1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::{genesis_block, ChainHash};
23 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
25 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
27 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
29 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
31 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
34 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
39 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
40 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
41 // construct one themselves.
42 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
43 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UnfundedChannelContext, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel};
44 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
45 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
46 use crate::ln::features::Bolt11InvoiceFeatures;
47 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
48 use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteParameters, Router};
49 use crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters};
51 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
52 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
53 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
55 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
56 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment, SendAlongPathArgs};
57 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
58 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider, ChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
59 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
60 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
61 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
62 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
63 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
64 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
65 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
67 use alloc::collections::BTreeMap;
70 use crate::prelude::*;
72 use core::cell::RefCell;
74 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
75 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, AtomicBool, Ordering};
76 use core::time::Duration;
79 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
80 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
81 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
83 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
85 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
86 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
87 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
89 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
90 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
91 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
92 // before we forward it.
94 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
95 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
96 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
97 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
98 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
100 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
101 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
103 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
104 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
105 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
106 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
109 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
110 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
111 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
112 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
115 /// This was added in 0.0.116 and will break deserialization on downgrades.
116 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
117 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
118 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
119 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
123 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
124 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
125 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
126 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
127 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
129 pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
130 /// Sender intended amount to forward or receive (actual amount received
131 /// may overshoot this in either case)
132 pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
133 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
134 /// The fee being skimmed off the top of this HTLC. If this is a forward, it'll be the fee we are
135 /// skimming. If we're receiving this HTLC, it's the fee that our counterparty skimmed.
136 pub(super) skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
139 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
140 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
141 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
142 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
145 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
146 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
147 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
148 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
149 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
152 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
153 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
155 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
156 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
157 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
160 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
161 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
163 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
164 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
167 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
168 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
171 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
175 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
176 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
177 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
178 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
179 short_channel_id: u64,
181 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
182 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
184 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
185 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
190 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
192 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
193 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
194 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
196 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
197 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
200 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
201 struct ClaimableHTLC {
202 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
204 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
206 /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
207 /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
208 sender_intended_value: u64,
209 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
211 /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
212 /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
213 total_value_received: Option<u64>,
214 /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
216 /// The extra fee our counterparty skimmed off the top of this HTLC.
217 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
220 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
222 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
223 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
224 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
226 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
227 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
232 impl Readable for PaymentId {
233 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
234 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
239 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
241 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
242 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
243 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
245 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
246 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
251 impl Readable for InterceptId {
252 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
253 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
258 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
259 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
260 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
261 PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
262 OutboundRoute { session_priv: SecretKey },
265 pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
267 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
268 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
269 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
271 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
272 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: *session_priv },
276 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
277 (0, PreviousHopData) => {
278 (0, short_channel_id, required),
279 (2, htlc_id, required),
281 (2, OutboundRoute) => {
282 (0, session_priv, required),
287 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
288 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
289 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
290 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
291 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
294 session_priv: SecretKey,
295 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
296 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
297 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
298 payment_id: PaymentId,
301 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
302 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
303 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
305 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
307 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
309 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
312 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
313 payment_id.hash(hasher);
314 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
320 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
322 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
323 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
324 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
325 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
326 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
327 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
331 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
332 /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
333 /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
334 pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
335 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
336 *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
338 // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
344 struct InboundOnionErr {
350 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
351 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
353 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
354 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
355 pub enum FailureCode {
356 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
357 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
358 TemporaryNodeFailure = 0x2000 | 2,
359 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
360 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
361 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing = 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
362 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
363 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
364 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
365 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
366 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails = 0x4000 | 15,
369 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
370 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
371 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
372 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
373 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
375 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
376 err: msgs::LightningError,
377 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
378 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
380 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
382 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
384 err: LightningError {
386 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
387 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
394 shutdown_finish: None,
398 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
399 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
402 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
404 err: LightningError {
406 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
407 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
413 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
414 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
418 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
421 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
423 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
424 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
428 log_level: Level::Warn,
431 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
433 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
435 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
437 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
438 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
446 shutdown_finish: None,
451 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
452 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
453 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
454 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
455 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
457 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
458 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
459 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
460 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
461 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
462 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
463 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
465 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
469 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
470 struct ClaimingPayment {
472 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
473 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
475 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
476 (0, amount_msat, required),
477 (2, payment_purpose, required),
478 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
481 struct ClaimablePayment {
482 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
483 onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
484 htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
487 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
488 struct ClaimablePayments {
489 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
490 /// failed/claimed by the user.
492 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
493 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
495 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
496 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
497 claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
499 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
500 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
501 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
502 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
505 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be processed immediately at the generation site
506 /// usually because we're running pre-full-init. They are handled immediately once we detect we are
507 /// running normally, and specifically must be processed before any other non-background
508 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are applied.
509 enum BackgroundEvent {
510 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which closes the channel or for an already-closed channel.
511 /// This is only separated from [`Self::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`] as the
512 /// maybe-non-closing variant needs a public key to handle channel resumption, whereas if the
513 /// channel has been force-closed we do not need the counterparty node_id.
515 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
516 /// are regenerated on startup.
517 ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
518 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which may or may not close the channel and may unblock the
519 /// channel to continue normal operation.
521 /// In general this should be used rather than
522 /// [`Self::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`], however in cases where the
523 /// `counterparty_node_id` is not available as the channel has closed from a [`ChannelMonitor`]
524 /// error the other variant is acceptable.
526 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
527 /// are regenerated on startup.
528 MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
529 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
530 funding_txo: OutPoint,
531 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate
533 /// Some [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (s) completed before we were serialized but we still have
534 /// them marked pending, thus we need to run any [`MonitorUpdateCompletionAction`] (s) pending
536 MonitorUpdatesComplete {
537 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
538 channel_id: [u8; 32],
543 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
544 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
545 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
546 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
547 /// event can be generated.
548 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
549 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user and possibly resume the
550 /// operation of another channel.
552 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
553 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
554 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. In that case, after the inbound
555 /// edge completes, we will surface an [`Event::PaymentForwarded`] as well as unblock the
557 EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
558 event: events::Event,
559 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction)>,
563 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
564 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
565 (2, EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel) => {
566 (0, event, upgradable_required),
567 // LDK prior to 0.0.116 did not have this field as the monitor update application order was
568 // required by clients. If we downgrade to something prior to 0.0.116 this may result in
569 // monitor updates which aren't properly blocked or resumed, however that's fine - we don't
570 // support async monitor updates even in LDK 0.0.116 and once we do we'll require no
571 // downgrades to prior versions.
572 (1, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint, option),
576 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
577 pub(crate) enum EventCompletionAction {
578 ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
579 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
580 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
583 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(EventCompletionAction,
584 (0, ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate) => {
585 (0, channel_funding_outpoint, required),
586 (2, counterparty_node_id, required),
590 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
591 /// If something is blocked on the completion of an RAA-generated [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] we track
592 /// the blocked action here. See enum variants for more info.
593 pub(crate) enum RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
594 /// A forwarded payment was claimed. We block the downstream channel completing its monitor
595 /// update which removes the HTLC preimage until the upstream channel has gotten the preimage
597 ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
598 /// The upstream channel ID (i.e. the inbound edge).
599 channel_id: [u8; 32],
600 /// The HTLC ID on the inbound edge.
605 impl RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
607 fn from_prev_hop_data(prev_hop: &HTLCPreviousHopData) -> Self {
608 Self::ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
609 channel_id: prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
610 htlc_id: prev_hop.htlc_id,
615 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
616 (0, ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim) => { (0, channel_id, required), (2, htlc_id, required) }
620 /// State we hold per-peer.
621 pub(super) struct PeerState<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
622 /// `channel_id` -> `Channel`.
624 /// Holds all funded channels where the peer is the counterparty.
625 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
626 /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `OutboundV1Channel`.
628 /// Holds all outbound V1 channels where the peer is the counterparty. Once an outbound channel has
629 /// been assigned a `channel_id`, the entry in this map is removed and one is created in
631 pub(super) outbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], OutboundV1Channel<Signer>>,
632 /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `InboundV1Channel`.
634 /// Holds all inbound V1 channels where the peer is the counterparty. Once an inbound channel has
635 /// been assigned a `channel_id`, the entry in this map is removed and one is created in
637 pub(super) inbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], InboundV1Channel<Signer>>,
638 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
639 latest_features: InitFeatures,
640 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
641 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
642 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
643 /// Map from Channel IDs to pending [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s which have been passed to the
644 /// user but which have not yet completed.
646 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example if the channel was closed but we
647 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
648 /// for a missing channel.
649 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<OutPoint, Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>,
650 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
651 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
653 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
654 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
655 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
656 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
658 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
659 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
660 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
661 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
662 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
663 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
664 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
665 /// If another channel's [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] needs to complete before a channel we have
666 /// with this peer can complete an RAA [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (e.g. because the RAA update
667 /// will remove a preimage that needs to be durably in an upstream channel first), we put an
668 /// entry here to note that the channel with the key's ID is blocked on a set of actions.
669 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
670 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
671 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
672 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
676 impl <Signer: ChannelSigner> PeerState<Signer> {
677 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
678 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
679 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
680 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
681 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
684 self.channel_by_id.is_empty() && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
685 && self.in_flight_monitor_updates.is_empty()
688 // Returns a count of all channels we have with this peer, including unfunded channels.
689 fn total_channel_count(&self) -> usize {
690 self.channel_by_id.len() +
691 self.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.len() +
692 self.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.len()
695 // Returns a bool indicating if the given `channel_id` matches a channel we have with this peer.
696 fn has_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> bool {
697 self.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
698 self.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
699 self.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id)
703 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
704 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
706 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
709 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
710 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
711 struct PendingInboundPayment {
712 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
713 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
714 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
715 /// this payment being removed.
717 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
718 user_payment_id: u64,
719 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
720 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
721 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
724 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
725 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
726 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
727 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
728 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
729 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
730 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
731 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
733 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
734 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
742 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
744 Arc<Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>,
745 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
746 ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>,
751 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
752 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
753 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
754 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
755 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
756 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
757 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
758 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
759 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
761 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
762 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> =
771 &'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>,
773 &'h Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>,
774 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
775 ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>
780 macro_rules! define_test_pub_trait { ($vis: vis) => {
781 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`] used in testing.
782 $vis trait AChannelManager {
783 type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
784 type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
785 type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface + ?Sized;
786 type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
787 type EntropySource: EntropySource + ?Sized;
788 type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
789 type NodeSigner: NodeSigner + ?Sized;
790 type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
791 type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner + Sized;
792 type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<Signer = Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
793 type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
794 type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator + ?Sized;
795 type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
796 type Router: Router + ?Sized;
797 type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
798 type Logger: Logger + ?Sized;
799 type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
800 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
803 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
804 define_test_pub_trait!(pub);
805 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
806 define_test_pub_trait!(pub(crate));
807 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
808 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
810 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
811 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
812 ES::Target: EntropySource,
813 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
814 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
815 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
819 type Watch = M::Target;
821 type Broadcaster = T::Target;
823 type EntropySource = ES::Target;
825 type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
827 type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer;
828 type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
830 type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
832 type Router = R::Target;
834 type Logger = L::Target;
836 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
839 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
840 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
842 /// Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
843 /// to individual Channels.
845 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
846 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
847 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
848 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
850 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
851 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
852 /// returning from [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`], with ChannelManagers, writing updates
853 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during
854 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
855 /// [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the
856 /// `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
858 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
859 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
860 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
862 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
863 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
864 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
865 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
866 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
868 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
869 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
870 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
871 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
873 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
874 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
875 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
877 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
878 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
879 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
880 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
881 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
883 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
884 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
885 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
886 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
887 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
888 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
889 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
890 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
893 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
894 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
895 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
896 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
897 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
901 // `total_consistency_lock`
903 // |__`forward_htlcs`
905 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
907 // |__`per_peer_state`
909 // | |__`pending_inbound_payments`
911 // | |__`claimable_payments`
913 // | |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
919 // | |__`short_to_chan_info`
921 // | |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
925 // | |__`pending_events`
927 // | |__`pending_background_events`
929 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
931 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
932 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
933 ES::Target: EntropySource,
934 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
935 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
936 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
940 default_configuration: UserConfig,
941 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
942 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
948 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
950 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
952 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
953 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
955 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
956 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
957 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
958 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
960 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
961 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
963 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
964 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
965 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
966 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
967 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
968 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
969 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
970 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
972 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
974 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
975 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
977 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
979 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
980 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
981 /// and via the classic SCID.
983 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
984 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
986 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
988 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
990 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
991 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
992 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
994 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
995 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
997 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
998 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
1000 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1001 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
1003 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
1004 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
1005 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
1006 /// active channel list on load.
1008 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1009 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
1011 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
1013 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
1014 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
1015 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
1017 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
1018 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
1019 /// the handling of the events.
1021 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
1022 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
1025 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
1026 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
1027 /// would break backwards compatability.
1028 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
1029 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
1030 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
1032 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1033 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<[u8; 32], PublicKey>>,
1035 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
1037 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
1038 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
1039 /// confirmation depth.
1041 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
1042 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
1043 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
1045 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1047 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
1049 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
1051 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
1053 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
1055 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
1056 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
1057 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
1059 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
1060 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
1062 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
1063 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
1064 /// keeping additional state.
1065 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
1067 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
1068 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
1069 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
1070 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
1072 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
1073 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
1075 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
1076 /// are currently open with that peer.
1078 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
1079 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
1082 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
1084 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1085 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1086 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
1087 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1088 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
1090 /// The set of events which we need to give to the user to handle. In some cases an event may
1091 /// require some further action after the user handles it (currently only blocking a monitor
1092 /// update from being handed to the user to ensure the included changes to the channel state
1093 /// are handled by the user before they're persisted durably to disk). In that case, the second
1094 /// element in the tuple is set to `Some` with further details of the action.
1096 /// Note that events MUST NOT be removed from pending_events after deserialization, as they
1097 /// could be in the middle of being processed without the direct mutex held.
1099 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1100 pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1101 /// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
1102 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
1104 /// If we are running during init (either directly during the deserialization method or in
1105 /// block connection methods which run after deserialization but before normal operation) we
1106 /// cannot provide the user with [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s through the normal update flow -
1107 /// prior to normal operation the user may not have loaded the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into their
1108 /// [`ChainMonitor`] and thus attempting to update it will fail or panic.
1110 /// Thus, we place them here to be handled as soon as possible once we are running normally.
1112 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1114 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
1115 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
1116 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
1117 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
1118 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
1119 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
1120 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
1121 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
1122 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
1124 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool,
1126 persistence_notifier: Notifier,
1130 signer_provider: SP,
1135 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
1137 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
1138 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
1139 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
1140 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
1141 pub struct ChainParameters {
1142 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
1143 pub network: Network,
1145 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
1147 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
1148 pub best_block: BestBlock,
1151 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
1158 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
1159 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
1160 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
1161 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
1162 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
1163 /// updates are ready for persistence).
1165 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
1166 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
1167 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
1168 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
1169 persistence_notifier: &'a Notifier,
1171 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
1172 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
1175 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
1176 fn notify_on_drop<C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
1177 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1178 let _ = cm.get_cm().process_background_events(); // We always persist
1180 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1181 persistence_notifier: &cm.get_cm().persistence_notifier,
1182 should_persist: || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist },
1183 _read_guard: read_guard,
1188 /// Note that if any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are possibly generated,
1189 /// [`ChannelManager::process_background_events`] MUST be called first.
1190 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1191 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
1193 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1194 persistence_notifier: notifier,
1195 should_persist: persist_check,
1196 _read_guard: read_guard,
1201 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1202 fn drop(&mut self) {
1203 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
1204 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
1209 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1210 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1212 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1214 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1215 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1216 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1217 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1218 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1220 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1221 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1223 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1225 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1226 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1227 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1228 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1229 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1230 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1231 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
1232 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
1233 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
1234 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
1235 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
1236 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
1237 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
1239 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1240 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
1242 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1243 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1244 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1245 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
1247 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1248 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1249 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1250 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1251 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1252 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1255 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1257 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1258 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1261 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1263 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1264 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1266 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until we time-out the
1267 /// idempotency of payments by [`PaymentId`]. See
1268 /// [`OutboundPayments::remove_stale_resolved_payments`].
1269 pub(crate) const IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 7;
1271 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
1272 /// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
1273 pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
1275 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is connected until
1276 /// we mark the channel enabled and gossip the update.
1277 pub(crate) const ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 5;
1279 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
1280 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
1281 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
1282 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1284 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1285 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1286 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1288 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1289 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1290 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1292 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1293 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1294 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1295 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1296 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1297 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1298 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1299 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1300 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1301 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1302 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1305 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1306 /// to better separate parameters.
