1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
23 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
25 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
27 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
29 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
31 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
34 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
39 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
40 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
41 // construct one themselves.
42 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
43 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
44 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
45 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
46 use crate::ln::features::InvoiceFeatures;
47 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
48 use crate::routing::router::{DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, RoutePath, Router};
49 use crate::routing::scoring::ProbabilisticScorer;
51 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
52 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
53 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
55 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
56 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment};
57 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
58 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider, ChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
59 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig};
60 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
61 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
62 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
63 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
64 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
65 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
67 use alloc::collections::BTreeMap;
70 use crate::prelude::*;
72 use core::cell::RefCell;
74 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
75 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, AtomicBool, Ordering};
76 use core::time::Duration;
79 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
80 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
82 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
84 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
85 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
86 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
88 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
89 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
90 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
91 // before we forward it.
93 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
94 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
95 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
96 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
97 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
99 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
100 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
102 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
103 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
104 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
105 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
108 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
109 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
110 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
113 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
114 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
118 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
119 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
120 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
121 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
122 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
124 pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
125 /// Sender intended amount to forward or receive (actual amount received
126 /// may overshoot this in either case)
127 pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
128 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
131 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
132 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
133 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
134 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
137 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
138 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
139 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
140 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
141 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
144 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
145 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
147 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
148 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
149 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
152 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
153 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
155 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
156 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
159 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
160 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
163 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
167 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
168 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
169 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
170 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
171 short_channel_id: u64,
173 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
174 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
176 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
177 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
182 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
184 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
185 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
186 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
188 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
189 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
192 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
193 struct ClaimableHTLC {
194 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
196 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
198 /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
199 /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
200 sender_intended_value: u64,
201 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
203 /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
204 /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
205 total_value_received: Option<u64>,
206 /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
210 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
212 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
213 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
214 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
216 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
217 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
222 impl Readable for PaymentId {
223 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
224 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
229 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
231 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
232 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
233 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
235 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
236 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
241 impl Readable for InterceptId {
242 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
243 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
248 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
249 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
250 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
251 PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
252 OutboundRoute { session_priv: SecretKey },
255 pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
257 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
258 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
259 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
261 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
262 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: *session_priv },
266 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
267 (0, PreviousHopData) => {
268 (0, short_channel_id, required),
269 (2, htlc_id, required),
271 (2, OutboundRoute) => {
272 (0, session_priv, required),
277 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
278 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
279 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
280 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
281 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
284 session_priv: SecretKey,
285 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
286 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
287 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
288 payment_id: PaymentId,
291 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
292 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
293 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
295 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
297 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
299 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
302 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
303 payment_id.hash(hasher);
304 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
310 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
312 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
313 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
315 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
316 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
317 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
321 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
322 /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
323 /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
324 pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
325 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
326 *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
328 // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
334 struct ReceiveError {
340 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
341 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
343 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
344 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
345 pub enum FailureCode {
346 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
347 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
348 TemporaryNodeFailure = 0x2000 | 2,
349 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
350 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
351 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing = 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
352 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
353 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
354 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
355 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
356 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails = 0x4000 | 15,
359 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>);
361 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
362 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
363 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
364 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
365 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
367 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
368 err: msgs::LightningError,
369 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
370 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
372 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
374 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
376 err: LightningError {
378 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
379 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
386 shutdown_finish: None,
390 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
391 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
394 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
396 err: LightningError {
398 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
399 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
405 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
406 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
410 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
413 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
415 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
416 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
420 log_level: Level::Warn,
423 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
425 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
427 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
429 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
430 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
438 shutdown_finish: None,
443 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
444 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
445 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
446 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
447 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
449 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
450 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
451 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
452 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
453 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
454 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
455 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
457 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
461 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
462 struct ClaimingPayment {
464 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
465 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
467 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
468 (0, amount_msat, required),
469 (2, payment_purpose, required),
470 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
473 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
474 struct ClaimablePayments {
475 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
476 /// failed/claimed by the user.
478 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
479 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
481 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
482 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
483 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, (events::PaymentPurpose, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>)>,
485 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
486 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
487 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
488 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
491 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
492 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
493 /// quite some time lag.
494 enum BackgroundEvent {
495 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
496 /// commitment transaction.
497 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
501 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
502 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
503 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
504 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
505 /// event can be generated.
506 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
507 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user.
508 EmitEvent { event: events::Event },
511 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
512 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
513 (2, EmitEvent) => { (0, event, upgradable_required) },
516 /// State we hold per-peer.
517 pub(super) struct PeerState<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
518 /// `temporary_channel_id` or `channel_id` -> `channel`.
520 /// Holds all channels where the peer is the counterparty. Once a channel has been assigned a
521 /// `channel_id`, the `temporary_channel_id` key in the map is updated and is replaced by the
523 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
524 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
525 latest_features: InitFeatures,
526 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
527 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
528 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
529 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
530 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
532 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
533 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
534 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
535 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
537 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
538 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
539 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
540 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
541 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
542 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
543 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
544 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
545 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
546 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
550 impl <Signer: ChannelSigner> PeerState<Signer> {
551 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
552 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
553 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
554 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
555 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
558 self.channel_by_id.is_empty() && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
562 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
563 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
565 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
568 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
569 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
570 struct PendingInboundPayment {
571 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
572 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
573 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
574 /// this payment being removed.
576 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
577 user_payment_id: u64,
578 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
579 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
580 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
583 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
584 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
585 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
586 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
587 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
588 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
589 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
590 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
592 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
593 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
601 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
603 Arc<Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>
608 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
609 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
610 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
611 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
612 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
613 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
614 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
615 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
616 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
618 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
619 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<&'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e DefaultRouter<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L, &'h Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>>, &'g L>;
621 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`] used in testing.
622 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
623 pub trait AChannelManager {
624 type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer>;
625 type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
626 type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface;
627 type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
628 type EntropySource: EntropySource;
629 type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
630 type NodeSigner: NodeSigner;
631 type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
632 type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner;
633 type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<Signer = Self::Signer>;
634 type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
635 type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator;
636 type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
638 type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
640 type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
641 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
643 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
644 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
645 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
647 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> + Sized,
648 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface + Sized,
649 ES::Target: EntropySource + Sized,
650 NS::Target: NodeSigner + Sized,
651 SP::Target: SignerProvider + Sized,
652 F::Target: FeeEstimator + Sized,
653 R::Target: Router + Sized,
654 L::Target: Logger + Sized,
656 type Watch = M::Target;
658 type Broadcaster = T::Target;
660 type EntropySource = ES::Target;
662 type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
664 type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer;
665 type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
667 type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
669 type Router = R::Target;
671 type Logger = L::Target;
673 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
676 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
677 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
679 /// Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
680 /// to individual Channels.
682 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
683 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
684 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
685 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
687 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
688 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
689 /// returning from [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`], with ChannelManagers, writing updates
690 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during
691 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
692 /// [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the
693 /// `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
695 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
696 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
697 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
699 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
700 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
701 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
702 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
703 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
705 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
706 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
707 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
708 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
710 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
711 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
712 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
714 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
715 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
716 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
717 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
718 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
720 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
721 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
722 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
723 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
724 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
725 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
726 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
727 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
730 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
731 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
732 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
733 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
734 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
738 // `total_consistency_lock`
740 // |__`forward_htlcs`
742 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
744 // |__`per_peer_state`
746 // | |__`pending_inbound_payments`
748 // | |__`claimable_payments`
750 // | |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
756 // | |__`short_to_chan_info`
758 // | |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
762 // | |__`pending_events`
764 // | |__`pending_background_events`
766 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
768 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
769 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
770 ES::Target: EntropySource,
771 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
772 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
773 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
777 default_configuration: UserConfig,
778 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
779 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
785 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
787 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
789 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
790 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
792 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
793 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
794 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
795 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
797 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
798 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
800 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
801 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
802 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
803 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
804 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
805 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
806 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
807 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
809 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
811 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
812 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
814 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
816 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
817 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
818 /// and via the classic SCID.
820 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
821 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
823 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
825 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
827 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
828 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
829 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
831 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
832 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
834 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
835 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
837 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
838 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
840 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
841 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
842 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
843 /// active channel list on load.
845 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
846 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
848 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
850 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
851 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
852 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
854 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
855 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
856 /// the handling of the events.
858 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
859 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
862 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
863 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
864 /// would break backwards compatability.
865 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
866 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
867 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
869 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
870 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<[u8; 32], PublicKey>>,
872 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
874 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
875 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
876 /// confirmation depth.
878 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
879 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
880 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
882 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
884 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
886 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
888 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
890 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
892 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
893 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
894 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
896 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
897 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
899 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
900 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
901 /// keeping additional state.
902 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
904 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
905 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
906 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
907 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
909 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
910 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
912 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
913 /// are currently open with that peer.
915 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
916 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
919 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
921 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
922 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
923 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
924 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
925 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
927 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
928 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
929 /// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
930 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
931 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
932 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
933 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
934 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
935 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
936 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
937 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
938 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
939 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
941 persistence_notifier: Notifier,
950 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
952 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
953 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
954 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
955 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
956 pub struct ChainParameters {
957 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
958 pub network: Network,
960 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
962 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
963 pub best_block: BestBlock,
966 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
972 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
973 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
974 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
975 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
976 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
977 /// updates are ready for persistence).
979 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
980 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
981 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
982 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
983 persistence_notifier: &'a Notifier,
985 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
986 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
989 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
990 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
991 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
994 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
995 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
997 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
998 persistence_notifier: notifier,
999 should_persist: persist_check,
1000 _read_guard: read_guard,
1005 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1006 fn drop(&mut self) {
1007 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
1008 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
1013 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1014 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1016 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1018 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1019 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1020 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1021 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1022 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1024 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1025 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1027 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1029 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1030 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1031 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1032 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1033 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1034 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1035 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
1036 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
1037 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
1038 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
1039 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
1040 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
1041 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
1043 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1044 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
1046 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1047 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1048 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1049 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
1051 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1052 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1053 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1054 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1055 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1056 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1059 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1061 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1062 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1065 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1067 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1068 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1070 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until we time-out the
1071 /// idempotency of payments by [`PaymentId`]. See
1072 /// [`OutboundPayments::remove_stale_resolved_payments`].
1073 pub(crate) const IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 7;
1075 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
1076 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
1077 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
1078 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1080 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1081 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1082 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1084 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1085 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1086 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1088 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1089 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1090 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1091 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1092 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1093 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1094 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1095 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1096 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1097 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1098 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1101 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1102 /// to better separate parameters.
1103 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1104 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1105 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1106 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1107 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1108 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1109 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1110 pub features: InitFeatures,
1111 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1112 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1113 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1115 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1117 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1118 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1119 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1120 /// payments to us through this channel.
1121 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1122 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1123 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1124 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1125 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1126 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1127 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1130 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
1131 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1132 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1133 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1134 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1135 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1136 /// lifetime of the channel.
1137 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
1138 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1139 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1140 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1141 /// our counterparty already.
1143 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1144 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1145 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1146 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1148 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1149 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1150 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1151 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1153 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1154 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1156 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1157 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1159 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1160 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1161 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1162 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1163 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1164 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1165 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1166 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1167 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1170 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1172 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1173 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1174 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1175 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1176 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1177 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1178 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1180 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1181 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1183 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1184 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1185 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1186 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1187 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1188 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1189 /// this value on chain.
