1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
23 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
25 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
27 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
29 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
31 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
34 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
39 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
40 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
41 // construct one themselves.
42 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, ChannelId, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
43 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelPhase, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UnfundedChannelContext, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel};
44 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
45 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
46 use crate::ln::features::Bolt11InvoiceFeatures;
47 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
48 use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteParameters, Router};
49 use crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters};
51 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
52 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
53 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
55 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
56 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment, SendAlongPathArgs};
57 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
58 use crate::offers::offer::{DerivedMetadata, OfferBuilder};
59 use crate::offers::parse::Bolt12SemanticError;
60 use crate::offers::refund::RefundBuilder;
61 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
62 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
63 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
64 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
65 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
66 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
67 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
68 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
70 use alloc::collections::{btree_map, BTreeMap};
73 use crate::prelude::*;
75 use core::cell::RefCell;
77 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
78 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, AtomicBool, Ordering};
79 use core::time::Duration;
82 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
83 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, ProbeSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
84 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
86 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
88 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
89 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
90 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
92 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
93 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
94 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
95 // before we forward it.
97 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
98 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
99 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
100 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
101 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
103 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
104 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
106 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
107 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
108 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
109 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
112 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
113 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
114 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
115 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
116 /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`] for more info.
117 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
120 /// This was added in 0.0.116 and will break deserialization on downgrades.
121 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
122 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
123 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
124 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
125 /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`] for more info.
126 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
130 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
131 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
132 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
133 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
134 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
136 pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
137 /// Sender intended amount to forward or receive (actual amount received
138 /// may overshoot this in either case)
139 pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
140 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
141 /// The fee being skimmed off the top of this HTLC. If this is a forward, it'll be the fee we are
142 /// skimming. If we're receiving this HTLC, it's the fee that our counterparty skimmed.
143 pub(super) skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
146 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
147 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
148 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
149 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
152 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
153 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
154 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
155 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
156 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
159 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
160 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
162 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
163 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
164 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
167 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
168 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
170 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
171 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
174 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
175 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
178 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
182 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
183 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
184 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
185 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
186 short_channel_id: u64,
187 user_channel_id: Option<u128>,
189 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
190 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
192 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
193 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
198 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
200 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
201 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
202 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
204 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
205 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
208 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
209 struct ClaimableHTLC {
210 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
212 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
214 /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
215 /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
216 sender_intended_value: u64,
217 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
219 /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
220 /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
221 total_value_received: Option<u64>,
222 /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
224 /// The extra fee our counterparty skimmed off the top of this HTLC.
225 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
228 impl From<&ClaimableHTLC> for events::ClaimedHTLC {
229 fn from(val: &ClaimableHTLC) -> Self {
230 events::ClaimedHTLC {
231 channel_id: val.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
232 user_channel_id: val.prev_hop.user_channel_id.unwrap_or(0),
233 cltv_expiry: val.cltv_expiry,
234 value_msat: val.value,
239 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
240 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
242 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
243 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
244 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; Self::LENGTH]);
247 /// Number of bytes in the id.
248 pub const LENGTH: usize = 32;
251 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
252 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
257 impl Readable for PaymentId {
258 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
259 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
264 impl core::fmt::Display for PaymentId {
265 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut core::fmt::Formatter) -> core::fmt::Result {
266 crate::util::logger::DebugBytes(&self.0).fmt(f)
270 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
272 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
273 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
274 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
276 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
277 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
282 impl Readable for InterceptId {
283 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
284 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
289 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
290 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
291 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
292 PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
293 OutboundRoute { session_priv: SecretKey },
296 pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
298 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
299 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
300 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
302 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
303 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: *session_priv },
307 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
308 (0, PreviousHopData) => {
309 (0, short_channel_id, required),
310 (2, htlc_id, required),
312 (2, OutboundRoute) => {
313 (0, session_priv, required),
318 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
319 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
320 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
321 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
322 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
325 session_priv: SecretKey,
326 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
327 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
328 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
329 payment_id: PaymentId,
332 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
333 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
334 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
336 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
338 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
340 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
343 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
344 payment_id.hash(hasher);
345 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
351 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
353 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
354 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
355 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
356 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
357 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
358 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
362 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
363 /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
364 /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
365 pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
366 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
367 *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
369 // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
375 struct InboundOnionErr {
381 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
382 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
384 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
385 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
386 pub enum FailureCode {
387 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
388 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
389 TemporaryNodeFailure,
390 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
391 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
392 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing,
393 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
394 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
395 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
396 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
397 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails,
398 /// We failed to process the payload after the onion was decrypted. You may wish to
399 /// use this when receiving custom HTLC TLVs with even type numbers that you don't recognize.
401 /// If available, the tuple data may include the type number and byte offset in the
402 /// decrypted byte stream where the failure occurred.
403 InvalidOnionPayload(Option<(u64, u16)>),
406 impl Into<u16> for FailureCode {
407 fn into(self) -> u16 {
409 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => 0x2000 | 2,
410 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
411 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => 0x4000 | 15,
412 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(_) => 0x4000 | 22,
417 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
418 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
419 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
420 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
421 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
423 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
424 err: msgs::LightningError,
425 chan_id: Option<(ChannelId, u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
426 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
427 channel_capacity: Option<u64>,
429 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
431 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
433 err: LightningError {
435 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
436 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
443 shutdown_finish: None,
444 channel_capacity: None,
448 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
449 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None, channel_capacity: None }
452 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId, user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>, channel_capacity: u64) -> Self {
453 let err_msg = msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: err.clone() };
454 let action = if let (Some(_), ..) = &shutdown_res {
455 // We have a closing `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, which means the channel was funded and we
456 // should disconnect our peer such that we force them to broadcast their latest
457 // commitment upon reconnecting.
458 msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(err_msg) }
460 msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: err_msg }
463 err: LightningError { err, action },
464 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
465 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
466 channel_capacity: Some(channel_capacity)
470 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
473 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
475 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
476 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
480 log_level: Level::Warn,
483 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
485 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
487 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
489 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
490 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
498 shutdown_finish: None,
499 channel_capacity: None,
503 fn closes_channel(&self) -> bool {
504 self.chan_id.is_some()
508 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
509 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
510 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
511 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
512 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
514 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
515 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
516 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
517 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
518 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
519 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
520 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
522 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
526 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
527 struct ClaimingPayment {
529 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
530 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
531 htlcs: Vec<events::ClaimedHTLC>,
532 sender_intended_value: Option<u64>,
534 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
535 (0, amount_msat, required),
536 (2, payment_purpose, required),
537 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
538 (5, htlcs, optional_vec),
539 (7, sender_intended_value, option),
542 struct ClaimablePayment {
543 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
544 onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
545 htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
548 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
549 struct ClaimablePayments {
550 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
551 /// failed/claimed by the user.
553 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
554 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
556 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
557 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
558 claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
560 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
561 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
562 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
563 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
566 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be processed immediately at the generation site
567 /// usually because we're running pre-full-init. They are handled immediately once we detect we are
568 /// running normally, and specifically must be processed before any other non-background
569 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are applied.
570 enum BackgroundEvent {
571 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which closes the channel or for an already-closed channel.
572 /// This is only separated from [`Self::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`] as the
573 /// maybe-non-closing variant needs a public key to handle channel resumption, whereas if the
574 /// channel has been force-closed we do not need the counterparty node_id.
576 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
577 /// are regenerated on startup.
578 ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
579 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which may or may not close the channel and may unblock the
580 /// channel to continue normal operation.
582 /// In general this should be used rather than
583 /// [`Self::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`], however in cases where the
584 /// `counterparty_node_id` is not available as the channel has closed from a [`ChannelMonitor`]
585 /// error the other variant is acceptable.
587 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
588 /// are regenerated on startup.
589 MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
590 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
591 funding_txo: OutPoint,
592 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate
594 /// Some [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (s) completed before we were serialized but we still have
595 /// them marked pending, thus we need to run any [`MonitorUpdateCompletionAction`] (s) pending
597 MonitorUpdatesComplete {
598 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
599 channel_id: ChannelId,
604 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
605 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
606 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
607 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
608 /// event can be generated.
609 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
610 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user and possibly resume the
611 /// operation of another channel.
613 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
614 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
615 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. In that case, after the inbound
616 /// edge completes, we will surface an [`Event::PaymentForwarded`] as well as unblock the
618 EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
619 event: events::Event,
620 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction)>,
624 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
625 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
626 (2, EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel) => {
627 (0, event, upgradable_required),
628 // LDK prior to 0.0.116 did not have this field as the monitor update application order was
629 // required by clients. If we downgrade to something prior to 0.0.116 this may result in
630 // monitor updates which aren't properly blocked or resumed, however that's fine - we don't
631 // support async monitor updates even in LDK 0.0.116 and once we do we'll require no
632 // downgrades to prior versions.
633 (1, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint, option),
637 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
638 pub(crate) enum EventCompletionAction {
639 ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
640 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
641 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
644 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(EventCompletionAction,
645 (0, ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate) => {
646 (0, channel_funding_outpoint, required),
647 (2, counterparty_node_id, required),
651 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
652 /// If something is blocked on the completion of an RAA-generated [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] we track
653 /// the blocked action here. See enum variants for more info.
654 pub(crate) enum RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
655 /// A forwarded payment was claimed. We block the downstream channel completing its monitor
656 /// update which removes the HTLC preimage until the upstream channel has gotten the preimage
658 ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
659 /// The upstream channel ID (i.e. the inbound edge).
660 channel_id: ChannelId,
661 /// The HTLC ID on the inbound edge.
666 impl RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
667 fn from_prev_hop_data(prev_hop: &HTLCPreviousHopData) -> Self {
668 Self::ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
669 channel_id: prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
670 htlc_id: prev_hop.htlc_id,
675 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
676 (0, ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim) => { (0, channel_id, required), (2, htlc_id, required) }
680 /// State we hold per-peer.
681 pub(super) struct PeerState<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
682 /// `channel_id` -> `ChannelPhase`
684 /// Holds all channels within corresponding `ChannelPhase`s where the peer is the counterparty.
685 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>,
686 /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `InboundChannelRequest`.
688 /// When manual channel acceptance is enabled, this holds all unaccepted inbound channels where
689 /// the peer is the counterparty. If the channel is accepted, then the entry in this table is
690 /// removed, and an InboundV1Channel is created and placed in the `inbound_v1_channel_by_id` table. If
691 /// the channel is rejected, then the entry is simply removed.
692 pub(super) inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, InboundChannelRequest>,
693 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
694 latest_features: InitFeatures,
695 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
696 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
697 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
698 /// Map from Channel IDs to pending [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s which have been passed to the
699 /// user but which have not yet completed.
701 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example if the channel was closed but we
702 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
703 /// for a missing channel.
704 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<OutPoint, Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>,
705 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
706 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
708 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
709 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
710 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
711 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
713 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
714 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
715 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
716 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
717 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
718 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
719 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
720 /// If another channel's [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] needs to complete before a channel we have
721 /// with this peer can complete an RAA [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (e.g. because the RAA update
722 /// will remove a preimage that needs to be durably in an upstream channel first), we put an
723 /// entry here to note that the channel with the key's ID is blocked on a set of actions.
724 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
725 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
726 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
727 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
731 impl <SP: Deref> PeerState<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
732 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
733 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
734 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
735 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
736 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
739 self.channel_by_id.iter().filter(|(_, phase)| matches!(phase, ChannelPhase::Funded(_))).count() == 0
740 && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
741 && self.in_flight_monitor_updates.is_empty()
744 // Returns a count of all channels we have with this peer, including unfunded channels.
745 fn total_channel_count(&self) -> usize {
746 self.channel_by_id.len() + self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
749 // Returns a bool indicating if the given `channel_id` matches a channel we have with this peer.
750 fn has_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId) -> bool {
751 self.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
752 self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.contains_key(channel_id)
756 /// A not-yet-accepted inbound (from counterparty) channel. Once
757 /// accepted, the parameters will be used to construct a channel.
758 pub(super) struct InboundChannelRequest {
759 /// The original OpenChannel message.
760 pub open_channel_msg: msgs::OpenChannel,
761 /// The number of ticks remaining before the request expires.
762 pub ticks_remaining: i32,
765 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unaccepted inbound channel to be
766 /// accepted. An unaccepted channel that exceeds this limit will be abandoned.
767 const UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: i32 = 2;
769 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
770 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
772 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
775 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
776 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
777 struct PendingInboundPayment {
778 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
779 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
780 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
781 /// this payment being removed.
783 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
784 user_payment_id: u64,
785 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
786 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
787 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
790 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
791 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
792 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
793 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
794 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
795 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
796 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
797 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
799 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
800 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
808 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
810 Arc<RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>,
811 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
812 ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>,
817 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
818 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
819 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
820 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
821 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
822 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
823 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
824 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
825 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
827 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
828 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> =
837 &'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>,
839 &'h RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>,
840 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
841 ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>
846 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`].
848 /// This is not exported to bindings users as general cover traits aren't useful in other
850 pub trait AChannelManager {
851 /// A type implementing [`chain::Watch`].
852 type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
853 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Watch`].
854 type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
855 /// A type implementing [`BroadcasterInterface`].
856 type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface + ?Sized;
857 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Broadcaster`].
858 type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
859 /// A type implementing [`EntropySource`].
860 type EntropySource: EntropySource + ?Sized;
861 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::EntropySource`].
862 type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
863 /// A type implementing [`NodeSigner`].
864 type NodeSigner: NodeSigner + ?Sized;
865 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::NodeSigner`].
866 type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
867 /// A type implementing [`WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner`].
868 type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner + Sized;
869 /// A type implementing [`SignerProvider`] for [`Self::Signer`].
870 type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<Signer = Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
871 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::SignerProvider`].
872 type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
873 /// A type implementing [`FeeEstimator`].
874 type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator + ?Sized;
875 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::FeeEstimator`].
876 type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
877 /// A type implementing [`Router`].
878 type Router: Router + ?Sized;
879 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Router`].
880 type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
881 /// A type implementing [`Logger`].
882 type Logger: Logger + ?Sized;
883 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Logger`].
884 type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
885 /// Returns a reference to the actual [`ChannelManager`] object.
886 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
889 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
890 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
892 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
893 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
894 ES::Target: EntropySource,
895 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
896 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
897 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
901 type Watch = M::Target;
903 type Broadcaster = T::Target;
905 type EntropySource = ES::Target;
907 type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
909 type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer;
910 type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
912 type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
914 type Router = R::Target;
916 type Logger = L::Target;
918 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
921 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
922 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
924 /// Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
925 /// to individual Channels.
927 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
928 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
929 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
930 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
932 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
933 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST durably write each
934 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] before returning from
935 /// [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`] or before completing async writes. With
936 /// `ChannelManager`s, writing updates happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other
937 /// `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during the serialization process). If the
938 /// deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to
939 /// [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds
940 /// will be lost (modulo on-chain transaction fees).
942 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
943 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
944 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
946 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
947 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
948 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
949 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
950 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
952 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
953 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
954 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
955 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
957 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
958 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
959 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
961 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
962 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
963 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
964 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
965 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
967 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
968 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
969 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
970 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
971 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
972 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
973 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
974 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
977 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
978 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
979 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
980 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
981 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
985 // `total_consistency_lock`
987 // |__`forward_htlcs`
989 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
991 // |__`per_peer_state`
993 // | |__`pending_inbound_payments`
995 // | |__`claimable_payments`
997 // | |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
1001 // | |__`id_to_peer`
1003 // | |__`short_to_chan_info`
1005 // | |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
1007 // | |__`best_block`
1009 // | |__`pending_events`
1011 // | |__`pending_background_events`
1013 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
1015 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
1016 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1017 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1018 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1019 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1020 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1024 default_configuration: UserConfig,
1025 chain_hash: ChainHash,
1026 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1032 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1034 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1036 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1037 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
1039 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
1040 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
1041 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
1042 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
1044 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1045 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
1047 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
1048 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
1049 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
1050 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
1051 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
1052 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
1053 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
1054 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
1056 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
1058 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1059 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
1061 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
1063 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
1064 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
1065 /// and via the classic SCID.
1067 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
1068 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
1070 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1072 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1074 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1075 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
1076 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
1078 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1079 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
1081 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
1082 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
1084 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1085 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
1087 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
1088 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
1089 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
1090 /// active channel list on load.
1092 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1093 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
1095 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
1097 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
1098 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
1099 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
1101 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
1102 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
1103 /// the handling of the events.
1105 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
1106 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
1109 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
1110 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
1111 /// would break backwards compatability.
1112 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
1113 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
1114 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
1116 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1117 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<ChannelId, PublicKey>>,
1119 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
1121 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
1122 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
1123 /// confirmation depth.
1125 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
1126 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
1127 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
1129 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1131 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1133 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1135 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
1137 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
1139 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
1140 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
1141 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
1143 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
1144 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
1146 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
1147 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
1148 /// keeping additional state.
1149 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
1151 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
1152 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
1153 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
1154 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
1156 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
1157 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
1159 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
1160 /// are currently open with that peer.
1162 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
1163 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
1166 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
1168 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1169 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1170 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1171 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1172 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1174 /// The set of events which we need to give to the user to handle. In some cases an event may
1175 /// require some further action after the user handles it (currently only blocking a monitor
1176 /// update from being handed to the user to ensure the included changes to the channel state
1177 /// are handled by the user before they're persisted durably to disk). In that case, the second
1178 /// element in the tuple is set to `Some` with further details of the action.
1180 /// Note that events MUST NOT be removed from pending_events after deserialization, as they
1181 /// could be in the middle of being processed without the direct mutex held.
1183 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1184 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1185 pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1186 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1187 pub(crate) pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1189 /// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
1190 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
1192 /// If we are running during init (either directly during the deserialization method or in
1193 /// block connection methods which run after deserialization but before normal operation) we
1194 /// cannot provide the user with [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s through the normal update flow -
1195 /// prior to normal operation the user may not have loaded the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into their
1196 /// [`ChainMonitor`] and thus attempting to update it will fail or panic.
1198 /// Thus, we place them here to be handled as soon as possible once we are running normally.
1200 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1202 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
1203 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
1204 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
1205 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
1206 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
1207 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
1208 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
1209 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
1210 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
1211 /// Tracks the progress of channels going through batch funding by whether funding_signed was
1212 /// received and the monitor has been persisted.
1214 /// This information does not need to be persisted as funding nodes can forget
1215 /// unfunded channels upon disconnection.
1216 funding_batch_states: Mutex<BTreeMap<Txid, Vec<(ChannelId, PublicKey, bool)>>>,
1218 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool,
1220 event_persist_notifier: Notifier,
1221 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool,
1225 signer_provider: SP,
1230 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
1232 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
1233 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
1234 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
1235 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
1236 pub struct ChainParameters {
1237 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
1238 pub network: Network,
1240 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
1242 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
1243 pub best_block: BestBlock,
1246 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
1250 SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1251 SkipPersistNoEvents,
1254 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
1255 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
1256 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
1257 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
1258 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
1259 /// updates are ready for persistence).
1261 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
1262 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
1263 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
1264 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1265 event_persist_notifier: &'a Notifier,
1266 needs_persist_flag: &'a AtomicBool,
1268 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
1269 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
1272 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
1273 /// Notifies any waiters and indicates that we need to persist, in addition to possibly having
1274 /// events to handle.