1307 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1308 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1309 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1310 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1311 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1312 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1313 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1314 pub features: InitFeatures,
1315 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1316 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1317 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1319 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1321 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1322 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1323 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1324 /// payments to us through this channel.
1325 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1326 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1327 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1328 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1329 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1330 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1331 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1334 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
1335 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1336 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1337 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1338 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1339 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1340 /// lifetime of the channel.
1341 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
1342 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1343 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1344 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1345 /// our counterparty already.
1347 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1348 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1349 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1350 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1352 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1353 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1354 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1355 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1357 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1358 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1360 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1361 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1363 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1364 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1365 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1366 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1367 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1368 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1369 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1370 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1371 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1374 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1376 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1377 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1378 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1379 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1380 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1381 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1382 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1384 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1385 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1387 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1388 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1389 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1390 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1391 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1392 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1393 /// this value on chain.
1395 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1397 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1399 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1400 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1401 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or a random value if the channel was
1402 /// inbound. This may be zero for inbound channels serialized with LDK versions prior to
1404 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1405 /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
1406 /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
1408 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
1409 pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
1410 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1411 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1412 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1414 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1415 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1416 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1417 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1419 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1420 pub balance_msat: u64,
1421 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1422 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1423 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1424 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1426 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1428 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1429 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1430 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1431 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1432 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1433 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1434 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1435 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1437 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat`],
1438 /// [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`], and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1439 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1440 /// The minimum value for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is the equivalent of
1441 /// [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat`] but represents a lower-bound, rather than
1442 /// an upper-bound. This is intended for use when routing, allowing us to ensure we pick a
1443 /// route which is valid.
1444 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1445 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1446 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1447 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1448 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1449 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1451 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1452 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1453 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1454 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1455 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1456 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1457 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1458 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1459 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1461 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1463 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1464 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1465 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1466 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1467 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1469 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1470 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1471 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1472 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1473 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1474 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1475 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1477 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1478 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1479 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1480 pub is_outbound: bool,
1481 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1482 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1483 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1484 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1485 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1487 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1488 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1489 /// The stage of the channel's shutdown.
1490 /// `None` for `ChannelDetails` serialized on LDK versions prior to 0.0.116.
1491 pub channel_shutdown_state: Option<ChannelShutdownState>,
1492 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1493 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1495 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1496 pub is_usable: bool,
1497 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1498 pub is_public: bool,
1499 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1500 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1501 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1502 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1503 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1504 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1506 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1507 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1510 impl ChannelDetails {
1511 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1512 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1513 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1515 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1516 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1517 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1518 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1521 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1522 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1523 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1525 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1526 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1527 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1528 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1531 fn from_channel_context<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, F: Deref>(
1532 context: &ChannelContext<Signer>, best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures,
1533 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
1535 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1537 let balance = context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
1538 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1539 context.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1541 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
1542 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1543 node_id: context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1544 features: latest_features,
1545 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1546 forwarding_info: context.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1547 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1548 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1549 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1550 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1551 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1552 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if context.have_received_message() {
1553 Some(context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1554 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1556 funding_txo: context.get_funding_txo(),
1557 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1558 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1559 channel_type: if context.have_received_message() { Some(context.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1560 short_channel_id: context.get_short_channel_id(),
1561 outbound_scid_alias: if context.is_usable() { Some(context.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1562 inbound_scid_alias: context.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1563 channel_value_satoshis: context.get_value_satoshis(),
1564 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
1565 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1566 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1567 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1568 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1569 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1570 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1571 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
1572 confirmations_required: context.minimum_depth(),
1573 confirmations: Some(context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1574 force_close_spend_delay: context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1575 is_outbound: context.is_outbound(),
1576 is_channel_ready: context.is_usable(),
1577 is_usable: context.is_live(),
1578 is_public: context.should_announce(),
1579 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(context.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1580 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1581 config: Some(context.config()),
1582 channel_shutdown_state: Some(context.shutdown_state()),
1587 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1588 /// Further information on the details of the channel shutdown.
1589 /// Upon channels being forced closed (i.e. commitment transaction confirmation detected
1590 /// by `ChainMonitor`), ChannelShutdownState will be set to `ShutdownComplete` or
1591 /// the channel will be removed shortly.
1592 /// Also note, that in normal operation, peers could disconnect at any of these states
1593 /// and require peer re-connection before making progress onto other states
1594 pub enum ChannelShutdownState {
1595 /// Channel has not sent or received a shutdown message.
1597 /// Local node has sent a shutdown message for this channel.
1599 /// Shutdown message exchanges have concluded and the channels are in the midst of
1600 /// resolving all existing open HTLCs before closing can continue.
1602 /// All HTLCs have been resolved, nodes are currently negotiating channel close onchain fee rates.
1603 NegotiatingClosingFee,
1604 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point `ChannelManager` is about
1605 /// to drop the channel.
1609 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1610 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1611 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1612 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1613 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1615 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1617 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1618 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1619 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1622 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1623 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1624 /// payment is removed from tracking.
1626 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1627 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1628 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1630 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1631 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1632 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1634 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1635 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1639 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1641 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
1643 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1644 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1645 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1646 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1648 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1649 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1650 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1653 macro_rules! handle_error {
1654 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
1655 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1656 // entering the macro.
1657 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1658 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1662 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1663 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1665 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1666 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1667 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1668 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1672 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1673 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1674 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1675 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1680 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1681 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1683 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1684 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1685 action: err.action.clone()
1689 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1690 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1691 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1692 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1693 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1697 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1702 ($self: ident, $internal: expr) => {
1705 Err((chan, msg_handle_err)) => {
1706 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
1707 handle_error!($self, Err(msg_handle_err), counterparty_node_id).map_err(|err| (chan, err))
1713 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1714 ($self: expr, $channel_context: expr) => {{
1715 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.channel_id());
1716 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1717 if let Some(short_id) = $channel_context.get_short_channel_id() {
1718 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1720 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1721 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1722 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1723 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1724 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1726 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
1727 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1729 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
1733 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1734 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1735 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1737 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1738 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1740 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1741 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1743 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1744 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1745 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &$channel.context);
1746 let shutdown_res = $channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
1747 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.context.get_user_id(),
1748 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1752 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_context: expr, $channel_id: expr, UNFUNDED) => {
1754 // We should only ever have `ChannelError::Close` when unfunded channels error.
1755 // In any case, just close the channel.
1756 ChannelError::Warn(msg) | ChannelError::Ignore(msg) | ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1757 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing unfunded channel {} due to an error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1758 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &$channel_context);
1759 let shutdown_res = $channel_context.force_shutdown(false);
1760 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel_context.get_user_id(),
1761 shutdown_res, None))
1767 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1768 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1772 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1774 $entry.remove_entry();
1782 macro_rules! try_v1_outbound_chan_entry {
1783 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1787 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut().context, $entry.key(), UNFUNDED);
1789 $entry.remove_entry();
1797 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1798 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1802 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1804 $entry.remove_entry();
1812 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1813 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1815 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1816 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &channel.context);
1822 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1823 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
1824 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1825 node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1826 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1828 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1829 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1830 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1831 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.context.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
1832 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
1833 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1834 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
1835 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
1836 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
1837 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1842 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
1843 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1844 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
1845 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelPending {
1846 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
1847 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.context.temporary_channel_id(),
1848 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1849 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
1850 funding_txo: $channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
1852 $channel.context.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
1857 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
1858 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1859 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
1860 debug_assert!($channel.context.channel_pending_event_emitted());
1861 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelReady {
1862 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
1863 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
1864 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1865 channel_type: $channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
1867 $channel.context.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
1872 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
1873 ($self: ident, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
1874 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&$self.logger,
1875 &$self.node_signer, $self.genesis_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
1876 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
1877 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
1878 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.context.is_usable() {
1879 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
1880 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
1881 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
1882 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
1884 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
1885 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
1886 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1892 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
1893 .remove(&$chan.context.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
1895 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
1896 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
1897 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
1898 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
1899 updates.announcement_sigs);
1900 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
1901 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
1904 let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id();
1905 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
1906 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
1908 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
1910 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1911 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1913 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
1914 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1915 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
1916 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
1921 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
1922 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, _internal, $remove: expr, $completed: expr) => { {
1923 // update_maps_on_chan_removal needs to be able to take id_to_peer, so make sure we can in
1924 // any case so that it won't deadlock.
1925 debug_assert_ne!($self.id_to_peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1926 debug_assert!($self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire));
1928 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
1929 log_debug!($self.logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
1930 log_bytes!($chan.context.channel_id()[..]));
1933 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
1934 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure",
1935 log_bytes!($chan.context.channel_id()[..]));
1936 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &$chan.context);
1937 let res = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(
1938 "ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), $chan.context.channel_id(),
1939 $chan.context.get_user_id(), $chan.context.force_shutdown(false),
1940 $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok()));
1944 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
1950 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, MANUALLY_REMOVING_INITIAL_MONITOR, $remove: expr) => {
1951 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state,
1952 $per_peer_state_lock, $chan, _internal, $remove,
1953 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan))
1955 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan_entry: expr, INITIAL_MONITOR) => {
1956 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan_entry.get_mut(), MANUALLY_REMOVING_INITIAL_MONITOR, $chan_entry.remove_entry())
1958 ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, MANUALLY_REMOVING, $remove: expr) => { {
1959 let in_flight_updates = $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.entry($funding_txo)
1960 .or_insert_with(Vec::new);
1961 // During startup, we push monitor updates as background events through to here in
1962 // order to replay updates that were in-flight when we shut down. Thus, we have to
1963 // filter for uniqueness here.
1964 let idx = in_flight_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd == &$update)
1965 .unwrap_or_else(|| {
1966 in_flight_updates.push($update);
1967 in_flight_updates.len() - 1
1969 let update_res = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($funding_txo, &in_flight_updates[idx]);
1970 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, update_res, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state,
1971 $per_peer_state_lock, $chan, _internal, $remove,
1973 let _ = in_flight_updates.remove(idx);
1974 if in_flight_updates.is_empty() && $chan.blocked_monitor_updates_pending() == 0 {
1975 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
1979 ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan_entry: expr) => {
1980 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $funding_txo, $update, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan_entry.get_mut(), MANUALLY_REMOVING, $chan_entry.remove_entry())
1984 macro_rules! process_events_body {
1985 ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
1986 let mut processed_all_events = false;
1987 while !processed_all_events {
1988 if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
1992 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
1995 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
1996 // persists happen while processing monitor events.
1997 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1999 // Because `handle_post_event_actions` may send `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to the user we must
2000 // ensure any startup-generated background events are handled first.
2001 if $self.process_background_events() == NotifyOption::DoPersist { result = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
2003 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
2004 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
2005 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
2006 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2010 let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
2011 let num_events = pending_events.len();
2012 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
2013 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2016 let mut post_event_actions = Vec::new();
2018 for (event, action_opt) in pending_events {
2019 $event_to_handle = event;
2021 if let Some(action) = action_opt {
2022 post_event_actions.push(action);
2027 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2028 pending_events.drain(..num_events);
2029 processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
2030 // Note that `push_pending_forwards_ev` relies on `pending_events_processor` being
2031 // updated here with the `pending_events` lock acquired.
2032 $self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
2035 if !post_event_actions.is_empty() {
2036 $self.handle_post_event_actions(post_event_actions);
2037 // If we had some actions, go around again as we may have more events now
2038 processed_all_events = false;
2041 if result == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
2042 $self.persistence_notifier.notify();
2048 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
2050 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
2051 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2052 ES::Target: EntropySource,
2053 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2054 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2055 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2059 /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
2061 /// The current time or latest block header time can be provided as the `current_timestamp`.
2063 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
2064 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
2066 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
2068 /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
2069 /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
2070 /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
2073 /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
2074 /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
2075 /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
2077 fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES,
2078 node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters,
2079 current_timestamp: u32,
2081 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2082 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
2083 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
2084 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
2086 default_configuration: config.clone(),
2087 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
2088 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
2093 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
2095 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
2096 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2097 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
2098 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2099 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
2100 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2101 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2102 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2104 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
2107 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
2108 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2110 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2112 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(current_timestamp as usize),
2114 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2116 pending_events: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
2117 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
2118 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2119 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
2120 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
2121 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
2131 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
2132 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
2133 &self.default_configuration
2136 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
2137 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2138 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
2141 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
2142 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
2144 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
2146 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
2150 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
2155 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
2157 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
2158 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
2159 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
2160 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
2161 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
2163 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
2164 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
2166 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to
2167 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2168 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`].
2170 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
2171 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
2172 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
2174 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
2175 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
2176 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
2177 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
2178 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
2179 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
2181 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
2182 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
2183 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
2184 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
2185 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
2186 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
2189 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2190 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
2191 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2193 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2195 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
2196 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
2198 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2200 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
2201 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2202 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
2203 match OutboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
2204 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
2205 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
2209 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
2214 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
2216 let temporary_channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
2217 match peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
2218 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2220 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
2222 panic!("RNG is bad???");
2225 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
2228 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
2229 node_id: their_network_key,
2232 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
2235 fn list_funded_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2236 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2237 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2238 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2239 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2240 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2241 // the same channel.
2242 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2244 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2245 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2246 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2247 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2248 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2249 // Only `Channels` in the channel_by_id map can be considered funded.
2250 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(f) {
2251 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2252 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2260 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
2261 /// more information.
2262 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2263 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2264 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2265 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2266 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2267 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2268 // the same channel.
2269 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2271 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2272 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2273 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2274 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2275 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2276 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
2277 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2278 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2281 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.iter() {
2282 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2283 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2286 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.iter() {
2287 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2288 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2296 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
2297 /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
2299 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
2300 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
2302 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2303 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
2304 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
2305 // really wanted anyway.
2306 self.list_funded_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.context.is_live())
2309 /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
2310 pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2311 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2312 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2314 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
2315 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2316 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2317 let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2318 let chan_context_to_details = |context| {
2319 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height, features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2321 return peer_state.channel_by_id
2323 .map(|(_, channel)| &channel.context)
2324 .chain(peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.iter().map(|(_, channel)| &channel.context))
2325 .chain(peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.iter().map(|(_, channel)| &channel.context))
2326 .map(chan_context_to_details)
2332 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
2333 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
2335 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
2336 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
2337 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
2339 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2340 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
2341 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
2342 .filter_map(|(_, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
2343 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
2344 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
2345 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2346 total_msat: *total_msat,
2349 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
2350 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2352 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
2353 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2355 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
2360 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
2361 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, context: &ChannelContext<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
2362 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2363 match context.unbroadcasted_funding() {
2364 Some(transaction) => {
2365 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::DiscardFunding {
2366 channel_id: context.channel_id(), transaction
2371 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
2372 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
2373 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
2374 reason: closure_reason
2378 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2379 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2381 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
2382 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
2384 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2386 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2387 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2389 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2390 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2392 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2393 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2394 let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().context.get_funding_txo();
2395 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2396 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut()
2397 .get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
2398 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
2400 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
2401 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
2402 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
2403 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2404 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
2408 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
2409 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
2410 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
2411 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry).map(|_| ());
2414 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
2415 let channel = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
2416 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
2417 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2421 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel.context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2425 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (),
2428 // If we reach this point, it means that the channel_id either refers to an unfunded channel or
2429 // it does not exist for this peer. Either way, we can attempt to force-close it.
2431 // An appropriate error will be returned for non-existence of the channel if that's the case.
2432 return self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, false).map(|_| ())
2433 // TODO(dunxen): This is still not ideal as we're doing some extra lookups.
2434 // Fix this with https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/2422
2437 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2438 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2439 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
2440 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
2443 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
2447 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2448 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2449 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2451 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
2452 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2454 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
2455 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
2456 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
2457 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
2459 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2461 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2462 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2463 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2466 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2467 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2468 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2469 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2470 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2471 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None)
2474 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2475 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2476 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2478 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
2479 /// the channel being closed or not:
2480 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
2481 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
2482 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2483 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
2484 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
2485 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
2486 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
2488 /// The `shutdown_script` provided will be used as the `scriptPubKey` for the closing transaction.
2489 /// Will fail if a shutdown script has already been set for this channel by
2490 /// ['ChannelHandshakeConfig::commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey`]. The given shutdown script must
2491 /// also be compatible with our and the counterparty's features.
2493 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2495 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2496 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2497 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2500 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2501 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2502 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2503 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2504 pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2505 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script)
2509 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
2510 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
2511 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
2512 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2513 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
2514 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2515 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2516 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
2518 if let Some((_, funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
2519 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2520 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2521 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2522 // ignore the result here.