1191 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1193 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1195 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1196 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1197 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or a random value if the channel was
1198 /// inbound. This may be zero for inbound channels serialized with LDK versions prior to
1200 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1201 /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
1202 /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
1204 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
1205 pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
1206 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1207 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1208 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1210 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1211 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1212 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1213 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1215 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1216 pub balance_msat: u64,
1217 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1218 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1219 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1220 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1222 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1224 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1225 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1226 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1227 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1228 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1229 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1230 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1231 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1233 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`] and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1234 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1235 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1236 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1237 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1238 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1239 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1241 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1242 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1243 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1244 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1245 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1246 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1247 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1248 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1249 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1251 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1253 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1254 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1255 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1256 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1257 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1259 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1260 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1261 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1262 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1263 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1264 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1265 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1267 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1268 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1269 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1270 pub is_outbound: bool,
1271 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1272 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1273 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1274 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1275 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1277 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1278 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1279 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1280 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1282 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1283 pub is_usable: bool,
1284 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1285 pub is_public: bool,
1286 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1287 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1288 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1289 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1290 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1291 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1293 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1294 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1297 impl ChannelDetails {
1298 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1299 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1300 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1302 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1303 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1304 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1305 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1308 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1309 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1310 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1312 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1313 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1314 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1315 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1318 fn from_channel<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner>(channel: &Channel<Signer>,
1319 best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures) -> Self {
1321 let balance = channel.get_available_balances();
1322 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1323 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1325 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1326 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1327 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1328 features: latest_features,
1329 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1330 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1331 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1332 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1333 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1334 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1335 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1336 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if channel.have_received_message() {
1337 Some(channel.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1338 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1340 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1341 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1342 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1343 channel_type: if channel.have_received_message() { Some(channel.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1344 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1345 outbound_scid_alias: if channel.is_usable() { Some(channel.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1346 inbound_scid_alias: channel.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1347 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1348 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(channel.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
1349 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1350 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1351 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1352 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1353 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1354 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1355 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1356 confirmations: Some(channel.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1357 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1358 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1359 is_channel_ready: channel.is_usable(),
1360 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1361 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1362 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1363 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1364 config: Some(channel.config()),
1369 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1370 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1371 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1372 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1373 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1375 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1377 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1378 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1379 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1382 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1383 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1384 /// payment is removed from tracking.
1386 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1387 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1388 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1390 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1391 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1392 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1394 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1395 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1399 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1401 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
1403 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1404 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1405 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1406 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1408 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1409 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1410 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1413 macro_rules! handle_error {
1414 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
1415 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1416 // entering the macro.
1417 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1418 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1422 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1423 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1425 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1426 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1427 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1428 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1432 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1433 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1434 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1435 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1440 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1441 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1443 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1444 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1445 action: err.action.clone()
1449 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1450 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1451 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1452 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1453 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1457 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1464 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1465 ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {{
1466 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.channel_id());
1467 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1468 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1469 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1471 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1472 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1473 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1474 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1475 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1477 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1478 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1480 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1484 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1485 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1486 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1488 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1489 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1491 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1492 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1494 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1495 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1496 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel);
1497 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1498 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1499 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1505 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1506 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1510 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1512 $entry.remove_entry();
1520 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1521 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1525 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1527 $entry.remove_entry();
1535 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1536 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1538 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1539 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, channel);
1545 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1546 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
1547 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1548 node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1549 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1551 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1552 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1553 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1554 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1555 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1556 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1557 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1558 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1559 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1560 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1565 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
1566 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1567 if $channel.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
1568 $locked_events.push(events::Event::ChannelPending {
1569 channel_id: $channel.channel_id(),
1570 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.temporary_channel_id(),
1571 counterparty_node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1572 user_channel_id: $channel.get_user_id(),
1573 funding_txo: $channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
1575 $channel.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
1580 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
1581 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1582 if $channel.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
1583 debug_assert!($channel.channel_pending_event_emitted());
1584 $locked_events.push(events::Event::ChannelReady {
1585 channel_id: $channel.channel_id(),
1586 user_channel_id: $channel.get_user_id(),
1587 counterparty_node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1588 channel_type: $channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
1590 $channel.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
1595 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
1596 ($self: ident, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
1597 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&$self.logger,
1598 &$self.node_signer, $self.genesis_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
1599 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
1600 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
1601 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.is_usable() {
1602 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
1603 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
1604 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
1605 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
1607 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
1608 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
1609 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1615 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
1616 .remove(&$chan.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
1618 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
1619 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
1620 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
1621 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
1622 updates.announcement_sigs);
1623 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
1624 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
1627 let channel_id = $chan.channel_id();
1628 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
1629 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
1631 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
1633 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1634 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1636 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
1637 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1638 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
1639 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
1644 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
1645 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, MANUALLY_REMOVING, $remove: expr) => { {
1646 // update_maps_on_chan_removal needs to be able to take id_to_peer, so make sure we can in
1647 // any case so that it won't deadlock.
1648 debug_assert_ne!($self.id_to_peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1650 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
1651 log_debug!($self.logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
1652 log_bytes!($chan.channel_id()[..]));
1655 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
1656 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure",
1657 log_bytes!($chan.channel_id()[..]));
1658 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $chan);
1659 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(
1660 "ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), $chan.channel_id(),
1661 $chan.get_user_id(), $chan.force_shutdown(false),
1662 $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok()));
1666 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
1667 if ($update_id == 0 || $chan.get_next_monitor_update()
1668 .expect("We can't be processing a monitor update if it isn't queued")
1669 .update_id == $update_id) &&
1670 $chan.get_latest_monitor_update_id() == $update_id
1672 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $update_id, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
1678 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan_entry: expr) => {
1679 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $update_id, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan_entry.get_mut(), MANUALLY_REMOVING, $chan_entry.remove_entry())
1683 macro_rules! process_events_body {
1684 ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
1685 let mut processed_all_events = false;
1686 while !processed_all_events {
1687 if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
1691 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
1694 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
1695 // persists happen while processing monitor events.
1696 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1698 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
1699 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
1700 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
1701 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
1705 let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
1706 let num_events = pending_events.len();
1707 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
1708 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
1711 for event in pending_events {
1712 $event_to_handle = event;
1717 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1718 pending_events.drain(..num_events);
1719 processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
1720 $self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
1723 if result == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
1724 $self.persistence_notifier.notify();
1730 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
1732 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
1733 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1734 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1735 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1736 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1737 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1741 /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
1743 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1744 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
1746 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1748 /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
1749 /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
1750 /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
1753 /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
1754 /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
1755 /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
1756 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1757 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1758 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1759 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
1760 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
1762 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1763 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1764 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
1769 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1771 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
1772 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1773 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
1774 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1775 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
1776 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1777 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1778 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1780 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
1783 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
1784 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1786 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1788 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1790 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1792 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1793 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
1794 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1795 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1796 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
1806 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
1807 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1808 &self.default_configuration
1811 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1812 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1813 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
1816 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
1817 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
1819 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
1821 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
1825 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
1830 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1832 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1833 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1834 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
1835 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
1836 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
1838 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1839 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1841 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1842 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1843 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1845 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1846 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1847 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1848 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1849 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1850 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1852 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1853 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1854 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1855 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1856 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1857 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1860 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1861 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1862 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1864 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1866 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
1867 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
1869 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1871 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
1872 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1873 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1874 match Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
1875 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
1876 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
1880 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
1885 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1887 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1888 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1889 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1891 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1893 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1896 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1899 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1900 node_id: their_network_key,
1903 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1906 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1907 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
1908 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
1909 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
1910 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
1911 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
1912 // the same channel.
1913 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
1915 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1916 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1917 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
1918 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1919 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1920 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1921 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel(channel, best_block_height,
1922 peer_state.latest_features.clone());
1930 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
1931 /// more information.
1932 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1933 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1936 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
1937 /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1939 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1940 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1942 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1943 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1944 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1945 // really wanted anyway.
1946 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1949 /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
1950 pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1951 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1952 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1954 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
1955 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1956 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1957 let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1958 return peer_state.channel_by_id
1961 ChannelDetails::from_channel(channel, best_block_height, features.clone()))
1967 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
1968 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1970 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
1971 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
1972 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
1974 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
1975 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
1976 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
1977 .filter_map(|(_, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
1978 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
1979 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
1980 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
1981 total_msat: *total_msat,
1984 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
1985 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
1987 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
1988 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
1990 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
1995 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
1996 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
1997 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1998 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
1999 Some(transaction) => {
2000 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::DiscardFunding { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction })
2004 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
2005 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
2006 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
2007 reason: closure_reason
2011 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2012 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2014 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
2015 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
2016 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2018 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2019 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2021 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2022 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2023 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2024 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2025 let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo();
2026 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2027 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut()
2028 .get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?;
2029 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
2031 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
2032 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
2033 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
2034 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2035 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
2039 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
2040 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
2041 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2042 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update);
2043 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry);
2046 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
2047 let channel = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
2048 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
2049 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2053 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2057 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id) })
2061 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2062 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2063 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
2064 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
2067 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
2071 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2072 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2073 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2075 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
2076 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2078 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
2079 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
2080 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
2081 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
2083 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2085 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2086 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2087 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2088 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2089 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2090 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None)
2093 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2094 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2095 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2097 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
2098 /// the channel being closed or not:
2099 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
2100 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
2101 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2102 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
2103 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
2104 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
2105 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
2107 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2109 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2110 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2111 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2112 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2113 pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2114 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
2118 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
2119 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
2120 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
2121 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2122 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
2123 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2124 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2125 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
2127 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
2128 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2129 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2130 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2131 // ignore the result here.
2132 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
2136 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2137 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2138 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
2139 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2140 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2141 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2142 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
2144 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2145 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2146 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2147 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2148 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) });
2150 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2152 remove_channel!(self, chan)
2154 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), peer_node_id) });
2157 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2158 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(broadcast));
2159 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2160 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2161 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2166 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
2169 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2170 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2171 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2172 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2173 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2174 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2175 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2176 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
2177 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2178 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2179 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
2180 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
2191 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2192 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2193 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2195 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2196 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2197 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2200 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2201 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2202 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2204 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2205 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2206 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2207 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2208 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2211 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2212 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2213 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2214 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2215 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2219 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2220 /// local transaction(s).
