pub node_signer: NS,
7213 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
7214 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
7216 pub signer_provider: SP,
7218 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7220 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
7221 pub fee_estimator: F,
7222 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7224 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
7225 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
7226 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
7227 pub chain_monitor: M,
7229 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
7230 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
7231 /// force-closed during deserialization.
7232 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
7233 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
7234 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
7236 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
7238 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
7239 /// deserialization.
7241 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
7242 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
7243 pub default_config: UserConfig,
7245 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
7246 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
7248 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
7249 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
7250 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
7251 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
7253 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
7256 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
7257 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>,
7260 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7261 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7263 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7264 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7265 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7266 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7267 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7268 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7272 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
7273 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
7274 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
7275 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
7276 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>) -> Self {
7278 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
7279 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
7284 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
7285 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
7286 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7287 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
7289 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7290 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7291 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7292 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7293 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7294 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7298 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7299 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
7300 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
7304 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7305 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
7307 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7308 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7309 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7310 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7311 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7312 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7316 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7317 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7319 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7320 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7321 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7323 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
7325 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7326 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7327 let mut peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7328 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7329 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7330 let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
7331 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
7332 for _ in 0..channel_count {
7333 let mut channel: Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (
7334 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
7336 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7337 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
7338 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
7339 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7340 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7341 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7342 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7343 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
7344 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
7345 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7346 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7347 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7348 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7349 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7350 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7351 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7352 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7353 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7354 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7355 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7356 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
7357 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
7358 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
7359 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7360 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7361 let (monitor_update, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
7362 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
7363 pending_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate(monitor_update));
7365 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
7366 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7367 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7368 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7369 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
7371 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
7372 let mut found_htlc = false;
7373 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
7374 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
7377 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
7378 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
7379 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
7380 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
7381 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
7382 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
7383 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
7384 log_info!(args.logger,
7385 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
7386 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7387 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7391 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7392 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
7393 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7395 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7396 id_to_peer.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel.get_counterparty_node_id());
7398 match peer_channels.entry(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
7399 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7400 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
7401 by_id_map.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
7403 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7404 let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
7405 by_id_map.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
7406 entry.insert(by_id_map);
7410 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
7411 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
7412 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
7413 // safely discard the channel.
7414 let _ = channel.force_shutdown(false);
7415 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7416 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7417 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7418 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
7421 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7422 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7423 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7424 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7425 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7426 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7430 for (funding_txo, _) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7431 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
7432 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
7433 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
7434 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
7436 pending_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((*funding_txo, monitor_update)));
7440 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
7441 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7442 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7443 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
7444 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7445 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7446 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
7447 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
7448 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
7450 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
7453 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7454 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7455 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
7456 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7457 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7458 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
7459 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
7460 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
7462 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
7465 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7466 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>)>()));
7467 for _ in 0..peer_count {
7468 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7469 let peer_state = PeerState {
7470 channel_by_id: peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new()),
7471 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
7472 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
7473 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
7474 is_connected: false,
7476 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
7479 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7480 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
7481 for _ in 0..event_count {
7482 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
7483 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
7488 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7489 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
7490 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7492 let (funding_txo, monitor_update): (OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate) = (Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?);
7493 if pending_background_events.iter().find(|e| {
7494 let BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((pending_funding_txo, pending_monitor_update)) = e;
7495 *pending_funding_txo == funding_txo && *pending_monitor_update == monitor_update
7497 pending_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)));
7500 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7504 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
7505 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7507 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7508 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
7509 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
7510 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
7511 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7515 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7516 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
7517 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
7518 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
7519 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
7520 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
7521 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
7523 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
7524 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7528 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
7529 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
7530 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
7531 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
7532 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
7533 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7534 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7535 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
7536 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
7537 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = Some(Vec::new());
7538 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7539 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
7540 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7541 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
7542 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
7543 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
7544 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
7545 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
7546 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7547 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
7549 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
7550 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7553 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
7554 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7557 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
7558 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
7561 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
7562 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
7563 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
7564 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
7565 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
7566 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
7568 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
7570 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
7571 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
7572 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
7576 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
7577 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
7578 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
7579 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
7580 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
7581 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
7582 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
7584 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7585 if id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
7586 for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
7587 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
7588 if path.is_empty() {
7589 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
7590 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7593 let path_amt = path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
7594 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
7595 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
7596 match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
7597 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7598 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
7599 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
7600 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
7602 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7603 let path_fee = path.get_path_fees();
7604 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
7605 retry_strategy: None,
7606 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
7607 payment_params: None,
7608 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
7609 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
7610 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
7611 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
7612 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
7613 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
7614 total_msat: path_amt,
7615 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
7617 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
7618 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
7623 for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
7625 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
7626 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
7627 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
7628 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
7630 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
7631 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
7632 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
7633 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
7634 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