2523 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
2527 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2528 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2529 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
2530 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2531 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2532 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2533 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
2534 let (update_opt, counterparty_node_id) = {
2535 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2536 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2537 let closure_reason = if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2538 ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) }
2540 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
2542 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2543 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2544 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.get().context, closure_reason);
2545 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan);
2546 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(broadcast));
2547 (self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan).ok(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2548 } else if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2549 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2550 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.get().context, closure_reason);
2551 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan);
2552 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
2553 // Unfunded channel has no update
2554 (None, chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2555 } else if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2556 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2557 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.get().context, closure_reason);
2558 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan);
2559 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
2560 // Unfunded channel has no update
2561 (None, chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2563 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), peer_node_id) });
2566 if let Some(update) = update_opt {
2567 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2568 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2573 Ok(counterparty_node_id)
2576 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2577 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2578 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2579 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2580 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2581 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2582 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2583 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
2584 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2585 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2586 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
2587 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
2598 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2599 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2600 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2602 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2603 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2604 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2607 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2608 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2609 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2611 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2612 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2613 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2614 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2615 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2618 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2619 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2620 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2621 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2622 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2626 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2627 /// local transaction(s).
2628 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2629 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2630 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2634 fn construct_fwd_pending_htlc_info(
2635 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload, hop_hmac: [u8; 32],
2636 new_packet_bytes: [u8; onion_utils::ONION_DATA_LEN], shared_secret: [u8; 32],
2637 next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>
2638 ) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, InboundOnionErr> {
2639 debug_assert!(next_packet_pubkey_opt.is_some());
2640 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2642 public_key: next_packet_pubkey_opt.unwrap_or(Err(secp256k1::Error::InvalidPublicKey)),
2643 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2647 let (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value) = match hop_data {
2648 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward { short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value } =>
2649 (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value),
2650 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { .. } =>
2651 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2652 msg: "Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node",
2653 err_code: 0x4000 | 22,
2654 err_data: Vec::new(),
2658 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2659 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2660 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2663 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2664 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2665 incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
2666 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward,
2667 outgoing_cltv_value,
2668 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
2672 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(
2673 &self, hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload, shared_secret: [u8; 32], payment_hash: PaymentHash,
2674 amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>, allow_underpay: bool,
2675 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
2676 ) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, InboundOnionErr> {
2677 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage, onion_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata) = match hop_data {
2678 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
2679 payment_data, keysend_preimage, amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata, ..
2681 (payment_data, keysend_preimage, amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata),
2683 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2684 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2685 err_data: Vec::new(),
2686 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2689 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2690 if outgoing_cltv_value > cltv_expiry {
2691 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2692 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to less than the CLTV set by the sender",
2694 err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
2697 // final_expiry_too_soon
2698 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2699 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2701 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2702 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2703 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2704 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2705 if (outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= current_height as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2706 let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12);
2707 err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes());
2708 err_data.extend_from_slice(¤t_height.to_be_bytes());
2709 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2710 err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data,
2711 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2714 if (!allow_underpay && onion_amt_msat > amt_msat) ||
2715 (allow_underpay && onion_amt_msat >
2716 amt_msat.saturating_add(counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)))
2718 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2720 err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
2721 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2725 let routing = if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2726 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2727 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2728 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2729 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2730 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2731 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2732 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2733 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2734 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2735 err_data: Vec::new(),
2736 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2739 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && payment_data.is_some() {
2740 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2741 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2742 err_data: Vec::new(),
2743 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2746 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2750 incoming_cltv_expiry: outgoing_cltv_value,
2752 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2753 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2756 incoming_cltv_expiry: outgoing_cltv_value,
2757 phantom_shared_secret,
2760 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2761 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2762 err_data: Vec::new(),
2763 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2766 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2769 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2770 incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
2771 outgoing_amt_msat: onion_amt_msat,
2772 outgoing_cltv_value,
2773 skimmed_fee_msat: counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
2777 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(
2778 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC
2779 ) -> Result<(onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>), HTLCFailureMsg> {
2780 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2781 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2783 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2784 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2785 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2786 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2787 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2788 failure_code: $err_code,
2794 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2795 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2798 let shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(
2799 Recipient::Node, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None
2800 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
2802 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2803 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2804 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2805 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2806 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2807 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2808 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2809 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2811 macro_rules! return_err {
2812 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2814 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2815 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2816 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2817 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2818 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
2819 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
2825 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2827 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2828 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2830 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2831 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2834 let (outgoing_scid, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, next_packet_pk_opt) = match next_hop {
2835 onion_utils::Hop::Forward {
2836 next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward {
2837 short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value
2840 let next_pk = onion_utils::next_hop_packet_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx,
2841 msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &shared_secret);
2842 (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(next_pk))
2844 // We'll do receive checks in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] so we have access to the
2845 // inbound channel's state.
2846 onion_utils::Hop::Receive { .. } => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)),
2847 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { .. }, .. } => {
2848 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0; 0]);
2852 // Perform outbound checks here instead of in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] because we
2853 // can't hold the outbound peer state lock at the same time as the inbound peer state lock.
2854 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
2855 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&outgoing_scid).cloned();
2856 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
2857 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2858 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2859 // phantom or an intercept.
2860 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
2861 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.genesis_hash)) ||
2862 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.genesis_hash)
2866 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2869 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
2871 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
2872 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2873 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
2874 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
2875 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2877 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
2878 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2879 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id) {
2881 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
2882 // have no consistency guarantees.
2883 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2887 if !chan.context.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2888 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2889 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2890 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2891 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2893 if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && outgoing_scid != chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() {
2894 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
2895 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
2896 // we don't have the channel here.
2897 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2899 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
2901 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2902 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2903 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2904 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2905 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2906 if !chan.context.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2907 // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
2908 // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
2909 // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
2910 if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
2911 break Some(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2913 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
2916 if outgoing_amt_msat < chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2917 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
2919 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value) {
2920 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
2924 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
2925 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
2926 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
2927 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
2929 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
2936 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2937 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2938 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2939 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2940 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2941 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2943 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2944 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2946 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2947 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2948 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2949 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2950 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2951 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2952 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2953 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2954 if (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2955 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2961 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
2962 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2963 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2964 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2966 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2967 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2969 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2970 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
2971 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2973 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2974 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2975 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2976 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
2977 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
2978 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
2979 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
2983 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
2985 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt))
2988 fn construct_pending_htlc_status<'a>(
2989 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, shared_secret: [u8; 32], decoded_hop: onion_utils::Hop,
2990 allow_underpay: bool, next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>
2991 ) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
2992 macro_rules! return_err {
2993 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2995 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2996 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2997 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2998 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2999 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
3000 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3006 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
3008 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash,
3009 msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None, allow_underpay, msg.skimmed_fee_msat)
3012 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
3013 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
3014 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
3015 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
3016 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
3018 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3021 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
3022 match self.construct_fwd_pending_htlc_info(msg, next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac,
3023 new_packet_bytes, shared_secret, next_packet_pubkey_opt) {
3024 Ok(info) => PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info),
3025 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3031 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
3032 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
3033 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
3035 /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
3036 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
3037 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3039 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3040 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3041 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3042 if !chan.context.should_announce() {
3043 return Err(LightningError {
3044 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
3045 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
3048 if chan.context.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
3049 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
3051 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.context.channel_id()));
3052 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
3055 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
3056 /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
3057 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
3058 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
3060 /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
3061 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
3062 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3064 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3065 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3066 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3067 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.context.channel_id()));
3068 let short_channel_id = match chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
3069 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
3073 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
3076 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3077 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.context.channel_id()));
3078 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
3080 let enabled = chan.context.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
3081 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
3082 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
3083 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
3084 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => false,
3087 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
3088 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
3090 timestamp: chan.context.get_update_time_counter(),
3091 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
3092 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.context.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
3093 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
3094 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.context.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
3095 fee_base_msat: chan.context.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
3096 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.context.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
3097 excess_data: Vec::new(),
3099 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
3100 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
3101 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
3103 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
3105 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
3112 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3113 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3114 self.send_payment_along_path(SendAlongPathArgs {
3115 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3120 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, args: SendAlongPathArgs) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3121 let SendAlongPathArgs {
3122 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3125 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
3126 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
3128 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
3129 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
3130 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
3132 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
3133 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected".to_owned()})?;
3134 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
3136 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash)
3137 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute { err: "Route size too large considering onion data".to_owned()})?;
3139 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
3140 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
3141 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
3142 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3145 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3146 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3147 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
3148 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3149 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3150 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
3151 if !chan.get().context.is_live() {
3152 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
3154 let funding_txo = chan.get().context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
3155 let send_res = chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
3156 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3158 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
3159 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
3161 }, onion_packet, None, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
3162 match break_chan_entry!(self, send_res, chan) {
3163 Some(monitor_update) => {
3164 match handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
3165 Err(e) => break Err(e),
3167 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
3168 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
3169 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
3170 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
3171 // which we do in the send_payment check for
3172 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
3173 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
3181 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
3182 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
3183 // `channel_by_id` map.
3184 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
3185 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
3190 match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
3191 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3193 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
3198 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
3200 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
3201 /// fields for more info.
3203 /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
3204 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
3206 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
3208 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
3209 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
3210 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
3211 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
3212 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
3214 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
3215 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
3216 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
3217 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
3218 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
3220 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
3221 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
3222 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
3223 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
3225 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
3227 /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
3228 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
3229 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
3231 /// In general, a path may raise:
3232 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
3233 /// node public key) is specified.
3234 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
3235 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
3237 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
3238 /// relevant updates.
3240 /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
3241 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
3242 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
3244 /// [`RouteHop`]: crate::routing::router::RouteHop
3245 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3246 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
3247 /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
3248 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
3249 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3250 pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3251 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3252 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3253 self.pending_outbound_payments
3254 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id,
3255 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3256 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3259 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route`], but will automatically find a route based on
3260 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3261 pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
3262 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3263 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3264 self.pending_outbound_payments
3265 .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
3266 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
3267 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
3268 &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3272 pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3273 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3274 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3275 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion,
3276 keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer,
3277 best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3281 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
3282 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3283 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
3287 pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
3288 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
3292 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
3293 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
3294 /// retries are exhausted.
3296 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
3297 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
3299 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
3300 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
3301 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
3303 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event is generated and we restart without this
3304 /// [`ChannelManager`] having been persisted, another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated.
3306 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
3307 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3308 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
3309 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3310 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
3313 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
3314 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
3315 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
3316 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
3317 /// never reach the recipient.
3319 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
3320 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
3322 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
3323 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
3325 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
3326 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
3327 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3328 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3329 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
3330 route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
3331 &self.node_signer, best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3334 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
3335 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3337 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
3340 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
3341 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
3342 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3343 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3344 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
3345 payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3346 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3347 &self.logger, &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3350 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
3351 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
3352 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
3353 pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
3354 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3355 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3356 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret,
3357 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3358 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3361 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
3364 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
3365 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
3368 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
3369 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
3370 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&OutboundV1Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
3371 &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
3372 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3373 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3374 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3375 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3377 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3378 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3379 let (chan, msg) = match peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
3381 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
3383 let funding_res = chan.get_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
3384 .map_err(|(mut chan, e)| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
3385 let channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
3386 let user_id = chan.context.get_user_id();
3387 let shutdown_res = chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
3388 (chan, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None))
3389 } else { unreachable!(); });
3391 Ok((chan, funding_msg)) => (chan, funding_msg),
3392 Err((chan, err)) => {
3393 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
3394 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3396 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(err), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
3397 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3398 err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
3404 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3406 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
3407 log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
3412 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
3413 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3416 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
3417 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3418 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
3420 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3421 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
3422 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.context.channel_id(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
3423 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
3432 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3433 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
3434 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
3438 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
3440 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
3441 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
3443 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
3444 /// across the p2p network.
3446 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
3447 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
3449 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
3450 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
3451 /// keys per-channel).
3453 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
3454 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
3455 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
3457 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
3458 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
3459 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
3461 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
3462 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
3463 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
3464 /// for more details.
3466 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
3467 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
3468 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3469 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3471 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
3472 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
3473 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3474 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
3479 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3480 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools if their locktime is strictly
3481 // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
3482 // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
3483 // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
3484 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 1 {
3485 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3486 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
3490 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
3491 if tx.output.len() > u16::max_value() as usize {
3492 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3493 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
3497 let mut output_index = None;
3498 let expected_spk = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
3499 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3500 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.context.get_value_satoshis() {
3501 if output_index.is_some() {
3502 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3503 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
3506 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
3509 if output_index.is_none() {
3510 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3511 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
3514 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
3518 /// Atomically applies partial updates to the [`ChannelConfig`] of the given channels.
3520 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3521 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3522 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3523 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3525 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3526 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3528 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3529 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3531 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3533 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3534 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3535 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3536 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3537 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3538 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3539 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3540 pub fn update_partial_channel_config(
3541 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config_update: &ChannelConfigUpdate,
3542 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3543 if config_update.cltv_expiry_delta.map(|delta| delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA).unwrap_or(false) {
3544 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3545 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
3549 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3550 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3551 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3552 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3553 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3554 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3555 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3556 if !peer_state.has_channel(channel_id) {
3557 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3558 err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
3562 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3563 if let Some(channel) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
3564 let mut config = channel.context.config();
3565 config.apply(config_update);
3566 if !channel.context.update_config(&config) {
3569 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
3570 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
3571 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
3572 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3573 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3580 let context = if let Some(channel) = peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
3581 &mut channel.context
3582 } else if let Some(channel) = peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
3583 &mut channel.context
3585 // This should not be reachable as we've already checked for non-existence in the previous channel_id loop.
3586 debug_assert!(false);
3587 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3589 "Channel with ID {} for passed counterparty_node_id {} disappeared after we confirmed its existence - this should not be reachable!",
3590 log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
3593 let mut config = context.config();
3594 config.apply(config_update);
3595 // We update the config, but we MUST NOT broadcast a `channel_update` before `channel_ready`
3596 // which would be the case for pending inbound/outbound channels.
3597 context.update_config(&config);
3602 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
3604 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3605 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3606 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3607 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3609 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3610 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3612 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3613 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3615 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3617 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3618 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3619 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3620 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3621 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3622 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3623 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3624 pub fn update_channel_config(
3625 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config: &ChannelConfig,
3626 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3627 return self.update_partial_channel_config(counterparty_node_id, channel_ids, &(*config).into());
3630 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
3631 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
3633 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
3634 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
3636 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
3637 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
3638 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
3639 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
3640 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
3642 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
3643 /// you from forwarding more than you received. See
3644 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`] for more on forwarding a different amount
3647 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3650 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
3651 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3652 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
3653 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
3654 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
3655 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &[u8; 32], next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3656 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3658 let next_hop_scid = {
3659 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3660 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
3661 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
3662 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3663 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3664 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
3666 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
3667 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3668 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id))
3671 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias())
3673 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3674 err: format!("Funded channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}. Channel may still be opening.",
3675 log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id), next_node_id)
3680 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3681 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3682 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3685 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
3686 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => {
3687 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid }
3689 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3691 let skimmed_fee_msat =
3692 payment.forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat.saturating_sub(amt_to_forward_msat);
3693 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
3694 skimmed_fee_msat: if skimmed_fee_msat == 0 { None } else { Some(skimmed_fee_msat) },
3695 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
3698 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
3699 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3700 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3701 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
3702 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
3704 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
3708 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
3709 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
3711 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3714 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3715 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3716 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3718 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3719 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3720 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3723 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
3724 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3725 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3726 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3727 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
3728 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
3729 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3732 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
3733 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
3734 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3735 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3740 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
3742 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
3743 /// Will likely generate further events.
3744 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
3745 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3747 let mut new_events = VecDeque::new();
3748 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
3749 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
3751 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
3752 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
3754 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
3755 if short_chan_id != 0 {
3756 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
3758 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3759 match forward_info {
3760 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3761 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3762 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3763 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
3764 outgoing_cltv_value, ..
3767 macro_rules! failure_handler {
3768 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
3769 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3771 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3772 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3773 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3774 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3775 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3776 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
3779 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
3780 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
3782 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
3785 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3786 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
3792 macro_rules! fail_forward {
3793 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3795 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
3799 macro_rules! failed_payment {
3800 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3802 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
3806 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
3807 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
3808 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.genesis_hash) {
3809 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
3810 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
3812 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3813 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
3814 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
3815 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
3816 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
3818 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
3820 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3821 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
3825 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
3826 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data,
3827 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
3828 outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret), false, None)
3830 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
3831 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
3837 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3840 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3843 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3844 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
3845 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
3846 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
3847 // problem, not ours.
3853 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id) {
3854 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3856 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3860 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3861 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3862 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3863 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3866 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3867 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3868 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
3869 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3870 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3873 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3874 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3875 match forward_info {
3876 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3877 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id: _,
3878 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3879 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
3880 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, skimmed_fee_msat, ..