2221 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2222 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2223 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2227 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(&self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
2228 payment_hash: PaymentHash, amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError>
2230 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2231 if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value > cltv_expiry {
2232 return Err(ReceiveError {
2233 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to less than the CLTV set by the sender",
2235 err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
2238 // final_expiry_too_soon
2239 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2240 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2242 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2243 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2244 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2245 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2246 if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= current_height as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2247 let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12);
2248 err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes());
2249 err_data.extend_from_slice(¤t_height.to_be_bytes());
2250 return Err(ReceiveError {
2251 err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data,
2252 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2255 if hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat {
2256 return Err(ReceiveError {
2258 err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
2259 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2263 let routing = match hop_data.format {
2264 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => {
2265 return Err(ReceiveError {
2266 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2267 err_data: Vec::new(),
2268 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2271 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
2272 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
2273 return Err(ReceiveError {
2274 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2275 err_data: Vec::new(),
2276 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2278 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2279 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2281 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2282 phantom_shared_secret,
2284 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2285 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2286 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2287 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2288 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2289 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2290 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2291 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2292 return Err(ReceiveError {
2293 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2294 err_data: Vec::new(),
2295 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2299 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2301 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2304 return Err(ReceiveError {
2305 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2306 err_data: Vec::new(),
2307 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2312 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2315 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2316 incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
2317 outgoing_amt_msat: hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2318 outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2322 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
2323 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2324 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2326 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2327 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2328 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2329 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2330 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2331 failure_code: $err_code,
2337 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2338 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2341 let shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(
2342 Recipient::Node, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None
2343 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
2345 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2346 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2347 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2348 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2349 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2350 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2351 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2352 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2354 macro_rules! return_err {
2355 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2357 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2358 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2359 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2360 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2361 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
2362 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
2368 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2370 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2371 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2373 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2374 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2378 let pending_forward_info = match next_hop {
2379 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
2381 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None) {
2383 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
2384 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
2385 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
2386 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
2387 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
2389 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
2392 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
2393 let new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
2394 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2396 public_key: onion_utils::next_hop_packet_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx, new_pubkey, &shared_secret),
2397 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2398 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
2401 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
2402 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2403 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
2404 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2408 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2409 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2410 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2413 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2414 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2415 incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
2416 outgoing_amt_msat: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2417 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2422 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref outgoing_amt_msat, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
2423 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
2424 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
2425 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
2426 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
2427 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
2428 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(short_channel_id).cloned();
2429 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
2430 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2431 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2432 // phantom or an intercept.
2433 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
2434 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)) ||
2435 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)
2439 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2442 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
2444 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
2445 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2446 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
2447 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
2448 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2450 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
2451 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2452 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id) {
2454 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
2455 // have no consistency guarantees.
2456 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2460 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2461 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2462 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2463 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2464 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2466 if chan.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && *short_channel_id != chan.outbound_scid_alias() {
2467 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
2468 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
2469 // we don't have the channel here.
2470 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2472 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(*short_channel_id, chan).ok();
2474 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2475 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2476 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2477 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2478 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2479 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2480 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2482 if *outgoing_amt_msat < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2483 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
2485 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, *outgoing_amt_msat, *outgoing_cltv_value) {
2486 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
2490 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
2491 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
2492 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
2493 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
2495 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
2502 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2503 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2504 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2505 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2506 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2507 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2509 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2510 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2512 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2513 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2514 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2515 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2516 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2517 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2518 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2519 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2520 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2521 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2527 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
2528 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2529 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2530 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2532 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2533 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2535 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2536 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
2537 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2539 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2540 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2541 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2542 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
2543 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
2544 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
2545 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
2549 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
2554 pending_forward_info
2557 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2558 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2559 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2561 /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
2562 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
2563 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
2565 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2566 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
2567 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2568 if !chan.should_announce() {
2569 return Err(LightningError {
2570 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2571 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2574 if chan.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
2575 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
2577 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2578 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2581 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2582 /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
2583 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2584 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2586 /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
2587 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
2588 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
2590 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2591 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
2592 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2593 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2594 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
2595 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2599 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
2601 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2602 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2603 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2605 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2606 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2608 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2609 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
2610 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2611 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2612 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
2613 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2614 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2615 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2617 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
2618 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
2619 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
2621 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
2623 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2630 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2631 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2632 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv_bytes)
2635 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2636 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
2637 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2639 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2640 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
2641 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2643 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2644 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected".to_owned()})?;
2645 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2646 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
2647 return Err(APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Route size too large considering onion data".to_owned()});
2649 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
2651 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2652 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2653 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2654 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
2657 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2658 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
2659 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
2660 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2661 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2662 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
2663 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2664 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
2666 let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2667 let send_res = chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
2668 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2670 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2671 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2673 }, onion_packet, &self.logger);
2674 match break_chan_entry!(self, send_res, chan) {
2675 Some(monitor_update) => {
2676 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2677 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
2678 if let Err(e) = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
2681 if update_res == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress {
2682 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
2683 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
2684 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
2685 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
2686 // which we do in the send_payment check for
2687 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
2688 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
2694 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
2695 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
2696 // `channel_by_id` map.
2697 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
2698 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
2703 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2704 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2706 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2711 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2713 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
2714 /// fields for more info.
2716 /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
2717 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
2719 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
2721 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
2722 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
2723 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
2724 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
2725 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
2727 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
2728 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
2729 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
2730 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
2731 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
2733 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
2734 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
2735 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
2736 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
2738 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
2740 /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
2741 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2742 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
2744 /// In general, a path may raise:
2745 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2746 /// node public key) is specified.
2747 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2748 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2750 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2751 /// relevant updates.
2753 /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
2754 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2755 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2757 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2758 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2759 /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
2760 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
2761 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
2762 pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2763 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2764 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2765 self.pending_outbound_payments
2766 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2767 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2768 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2771 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment`], but will automatically find a route based on
2772 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
2773 pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
2774 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2775 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2776 self.pending_outbound_payments
2777 .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
2778 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
2779 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
2780 &self.pending_events,
2781 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2782 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2786 pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2787 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2788 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2789 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2790 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2791 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2795 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
2796 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2797 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
2801 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
2802 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
2803 /// retries are exhausted.
2805 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
2806 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
2808 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
2809 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
2810 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
2812 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event is generated and we restart without this
2813 /// [`ChannelManager`] having been persisted, another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated.
2815 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2816 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2817 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
2818 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2819 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
2822 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2823 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2824 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2825 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2826 /// never reach the recipient.
2828 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
2829 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
2831 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2832 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2834 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2836 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2837 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
2838 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2839 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2840 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
2841 route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
2842 &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2843 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2844 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2847 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
2848 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
2850 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
2853 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
2854 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
2855 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2856 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2857 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
2858 payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
2859 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2860 &self.logger, &self.pending_events,
2861 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2862 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2865 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
2866 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
2867 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
2868 pub fn send_probe(&self, hops: Vec<RouteHop>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2869 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2870 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2871 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(hops, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2872 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2873 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2876 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
2879 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
2880 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
2883 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2884 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2885 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
2886 &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
2887 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2888 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2889 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2890 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2892 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2893 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2894 let (msg, chan) = match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2896 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2898 let funding_res = chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2899 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2900 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2901 } else { unreachable!(); });
2903 Ok(funding_msg) => (funding_msg, chan),
2905 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
2906 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
2908 let _ = handle_error!(self, funding_res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id());
2909 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2910 err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
2916 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2918 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
2919 log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
2924 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2925 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2928 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2929 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2930 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2932 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2933 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
2934 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.channel_id(), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
2935 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
2944 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2945 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2946 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2950 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2952 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2953 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2955 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
2956 /// across the p2p network.
2958 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
2959 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
2961 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2962 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
2963 /// keys per-channel).
2965 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
2966 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
2967 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
2969 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
2970 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
2971 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2973 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
2974 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
2975 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
2976 /// for more details.
2978 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2979 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
2980 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2981 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2983 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
2984 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
2985 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2986 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
2991 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2992 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools at the next block. However, the modules
2993 // constituting our Lightning node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if
2994 // the wallet module is in advance on the LDK view, allow one more block of headroom.
2995 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 2 {
2996 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2997 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
3001 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
3002 let mut output_index = None;
3003 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
3004 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3005 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
3006 if output_index.is_some() {
3007 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3008 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
3011 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
3012 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3013 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
3016 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
3019 if output_index.is_none() {
3020 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3021 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
3024 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
3028 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
3030 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3031 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3032 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3033 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3035 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3036 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3038 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3039 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3041 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3043 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3044 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3045 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3046 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3047 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3048 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3049 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3050 pub fn update_channel_config(
3051 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config: &ChannelConfig,
3052 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3053 if config.cltv_expiry_delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA {
3054 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3055 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
3059 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(
3060 &self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier,
3062 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3063 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3064 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3065 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3066 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3067 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3068 if !peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) {
3069 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3070 err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
3074 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3075 let channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id).unwrap();
3076 if !channel.update_config(config) {
3079 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
3080 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
3081 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
3082 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3083 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3091 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
3092 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
3094 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
3095 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
3097 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
3098 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
3099 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
3100 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
3101 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
3103 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
3104 /// you from forwarding more than you received.
3106 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3109 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
3110 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3111 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
3112 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
3113 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &[u8; 32], next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3114 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3116 let next_hop_scid = {
3117 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3118 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
3119 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
3120 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3121 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3122 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
3124 if !chan.is_usable() {
3125 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3126 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id))
3129 chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.outbound_scid_alias())
3131 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3132 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id), next_node_id)
3137 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3138 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3139 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3142 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
3143 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => {
3144 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid }
3146 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3148 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
3149 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
3152 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
3153 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3154 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3155 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
3156 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
3158 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
3162 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
3163 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
3165 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3168 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3169 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3170 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3172 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3173 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3174 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3177 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
3178 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3179 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3180 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3181 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
3182 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
3183 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3186 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
3187 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
3188 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3189 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3194 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
3196 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
3197 /// Will likely generate further events.
3198 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
3199 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3201 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
3202 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
3203 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
3205 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
3206 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
3208 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
3209 if short_chan_id != 0 {
3210 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
3212 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3213 match forward_info {
3214 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3215 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3216 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3217 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
3218 outgoing_cltv_value, incoming_amt_msat: _
3221 macro_rules! failure_handler {
3222 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
3223 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3225 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3226 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3227 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3228 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3229 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3230 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
3233 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
3234 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
3236 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
3239 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3240 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
3246 macro_rules! fail_forward {
3247 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3249 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
3253 macro_rules! failed_payment {
3254 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3256 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
3260 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
3261 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
3262 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.genesis_hash) {
3263 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
3264 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
3266 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3267 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
3268 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
3269 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
3270 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
3272 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
3274 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3275 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
3279 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
3280 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) {
3281 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
3282 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
3288 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3291 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3294 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3295 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
3296 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
3297 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
3298 // problem, not ours.
3304 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id) {
3305 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3307 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3311 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3312 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3313 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3314 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3317 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3318 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3319 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
3320 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3321 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3324 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3325 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3326 match forward_info {
3327 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3328 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id: _,
3329 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3330 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
3331 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, incoming_amt_msat: _,
3334 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
3335 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3336 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3337 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3338 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3339 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3340 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
3341 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3343 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
3344 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
3345 onion_packet, &self.logger)
3347 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3348 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
3350 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3352 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
3353 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3354 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
3355 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
3360 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3361 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3363 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3364 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3365 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_fail_htlc(
3366 htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger
3368 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3369 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3371 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
3373 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3374 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3375 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3384 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3385 match forward_info {
3386 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3387 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3388 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3389 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat, ..