1276 /// This must always be called if the changes included a `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, as well as in
1277 /// other cases where losing the changes on restart may result in a force-close or otherwise
1279 fn notify_on_drop<C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1280 Self::optionally_notify(cm, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
1283 fn optionally_notify<F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C, mut persist_check: F)
1284 -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1285 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1286 let force_notify = cm.get_cm().process_background_events();
1288 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1289 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1290 needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1291 should_persist: move || {
1292 // Pick the "most" action between `persist_check` and the background events
1293 // processing and return that.
1294 let notify = persist_check();
1295 match (notify, force_notify) {
1296 (NotifyOption::DoPersist, _) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1297 (_, NotifyOption::DoPersist) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1298 (NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents, _) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1299 (_, NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1300 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
1303 _read_guard: read_guard,
1307 /// Note that if any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are possibly generated,
1308 /// [`ChannelManager::process_background_events`] MUST be called first (or
1309 /// [`Self::optionally_notify`] used).
1310 fn optionally_notify_skipping_background_events<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>
1311 (cm: &'a C, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1312 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1314 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1315 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1316 needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1317 should_persist: persist_check,
1318 _read_guard: read_guard,
1323 impl<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1324 fn drop(&mut self) {
1325 match (self.should_persist)() {
1326 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
1327 self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
1328 self.event_persist_notifier.notify()
1330 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
1331 self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
1332 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
1337 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1338 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1340 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1342 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1343 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1344 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1345 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1346 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1348 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1349 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1351 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1353 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1354 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1355 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1356 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1357 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1358 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1359 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
1360 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
1361 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
1362 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
1363 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
1364 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
1365 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
1367 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1368 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
1370 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1371 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1372 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1373 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
1375 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1376 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1377 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1378 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1379 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1380 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1383 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1385 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1386 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1389 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1391 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1392 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1394 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
1395 /// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
1396 pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
1398 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is connected until
1399 /// we mark the channel enabled and gossip the update.
1400 pub(crate) const ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 5;
1402 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
1403 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
1404 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
1405 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1407 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1408 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1409 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1411 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1412 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1413 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1415 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1416 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1417 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1418 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1419 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1420 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1421 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1422 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1423 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1424 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1425 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1428 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1429 /// to better separate parameters.
1430 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1431 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1432 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1433 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1434 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1435 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1436 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1437 pub features: InitFeatures,
1438 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1439 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1440 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1442 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1444 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1445 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1446 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1447 /// payments to us through this channel.
1448 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1449 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1450 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1451 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1452 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1453 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1454 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1457 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
1458 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1459 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1460 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1461 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1462 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1463 /// lifetime of the channel.
1464 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
1465 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1466 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1467 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1468 /// our counterparty already.
1470 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1471 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1472 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1473 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1475 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1476 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1477 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1478 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1480 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1481 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1483 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1484 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1486 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1487 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1488 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1489 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1490 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1491 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1492 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1493 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1494 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1497 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1499 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1500 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1501 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1502 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1503 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1504 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1505 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1507 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1508 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1510 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1511 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1512 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1513 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1514 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1515 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1516 /// this value on chain.
1518 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1520 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1522 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1523 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1524 /// The `user_channel_id` value passed in to [`ChannelManager::create_channel`] for outbound
1525 /// channels, or to [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`] for inbound channels if
1526 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] config flag is set to true. Otherwise
1527 /// `user_channel_id` will be randomized for an inbound channel. This may be zero for objects
1528 /// serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1530 /// [`ChannelManager::create_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_channel
1531 /// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel
1532 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels
1533 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1534 /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
1535 /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
1537 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
1538 pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
1539 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1540 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1541 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1543 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1544 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1545 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1546 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1548 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1549 pub balance_msat: u64,
1550 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1551 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1552 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1553 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1555 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1557 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1558 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1559 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1560 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1561 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1562 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1563 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1564 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1566 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat`],
1567 /// [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`], and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1568 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1569 /// The minimum value for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is the equivalent of
1570 /// [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat`] but represents a lower-bound, rather than
1571 /// an upper-bound. This is intended for use when routing, allowing us to ensure we pick a
1572 /// route which is valid.
1573 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1574 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1575 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1576 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1577 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1578 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1580 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1581 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1582 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1583 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1584 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1585 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1586 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1587 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1588 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1590 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1592 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1593 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1594 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1595 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1596 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1598 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1599 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1600 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1601 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1602 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1603 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1604 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1606 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1607 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1608 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1609 pub is_outbound: bool,
1610 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1611 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1612 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1613 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1614 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1616 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1617 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1618 /// The stage of the channel's shutdown.
1619 /// `None` for `ChannelDetails` serialized on LDK versions prior to 0.0.116.
1620 pub channel_shutdown_state: Option<ChannelShutdownState>,
1621 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1622 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1624 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1625 pub is_usable: bool,
1626 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1627 pub is_public: bool,
1628 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1629 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1630 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1631 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1632 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1633 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1635 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1636 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1639 impl ChannelDetails {
1640 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1641 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1642 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1644 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1645 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1646 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1647 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1650 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1651 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1652 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1654 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1655 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1656 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1657 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1660 fn from_channel_context<SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
1661 context: &ChannelContext<SP>, best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures,
1662 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
1665 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1666 F::Target: FeeEstimator
1668 let balance = context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
1669 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1670 context.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1672 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
1673 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1674 node_id: context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1675 features: latest_features,
1676 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1677 forwarding_info: context.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1678 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1679 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1680 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1681 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1682 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1683 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if context.have_received_message() {
1684 Some(context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1685 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1687 funding_txo: context.get_funding_txo(),
1688 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1689 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1690 channel_type: if context.have_received_message() { Some(context.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1691 short_channel_id: context.get_short_channel_id(),
1692 outbound_scid_alias: if context.is_usable() { Some(context.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1693 inbound_scid_alias: context.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1694 channel_value_satoshis: context.get_value_satoshis(),
1695 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
1696 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1697 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1698 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1699 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1700 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1701 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1702 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
1703 confirmations_required: context.minimum_depth(),
1704 confirmations: Some(context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1705 force_close_spend_delay: context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1706 is_outbound: context.is_outbound(),
1707 is_channel_ready: context.is_usable(),
1708 is_usable: context.is_live(),
1709 is_public: context.should_announce(),
1710 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(context.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1711 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1712 config: Some(context.config()),
1713 channel_shutdown_state: Some(context.shutdown_state()),
1718 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1719 /// Further information on the details of the channel shutdown.
1720 /// Upon channels being forced closed (i.e. commitment transaction confirmation detected
1721 /// by `ChainMonitor`), ChannelShutdownState will be set to `ShutdownComplete` or
1722 /// the channel will be removed shortly.
1723 /// Also note, that in normal operation, peers could disconnect at any of these states
1724 /// and require peer re-connection before making progress onto other states
1725 pub enum ChannelShutdownState {
1726 /// Channel has not sent or received a shutdown message.
1728 /// Local node has sent a shutdown message for this channel.
1730 /// Shutdown message exchanges have concluded and the channels are in the midst of
1731 /// resolving all existing open HTLCs before closing can continue.
1733 /// All HTLCs have been resolved, nodes are currently negotiating channel close onchain fee rates.
1734 NegotiatingClosingFee,
1735 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point `ChannelManager` is about
1736 /// to drop the channel.
1740 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1741 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1742 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1743 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1744 /// When an invoice was requested and thus a payment has not yet been sent.
1746 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1747 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1748 payment_id: PaymentId,
1750 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1752 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1753 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1754 payment_id: PaymentId,
1755 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1757 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1758 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1759 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1762 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1763 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1764 /// payment is removed from tracking.
1766 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1767 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1768 payment_id: PaymentId,
1769 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1770 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1771 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1773 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1774 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1775 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1777 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1778 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1779 payment_id: PaymentId,
1780 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1781 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1785 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1787 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
1789 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1790 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1791 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1792 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1794 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1795 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1796 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1799 macro_rules! handle_error {
1800 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
1801 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1802 // entering the macro.
1803 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1804 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1808 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish, channel_capacity }) => {
1809 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1811 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1812 $self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1813 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1814 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1818 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1819 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1820 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1821 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() },
1822 counterparty_node_id: Some($counterparty_node_id),
1823 channel_capacity_sats: channel_capacity,
1828 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1829 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1831 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1832 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1833 action: err.action.clone()
1837 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1838 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1839 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1840 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1841 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1845 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1850 ($self: ident, $internal: expr) => {
1853 Err((chan, msg_handle_err)) => {
1854 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
1855 handle_error!($self, Err(msg_handle_err), counterparty_node_id).map_err(|err| (chan, err))
1861 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1862 ($self: expr, $channel_context: expr) => {{
1863 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.channel_id());
1864 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1865 if let Some(short_id) = $channel_context.get_short_channel_id() {
1866 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1868 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1869 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1870 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1871 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1872 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1874 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
1875 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1877 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
1881 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1882 macro_rules! convert_chan_phase_err {
1883 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, $channel_update: expr) => {
1885 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1886 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), *$channel_id))
1888 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1889 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), *$channel_id))
1891 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1892 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", $channel_id, msg);
1893 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel.context);
1894 let shutdown_res = $channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
1895 let user_id = $channel.context.get_user_id();
1896 let channel_capacity_satoshis = $channel.context.get_value_satoshis();
1898 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, user_id,
1899 shutdown_res, $channel_update, channel_capacity_satoshis))
1903 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, FUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
1904 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, { $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast($channel).ok() })
1906 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
1907 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, None)
1909 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_phase: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1910 match $channel_phase {
1911 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
1912 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL)
1914 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel) => {
1915 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
1917 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel) => {
1918 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
1924 macro_rules! break_chan_phase_entry {
1925 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1929 let key = *$entry.key();
1930 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
1932 $entry.remove_entry();
1940 macro_rules! try_chan_phase_entry {
1941 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1945 let key = *$entry.key();
1946 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
1948 $entry.remove_entry();
1956 macro_rules! remove_channel_phase {
1957 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1959 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1960 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &channel.context());
1966 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1967 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
1968 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1969 node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1970 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1972 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1973 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1974 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1975 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.context.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
1976 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
1977 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1978 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
1979 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
1980 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
1981 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1986 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
1987 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1988 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
1989 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelPending {
1990 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
1991 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.context.temporary_channel_id(),
1992 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1993 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
1994 funding_txo: $channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
1996 $channel.context.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
2001 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
2002 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2003 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
2004 debug_assert!($channel.context.channel_pending_event_emitted());
2005 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelReady {
2006 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2007 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2008 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2009 channel_type: $channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
2011 $channel.context.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
2016 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
2017 ($self: ident, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2018 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&$self.logger,
2019 &$self.node_signer, $self.chain_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
2020 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
2021 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
2022 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.context.is_usable() {
2023 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
2024 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
2025 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
2026 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
2028 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
2029 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2030 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2036 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
2037 .remove(&$chan.context.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
2039 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
2040 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
2041 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
2042 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
2043 updates.announcement_sigs);
2044 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
2045 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
2048 let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id();
2049 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = $chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2050 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
2051 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
2053 // If the channel belongs to a batch funding transaction, the progress of the batch
2054 // should be updated as we have received funding_signed and persisted the monitor.
2055 if let Some(txid) = unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2056 let mut funding_batch_states = $self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2057 let mut batch_completed = false;
2058 if let Some(batch_state) = funding_batch_states.get_mut(&txid) {
2059 let channel_state = batch_state.iter_mut().find(|(chan_id, pubkey, _)| (
2060 *chan_id == channel_id &&
2061 *pubkey == counterparty_node_id
2063 if let Some(channel_state) = channel_state {
2064 channel_state.2 = true;
2066 debug_assert!(false, "Missing channel batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2068 batch_completed = batch_state.iter().all(|(_, _, completed)| *completed);
2070 debug_assert!(false, "Missing batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2073 // When all channels in a batched funding transaction have become ready, it is not necessary
2074 // to track the progress of the batch anymore and the state of the channels can be updated.
2075 if batch_completed {
2076 let removed_batch_state = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2077 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2078 let mut batch_funding_tx = None;
2079 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, _) in removed_batch_state {
2080 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2081 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2082 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
2083 batch_funding_tx = batch_funding_tx.or_else(|| chan.context.unbroadcasted_funding());
2084 chan.set_batch_ready();
2085 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2086 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, chan);
2090 if let Some(tx) = batch_funding_tx {
2091 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting batch funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
2092 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
2097 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
2099 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
2100 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
2102 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
2103 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2104 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2105 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
2110 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
2111 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $chan: expr, _internal, $completed: expr) => { {
2112 debug_assert!($self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire));
2114 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::UnrecoverableError => {
2115 let err_str = "ChannelMonitor[Update] persistence failed unrecoverably. This indicates we cannot continue normal operation and must shut down.";
2116 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err_str);
2117 panic!("{}", err_str);
2119 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
2120 log_debug!($self.logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
2121 &$chan.context.channel_id());
2124 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
2130 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, INITIAL_MONITOR) => {
2131 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $chan, _internal,
2132 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan))
2134 ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2135 let in_flight_updates = $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.entry($funding_txo)
2136 .or_insert_with(Vec::new);
2137 // During startup, we push monitor updates as background events through to here in
2138 // order to replay updates that were in-flight when we shut down. Thus, we have to
2139 // filter for uniqueness here.
2140 let idx = in_flight_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd == &$update)
2141 .unwrap_or_else(|| {
2142 in_flight_updates.push($update);
2143 in_flight_updates.len() - 1
2145 let update_res = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($funding_txo, &in_flight_updates[idx]);
2146 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, update_res, $chan, _internal,
2148 let _ = in_flight_updates.remove(idx);
2149 if in_flight_updates.is_empty() && $chan.blocked_monitor_updates_pending() == 0 {
2150 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
2156 macro_rules! process_events_body {
2157 ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
2158 let mut processed_all_events = false;
2159 while !processed_all_events {
2160 if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
2167 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
2168 // persists happen while processing monitor events.
2169 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2171 // Because `handle_post_event_actions` may send `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to the user we must
2172 // ensure any startup-generated background events are handled first.
2173 result = $self.process_background_events();
2175 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
2176 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
2177 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
2178 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2182 let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
2183 let num_events = pending_events.len();
2184 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
2185 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2188 let mut post_event_actions = Vec::new();
2190 for (event, action_opt) in pending_events {
2191 $event_to_handle = event;
2193 if let Some(action) = action_opt {
2194 post_event_actions.push(action);
2199 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2200 pending_events.drain(..num_events);
2201 processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
2202 // Note that `push_pending_forwards_ev` relies on `pending_events_processor` being
2203 // updated here with the `pending_events` lock acquired.
2204 $self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
2207 if !post_event_actions.is_empty() {
2208 $self.handle_post_event_actions(post_event_actions);
2209 // If we had some actions, go around again as we may have more events now
2210 processed_all_events = false;
2214 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
2215 $self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
2216 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify();
2218 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
2219 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
2220 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
2226 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
2228 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
2229 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2230 ES::Target: EntropySource,
2231 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2232 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2233 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2237 /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
2239 /// The current time or latest block header time can be provided as the `current_timestamp`.
2241 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
2242 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
2244 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
2246 /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
2247 /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
2248 /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
2251 /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
2252 /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
2253 /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
2255 fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES,
2256 node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters,
2257 current_timestamp: u32,
2259 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2260 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
2261 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
2262 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
2264 default_configuration: config.clone(),
2265 chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(params.network),
2266 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
2271 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
2273 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
2274 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2275 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
2276 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2277 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
2278 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2279 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2280 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2282 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
2285 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
2286 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2288 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2290 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(current_timestamp as usize),
2292 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2294 pending_events: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
2295 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
2296 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2297 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
2298 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
2299 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
2300 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
2301 funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
2311 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
2312 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
2313 &self.default_configuration
2316 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
2317 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2318 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
2321 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
2322 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
2324 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
2326 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
2330 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
2335 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
2337 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
2338 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
2339 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
2340 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
2341 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
2343 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
2344 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
2346 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to
2347 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2348 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`].
2350 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
2351 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
2352 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
2354 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
2355 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
2356 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
2357 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
2358 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
2359 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
2361 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
2362 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
2363 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
2364 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<ChannelId, APIError> {
2365 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
2366 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
2369 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2370 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
2371 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2373 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2375 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
2376 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
2378 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2380 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
2381 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2382 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
2383 match OutboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
2384 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
2385 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
2389 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
2394 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.chain_hash);
2396 let temporary_channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
2397 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
2398 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2400 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
2402 panic!("RNG is bad???");
2405 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel)); }
2408 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
2409 node_id: their_network_key,
2412 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
2415 fn list_funded_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&ChannelId, &Channel<SP>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2416 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2417 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2418 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2419 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2420 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2421 // the same channel.
2422 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2424 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2425 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2426 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2427 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2428 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2429 res.extend(peer_state.channel_by_id.iter()
2430 .filter_map(|(chan_id, phase)| match phase {
2431 // Only `Channels` in the `ChannelPhase::Funded` phase can be considered funded.
2432 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => Some((chan_id, chan)),
2436 .map(|(_channel_id, channel)| {
2437 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2438 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2446 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
2447 /// more information.
2448 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2449 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2450 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2451 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2452 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2453 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2454 // the same channel.
2455 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2457 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2458 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2459 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2460 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2461 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2462 for context in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().map(|(_, phase)| phase.context()) {
2463 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height,
2464 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2472 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
2473 /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
2475 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
2476 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
2478 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2479 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
2480 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
2481 // really wanted anyway.
2482 self.list_funded_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.context.is_live())
2485 /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
2486 pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2487 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2488 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2490 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
2491 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2492 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2493 let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2494 let context_to_details = |context| {
2495 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height, features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2497 return peer_state.channel_by_id
2499 .map(|(_, phase)| phase.context())
2500 .map(context_to_details)
2506 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
2507 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
2509 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
2510 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
2511 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
2513 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2514 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
2515 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
2516 .filter_map(|(payment_id, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
2517 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {
2518 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2520 // InvoiceReceived is an intermediate state and doesn't need to be exposed
2521 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {
2522 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2524 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
2525 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
2526 payment_id: *payment_id,
2527 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2528 total_msat: *total_msat,
2531 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
2532 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2534 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
2535 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2537 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
2542 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
2543 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, context: &ChannelContext<SP>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
2544 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2545 match context.unbroadcasted_funding() {
2546 Some(transaction) => {
2547 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::DiscardFunding {
2548 channel_id: context.channel_id(), transaction
2553 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
2554 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
2555 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
2556 reason: closure_reason,
2557 counterparty_node_id: Some(context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
2558 channel_capacity_sats: Some(context.get_value_satoshis()),
2562 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2563 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2565 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
2566 let mut shutdown_result = None;
2568 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2570 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2571 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2573 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2574 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2576 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2577 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
2578 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
2579 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
2580 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2581 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2582 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) =
2583 chan.get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
2584 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
2586 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
2587 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
2588 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
2589 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2590 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
2594 debug_assert!(monitor_update_opt.is_none() || !chan.is_shutdown(),
2595 "We can't both complete shutdown and generate a monitor update");
2597 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
2598 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
2599 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
2600 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
2604 if chan.is_shutdown() {
2605 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
2606 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2607 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2611 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2612 shutdown_result = Some((None, Vec::new(), unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid));
2618 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
2619 // If we reach this point, it means that the channel_id either refers to an unfunded channel or
2620 // it does not exist for this peer. Either way, we can attempt to force-close it.