7635 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
7636 forwards.retain(|forward| {
7637 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
7638 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
7639 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
7640 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
7645 !forwards.is_empty()
7647 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
7648 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
7649 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
7650 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
7651 pending_events_read.retain(|event| {
7652 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
7653 intercepted_id != ev_id
7660 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
7661 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
7662 let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
7663 // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
7664 // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
7665 // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
7666 // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
7667 // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
7668 // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
7669 // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
7670 // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
7671 pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv, path, false, &pending_events, &args.logger);
7672 pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
7681 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
7682 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
7683 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
7684 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
7685 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
7686 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
7687 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
7688 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
7692 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
7693 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
7695 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
7696 if let Some(mut purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
7697 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
7698 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7700 for (purpose, (payment_hash, previous_hops)) in purposes.drain(..).zip(claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..)) {
7701 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7704 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
7705 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
7706 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
7707 if previous_hops.is_empty() {
7708 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7710 let purpose = match &previous_hops[0].onion_payload {
7711 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
7712 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
7713 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
7714 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
7715 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
7716 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
7717 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
7719 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7720 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7724 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
7726 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
7728 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
7729 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
7731 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7735 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7736 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7738 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
7740 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7742 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
7743 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
7744 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
7745 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7749 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
7750 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
7751 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7752 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7753 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
7754 if chan.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
7755 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
7757 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
7758 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
7759 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
7761 chan.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
7762 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias()) {
7763 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7764 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7765 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7766 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7768 if chan.is_usable() {
7769 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
7770 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7771 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7772 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7773 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7779 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
7781 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7782 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
7783 if let Some((payment_purpose, claimable_htlcs)) = claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
7784 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7785 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
7786 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
7787 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
7788 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
7789 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
7790 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
7791 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
7793 for claimable_htlc in claimable_htlcs {
7794 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
7796 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
7797 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
7798 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
7799 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
7801 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
7802 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
7803 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
7804 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
7806 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
7807 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
7808 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
7809 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
7811 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
7812 if let Some(peer_node_id) = id_to_peer.get(&previous_channel_id){
7813 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
7814 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7815 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7816 if let Some(channel) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
7817 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
7820 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
7821 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
7824 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
7827 purpose: payment_purpose,
7828 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
7834 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
7835 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get_mut(&node_id) {
7836 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
7838 log_error!(args.logger, "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
7839 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7843 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
7845 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
7846 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
7847 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
7848 router: args.router,
7850 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
7852 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
7853 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
7854 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
7855 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
7857 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
7858 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_htlcs, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
7859 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
7860 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
7861 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
7862 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
7864 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
7869 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
7871 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
7873 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
7874 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
7875 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
7876 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
7878 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
7879 node_signer: args.node_signer,
7880 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
7882 logger: args.logger,
7883 default_configuration: args.default_config,
7886 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7887 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
7888 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
7889 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
7890 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
7893 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
7894 //connection or two.
7896 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
7902 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7903 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7904 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
7905 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
7906 use core::time::Duration;
7907 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
7908 use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
7909 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
7910 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
7911 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
7912 use crate::ln::msgs;
7913 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
7914 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
7915 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7916 use crate::util::test_utils;
7917 use crate::util::config::ChannelConfig;
7918 use crate::chain::keysinterface::EntropySource;
7921 fn test_notify_limits() {
7922 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
7923 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
7924 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7925 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7926 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7927 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7929 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
7930 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
7931 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
7932 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
7933 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
7935 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7937 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
7938 // to connect messages with new values
7939 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7940 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7941 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
7942 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
7943 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
7944 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
7946 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
7947 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
7948 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
7949 // ... but the last node should not.
7950 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
7951 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
7952 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
7953 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
7955 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
7956 // about the channel.
7957 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7958 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7959 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
7961 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
7963 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7964 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7965 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7966 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7967 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
7968 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
7970 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
7971 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7972 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7974 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
7975 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
7976 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
7977 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
7978 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
7979 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
7981 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
7982 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
7983 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7984 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7985 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
7986 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
7987 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7988 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7990 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
7991 // the channel info has updated.
7992 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7993 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7994 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
7995 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
7996 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7997 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
8001 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
8002 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
8004 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8005 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8006 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8007 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8008 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8010 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
8011 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8012 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
8013 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
8015 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
8016 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
8017 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
8018 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
8019 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
8020 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
8021 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
8022 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
8023 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8024 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8025 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8026 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
8028 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
8029 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
8030 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8031 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8032 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8033 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8034 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8035 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8036 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8037 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8038 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8039 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8040 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
8041 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8042 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8043 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8044 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8045 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8046 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8047 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8048 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8049 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8050 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
8052 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
8053 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
8054 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
8055 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8056 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8057 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8058 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
8060 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
8061 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
8062 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
8063 // lightning messages manually.