3392 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret) = match routing {
3393 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } => {
3394 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
3395 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data }, Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret)
3397 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
3398 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage), None, None),
3400 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3403 let mut claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3404 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3405 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3406 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3407 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3408 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3409 phantom_shared_secret,
3411 // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
3412 // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
3413 // if routing nodes overpay
3414 value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
3415 sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
3417 total_value_received: None,
3418 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
3423 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3424 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
3425 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3426 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3427 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
3429 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3430 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
3431 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3432 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3433 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3434 phantom_shared_secret,
3436 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
3437 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
3441 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
3442 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
3443 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
3444 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
3445 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
3448 macro_rules! check_total_value {
3449 ($payment_data: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{
3450 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
3452 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
3453 payment_preimage: $payment_preimage,
3454 payment_secret: $payment_data.payment_secret,
3457 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3458 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3459 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3462 let (_, ref mut htlcs) = claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
3463 .or_insert_with(|| (purpose(), Vec::new()));
3464 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
3465 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3466 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3467 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3471 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
3472 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
3473 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3474 total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
3475 earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
3476 match &htlc.onion_payload {
3477 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3478 if htlc.total_msat != $payment_data.total_msat {
3479 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
3480 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $payment_data.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
3481 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
3483 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
3485 _ => unreachable!(),
3488 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
3489 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
3490 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
3491 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3492 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= $payment_data.total_msat {
3493 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
3494 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3495 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3496 } else if total_value >= $payment_data.total_msat {
3497 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3498 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3499 let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
3500 htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
3501 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3502 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3506 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3507 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3508 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
3510 payment_claimable_generated = true;
3512 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
3513 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
3515 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3517 payment_claimable_generated
3521 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
3522 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
3523 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
3524 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
3525 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
3526 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
3527 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3528 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3529 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3530 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3531 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3532 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3533 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
3534 Ok(result) => result,
3536 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3537 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3541 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
3542 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
3543 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
3544 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
3545 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
3546 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3550 check_total_value!(payment_data, payment_preimage);
3552 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
3553 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3554 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3555 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3558 match claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
3559 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3560 let amount_msat = claimable_htlc.value;
3561 claimable_htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat);
3562 let claim_deadline = Some(claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER);
3563 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
3564 e.insert((purpose.clone(), vec![claimable_htlc]));
3565 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3566 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3567 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3571 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3572 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3576 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3577 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3578 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3584 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
3585 if payment_data.is_none() {
3586 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3587 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3590 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3591 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
3592 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3593 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3594 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
3595 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
3596 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
3597 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3599 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage);
3600 if payment_claimable_generated {
3601 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
3607 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3608 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
3616 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3617 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
3618 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3619 &self.pending_events, &self.logger,
3620 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
3621 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv));
3623 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
3624 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3626 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
3628 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
3629 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
3630 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
3632 self.check_free_holding_cells();
3634 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
3635 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3636 events.append(&mut new_events);
3639 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
3641 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
3642 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
3644 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
3645 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
3646 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
3647 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
3648 if background_events.is_empty() {
3652 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
3654 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
3655 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
3656 // monitor updating completing.
3657 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
3664 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3665 /// Process background events, for functional testing
3666 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
3667 self.process_background_events();
3670 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
3671 if !chan.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersist; }
3672 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
3673 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
3674 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3675 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
3676 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3678 if !chan.is_live() {
3679 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
3680 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
3681 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3683 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3684 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
3686 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.logger);
3687 NotifyOption::DoPersist
3691 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
3692 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
3693 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
3694 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
3695 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
3696 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3697 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3699 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3701 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3702 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3703 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3704 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3705 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
3706 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3707 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3715 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
3717 /// This currently includes:
3718 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
3719 /// * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
3720 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
3722 /// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
3723 /// with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
3724 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
3726 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
3727 /// estimate fetches.
3729 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3730 /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
3731 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
3732 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3733 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3734 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3736 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3738 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
3739 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
3740 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
3742 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3743 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3744 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3745 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3746 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
3747 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
3748 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3749 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3750 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3752 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
3753 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id);
3754 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
3755 if needs_close { return false; }
3758 match chan.channel_update_status() {
3759 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
3760 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
3761 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3762 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3763 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
3764 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3765 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3769 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3770 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3772 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
3773 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3774 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3778 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3779 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3784 chan.maybe_expire_prev_config();
3788 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
3789 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
3794 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
3795 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
3796 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
3797 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
3798 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
3799 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
3800 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
3801 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
3802 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
3803 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
3804 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
3805 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
3806 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
3807 // have no channels to the peer.
3808 let remove_entry = {
3809 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
3810 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
3813 entry.remove_entry();
3816 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
3821 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
3822 if htlcs.is_empty() {
3823 // This should be unreachable
3824 debug_assert!(false);
3827 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3828 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
3829 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
3830 // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
3831 // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
3832 if htlcs[0].total_msat <= htlcs.iter().fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value) {
3834 } else if htlcs.into_iter().any(|htlc| {
3835 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
3836 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
3838 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(htlcs.drain(..).map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
3845 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
3846 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
3847 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
3848 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
3849 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
3852 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3853 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3856 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_resolved_payments(&self.pending_events);
3858 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
3859 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
3860 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
3861 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
3862 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3869 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
3870 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
3871 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
3873 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
3874 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
3875 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
3876 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
3878 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
3879 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
3880 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
3881 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
3882 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
3883 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
3886 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
3887 /// reason for the failure.
3889 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
3890 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
3891 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3893 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
3894 if let Some((_, mut sources)) = removed_source {
3895 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3896 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
3897 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
3898 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
3899 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3904 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
3905 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
3906 match failure_code {
3907 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code as u16),
3908 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code as u16),
3909 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
3910 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3911 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
3912 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code as u16, htlc_msat_height_data)
3917 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3918 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3920 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
3922 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3923 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
3924 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
3925 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
3926 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
3927 let scid_pref = if chan.should_announce() {
3928 chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
3930 chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.get_short_channel_id())
3932 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
3933 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
3935 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3940 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3941 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3942 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3943 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
3944 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
3945 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
3946 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3947 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
3948 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
3949 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3951 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3952 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3953 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3954 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
3956 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
3957 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
3958 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
3959 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
3960 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3964 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
3965 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
3966 // be surfaced to the user.
3967 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
3968 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32],
3969 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
3971 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
3972 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3973 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
3974 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3975 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3976 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3977 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
3978 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
3980 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3982 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
3985 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
3986 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
3987 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
3988 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3992 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
3993 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
3994 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
3995 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
3996 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
3997 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
3998 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
3999 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
4000 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
4003 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
4004 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
4005 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
4008 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4009 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
4010 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4012 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
4013 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
4014 session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
4015 &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
4016 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
4018 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint }) => {
4019 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), onion_error);
4020 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
4022 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
4023 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4024 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
4025 push_forward_ev = true;
4027 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
4028 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4029 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
4031 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4032 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
4035 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
4036 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
4037 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4038 pending_events.push(events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
4039 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
4040 failed_next_destination: destination,
4046 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
4047 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
4049 /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
4050 /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
4051 /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
4052 /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
4054 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
4055 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
4056 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
4057 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
4059 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
4060 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
4061 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
4062 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
4063 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
4064 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
4065 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
4066 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4068 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4071 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4072 if let Some((payment_purpose, sources)) = claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
4073 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4074 for htlc in sources.iter() {
4075 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4076 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4077 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4078 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
4083 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
4084 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: sources.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
4085 payment_purpose, receiver_node_id,
4087 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
4088 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
4089 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
4090 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4095 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
4097 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
4098 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
4099 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
4100 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
4101 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
4102 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
4103 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
4104 let mut valid_mpp = true;
4105 let mut errs = Vec::new();
4106 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4107 for htlc in sources.iter() {
4108 if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
4109 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4110 debug_assert!(false);
4114 prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
4116 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
4117 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4118 debug_assert!(false);
4122 expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
4124 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = &htlc.onion_payload {
4125 // We don't currently support MPP for spontaneous payments, so just check
4126 // that there's one payment here and move on.
4127 if sources.len() != 1 {
4128 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP spontaneous payment - this should not be reachable!");
4129 debug_assert!(false);
4135 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
4137 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4138 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
4139 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4140 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
4143 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
4144 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4145 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
4146 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
4150 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4151 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
4152 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
4153 |_| Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash }))
4155 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
4156 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
4157 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
4158 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
4159 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
4164 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4165 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4166 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
4167 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4168 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
4169 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
4170 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4172 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4175 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
4176 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
4177 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4178 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
4182 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
4183 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
4184 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
4185 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
4188 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4189 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
4190 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
4191 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
4195 let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
4196 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4197 .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
4200 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
4201 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
4202 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4203 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4204 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
4205 let fulfill_res = chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger);
4207 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = fulfill_res {
4208 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)) {
4209 log_trace!(self.logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
4210 log_bytes!(chan_id), action);
4211 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
4213 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4214 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update);
4215 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock,
4216 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4217 if let Err(e) = res {
4218 // TODO: This is a *critical* error - we probably updated the outbound edge
4219 // of the HTLC's monitor with a preimage. We should retry this monitor
4220 // update over and over again until morale improves.
4221 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}", payment_preimage);
4222 return Err((counterparty_node_id, e));
4229 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4230 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
4231 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
4235 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
4236 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
4237 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
4238 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
4239 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
4240 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
4241 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
4242 // again on restart.
4243 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4244 payment_preimage, update_res);
4246 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
4247 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
4248 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
4249 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
4250 // `PaymentForwarded`).
4251 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
4255 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
4256 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
4259 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
4261 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
4262 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage, session_priv, path, from_onchain, &self.pending_events, &self.logger);
4264 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
4265 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
4266 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
4267 |htlc_claim_value_msat| {
4268 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
4269 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
4270 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
4273 let prev_channel_id = Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id());
4274 let next_channel_id = Some(next_channel_id);
4276 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEvent { event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
4278 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
4281 outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
4285 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
4286 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4287 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
4293 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
4294 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4295 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
4298 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
4299 for action in actions.into_iter() {
4301 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
4302 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4303 if let Some(ClaimingPayment { amount_msat, payment_purpose: purpose, receiver_node_id }) = payment {
4304 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
4305 payment_hash, purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4309 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEvent { event } => {
4310 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(event);
4316 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
4317 /// update completion.
4318 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4319 channel: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
4320 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
4321 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
4322 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
4323 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
4324 log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
4325 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()),
4326 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
4327 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
4328 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
4329 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
4330 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
4332 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
4334 let counterparty_node_id = channel.get_counterparty_node_id();
4335 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4336 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.outbound_scid_alias()),
4337 channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
4340 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4341 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
4343 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
4344 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4345 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4350 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
4351 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
4352 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4353 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4358 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
4359 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
4360 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4361 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4362 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4367 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
4371 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
4377 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
4378 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
4379 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
4383 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4384 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
4385 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
4391 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
4392 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
4394 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
4395 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4397 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
4398 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
4399 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4400 match id_to_peer.get(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4401 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4406 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4407 let mut peer_state_lock;
4408 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4409 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
4410 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4411 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4413 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()){
4414 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
4415 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
4418 log_trace!(self.logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}",
4419 highest_applied_update_id, channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id());
4420 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
4423 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, highest_applied_update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel.get_mut());
4426 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
4428 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
4429 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
4432 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4433 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4434 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4436 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
4437 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
4438 /// used to accept such channels.
4440 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4441 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4442 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4443 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
4446 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
4447 /// it as confirmed immediately.
4449 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4450 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4451 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4453 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
4454 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
4456 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
4457 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
4459 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
4460 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
4462 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4463 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4464 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4465 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
4468 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4469 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4471 let peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| !peer.channel_by_id.is_empty());
4472 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4473 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4474 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4475 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4476 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4477 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.len() == 1;
4478 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4479 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
4480 if !channel.get().inbound_is_awaiting_accept() {
4481 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
4484 channel.get_mut().set_0conf();
4485 } else if channel.get().get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4486 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4487 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4488 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4489 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
4492 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4493 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4494 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
4496 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
4497 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
4498 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
4499 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
4500 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4501 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4502 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4503 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
4506 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4507 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4508 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned() });
4512 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4513 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4514 msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4517 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4518 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id) });
4524 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
4525 /// or 0-conf channels.