2622 // An appropriate error will be returned for non-existence of the channel if that's the case.
2623 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
2624 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
2625 return self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, false).map(|_| ())
2630 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2631 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2632 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
2633 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
2636 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
2637 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
2643 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2644 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2645 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2647 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
2648 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2650 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
2651 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
2652 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
2653 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
2655 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2657 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2658 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2659 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2662 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2663 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2664 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2665 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2666 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2667 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None)
2670 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2671 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2672 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2674 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
2675 /// the channel being closed or not:
2676 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
2677 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
2678 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2679 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
2680 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
2681 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
2682 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
2684 /// The `shutdown_script` provided will be used as the `scriptPubKey` for the closing transaction.
2685 /// Will fail if a shutdown script has already been set for this channel by
2686 /// ['ChannelHandshakeConfig::commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey`]. The given shutdown script must
2687 /// also be compatible with our and the counterparty's features.
2689 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2691 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2692 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2693 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2696 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2697 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2698 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2699 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2700 pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2701 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script)
2704 fn finish_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
2705 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2706 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2707 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
2708 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2711 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs, unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid) = shutdown_res;
2712 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
2713 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2714 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
2715 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2716 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2717 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
2719 if let Some((_, funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
2720 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2721 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2722 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2723 // ignore the result here.
2724 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
2726 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
2727 if let Some(txid) = unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2728 let mut funding_batch_states = self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2729 let affected_channels = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2730 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2731 let mut has_uncompleted_channel = None;
2732 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, state) in affected_channels {
2733 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2734 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2735 if let Some(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id) {
2736 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
2737 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context(), ClosureReason::FundingBatchClosure);
2738 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
2741 has_uncompleted_channel = Some(has_uncompleted_channel.map_or(!state, |v| v || !state));
2744 has_uncompleted_channel.unwrap_or(true),
2745 "Closing a batch where all channels have completed initial monitor update",
2748 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
2749 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
2753 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2754 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2755 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
2756 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2757 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2758 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2759 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
2760 let (update_opt, counterparty_node_id) = {
2761 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2762 let closure_reason = if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2763 ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) }
2765 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
2767 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2768 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", channel_id);
2769 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan_phase_entry.get().context(), closure_reason);
2770 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
2771 mem::drop(peer_state);
2772 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
2774 ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) => {
2775 self.finish_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(broadcast));
2776 (self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan).ok(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2778 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {
2779 self.finish_close_channel(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
2780 // Unfunded channel has no update
2781 (None, chan_phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id())
2784 } else if peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(channel_id).is_some() {
2785 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", &channel_id);
2786 // N.B. that we don't send any channel close event here: we
2787 // don't have a user_channel_id, and we never sent any opening
2789 (None, *peer_node_id)
2791 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, peer_node_id) });
2794 if let Some(update) = update_opt {
2795 // Try to send the `BroadcastChannelUpdate` to the peer we just force-closed on, but if
2796 // not try to broadcast it via whatever peer we have.
2797 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2798 let a_peer_state_opt = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2799 .ok_or(per_peer_state.values().next());
2800 if let Ok(a_peer_state_mutex) = a_peer_state_opt {
2801 let mut a_peer_state = a_peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2802 a_peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2808 Ok(counterparty_node_id)
2811 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2812 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2813 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2814 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2815 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2816 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2817 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2818 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
2819 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2820 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2821 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
2822 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() })
2833 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2834 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2835 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2837 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2838 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2839 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2842 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2843 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2844 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2846 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2847 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2848 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2849 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2850 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2853 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2854 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2855 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2856 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2857 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2861 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2862 /// local transaction(s).
2863 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2864 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2865 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2869 fn construct_fwd_pending_htlc_info(
2870 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload, hop_hmac: [u8; 32],
2871 new_packet_bytes: [u8; onion_utils::ONION_DATA_LEN], shared_secret: [u8; 32],
2872 next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>
2873 ) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, InboundOnionErr> {
2874 debug_assert!(next_packet_pubkey_opt.is_some());
2875 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2877 public_key: next_packet_pubkey_opt.unwrap_or(Err(secp256k1::Error::InvalidPublicKey)),
2878 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2882 let (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value) = match hop_data {
2883 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward { short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value } =>
2884 (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value),
2885 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { .. } | msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedReceive { .. } =>
2886 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2887 msg: "Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node",
2888 err_code: 0x4000 | 22,
2889 err_data: Vec::new(),
2893 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2894 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2895 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2898 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2899 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2900 incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
2901 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward,
2902 outgoing_cltv_value,
2903 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
2907 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(
2908 &self, hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload, shared_secret: [u8; 32], payment_hash: PaymentHash,
2909 amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>, allow_underpay: bool,
2910 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
2911 ) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, InboundOnionErr> {
2912 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, onion_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata) = match hop_data {
2913 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
2914 payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata, ..
2916 (payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata),
2917 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedReceive {
2918 amt_msat, total_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_secret, ..
2920 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData { payment_secret, total_msat };
2921 (Some(payment_data), None, Vec::new(), amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, None)
2923 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward { .. } => {
2924 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2925 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2926 err_data: Vec::new(),
2927 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2931 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2932 if outgoing_cltv_value > cltv_expiry {
2933 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2934 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to less than the CLTV set by the sender",
2936 err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
2939 // final_expiry_too_soon
2940 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2941 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2943 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2944 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2945 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2946 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2947 if cltv_expiry <= current_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 {
2948 let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12);
2949 err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes());
2950 err_data.extend_from_slice(¤t_height.to_be_bytes());
2951 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2952 err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data,
2953 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2956 if (!allow_underpay && onion_amt_msat > amt_msat) ||
2957 (allow_underpay && onion_amt_msat >
2958 amt_msat.saturating_add(counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)))
2960 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2962 err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
2963 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2967 let routing = if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2968 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2969 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2970 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2971 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2972 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2973 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2974 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2975 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2976 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2977 err_data: Vec::new(),
2978 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2981 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && payment_data.is_some() {
2982 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2983 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2984 err_data: Vec::new(),
2985 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2988 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2992 incoming_cltv_expiry: outgoing_cltv_value,
2995 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2996 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2999 incoming_cltv_expiry: outgoing_cltv_value,
3000 phantom_shared_secret,
3004 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
3005 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
3006 err_data: Vec::new(),
3007 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
3010 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
3013 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
3014 incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
3015 outgoing_amt_msat: onion_amt_msat,
3016 outgoing_cltv_value,
3017 skimmed_fee_msat: counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
3021 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(
3022 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC
3023 ) -> Result<(onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>), HTLCFailureMsg> {
3024 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
3025 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
3027 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3028 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3029 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3030 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3031 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
3032 failure_code: $err_code,
3038 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
3039 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
3042 let shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(
3043 Recipient::Node, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None
3044 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
3046 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
3047 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
3048 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
3049 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
3050 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
3051 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
3052 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
3053 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
3055 macro_rules! return_err {
3056 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3058 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3059 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3060 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3061 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3062 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
3063 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3069 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(
3070 shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac,
3071 msg.payment_hash, &self.node_signer
3074 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3075 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
3077 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3078 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
3081 let (outgoing_scid, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, next_packet_pk_opt) = match next_hop {
3082 onion_utils::Hop::Forward {
3083 next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward {
3084 short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value
3087 let next_packet_pk = onion_utils::next_hop_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx,
3088 msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &shared_secret);
3089 (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(next_packet_pk))
3091 // We'll do receive checks in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] so we have access to the
3092 // inbound channel's state.
3093 onion_utils::Hop::Receive { .. } => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)),
3094 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { .. }, .. } |
3095 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedReceive { .. }, .. } =>
3097 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0; 0]);
3101 // Perform outbound checks here instead of in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] because we
3102 // can't hold the outbound peer state lock at the same time as the inbound peer state lock.
3103 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
3104 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&outgoing_scid).cloned();
3105 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
3106 None => { // unknown_next_peer
3107 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
3108 // phantom or an intercept.
3109 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
3110 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)) ||
3111 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)
3115 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3118 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
3120 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
3121 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3122 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3123 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3124 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3126 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3127 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3128 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).map(
3129 |chan_phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
3132 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
3133 // have no consistency guarantees.
3134 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3138 if !chan.context.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
3139 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
3140 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
3141 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
3142 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3144 if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && outgoing_scid != chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() {
3145 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
3146 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
3147 // we don't have the channel here.
3148 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3150 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
3152 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
3153 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
3154 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
3155 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
3156 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
3157 if !chan.context.is_live() { // channel_disabled
3158 // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
3159 // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
3160 // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
3161 if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
3162 break Some(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
3164 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
3167 if outgoing_amt_msat < chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
3168 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
3170 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value) {
3171 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
3175 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
3176 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
3177 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
3178 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
3180 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
3187 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3188 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
3189 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
3190 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
3191 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
3192 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
3194 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
3195 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
3197 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
3198 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
3199 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
3200 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
3201 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
3202 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
3203 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
3204 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
3205 if (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
3206 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
3212 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
3213 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
3214 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
3215 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3217 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
3218 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3220 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3221 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
3222 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3224 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3225 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3226 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3227 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
3228 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
3229 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
3230 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
3234 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
3236 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt))
3239 fn construct_pending_htlc_status<'a>(
3240 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, shared_secret: [u8; 32], decoded_hop: onion_utils::Hop,
3241 allow_underpay: bool, next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>
3242 ) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
3243 macro_rules! return_err {
3244 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3246 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3247 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3248 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3249 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3250 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
3251 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3257 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
3259 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash,
3260 msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None, allow_underpay, msg.skimmed_fee_msat)
3263 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
3264 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
3265 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
3266 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
3267 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
3269 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3272 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
3273 match self.construct_fwd_pending_htlc_info(msg, next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac,
3274 new_packet_bytes, shared_secret, next_packet_pubkey_opt) {
3275 Ok(info) => PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info),
3276 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3282 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
3283 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
3284 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
3286 /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
3287 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
3288 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3290 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3291 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3292 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3293 if !chan.context.should_announce() {
3294 return Err(LightningError {
3295 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
3296 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
3299 if chan.context.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
3300 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
3302 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3303 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
3306 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
3307 /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
3308 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
3309 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
3311 /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
3312 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
3313 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3315 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3316 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3317 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3318 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3319 let short_channel_id = match chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
3320 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
3324 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
3327 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3328 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3329 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
3331 let enabled = chan.context.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
3332 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
3333 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
3334 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
3335 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => false,
3338 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
3339 chain_hash: self.chain_hash,
3341 timestamp: chan.context.get_update_time_counter(),
3342 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
3343 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.context.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
3344 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
3345 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.context.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
3346 fee_base_msat: chan.context.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
3347 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.context.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
3348 excess_data: Vec::new(),
3350 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
3351 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
3352 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
3354 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
3356 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
3363 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3364 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3365 self.send_payment_along_path(SendAlongPathArgs {
3366 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3371 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, args: SendAlongPathArgs) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3372 let SendAlongPathArgs {
3373 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3376 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
3377 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
3379 log_trace!(self.logger,
3380 "Attempting to send payment with payment hash {} along path with next hop {}",
3381 payment_hash, path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
3382 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
3383 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
3385 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
3386 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected".to_owned()})?;
3387 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
3389 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash)
3390 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute { err: "Route size too large considering onion data".to_owned()})?;
3392 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
3393 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
3394 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
3395 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3398 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3399 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3400 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
3401 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3402 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3403 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
3404 match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
3405 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
3406 if !chan.context.is_live() {
3407 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
3409 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
3410 let send_res = chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
3411 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3413 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
3414 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
3416 }, onion_packet, None, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
3417 match break_chan_phase_entry!(self, send_res, chan_phase_entry) {
3418 Some(monitor_update) => {
3419 match handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
3421 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
3422 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
3423 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
3424 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
3425 // which we do in the send_payment check for
3426 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
3427 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
3435 _ => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel to first hop is unfunded".to_owned()}),
3438 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
3439 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
3440 // `channel_by_id` map.
3441 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
3442 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
3447 match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
3448 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3450 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
3455 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
3457 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
3458 /// fields for more info.
3460 /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
3461 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
3463 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
3465 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
3466 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
3467 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
3468 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
3469 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
3471 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
3472 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
3473 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
3474 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
3475 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
3477 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
3478 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
3479 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
3480 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
3482 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
3484 /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
3485 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
3486 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
3488 /// In general, a path may raise:
3489 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
3490 /// node public key) is specified.
3491 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available as it has been
3492 /// closed, doesn't exist, or the peer is currently disconnected.
3493 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
3494 /// relevant updates.
3496 /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
3497 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
3498 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
3500 /// [`RouteHop`]: crate::routing::router::RouteHop
3501 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3502 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
3503 /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
3504 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
3505 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3506 pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3507 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3508 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3509 self.pending_outbound_payments
3510 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id,
3511 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3512 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3515 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route`], but will automatically find a route based on
3516 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3517 pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
3518 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3519 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3520 self.pending_outbound_payments
3521 .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
3522 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
3523 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
3524 &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3528 pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3529 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3530 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3531 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion,
3532 keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer,
3533 best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3537 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
3538 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3539 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
3543 pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
3544 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
3548 /// Signals that no further attempts for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
3549 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
3550 /// retries are exhausted.
3552 /// # Event Generation
3554 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
3555 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
3557 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
3558 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
3559 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
3561 /// # Restart Behavior
3563 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated and we restart without first persisting the
3564 /// [`ChannelManager`], another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated.
3565 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
3566 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3567 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
3570 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
3571 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
3572 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
3573 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
3574 /// never reach the recipient.
3576 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
3577 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
3579 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
3580 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
3582 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
3583 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
3584 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3585 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3586 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
3587 route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
3588 &self.node_signer, best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3591 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
3592 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3594 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
3597 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
3598 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
3599 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3600 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3601 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
3602 payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3603 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3604 &self.logger, &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3607 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
3608 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
3609 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
3610 pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
3611 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3612 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3613 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret,
3614 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3615 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3618 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
3621 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
3622 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
3625 /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay the given
3626 /// amount to the given `node_id`.
3628 /// See [`ChannelManager::send_preflight_probes`] for more information.
3629 pub fn send_spontaneous_preflight_probes(
3630 &self, node_id: PublicKey, amount_msat: u64, final_cltv_expiry_delta: u32,
3631 liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
3632 ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
3633 let payment_params =
3634 PaymentParameters::from_node_id(node_id, final_cltv_expiry_delta);
3636 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, amount_msat);
3638 self.send_preflight_probes(route_params, liquidity_limit_multiplier)
3641 /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay a route found
3642 /// according to the given [`RouteParameters`].
3644 /// This may be used to send "pre-flight" probes, i.e., to train our scorer before conducting
3645 /// the actual payment. Note this is only useful if there likely is sufficient time for the
3646 /// probe to settle before sending out the actual payment, e.g., when waiting for user
3647 /// confirmation in a wallet UI.
3649 /// Otherwise, there is a chance the probe could take up some liquidity needed to complete the
3650 /// actual payment. Users should therefore be cautious and might avoid sending probes if
3651 /// liquidity is scarce and/or they don't expect the probe to return before they send the
3652 /// payment. To mitigate this issue, channels with available liquidity less than the required
3653 /// amount times the given `liquidity_limit_multiplier` won't be used to send pre-flight
3654 /// probes. If `None` is given as `liquidity_limit_multiplier`, it defaults to `3`.
3655 pub fn send_preflight_probes(
3656 &self, route_params: RouteParameters, liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
3657 ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
3658 let liquidity_limit_multiplier = liquidity_limit_multiplier.unwrap_or(3);
3660 let payer = self.get_our_node_id();
3661 let usable_channels = self.list_usable_channels();
3662 let first_hops = usable_channels.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>();
3663 let inflight_htlcs = self.compute_inflight_htlcs();
3667 .find_route(&payer, &route_params, Some(&first_hops), inflight_htlcs)
3669 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to find path for payment probe: {:?}", e);
3670 ProbeSendFailure::RouteNotFound
3673 let mut used_liquidity_map = HashMap::with_capacity(first_hops.len());
3675 let mut res = Vec::new();
3677 for mut path in route.paths {
3678 // If the last hop is probably an unannounced channel we refrain from probing all the
3679 // way through to the end and instead probe up to the second-to-last channel.
3680 while let Some(last_path_hop) = path.hops.last() {
3681 if last_path_hop.maybe_announced_channel {
3682 // We found a potentially announced last hop.
3685 // Drop the last hop, as it's likely unannounced.
3688 "Avoided sending payment probe all the way to last hop {} as it is likely unannounced.",
3689 last_path_hop.short_channel_id
3691 let final_value_msat = path.final_value_msat();
3693 if let Some(new_last) = path.hops.last_mut() {
3694 new_last.fee_msat += final_value_msat;
3699 if path.hops.len() < 2 {
3702 "Skipped sending payment probe over path with less than two hops."
3707 if let Some(first_path_hop) = path.hops.first() {
3708 if let Some(first_hop) = first_hops.iter().find(|h| {
3709 h.get_outbound_payment_scid() == Some(first_path_hop.short_channel_id)
3711 let path_value = path.final_value_msat() + path.fee_msat();
3712 let used_liquidity =
3713 used_liquidity_map.entry(first_path_hop.short_channel_id).or_insert(0);
3715 if first_hop.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat
3716 < (*used_liquidity + path_value) * liquidity_limit_multiplier
3718 log_debug!(self.logger, "Skipped sending payment probe to avoid putting channel {} under the liquidity limit.", first_path_hop.short_channel_id);
3721 *used_liquidity += path_value;
3726 res.push(self.send_probe(path).map_err(|e| {
3727 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to send pre-flight probe: {:?}", e);
3728 ProbeSendFailure::SendingFailed(e)
3735 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
3736 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
3737 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: FnMut(&OutboundV1Channel<SP>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
3738 &self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, is_batch_funding: bool,
3739 mut find_funding_output: FundingOutput,
3740 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3741 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3742 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3743 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3745 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3746 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3747 let (chan, msg) = match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
3748 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan)) => {
3749 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
3751 let funding_res = chan.get_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, is_batch_funding, &self.logger)
3752 .map_err(|(mut chan, e)| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
3753 let channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
3754 let user_id = chan.context.get_user_id();
3755 let shutdown_res = chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
3756 let channel_capacity = chan.context.get_value_satoshis();
3757 (chan, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None, channel_capacity))
3758 } else { unreachable!(); });
3760 Ok((chan, funding_msg)) => (chan, funding_msg),
3761 Err((chan, err)) => {
3762 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
3763 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3765 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(err), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
3766 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3767 err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
3773 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(*temporary_channel_id, phase);
3774 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3776 "Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is not an unfunded, outbound V1 channel",
3777 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3780 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {err: format!(
3781 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
3782 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3786 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
3787 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3790 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
3791 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3792 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
3794 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3795 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
3796 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.context.channel_id(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
3797 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
3799 e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan));
3806 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3807 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, false, |_, tx| {
3808 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
3812 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
3814 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
3815 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
3817 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
3818 /// across the p2p network.