3883 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
3884 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3885 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3886 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3887 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3888 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3889 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
3890 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3892 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
3893 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
3894 onion_packet, skimmed_fee_msat, &self.fee_estimator,
3897 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3898 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
3900 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3902 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
3903 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3904 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
3905 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
3910 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3911 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3913 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3914 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3915 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_fail_htlc(
3916 htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger
3918 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3919 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3921 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
3923 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3924 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3925 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3934 'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3935 match forward_info {
3936 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3937 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3938 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3939 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat,
3940 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
3943 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
3944 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } => {
3945 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
3947 RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret), payment_metadata };
3948 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
3949 Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
3951 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_data, payment_preimage, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry } => {
3952 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields {
3953 payment_secret: payment_data.as_ref().map(|data| data.payment_secret),
3956 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
3957 payment_data, None, onion_fields)
3960 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3963 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3964 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3965 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3966 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3967 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3968 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3969 phantom_shared_secret,
3971 // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
3972 // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
3973 // if routing nodes overpay
3974 value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
3975 sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
3977 total_value_received: None,
3978 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
3981 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
3984 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
3986 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3987 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
3988 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
3989 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3990 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3991 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
3993 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3994 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
3995 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3996 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3997 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3998 phantom_shared_secret,
4000 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
4001 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
4003 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
4006 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
4007 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4008 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4009 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4010 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4013 macro_rules! check_total_value {
4014 ($purpose: expr) => {{
4015 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
4016 let is_keysend = match $purpose {
4017 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(_) => true,
4018 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { .. } => false,
4020 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4021 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
4022 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4024 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
4025 .entry(payment_hash)
4026 // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
4027 .or_insert_with(|| {
4028 committed_to_claimable = true;
4030 purpose: $purpose.clone(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
4033 if $purpose != claimable_payment.purpose {
4034 let log_keysend = |keysend| if keysend { "keysend" } else { "non-keysend" };
4035 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new {} HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing {} HTLC with the same payment hash", log_keysend(is_keysend), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), log_keysend(!is_keysend));
4036 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4038 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && is_keysend && !claimable_payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4039 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash and our config states we don't accept MPP keysend", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4040 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4042 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
4043 if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
4044 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4047 claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
4049 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
4050 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
4051 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
4052 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
4053 total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
4054 earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
4055 if htlc.total_msat != claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4056 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
4057 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), claimable_htlc.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
4058 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
4060 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
4062 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
4063 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
4064 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
4065 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4066 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4067 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
4068 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4069 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4070 } else if total_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4071 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4072 committed_to_claimable = true;
4074 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
4075 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4076 let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
4077 htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
4078 let counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat = htlcs.iter()
4079 .map(|htlc| htlc.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)).sum();
4080 debug_assert!(total_value.saturating_sub(amount_msat) <=
4081 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat);
4082 new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
4083 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4087 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
4088 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
4089 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4090 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
4091 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
4093 payment_claimable_generated = true;
4095 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
4096 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
4098 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4099 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4100 committed_to_claimable = true;
4103 payment_claimable_generated
4107 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
4108 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
4109 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
4110 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
4111 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
4112 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
4113 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4114 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
4115 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4116 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4117 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
4118 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4119 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
4120 Ok(result) => result,
4122 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4123 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4126 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
4127 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
4128 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
4129 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
4130 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
4131 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4134 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4135 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4136 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4138 check_total_value!(purpose);
4140 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
4141 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
4142 check_total_value!(purpose);
4146 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
4147 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4148 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4149 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4151 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4152 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
4153 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4154 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4155 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
4156 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
4157 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
4158 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4160 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4161 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
4162 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4164 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(purpose);
4165 if payment_claimable_generated {
4166 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
4172 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
4173 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
4181 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4182 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
4183 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4184 &self.pending_events, &self.logger, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args));
4186 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
4187 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4189 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
4191 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
4192 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
4193 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
4195 self.check_free_holding_cells();
4197 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
4198 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4199 events.append(&mut new_events);
4202 /// Free the background events, generally called from [`PersistenceNotifierGuard`] constructors.
4204 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
4205 fn process_background_events(&self) -> NotifyOption {
4206 debug_assert_ne!(self.total_consistency_lock.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::NotHeldByThread);
4208 self.background_events_processed_since_startup.store(true, Ordering::Release);
4210 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
4211 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
4212 if background_events.is_empty() {
4213 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4216 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
4218 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, update)) => {
4219 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
4220 // monitor updating completing.
4221 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4223 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup { counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update } => {
4224 let mut updated_chan = false;
4226 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4227 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4228 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4229 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4230 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4231 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4232 updated_chan = true;
4233 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, update.clone(),
4234 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan).map(|_| ())
4236 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Ok(()),
4241 // TODO: Track this as in-flight even though the channel is closed.
4242 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4244 // TODO: If this channel has since closed, we're likely providing a payment
4245 // preimage update, which we must ensure is durable! We currently don't,
4246 // however, ensure that.
4248 log_error!(self.logger,
4249 "Failed to provide ChannelMonitorUpdate to closed channel! This likely lost us a payment preimage!");
4251 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
4253 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete { counterparty_node_id, channel_id } => {
4254 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4255 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4256 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4257 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4258 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
4259 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4261 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
4262 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
4263 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
4264 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4265 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
4271 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4274 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
4275 /// Process background events, for functional testing
4276 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
4277 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
4278 let _ = self.process_background_events();
4281 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
4282 if !chan.context.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersist; }
4283 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
4284 if new_feerate <= chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4285 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4286 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4287 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4289 if !chan.context.is_live() {
4290 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
4291 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4292 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4294 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4295 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4297 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
4298 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4302 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
4303 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
4304 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
4305 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
4306 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
4307 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4308 let mut should_persist = self.process_background_events();
4310 let normal_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4311 let min_mempool_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::MempoolMinimum);
4313 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4314 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4315 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4316 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4317 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
4318 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4323 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4324 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4332 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
4334 /// This currently includes:
4335 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
4336 /// * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
4337 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
4339 /// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
4340 /// with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
4341 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
4342 /// * Force-closing and removing channels which have not completed establishment in a timely manner.
4344 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
4345 /// estimate fetches.
4347 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4348 /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
4349 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
4350 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4351 let mut should_persist = self.process_background_events();
4353 let normal_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4354 let min_mempool_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::MempoolMinimum);
4356 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
4357 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
4358 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
4360 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4361 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4362 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4363 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4364 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
4365 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
4366 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
4367 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4372 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4373 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4375 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
4376 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id);
4377 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
4378 if needs_close { return false; }
4381 match chan.channel_update_status() {
4382 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
4383 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
4384 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.context.is_live()
4385 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
4386 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.context.is_live()
4387 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
4388 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.context.is_live() => {
4390 if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4391 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
4392 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4393 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4397 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4399 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
4402 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.context.is_live() => {
4404 if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4405 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
4406 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4407 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4411 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4413 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
4419 chan.context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4421 if chan.should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response() {
4422 log_debug!(self.logger, "Disconnecting peer {} due to not making any progress on channel {}",
4423 counterparty_node_id, log_bytes!(*chan_id));
4424 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4425 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4426 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning {
4427 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
4428 channel_id: *chan_id,
4429 data: "Disconnecting due to timeout awaiting response".to_owned(),
4438 let process_unfunded_channel_tick = |
4440 chan_context: &mut ChannelContext<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
4441 unfunded_chan_context: &mut UnfundedChannelContext,
4443 chan_context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4444 if unfunded_chan_context.should_expire_unfunded_channel() {
4445 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing pending outbound channel {} for not establishing in a timely manner", log_bytes!(&chan_id[..]));
4446 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan_context);
4447 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan_context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4448 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan_context.force_shutdown(false));
4454 peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context));
4455 peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context));
4457 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
4458 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
4463 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
4464 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
4465 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
4466 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
4467 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
4468 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
4469 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
4470 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
4471 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
4472 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
4473 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
4474 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
4475 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
4476 // have no channels to the peer.
4477 let remove_entry = {
4478 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
4479 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
4482 entry.remove_entry();
4485 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
4490 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
4491 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4492 // This should be unreachable
4493 debug_assert!(false);
4496 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
4497 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
4498 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
4499 // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
4500 // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
4501 if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
4502 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
4505 } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
4506 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
4507 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
4509 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
4510 .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
4517 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
4518 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
4519 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
4520 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
4521 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
4524 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4525 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4528 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_resolved_payments(&self.pending_events);
4530 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
4531 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
4532 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
4533 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
4534 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4541 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
4542 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
4543 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
4545 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
4546 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
4547 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
4548 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
4550 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
4551 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
4552 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
4553 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
4554 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
4555 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
4558 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
4559 /// reason for the failure.
4561 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
4562 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
4563 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4565 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
4566 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
4567 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
4568 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
4569 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4570 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
4571 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4576 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
4577 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
4578 match failure_code {
4579 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code as u16),
4580 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code as u16),
4581 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
4582 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4583 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
4584 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code as u16, htlc_msat_height_data)
4589 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
4590 /// that we want to return and a channel.
4592 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
4594 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
4595 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
4596 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
4597 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
4598 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
4599 let scid_pref = if chan.context.should_announce() {
4600 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
4602 chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.context.get_short_channel_id())
4604 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
4605 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
4607 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4612 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
4613 /// that we want to return and a channel.
4614 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
4615 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
4616 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
4617 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
4618 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
4619 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
4620 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
4621 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4623 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4624 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4625 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4626 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
4628 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
4629 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
4630 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
4631 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
4632 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4636 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
4637 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
4638 // be surfaced to the user.
4639 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
4640 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32],
4641 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
4643 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
4644 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4645 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
4646 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4647 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4648 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
4649 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
4650 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
4652 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4654 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
4657 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
4658 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
4659 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
4660 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4664 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
4665 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
4666 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
4667 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
4668 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
4669 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
4670 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
4671 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
4672 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
4675 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
4676 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
4677 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
4680 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4681 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
4682 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4684 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
4685 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
4686 session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
4687 &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
4688 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
4690 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint }) => {
4691 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), onion_error);
4692 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
4694 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
4695 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4696 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
4697 push_forward_ev = true;
4699 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
4700 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4701 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
4703 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4704 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
4707 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
4708 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
4709 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4710 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
4711 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
4712 failed_next_destination: destination,
4718 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
4719 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
4721 /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
4722 /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
4723 /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
4724 /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
4726 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
4727 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
4728 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
4729 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
4731 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
4732 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
4733 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
4734 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
4735 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
4736 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
4737 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
4738 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4740 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4743 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4744 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
4745 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4746 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
4747 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4748 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4749 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4750 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
4755 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
4756 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
4757 payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id,
4759 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
4760 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
4761 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
4762 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4767 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
4769 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
4770 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
4771 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
4772 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
4773 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
4774 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
4775 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
4776 let mut valid_mpp = true;
4777 let mut errs = Vec::new();
4778 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4779 for htlc in sources.iter() {
4780 if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
4781 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4782 debug_assert!(false);
4786 prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
4788 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
4789 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4790 debug_assert!(false);
4794 expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
4795 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
4797 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4798 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
4799 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4800 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
4803 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
4804 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4805 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
4806 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
4810 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4811 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
4812 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
4813 |_| Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash }))
4815 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
4816 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
4817 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
4818 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
4819 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
4824 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4825 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4826 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
4827 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4828 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
4829 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
4830 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4832 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4835 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
4836 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
4837 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4838 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
4842 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
4843 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
4844 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
4845 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
4847 // If we haven't yet run background events assume we're still deserializing and shouldn't
4848 // actually pass `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to users yet. Instead, queue them up as
4849 // `BackgroundEvent`s.
4850 let during_init = !self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire);
4853 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4854 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
4855 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
4856 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
4860 let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
4861 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4862 .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
4865 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
4866 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
4867 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4868 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4869 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id();
4870 let fulfill_res = chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger);
4872 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = fulfill_res {
4873 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)) {
4874 log_trace!(self.logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
4875 log_bytes!(chan_id), action);
4876 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
4879 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
4880 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4881 if let Err(e) = res {
4882 // TODO: This is a *critical* error - we probably updated the outbound edge
4883 // of the HTLC's monitor with a preimage. We should retry this monitor
4884 // update over and over again until morale improves.
4885 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}", payment_preimage);
4886 return Err((counterparty_node_id, e));
4889 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly -
4890 // they probably haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the
4891 // monitor update as a background event.
4892 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
4893 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
4894 counterparty_node_id,
4895 funding_txo: prev_hop.outpoint,
4896 update: monitor_update.clone(),
4904 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4905 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
4906 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
4912 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
4913 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
4914 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
4915 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
4916 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
4917 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
4918 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
4919 // again on restart.
4920 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4921 payment_preimage, update_res);
4924 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly - they probably
4925 // haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the monitor update as a background
4927 // Note that while it's safe to use `ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup` here (the
4928 // channel is already closed) we need to ultimately handle the monitor update
4929 // completion action only after we've completed the monitor update. This is the only
4930 // way to guarantee this update *will* be regenerated on startup (otherwise if this was
4931 // from a forwarded HTLC the downstream preimage may be deleted before we claim
4932 // upstream). Thus, we need to transition to some new `BackgroundEvent` type which will
4933 // complete the monitor update completion action from `completion_action`.
4934 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
4935 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((
4936 prev_hop.outpoint, preimage_update,
4939 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
4940 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
4941 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
4942 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
4943 // `PaymentForwarded`).
4944 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
4948 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
4949 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
4952 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
4954 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
4955 debug_assert!(self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire),
4956 "We don't support claim_htlc claims during startup - monitors may not be available yet");
4957 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage, session_priv, path, from_onchain, &self.pending_events, &self.logger);
4959 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
4960 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
4961 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
4962 |htlc_claim_value_msat| {
4963 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
4964 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
4965 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
4968 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
4969 event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
4971 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
4972 prev_channel_id: Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
4973 next_channel_id: Some(next_channel_id),
4974 outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
4976 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: None,
4980 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
4981 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4982 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
4988 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
4989 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4990 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
4993 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
4994 for action in actions.into_iter() {
4996 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
4997 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4998 if let Some(ClaimingPayment { amount_msat, payment_purpose: purpose, receiver_node_id }) = payment {
4999 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
5000 payment_hash, purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
5004 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5005 event, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint
5007 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
5008 if let Some((node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker)) = downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint {
5009 self.handle_monitor_update_release(node_id, funding_outpoint, Some(blocker));
5016 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
5017 /// update completion.
5018 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
5019 channel: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
5020 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
5021 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
5022 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
5023 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
5024 log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
5025 log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()),
5026 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
5027 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
5028 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
5029 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
5030 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
5032 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
5034 let counterparty_node_id = channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5035 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5036 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.context.outbound_scid_alias()),
5037 channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.context.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
5040 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
5041 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
5043 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
5044 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5045 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5050 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
5051 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
5052 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5053 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5058 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
5059 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
5060 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
5061 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5062 msg: revoke_and_ack,
5067 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
5071 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
5077 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
5078 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
5079 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
5083 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5084 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
5085 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
5091 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
5092 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
5094 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
5095 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5097 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5098 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
5099 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5100 match id_to_peer.get(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
5101 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5106 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5107 let mut peer_state_lock;
5108 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
5109 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
5110 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5111 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5113 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
5116 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
5117 .remove(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
5118 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5119 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5120 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
5123 let remaining_in_flight =
5124 if let Some(pending) = peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.get_mut(funding_txo) {
5125 pending.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > highest_applied_update_id);
5128 log_trace!(self.logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}. {} pending in-flight updates.",
5129 highest_applied_update_id, channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
5130 remaining_in_flight);
5131 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
5134 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel);
5137 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
5139 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
5140 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
5143 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5144 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5145 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5147 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
5148 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
5149 /// used to accept such channels.
5151 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5152 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5153 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5154 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
5157 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
5158 /// it as confirmed immediately.
5160 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5161 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5162 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5164 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
5165 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
5167 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
5168 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
5170 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
5171 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
5173 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5174 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5175 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5176 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
5179 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5180 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5182 let peers_without_funded_channels =
5183 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| { peer.total_channel_count() > 0 });
5184 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5185 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5186 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
5187 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5188 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5189 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.total_channel_count() == 1;
5190 match peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
5191 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
5192 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_accept() {
5193 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
5196 channel.get_mut().set_0conf();
5197 } else if channel.get().context.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
5198 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5199 node_id: channel.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5200 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
5201 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
5204 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
5205 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
5206 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
5208 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
5209 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
5210 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
5211 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
5212 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5213 node_id: channel.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5214 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
5215 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
5218 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
5219 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
5220 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned() });
5224 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
5225 node_id: channel.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5226 msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
5229 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
5230 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id) });
5236 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
5237 /// or 0-conf channels.