4527 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
4528 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
4529 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
4530 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> bool {
4531 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
4532 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4534 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4535 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
4536 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
4537 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
4538 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
4539 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.channel_by_id.len() {
4540 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
4544 return peers_without_funded_channels;
4547 fn unfunded_channel_count(
4548 peer: &PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, best_block_height: u32
4550 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
4551 for (_, chan) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
4552 if !chan.is_outbound() && chan.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
4553 chan.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
4555 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
4558 num_unfunded_channels
4561 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4562 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
4563 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4566 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
4567 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4570 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
4571 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
4572 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
4573 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
4575 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
4576 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
4577 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
4578 let channeled_peers_without_funding = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| !node.channel_by_id.is_empty());
4580 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4581 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4583 debug_assert!(false);
4584 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())
4586 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4587 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4589 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
4590 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
4591 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
4592 if peer_state.channel_by_id.is_empty() &&
4593 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
4594 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
4596 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4597 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
4598 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4601 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4602 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
4603 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4604 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
4605 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4608 let mut channel = match Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
4609 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
4610 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias)
4613 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4614 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
4618 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
4619 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4620 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4621 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
4623 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4624 if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
4625 if channel.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4626 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4628 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4629 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4630 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4633 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4634 pending_events.push(
4635 events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
4636 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
4637 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4638 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
4639 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
4640 channel_type: channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
4645 entry.insert(channel);
4651 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4652 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
4653 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4654 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4656 debug_assert!(false);
4657 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
4659 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4660 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4661 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4662 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4663 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), chan);
4664 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
4666 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4669 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4670 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
4671 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
4672 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4673 channel_value_satoshis: value,
4675 user_channel_id: user_id,
4680 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4681 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4683 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4684 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4686 debug_assert!(false);
4687 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
4690 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4691 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4692 let ((funding_msg, monitor), chan) =
4693 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4694 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4695 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan), chan.remove())
4697 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4700 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
4701 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4702 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
4704 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4705 match self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().entry(chan.channel_id()) {
4706 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4707 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4708 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
4709 funding_msg.channel_id))
4711 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
4712 i_e.insert(chan.get_counterparty_node_id());
4716 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
4717 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
4718 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
4719 // until we have persisted our monitor.
4720 let new_channel_id = funding_msg.channel_id;
4721 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
4722 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4726 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
4728 let chan = e.insert(chan);
4729 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, monitor_res, 0, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
4730 per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING, { peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&new_channel_id) });
4732 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
4733 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
4734 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
4735 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
4736 // We do not propagate the monitor update to the user as it would be for a monitor
4737 // that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we don't respond
4738 // with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
4739 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { shutdown_finish: Some((res, _)), .. }) = &mut res {
4747 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4748 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4749 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4750 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4752 debug_assert!(false);
4753 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4756 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4757 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4758 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4759 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4760 let monitor = try_chan_entry!(self,
4761 chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan);
4762 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor);
4763 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, 0, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4764 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
4765 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
4766 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
4767 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
4768 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
4769 shutdown_finish.0.take();
4774 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4778 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4779 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4780 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4782 debug_assert!(false);
4783 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4785 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4786 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4787 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4788 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4789 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
4790 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan);
4791 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
4792 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4793 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4794 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4795 msg: announcement_sigs,
4797 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4798 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
4799 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
4800 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
4801 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
4802 // announcement_signatures.
4803 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4804 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
4805 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4806 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4813 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4814 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan.get_mut());
4819 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4823 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4824 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
4825 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
4826 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4827 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4829 debug_assert!(false);
4830 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4832 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4833 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4834 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4835 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4837 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
4838 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
4839 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
4840 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
4843 let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo();
4844 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self,
4845 chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_entry);
4846 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
4848 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4849 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
4850 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
4851 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
4852 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4853 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4858 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
4859 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
4860 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4861 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update);
4862 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry);
4866 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4869 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
4870 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
4871 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
4872 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
4878 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4879 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4880 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4882 debug_assert!(false);
4883 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4885 let (tx, chan_option) = {
4886 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4887 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4888 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4889 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4890 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_entry);
4891 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
4892 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4893 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4898 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
4899 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
4900 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
4901 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
4902 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
4903 (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, chan_entry)))
4904 } else { (tx, None) }
4906 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4909 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
4910 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
4911 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
4913 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
4914 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4915 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4916 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4917 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4921 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4926 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4927 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
4928 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
4929 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
4931 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
4932 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
4933 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
4934 //but we should prevent it anyway.
4936 let pending_forward_info = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
4937 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4938 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4940 debug_assert!(false);
4941 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4943 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4944 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4945 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4946 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4948 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
4949 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
4950 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
4951 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
4952 match pending_forward_info {
4953 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
4954 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
4955 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
4956 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
4958 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
4959 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
4960 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4961 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
4962 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
4965 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
4967 _ => pending_forward_info
4970 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), chan);
4972 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4977 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4978 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
4979 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4980 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4982 debug_assert!(false);
4983 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4985 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4986 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4987 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4988 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4989 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan)
4991 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4994 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, msg.channel_id);
4998 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4999 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5000 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5002 debug_assert!(false);
5003 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5005 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5006 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5007 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5008 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5009 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan);
5011 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5016 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5017 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5018 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5020 debug_assert!(false);
5021 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5023 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5024 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5025 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5026 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5027 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
5028 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
5029 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan);
5031 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan);
5034 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5038 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5039 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5040 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5042 debug_assert!(false);
5043 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5045 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5046 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5047 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5048 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5049 let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo();
5050 let monitor_update = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
5051 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update);
5052 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5053 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock,
5054 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan)
5056 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5061 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
5062 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
5063 let mut push_forward_event = false;
5064 let mut new_intercept_events = Vec::new();
5065 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
5066 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5067 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
5068 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
5069 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
5070 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
5071 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
5073 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
5074 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
5076 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5077 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
5078 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
5079 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5080 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5081 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
5083 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5084 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
5085 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.genesis_hash)
5087 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).into_inner());
5088 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5089 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
5090 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5091 new_intercept_events.push(events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
5092 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
5093 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
5094 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
5095 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
5098 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5099 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
5101 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
5102 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
5103 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5104 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
5105 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
5106 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
5107 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
5108 phantom_shared_secret: None,
5111 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
5112 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
5113 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
5118 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
5119 // payments are being processed.
5120 if forward_htlcs_empty {
5121 push_forward_event = true;
5123 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5124 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
5131 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
5132 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
5135 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
5136 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5137 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
5139 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
5143 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued.
5144 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
5145 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5146 let forward_ev_exists = pending_events.iter()
5147 .find(|ev| if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false })
5149 if !forward_ev_exists {
5150 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
5152 Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
5157 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5158 let (htlcs_to_fail, res) = {
5159 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5160 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5162 debug_assert!(false);
5163 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5164 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
5165 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5166 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5167 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5168 let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo();
5169 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
5170 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update);
5171 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5172 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id,
5173 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5174 (htlcs_to_fail, res)
5176 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5179 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
5183 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5184 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5185 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5187 debug_assert!(false);
5188 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5190 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5191 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5192 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5193 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5194 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan);
5196 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5201 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5202 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5203 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5205 debug_assert!(false);
5206 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5208 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5209 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5210 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5211 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5212 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
5213 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
5216 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5217 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
5218 &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
5219 msg, &self.default_configuration
5221 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5222 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5223 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap()),
5226 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5231 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
5232 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5233 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
5234 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
5236 // It's not a local channel
5237 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5240 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5241 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
5242 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
5243 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5245 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5246 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5247 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5248 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5249 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5250 if chan.get().should_announce() {
5251 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
5252 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
5253 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
5254 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5256 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
5258 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
5259 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
5260 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
5261 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5263 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", log_bytes!(chan_id));
5264 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), chan);
5267 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5269 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
5272 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5274 let need_lnd_workaround = {
5275 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5277 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5279 debug_assert!(false);
5280 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5282 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5283 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5284 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5285 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5286 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
5287 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
5288 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
5289 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
5290 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
5291 msg, &self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash,
5292 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan);
5293 let mut channel_update = None;
5294 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
5295 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5296 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5299 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
5300 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
5301 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
5302 // they have the latest channel parameters.
5303 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
5304 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5305 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
5310 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
5311 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
5312 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get_mut(), responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
5313 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
5314 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
5315 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
5319 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5323 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
5324 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
5327 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
5328 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
5333 /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
5334 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
5335 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
5337 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5338 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
5339 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
5340 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
5341 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
5342 match monitor_event {
5343 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
5344 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
5345 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
5346 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
5348 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
5349 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
5350 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
5351 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5354 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
5355 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
5356 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
5357 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
5359 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5360 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
5361 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5362 id_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).cloned()
5365 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
5366 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5367 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
5368 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5369 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5370 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5371 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
5372 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
5373 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
5374 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5375 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5379 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
5380 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
5382 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
5384 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
5385 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5386 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5387 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5388 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5395 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
5396 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
5402 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5403 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5406 has_pending_monitor_events
5409 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
5410 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
5411 /// update events as a separate process method here.
5413 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
5414 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5415 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5416 NotifyOption::DoPersist
5418 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
5423 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
5424 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
5425 /// update was applied.
5426 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
5427 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
5428 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5429 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
5431 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
5432 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
5433 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
5434 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
5436 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5437 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5439 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5440 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5441 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
5442 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
5443 let funding_txo = chan.get_funding_txo();
5444 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
5445 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger);
5446 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
5447 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
5449 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
5450 has_monitor_update = true;
5452 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(
5453 funding_txo.expect("channel is live"), monitor_update);
5454 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5455 let channel_id: [u8; 32] = *channel_id;
5456 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id,
5457 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING,
5458 peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id));
5460 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, res));
5462 continue 'peer_loop;
5471 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
5472 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
5473 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
5476 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5477 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5483 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
5484 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
5485 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
5486 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
5487 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
5488 let mut has_update = false;
5490 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5492 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5493 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5494 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5495 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5496 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5497 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
5498 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
5499 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
5501 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5502 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
5505 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
5506 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
5507 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
5508 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5509 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5514 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5516 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
5517 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
5518 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
5524 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
5525 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5533 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5534 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5540 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
5541 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
5543 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
5544 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5545 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
5546 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
5547 // reorganized out of the main chain.
5548 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
5549 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
5550 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
5551 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
5552 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
5553 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
5554 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
5555 assert!(should_broadcast);
5556 } else { unreachable!(); }
5557 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
5559 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5563 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5564 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
5566 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
5567 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("min_value_msat of {} greater than total 21 million bitcoin supply", min_value_msat.unwrap()) });
5570 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5572 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5573 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5574 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5575 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5576 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
5577 payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
5578 user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
5579 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
5580 // it's updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
5581 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
5582 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
5583 // never fail a payment too early.
5584 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
5586 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
5589 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
5594 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
5597 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
5598 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
5600 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
5601 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
5602 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
5603 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
5605 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
5607 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5608 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5612 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5613 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5615 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5617 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
5618 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
5620 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5621 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5622 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
5623 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
5624 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
5625 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5626 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
5627 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
5628 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
5629 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
5630 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
5633 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5634 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5636 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5639 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5641 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5643 pub fn create_inbound_payment_legacy(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), APIError> {
5644 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5645 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5646 let payment_secret = self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)?;
5647 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret))
5650 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
5651 /// stored external to LDK.