3820 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
3821 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
3823 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
3824 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
3825 /// keys per-channel).
3827 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
3828 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
3829 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
3831 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
3832 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
3833 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
3835 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
3836 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
3837 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
3838 /// for more details.
3840 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
3841 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
3842 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3843 self.batch_funding_transaction_generated(&[(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id)], funding_transaction)
3846 /// Call this upon creation of a batch funding transaction for the given channels.
3848 /// Return values are identical to [`Self::funding_transaction_generated`], respective to
3849 /// each individual channel and transaction output.
3851 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. This batch funding transcaction
3852 /// will only be broadcast when we have safely received and persisted the counterparty's
3853 /// signature for each channel.
3855 /// If there is an error, all channels in the batch are to be considered closed.
3856 pub fn batch_funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channels: &[(&ChannelId, &PublicKey)], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3857 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3858 let mut result = Ok(());
3860 if !funding_transaction.is_coin_base() {
3861 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
3862 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
3863 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3864 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
3869 if funding_transaction.output.len() > u16::max_value() as usize {
3870 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3871 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
3875 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3876 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools if their locktime is strictly
3877 // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
3878 // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
3879 // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
3880 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 1 {
3881 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3882 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
3887 let txid = funding_transaction.txid();
3888 let is_batch_funding = temporary_channels.len() > 1;
3889 let mut funding_batch_states = if is_batch_funding {
3890 Some(self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap())
3894 let mut funding_batch_state = funding_batch_states.as_mut().and_then(|states| {
3895 match states.entry(txid) {
3896 btree_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3897 result = result.clone().and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3898 err: "Batch funding transaction with the same txid already exists".to_owned()
3902 btree_map::Entry::Vacant(vacant) => Some(vacant.insert(Vec::new())),
3905 for &(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in temporary_channels.iter() {
3906 result = result.and_then(|_| self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(
3907 temporary_channel_id,
3908 counterparty_node_id,
3909 funding_transaction.clone(),
3912 let mut output_index = None;
3913 let expected_spk = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
3914 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3915 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.context.get_value_satoshis() {
3916 if output_index.is_some() {
3917 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3918 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
3921 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
3924 if output_index.is_none() {
3925 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3926 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
3929 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() };
3930 if let Some(funding_batch_state) = funding_batch_state.as_mut() {
3931 funding_batch_state.push((outpoint.to_channel_id(), *counterparty_node_id, false));
3937 if let Err(ref e) = result {
3938 // Remaining channels need to be removed on any error.
3939 let e = format!("Error in transaction funding: {:?}", e);
3940 let mut channels_to_remove = Vec::new();
3941 channels_to_remove.extend(funding_batch_states.as_mut()
3942 .and_then(|states| states.remove(&txid))
3943 .into_iter().flatten()
3944 .map(|(chan_id, node_id, _state)| (chan_id, node_id))
3946 channels_to_remove.extend(temporary_channels.iter()
3947 .map(|(&chan_id, &node_id)| (chan_id, node_id))
3949 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
3951 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3952 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in channels_to_remove {
3953 per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3954 .map(|peer_state_mutex| peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap())
3955 .and_then(|mut peer_state| peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id))
3957 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
3958 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context(), ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: e.clone() });
3959 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
3963 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
3964 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
3970 /// Atomically applies partial updates to the [`ChannelConfig`] of the given channels.
3972 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3973 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3974 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3975 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3977 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3978 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3980 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3981 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3983 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3985 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3986 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3987 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3988 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3989 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3990 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3991 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3992 pub fn update_partial_channel_config(
3993 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config_update: &ChannelConfigUpdate,
3994 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3995 if config_update.cltv_expiry_delta.map(|delta| delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA).unwrap_or(false) {
3996 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3997 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
4001 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4002 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4003 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4004 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4005 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4006 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4007 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4008 if !peer_state.has_channel(channel_id) {
4009 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4010 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4014 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4015 if let Some(channel_phase) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
4016 let mut config = channel_phase.context().config();
4017 config.apply(config_update);
4018 if !channel_phase.context_mut().update_config(&config) {
4021 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = channel_phase {
4022 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
4023 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
4024 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
4025 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4026 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4033 // This should not be reachable as we've already checked for non-existence in the previous channel_id loop.
4034 debug_assert!(false);
4035 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4037 "Channel with ID {} for passed counterparty_node_id {} disappeared after we confirmed its existence - this should not be reachable!",
4038 channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4045 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
4047 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
4048 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
4049 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
4050 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
4052 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
4053 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
4055 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
4056 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
4058 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
4060 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4061 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
4062 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
4063 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
4064 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4065 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
4066 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
4067 pub fn update_channel_config(
4068 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config: &ChannelConfig,
4069 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4070 return self.update_partial_channel_config(counterparty_node_id, channel_ids, &(*config).into());
4073 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
4074 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
4076 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
4077 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
4079 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
4080 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
4081 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
4082 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
4083 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
4085 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
4086 /// you from forwarding more than you received. See
4087 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`] for more on forwarding a different amount
4090 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4093 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
4094 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4095 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
4096 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
4097 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
4098 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &ChannelId, next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4099 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4101 let next_hop_scid = {
4102 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4103 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
4104 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
4105 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4106 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4107 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
4108 Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) => {
4109 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
4110 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4111 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", next_hop_channel_id)
4114 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias())
4116 Some(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4117 err: format!("Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is still opening.",
4118 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id)
4120 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4121 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
4122 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id)
4127 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4128 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4129 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4132 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
4133 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => {
4134 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid }
4136 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4138 let skimmed_fee_msat =
4139 payment.forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat.saturating_sub(amt_to_forward_msat);
4140 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
4141 skimmed_fee_msat: if skimmed_fee_msat == 0 { None } else { Some(skimmed_fee_msat) },
4142 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
4145 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
4146 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4147 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4148 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
4149 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
4151 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
4155 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
4156 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
4158 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4161 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4162 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4163 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4165 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4166 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4167 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4170 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
4171 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4172 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4173 user_channel_id: Some(payment.prev_user_channel_id),
4174 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4175 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
4176 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
4177 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4180 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
4181 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
4182 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4183 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4188 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
4190 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
4191 /// Will likely generate further events.
4192 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
4193 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4195 let mut new_events = VecDeque::new();
4196 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
4197 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
4199 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
4200 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
4202 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
4203 if short_chan_id != 0 {
4204 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
4206 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4207 match forward_info {
4208 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4209 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4210 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4211 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4212 outgoing_cltv_value, ..
4215 macro_rules! failure_handler {
4216 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
4217 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
4219 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4220 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4221 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4222 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4223 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4224 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4225 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
4228 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
4229 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
4231 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
4234 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4235 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
4241 macro_rules! fail_forward {
4242 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4244 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
4248 macro_rules! failed_payment {
4249 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4251 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
4255 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
4256 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
4257 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.chain_hash) {
4258 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
4259 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(
4260 phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac,
4261 payment_hash, &self.node_signer
4264 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4265 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
4266 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
4267 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
4268 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
4270 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
4272 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4273 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
4277 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
4278 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data,
4279 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4280 outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret), false, None)
4282 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
4283 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
4289 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4292 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4295 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
4296 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
4297 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
4298 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
4299 // problem, not ours.
4305 let chan_info_opt = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id).cloned();
4306 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match chan_info_opt {
4307 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id, chan_id),
4309 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4313 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4314 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4315 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
4316 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4319 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4320 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4321 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id) {
4322 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4323 match forward_info {
4324 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4325 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4326 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4327 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
4328 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4331 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, &payment_hash, short_chan_id);
4332 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4333 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4334 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4335 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4336 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4337 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4338 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
4339 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4341 if let Err(e) = chan.queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
4342 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
4343 onion_packet, skimmed_fee_msat, &self.fee_estimator,
4346 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4347 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", &payment_hash, msg);
4349 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
4351 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan);
4352 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4353 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
4354 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
4359 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
4360 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
4362 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
4363 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
4364 if let Err(e) = chan.queue_fail_htlc(
4365 htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger
4367 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4368 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
4370 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
4372 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
4373 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
4374 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
4381 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4385 'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4386 match forward_info {
4387 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4388 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4389 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4390 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat,
4391 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4394 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
4395 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret, custom_tlvs } => {
4396 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
4397 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret),
4398 payment_metadata, custom_tlvs };
4399 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
4400 Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
4402 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_data, payment_preimage, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, custom_tlvs } => {
4403 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields {
4404 payment_secret: payment_data.as_ref().map(|data| data.payment_secret),
4408 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
4409 payment_data, None, onion_fields)
4412 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
4415 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
4416 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
4417 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4418 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4419 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4420 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4421 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4422 phantom_shared_secret,
4424 // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
4425 // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
4426 // if routing nodes overpay
4427 value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
4428 sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
4430 total_value_received: None,
4431 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
4434 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
4437 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
4439 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
4440 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
4441 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
4442 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4443 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
4444 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
4446 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4447 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
4448 user_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.user_channel_id,
4449 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4450 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
4451 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
4452 phantom_shared_secret,
4454 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
4455 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
4457 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
4460 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
4461 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4462 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4463 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4464 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4467 macro_rules! check_total_value {
4468 ($purpose: expr) => {{
4469 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
4470 let is_keysend = match $purpose {
4471 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(_) => true,
4472 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { .. } => false,
4474 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4475 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
4476 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4478 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
4479 .entry(payment_hash)
4480 // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
4481 .or_insert_with(|| {
4482 committed_to_claimable = true;
4484 purpose: $purpose.clone(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
4487 if $purpose != claimable_payment.purpose {
4488 let log_keysend = |keysend| if keysend { "keysend" } else { "non-keysend" };
4489 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new {} HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing {} HTLC with the same payment hash", log_keysend(is_keysend), &payment_hash, log_keysend(!is_keysend));
4490 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4492 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && is_keysend && !claimable_payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4493 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash and our config states we don't accept MPP keysend", &payment_hash);
4494 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4496 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
4497 if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
4498 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4501 claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
4503 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
4504 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
4505 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
4506 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
4507 total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
4508 earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
4509 if htlc.total_msat != claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4510 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
4511 &payment_hash, claimable_htlc.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
4512 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
4514 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
4516 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
4517 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
4518 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
4519 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4520 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4521 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
4523 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4524 } else if total_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4525 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4526 committed_to_claimable = true;
4528 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
4529 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4530 let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
4531 htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
4532 let counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat = htlcs.iter()
4533 .map(|htlc| htlc.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)).sum();
4534 debug_assert!(total_value.saturating_sub(amount_msat) <=
4535 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat);
4536 new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
4537 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4541 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
4542 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
4543 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4544 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
4545 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
4547 payment_claimable_generated = true;
4549 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
4550 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
4552 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4553 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4554 committed_to_claimable = true;
4557 payment_claimable_generated
4561 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
4562 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
4563 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
4564 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
4565 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
4566 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
4567 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4568 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
4569 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4570 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4571 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
4572 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4573 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
4574 Ok(result) => result,
4576 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", &payment_hash);
4577 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4580 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
4581 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
4582 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
4583 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
4584 &payment_hash, cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
4585 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4588 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4589 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4590 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4592 check_total_value!(purpose);
4594 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
4595 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
4596 check_total_value!(purpose);
4600 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
4601 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4602 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", &payment_hash);
4603 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4605 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4606 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
4607 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", &payment_hash);
4608 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4609 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
4610 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
4611 &payment_hash, payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
4612 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4614 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4615 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
4616 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4618 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(purpose);
4619 if payment_claimable_generated {
4620 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
4626 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
4627 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
4635 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4636 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
4637 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4638 &self.pending_events, &self.logger, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args));
4640 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
4641 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4643 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
4645 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
4646 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
4647 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
4649 self.check_free_holding_cells();
4651 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
4652 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4653 events.append(&mut new_events);
4656 /// Free the background events, generally called from [`PersistenceNotifierGuard`] constructors.
4658 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
4659 fn process_background_events(&self) -> NotifyOption {
4660 debug_assert_ne!(self.total_consistency_lock.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::NotHeldByThread);
4662 self.background_events_processed_since_startup.store(true, Ordering::Release);
4664 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
4665 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
4666 if background_events.is_empty() {
4667 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4670 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
4672 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, update)) => {
4673 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
4674 // monitor updating completing.
4675 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4677 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup { counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update } => {
4678 let mut updated_chan = false;
4680 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4681 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4682 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4683 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4684 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4685 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase) => {
4686 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase.get_mut() {
4687 updated_chan = true;
4688 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, update.clone(),
4689 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4691 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't have an update for a non-funded channel");
4694 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {},
4699 // TODO: Track this as in-flight even though the channel is closed.
4700 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4703 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete { counterparty_node_id, channel_id } => {
4704 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4705 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4706 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4707 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4708 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
4709 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4711 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
4712 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
4713 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
4714 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4715 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
4721 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4724 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
4725 /// Process background events, for functional testing
4726 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
4727 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
4728 let _ = self.process_background_events();
4731 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &ChannelId, chan: &mut Channel<SP>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
4732 if !chan.context.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents; }
4733 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
4734 if new_feerate <= chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4735 if new_feerate != chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4736 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4737 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4739 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4741 if !chan.context.is_live() {
4742 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
4743 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4744 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4746 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4747 &chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4749 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
4750 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4754 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
4755 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
4756 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
4757 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
4758 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
4759 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
4760 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4762 let normal_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4763 let min_mempool_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::MempoolMinimum);
4765 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4766 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4767 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4768 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4769 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
4770 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
4772 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4777 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4778 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4786 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
4788 /// This currently includes:
4789 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
4790 /// * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
4791 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
4793 /// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
4794 /// with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
4795 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
4796 /// * Force-closing and removing channels which have not completed establishment in a timely manner.
4797 /// * Forgetting about stale outbound payments, either those that have already been fulfilled
4798 /// or those awaiting an invoice that hasn't been delivered in the necessary amount of time.
4799 /// The latter is determined using the system clock in `std` and the block time minus two
4800 /// hours in `no-std`.
4802 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
4803 /// estimate fetches.
4805 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4806 /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
4807 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
4808 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
4809 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4811 let normal_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4812 let min_mempool_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::MempoolMinimum);
4814 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
4815 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
4816 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
4817 let mut shutdown_channels = Vec::new();
4819 let mut process_unfunded_channel_tick = |
4820 chan_id: &ChannelId,
4821 context: &mut ChannelContext<SP>,
4822 unfunded_context: &mut UnfundedChannelContext,
4823 pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4824 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
4826 context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4827 if unfunded_context.should_expire_unfunded_channel() {
4828 log_error!(self.logger,
4829 "Force-closing pending channel with ID {} for not establishing in a timely manner", chan_id);
4830 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
4831 self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4832 shutdown_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false));
4833 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4834 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4835 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4836 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
4837 channel_id: *chan_id,
4838 data: "Force-closing pending channel due to timeout awaiting establishment handshake".to_owned(),
4849 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4850 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4851 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4852 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4853 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
4854 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
4855 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, phase| {
4857 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
4858 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4863 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4864 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4866 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
4867 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
4868 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
4869 if needs_close { return false; }
4872 match chan.channel_update_status() {
4873 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
4874 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
4875 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.context.is_live()
4876 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
4877 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.context.is_live()
4878 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
4879 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.context.is_live() => {
4881 if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4882 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
4883 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4884 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4888 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4890 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
4893 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.context.is_live() => {
4895 if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4896 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
4897 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4898 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4902 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4904 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
4910 chan.context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4912 if chan.should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response() {
4913 log_debug!(self.logger, "Disconnecting peer {} due to not making any progress on channel {}",
4914 counterparty_node_id, chan_id);
4915 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4916 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4917 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning {
4918 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
4919 channel_id: *chan_id,
4920 data: "Disconnecting due to timeout awaiting response".to_owned(),
4928 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
4929 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
4930 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
4932 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
4933 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
4934 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
4939 for (chan_id, req) in peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.iter_mut() {
4940 if { req.ticks_remaining -= 1 ; req.ticks_remaining } <= 0 {
4941 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing unaccepted inbound channel {} for not accepting in a timely manner", &chan_id);
4942 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
4943 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4944 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4945 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4946 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_id.clone(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
4952 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.retain(|_, req| req.ticks_remaining > 0);
4954 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
4955 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
4960 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
4961 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
4962 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
4963 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
4964 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
4965 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
4966 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
4967 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
4968 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
4969 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
4970 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
4971 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
4972 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
4973 // have no channels to the peer.
4974 let remove_entry = {
4975 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
4976 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
4979 entry.remove_entry();
4982 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
4987 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
4988 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4989 // This should be unreachable
4990 debug_assert!(false);
4993 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
4994 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
4995 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
4996 // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
4997 // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
4998 if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
4999 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
5002 } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
5003 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
5004 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
5006 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
5007 .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
5014 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
5015 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
5016 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
5017 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
5018 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
5021 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5022 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5025 for shutdown_res in shutdown_channels {
5026 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
5029 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
5030 let duration_since_epoch = std::time::SystemTime::now()
5031 .duration_since(std::time::SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH)
5032 .expect("SystemTime::now() should come after SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH");
5033 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
5034 let duration_since_epoch = Duration::from_secs(
5035 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire).saturating_sub(7200) as u64
5038 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_payments(
5039 duration_since_epoch, &self.pending_events
5042 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
5043 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
5044 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
5045 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5046 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5053 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
5054 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
5055 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
5057 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
5058 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
5059 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
5060 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
5062 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
5063 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
5064 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
5065 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
5066 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
5067 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
5070 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
5071 /// reason for the failure.
5073 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
5074 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
5075 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5077 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
5078 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
5079 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5080 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
5081 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5082 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
5083 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5088 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
5089 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
5090 match failure_code {
5091 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
5092 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
5093 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
5094 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5095 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
5096 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), htlc_msat_height_data)
5098 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(data) => {
5099 let fail_data = match data {
5100 Some((typ, offset)) => [BigSize(typ).encode(), offset.encode()].concat(),
5103 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), fail_data)
5108 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5109 /// that we want to return and a channel.
5111 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
5113 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5114 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
5115 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
5116 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
5117 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
5118 let scid_pref = if chan.context.should_announce() {
5119 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
5121 chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.context.get_short_channel_id())
5123 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
5124 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
5126 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5131 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5132 /// that we want to return and a channel.
5133 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5134 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
5135 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
5136 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
5137 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
5138 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
5139 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
5140 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5142 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5143 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5144 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5145 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
5147 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
5148 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
5149 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
5150 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
5151 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5155 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
5156 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
5157 // be surfaced to the user.
5158 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
5159 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: ChannelId,
5160 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
5162 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
5163 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5164 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
5165 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5166 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5167 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
5168 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
5169 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get() {
5170 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan)
5172 // We shouldn't be trying to fail holding cell HTLCs on an unfunded channel.
5173 debug_assert!(false);
5174 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5177 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5179 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
5182 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
5183 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
5184 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
5185 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5189 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
5190 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
5191 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
5192 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
5193 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
5194 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
5195 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
5196 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5197 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
5198 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5201 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
5202 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
5203 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
5206 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5207 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
5208 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5210 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
5211 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
5212 session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
5213 &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
5214 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5216 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint, .. }) => {
5217 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", &payment_hash, onion_error);
5218 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
5220 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
5221 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5222 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
5223 push_forward_ev = true;
5225 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
5226 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5227 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
5229 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5230 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
5233 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
5234 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5235 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5236 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
5237 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
5238 failed_next_destination: destination,
5244 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
5245 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
5247 /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
5248 /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
5249 /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
5250 /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
5252 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
5253 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
5254 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
5255 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
5257 /// This function will fail the payment if it has custom TLVs with even type numbers, as we
5258 /// will assume they are unknown. If you intend to accept even custom TLVs, you should use
5259 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`].