5239 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
5240 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
5241 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
5242 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> bool {
5243 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
5244 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5246 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5247 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
5248 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5249 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
5250 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
5251 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.total_channel_count() {
5252 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
5256 return peers_without_funded_channels;
5259 fn unfunded_channel_count(
5260 peer: &PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, best_block_height: u32
5262 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
5263 for (_, chan) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
5264 // This covers non-zero-conf inbound `Channel`s that we are currently monitoring, but those
5265 // which have not yet had any confirmations on-chain.
5266 if !chan.context.is_outbound() && chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
5267 chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
5269 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
5272 for (_, chan) in peer.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.iter() {
5273 if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 {
5274 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
5277 num_unfunded_channels
5280 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5281 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
5282 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5285 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
5286 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5289 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
5290 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
5291 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
5292 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
5294 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
5295 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
5296 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
5297 let channeled_peers_without_funding =
5298 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.total_channel_count() > 0);
5300 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5301 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5303 debug_assert!(false);
5304 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())
5306 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5307 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5309 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
5310 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
5311 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
5312 if peer_state.total_channel_count() == 0 &&
5313 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
5314 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
5316 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
5317 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
5318 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5321 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5322 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
5323 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
5324 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
5325 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5328 let mut channel = match InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
5329 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
5330 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias)
5333 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
5334 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
5338 let channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
5339 let channel_exists = peer_state.has_channel(&channel_id);
5341 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
5342 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
5344 if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
5345 let channel_type = channel.context.get_channel_type();
5346 if channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
5347 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5349 if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5350 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5352 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
5353 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5354 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
5357 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5358 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
5359 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
5360 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5361 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
5362 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
5363 channel_type: channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
5366 peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.insert(channel_id, channel);
5371 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5372 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
5373 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5374 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5376 debug_assert!(false);
5377 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
5379 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5380 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5381 match peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
5382 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5383 try_v1_outbound_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), chan);
5384 (chan.get().context.get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().context.get_user_id())
5386 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
5389 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5390 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
5391 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
5392 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
5393 channel_value_satoshis: value,
5395 user_channel_id: user_id,
5400 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5401 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5403 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5404 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5406 debug_assert!(false);
5407 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
5410 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5411 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5412 let (chan, funding_msg, monitor) =
5413 match peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
5414 Some(inbound_chan) => {
5415 match inbound_chan.funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger) {
5417 Err((mut inbound_chan, err)) => {
5418 // We've already removed this inbound channel from the map in `PeerState`
5419 // above so at this point we just need to clean up any lingering entries
5420 // concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
5421 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &inbound_chan.context);
5422 let user_id = inbound_chan.context.get_user_id();
5423 let shutdown_res = inbound_chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
5424 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(format!("{}", err),
5425 msg.temporary_channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None));
5429 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
5432 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
5433 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
5434 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
5436 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5437 match self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
5438 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
5439 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
5440 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
5441 funding_msg.channel_id))
5443 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
5444 i_e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
5448 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
5449 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
5450 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
5451 // until we have persisted our monitor.
5452 let new_channel_id = funding_msg.channel_id;
5453 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
5454 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5458 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
5460 let chan = e.insert(chan);
5461 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, monitor_res, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
5462 per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING_INITIAL_MONITOR,
5463 { peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&new_channel_id) });
5465 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
5466 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
5467 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
5468 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
5469 // We do not propagate the monitor update to the user as it would be for a monitor
5470 // that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we don't respond
5471 // with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
5472 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { shutdown_finish: Some((res, _)), .. }) = &mut res {
5480 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5481 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5482 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5483 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5485 debug_assert!(false);
5486 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5489 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5490 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5491 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5492 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5493 let monitor = try_chan_entry!(self,
5494 chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan);
5495 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor);
5496 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
5497 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
5498 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
5499 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
5500 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
5501 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
5502 shutdown_finish.0.take();
5507 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5511 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5512 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5513 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5515 debug_assert!(false);
5516 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5518 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5519 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5520 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5521 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5522 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
5523 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan);
5524 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
5525 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().context.channel_id()));
5526 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5527 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5528 msg: announcement_sigs,
5530 } else if chan.get().context.is_usable() {
5531 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
5532 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
5533 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
5534 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
5535 // announcement_signatures.
5536 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().context.channel_id()));
5537 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
5538 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5539 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5546 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5547 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan.get_mut());
5552 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5556 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5557 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
5558 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
5559 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5560 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5562 debug_assert!(false);
5563 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5565 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5566 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5567 // TODO(dunxen): Fix this duplication when we switch to a single map with enums as per
5568 // https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/2422
5569 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
5570 log_error!(self.logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", log_bytes!(&msg.channel_id[..]));
5571 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan_entry.get().context, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel);
5572 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
5573 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
5575 } else if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
5576 log_error!(self.logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", log_bytes!(&msg.channel_id[..]));
5577 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan_entry.get().context, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel);
5578 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
5579 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
5581 } else if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
5582 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
5583 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
5584 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
5585 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
5588 let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().context.get_funding_txo();
5589 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self,
5590 chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_entry);
5591 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
5593 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
5594 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
5595 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
5596 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
5597 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5598 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
5603 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
5604 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
5605 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
5606 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry).map(|_| ());
5610 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5613 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
5614 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
5615 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
5616 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
5622 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5623 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5624 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5626 debug_assert!(false);
5627 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5629 let (tx, chan_option) = {
5630 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5631 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5632 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
5633 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
5634 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_entry);
5635 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
5636 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5637 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5642 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
5643 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
5644 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
5645 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
5646 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
5647 (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, chan_entry)))
5648 } else { (tx, None) }
5650 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5653 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
5654 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
5655 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&broadcast_tx]);
5657 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
5658 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5659 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5660 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5661 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5665 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5670 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5671 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
5672 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
5673 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
5675 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
5676 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
5677 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
5678 //but we should prevent it anyway.
5680 let decoded_hop_res = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
5681 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5682 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5684 debug_assert!(false);
5685 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5687 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5688 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5689 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5690 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5692 let pending_forward_info = match decoded_hop_res {
5693 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt)) =>
5694 self.construct_pending_htlc_status(msg, shared_secret, next_hop,
5695 chan.get().context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_pk_opt),
5696 Err(e) => PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(e)
5698 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
5699 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
5700 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
5701 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
5702 match pending_forward_info {
5703 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
5704 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
5705 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
5706 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
5708 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
5709 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
5710 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
5711 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
5712 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
5715 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
5717 _ => pending_forward_info
5720 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger), chan);
5722 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5727 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5728 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
5729 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5730 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5732 debug_assert!(false);
5733 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5735 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5736 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5737 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5738 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5739 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan)
5741 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5744 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, msg.channel_id);
5748 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5749 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5750 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5752 debug_assert!(false);
5753 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5755 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5756 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5757 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5758 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5759 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan);
5761 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5766 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5767 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5768 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5770 debug_assert!(false);
5771 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5773 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5774 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5775 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5776 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5777 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
5778 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
5779 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan);
5781 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan);
5784 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5788 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5789 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5790 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5792 debug_assert!(false);
5793 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5795 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5796 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5797 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5798 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5799 let funding_txo = chan.get().context.get_funding_txo();
5800 let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
5801 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
5802 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
5803 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan).map(|_| ())
5806 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5811 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
5812 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
5813 let mut push_forward_event = false;
5814 let mut new_intercept_events = VecDeque::new();
5815 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
5816 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5817 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
5818 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
5819 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
5820 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
5821 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
5823 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
5824 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
5826 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5827 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
5828 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
5829 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5830 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5831 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
5833 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5834 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
5835 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.genesis_hash)
5837 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).into_inner());
5838 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5839 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
5840 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5841 new_intercept_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
5842 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
5843 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
5844 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
5845 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
5848 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5849 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
5851 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
5852 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
5853 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5854 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
5855 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
5856 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
5857 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
5858 phantom_shared_secret: None,
5861 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
5862 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
5863 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
5868 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
5869 // payments are being processed.
5870 if forward_htlcs_empty {
5871 push_forward_event = true;
5873 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5874 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
5881 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
5882 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
5885 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
5886 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5887 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
5889 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
5893 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
5894 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5895 let is_processing_events = self.pending_events_processor.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5896 let num_forward_events = pending_events.iter().filter(|(ev, _)|
5897 if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false }
5899 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued. Processing
5900 // events is done in batches and they are not removed until we're done processing each
5901 // batch. Since handling a `PendingHTLCsForwardable` event will call back into the
5902 // `ChannelManager`, we'll still see the original forwarding event not removed. Phantom
5903 // payments will need an additional forwarding event before being claimed to make them look
5904 // real by taking more time.
5905 if (is_processing_events && num_forward_events <= 1) || num_forward_events < 1 {
5906 pending_events.push_back((Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
5907 time_forwardable: Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
5912 /// Checks whether [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s generated by the receipt of a remote
5913 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] should be held for the given channel until some other action
5914 /// completes. Note that this needs to happen in the same [`PeerState`] mutex as any release of
5915 /// the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in question.
5916 fn raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
5917 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: &BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
5918 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
5920 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
5921 .get(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).map(|v| !v.is_empty()).unwrap_or(false)
5922 || self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().iter().any(|(_, action)| {
5923 action == &Some(EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
5924 channel_funding_outpoint,
5925 counterparty_node_id,
5930 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5931 let (htlcs_to_fail, res) = {
5932 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5933 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5935 debug_assert!(false);
5936 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5937 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
5938 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5939 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5940 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5941 let funding_txo = chan.get().context.get_funding_txo();
5942 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger), chan);
5943 let res = if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
5944 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update,
5945 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan).map(|_| ())
5947 (htlcs_to_fail, res)
5949 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5952 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
5956 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5957 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5958 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5960 debug_assert!(false);
5961 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5963 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5964 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5965 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5966 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5967 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan);
5969 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5974 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5975 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5976 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5978 debug_assert!(false);
5979 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5981 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5982 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5983 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5984 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5985 if !chan.get().context.is_usable() {
5986 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
5989 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5990 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
5991 &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
5992 msg, &self.default_configuration
5994 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5995 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5996 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap()),
5999 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6004 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
6005 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6006 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
6007 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
6009 // It's not a local channel
6010 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
6013 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6014 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
6015 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
6016 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
6018 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6019 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6020 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
6021 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
6022 if chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6023 if chan.get().context.should_announce() {
6024 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
6025 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
6026 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
6027 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
6029 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
6031 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
6032 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
6033 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
6034 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
6036 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", log_bytes!(chan_id));
6037 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), chan);
6040 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
6042 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
6045 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6047 let need_lnd_workaround = {
6048 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6050 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6052 debug_assert!(false);
6053 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6055 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6056 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6057 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6058 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
6059 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
6060 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
6061 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
6062 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
6063 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
6064 msg, &self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash,
6065 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan);
6066 let mut channel_update = None;
6067 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
6068 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
6069 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6072 } else if chan.get().context.is_usable() {
6073 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
6074 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
6075 // they have the latest channel parameters.
6076 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
6077 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6078 node_id: chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6083 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
6084 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
6085 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get_mut(), responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
6086 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
6087 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
6088 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
6092 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6096 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
6097 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
6100 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
6101 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
6106 /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
6107 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
6108 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
6110 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6111 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
6112 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
6113 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
6114 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
6115 match monitor_event {
6116 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
6117 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
6118 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
6119 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
6121 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
6122 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
6123 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
6124 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
6127 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
6128 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
6129 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
6130 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
6132 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
6133 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
6134 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6135 id_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).cloned()
6138 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
6139 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6140 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
6141 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6142 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6143 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6144 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
6145 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
6146 failed_channels.push(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
6147 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6148 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6152 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
6153 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
6155 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
6157 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, reason);
6158 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6159 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6160 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
6161 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.context.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
6168 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
6169 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
6175 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6176 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6179 has_pending_monitor_events
6182 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
6183 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
6184 /// update events as a separate process method here.
6186 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
6187 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6188 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
6191 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
6192 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
6193 /// update was applied.
6194 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
6195 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
6196 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
6197 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
6199 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
6200 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
6201 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
6202 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
6204 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6205 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6207 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6208 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6209 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
6210 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
6211 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6212 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
6213 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
6214 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
6215 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
6217 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
6218 has_monitor_update = true;
6220 let channel_id: [u8; 32] = *channel_id;
6221 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update,
6222 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING,
6223 peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id));
6225 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, res));
6227 continue 'peer_loop;
6236 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
6237 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
6238 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
6241 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
6242 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
6248 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
6249 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
6250 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
6251 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
6252 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
6253 let mut has_update = false;
6255 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6257 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6258 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6259 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6260 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6261 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
6262 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
6263 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
6264 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
6266 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
6267 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
6270 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
6271 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
6272 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
6273 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6274 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6279 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
6281 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
6282 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
6283 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
6289 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
6290 handle_errors.push((chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
6298 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
6299 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
6305 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
6306 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
6308 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
6309 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6310 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
6311 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
6312 // reorganized out of the main chain.
6313 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
6314 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
6315 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
6316 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
6317 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
6318 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
6319 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
6320 assert!(should_broadcast);
6321 } else { unreachable!(); }
6322 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
6323 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
6324 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
6327 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6331 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
6334 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
6335 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
6337 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
6338 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
6339 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
6340 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
6342 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
6344 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
6345 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
6349 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
6350 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
6352 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
6354 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
6355 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
6357 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
6358 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
6359 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
6360 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
6361 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
6362 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
6363 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
6364 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
6365 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
6366 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
6367 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
6370 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
6371 /// stored external to LDK.
6373 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
6374 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
6375 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
6377 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
6378 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
6381 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
6382 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
6383 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
6384 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
6386 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
6387 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
6388 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
6389 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
6390 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
6392 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
6393 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
6394 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
6395 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
6396 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
6398 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
6399 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
6401 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
6402 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
6406 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
6407 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
6409 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
6411 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
6412 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
6414 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
6415 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
6416 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
6417 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
6418 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
6419 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
6420 min_final_cltv_expiry)
6423 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
6424 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
6426 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
6427 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
6428 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
6431 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
6432 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
6434 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
6435 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
6436 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6437 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
6439 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
6440 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
6441 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
6442 Some(_) => continue,
6443 None => return scid_candidate
6448 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
6450 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
6451 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
6453 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
6454 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
6455 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
6459 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
6460 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
6461 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
6463 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
6464 /// times to get a unique scid.
6465 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
6466 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6467 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
6469 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
6470 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
6471 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
6472 return scid_candidate
6476 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
6477 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
6478 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
6479 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
6481 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6482 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6483 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6484 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6485 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
6486 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
6487 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
6488 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
6497 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6498 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
6499 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
6500 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
6501 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
6505 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
6506 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
6507 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6508 events.push_back((event, None));
6512 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
6513 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6514 events.pop_front().map(|(e, _)| e)
6518 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
6519 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
6523 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
6524 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
6527 /// When something which was blocking a channel from updating its [`ChannelMonitor`] (e.g. an
6528 /// [`Event`] being handled) completes, this should be called to restore the channel to normal
6529 /// operation. It will double-check that nothing *else* is also blocking the same channel from
6530 /// making progress and then let any blocked [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s fly.
6531 fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, mut completed_blocker: Option<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>) {
6532 let mut errors = Vec::new();
6534 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6535 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
6536 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6537 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
6539 if let Some(blocker) = completed_blocker.take() {
6540 // Only do this on the first iteration of the loop.
6541 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
6542 .get_mut(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
6544 blockers.retain(|iter| iter != &blocker);
6548 if self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
6549 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id) {
6550 // Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have anything else
6551 // blocking monitor updates for this channel. If we do, release the monitor
6552 // update(s) when those blockers complete.
6553 log_trace!(self.logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another channel's mon update needs to complete first",
6554 log_bytes!(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
6558 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
6559 debug_assert_eq!(chan.get().context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
6560 if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.get_mut().unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
6561 log_debug!(self.logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
6562 log_bytes!(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
6563 if let Err(e) = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update,
6564 peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan)
6566 errors.push((e, counterparty_node_id));
6568 if further_update_exists {
6569 // If there are more `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to process, restart at the
6574 log_trace!(self.logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
6575 log_bytes!(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
6579 log_debug!(self.logger,
6580 "Got a release post-RAA monitor update for peer {} but the channel is gone",
6581 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6585 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in errors {
6586 let res = Err::<(), _>(err);
6587 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
6591 fn handle_post_event_actions(&self, actions: Vec<EventCompletionAction>) {
6592 for action in actions {
6594 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
6595 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id
6597 self.handle_monitor_update_release(counterparty_node_id, channel_funding_outpoint, None);
6603 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
6604 /// using the given event handler.
6606 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
6607 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
6611 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
6615 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6617 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6618 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6619 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6620 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6621 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6622 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6626 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
6627 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
6628 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
6629 /// is always placed next to each other.