8064 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8065 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
8066 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8068 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8069 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8070 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
8071 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8072 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8073 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
8074 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8075 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8076 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
8077 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8078 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8079 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8080 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
8081 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8082 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8083 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
8084 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8085 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8086 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
8087 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8088 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
8089 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8090 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8091 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
8092 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8094 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
8095 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
8096 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8097 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
8099 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
8100 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
8101 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
8102 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
8104 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8107 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
8108 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
8109 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
8110 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
8112 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8115 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
8116 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
8117 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
8118 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
8120 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8125 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
8126 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
8127 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
8128 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
8129 // fails as expected.
8130 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8131 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8132 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8133 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8134 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8135 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8136 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8138 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
8139 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
8140 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
8142 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
8143 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8144 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV),
8145 final_value_msat: 100_000,
8147 let route = find_route(
8148 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
8149 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8151 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
8152 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8153 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8154 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8155 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8156 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8157 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8158 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8159 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8160 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8161 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
8162 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
8163 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8164 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
8165 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8166 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8167 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8168 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8169 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8170 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8171 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8172 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8173 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8174 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
8176 // Finally, claim the original payment.
8177 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
8179 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
8180 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8181 let route = find_route(
8182 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
8183 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8185 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
8186 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8187 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8188 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8189 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8190 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
8191 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
8192 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
8194 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
8195 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8196 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
8197 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8198 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8199 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8200 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8201 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8202 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8203 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8204 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8205 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8206 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8207 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
8208 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8209 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8210 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8211 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8212 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8213 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8214 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8215 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8216 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8217 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
8219 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
8220 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
8224 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
8225 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
8226 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
8227 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8228 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8229 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8230 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8232 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8233 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8235 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
8236 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8237 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
8238 final_value_msat: 10_000,
8240 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
8241 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
8242 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8243 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8244 let route = find_route(
8245 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
8246 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8249 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8250 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
8251 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
8252 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
8253 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
8254 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
8255 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8257 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8258 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8259 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8260 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8261 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8262 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8263 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8265 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
8269 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
8270 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
8271 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8272 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8273 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8274 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8276 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8277 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8279 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
8280 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8281 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
8282 final_value_msat: 10_000,
8284 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
8285 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
8286 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8287 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8288 let route = find_route(
8289 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
8290 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8293 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8294 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8295 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
8296 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
8297 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
8298 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
8299 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
8300 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
8301 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8303 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8304 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8305 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8306 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8307 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8308 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8309 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8311 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
8315 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
8316 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8317 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8318 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8319 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8321 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8322 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8323 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8324 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8326 // Marshall an MPP route.
8327 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8328 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8329 route.paths.push(path);
8330 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8331 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8332 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8333 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8334 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8335 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8337 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
8338 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
8340 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
8341 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
8343 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
8348 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
8349 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8350 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8351 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8352 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8354 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8356 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8357 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8359 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8360 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8361 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8362 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8365 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
8366 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
8367 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8368 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
8369 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
8370 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
8373 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
8376 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
8377 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
8382 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
8383 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
8384 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8385 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8386 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8387 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8389 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
8390 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
8392 total_msat: 100_000,
8395 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
8396 // payment verification fails as expected.
8397 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
8398 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
8399 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
8400 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
8402 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
8406 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
8407 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
8411 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
8412 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
8413 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
8414 // the channel is successfully closed.
8415 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8416 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8417 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8418 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8420 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8421 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8422 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
8423 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8424 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
8426 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
8427 let channel_id = &tx.txid().into_inner();
8429 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
8430 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
8431 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8432 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8435 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8437 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8438 // as it has the funding transaction.
8439 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8440 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8441 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8444 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8446 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8448 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8450 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8451 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8452 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8454 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8457 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8458 // as it has the funding transaction.
8459 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8460 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8461 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8463 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8464 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8465 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
8466 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8467 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8468 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
8469 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
8470 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
8472 nodes[0].node.close_channel(channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8473 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8474 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8475 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
8477 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8478 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
8480 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
8481 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
8482 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
8483 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
8484 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8485 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8486 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8490 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
8491 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
8492 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
8493 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
8494 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8495 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8496 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8499 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8501 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
8502 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
8503 // closing transaction).