5261 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5262 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
5263 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
5264 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
5265 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5266 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5267 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`]: Self::claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs
5268 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5269 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, false);
5272 /// This is a variant of [`claim_funds`] that allows accepting a payment with custom TLVs with
5273 /// even type numbers.
5277 /// You MUST check you've understood all even TLVs before using this to
5278 /// claim, otherwise you may unintentionally agree to some protocol you do not understand.
5280 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5281 pub fn claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5282 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, true);
5285 fn claim_payment_internal(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, custom_tlvs_known: bool) {
5286 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5288 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5291 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
5292 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
5293 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
5294 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
5295 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
5296 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
5297 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
5298 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
5303 let htlcs = payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect();
5304 let sender_intended_value = payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat);
5305 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
5306 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
5307 payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id, htlcs, sender_intended_value
5309 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
5310 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
5311 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
5315 if let Some(RecipientOnionFields { ref custom_tlvs, .. }) = payment.onion_fields {
5316 if !custom_tlvs_known && custom_tlvs.iter().any(|(typ, _)| typ % 2 == 0) {
5317 log_info!(self.logger, "Rejecting payment with payment hash {} as we cannot accept payment with unknown even TLVs: {}",
5318 &payment_hash, log_iter!(custom_tlvs.iter().map(|(typ, _)| typ).filter(|typ| *typ % 2 == 0)));
5319 claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5320 mem::drop(claimable_payments);
5321 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5322 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(None), &htlc);
5323 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5324 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5325 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5334 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
5336 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
5337 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
5338 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
5339 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
5340 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
5341 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
5342 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
5343 let mut valid_mpp = true;
5344 let mut errs = Vec::new();
5345 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5346 for htlc in sources.iter() {
5347 if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
5348 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5349 debug_assert!(false);
5353 prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
5355 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
5356 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5357 debug_assert!(false);
5361 expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
5362 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
5364 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5365 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
5366 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5367 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
5370 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
5371 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5372 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
5373 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
5377 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5378 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
5379 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
5380 |_| Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash }))
5382 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
5383 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
5384 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
5385 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
5386 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
5391 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5392 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5393 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
5394 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5395 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
5396 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5397 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5399 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5402 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
5403 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
5404 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5405 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
5409 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
5410 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
5411 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
5412 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
5414 // If we haven't yet run background events assume we're still deserializing and shouldn't
5415 // actually pass `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to users yet. Instead, queue them up as
5416 // `BackgroundEvent`s.
5417 let during_init = !self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5420 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5421 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
5422 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
5423 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
5427 let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
5428 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5429 .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
5432 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
5433 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
5434 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5435 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5436 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
5437 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5438 let fulfill_res = chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger);
5440 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = fulfill_res {
5441 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)) {
5442 log_trace!(self.logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
5444 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
5447 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
5448 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5450 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly -
5451 // they probably haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the
5452 // monitor update as a background event.
5453 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5454 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5455 counterparty_node_id,
5456 funding_txo: prev_hop.outpoint,
5457 update: monitor_update.clone(),
5466 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5467 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
5468 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5474 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
5475 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
5476 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
5477 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
5478 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
5479 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
5480 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
5481 // again on restart.
5482 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
5483 payment_preimage, update_res);
5486 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly - they probably
5487 // haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the monitor update as a background
5489 // Note that while it's safe to use `ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup` here (the
5490 // channel is already closed) we need to ultimately handle the monitor update
5491 // completion action only after we've completed the monitor update. This is the only
5492 // way to guarantee this update *will* be regenerated on startup (otherwise if this was
5493 // from a forwarded HTLC the downstream preimage may be deleted before we claim
5494 // upstream). Thus, we need to transition to some new `BackgroundEvent` type which will
5495 // complete the monitor update completion action from `completion_action`.
5496 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5497 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((
5498 prev_hop.outpoint, preimage_update,
5501 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
5502 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
5503 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
5504 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
5505 // `PaymentForwarded`).
5506 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
5510 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
5511 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
5514 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
5515 forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool,
5516 next_channel_counterparty_node_id: Option<PublicKey>, next_channel_outpoint: OutPoint
5519 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
5520 debug_assert!(self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire),
5521 "We don't support claim_htlc claims during startup - monitors may not be available yet");
5522 if let Some(pubkey) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
5523 debug_assert_eq!(pubkey, path.hops[0].pubkey);
5525 let ev_completion_action = EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
5526 channel_funding_outpoint: next_channel_outpoint,
5527 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
5529 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage,
5530 session_priv, path, from_onchain, ev_completion_action, &self.pending_events,
5533 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
5534 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
5535 let completed_blocker = RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&hop_data);
5536 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
5537 |htlc_claim_value_msat| {
5538 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
5539 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
5540 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
5543 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5544 event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
5546 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
5547 prev_channel_id: Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
5548 next_channel_id: Some(next_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
5549 outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
5551 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
5552 if let Some(node_id) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
5553 Some((node_id, next_channel_outpoint, completed_blocker))
5555 // We can only get `None` here if we are processing a
5556 // `ChannelMonitor`-originated event, in which case we
5557 // don't care about ensuring we wake the downstream
5558 // channel's monitor updating - the channel is already
5565 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
5566 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5567 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
5573 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
5574 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
5575 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
5578 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
5579 for action in actions.into_iter() {
5581 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
5582 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5583 if let Some(ClaimingPayment {
5585 payment_purpose: purpose,
5588 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_total_msat,
5590 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
5594 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
5596 sender_intended_total_msat,
5600 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5601 event, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint
5603 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
5604 if let Some((node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker)) = downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint {
5605 self.handle_monitor_update_release(node_id, funding_outpoint, Some(blocker));
5612 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
5613 /// update completion.
5614 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
5615 channel: &mut Channel<SP>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
5616 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
5617 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
5618 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
5619 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
5620 log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
5621 &channel.context.channel_id(),
5622 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
5623 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
5624 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
5625 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
5626 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
5628 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
5630 let counterparty_node_id = channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5631 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5632 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.context.outbound_scid_alias()),
5633 channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.context.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
5636 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
5637 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
5639 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
5640 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5641 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5646 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
5647 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
5648 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5649 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5654 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
5655 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
5656 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
5657 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5658 msg: revoke_and_ack,
5663 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
5667 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
5673 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
5674 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
5675 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
5679 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5680 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
5681 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
5687 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
5688 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
5690 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
5691 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5693 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5694 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
5695 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5696 match id_to_peer.get(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
5697 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5702 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5703 let mut peer_state_lock;
5704 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
5705 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
5706 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5707 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5709 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
5712 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
5713 .remove(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
5714 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5715 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5716 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
5719 let remaining_in_flight =
5720 if let Some(pending) = peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.get_mut(funding_txo) {
5721 pending.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > highest_applied_update_id);
5724 log_trace!(self.logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}. {} pending in-flight updates.",
5725 highest_applied_update_id, channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
5726 remaining_in_flight);
5727 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
5730 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel);
5733 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
5735 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
5736 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
5739 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5740 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5741 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5743 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
5744 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
5745 /// used to accept such channels.
5747 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5748 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5749 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5750 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
5753 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
5754 /// it as confirmed immediately.
5756 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5757 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5758 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5760 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
5761 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
5763 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
5764 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
5766 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
5767 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
5769 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5770 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5771 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5772 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
5775 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5776 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5778 let peers_without_funded_channels =
5779 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| { peer.total_channel_count() > 0 });
5780 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5781 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5782 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
5783 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5784 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5785 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.total_channel_count() == 1;
5787 // Find (and remove) the channel in the unaccepted table. If it's not there, something weird is
5788 // happening and return an error. N.B. that we create channel with an outbound SCID of zero so
5789 // that we can delay allocating the SCID until after we're sure that the checks below will
5791 let mut channel = match peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
5792 Some(unaccepted_channel) => {
5793 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5794 InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
5795 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features,
5796 &unaccepted_channel.open_channel_msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration, best_block_height,
5797 &self.logger, accept_0conf).map_err(|e| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.to_string() })
5799 _ => Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() })
5803 // This should have been correctly configured by the call to InboundV1Channel::new.
5804 debug_assert!(channel.context.minimum_depth().unwrap() == 0);
5805 } else if channel.context.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
5806 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5807 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5808 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
5809 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
5812 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
5813 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
5815 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
5816 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
5817 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
5818 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
5819 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5820 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5821 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
5822 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
5825 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
5826 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned() });
5830 // Now that we know we have a channel, assign an outbound SCID alias.
5831 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
5832 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
5834 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
5835 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5836 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
5839 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(temporary_channel_id.clone(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
5844 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
5845 /// or 0-conf channels.
5847 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
5848 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
5849 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
5850 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<SP>) -> bool {
5851 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
5852 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5854 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5855 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
5856 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5857 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
5858 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
5859 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.total_channel_count() {
5860 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
5864 return peers_without_funded_channels;
5867 fn unfunded_channel_count(
5868 peer: &PeerState<SP>, best_block_height: u32
5870 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
5871 for (_, phase) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
5873 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
5874 // This covers non-zero-conf inbound `Channel`s that we are currently monitoring, but those
5875 // which have not yet had any confirmations on-chain.
5876 if !chan.context.is_outbound() && chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
5877 chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
5879 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
5882 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
5883 if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 {
5884 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
5887 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
5888 // Outbound channels don't contribute to the unfunded count in the DoS context.
5893 num_unfunded_channels + peer.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
5896 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5897 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
5898 // likely to be lost on restart!
5899 if msg.chain_hash != self.chain_hash {
5900 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5903 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
5904 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5907 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
5908 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
5909 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
5910 let channeled_peers_without_funding =
5911 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.total_channel_count() > 0);
5913 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5914 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5916 debug_assert!(false);
5917 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())
5919 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5920 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5922 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
5923 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
5924 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
5925 if peer_state.total_channel_count() == 0 &&
5926 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
5927 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
5929 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
5930 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
5931 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5934 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5935 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
5936 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
5937 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
5938 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5941 let channel_id = msg.temporary_channel_id;
5942 let channel_exists = peer_state.has_channel(&channel_id);
5944 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5947 // If we're doing manual acceptance checks on the channel, then defer creation until we're sure we want to accept.
5948 if self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
5949 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5950 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
5951 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
5952 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5953 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
5954 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
5955 channel_type: msg.channel_type.clone().unwrap(),
5957 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.insert(channel_id, InboundChannelRequest {
5958 open_channel_msg: msg.clone(),
5959 ticks_remaining: UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS,
5964 // Otherwise create the channel right now.
5965 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
5966 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
5967 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
5968 let mut channel = match InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
5969 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
5970 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, /*is_0conf=*/false)
5973 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
5978 let channel_type = channel.context.get_channel_type();
5979 if channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
5980 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5982 if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5983 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5986 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
5987 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
5989 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
5990 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5991 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
5993 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(channel_id, ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
5997 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5998 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
5999 // likely to be lost on restart!
6000 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
6001 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6002 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6004 debug_assert!(false);
6005 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
6007 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6008 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6009 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
6010 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut phase) => {
6011 match phase.get_mut() {
6012 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
6013 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), phase);
6014 (chan.context.get_value_satoshis(), chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.context.get_user_id())
6017 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected accept_channel message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id));
6021 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
6024 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6025 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
6026 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
6027 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6028 channel_value_satoshis: value,
6030 user_channel_id: user_id,
6035 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6036 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6038 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6039 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6041 debug_assert!(false);
6042 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
6045 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6046 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6047 let (chan, funding_msg, monitor) =
6048 match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
6049 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan)) => {
6050 match inbound_chan.funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger) {
6052 Err((mut inbound_chan, err)) => {
6053 // We've already removed this inbound channel from the map in `PeerState`
6054 // above so at this point we just need to clean up any lingering entries
6055 // concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
6056 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &inbound_chan.context);
6057 let user_id = inbound_chan.context.get_user_id();
6058 let shutdown_res = inbound_chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
6059 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(format!("{}", err),
6060 msg.temporary_channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None, inbound_chan.context.get_value_satoshis()));
6064 Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(_)) | Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_)) => {
6065 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected funding_created message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id));
6067 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
6070 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
6071 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6072 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
6074 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6075 let mut id_to_peer_lock = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6076 match id_to_peer_lock.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
6077 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6078 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6079 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
6080 funding_msg.channel_id))
6082 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
6083 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
6084 if let Ok(persist_state) = monitor_res {
6085 i_e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
6086 mem::drop(id_to_peer_lock);
6088 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
6089 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
6090 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
6091 // until we have persisted our monitor.
6092 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
6093 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6097 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) {
6098 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_state, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
6099 per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
6101 unreachable!("This must be a funded channel as we just inserted it.");
6105 log_error!(self.logger, "Persisting initial ChannelMonitor failed, implying the funding outpoint was duplicated");
6106 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6107 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
6108 funding_msg.channel_id));
6116 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6117 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6118 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6119 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6121 debug_assert!(false);
6122 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6125 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6126 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6127 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6128 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6129 match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6130 ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) => {
6131 let monitor = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6132 chan.funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6133 if let Ok(persist_status) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
6134 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_status, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
6137 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel funding outpoint was a duplicate".to_owned())), chan_phase_entry)
6141 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
6145 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
6149 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6150 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6151 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6152 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6153 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6155 debug_assert!(false);
6156 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6158 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6159 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6160 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6161 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6162 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6163 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
6164 self.chain_hash, &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6165 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
6166 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
6167 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6168 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6169 msg: announcement_sigs,
6171 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
6172 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
6173 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
6174 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
6175 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
6176 // announcement_signatures.
6177 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
6178 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
6179 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6180 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6187 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6188 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan);
6193 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6194 "Got a channel_ready message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry)
6197 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
6198 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6203 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6204 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
6205 let mut finish_shutdown = None;
6207 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6208 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6210 debug_assert!(false);
6211 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6213 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6214 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6215 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
6216 let phase = chan_phase_entry.get_mut();
6218 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
6219 if !chan.received_shutdown() {
6220 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
6222 if chan.sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
6225 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6226 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6227 chan.shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
6228 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
6230 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
6231 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
6232 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
6233 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
6234 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
6235 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6239 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
6240 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6241 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
6242 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6245 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
6246 let context = phase.context_mut();
6247 log_error!(self.logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
6248 self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel);
6249 let mut chan = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
6250 finish_shutdown = Some(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
6254 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6257 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
6258 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
6259 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
6260 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
6262 if let Some(shutdown_res) = finish_shutdown {
6263 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
6269 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6270 let mut shutdown_result = None;
6271 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid;
6272 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6273 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6275 debug_assert!(false);
6276 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6278 let (tx, chan_option) = {
6279 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6280 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6281 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
6282 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6283 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6284 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
6285 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
6286 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
6287 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
6288 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6293 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
6294 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
6295 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
6296 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
6297 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
6298 (tx, Some(remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry)))
6299 } else { (tx, None) }
6301 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6302 "Got a closing_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6305 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6308 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
6309 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
6310 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&broadcast_tx]);
6312 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = chan_option {
6313 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6314 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6315 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6316 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6320 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
6321 shutdown_result = Some((None, Vec::new(), unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid));
6323 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6324 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
6325 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
6330 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6331 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
6332 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
6333 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
6335 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
6336 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
6337 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
6338 //but we should prevent it anyway.
6340 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6341 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6343 let decoded_hop_res = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
6344 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6345 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6347 debug_assert!(false);
6348 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6350 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6351 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6352 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6353 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6354 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6355 let pending_forward_info = match decoded_hop_res {
6356 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt)) =>
6357 self.construct_pending_htlc_status(msg, shared_secret, next_hop,
6358 chan.context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_pk_opt),
6359 Err(e) => PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(e)
6361 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<SP>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
6362 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
6363 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
6364 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
6365 match pending_forward_info {
6366 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
6367 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
6368 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
6369 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
6371 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
6372 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
6373 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6374 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
6375 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
6378 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
6380 _ => pending_forward_info
6383 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6385 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6386 "Got an update_add_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6389 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6394 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6396 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
6397 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6398 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6400 debug_assert!(false);
6401 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6403 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6404 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6405 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6406 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6407 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6408 let res = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
6409 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop) = &res.0 {
6410 peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates.entry(msg.channel_id)
6411 .or_insert_with(Vec::new)
6412 .push(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&prev_hop));
6414 // Note that we do not need to push an `actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates`
6415 // entry here, even though we *do* need to block the next RAA monitor update.
6416 // We do this instead in the `claim_funds_internal` by attaching a
6417 // `ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate` action to the event generated when the
6418 // outbound HTLC is claimed. This is guaranteed to all complete before we
6419 // process the RAA as messages are processed from single peers serially.
6420 funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().expect("We won't accept a fulfill until funded");
6423 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6424 "Got an update_fulfill_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6427 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6430 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, Some(*counterparty_node_id), funding_txo);
6434 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6435 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6436 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6437 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6438 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6440 debug_assert!(false);
6441 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6443 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6444 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6445 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6446 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6447 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6448 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan_phase_entry);
6450 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6451 "Got an update_fail_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6454 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6459 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6460 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6461 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6462 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6463 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6465 debug_assert!(false);
6466 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6468 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6469 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6470 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6471 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6472 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
6473 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
6474 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan_phase_entry);
6476 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6477 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan_phase_entry);
6479 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6480 "Got an update_fail_malformed_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6484 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6488 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6489 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6490 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6492 debug_assert!(false);
6493 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6495 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6496 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6497 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6498 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6499 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6500 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6501 let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6502 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6503 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
6504 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6508 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6509 "Got a commitment_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6512 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6517 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
6518 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
6519 let mut push_forward_event = false;
6520 let mut new_intercept_events = VecDeque::new();
6521 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
6522 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
6523 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
6524 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
6525 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6526 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
6527 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
6529 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
6530 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
6532 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6533 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
6534 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
6535 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
6536 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6537 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
6539 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6540 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
6541 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.chain_hash)
6543 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).into_inner());
6544 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6545 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
6546 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6547 new_intercept_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
6548 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
6549 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
6550 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
6551 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
6554 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6555 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
6557 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6558 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
6559 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6560 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
6561 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
6562 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
6563 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
6564 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6565 phantom_shared_secret: None,
6568 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
6569 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
6570 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
6575 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
6576 // payments are being processed.
6577 if forward_htlcs_empty {
6578 push_forward_event = true;
6580 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6581 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
6588 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
6589 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
6592 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
6593 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6594 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
6596 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
6600 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
6601 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6602 let is_processing_events = self.pending_events_processor.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6603 let num_forward_events = pending_events.iter().filter(|(ev, _)|
6604 if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false }
6606 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued. Processing
6607 // events is done in batches and they are not removed until we're done processing each
6608 // batch. Since handling a `PendingHTLCsForwardable` event will call back into the
6609 // `ChannelManager`, we'll still see the original forwarding event not removed. Phantom
6610 // payments will need an additional forwarding event before being claimed to make them look
6611 // real by taking more time.