6631 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
6632 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
6633 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
6634 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
6636 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
6637 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
6638 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
6639 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
6640 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
6641 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6642 let mut result = self.process_background_events();
6644 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
6645 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
6646 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
6647 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6650 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
6651 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6653 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
6654 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6657 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
6658 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6659 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6660 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6661 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6662 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
6663 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
6667 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
6668 events.replace(pending_events);
6677 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6679 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6680 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6681 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6682 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6683 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6684 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6688 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
6690 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
6691 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
6692 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
6694 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
6698 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6700 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6701 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6702 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6703 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6704 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6705 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6709 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
6711 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6712 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
6713 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
6714 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
6715 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
6718 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
6719 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
6722 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
6723 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
6724 &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
6725 let new_height = height - 1;
6727 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
6728 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
6729 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
6730 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
6731 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
6732 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
6735 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
6739 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6741 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6742 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6743 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6744 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6745 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6746 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6750 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
6751 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6752 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6753 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6755 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
6756 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
6758 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
6759 &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
6760 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)
6761 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
6763 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6764 if height < last_best_block_height {
6765 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6766 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
6770 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
6771 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6772 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6773 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6775 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
6776 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
6778 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
6779 &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
6780 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
6782 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
6784 macro_rules! max_time {
6785 ($timestamp: expr) => {
6787 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
6788 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
6789 // having an explicit local time source.
6790 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
6791 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
6792 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6793 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
6794 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
6800 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
6801 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6802 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
6803 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
6807 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
6808 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
6809 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
6810 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6811 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6812 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
6813 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(block_hash)) = (chan.context.get_funding_txo(), chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
6814 res.push((funding_txo.txid, Some(block_hash)));
6821 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
6822 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
6823 &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
6824 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
6825 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
6826 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
6827 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
6828 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
6829 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
6834 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6836 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6837 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6838 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6839 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6840 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6841 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6845 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
6846 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
6848 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
6849 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
6850 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6851 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6852 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6854 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6855 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
6857 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6858 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6859 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6860 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6861 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6862 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
6863 let res = f(channel);
6864 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
6865 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
6866 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
6867 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
6868 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.context.channel_id() }));
6870 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
6871 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
6872 if channel.context.is_usable() {
6873 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()));
6874 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
6875 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6876 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6881 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()));
6886 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6887 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
6890 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
6891 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()));
6892 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6893 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6894 msg: announcement_sigs,
6896 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6897 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
6898 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
6900 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
6901 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
6902 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
6907 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
6908 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
6909 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
6910 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
6911 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
6912 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
6913 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
6914 // is always consistent.
6915 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
6916 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
6917 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()),
6918 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
6919 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
6922 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
6923 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &channel.context);
6924 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
6925 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
6926 failed_channels.push(channel.context.force_shutdown(true));
6927 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
6928 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6932 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
6933 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel.context, reason);
6934 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6935 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6936 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
6937 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
6938 data: reason_message,
6948 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6949 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
6950 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
6951 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
6952 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
6953 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
6954 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
6955 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6956 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
6957 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
6959 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
6960 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
6961 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
6965 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
6968 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6969 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
6970 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6971 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6972 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
6973 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
6974 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6975 phantom_shared_secret: None,
6976 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
6979 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
6980 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6981 _ => unreachable!(),
6983 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
6984 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
6985 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
6986 log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
6992 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
6994 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
6995 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
6999 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
7001 /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
7002 /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
7004 pub fn get_persistable_update_future(&self) -> Future {
7005 self.persistence_notifier.get_future()
7008 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
7009 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
7010 self.persistence_notifier.notify_pending()
7013 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
7014 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
7015 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
7016 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
7019 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7020 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7021 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
7022 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
7025 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7026 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7028 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
7029 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
7030 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
7031 pub fn invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
7032 provided_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
7035 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7036 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7037 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
7038 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
7041 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7042 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7043 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
7044 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
7047 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7048 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7049 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
7050 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
7054 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7055 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7057 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7058 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7059 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7060 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7061 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7062 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7066 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
7067 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7068 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7071 fn handle_open_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2) {
7072 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7073 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7074 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7077 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
7078 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7079 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7082 fn handle_accept_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannelV2) {
7083 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7084 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7085 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7088 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
7089 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7090 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7093 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
7094 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7095 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7098 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
7099 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7100 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7103 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
7104 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7105 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7108 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
7109 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7110 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7113 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
7114 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7115 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7118 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
7119 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7120 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7123 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
7124 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7125 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7128 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
7129 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7130 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7133 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
7134 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7135 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7138 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
7139 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7140 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7143 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
7144 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7145 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7148 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
7149 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7150 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7153 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
7154 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
7155 let force_persist = self.process_background_events();
7156 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
7157 if force_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { NotifyOption::DoPersist } else { persist }
7159 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
7164 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
7165 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7166 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7169 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
7170 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7171 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
7172 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
7174 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
7175 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
7176 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
7177 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7178 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7179 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7180 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
7181 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
7182 if chan.is_shutdown() {
7183 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
7184 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
7189 peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
7190 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
7191 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
7194 peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
7195 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
7196 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
7199 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
7201 // V1 Channel Establishment
7202 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
7203 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
7204 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
7205 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
7206 // V2 Channel Establishment
7207 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannelV2 { .. } => false,
7208 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 { .. } => false,
7209 // Common Channel Establishment
7210 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
7211 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
7212 // Interactive Transaction Construction
7213 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddInput { .. } => false,
7214 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddOutput { .. } => false,
7215 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveInput { .. } => false,
7216 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveOutput { .. } => false,
7217 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxComplete { .. } => false,
7218 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxSignatures { .. } => false,
7219 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxInitRbf { .. } => false,
7220 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAckRbf { .. } => false,
7221 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAbort { .. } => false,
7222 // Channel Operations
7223 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
7224 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
7225 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
7226 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
7227 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
7228 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
7230 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
7231 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
7232 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
7233 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
7234 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
7235 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
7236 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
7237 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
7238 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
7241 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
7242 peer_state.is_connected = false;
7243 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
7244 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
7247 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
7249 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
7251 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7252 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
7256 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
7257 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
7258 log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
7262 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7264 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
7265 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
7266 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
7267 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
7268 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
7269 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
7272 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
7273 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
7274 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
7275 if inbound_peer_limited {
7278 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
7279 channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
7280 outbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
7281 inbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
7282 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
7283 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
7284 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
7285 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
7286 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
7290 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
7291 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
7292 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
7294 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7295 if inbound_peer_limited &&
7296 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
7297 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
7302 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
7303 peer_state.is_connected = true;
7308 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
7310 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7311 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
7312 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7313 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7314 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7316 // Since unfunded channel maps are cleared upon disconnecting a peer, and they're not persisted
7317 // (so won't be recovered after a crash) we don't need to bother closing unfunded channels and
7318 // clearing their maps here. Instead we can just send queue channel_reestablish messages for
7319 // channels in the channel_by_id map.
7320 peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().for_each(|(_, chan)| {
7321 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
7322 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7323 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
7327 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
7331 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
7332 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7334 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
7335 let channel_ids: Vec<[u8; 32]> = {
7336 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7337 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
7338 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
7339 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7340 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7341 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned()
7342 .chain(peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.keys().cloned())
7343 .chain(peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.keys().cloned()).collect()
7345 for channel_id in channel_ids {
7346 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
7347 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
7351 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
7352 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7353 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
7354 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
7355 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7356 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7357 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
7358 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
7359 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
7360 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7368 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
7369 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
7373 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
7374 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
7377 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
7378 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
7381 fn get_genesis_hashes(&self) -> Option<Vec<ChainHash>> {
7382 Some(vec![ChainHash::from(&self.genesis_hash[..])])
7385 fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddInput) {
7386 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7387 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7388 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7391 fn handle_tx_add_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddOutput) {
7392 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7393 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7394 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7397 fn handle_tx_remove_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveInput) {
7398 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7399 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7400 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7403 fn handle_tx_remove_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveOutput) {
7404 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7405 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7406 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7409 fn handle_tx_complete(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxComplete) {
7410 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7411 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7412 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7415 fn handle_tx_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxSignatures) {
7416 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7417 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7418 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7421 fn handle_tx_init_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxInitRbf) {
7422 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7423 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7424 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7427 fn handle_tx_ack_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAckRbf) {
7428 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7429 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7430 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7433 fn handle_tx_abort(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAbort) {
7434 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7435 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7436 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7440 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7441 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7442 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
7443 let mut node_features = provided_init_features(config).to_context();
7444 node_features.set_keysend_optional();
7448 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7449 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7451 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
7452 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
7453 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
7454 pub(crate) fn provided_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
7455 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
7458 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7459 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7460 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
7461 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
7464 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7465 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7466 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
7467 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
7470 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7471 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7472 pub fn provided_init_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
7473 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
7474 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
7475 // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
7476 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
7477 features.set_data_loss_protect_required();
7478 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
7479 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
7480 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
7481 features.set_payment_secret_required();
7482 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
7483 features.set_wumbo_optional();
7484 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
7485 features.set_channel_type_optional();
7486 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
7487 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
7488 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
7489 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
7494 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
7495 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
7497 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
7498 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
7499 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
7500 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
7503 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
7504 (2, node_id, required),
7505 (4, features, required),
7506 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
7507 (8, forwarding_info, option),
7508 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
7509 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
7512 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
7513 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7514 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7515 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
7516 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
7517 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
7518 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7519 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
7520 (2, self.channel_id, required),
7521 (3, self.channel_type, option),
7522 (4, self.counterparty, required),
7523 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
7524 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
7525 (7, self.config, option),
7526 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
7527 (9, self.confirmations, option),
7528 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
7529 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
7530 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
7531 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
7532 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
7533 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required),
7534 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
7535 (21, self.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, required),
7536 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
7537 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
7538 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
7539 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
7540 (30, self.is_usable, required),
7541 (32, self.is_public, required),
7542 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
7543 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
7544 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
7545 (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
7546 (41, self.channel_shutdown_state, option),
7552 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
7553 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7554 _init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7555 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
7556 (2, channel_id, required),
7557 (3, channel_type, option),
7558 (4, counterparty, required),
7559 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
7560 (6, funding_txo, option),
7561 (7, config, option),
7562 (8, short_channel_id, option),
7563 (9, confirmations, option),
7564 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
7565 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
7566 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
7567 (16, balance_msat, required),
7568 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
7569 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
7570 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
7571 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
7572 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
7573 (21, next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, (default_value, 0)),
7574 (22, confirmations_required, option),
7575 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
7576 (26, is_outbound, required),
7577 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
7578 (30, is_usable, required),
7579 (32, is_public, required),
7580 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
7581 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
7582 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
7583 (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
7584 (41, channel_shutdown_state, option),
7587 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7588 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
7589 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
7590 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
7591 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
7595 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
7597 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
7598 outbound_scid_alias,
7602 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
7603 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
7605 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
7606 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
7607 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
7608 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat.0.unwrap(),
7609 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
7610 confirmations_required,
7612 force_close_spend_delay,
7613 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
7614 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
7615 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
7616 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
7617 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
7618 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
7619 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
7620 channel_shutdown_state,
7625 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
7626 (2, channels, required_vec),
7627 (4, phantom_scid, required),
7628 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
7631 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
7633 (0, onion_packet, required),
7634 (2, short_channel_id, required),
7637 (0, payment_data, required),
7638 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
7639 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
7640 (3, payment_metadata, option),
7642 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
7643 (0, payment_preimage, required),
7644 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
7645 (3, payment_metadata, option),
7646 (4, payment_data, option), // Added in 0.0.116
7650 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
7651 (0, routing, required),
7652 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
7653 (4, payment_hash, required),
7654 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
7655 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
7656 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
7657 (10, skimmed_fee_msat, option),
7661 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
7662 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7664 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
7666 channel_id.write(writer)?;
7667 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7668 reason.write(writer)?;
7670 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
7671 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
7674 channel_id.write(writer)?;
7675 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7676 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
7677 failure_code.write(writer)?;
7684 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
7685 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7686 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7689 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
7690 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7691 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7692 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
7696 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
7697 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7698 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7699 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
7700 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
7703 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
7704 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
7705 // messages contained in the variants.
7706 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
7707 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
7708 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
7710 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
7711 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
7712 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
7713 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
7714 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
7717 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
7718 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
7719 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
7720 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
7721 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
7723 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
7728 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
7733 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
7734 (0, short_channel_id, required),
7735 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
7736 (2, outpoint, required),
7737 (4, htlc_id, required),
7738 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
7741 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
7742 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7743 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
7744 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
7745 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
7747 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7748 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
7749 (1, self.total_msat, required),
7750 (2, self.value, required),
7751 (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
7752 (4, payment_data, option),
7753 (5, self.total_value_received, option),
7754 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
7755 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
7756 (10, self.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
7762 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
7763 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7764 _init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7765 (0, prev_hop, required),
7766 (1, total_msat, option),
7767 (2, value_ser, required),
7768 (3, sender_intended_value, option),
7769 (4, payment_data_opt, option),
7770 (5, total_value_received, option),
7771 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
7772 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
7773 (10, counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
7775 let payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = payment_data_opt;
7776 let value = value_ser.0.unwrap();
7777 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
7779 if payment_data.is_some() {
7780 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7782 if total_msat.is_none() {
7783 total_msat = Some(value);
7785 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
7788 if total_msat.is_none() {
7789 if payment_data.is_none() {
7790 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7792 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
7794 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
7798 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
7801 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
7802 total_value_received,
7803 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
7805 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry.0.unwrap(),
7806 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
7811 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
7812 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7813 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7816 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
7817 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
7818 let mut path_hops = Vec::new();
7819 let mut payment_id = None;
7820 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
7821 let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
7822 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7823 (0, session_priv, required),
7824 (1, payment_id, option),
7825 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
7826 (4, path_hops, required_vec),
7827 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
7828 (6, blinded_tail, option),
7830 if payment_id.is_none() {
7831 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
7833 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
7835 let path = Path { hops: path_hops, blinded_tail };
7836 if path.hops.len() == 0 {
7837 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7839 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
7840 if let Payee::Clear { ref mut final_cltv_expiry_delta, .. } = params.payee {
7841 if final_cltv_expiry_delta == &0 {
7842 *final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.final_cltv_expiry_delta().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7846 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
7847 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
7848 first_hop_htlc_msat,
7850 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
7853 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
7854 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
7859 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
7860 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
7862 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
7864 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
7865 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7866 (0, session_priv, required),
7867 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
7868 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
7869 // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
7870 (4, path.hops, required_vec),
7871 (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
7872 (6, path.blinded_tail, option),
7875 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
7877 field.write(writer)?;
7884 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
7885 (0, forward_info, required),
7886 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
7887 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
7888 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
7889 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
7892 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
7894 (0, htlc_id, required),
7895 (2, err_packet, required),
7900 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
7901 (0, payment_secret, required),
7902 (2, expiry_time, required),
7903 (4, user_payment_id, required),
7904 (6, payment_preimage, required),
7905 (8, min_value_msat, required),
7908 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7910 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7911 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7912 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7913 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7914 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7915 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7919 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7920 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
7922 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7924 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
7926 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
7927 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
7928 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
7931 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
7933 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7934 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
7935 let mut number_of_channels = 0;
7936 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7937 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7938 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7939 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
7940 serializable_peer_count += 1;
7942 number_of_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.len();
7943 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
7944 if !channel.context.is_funding_initiated() {
7945 unfunded_channels += 1;
7950 ((number_of_channels - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
7952 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7953 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7954 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7955 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
7956 if channel.context.is_funding_initiated() {
7957 channel.write(writer)?;
7964 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7965 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7966 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
7967 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
7968 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7969 for forward in pending_forwards {
7970 forward.write(writer)?;
7975 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
7977 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7978 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
7979 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7981 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
7982 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
7983 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7984 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
7985 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7986 (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7987 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
7988 htlc.write(writer)?;
7990 htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
7991 htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
7994 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
7995 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
7996 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7997 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
7998 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
7999 // per_peer_state lock at all.
8000 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
8003 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
8004 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
8005 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
8006 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
8007 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
8009 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
8010 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
8011 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
8012 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
8013 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
8014 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
8015 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
8020 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8021 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.115 don't support post-event actions, thus if there's no
8022 // actions at all, skip writing the required TLV. Otherwise, pre-0.0.115 versions will
8023 // refuse to read the new ChannelManager.
8024 let events_not_backwards_compatible = events.iter().any(|(_, action)| action.is_some());
8025 if events_not_backwards_compatible {
8026 // If we're gonna write a even TLV that will overwrite our events anyway we might as
8027 // well save the space and not write any events here.