5653 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
5654 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
5655 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
5657 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
5658 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
5661 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
5662 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
5663 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
5664 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
5666 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
5667 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
5668 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
5669 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
5670 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
5672 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
5673 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
5674 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
5675 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
5676 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
5678 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
5679 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
5681 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5682 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5686 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5687 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5689 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5691 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
5692 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
5694 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5695 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5696 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
5697 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
5698 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
5699 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
5700 min_final_cltv_expiry)
5703 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5704 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5706 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5709 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5711 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5713 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5714 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
5717 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
5718 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
5720 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5721 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
5722 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
5725 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
5726 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
5728 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5729 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5730 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5731 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5733 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
5734 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5735 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
5736 Some(_) => continue,
5737 None => return scid_candidate
5742 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
5744 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5745 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
5747 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
5748 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
5749 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
5753 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
5754 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
5755 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
5757 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
5758 /// times to get a unique scid.
5759 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5760 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5761 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5763 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
5764 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5765 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
5766 return scid_candidate
5770 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
5771 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
5772 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
5773 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
5775 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5776 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5777 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5778 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5779 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
5780 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
5781 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
5782 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
5791 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5792 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
5793 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5794 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
5795 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
5799 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
5800 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
5801 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5806 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
5807 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5808 if events.is_empty() { None } else { Some(events.remove(0)) }
5812 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
5813 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
5817 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
5818 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
5821 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
5822 /// using the given event handler.
5824 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
5825 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
5829 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
5833 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5835 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5836 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5837 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5838 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5839 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5840 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5844 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
5845 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
5846 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
5847 /// is always placed next to each other.
5849 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
5850 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
5851 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
5852 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
5854 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
5855 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
5856 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
5857 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
5858 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5859 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5860 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5862 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5863 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5864 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5865 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5868 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5869 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5871 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
5872 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5875 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
5876 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5877 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5878 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5879 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5880 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
5881 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
5885 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5886 events.replace(pending_events);
5895 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5897 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5898 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5899 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5900 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5901 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5902 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5906 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
5908 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
5909 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
5910 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
5912 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
5916 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5918 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5919 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5920 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5921 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5922 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5923 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5927 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5929 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5930 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
5931 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
5932 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
5933 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
5936 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
5937 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
5940 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5941 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5942 let new_height = height - 1;
5944 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
5945 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
5946 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
5947 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
5948 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
5949 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
5952 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
5956 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5958 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5959 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5960 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5961 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5962 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5963 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5967 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5968 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5969 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5970 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5972 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5973 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
5975 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5976 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)
5977 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
5979 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5980 if height < last_best_block_height {
5981 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5982 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
5986 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5987 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5988 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5989 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5991 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5992 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
5994 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5996 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
5998 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
6000 macro_rules! max_time {
6001 ($timestamp: expr) => {
6003 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
6004 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
6005 // having an explicit local time source.
6006 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
6007 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
6008 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6009 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
6010 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
6016 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
6017 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6018 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
6019 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
6023 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
6024 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
6025 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
6026 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6027 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6028 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
6029 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(block_hash)) = (chan.get_funding_txo(), chan.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
6030 res.push((funding_txo.txid, Some(block_hash)));
6037 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
6038 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6039 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
6040 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
6041 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
6042 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
6043 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
6044 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
6049 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6051 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6052 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6053 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6054 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6055 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6056 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6060 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
6061 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
6063 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
6064 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
6065 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6066 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6067 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6069 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6070 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
6072 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6073 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6074 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6075 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6076 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6077 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
6078 let res = f(channel);
6079 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
6080 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
6081 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
6082 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
6083 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.channel_id() }));
6085 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
6086 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
6087 if channel.is_usable() {
6088 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6089 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
6090 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6091 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6096 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6101 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6102 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
6105 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
6106 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6107 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6108 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6109 msg: announcement_sigs,
6111 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6112 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
6113 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
6115 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
6116 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
6117 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
6122 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
6123 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
6124 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
6125 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
6126 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
6127 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
6128 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
6129 // is always consistent.
6130 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
6131 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
6132 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()),
6133 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
6134 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
6137 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
6138 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, channel);
6139 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
6140 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
6141 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
6142 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
6143 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6147 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
6148 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
6149 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6150 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6151 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
6152 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
6153 data: reason_message,
6163 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6164 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
6165 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
6166 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
6167 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
6168 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
6169 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
6170 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6171 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
6172 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
6174 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
6175 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
6176 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
6180 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
6183 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6184 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
6185 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6186 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6187 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
6188 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
6189 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6190 phantom_shared_secret: None,
6191 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
6194 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
6195 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6196 _ => unreachable!(),
6198 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
6199 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
6200 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
6201 log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
6207 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
6209 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
6210 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
6214 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
6216 /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
6217 /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
6219 pub fn get_persistable_update_future(&self) -> Future {
6220 self.persistence_notifier.get_future()
6223 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6224 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
6225 self.persistence_notifier.notify_pending()
6228 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
6229 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
6230 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
6231 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
6234 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6235 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6236 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6237 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
6240 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6241 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6243 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6244 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6245 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6246 pub fn invoice_features(&self) -> InvoiceFeatures {
6247 provided_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
6250 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6251 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6252 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
6253 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
6256 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6257 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6258 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6259 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
6262 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6263 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6264 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
6265 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
6269 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
6270 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6272 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6273 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6274 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6275 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6276 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6277 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6281 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
6282 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6283 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6286 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
6287 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6288 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6291 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
6292 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6293 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6296 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
6297 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6298 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6301 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
6302 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6303 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6306 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
6307 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6308 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6311 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
6312 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6313 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6316 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
6317 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6318 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6321 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
6322 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6323 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6326 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
6327 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6328 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6331 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
6332 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6333 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6336 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
6337 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6338 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6341 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
6342 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6343 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6346 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
6347 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6348 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6351 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
6352 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6353 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6356 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
6357 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6358 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
6361 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
6366 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
6367 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6368 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6371 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
6372 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6373 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6374 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6376 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
6377 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6378 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
6379 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6380 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6381 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6382 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6383 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
6384 if chan.is_shutdown() {
6385 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
6386 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
6391 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
6393 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
6394 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
6395 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
6396 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
6397 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
6398 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
6399 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
6400 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
6401 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
6402 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
6403 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
6404 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
6405 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6406 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
6407 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6408 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
6409 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
6410 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
6411 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
6412 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
6413 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
6416 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
6417 peer_state.is_connected = false;
6418 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
6419 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
6422 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
6424 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6426 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6427 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6431 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
6432 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
6433 log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6437 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6439 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
6440 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
6441 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
6442 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
6443 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
6444 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
6447 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6448 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
6449 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6450 if inbound_peer_limited {
6453 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
6454 channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
6455 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
6456 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
6457 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
6461 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
6462 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
6463 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
6465 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6466 if inbound_peer_limited &&
6467 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
6468 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
6473 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
6474 peer_state.is_connected = true;
6479 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6481 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6482 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6483 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6484 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6485 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6486 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6487 let retain = if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
6488 if !chan.have_received_message() {
6489 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
6490 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
6491 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
6495 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
6496 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6497 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
6502 if retain && chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6503 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.default_configuration) {
6504 if let Ok(update_msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
6505 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement {
6506 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6515 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
6519 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
6520 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6522 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
6523 let channel_ids: Vec<[u8; 32]> = {
6524 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6525 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
6526 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
6527 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6528 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6529 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
6531 for channel_id in channel_ids {
6532 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6533 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6537 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
6538 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6539 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
6540 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
6541 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6542 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6543 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
6544 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash) {
6545 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
6546 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6554 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6555 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6559 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6560 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
6563 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
6564 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
6568 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6569 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6570 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
6571 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6574 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6575 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6577 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6578 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6579 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6580 pub(crate) fn provided_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InvoiceFeatures {
6581 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6584 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6585 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6586 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
6587 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6590 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6591 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6592 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6593 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
6596 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6597 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6598 pub fn provided_init_features(_config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
6599 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
6600 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
6601 // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
6602 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
6603 features.set_data_loss_protect_optional();
6604 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
6605 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
6606 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
6607 features.set_payment_secret_required();
6608 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
6609 features.set_wumbo_optional();
6610 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
6611 features.set_channel_type_optional();
6612 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
6613 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
6615 { // Attributes are not allowed on if expressions on our current MSRV of 1.41.
6616 if _config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
6617 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
6623 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6624 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6626 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
6627 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
6628 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
6629 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
6632 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
6633 (2, node_id, required),
6634 (4, features, required),
6635 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
6636 (8, forwarding_info, option),
6637 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6638 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6641 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
6642 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6643 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6644 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6645 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
6646 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
6647 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6648 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
6649 (2, self.channel_id, required),
6650 (3, self.channel_type, option),
6651 (4, self.counterparty, required),
6652 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
6653 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
6654 (7, self.config, option),
6655 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
6656 (9, self.confirmations, option),
6657 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
6658 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6659 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6660 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
6661 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6662 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6663 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6664 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6665 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6666 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
6667 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
6668 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
6669 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
6670 (30, self.is_usable, required),
6671 (32, self.is_public, required),
6672 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6673 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6674 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6675 (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
6681 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
6682 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6683 _init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6684 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
6685 (2, channel_id, required),
6686 (3, channel_type, option),
6687 (4, counterparty, required),
6688 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6689 (6, funding_txo, option),
6690 (7, config, option),
6691 (8, short_channel_id, option),
6692 (9, confirmations, option),
6693 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
6694 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6695 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6696 (16, balance_msat, required),
6697 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6698 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6699 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6700 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6701 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6702 (22, confirmations_required, option),
6703 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
6704 (26, is_outbound, required),
6705 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
6706 (30, is_usable, required),
6707 (32, is_public, required),
6708 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6709 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6710 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6711 (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
6714 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6715 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6716 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
6717 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
6718 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
6722 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
6724 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
6725 outbound_scid_alias,
6729 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
6730 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
6732 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
6733 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
6734 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
6735 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
6736 confirmations_required,
6738 force_close_spend_delay,
6739 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
6740 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
6741 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
6742 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
6743 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
6744 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
6745 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
6750 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
6751 (2, channels, vec_type),
6752 (4, phantom_scid, required),
6753 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
6756 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
6758 (0, onion_packet, required),
6759 (2, short_channel_id, required),
6762 (0, payment_data, required),
6763 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6764 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6766 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
6767 (0, payment_preimage, required),
6768 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6772 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
6773 (0, routing, required),
6774 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
6775 (4, payment_hash, required),
6776 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
6777 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
6778 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
6782 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6783 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6785 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
6787 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6788 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6789 reason.write(writer)?;
6791 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6792 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
6795 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6796 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6797 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
6798 failure_code.write(writer)?;
6805 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6806 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6807 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6810 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6811 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6812 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6813 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
6817 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6818 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6819 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6820 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
6821 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
6824 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
6825 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
6826 // messages contained in the variants.