6612 if (is_processing_events && num_forward_events <= 1) || num_forward_events < 1 {
6613 pending_events.push_back((Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
6614 time_forwardable: Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
6619 /// Checks whether [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s generated by the receipt of a remote
6620 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] should be held for the given channel until some other action
6621 /// completes. Note that this needs to happen in the same [`PeerState`] mutex as any release of
6622 /// the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in question.
6623 fn raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
6624 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: &BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
6625 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
6627 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
6628 .get(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).map(|v| !v.is_empty()).unwrap_or(false)
6629 || self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().iter().any(|(_, action)| {
6630 action == &Some(EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
6631 channel_funding_outpoint,
6632 counterparty_node_id,
6637 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6638 pub(crate) fn test_raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
6639 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_id: ChannelId
6641 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6642 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
6643 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6644 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
6646 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&channel_id) {
6647 return self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
6648 chan.context().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), counterparty_node_id);
6654 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6655 let htlcs_to_fail = {
6656 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6657 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6659 debug_assert!(false);
6660 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6661 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
6662 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6663 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6664 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6665 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6666 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6667 let mon_update_blocked = if let Some(funding_txo) = funding_txo_opt {
6668 self.raa_monitor_updates_held(
6669 &peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates, funding_txo,
6670 *counterparty_node_id)
6672 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6673 chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger, mon_update_blocked), chan_phase_entry);
6674 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6675 let funding_txo = funding_txo_opt
6676 .expect("Funding outpoint must have been set for RAA handling to succeed");
6677 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update,
6678 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6682 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6683 "Got a revoke_and_ack message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6686 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6689 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
6693 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6694 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6695 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6697 debug_assert!(false);
6698 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6700 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6701 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6702 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6703 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6704 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6705 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6707 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6708 "Got an update_fee message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6711 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6716 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6717 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6718 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6720 debug_assert!(false);
6721 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6723 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6724 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6725 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6726 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6727 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6728 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
6729 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
6732 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
6733 msg: try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.announcement_signatures(
6734 &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
6735 msg, &self.default_configuration
6736 ), chan_phase_entry),
6737 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
6738 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
6739 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan).unwrap()),
6742 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6743 "Got an announcement_signatures message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6746 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6751 /// Returns DoPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersistNoEvents or an Err.
6752 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6753 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
6754 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
6756 // It's not a local channel
6757 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
6760 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6761 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
6762 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
6763 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
6765 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6766 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6767 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
6768 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6769 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6770 if chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6771 if chan.context.should_announce() {
6772 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
6773 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
6774 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
6775 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
6777 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
6779 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
6780 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
6781 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
6782 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
6784 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update {:?} for channel {}.", msg, chan_id);
6785 let did_change = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_update(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
6786 // If nothing changed after applying their update, we don't need to bother
6789 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
6793 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6794 "Got a channel_update for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6797 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
6799 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
6802 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6804 let need_lnd_workaround = {
6805 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6807 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6809 debug_assert!(false);
6810 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6811 format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id),
6815 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6816 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6817 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6818 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6819 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6820 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
6821 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
6822 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
6823 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
6824 let responses = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_reestablish(
6825 msg, &self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash,
6826 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan_phase_entry);
6827 let mut channel_update = None;
6828 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
6829 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
6830 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6833 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
6834 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
6835 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
6836 // they have the latest channel parameters.
6837 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
6838 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6839 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6844 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
6845 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
6846 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
6847 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
6848 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
6849 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
6853 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6854 "Got a channel_reestablish message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6857 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
6858 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending bogus ChannelReestablish for unknown channel {} to force channel closure",
6859 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id.0));
6860 // Unfortunately, lnd doesn't force close on errors
6861 // (https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/blob/abb1e3463f3a83bbb843d5c399869dbe930ad94f/htlcswitch/link.go#L2119).
6862 // One of the few ways to get an lnd counterparty to force close is by
6863 // replicating what they do when restoring static channel backups (SCBs). They
6864 // send an invalid `ChannelReestablish` with `0` commitment numbers and an
6865 // invalid `your_last_per_commitment_secret`.
6867 // Since we received a `ChannelReestablish` for a channel that doesn't exist, we
6868 // can assume it's likely the channel closed from our point of view, but it
6869 // remains open on the counterparty's side. By sending this bogus
6870 // `ChannelReestablish` message now as a response to theirs, we trigger them to
6871 // force close broadcasting their latest state. If the closing transaction from
6872 // our point of view remains unconfirmed, it'll enter a race with the
6873 // counterparty's to-be-broadcast latest commitment transaction.
6874 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
6875 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6876 msg: msgs::ChannelReestablish {
6877 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
6878 next_local_commitment_number: 0,
6879 next_remote_commitment_number: 0,
6880 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [1u8; 32],
6881 my_current_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_slice(&[2u8; 33]).unwrap(),
6882 next_funding_txid: None,
6885 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6886 format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}",
6887 counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6893 let mut persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
6894 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
6895 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
6896 persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6899 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
6900 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
6905 /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
6906 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
6907 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
6909 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6910 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
6911 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
6912 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
6913 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
6914 match monitor_event {
6915 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
6916 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
6917 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", preimage);
6918 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, counterparty_node_id, funding_outpoint);
6920 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", &htlc_update.payment_hash);
6921 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
6922 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
6923 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
6926 MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(funding_outpoint) => {
6927 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
6928 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
6930 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
6931 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
6932 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6933 id_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).cloned()
6936 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
6937 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6938 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
6939 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6940 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6941 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6942 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
6943 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
6944 failed_channels.push(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
6945 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6946 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6950 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
6951 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6952 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6953 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
6954 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.context.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() })
6962 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
6963 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
6969 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6970 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
6973 has_pending_monitor_events
6976 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
6977 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
6978 /// update events as a separate process method here.
6980 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
6981 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6982 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
6985 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
6986 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
6987 /// update was applied.
6988 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
6989 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
6990 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
6992 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
6993 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
6994 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
6995 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
6997 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6998 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7000 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7001 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7002 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
7003 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
7005 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
7006 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
7007 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
7008 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
7009 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
7010 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
7012 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
7013 has_monitor_update = true;
7015 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update,
7016 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7017 continue 'peer_loop;
7026 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty();
7027 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7028 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
7034 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
7035 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
7036 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
7037 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
7038 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
7039 let mut has_update = false;
7040 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
7042 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7044 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7045 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7046 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7047 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7048 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, phase| {
7050 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
7051 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
7052 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
7053 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
7054 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
7056 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
7057 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
7060 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
7061 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
7062 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
7063 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7064 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7069 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
7071 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
7072 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
7073 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
7074 shutdown_results.push((None, Vec::new(), unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid));
7080 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
7081 handle_errors.push((chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
7086 _ => true, // Retain unfunded channels if present.
7092 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
7093 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
7096 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
7097 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
7103 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
7104 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
7106 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
7107 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7108 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
7109 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
7110 // reorganized out of the main chain.
7111 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
7112 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
7113 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
7114 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
7115 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
7116 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
7117 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
7118 assert!(should_broadcast);
7119 } else { unreachable!(); }
7120 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
7121 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
7122 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
7125 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
7129 /// Creates an [`OfferBuilder`] such that the [`Offer`] it builds is recognized by the
7130 /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`InvoiceRequest`] messages for the offer. The offer will
7131 /// not have an expiration unless otherwise set on the builder.
7133 /// [`Offer`]: crate::offers::offer::Offer
7134 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
7135 pub fn create_offer_builder(
7136 &self, description: String
7137 ) -> OfferBuilder<DerivedMetadata, secp256k1::All> {
7138 let node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
7139 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7140 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7141 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7143 // TODO: Set blinded paths
7144 OfferBuilder::deriving_signing_pubkey(description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx)
7145 .chain_hash(self.chain_hash)
7148 /// Creates a [`RefundBuilder`] such that the [`Refund`] it builds is recognized by the
7149 /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`Bolt12Invoice`] messages for the refund. The builder will
7150 /// have the provided expiration set. Any changes to the expiration on the returned builder will
7151 /// not be honored by [`ChannelManager`].
7153 /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the refund.
7155 /// [`Refund`]: crate::offers::refund::Refund
7156 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7157 pub fn create_refund_builder(
7158 &self, description: String, amount_msats: u64, absolute_expiry: Duration,
7159 payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry, max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
7160 ) -> Result<RefundBuilder<secp256k1::All>, Bolt12SemanticError> {
7161 let node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
7162 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7163 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7164 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7166 // TODO: Set blinded paths
7167 let builder = RefundBuilder::deriving_payer_id(
7168 description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, amount_msats, payment_id
7170 .chain_hash(self.chain_hash)
7171 .absolute_expiry(absolute_expiry);
7173 self.pending_outbound_payments
7174 .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
7175 payment_id, absolute_expiry, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat,
7177 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
7182 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
7185 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
7186 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
7188 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
7189 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
7190 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
7191 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
7193 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
7195 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
7196 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
7200 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
7201 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
7203 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
7205 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
7206 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
7208 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
7209 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
7210 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
7211 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
7212 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
7213 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
7214 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
7215 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
7216 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
7217 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
7218 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
7221 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
7222 /// stored external to LDK.
7224 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
7225 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
7226 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
7228 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
7229 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
7232 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
7233 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
7234 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
7235 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
7237 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
7238 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
7239 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
7240 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
7241 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
7243 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
7244 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
7245 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
7246 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
7247 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
7249 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
7250 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
7252 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
7253 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
7257 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
7258 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
7260 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
7262 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
7263 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
7265 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
7266 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
7267 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
7268 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
7269 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
7270 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
7271 min_final_cltv_expiry)
7274 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
7275 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
7277 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
7278 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
7279 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
7282 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
7283 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
7285 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
7286 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
7287 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7288 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
7290 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
7291 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
7292 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
7293 Some(_) => continue,
7294 None => return scid_candidate
7299 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
7301 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
7302 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
7304 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
7305 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
7306 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
7310 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
7311 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
7312 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
7314 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
7315 /// times to get a unique scid.
7316 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
7317 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7318 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
7320 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
7321 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
7322 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
7323 return scid_candidate
7327 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
7328 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
7329 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
7330 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
7332 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7333 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7334 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7335 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7336 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(
7337 |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
7339 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
7340 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
7341 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
7350 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
7351 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
7352 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
7353 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
7354 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
7358 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
7359 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
7360 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7361 events.push_back((event, None));
7365 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
7366 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7367 events.pop_front().map(|(e, _)| e)
7371 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
7372 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
7376 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
7377 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
7380 /// When something which was blocking a channel from updating its [`ChannelMonitor`] (e.g. an
7381 /// [`Event`] being handled) completes, this should be called to restore the channel to normal
7382 /// operation. It will double-check that nothing *else* is also blocking the same channel from
7383 /// making progress and then let any blocked [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s fly.
7384 fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, mut completed_blocker: Option<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>) {
7386 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7387 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7388 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
7389 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
7391 if let Some(blocker) = completed_blocker.take() {
7392 // Only do this on the first iteration of the loop.
7393 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
7394 .get_mut(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
7396 blockers.retain(|iter| iter != &blocker);
7400 if self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
7401 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id) {
7402 // Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have anything else
7403 // blocking monitor updates for this channel. If we do, release the monitor
7404 // update(s) when those blockers complete.
7405 log_trace!(self.logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another channel's mon update needs to complete first",
7406 &channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
7410 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
7411 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7412 debug_assert_eq!(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
7413 if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
7414 log_debug!(self.logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
7415 channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
7416 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update,
7417 peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7418 if further_update_exists {
7419 // If there are more `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to process, restart at the
7424 log_trace!(self.logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
7425 channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
7430 log_debug!(self.logger,
7431 "Got a release post-RAA monitor update for peer {} but the channel is gone",
7432 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
7438 fn handle_post_event_actions(&self, actions: Vec<EventCompletionAction>) {
7439 for action in actions {
7441 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
7442 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id
7444 self.handle_monitor_update_release(counterparty_node_id, channel_funding_outpoint, None);
7450 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
7451 /// using the given event handler.
7453 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
7454 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
7458 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
7462 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7464 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7465 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7466 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7467 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7468 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7469 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7473 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
7474 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
7475 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
7476 /// is always placed next to each other.
7478 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
7479 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
7480 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
7481 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
7483 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
7484 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
7485 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
7486 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
7487 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
7488 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
7489 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
7491 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
7492 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
7493 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
7494 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7497 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
7498 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7500 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
7501 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7504 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
7505 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7506 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7507 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7508 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7509 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
7510 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
7514 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
7515 events.replace(pending_events);
7524 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7526 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7527 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7528 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7529 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7530 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7531 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7535 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
7537 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
7538 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
7539 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
7541 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
7545 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7547 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7548 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7549 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7550 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7551 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7552 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7556 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
7558 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
7559 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
7560 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
7561 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
7562 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
7565 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
7566 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
7569 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
7570 let _persistence_guard =
7571 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
7572 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
7573 let new_height = height - 1;
7575 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
7576 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
7577 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
7578 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
7579 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
7580 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
7583 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
7587 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7589 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7590 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7591 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7592 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7593 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7594 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7598 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
7599 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
7600 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
7601 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
7603 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
7604 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
7606 let _persistence_guard =
7607 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
7608 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
7609 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)
7610 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
7612 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7613 if height < last_best_block_height {
7614 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
7615 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
7619 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
7620 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
7621 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
7622 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
7624 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
7625 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
7627 let _persistence_guard =
7628 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
7629 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
7630 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
7632 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
7634 macro_rules! max_time {
7635 ($timestamp: expr) => {
7637 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
7638 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
7639 // having an explicit local time source.
7640 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
7641 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
7642 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
7643 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
7644 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
7650 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
7651 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7652 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
7653 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
7657 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
7658 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
7659 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
7660 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7661 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7662 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(|phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }) {
7663 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(block_hash)) = (chan.context.get_funding_txo(), chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
7664 res.push((funding_txo.txid, Some(block_hash)));
7671 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
7672 let _persistence_guard =
7673 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
7674 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
7675 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
7676 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
7677 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
7678 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
7679 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
7680 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
7685 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7687 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7688 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7689 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7690 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7691 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7692 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7696 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
7697 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
7699 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<SP>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
7700 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
7701 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
7702 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
7703 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
7705 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
7706 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
7708 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7709 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7710 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7711 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7712 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7713 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
7715 // Retain unfunded channels.
7716 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => true,
7717 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
7718 let res = f(channel);
7719 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
7720 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
7721 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
7722 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
7723 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.context.channel_id() }));
7725 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
7726 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
7727 if channel.context.is_usable() {
7728 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
7729 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
7730 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
7731 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7736 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", channel.context.channel_id());
7741 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7742 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
7745 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
7746 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
7747 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
7748 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7749 msg: announcement_sigs,
7751 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
7752 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
7753 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
7755 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
7756 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
7757 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
7762 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
7763 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
7764 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
7765 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
7766 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
7767 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
7768 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
7769 // is always consistent.
7770 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
7771 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
7772 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()),
7773 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
7774 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
7777 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
7778 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &channel.context);
7779 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
7780 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
7781 failed_channels.push(channel.context.force_shutdown(true));
7782 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
7783 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7787 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
7788 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel.context, reason);
7789 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
7790 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7791 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
7792 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage {
7793 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
7794 data: reason_message,
7807 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
7808 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
7809 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
7810 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
7811 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
7812 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
7813 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
7814 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
7815 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
7816 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
7818 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
7819 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
7820 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
7824 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
7827 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7828 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
7829 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
7830 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
7831 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
7832 user_channel_id: Some(htlc.prev_user_channel_id),
7833 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
7834 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
7835 phantom_shared_secret: None,
7836 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
7839 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
7840 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
7841 _ => unreachable!(),
7843 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
7844 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
7845 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
7846 log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
7852 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
7854 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
7855 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
7859 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] may need to be persisted or
7860 /// may have events that need processing.
7862 /// In order to check if this [`ChannelManager`] needs persisting, call
7863 /// [`Self::get_and_clear_needs_persistence`].
7865 /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
7866 /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
7867 pub fn get_event_or_persistence_needed_future(&self) -> Future {
7868 self.event_persist_notifier.get_future()
7871 /// Returns true if this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
7872 pub fn get_and_clear_needs_persistence(&self) -> bool {
7873 self.needs_persist_flag.swap(false, Ordering::AcqRel)
7876 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
7877 pub fn get_event_or_persist_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
7878 self.event_persist_notifier.notify_pending()
7881 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
7882 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
7883 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
7884 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
7887 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7888 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7889 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
7890 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
7893 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7894 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7896 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
7897 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
7898 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
7899 pub fn invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
7900 provided_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
7903 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7904 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7905 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
7906 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
7909 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7910 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7911 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
7912 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
7915 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7916 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7917 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
7918 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
7922 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7923 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7925 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7926 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7927 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7928 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7929 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7930 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7934 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
7935 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
7936 // open_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
7937 // change to the contents.
7938 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
7939 let res = self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg);
7940 let persist = match &res {
7941 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => {
7942 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't close a new channel");
7943 NotifyOption::DoPersist
7945 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
7947 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
7952 fn handle_open_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2) {
7953 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7954 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7955 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7958 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
7959 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
7960 // accept_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
7961 // change to the contents.
7962 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
7963 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7964 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents
7968 fn handle_accept_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannelV2) {
7969 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7970 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7971 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7974 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
7975 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7976 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7979 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
7980 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7981 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7984 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
7985 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
7986 // channel_ready message - while the channel's state will change, any channel_ready message
7987 // will ultimately be re-sent on startup and the `ChannelMonitor` won't be updated so we
7988 // will not force-close the channel on startup.
7989 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
7990 let res = self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg);
7991 let persist = match &res {
7992 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
7993 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
7995 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8000 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
8001 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8002 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8005 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
8006 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8007 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8010 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
8011 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8012 // update_add_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8013 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8014 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8015 let res = self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8016 let persist = match &res {
8017 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8018 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8019 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8021 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8026 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
8027 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8028 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8031 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
8032 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8033 // update_fail_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8034 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8035 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8036 let res = self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8037 let persist = match &res {
8038 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8039 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8040 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8042 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8047 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
8048 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8049 // update_fail_malformed_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state
8050 // only the `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8051 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8052 let res = self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8053 let persist = match &res {
8054 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8055 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8056 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8058 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8063 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
8064 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8065 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8068 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
8069 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8070 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8073 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
8074 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8075 // update_fee message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8076 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8077 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8078 let res = self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8079 let persist = match &res {
8080 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8081 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8082 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8084 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8089 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
8090 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8091 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8094 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
8095 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8096 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
8099 NotifyOption::DoPersist
8104 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
8105 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8106 let res = self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8107 let persist = match &res {
8108 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8109 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8110 Ok(persist) => *persist,
8112 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8117 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
8118 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(
8119 self, || NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents);
8120 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
8121 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
8123 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
8124 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8125 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
8126 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8127 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8128 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8129 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
8130 let context = match phase {
8131 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
8132 if chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger).is_ok() {
8133 // We only retain funded channels that are not shutdown.
8138 // Unfunded channels will always be removed.
8139 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
8142 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
8146 // Clean up for removal.