8028 0u64.write(writer)?;
8030 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8031 for (event, _) in events.iter() {
8032 event.write(writer)?;
8036 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote the `pending_background_events`
8037 // `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here, however there was never a reason to do so -
8038 // the closing monitor updates were always effectively replayed on startup (either directly
8039 // by calling `broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn` on a `ChannelMonitor` during
8040 // deserialization or, in 0.0.115, by regenerating the monitor update itself).
8041 0u64.write(writer)?;
8043 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
8044 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
8045 // likely to be identical.
8046 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
8047 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
8049 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8050 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
8051 hash.write(writer)?;
8052 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
8055 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
8056 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
8057 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
8058 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
8059 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
8062 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
8063 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
8065 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
8066 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
8067 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
8068 session_priv.write(writer)?;
8071 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
8072 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
8076 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
8077 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
8078 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
8080 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
8081 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
8082 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
8088 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
8089 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
8090 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
8091 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
8094 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
8095 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
8096 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
8097 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
8098 pending_claiming_payments = None;
8101 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(&PublicKey, &OutPoint), &Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
8102 for ((counterparty_id, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
8103 for (funding_outpoint, updates) in peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.iter() {
8104 if !updates.is_empty() {
8105 if in_flight_monitor_updates.is_none() { in_flight_monitor_updates = Some(HashMap::new()); }
8106 in_flight_monitor_updates.as_mut().unwrap().insert((counterparty_id, funding_outpoint), updates);
8111 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
8112 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
8113 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
8114 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
8115 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
8116 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
8117 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
8118 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
8119 (8, if events_not_backwards_compatible { Some(&*events) } else { None }, option),
8120 (9, htlc_purposes, required_vec),
8121 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
8122 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
8123 (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
8130 impl Writeable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
8131 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8132 (self.len() as u64).write(w)?;
8133 for (event, action) in self.iter() {
8136 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
8137 // Events are MaybeReadable, in some cases indicating that they shouldn't actually
8138 // be persisted and are regenerated on restart. However, if such an event has a
8139 // post-event-handling action we'll write nothing for the event and would have to
8140 // either forget the action or fail on deserialization (which we do below). Thus,
8141 // check that the event is sane here.
8142 let event_encoded = event.encode();
8143 let event_read: Option<Event> =
8144 MaybeReadable::read(&mut &event_encoded[..]).unwrap();
8145 if action.is_some() { assert!(event_read.is_some()); }
8151 impl Readable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
8152 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8153 let len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8154 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 1024 * 16;
8155 let mut events: Self = VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(
8156 MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>() as u64,
8159 let ev_opt = MaybeReadable::read(reader)?;
8160 let action = Readable::read(reader)?;
8161 if let Some(ev) = ev_opt {
8162 events.push_back((ev, action));
8163 } else if action.is_some() {
8164 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8171 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(ChannelShutdownState,
8172 (0, NotShuttingDown) => {},
8173 (2, ShutdownInitiated) => {},
8174 (4, ResolvingHTLCs) => {},
8175 (6, NegotiatingClosingFee) => {},
8176 (8, ShutdownComplete) => {}, ;
8179 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
8181 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
8183 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
8184 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
8185 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
8186 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
8187 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
8188 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
8189 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
8190 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
8191 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
8192 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
8193 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
8194 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
8195 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
8197 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
8198 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
8200 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
8201 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
8203 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
8204 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
8205 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
8206 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
8207 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
8208 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
8210 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
8211 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8213 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8214 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8215 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8216 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8217 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8218 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8222 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
8223 pub entropy_source: ES,
8225 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
8226 pub node_signer: NS,
8228 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
8229 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
8231 pub signer_provider: SP,
8233 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
8235 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
8236 pub fee_estimator: F,
8237 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
8239 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
8240 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
8241 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
8242 pub chain_monitor: M,
8244 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
8245 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
8246 /// force-closed during deserialization.
8247 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
8248 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
8249 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
8251 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
8253 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
8254 /// deserialization.
8256 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
8257 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
8258 pub default_config: UserConfig,
8260 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
8261 /// value.context.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
8263 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
8264 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
8265 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
8266 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
8268 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
8271 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
8272 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>,
8275 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8276 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8278 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8279 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8280 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8281 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8282 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8283 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8287 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
8288 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
8289 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
8290 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
8291 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>) -> Self {
8293 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
8294 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
8299 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
8300 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
8301 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8302 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
8304 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8305 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8306 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8307 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8308 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8309 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8313 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8314 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
8315 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
8319 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8320 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
8322 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8323 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8324 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8325 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8326 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8327 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8331 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8332 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
8334 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
8335 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8336 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
8338 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
8340 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8341 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
8342 let mut peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
8343 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
8344 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
8345 let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
8346 let mut close_background_events = Vec::new();
8347 for _ in 0..channel_count {
8348 let mut channel: Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (
8349 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
8351 let funding_txo = channel.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8352 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
8353 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
8354 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
8355 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
8356 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
8357 channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
8358 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
8359 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
8360 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
8361 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
8362 log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
8363 let (monitor_update, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
8364 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = monitor_update {
8365 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
8366 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
8369 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
8370 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
8371 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
8372 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
8373 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
8375 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
8376 let mut found_htlc = false;
8377 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
8378 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
8381 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
8382 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
8383 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
8384 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
8385 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
8386 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
8387 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
8388 log_info!(args.logger,
8389 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
8390 log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
8391 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
8395 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {} at update_id {} against monitor at update id {}",
8396 log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
8397 monitor.get_latest_update_id());
8398 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
8399 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
8401 if channel.context.is_funding_initiated() {
8402 id_to_peer.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
8404 match peer_channels.entry(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
8405 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
8406 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
8407 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), channel);
8409 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
8410 let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
8411 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), channel);
8412 entry.insert(by_id_map);
8416 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
8417 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
8418 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
8419 // safely discard the channel.
8420 let _ = channel.context.force_shutdown(false);
8421 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
8422 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
8423 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
8424 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
8427 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()));
8428 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
8429 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
8430 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
8431 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
8432 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8436 for (funding_txo, _) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
8437 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
8438 log_info!(args.logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
8439 log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
8440 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
8441 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
8442 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
8444 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, monitor_update)));
8448 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
8449 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8450 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
8451 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
8452 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8453 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8454 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
8455 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
8456 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
8458 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
8461 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8462 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
8463 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
8464 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
8465 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8466 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
8467 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
8468 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
8470 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
8473 let peer_state_from_chans = |channel_by_id| {
8476 outbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8477 inbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8478 latest_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
8479 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
8480 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8481 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
8482 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8483 is_connected: false,
8487 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8488 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>)>()));
8489 for _ in 0..peer_count {
8490 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
8491 let peer_chans = peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new());
8492 let mut peer_state = peer_state_from_chans(peer_chans);
8493 peer_state.latest_features = Readable::read(reader)?;
8494 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
8497 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8498 let mut pending_events_read: VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> =
8499 VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>()));
8500 for _ in 0..event_count {
8501 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
8502 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push_back((event, None)),
8507 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8508 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
8509 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8511 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote pending `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here,
8512 // however we really don't (and never did) need them - we regenerate all
8513 // on-startup monitor updates.
8514 let _: OutPoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
8515 let _: ChannelMonitorUpdate = Readable::read(reader)?;
8517 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8521 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
8522 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8524 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8525 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
8526 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
8527 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
8528 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8532 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8533 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
8534 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
8535 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
8536 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
8537 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
8538 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
8540 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
8541 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
8545 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
8546 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
8547 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
8548 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
8549 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
8550 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
8551 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
8552 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
8553 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
8554 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
8555 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer: Option<Vec<(_, BTreeMap<_, Vec<_>>)>> = Some(Vec::new());
8556 let mut events_override = None;
8557 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(PublicKey, OutPoint), Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
8558 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
8559 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
8560 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
8561 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
8562 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
8563 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
8564 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
8565 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
8566 (8, events_override, option),
8567 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, optional_vec),
8568 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
8569 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
8570 (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
8572 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
8573 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
8576 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
8577 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
8580 if let Some(events) = events_override {
8581 pending_events_read = events;
8584 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
8585 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
8588 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
8589 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
8590 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
8591 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
8592 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
8593 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
8595 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
8597 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
8598 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
8599 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
8602 // We have to replay (or skip, if they were completed after we wrote the `ChannelManager`)
8603 // each `ChannelMonitorUpdate` in `in_flight_monitor_updates`. After doing so, we have to
8604 // check that each channel we have isn't newer than the latest `ChannelMonitorUpdate`(s) we
8605 // replayed, and for each monitor update we have to replay we have to ensure there's a
8606 // `ChannelMonitor` for it.
8608 // In order to do so we first walk all of our live channels (so that we can check their
8609 // state immediately after doing the update replays, when we have the `update_id`s
8610 // available) and then walk any remaining in-flight updates.
8612 // Because the actual handling of the in-flight updates is the same, it's macro'ized here:
8613 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
8614 macro_rules! handle_in_flight_updates {
8615 ($counterparty_node_id: expr, $chan_in_flight_upds: expr, $funding_txo: expr,
8616 $monitor: expr, $peer_state: expr, $channel_info_log: expr
8618 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = 0;
8619 $chan_in_flight_upds.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > $monitor.get_latest_update_id());
8620 for update in $chan_in_flight_upds.iter() {
8621 log_trace!(args.logger, "Replaying ChannelMonitorUpdate {} for {}channel {}",
8622 update.update_id, $channel_info_log, log_bytes!($funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
8623 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id, update.update_id);
8624 pending_background_events.push(
8625 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
8626 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
8627 funding_txo: $funding_txo,
8628 update: update.clone(),
8631 if $chan_in_flight_upds.is_empty() {
8632 // We had some updates to apply, but it turns out they had completed before we
8633 // were serialized, we just weren't notified of that. Thus, we may have to run
8634 // the completion actions for any monitor updates, but otherwise are done.
8635 pending_background_events.push(
8636 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
8637 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
8638 channel_id: $funding_txo.to_channel_id(),
8641 if $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.insert($funding_txo, $chan_in_flight_upds).is_some() {
8642 log_error!(args.logger, "Duplicate in-flight monitor update set for the same channel!");
8643 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8645 max_in_flight_update_id
8649 for (counterparty_id, peer_state_mtx) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
8650 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
8651 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8652 for (_, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
8653 // Channels that were persisted have to be funded, otherwise they should have been
8655 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8656 let monitor = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo)
8657 .expect("We already checked for monitor presence when loading channels");
8658 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = monitor.get_latest_update_id();
8659 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = &mut in_flight_monitor_updates {
8660 if let Some(mut chan_in_flight_upds) = in_flight_upds.remove(&(*counterparty_id, funding_txo)) {
8661 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id,
8662 handle_in_flight_updates!(*counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_upds,
8663 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, ""));
8666 if chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id() > max_in_flight_update_id {
8667 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
8668 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
8669 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} with update_id through {} in-flight",
8670 log_bytes!(chan.context.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), max_in_flight_update_id);
8671 log_error!(args.logger, " but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.", chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id());
8672 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
8673 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
8674 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
8675 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
8676 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8681 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = in_flight_monitor_updates {
8682 for ((counterparty_id, funding_txo), mut chan_in_flight_updates) in in_flight_upds {
8683 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
8684 // Now that we've removed all the in-flight monitor updates for channels that are
8685 // still open, we need to replay any monitor updates that are for closed channels,
8686 // creating the neccessary peer_state entries as we go.
8687 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_id).or_insert_with(|| {
8688 Mutex::new(peer_state_from_chans(HashMap::new()))
8690 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8691 handle_in_flight_updates!(counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_updates,
8692 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, "closed ");
8694 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is missing even though we have in-flight updates for it! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
8695 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is missing.",
8696 log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
8697 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
8698 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
8699 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
8700 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
8701 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8706 // Note that we have to do the above replays before we push new monitor updates.
8707 pending_background_events.append(&mut close_background_events);
8709 // If there's any preimages for forwarded HTLCs hanging around in ChannelMonitors we
8710 // should ensure we try them again on the inbound edge. We put them here and do so after we
8711 // have a fully-constructed `ChannelManager` at the end.
8712 let mut pending_claims_to_replay = Vec::new();
8715 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
8716 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
8717 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
8718 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
8719 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
8720 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
8721 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
8723 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
8724 let counterparty_opt = id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
8725 if counterparty_opt.is_none() {
8726 for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
8727 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
8728 if path.hops.is_empty() {
8729 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
8730 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8733 let path_amt = path.final_value_msat();
8734 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
8735 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
8736 match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
8737 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
8738 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
8739 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
8740 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
8742 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
8743 let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
8744 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
8745 retry_strategy: None,
8746 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
8747 payment_params: None,
8748 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
8749 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
8750 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
8751 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
8752 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
8753 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
8754 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
8755 total_msat: path_amt,
8756 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
8758 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
8759 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
8764 for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
8766 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
8767 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
8768 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
8769 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
8771 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
8772 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
8773 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
8774 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
8775 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
8776 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
8777 forwards.retain(|forward| {
8778 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
8779 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
8780 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
8781 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
8786 !forwards.is_empty()
8788 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
8789 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
8790 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
8791 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
8792 pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
8793 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
8794 intercepted_id != ev_id
8801 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
8802 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
8803 let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
8804 // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
8805 // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
8806 // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
8807 // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
8808 // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
8809 // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
8810 // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
8811 // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
8812 pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv, path, false, &pending_events, &args.logger);
8813 pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
8820 // Whether the downstream channel was closed or not, try to re-apply any payment
8821 // preimages from it which may be needed in upstream channels for forwarded
8823 let outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter = monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs()
8825 .filter_map(|(htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt))| {
8826 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(_) = htlc_source {
8827 if let Some(payment_preimage) = preimage_opt {
8828 Some((htlc_source, payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat,
8829 // Check if `counterparty_opt.is_none()` to see if the
8830 // downstream chan is closed (because we don't have a
8831 // channel_id -> peer map entry).
8832 counterparty_opt.is_none(),
8833 monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()))
8836 // If it was an outbound payment, we've handled it above - if a preimage
8837 // came in and we persisted the `ChannelManager` we either handled it and
8838 // are good to go or the channel force-closed - we don't have to handle the
8839 // channel still live case here.
8843 for tuple in outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter {
8844 pending_claims_to_replay.push(tuple);
8849 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
8850 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
8851 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
8852 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
8853 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
8854 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
8855 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
8856 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
8860 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
8861 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
8863 let mut claimable_payments = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
8864 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
8865 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
8866 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8868 if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
8869 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
8870 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8872 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
8873 purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
8875 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
8876 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
8878 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
8881 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
8882 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
8883 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
8885 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
8889 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
8890 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
8891 for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
8892 if htlcs.is_empty() {
8893 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8895 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
8896 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
8897 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
8898 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
8899 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
8900 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
8901 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
8902 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
8904 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
8905 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8909 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
8911 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
8913 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
8914 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
8916 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
8917 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
8922 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8923 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
8925 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
8927 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
8929 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
8930 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
8931 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
8932 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8936 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
8937 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
8938 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8939 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8940 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
8941 if chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
8942 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
8944 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
8945 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
8946 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
8948 chan.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
8949 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias()) {
8950 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
8951 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
8952 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
8953 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8955 if chan.context.is_usable() {
8956 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
8957 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
8958 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
8959 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
8960 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8966 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
8968 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
8969 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
8970 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
8971 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
8972 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
8973 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
8974 let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
8975 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
8976 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
8977 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
8978 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
8980 for claimable_htlc in payment.htlcs {
8981 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
8983 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
8984 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
8985 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
8986 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
8988 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
8989 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
8990 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
8991 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
8993 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
8994 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
8995 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
8996 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
8998 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
8999 if let Some(peer_node_id) = id_to_peer.get(&previous_channel_id){
9000 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
9001 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9002 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9003 if let Some(channel) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
9004 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
9007 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
9008 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
9011 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
9014 purpose: payment.purpose,
9015 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
9021 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
9022 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
9023 for (_, actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions.iter() {
9024 for action in actions.iter() {
9025 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
9026 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
9027 Some((blocked_node_id, blocked_channel_outpoint, blocking_action)), ..
9029 if let Some(blocked_peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&blocked_node_id) {
9030 blocked_peer_state.lock().unwrap().actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
9031 .entry(blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id())
9032 .or_insert_with(Vec::new).push(blocking_action.clone());
9034 // If the channel we were blocking has closed, we don't need to
9035 // worry about it - the blocked monitor update should never have
9036 // been released from the `Channel` object so it can't have
9037 // completed, and if the channel closed there's no reason to bother
9043 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
9045 log_error!(args.logger, "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
9046 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9050 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
9052 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
9053 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
9054 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
9055 router: args.router,
9057 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
9059 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
9060 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
9061 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
9062 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
9064 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
9065 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
9066 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
9067 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
9068 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
9069 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
9071 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
9076 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
9078 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
9080 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
9081 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
9082 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
9083 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
9084 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
9085 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
9087 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
9088 node_signer: args.node_signer,
9089 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
9091 logger: args.logger,
9092 default_configuration: args.default_config,
9095 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
9096 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
9097 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
9098 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
9099 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
9102 for (source, preimage, downstream_value, downstream_closed, downstream_chan_id) in pending_claims_to_replay {
9103 // We use `downstream_closed` in place of `from_onchain` here just as a guess - we
9104 // don't remember in the `ChannelMonitor` where we got a preimage from, but if the
9105 // channel is closed we just assume that it probably came from an on-chain claim.