6827 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
6828 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
6829 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
6831 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6832 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6833 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6834 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6835 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
6838 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6839 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6840 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6841 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6842 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
6844 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6849 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
6854 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
6855 (0, short_channel_id, required),
6856 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6857 (2, outpoint, required),
6858 (4, htlc_id, required),
6859 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
6862 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
6863 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6864 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
6865 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
6866 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
6868 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6869 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
6870 (1, self.total_msat, required),
6871 (2, self.value, required),
6872 (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
6873 (4, payment_data, option),
6874 (5, self.total_value_received, option),
6875 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
6876 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
6882 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
6883 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6884 let mut prev_hop = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
6886 let mut sender_intended_value = None;
6887 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
6888 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
6889 let mut total_value_received = None;
6890 let mut total_msat = None;
6891 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
6892 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6893 (0, prev_hop, required),
6894 (1, total_msat, option),
6895 (2, value, required),
6896 (3, sender_intended_value, option),
6897 (4, payment_data, option),
6898 (5, total_value_received, option),
6899 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
6900 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
6902 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
6904 if payment_data.is_some() {
6905 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6907 if total_msat.is_none() {
6908 total_msat = Some(value);
6910 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
6913 if total_msat.is_none() {
6914 if payment_data.is_none() {
6915 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6917 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
6919 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
6923 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
6926 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
6927 total_value_received,
6928 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
6935 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
6936 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6937 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6940 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
6941 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
6942 let mut path: Option<Vec<RouteHop>> = Some(Vec::new());
6943 let mut payment_id = None;
6944 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
6945 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6946 (0, session_priv, required),
6947 (1, payment_id, option),
6948 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6949 (4, path, vec_type),
6950 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
6952 if payment_id.is_none() {
6953 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
6955 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
6957 if path.is_none() || path.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
6958 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6960 let path = path.unwrap();
6961 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
6962 if params.final_cltv_expiry_delta == 0 {
6963 params.final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.last().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta;
6966 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
6967 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
6968 first_hop_htlc_msat,
6970 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
6973 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6974 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6979 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
6980 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
6982 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
6984 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
6985 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6986 (0, session_priv, required),
6987 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
6988 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6989 // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
6990 (4, *path, vec_type),
6991 (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
6994 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
6996 field.write(writer)?;
7003 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
7004 (0, forward_info, required),
7005 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
7006 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
7007 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
7008 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
7011 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
7013 (0, htlc_id, required),
7014 (2, err_packet, required),
7019 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
7020 (0, payment_secret, required),
7021 (2, expiry_time, required),
7022 (4, user_payment_id, required),
7023 (6, payment_preimage, required),
7024 (8, min_value_msat, required),
7027 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7029 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7030 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7031 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7032 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7033 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7034 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7038 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7039 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
7041 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7043 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
7045 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
7046 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
7047 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
7050 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
7052 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7053 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
7054 let mut number_of_channels = 0;
7055 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7056 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7057 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7058 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
7059 serializable_peer_count += 1;
7061 number_of_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.len();
7062 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
7063 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7064 unfunded_channels += 1;
7069 ((number_of_channels - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
7071 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7072 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7073 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7074 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
7075 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7076 channel.write(writer)?;
7083 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7084 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7085 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
7086 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
7087 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7088 for forward in pending_forwards {
7089 forward.write(writer)?;
7094 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
7096 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7097 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
7098 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7100 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
7101 (claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7102 for (payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops)) in claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
7103 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7104 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7105 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
7106 htlc.write(writer)?;
7108 htlc_purposes.push(purpose);
7111 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
7112 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
7113 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7114 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
7115 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
7116 // per_peer_state lock at all.
7117 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
7120 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
7121 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
7122 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
7123 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
7124 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
7126 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
7127 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
7128 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
7129 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
7130 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
7131 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
7132 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
7137 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7138 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7139 for event in events.iter() {
7140 event.write(writer)?;
7143 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
7144 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7145 for event in background_events.iter() {
7147 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
7149 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
7150 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
7155 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
7156 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
7157 // likely to be identical.
7158 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
7159 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
7161 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7162 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
7163 hash.write(writer)?;
7164 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
7167 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
7168 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
7169 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7170 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
7171 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
7174 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
7175 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7177 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7178 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7179 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
7180 session_priv.write(writer)?;
7183 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
7184 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
7188 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
7189 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
7190 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7192 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7193 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7194 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
7200 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
7201 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7202 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
7203 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
7206 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
7207 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
7208 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
7209 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
7210 pending_claiming_payments = None;
7213 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7214 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
7215 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7216 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
7217 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
7218 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
7219 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
7220 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
7221 (9, htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7222 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
7229 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
7231 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
7233 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7234 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
7235 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
7236 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
7237 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
7238 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
7239 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
7240 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
7241 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7242 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
7243 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
7244 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
7245 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
7247 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
7248 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
7250 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
7251 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
7253 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
7254 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
7255 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
7256 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
7257 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
7258 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
7260 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
7261 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7263 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7264 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7265 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7266 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7267 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7268 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7272 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
7273 pub entropy_source: ES,
7275 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
7276 pub node_signer: NS,
7278 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
7279 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
7281 pub signer_provider: SP,
7283 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7285 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
7286 pub fee_estimator: F,
7287 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7289 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
7290 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
7291 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
7292 pub chain_monitor: M,
7294 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
7295 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
7296 /// force-closed during deserialization.
7297 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
7298 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
7299 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
7301 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
7303 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
7304 /// deserialization.
7306 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
7307 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
7308 pub default_config: UserConfig,
7310 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
7311 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
7313 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
7314 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
7315 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
7316 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
7318 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
7321 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
7322 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>,
7325 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7326 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7328 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7329 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7330 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7331 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7332 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7333 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7337 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
7338 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
7339 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
7340 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
7341 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>) -> Self {
7343 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
7344 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
7349 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
7350 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
7351 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7352 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
7354 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7355 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7356 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7357 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7358 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7359 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7363 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7364 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
7365 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
7369 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7370 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
7372 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7373 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7374 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7375 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7376 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7377 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7381 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7382 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7384 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7385 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7386 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7388 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
7390 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7391 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7392 let mut peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7393 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7394 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7395 let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
7396 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
7397 for _ in 0..channel_count {
7398 let mut channel: Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (
7399 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
7401 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7402 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
7403 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
7404 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7405 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7406 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7407 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7408 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
7409 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
7410 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7411 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7412 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7413 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7414 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7415 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7416 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7417 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7418 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7419 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7420 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7421 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
7422 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
7423 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
7424 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7425 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7426 let (monitor_update, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
7427 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
7428 pending_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate(monitor_update));
7430 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
7431 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7432 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7433 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7434 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
7436 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
7437 let mut found_htlc = false;
7438 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
7439 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
7442 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
7443 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
7444 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
7445 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
7446 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
7447 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
7448 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
7449 log_info!(args.logger,
7450 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
7451 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7452 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7456 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7457 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
7458 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7460 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7461 id_to_peer.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel.get_counterparty_node_id());
7463 match peer_channels.entry(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
7464 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7465 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
7466 by_id_map.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
7468 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7469 let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
7470 by_id_map.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
7471 entry.insert(by_id_map);
7475 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
7476 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
7477 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
7478 // safely discard the channel.
7479 let _ = channel.force_shutdown(false);
7480 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7481 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7482 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7483 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
7486 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7487 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7488 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7489 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7490 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7491 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7495 for (funding_txo, _) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7496 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
7497 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
7498 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
7499 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
7501 pending_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((*funding_txo, monitor_update)));
7505 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
7506 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7507 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7508 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
7509 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7510 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7511 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
7512 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
7513 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
7515 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
7518 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7519 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7520 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
7521 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7522 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7523 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
7524 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
7525 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
7527 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
7530 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7531 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>)>()));
7532 for _ in 0..peer_count {
7533 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7534 let peer_state = PeerState {
7535 channel_by_id: peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new()),
7536 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
7537 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
7538 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
7539 is_connected: false,
7541 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
7544 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7545 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
7546 for _ in 0..event_count {
7547 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
7548 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
7553 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7554 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
7555 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7557 let (funding_txo, monitor_update): (OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate) = (Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?);
7558 if pending_background_events.iter().find(|e| {
7559 let BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((pending_funding_txo, pending_monitor_update)) = e;
7560 *pending_funding_txo == funding_txo && *pending_monitor_update == monitor_update
7562 pending_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)));
7565 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7569 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
7570 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7572 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7573 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
7574 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
7575 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
7576 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7580 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7581 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
7582 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
7583 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
7584 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
7585 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
7586 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
7588 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
7589 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7593 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
7594 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
7595 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
7596 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
7597 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
7598 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7599 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7600 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
7601 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
7602 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = Some(Vec::new());
7603 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7604 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
7605 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7606 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
7607 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
7608 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
7609 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
7610 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
7611 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7612 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
7614 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
7615 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7618 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
7619 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7622 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
7623 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
7626 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
7627 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
7628 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
7629 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
7630 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
7631 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
7633 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
7635 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
7636 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
7637 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
7641 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
7642 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
7643 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
7644 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
7645 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
7646 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
7647 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
7649 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7650 if id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
7651 for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
7652 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
7653 if path.is_empty() {
7654 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
7655 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7658 let path_amt = path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
7659 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
7660 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
7661 match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
7662 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7663 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
7664 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
7665 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
7667 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7668 let path_fee = path.get_path_fees();
7669 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
7670 retry_strategy: None,
7671 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
7672 payment_params: None,
7673 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
7674 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
7675 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
7676 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
7677 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
7678 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
7679 total_msat: path_amt,
7680 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
7682 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
7683 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
7688 for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
7690 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
7691 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
7692 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
7693 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
7695 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
7696 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
7697 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
7698 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
7699 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
7700 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
7701 forwards.retain(|forward| {
7702 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
7703 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
7704 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
7705 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
7710 !forwards.is_empty()
7712 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
7713 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
7714 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
7715 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
7716 pending_events_read.retain(|event| {
7717 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
7718 intercepted_id != ev_id
7725 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
7726 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
7727 let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
7728 // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
7729 // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
7730 // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
7731 // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
7732 // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
7733 // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
7734 // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
7735 // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
7736 pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv, path, false, &pending_events, &args.logger);
7737 pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
7746 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
7747 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
7748 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
7749 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
7750 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
7751 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
7752 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
7753 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
7757 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
7758 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
7760 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
7761 if let Some(mut purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
7762 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
7763 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7765 for (purpose, (payment_hash, previous_hops)) in purposes.drain(..).zip(claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..)) {
7766 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7769 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
7770 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
7771 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
7772 if previous_hops.is_empty() {
7773 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7775 let purpose = match &previous_hops[0].onion_payload {
7776 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
7777 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
7778 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
7779 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
7780 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
7781 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
7782 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
7784 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7785 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7789 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
7791 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
7793 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
7794 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
7796 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7800 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7801 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7803 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
7805 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7807 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
7808 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
7809 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
7810 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7814 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
7815 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
7816 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7817 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7818 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
7819 if chan.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
7820 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
7822 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
7823 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
7824 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
7826 chan.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
7827 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias()) {
7828 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7829 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7830 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7831 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7833 if chan.is_usable() {
7834 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
7835 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7836 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7837 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7838 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7844 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
7846 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7847 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
7848 if let Some((payment_purpose, claimable_htlcs)) = claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
7849 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7850 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
7851 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
7852 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
7853 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
7854 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
7855 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
7856 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
7858 for claimable_htlc in claimable_htlcs {
7859 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
7861 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
7862 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
7863 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
7864 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
7866 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
7867 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
7868 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
7869 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
7871 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
7872 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
7873 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
7874 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
7876 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
7877 if let Some(peer_node_id) = id_to_peer.get(&previous_channel_id){
7878 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
7879 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7880 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7881 if let Some(channel) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
7882 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
7885 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
7886 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
7889 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
7892 purpose: payment_purpose,
7893 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
7899 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
7900 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get_mut(&node_id) {
7901 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
7903 log_error!(args.logger, "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
7904 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7908 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
7910 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
7911 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
7912 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
7913 router: args.router,
7915 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
7917 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
7918 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
7919 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
7920 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
7922 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
7923 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_htlcs, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
7924 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
7925 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
7926 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
7927 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
7929 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
7934 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
7936 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
7938 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
7939 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
7940 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
7941 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
7942 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
7944 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
7945 node_signer: args.node_signer,
7946 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
7948 logger: args.logger,
7949 default_configuration: args.default_config,
7952 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7953 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
7954 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
7955 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
7956 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
7959 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
7960 //connection or two.