8504 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
8505 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
8506 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8508 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
8509 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
8510 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8511 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8512 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8515 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8517 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
8519 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
8520 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
8521 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8523 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8525 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8526 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8529 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
8530 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
8531 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
8534 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
8535 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
8536 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
8539 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
8541 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
8542 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
8544 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
8545 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
8547 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
8548 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
8553 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
8554 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
8555 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
8556 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
8557 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8558 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
8559 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
8560 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
8563 let channel_id = [4; 32];
8564 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8565 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
8567 // Test the API functions.
8568 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None), unkown_public_key);
8570 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
8572 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8574 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8576 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8578 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
8580 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
8584 fn test_connection_limiting() {
8585 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
8586 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8587 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8588 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8589 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8591 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
8593 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8594 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8596 let mut funding_tx = None;
8597 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
8598 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8599 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8602 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
8603 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
8604 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
8605 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
8606 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8608 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8609 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8610 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8612 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8614 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
8615 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8616 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8618 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8621 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
8622 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8623 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8624 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
8625 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8627 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
8628 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
8630 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
8631 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
8632 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
8633 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
8634 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
8635 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8636 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8638 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
8639 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
8640 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8641 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap_err();
8643 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
8644 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
8645 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8646 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8647 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
8648 for ev in chan_closed_events {
8649 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
8651 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8652 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8653 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
8654 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap_err();
8656 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
8657 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
8658 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
8659 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8661 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
8662 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
8664 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
8665 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
8666 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
8667 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
8668 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8670 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8671 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
8672 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8674 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
8675 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8676 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
8678 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
8679 // "protected" and can connect again.
8680 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
8681 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
8682 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8683 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8685 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
8687 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8688 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
8692 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
8693 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
8694 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8695 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8696 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8697 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8699 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
8701 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8702 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8704 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
8705 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8706 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8707 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8710 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
8712 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8713 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
8714 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8716 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
8717 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8718 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8720 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
8721 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8722 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
8723 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8727 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
8728 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
8729 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
8730 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8731 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8732 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
8733 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8734 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
8735 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8737 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
8739 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8740 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8742 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
8743 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
8744 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
8745 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
8746 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8747 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8749 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8750 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8752 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8753 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
8755 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8757 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
8758 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8761 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
8762 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
8763 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
8764 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8765 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8766 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8767 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8769 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8770 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
8771 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
8772 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
8776 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8778 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
8779 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8781 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
8782 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8783 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8785 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8786 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
8788 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8790 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
8795 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
8796 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
8797 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
8798 // the channel without the anchors feature.
8799 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8800 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8801 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
8802 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
8803 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8804 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
8805 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8807 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None).unwrap();
8808 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8809 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8811 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8812 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8814 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8815 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8817 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8820 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8821 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
8823 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8824 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8826 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8830 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
8832 use crate::chain::Listen;
8833 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
8834 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
8835 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
8836 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
8837 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
8838 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
8839 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
8840 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
8841 use crate::util::test_utils;
8842 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
8844 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
8845 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
8846 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
8848 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
8852 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
8853 node: &'a ChannelManager<
8854 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
8855 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
8856 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
8857 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
8858 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
8859 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>,
8864 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
8865 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
8868 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
8869 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
8870 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
8872 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
8874 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
8875 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
8876 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
8877 let scorer = Mutex::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
8878 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &scorer);
8880 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
8881 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
8883 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
8884 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
8885 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
8886 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
8888 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
8890 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
8892 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
8893 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
8894 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
8895 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
8896 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
8898 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
8900 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
8902 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: node_b.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8903 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: node_a.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
8904 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8905 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8906 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8909 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
8910 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8911 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
8913 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8914 } else { panic!(); }
8916 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8917 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8918 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
8920 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8921 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
8923 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8926 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8927 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8928 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
8930 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8931 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
8933 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8936 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
8939 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
8942 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
8943 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
8945 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8946 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8947 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
8948 match msg_events[0] {
8949 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
8950 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
8951 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
8955 match msg_events[1] {
8956 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8960 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8961 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
8963 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8964 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
8966 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8969 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8970 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
8972 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8973 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
8975 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8978 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
8979 macro_rules! send_payment {
8980 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
8981 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
8982 .with_features($node_b.invoice_features());
8983 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
8984 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
8986 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
8987 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
8989 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
8990 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), RouteParameters {
8991 payment_params, final_value_msat: 10_000,
8992 }, Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
8993 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
8994 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8995 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
8996 let (raa, cs) = do_get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
8997 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
8998 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
8999 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
9001 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
9002 expect_payment_claimable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
9003 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
9004 expect_payment_claimed!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
9006 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
9007 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
9008 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
9009 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
9010 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
9012 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
9015 let (raa, cs) = do_get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
9016 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
9017 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
9018 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
9020 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
9025 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
9026 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);