9106 channel_manager.claim_funds_internal(source, preimage, Some(downstream_value),
9107 downstream_closed, downstream_chan_id);
9110 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
9111 //connection or two.
9113 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
9119 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
9120 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
9121 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
9122 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
9123 use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
9124 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
9125 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
9126 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
9127 use crate::ln::msgs::{self, ErrorAction};
9128 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
9129 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
9130 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
9131 use crate::util::test_utils;
9132 use crate::util::config::{ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
9133 use crate::sign::EntropySource;
9136 fn test_notify_limits() {
9137 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
9138 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
9139 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9140 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9141 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9142 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9144 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
9145 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
9146 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9147 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9148 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9150 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9152 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
9153 // to connect messages with new values
9154 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
9155 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
9156 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
9157 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
9158 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
9159 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
9161 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
9162 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9163 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9164 // ... but the last node should not.
9165 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9166 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
9167 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9168 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9170 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
9171 // about the channel.
9172 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
9173 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
9174 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9176 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
9178 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
9179 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
9180 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
9181 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
9182 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9183 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9185 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
9186 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
9187 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
9189 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
9190 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
9191 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
9192 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
9193 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
9194 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
9196 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
9197 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
9198 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
9199 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
9200 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9201 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9202 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
9203 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
9205 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
9206 // the channel info has updated.
9207 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
9208 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
9209 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9210 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9211 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
9212 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
9216 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
9217 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
9219 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9220 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9221 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9222 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9223 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9225 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
9226 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
9227 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
9228 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
9230 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
9231 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
9232 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
9233 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
9234 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
9235 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
9236 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
9237 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
9238 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9239 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9240 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9241 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
9243 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
9244 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
9245 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
9246 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9247 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9248 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9249 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
9250 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
9251 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9252 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
9253 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9254 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9255 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
9256 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9257 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9258 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9259 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9260 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9261 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9262 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9263 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9264 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9265 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
9267 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
9268 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
9269 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
9270 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9271 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9272 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9273 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
9275 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
9276 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
9277 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
9278 // lightning messages manually.
9279 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
9280 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
9281 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
9283 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9284 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
9285 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
9286 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9287 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9288 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
9289 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9290 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9291 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
9292 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9293 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9294 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
9295 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
9296 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9297 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9298 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
9299 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9300 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9301 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
9302 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9303 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
9304 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9305 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9306 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
9307 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9309 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
9310 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
9311 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9312 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
9314 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
9315 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
9316 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
9317 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
9319 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9322 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
9323 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
9324 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
9325 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
9327 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9330 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
9331 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
9332 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
9333 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
9335 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9340 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
9341 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(false);
9342 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(true);
9345 fn do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(accept_mpp_keysend: bool) {
9346 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
9347 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
9348 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
9349 // fails as expected.
9350 // (3): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend
9351 // payment fails as expected. When `accept_mpp_keysend` is false, this tests that we
9352 // reject MPP keysend payments, since in this case where the payment has no payment
9353 // secret, a keysend payment with a duplicate hash is basically an MPP keysend. If
9354 // `accept_mpp_keysend` is true, this tests that we only accept MPP keysends with
9355 // payment secrets and reject otherwise.
9356 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9357 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9358 let mut mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
9359 mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = accept_mpp_keysend;
9360 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
9361 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9362 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9363 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
9364 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9366 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
9367 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
9368 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
9370 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
9371 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9372 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
9373 final_value_msat: 100_000,
9375 let route = find_route(
9376 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
9377 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
9379 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
9380 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
9381 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9382 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9383 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9384 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
9385 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
9386 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9387 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
9388 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9389 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
9390 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
9391 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9392 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
9393 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9394 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9395 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9396 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9397 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9398 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9399 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9400 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9401 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9402 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
9404 // Finally, claim the original payment.
9405 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
9407 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
9408 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9409 let route = find_route(
9410 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
9411 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
9413 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
9414 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
9415 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9416 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9417 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9418 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9419 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9420 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
9422 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
9423 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
9424 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9425 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9426 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9427 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9428 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9429 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
9430 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
9431 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9432 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
9433 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9434 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9435 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
9436 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9437 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9438 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9439 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9440 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9441 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9442 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9443 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9444 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9445 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
9447 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
9448 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
9450 // To start (3), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
9451 let payment_id_1 = PaymentId([44; 32]);
9452 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
9453 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_1).unwrap();
9454 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9455 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9456 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9457 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9458 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9459 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
9461 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
9462 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9463 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
9464 final_value_msat: 100_000,
9466 let route = find_route(
9467 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
9468 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
9470 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId([45; 32]);
9471 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
9472 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_2).unwrap();
9473 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9474 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9475 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9476 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
9477 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
9478 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9479 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
9480 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9481 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9482 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
9483 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9484 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9485 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9486 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9487 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9488 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9489 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9490 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9491 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9492 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
9494 // Finally, claim the original payment.
9495 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
9499 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
9500 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
9501 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
9502 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9503 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9504 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9505 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9507 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9508 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9510 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
9511 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9512 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false),
9513 final_value_msat: 10_000,
9515 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
9516 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
9517 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
9518 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9519 let route = find_route(
9520 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
9521 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
9524 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9525 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
9526 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
9527 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
9528 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
9529 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
9530 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9532 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9533 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
9534 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9535 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
9536 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9537 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9538 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
9540 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
9544 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
9545 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment
9546 // secret when we don't support MPP keysend.
9547 let mut reject_mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
9548 reject_mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = false;
9549 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9550 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9551 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(reject_mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
9552 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9554 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9555 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9557 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
9558 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9559 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false),
9560 final_value_msat: 10_000,
9562 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
9563 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
9564 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
9565 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9566 let route = find_route(
9567 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
9568 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
9571 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9572 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
9573 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
9574 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
9575 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
9576 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
9577 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
9578 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
9579 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9581 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9582 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
9583 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9584 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
9585 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9586 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9587 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
9589 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
9593 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
9594 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9595 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9596 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9597 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9599 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
9600 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
9601 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
9602 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
9604 // Marshall an MPP route.
9605 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
9606 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
9607 route.paths.push(path);
9608 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9609 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
9610 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
9611 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
9612 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
9613 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
9615 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9616 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
9618 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
9619 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
9621 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
9626 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
9627 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9628 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9629 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9630 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9632 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9634 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9635 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9637 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
9638 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
9639 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9640 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
9643 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
9644 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
9645 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9646 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
9647 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
9648 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
9651 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9654 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
9655 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
9660 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
9661 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
9662 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9663 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9664 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9665 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9667 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
9668 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
9670 total_msat: 100_000,
9673 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
9674 // payment verification fails as expected.
9675 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
9676 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
9677 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
9678 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
9680 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
9684 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
9685 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
9689 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
9690 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
9691 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
9692 // the channel is successfully closed.
9693 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9694 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9695 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9696 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9698 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9699 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9700 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
9701 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9702 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
9704 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
9705 let channel_id = &tx.txid().into_inner();
9707 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
9708 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
9709 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
9710 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
9713 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9715 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
9716 // as it has the funding transaction.
9717 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9718 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
9719 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9722 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
9724 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9726 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
9728 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9729 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
9730 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9732 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9735 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
9736 // as it has the funding transaction.
9737 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9738 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
9739 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9741 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9742 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9743 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
9744 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9745 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9746 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9747 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
9748 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
9750 nodes[0].node.close_channel(channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
9751 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9752 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9753 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
9755 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9756 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
9758 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
9759 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
9760 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
9761 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
9762 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9763 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
9764 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9768 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
9769 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
9770 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
9771 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
9772 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9773 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
9774 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9777 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9779 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
9780 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
9781 // closing transaction).
9782 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
9783 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
9784 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
9786 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
9787 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
9788 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9789 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
9790 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9793 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9795 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
9797 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
9798 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
9799 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
9801 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9803 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
9804 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
9807 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
9808 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
9809 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
9812 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
9813 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
9814 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
9817 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
9819 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
9820 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
9822 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
9823 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
9825 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
9826 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
9831 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
9832 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
9833 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
9834 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
9835 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9836 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
9837 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
9838 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
9841 let channel_id = [4; 32];
9842 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9843 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
9845 // Test the API functions.
9846 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None), unkown_public_key);
9848 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
9850 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
9852 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
9854 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
9856 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
9858 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
9862 fn test_connection_limiting() {
9863 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
9864 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9865 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9866 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9867 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9869 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
9871 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9872 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9874 let mut funding_tx = None;
9875 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
9876 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9877 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9880 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
9881 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
9882 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
9883 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
9884 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9886 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
9887 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9888 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9890 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9892 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
9893 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9894 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9896 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9899 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
9900 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9901 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9902 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
9903 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9905 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
9906 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
9908 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
9909 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
9910 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
9911 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
9912 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
9913 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
9914 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9917 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
9918 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
9919 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
9920 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9921 }, true).unwrap_err();
9923 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
9924 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
9925 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9926 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9927 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
9928 for ev in chan_closed_events {
9929 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
9931 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
9932 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9934 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
9935 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9936 }, true).unwrap_err();
9938 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
9939 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
9940 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9942 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9944 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
9945 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
9947 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
9948 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
9949 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
9950 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
9951 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9953 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
9954 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
9955 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9957 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
9958 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9959 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
9961 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
9962 // "protected" and can connect again.
9963 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
9964 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
9965 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9967 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9969 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
9971 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
9972 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
9976 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
9977 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
9978 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9979 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9980 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9981 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9983 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
9985 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9986 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9988 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
9989 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9990 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9991 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9994 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
9996 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9997 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
9998 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
10000 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
10001 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10002 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10004 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
10005 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10006 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
10007 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
10011 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
10012 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
10013 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
10014 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10015 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10016 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
10017 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
10018 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
10019 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10021 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
10023 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10024 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10026 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
10027 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
10028 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
10029 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
10030 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
10031 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10034 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
10035 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10037 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
10038 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
10040 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10042 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
10043 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
10046 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
10047 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
10048 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
10049 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
10050 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10052 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
10053 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10055 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
10056 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
10057 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
10058 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
10062 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10064 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
10065 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
10067 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
10068 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
10069 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10071 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
10072 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
10074 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10076 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
10080 fn reject_excessively_underpaying_htlcs() {
10081 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
10082 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
10083 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
10084 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
10085 let sender_intended_amt_msat = 100;
10086 let extra_fee_msat = 10;
10087 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
10089 outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
10090 payment_metadata: None,
10091 keysend_preimage: None,
10092 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
10093 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
10096 // Check that if the amount we received + the penultimate hop extra fee is less than the sender
10097 // intended amount, we fail the payment.
10098 if let Err(crate::ln::channelmanager::InboundOnionErr { err_code, .. }) =
10099 node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10100 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat - 1, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat))
10102 assert_eq!(err_code, 19);
10103 } else { panic!(); }
10105 // If amt_received + extra_fee is equal to the sender intended amount, we're fine.
10106 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { // This is the same payload as above, InboundOnionPayload doesn't implement Clone
10108 outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
10109 payment_metadata: None,
10110 keysend_preimage: None,
10111 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
10112 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
10115 assert!(node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10116 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat)).is_ok());
10120 fn test_inbound_anchors_manual_acceptance() {
10121 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
10122 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
10123 let mut anchors_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
10124 anchors_cfg.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
10126 let mut anchors_manual_accept_cfg = anchors_cfg.clone();
10127 anchors_manual_accept_cfg.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
10129 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
10130 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
10131 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs,
10132 &[Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_manual_accept_cfg.clone())]);
10133 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10135 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10136 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10138 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10139 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
10140 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10141 match &msg_events[0] {
10142 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } => {
10143 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10145 ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } =>
10146 assert_eq!(msg.data, "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned()),
10147 _ => panic!("Unexpected error action"),
10150 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10153 nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10154 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10156 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } =>
10157 nodes[2].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap(),
10158 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10160 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10164 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
10165 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
10166 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
10167 // the channel without the anchors feature.
10168 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10169 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10170 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
10171 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
10172 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
10173 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
10174 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10176 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None).unwrap();
10177 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10178 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
10180 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10181 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10183 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
10184 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
10186 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10189 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10190 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
10192 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10193 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
10195 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
10199 fn test_update_channel_config() {
10200 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10201 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
10202 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
10203 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
10204 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
10205 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
10206 let channel = &nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0];
10208 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
10209 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10210 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
10212 user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat += 10;
10213 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
10214 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_base_msat, user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat);
10215 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10216 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10218 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
10219 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
10222 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate::default()).unwrap();
10223 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10224 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
10226 let new_cltv_expiry_delta = user_config.channel_config.cltv_expiry_delta + 6;
10227 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
10228 cltv_expiry_delta: Some(new_cltv_expiry_delta),
10229 ..Default::default()
10231 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
10232 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10233 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10235 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
10236 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
10239 let new_fee = user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths + 100;
10240 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
10241 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
10242 ..Default::default()
10244 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
10245 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, new_fee);
10246 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10247 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10249 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
10250 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
10253 // If we provide a channel_id not associated with the peer, we should get an error and no updates
10254 // should be applied to ensure update atomicity as specified in the API docs.
10255 let bad_channel_id = [10; 32];
10256 let current_fee = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths;
10257 let new_fee = current_fee + 100;
10260 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id, bad_channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
10261 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
10262 ..Default::default()
10264 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: _ }),
10267 // Check that the fee hasn't changed for the channel that exists.
10268 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, current_fee);
10269 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10270 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
10276 use crate::chain::Listen;
10277 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
10278 use crate::sign::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
10279 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
10280 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
10281 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
10282 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
10283 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
10284 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
10285 use crate::util::test_utils;
10286 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
10288 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
10289 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
10290 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
10292 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
10294 use criterion::Criterion;
10296 type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
10297 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
10298 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
10299 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
10300 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
10301 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
10302 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
10304 struct ANodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
10305 node: &'a Manager<'a, P>,
10307 impl<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'a, P> {
10308 type CM = Manager<'a, P>;
10310 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'a, P> { self.node }
10312 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
10315 pub fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Criterion) {
10316 bench_two_sends(bench, "bench_sends", test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
10319 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Criterion, bench_name: &str, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
10320 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
10321 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
10323 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
10324 let genesis_block = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network);
10326 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
10327 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
10328 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
10329 let scorer = Mutex::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
10330 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &scorer);
10332 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
10333 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(5_000_000 / 253);
10334 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
10336 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
10337 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
10338 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
10339 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
10341 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
10342 }, genesis_block.header.time);
10343 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
10345 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
10346 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
10347 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
10348 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
10349 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
10351 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
10352 }, genesis_block.header.time);
10353 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
10355 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
10356 features: node_b.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10358 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
10359 features: node_a.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10360 }, false).unwrap();
10361 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
10362 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
10363 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
10366 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
10367 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
10368 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
10370 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
10371 } else { panic!(); }
10373 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
10374 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10375 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
10376 match events_b[0] {
10377 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
10378 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
10380 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10383 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
10384 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10385 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
10386 match events_a[0] {
10387 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
10388 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
10390 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10393 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
10395 let block = create_dummy_block(BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash(), 42, vec![tx]);
10396 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
10397 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
10399 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
10400 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10401 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
10402 match msg_events[0] {
10403 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
10404 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
10405 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
10409 match msg_events[1] {
10410 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
10414 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10415 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
10416 match events_a[0] {
10417 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
10418 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
10420 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10423 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10424 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
10425 match events_b[0] {
10426 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
10427 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
10429 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10432 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
10433 macro_rules! send_payment {
10434 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
10435 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
10436 .with_bolt11_features($node_b.invoice_features()).unwrap();
10437 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
10438 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
10439 payment_count += 1;
10440 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
10441 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
10443 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
10444 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), RouteParameters {
10445 payment_params, final_value_msat: 10_000,
10446 }, Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
10447 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
10448 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10449 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
10450 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
10451 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
10452 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
10453 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
10455 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
10456 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
10457 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
10458 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
10460 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
10461 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
10462 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
10463 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
10464 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
10466 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
10469 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
10470 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
10471 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
10472 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
10474 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
10478 bench.bench_function(bench_name, |b| b.iter(|| {
10479 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
10480 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);