7962 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
7968 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7969 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7970 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
7971 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
7972 use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
7973 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
7974 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
7975 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
7976 use crate::ln::msgs;
7977 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
7978 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
7979 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7980 use crate::util::test_utils;
7981 use crate::util::config::ChannelConfig;
7982 use crate::chain::keysinterface::EntropySource;
7985 fn test_notify_limits() {
7986 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
7987 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
7988 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7989 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7990 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7991 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7993 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
7994 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
7995 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
7996 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
7997 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
7999 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8001 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
8002 // to connect messages with new values
8003 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
8004 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
8005 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
8006 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
8007 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
8008 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
8010 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
8011 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8012 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8013 // ... but the last node should not.
8014 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8015 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
8016 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8017 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8019 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
8020 // about the channel.
8021 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
8022 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
8023 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8025 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
8027 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
8028 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
8029 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
8030 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
8031 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8032 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8034 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
8035 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
8036 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
8038 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
8039 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
8040 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
8041 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
8042 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
8043 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
8045 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
8046 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
8047 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
8048 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
8049 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8050 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8051 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
8052 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
8054 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
8055 // the channel info has updated.
8056 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
8057 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
8058 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8059 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8060 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
8061 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
8065 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
8066 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
8068 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8069 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8070 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8071 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8072 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8074 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
8075 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8076 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
8077 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
8079 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
8080 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
8081 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
8082 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
8083 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
8084 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
8085 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
8086 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
8087 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8088 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8089 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8090 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
8092 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
8093 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
8094 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8095 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8096 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8097 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8098 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8099 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8100 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8101 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8102 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8103 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8104 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
8105 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8106 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8107 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8108 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8109 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8110 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8111 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8112 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8113 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8114 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
8116 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
8117 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
8118 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
8119 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8120 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8121 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8122 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
8124 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
8125 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
8126 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
8127 // lightning messages manually.
8128 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8129 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
8130 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8132 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8133 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8134 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
8135 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8136 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8137 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
8138 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8139 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8140 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
8141 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8142 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8143 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8144 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
8145 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8146 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8147 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
8148 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8149 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8150 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
8151 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8152 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
8153 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8154 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8155 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
8156 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8158 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
8159 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
8160 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8161 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
8163 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
8164 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
8165 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
8166 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
8168 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8171 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
8172 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
8173 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
8174 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
8176 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8179 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
8180 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
8181 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
8182 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
8184 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8189 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
8190 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
8191 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
8192 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
8193 // fails as expected.
8194 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8195 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8196 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8197 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8198 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8199 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8200 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8202 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
8203 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
8204 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
8206 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
8207 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8208 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV),
8209 final_value_msat: 100_000,
8211 let route = find_route(
8212 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
8213 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8215 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
8216 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8217 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8218 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8219 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8220 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8221 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8222 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8223 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8224 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8225 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
8226 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
8227 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8228 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
8229 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8230 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8231 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8232 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8233 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8234 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8235 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8236 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8237 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8238 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
8240 // Finally, claim the original payment.
8241 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
8243 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
8244 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8245 let route = find_route(
8246 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
8247 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8249 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
8250 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8251 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8252 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8253 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8254 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
8255 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
8256 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
8258 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
8259 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8260 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
8261 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8262 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8263 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8264 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8265 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8266 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8267 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8268 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8269 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8270 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8271 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
8272 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8273 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8274 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8275 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8276 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8277 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8278 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8279 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8280 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8281 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
8283 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
8284 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
8288 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
8289 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
8290 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
8291 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8292 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8293 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8294 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8296 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8297 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8299 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
8300 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8301 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
8302 final_value_msat: 10_000,
8304 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
8305 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
8306 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8307 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8308 let route = find_route(
8309 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
8310 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8313 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8314 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
8315 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
8316 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
8317 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
8318 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
8319 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8321 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8322 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8323 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8324 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8325 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8326 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8327 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8329 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
8333 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
8334 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
8335 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8336 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8337 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8338 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8340 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8341 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8343 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
8344 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8345 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
8346 final_value_msat: 10_000,
8348 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
8349 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
8350 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8351 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8352 let route = find_route(
8353 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
8354 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8357 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8358 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8359 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
8360 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
8361 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
8362 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
8363 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
8364 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
8365 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8367 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8368 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8369 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8370 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8371 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8372 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8373 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8375 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
8379 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
8380 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8381 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8382 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8383 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8385 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8386 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8387 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8388 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8390 // Marshall an MPP route.
8391 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8392 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8393 route.paths.push(path);
8394 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8395 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8396 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8397 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8398 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8399 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8401 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
8402 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
8404 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
8405 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
8407 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
8412 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
8413 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8414 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8415 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8416 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8418 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8420 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8421 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8423 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8424 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8425 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8426 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8429 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
8430 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
8431 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8432 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
8433 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
8434 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
8437 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
8440 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
8441 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
8446 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
8447 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
8448 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8449 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8450 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8451 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8453 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
8454 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
8456 total_msat: 100_000,
8459 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
8460 // payment verification fails as expected.
8461 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
8462 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
8463 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
8464 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
8466 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
8470 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
8471 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
8475 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
8476 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
8477 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
8478 // the channel is successfully closed.
8479 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8480 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8481 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8482 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8484 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8485 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8486 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
8487 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8488 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
8490 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
8491 let channel_id = &tx.txid().into_inner();
8493 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
8494 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
8495 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8496 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8499 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8501 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8502 // as it has the funding transaction.
8503 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8504 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8505 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8508 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8510 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8512 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8514 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8515 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8516 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8518 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8521 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8522 // as it has the funding transaction.
8523 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8524 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8525 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8527 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8528 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8529 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
8530 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8531 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8532 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
8533 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
8534 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
8536 nodes[0].node.close_channel(channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8537 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8538 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8539 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
8541 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8542 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
8544 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
8545 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
8546 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
8547 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
8548 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8549 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8550 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8554 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
8555 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
8556 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
8557 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
8558 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8559 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8560 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8563 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8565 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
8566 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
8567 // closing transaction).
8568 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
8569 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
8570 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8572 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
8573 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
8574 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8575 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8576 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8579 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8581 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
8583 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
8584 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
8585 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8587 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8589 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8590 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8593 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
8594 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
8595 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
8598 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
8599 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
8600 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
8603 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
8605 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
8606 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
8608 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
8609 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
8611 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
8612 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
8617 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
8618 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
8619 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
8620 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
8621 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8622 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
8623 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
8624 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
8627 let channel_id = [4; 32];
8628 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8629 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
8631 // Test the API functions.
8632 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None), unkown_public_key);
8634 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
8636 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8638 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8640 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8642 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
8644 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
8648 fn test_connection_limiting() {
8649 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
8650 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8651 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8652 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8653 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8655 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
8657 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8658 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8660 let mut funding_tx = None;
8661 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
8662 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8663 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8666 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
8667 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
8668 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
8669 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
8670 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8672 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8673 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8674 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8676 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8678 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
8679 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8680 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8682 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8685 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
8686 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8687 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8688 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
8689 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8691 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
8692 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
8694 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
8695 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
8696 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
8697 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
8698 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
8699 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8700 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8702 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
8703 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
8704 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8705 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap_err();
8707 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
8708 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
8709 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8710 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8711 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
8712 for ev in chan_closed_events {
8713 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
8715 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8716 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8717 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
8718 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap_err();
8720 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
8721 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
8722 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
8723 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8725 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
8726 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
8728 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
8729 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
8730 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
8731 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
8732 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8734 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8735 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
8736 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8738 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
8739 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8740 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
8742 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
8743 // "protected" and can connect again.
8744 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
8745 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
8746 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8747 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8749 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
8751 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8752 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
8756 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
8757 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
8758 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8759 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8760 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8761 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8763 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
8765 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8766 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8768 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
8769 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8770 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8771 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8774 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
8776 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8777 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
8778 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8780 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
8781 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8782 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8784 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
8785 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8786 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
8787 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8791 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
8792 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
8793 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
8794 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8795 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8796 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
8797 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8798 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
8799 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8801 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
8803 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8804 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8806 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
8807 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
8808 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
8809 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
8810 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8811 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8813 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8814 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8816 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8817 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
8819 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8821 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
8822 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8825 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
8826 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
8827 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
8828 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8829 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8830 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8831 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8833 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8834 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
8835 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
8836 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
8840 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8842 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
8843 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8845 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
8846 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8847 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8849 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8850 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
8852 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8854 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
8859 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
8860 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
8861 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
8862 // the channel without the anchors feature.
8863 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8864 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8865 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
8866 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
8867 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8868 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
8869 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8871 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None).unwrap();
8872 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8873 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8875 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8876 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8878 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8879 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8881 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8884 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8885 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
8887 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8888 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8890 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8894 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
8896 use crate::chain::Listen;
8897 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
8898 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
8899 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
8900 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
8901 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
8902 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
8903 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
8904 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
8905 use crate::util::test_utils;
8906 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
8908 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
8909 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
8910 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
8912 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
8916 type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
8917 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
8918 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
8919 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
8920 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
8921 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
8922 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
8924 struct ANodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
8925 node: &'a Manager<'a, P>,
8927 impl<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'a, P> {
8928 type CM = Manager<'a, P>;
8930 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'a, P> { self.node }
8932 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
8937 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
8938 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
8941 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
8942 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
8943 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
8945 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
8947 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
8948 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
8949 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
8950 let scorer = Mutex::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
8951 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &scorer);
8953 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
8954 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
8956 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
8957 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
8958 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
8959 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
8961 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
8963 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
8965 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
8966 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
8967 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
8968 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
8969 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
8971 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
8973 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
8975 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: node_b.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8976 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: node_a.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
8977 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8978 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8979 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8982 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
8983 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8984 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
8986 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8987 } else { panic!(); }
8989 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8990 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8991 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
8993 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8994 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
8996 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8999 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
9000 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9001 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
9003 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
9004 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
9006 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9009 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
9012 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
9015 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
9016 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
9018 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
9019 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9020 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
9021 match msg_events[0] {
9022 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
9023 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
9024 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
9028 match msg_events[1] {
9029 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9033 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9034 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
9036 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
9037 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
9039 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9042 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9043 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
9045 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
9046 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
9048 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9051 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
9052 macro_rules! send_payment {
9053 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
9054 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
9055 .with_features($node_b.invoice_features());
9056 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
9057 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
9059 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
9060 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
9062 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
9063 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), RouteParameters {
9064 payment_params, final_value_msat: 10_000,
9065 }, Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
9066 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
9067 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9068 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
9069 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
9070 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
9071 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
9072 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
9074 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
9075 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
9076 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
9077 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
9079 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
9080 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
9081 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
9082 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
9083 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
9085 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
9088 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
9089 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
9090 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
9091 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
9093 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
9098 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
9099 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);