8147 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
8148 self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
8149 failed_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false));
8152 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
8153 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
8154 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
8155 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
8157 // V1 Channel Establishment
8158 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
8159 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
8160 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
8161 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
8162 // V2 Channel Establishment
8163 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannelV2 { .. } => false,
8164 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 { .. } => false,
8165 // Common Channel Establishment
8166 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
8167 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
8168 // Interactive Transaction Construction
8169 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddInput { .. } => false,
8170 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddOutput { .. } => false,
8171 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveInput { .. } => false,
8172 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveOutput { .. } => false,
8173 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxComplete { .. } => false,
8174 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxSignatures { .. } => false,
8175 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxInitRbf { .. } => false,
8176 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAckRbf { .. } => false,
8177 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAbort { .. } => false,
8178 // Channel Operations
8179 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
8180 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
8181 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
8182 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
8183 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
8184 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
8186 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
8187 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
8188 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
8189 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
8190 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
8191 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
8192 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
8193 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
8194 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
8197 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
8198 peer_state.is_connected = false;
8199 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
8200 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
8203 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
8205 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
8207 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
8208 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
8212 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
8213 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
8214 log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8218 let mut res = Ok(());
8220 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8221 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
8222 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
8223 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
8224 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
8225 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
8226 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
8229 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
8230 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
8231 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
8232 if inbound_peer_limited {
8234 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
8236 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
8237 channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8238 inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8239 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
8240 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
8241 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8242 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
8243 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8247 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
8248 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
8249 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
8251 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
8252 if inbound_peer_limited &&
8253 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
8254 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
8257 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
8260 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
8261 peer_state.is_connected = true;
8266 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8268 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8269 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
8270 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8271 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8272 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8274 peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(|(_, phase)|
8275 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else {
8276 // Since unfunded channel maps are cleared upon disconnecting a peer, and they're not persisted
8277 // (so won't be recovered after a crash), they shouldn't exist here and we would never need to
8278 // worry about closing and removing them.
8279 debug_assert!(false);
8283 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
8284 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8285 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
8290 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
8291 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
8296 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
8297 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8299 match &msg.data as &str {
8300 "cannot co-op close channel w/ active htlcs"|
8301 "link failed to shutdown" =>
8303 // LND hasn't properly handled shutdown messages ever, and force-closes any time we
8304 // send one while HTLCs are still present. The issue is tracked at
8305 // https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/6039 and has had multiple patches
8306 // to fix it but none so far have managed to land upstream. The issue appears to be
8307 // very low priority for the LND team despite being marked "P1".
8308 // We're not going to bother handling this in a sensible way, instead simply
8309 // repeating the Shutdown message on repeat until morale improves.
8310 if !msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
8311 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8312 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
8313 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
8314 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
8315 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&msg.channel_id) {
8316 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_outbound_shutdown() {
8317 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
8318 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
8322 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
8323 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
8324 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
8325 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
8326 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
8327 data: "You appear to be exhibiting LND bug 6039, we'll keep sending you shutdown messages until you handle them correctly".to_owned()
8329 log_level: Level::Trace,
8339 if msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
8340 let channel_ids: Vec<ChannelId> = {
8341 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8342 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
8343 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
8344 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
8345 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8346 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
8347 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
8348 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
8349 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
8351 for channel_id in channel_ids {
8352 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
8353 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
8357 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
8358 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8359 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
8360 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
8361 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
8362 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8363 if let Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
8364 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.chain_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
8365 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
8366 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
8374 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
8375 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
8379 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
8380 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
8383 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
8384 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
8387 fn get_chain_hashes(&self) -> Option<Vec<ChainHash>> {
8388 Some(vec![self.chain_hash])
8391 fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddInput) {
8392 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8393 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8394 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8397 fn handle_tx_add_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddOutput) {
8398 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8399 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8400 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8403 fn handle_tx_remove_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveInput) {
8404 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8405 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8406 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8409 fn handle_tx_remove_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveOutput) {
8410 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8411 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8412 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8415 fn handle_tx_complete(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxComplete) {
8416 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8417 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8418 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8421 fn handle_tx_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxSignatures) {
8422 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8423 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8424 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8427 fn handle_tx_init_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxInitRbf) {
8428 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8429 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8430 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8433 fn handle_tx_ack_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAckRbf) {
8434 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8435 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8436 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8439 fn handle_tx_abort(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAbort) {
8440 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8441 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8442 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8446 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
8447 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8448 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
8449 let mut node_features = provided_init_features(config).to_context();
8450 node_features.set_keysend_optional();
8454 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
8455 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8457 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
8458 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
8459 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
8460 pub(crate) fn provided_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
8461 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
8464 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
8465 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8466 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
8467 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
8470 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
8471 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8472 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
8473 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
8476 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
8477 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8478 pub fn provided_init_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
8479 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
8480 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
8481 // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
8482 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
8483 features.set_data_loss_protect_required();
8484 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
8485 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
8486 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
8487 features.set_payment_secret_required();
8488 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
8489 features.set_wumbo_optional();
8490 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
8491 features.set_channel_type_optional();
8492 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
8493 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
8494 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
8495 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
8500 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
8501 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
8503 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
8504 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
8505 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
8506 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
8509 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
8510 (2, node_id, required),
8511 (4, features, required),
8512 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
8513 (8, forwarding_info, option),
8514 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
8515 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
8518 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
8519 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8520 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
8521 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
8522 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
8523 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
8524 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
8525 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
8526 (2, self.channel_id, required),
8527 (3, self.channel_type, option),
8528 (4, self.counterparty, required),
8529 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
8530 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
8531 (7, self.config, option),
8532 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
8533 (9, self.confirmations, option),
8534 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
8535 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
8536 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
8537 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
8538 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
8539 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required),
8540 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
8541 (21, self.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, required),
8542 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
8543 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
8544 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
8545 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
8546 (30, self.is_usable, required),
8547 (32, self.is_public, required),
8548 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
8549 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
8550 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
8551 (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
8552 (41, self.channel_shutdown_state, option),
8558 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
8559 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8560 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
8561 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
8562 (2, channel_id, required),
8563 (3, channel_type, option),
8564 (4, counterparty, required),
8565 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
8566 (6, funding_txo, option),
8567 (7, config, option),
8568 (8, short_channel_id, option),
8569 (9, confirmations, option),
8570 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
8571 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
8572 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
8573 (16, balance_msat, required),
8574 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
8575 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
8576 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
8577 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
8578 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
8579 (21, next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, (default_value, 0)),
8580 (22, confirmations_required, option),
8581 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
8582 (26, is_outbound, required),
8583 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
8584 (30, is_usable, required),
8585 (32, is_public, required),
8586 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
8587 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
8588 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
8589 (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
8590 (41, channel_shutdown_state, option),
8593 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
8594 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
8595 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
8596 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
8597 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
8601 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
8603 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
8604 outbound_scid_alias,
8608 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
8609 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
8611 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
8612 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
8613 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
8614 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat.0.unwrap(),
8615 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
8616 confirmations_required,
8618 force_close_spend_delay,
8619 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
8620 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
8621 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
8622 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
8623 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
8624 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
8625 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
8626 channel_shutdown_state,
8631 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
8632 (2, channels, required_vec),
8633 (4, phantom_scid, required),
8634 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
8637 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
8639 (0, onion_packet, required),
8640 (2, short_channel_id, required),
8643 (0, payment_data, required),
8644 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
8645 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
8646 (3, payment_metadata, option),
8647 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
8649 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
8650 (0, payment_preimage, required),
8651 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
8652 (3, payment_metadata, option),
8653 (4, payment_data, option), // Added in 0.0.116
8654 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
8658 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
8659 (0, routing, required),
8660 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
8661 (4, payment_hash, required),
8662 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
8663 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
8664 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
8665 (10, skimmed_fee_msat, option),
8669 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
8670 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8672 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
8674 channel_id.write(writer)?;
8675 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8676 reason.write(writer)?;
8678 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
8679 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
8682 channel_id.write(writer)?;
8683 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8684 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
8685 failure_code.write(writer)?;
8692 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
8693 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8694 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8697 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
8698 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8699 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8700 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
8704 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
8705 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8706 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8707 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
8708 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
8711 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
8712 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
8713 // messages contained in the variants.
8714 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
8715 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
8716 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
8718 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
8719 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
8720 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
8721 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
8722 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
8725 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
8726 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
8727 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
8728 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
8729 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
8731 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
8736 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
8741 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
8742 (0, short_channel_id, required),
8743 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
8744 (2, outpoint, required),
8745 (4, htlc_id, required),
8746 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required),
8747 (7, user_channel_id, option),
8750 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
8751 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8752 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
8753 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
8754 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
8756 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
8757 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
8758 (1, self.total_msat, required),
8759 (2, self.value, required),
8760 (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
8761 (4, payment_data, option),
8762 (5, self.total_value_received, option),
8763 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
8764 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
8765 (10, self.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
8771 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
8772 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8773 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
8774 (0, prev_hop, required),
8775 (1, total_msat, option),
8776 (2, value_ser, required),
8777 (3, sender_intended_value, option),
8778 (4, payment_data_opt, option),
8779 (5, total_value_received, option),
8780 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
8781 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
8782 (10, counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
8784 let payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = payment_data_opt;
8785 let value = value_ser.0.unwrap();
8786 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
8788 if payment_data.is_some() {
8789 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
8791 if total_msat.is_none() {
8792 total_msat = Some(value);
8794 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
8797 if total_msat.is_none() {
8798 if payment_data.is_none() {
8799 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
8801 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
8803 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
8807 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
8810 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
8811 total_value_received,
8812 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
8814 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry.0.unwrap(),
8815 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
8820 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
8821 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8822 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8825 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
8826 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
8827 let mut path_hops = Vec::new();
8828 let mut payment_id = None;
8829 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
8830 let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
8831 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
8832 (0, session_priv, required),
8833 (1, payment_id, option),
8834 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
8835 (4, path_hops, required_vec),
8836 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
8837 (6, blinded_tail, option),
8839 if payment_id.is_none() {
8840 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
8842 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
8844 let path = Path { hops: path_hops, blinded_tail };
8845 if path.hops.len() == 0 {
8846 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8848 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
8849 if let Payee::Clear { ref mut final_cltv_expiry_delta, .. } = params.payee {
8850 if final_cltv_expiry_delta == &0 {
8851 *final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.final_cltv_expiry_delta().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8855 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
8856 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
8857 first_hop_htlc_msat,
8859 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
8862 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
8863 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
8868 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
8869 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
8871 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
8873 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
8874 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
8875 (0, session_priv, required),
8876 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
8877 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
8878 // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
8879 (4, path.hops, required_vec),
8880 (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
8881 (6, path.blinded_tail, option),
8884 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
8886 field.write(writer)?;
8893 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
8894 (0, forward_info, required),
8895 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
8896 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
8897 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
8898 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
8901 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
8903 (0, htlc_id, required),
8904 (2, err_packet, required),
8909 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
8910 (0, payment_secret, required),
8911 (2, expiry_time, required),
8912 (4, user_payment_id, required),
8913 (6, payment_preimage, required),
8914 (8, min_value_msat, required),
8917 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8919 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8920 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8921 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8922 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8923 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8924 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8928 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8929 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
8931 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
8933 self.chain_hash.write(writer)?;
8935 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
8936 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
8937 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
8940 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
8942 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8943 let mut number_of_funded_channels = 0;
8944 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8945 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8946 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8947 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
8948 serializable_peer_count += 1;
8951 number_of_funded_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(
8952 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { chan.context.is_funding_broadcast() } else { false }
8956 (number_of_funded_channels as u64).write(writer)?;
8958 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8959 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8960 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8961 for channel in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter_map(
8962 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = phase {
8963 if channel.context.is_funding_broadcast() { Some(channel) } else { None }
8966 channel.write(writer)?;
8972 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
8973 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8974 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
8975 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
8976 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8977 for forward in pending_forwards {
8978 forward.write(writer)?;
8983 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
8985 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
8986 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
8987 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
8989 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
8990 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
8991 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8992 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
8993 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
8994 (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8995 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
8996 htlc.write(writer)?;
8998 htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
8999 htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
9002 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
9003 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
9004 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9005 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
9006 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
9007 // per_peer_state lock at all.
9008 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
9011 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
9012 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
9013 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
9014 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
9015 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
9017 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
9018 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
9019 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
9020 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
9021 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
9022 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
9023 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
9028 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
9029 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.115 don't support post-event actions, thus if there's no
9030 // actions at all, skip writing the required TLV. Otherwise, pre-0.0.115 versions will
9031 // refuse to read the new ChannelManager.
9032 let events_not_backwards_compatible = events.iter().any(|(_, action)| action.is_some());
9033 if events_not_backwards_compatible {
9034 // If we're gonna write a even TLV that will overwrite our events anyway we might as
9035 // well save the space and not write any events here.
9036 0u64.write(writer)?;
9038 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9039 for (event, _) in events.iter() {
9040 event.write(writer)?;
9044 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote the `pending_background_events`
9045 // `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here, however there was never a reason to do so -
9046 // the closing monitor updates were always effectively replayed on startup (either directly
9047 // by calling `broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn` on a `ChannelMonitor` during
9048 // deserialization or, in 0.0.115, by regenerating the monitor update itself).
9049 0u64.write(writer)?;
9051 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
9052 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
9053 // likely to be identical.
9054 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
9055 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
9057 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9058 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
9059 hash.write(writer)?;
9060 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
9063 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
9064 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
9065 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
9066 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
9067 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
9070 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
9071 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
9073 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
9074 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
9075 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
9076 session_priv.write(writer)?;
9079 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {},
9080 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {},
9081 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
9082 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
9086 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
9087 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
9088 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
9090 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
9091 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
9092 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
9098 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
9099 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
9100 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
9101 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
9104 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
9105 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
9106 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
9107 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
9108 pending_claiming_payments = None;
9111 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(&PublicKey, &OutPoint), &Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
9112 for ((counterparty_id, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
9113 for (funding_outpoint, updates) in peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.iter() {
9114 if !updates.is_empty() {
9115 if in_flight_monitor_updates.is_none() { in_flight_monitor_updates = Some(HashMap::new()); }
9116 in_flight_monitor_updates.as_mut().unwrap().insert((counterparty_id, funding_outpoint), updates);
9121 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9122 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
9123 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
9124 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
9125 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
9126 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
9127 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
9128 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
9129 (8, if events_not_backwards_compatible { Some(&*events) } else { None }, option),
9130 (9, htlc_purposes, required_vec),
9131 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
9132 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
9133 (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
9140 impl Writeable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
9141 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9142 (self.len() as u64).write(w)?;
9143 for (event, action) in self.iter() {
9146 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
9147 // Events are MaybeReadable, in some cases indicating that they shouldn't actually
9148 // be persisted and are regenerated on restart. However, if such an event has a
9149 // post-event-handling action we'll write nothing for the event and would have to
9150 // either forget the action or fail on deserialization (which we do below). Thus,
9151 // check that the event is sane here.
9152 let event_encoded = event.encode();
9153 let event_read: Option<Event> =
9154 MaybeReadable::read(&mut &event_encoded[..]).unwrap();
9155 if action.is_some() { assert!(event_read.is_some()); }
9161 impl Readable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
9162 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9163 let len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9164 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 1024 * 16;
9165 let mut events: Self = VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(
9166 MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>() as u64,
9169 let ev_opt = MaybeReadable::read(reader)?;
9170 let action = Readable::read(reader)?;
9171 if let Some(ev) = ev_opt {
9172 events.push_back((ev, action));
9173 } else if action.is_some() {
9174 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9181 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(ChannelShutdownState,
9182 (0, NotShuttingDown) => {},
9183 (2, ShutdownInitiated) => {},
9184 (4, ResolvingHTLCs) => {},
9185 (6, NegotiatingClosingFee) => {},
9186 (8, ShutdownComplete) => {}, ;
9189 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
9191 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
9193 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
9194 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
9195 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
9196 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
9197 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
9198 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
9199 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
9200 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
9201 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
9202 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
9203 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
9204 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
9205 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
9207 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
9208 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
9210 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
9211 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
9213 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
9214 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
9215 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
9216 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
9217 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
9218 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
9220 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
9221 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9223 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
9224 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9225 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9226 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9227 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9228 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9232 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
9233 pub entropy_source: ES,
9235 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
9236 pub node_signer: NS,
9238 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
9239 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
9241 pub signer_provider: SP,
9243 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
9245 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
9246 pub fee_estimator: F,
9247 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
9249 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
9250 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
9251 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
9252 pub chain_monitor: M,
9254 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
9255 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
9256 /// force-closed during deserialization.
9257 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
9258 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
9259 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
9261 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
9263 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
9264 /// deserialization.
9266 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
9267 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
9268 pub default_config: UserConfig,
9270 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
9271 /// value.context.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
9273 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
9274 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
9275 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
9276 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
9278 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
9281 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
9282 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>,
9285 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9286 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9288 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
9289 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9290 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9291 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9292 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9293 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9297 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
9298 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
9299 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
9300 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
9301 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>) -> Self {
9303 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
9304 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
9309 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
9310 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
9311 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9312 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
9314 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
9315 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9316 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9317 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9318 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9319 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9323 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9324 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
9325 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
9329 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9330 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
9332 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
9333 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9334 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9335 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9336 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9337 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9341 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9342 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
9344 let chain_hash: ChainHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
9345 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9346 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
9348 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
9350 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9351 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
9352 let mut funded_peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
9353 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
9354 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
9355 let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
9356 let mut close_background_events = Vec::new();
9357 for _ in 0..channel_count {
9358 let mut channel: Channel<SP> = Channel::read(reader, (
9359 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
9361 let funding_txo = channel.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9362 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
9363 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
9364 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
9365 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
9366 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
9367 channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
9368 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
9369 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
9370 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
9371 if channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
9372 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
9373 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
9375 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() {
9376 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at holder commitment number {} but the ChannelManager is at holder commitment number {}.",
9377 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number());
9379 if channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() {
9380 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at revoked counterparty transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at revoked counterparty transaction number {}.",
9381 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
9383 if channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() {
9384 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at counterparty commitment transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at counterparty commitment transaction number {}.",
9385 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
9387 let (monitor_update, mut new_failed_htlcs, batch_funding_txid) = channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
9388 if batch_funding_txid.is_some() {
9389 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9391 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = monitor_update {
9392 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
9393 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
9396 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
9397 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
9398 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
9399 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
9400 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager,
9401 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
9402 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
9404 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
9405 let mut found_htlc = false;
9406 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
9407 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
9410 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
9411 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
9412 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
9413 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
9414 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
9415 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
9416 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
9417 log_info!(args.logger,
9418 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
9419 &channel.context.channel_id(), &payment_hash);
9420 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
9424 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {} at update_id {} against monitor at update id {}",
9425 &channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
9426 monitor.get_latest_update_id());
9427 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
9428 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
9430 if channel.context.is_funding_broadcast() {
9431 id_to_peer.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
9433 match funded_peer_channels.entry(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
9434 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
9435 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
9436 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
9438 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
9439 let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
9440 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
9441 entry.insert(by_id_map);
9445 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
9446 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
9447 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
9448 // safely discard the channel.
9449 let _ = channel.context.force_shutdown(false);
9450 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
9451 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
9452 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
9453 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
9454 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
9455 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
9458 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", &channel.context.channel_id());
9459 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
9460 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
9461 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
9462 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
9463 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9467 for (funding_txo, _) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
9468 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
9469 log_info!(args.logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
9470 &funding_txo.to_channel_id());
9471 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
9472 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
9473 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
9475 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, monitor_update)));
9479 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
9480 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9481 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
9482 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
9483 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
9484 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9485 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
9486 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
9487 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
9489 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
9492 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9493 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
9494 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
9495 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
9496 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9497 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
9498 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
9499 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
9501 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
9504 let peer_state_from_chans = |channel_by_id| {
9507 inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
9508 latest_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
9509 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
9510 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
9511 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
9512 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
9513 is_connected: false,
9517 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9518 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>)>()));
9519 for _ in 0..peer_count {
9520 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
9521 let peer_chans = funded_peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new());
9522 let mut peer_state = peer_state_from_chans(peer_chans);
9523 peer_state.latest_features = Readable::read(reader)?;
9524 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
9527 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9528 let mut pending_events_read: VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> =
9529 VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>()));
9530 for _ in 0..event_count {
9531 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
9532 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push_back((event, None)),
9537 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9538 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
9539 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
9541 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote pending `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here,
9542 // however we really don't (and never did) need them - we regenerate all
9543 // on-startup monitor updates.
9544 let _: OutPoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
9545 let _: ChannelMonitorUpdate = Readable::read(reader)?;
9547 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
9551 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
9552 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9554 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9555 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
9556 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
9557 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
9558 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9562 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9563 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
9564 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
9565 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
9566 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
9567 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
9568 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
9570 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
9571 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9575 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
9576 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
9577 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
9578 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
9579 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
9580 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
9581 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
9582 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
9583 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
9584 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
9585 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer: Option<Vec<(_, BTreeMap<_, Vec<_>>)>> = Some(Vec::new());
9586 let mut events_override = None;
9587 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(PublicKey, OutPoint), Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
9588 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9589 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
9590 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
9591 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
9592 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
9593 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
9594 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
9595 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
9596 (8, events_override, option),
9597 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, optional_vec),
9598 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
9599 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
9600 (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
9602 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
9603 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
9606 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
9607 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
9610 if let Some(events) = events_override {
9611 pending_events_read = events;
9614 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
9615 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
9618 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
9619 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
9620 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
9621 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
9622 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
9623 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
9625 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
9627 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
9628 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
9629 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
9632 // We have to replay (or skip, if they were completed after we wrote the `ChannelManager`)
9633 // each `ChannelMonitorUpdate` in `in_flight_monitor_updates`. After doing so, we have to
9634 // check that each channel we have isn't newer than the latest `ChannelMonitorUpdate`(s) we
9635 // replayed, and for each monitor update we have to replay we have to ensure there's a
9636 // `ChannelMonitor` for it.
9638 // In order to do so we first walk all of our live channels (so that we can check their
9639 // state immediately after doing the update replays, when we have the `update_id`s
9640 // available) and then walk any remaining in-flight updates.
9642 // Because the actual handling of the in-flight updates is the same, it's macro'ized here:
9643 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
9644 macro_rules! handle_in_flight_updates {
9645 ($counterparty_node_id: expr, $chan_in_flight_upds: expr, $funding_txo: expr,
9646 $monitor: expr, $peer_state: expr, $channel_info_log: expr
9648 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = 0;
9649 $chan_in_flight_upds.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > $monitor.get_latest_update_id());
9650 for update in $chan_in_flight_upds.iter() {
9651 log_trace!(args.logger, "Replaying ChannelMonitorUpdate {} for {}channel {}",
9652 update.update_id, $channel_info_log, &$funding_txo.to_channel_id());
9653 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id, update.update_id);
9654 pending_background_events.push(
9655 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
9656 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
9657 funding_txo: $funding_txo,
9658 update: update.clone(),
9661 if $chan_in_flight_upds.is_empty() {
9662 // We had some updates to apply, but it turns out they had completed before we
9663 // were serialized, we just weren't notified of that. Thus, we may have to run
9664 // the completion actions for any monitor updates, but otherwise are done.
9665 pending_background_events.push(
9666 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
9667 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
9668 channel_id: $funding_txo.to_channel_id(),
9671 if $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.insert($funding_txo, $chan_in_flight_upds).is_some() {
9672 log_error!(args.logger, "Duplicate in-flight monitor update set for the same channel!");
9673 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9675 max_in_flight_update_id
9679 for (counterparty_id, peer_state_mtx) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
9680 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
9681 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9682 for phase in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
9683 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
9684 // Channels that were persisted have to be funded, otherwise they should have been
9686 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9687 let monitor = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo)
9688 .expect("We already checked for monitor presence when loading channels");
9689 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = monitor.get_latest_update_id();
9690 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = &mut in_flight_monitor_updates {
9691 if let Some(mut chan_in_flight_upds) = in_flight_upds.remove(&(*counterparty_id, funding_txo)) {
9692 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id,
9693 handle_in_flight_updates!(*counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_upds,
9694 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, ""));
9697 if chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id() > max_in_flight_update_id {
9698 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
9699 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
9700 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} with update_id through {} in-flight",
9701 chan.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), max_in_flight_update_id);
9702 log_error!(args.logger, " but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.", chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id());
9703 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
9704 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
9705 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
9706 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
9707 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9710 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
9711 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
9712 debug_assert!(false);
9713 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9718 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = in_flight_monitor_updates {
9719 for ((counterparty_id, funding_txo), mut chan_in_flight_updates) in in_flight_upds {
9720 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
9721 // Now that we've removed all the in-flight monitor updates for channels that are
9722 // still open, we need to replay any monitor updates that are for closed channels,
9723 // creating the neccessary peer_state entries as we go.
9724 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_id).or_insert_with(|| {
9725 Mutex::new(peer_state_from_chans(HashMap::new()))
9727 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9728 handle_in_flight_updates!(counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_updates,
9729 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, "closed ");
9731 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is missing even though we have in-flight updates for it! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
9732 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is missing.",
9733 &funding_txo.to_channel_id());
9734 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
9735 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
9736 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
9737 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
9738 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9743 // Note that we have to do the above replays before we push new monitor updates.
9744 pending_background_events.append(&mut close_background_events);
9746 // If there's any preimages for forwarded HTLCs hanging around in ChannelMonitors we
9747 // should ensure we try them again on the inbound edge. We put them here and do so after we
9748 // have a fully-constructed `ChannelManager` at the end.
9749 let mut pending_claims_to_replay = Vec::new();
9752 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
9753 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
9754 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
9755 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
9756 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
9757 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
9758 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
9760 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
9761 let counterparty_opt = id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
9762 if counterparty_opt.is_none() {
9763 for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
9764 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
9765 if path.hops.is_empty() {
9766 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
9767 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9770 let path_amt = path.final_value_msat();
9771 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
9772 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
9773 match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
9774 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
9775 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
9776 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
9777 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), &htlc.payment_hash);
9779 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
9780 let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
9781 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
9782 retry_strategy: None,
9783 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
9784 payment_params: None,
9785 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
9786 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
9787 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
9788 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
9789 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
9790 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(), // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
9791 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
9792 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
9793 total_msat: path_amt,
9794 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
9795 remaining_max_total_routing_fee_msat: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
9797 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
9798 path_amt, &htlc.payment_hash, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
9803 for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
9805 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
9806 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
9807 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
9808 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
9810 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
9811 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
9812 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
9813 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
9814 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
9815 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
9816 forwards.retain(|forward| {
9817 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
9818 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
9819 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
9820 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
9825 !forwards.is_empty()
9827 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
9828 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
9829 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
9830 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
9831 pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
9832 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
9833 intercepted_id != ev_id
9840 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
9841 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
9842 let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
9843 // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
9844 // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
9845 // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
9846 // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
9847 // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
9848 // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
9849 // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
9850 // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
9852 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
9853 channel_funding_outpoint: monitor.get_funding_txo().0,
9854 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
9856 pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv,
9857 path, false, compl_action, &pending_events, &args.logger);
9858 pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
9865 // Whether the downstream channel was closed or not, try to re-apply any payment
9866 // preimages from it which may be needed in upstream channels for forwarded
9868 let outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter = monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs()
9870 .filter_map(|(htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt))| {
9871 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(_) = htlc_source {
9872 if let Some(payment_preimage) = preimage_opt {
9873 Some((htlc_source, payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat,
9874 // Check if `counterparty_opt.is_none()` to see if the
9875 // downstream chan is closed (because we don't have a
9876 // channel_id -> peer map entry).
9877 counterparty_opt.is_none(),
9878 counterparty_opt.cloned().or(monitor.get_counterparty_node_id()),
9879 monitor.get_funding_txo().0))
9882 // If it was an outbound payment, we've handled it above - if a preimage
9883 // came in and we persisted the `ChannelManager` we either handled it and
9884 // are good to go or the channel force-closed - we don't have to handle the
9885 // channel still live case here.
9889 for tuple in outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter {
9890 pending_claims_to_replay.push(tuple);
9895 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
9896 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
9897 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
9898 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
9899 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
9900 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
9901 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
9902 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
9906 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
9907 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
9909 let mut claimable_payments = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
9910 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
9911 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
9912 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9914 if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
9915 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
9916 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9918 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
9919 purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
9921 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
9922 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
9924 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
9927 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
9928 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
9929 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
9931 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
9935 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
9936 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
9937 for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
9938 if htlcs.is_empty() {
9939 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9941 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
9942 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
9943 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
9944 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
9945 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
9946 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
9947 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
9948 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
9950 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", &payment_hash);
9951 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9955 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
9957 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
9959 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
9960 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
9962 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
9963 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
9968 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9969 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
9971 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
9973 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9975 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
9976 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
9977 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
9978 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9982 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
9983 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
9984 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9985 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9986 for (chan_id, phase) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
9987 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
9988 if chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
9989 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
9991 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
9992 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &chain_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
9993 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
9995 chan.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
9996 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias()) {
9997 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
9998 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
9999 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
10000 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10002 if chan.context.is_usable() {
10003 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
10004 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
10005 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
10006 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
10007 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10011 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
10012 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
10013 debug_assert!(false);
10014 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10019 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
10021 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
10022 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
10023 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
10024 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", &payment_hash);
10025 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
10026 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
10027 let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
10028 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
10029 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
10030 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
10031 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
10033 for claimable_htlc in &payment.htlcs {
10034 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
10036 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
10037 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
10038 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
10039 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
10041 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
10042 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
10043 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
10044 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
10046 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
10047 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
10048 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
10049 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
10051 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
10052 if let Some(peer_node_id) = id_to_peer.get(&previous_channel_id){
10053 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
10054 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10055 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10056 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(channel)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
10057 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
10060 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
10061 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
10064 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
10067 purpose: payment.purpose,
10068 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
10069 htlcs: payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect(),
10070 sender_intended_total_msat: payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat),
10076 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
10077 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
10078 for (_, actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions.iter() {
10079 for action in actions.iter() {
10080 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
10081 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
10082 Some((blocked_node_id, blocked_channel_outpoint, blocking_action)), ..
10084 if let Some(blocked_peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&blocked_node_id) {
10085 blocked_peer_state.lock().unwrap().actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
10086 .entry(blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id())
10087 .or_insert_with(Vec::new).push(blocking_action.clone());
10089 // If the channel we were blocking has closed, we don't need to
10090 // worry about it - the blocked monitor update should never have
10091 // been released from the `Channel` object so it can't have
10092 // completed, and if the channel closed there's no reason to bother
10098 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
10100 log_error!(args.logger, "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
10101 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10105 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
10107 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
10108 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
10109 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
10110 router: args.router,
10112 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
10114 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
10115 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
10116 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
10117 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
10119 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
10120 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
10121 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
10122 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
10123 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
10124 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
10126 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
10128 our_network_pubkey,
10131 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
10133 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
10135 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
10136 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
10137 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
10138 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
10139 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
10141 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
10142 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
10144 funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
10146 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
10147 node_signer: args.node_signer,
10148 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
10150 logger: args.logger,
10151 default_configuration: args.default_config,
10154 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
10155 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
10156 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
10157 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
10158 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
10161 for (source, preimage, downstream_value, downstream_closed, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding) in pending_claims_to_replay {
10162 // We use `downstream_closed` in place of `from_onchain` here just as a guess - we
10163 // don't remember in the `ChannelMonitor` where we got a preimage from, but if the
10164 // channel is closed we just assume that it probably came from an on-chain claim.
10165 channel_manager.claim_funds_internal(source, preimage, Some(downstream_value),
10166 downstream_closed, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding);
10169 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
10170 //connection or two.
10172 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
10178 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
10179 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
10180 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
10181 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
10182 use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
10183 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
10184 use crate::ln::ChannelId;
10185 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
10186 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
10187 use crate::ln::msgs::{self, ErrorAction};
10188 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
10189 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
10190 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
10191 use crate::util::test_utils;
10192 use crate::util::config::{ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
10193 use crate::sign::EntropySource;
10196 fn test_notify_limits() {
10197 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
10198 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
10199 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
10200 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
10201 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
10202 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10204 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
10205 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
10206 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10207 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10208 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10210 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
10212 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
10213 // to connect messages with new values
10214 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
10215 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
10216 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
10217 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
10218 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
10219 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
10221 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
10222 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10223 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10224 // ... but the last node should not.
10225 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10226 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
10227 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10228 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10230 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
10231 // about the channel.
10232 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
10233 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
10234 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10236 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
10238 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
10239 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
10240 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
10241 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
10242 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10243 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10245 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
10246 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
10247 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
10249 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
10250 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
10251 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
10252 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
10253 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
10254 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
10256 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
10257 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
10258 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
10259 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
10260 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10261 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10262 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
10263 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
10265 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
10266 // the channel info has updated.
10267 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
10268 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
10269 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10270 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10271 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
10272 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
10276 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
10277 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
10279 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10280 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10281 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10282 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10283 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
10285 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
10286 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
10287 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
10288 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
10290 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
10291 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
10292 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
10293 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
10294 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
10295 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
10296 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
10297 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
10298 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10299 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10300 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10301 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
10303 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
10304 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
10305 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
10306 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10307 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10308 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10309 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
10310 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
10311 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10312 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
10313 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
10314 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
10315 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
10316 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10317 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10318 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
10319 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
10320 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
10321 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
10322 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
10323 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
10324 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
10325 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
10327 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
10328 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
10329 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
10330 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10331 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10332 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10333 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
10335 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
10336 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
10337 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
10338 // lightning messages manually.
10339 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
10340 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
10341 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
10343 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10344 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
10345 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
10346 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
10347 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10348 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10349 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
10350 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10351 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10352 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
10353 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10354 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10355 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
10356 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
10357 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10358 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10359 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
10360 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10361 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10362 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
10363 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10364 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
10365 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10366 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10367 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
10368 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10370 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
10371 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
10372 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10373 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
10375 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
10376 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
10377 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
10378 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
10380 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10383 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
10384 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
10385 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
10386 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
10388 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10393 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
10394 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(false);
10395 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(true);
10398 fn do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(accept_mpp_keysend: bool) {
10399 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
10400 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
10401 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
10402 // fails as expected.
10403 // (3): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend
10404 // payment fails as expected. When `accept_mpp_keysend` is false, this tests that we
10405 // reject MPP keysend payments, since in this case where the payment has no payment
10406 // secret, a keysend payment with a duplicate hash is basically an MPP keysend. If
10407 // `accept_mpp_keysend` is true, this tests that we only accept MPP keysends with
10408 // payment secrets and reject otherwise.
10409 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10410 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10411 let mut mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
10412 mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = accept_mpp_keysend;
10413 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
10414 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10415 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
10416 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
10417 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
10419 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
10420 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
10421 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
10423 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
10424 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
10425 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(),
10426 TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false), 100_000);
10427 let route = find_route(
10428 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
10429 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
10431 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
10432 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
10433 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10434 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10435 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10436 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
10437 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
10438 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10439 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
10440 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
10441 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
10442 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
10443 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
10444 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
10445 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10446 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10447 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
10448 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
10449 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
10450 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
10451 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
10452 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
10453 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
10454 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
10456 // Finally, claim the original payment.
10457 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
10459 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
10460 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
10461 let route = find_route(
10462 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
10463 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
10465 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
10466 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
10467 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10468 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10469 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10470 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
10471 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
10472 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
10474 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
10475 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
10476 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
10477 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
10478 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10479 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10480 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10481 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
10482 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
10483 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10484 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
10485 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
10486 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
10487 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
10488 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10489 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10490 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
10491 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
10492 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
10493 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
10494 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
10495 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
10496 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
10497 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
10499 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
10500 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
10502 // To start (3), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
10503 let payment_id_1 = PaymentId([44; 32]);
10504 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
10505 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_1).unwrap();
10506 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10507 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10508 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10509 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
10510 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
10511 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
10513 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
10514 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
10515 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
10518 let route = find_route(
10519 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
10520 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
10522 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId([45; 32]);
10523 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
10524 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_2).unwrap();
10525 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10526 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10527 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10528 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
10529 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
10530 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10531 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
10532 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
10533 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
10534 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
10535 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10536 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10537 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
10538 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
10539 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
10540 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
10541 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
10542 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
10543 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
10544 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
10546 // Finally, claim the original payment.
10547 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
10551 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
10552 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
10553 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
10554 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10555 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10556 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10557 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10559 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
10560 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
10562 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
10563 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
10564 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
10565 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
10566 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
10567 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
10568 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
10569 let route = find_route(
10570 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
10571 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
10574 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
10575 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
10576 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
10577 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
10578 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
10579 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
10580 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10582 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10583 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
10584 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
10585 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
10586 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
10587 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
10588 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
10590 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
10594 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
10595 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment
10596 // secret when we don't support MPP keysend.
10597 let mut reject_mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
10598 reject_mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = false;
10599 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10600 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10601 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(reject_mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
10602 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10604 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
10605 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
10607 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
10608 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
10609 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
10610 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
10611 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
10612 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
10613 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
10614 let route = find_route(
10615 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
10616 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
10619 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
10620 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
10621 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
10622 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
10623 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
10624 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
10625 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
10626 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
10627 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10629 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10630 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
10631 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
10632 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
10633 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
10634 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
10635 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
10637 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
10641 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
10642 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
10643 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
10644 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
10645 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10647 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
10648 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
10649 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
10650 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
10652 // Marshall an MPP route.
10653 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
10654 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
10655 route.paths.push(path);
10656 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
10657 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
10658 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
10659 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
10660 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
10661 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
10663 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
10664 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
10666 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
10667 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
10669 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
10674 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
10675 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10676 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10677 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10678 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10680 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
10682 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10683 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10685 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
10686 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
10687 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10688 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
10691 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
10692 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
10693 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
10694 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
10695 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
10696 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
10699 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10702 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
10703 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
10708 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
10709 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
10710 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10711 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10712 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10713 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10715 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
10716 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
10718 total_msat: 100_000,
10721 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
10722 // payment verification fails as expected.
10723 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
10724 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
10725 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
10726 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
10728 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
10732 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
10733 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
10737 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
10738 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
10739 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
10740 // the channel is successfully closed.
10741 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10742 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10743 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10744 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10746 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
10747 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10748 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
10749 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10750 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
10752 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
10753 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes(tx.txid().into_inner());
10755 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
10756 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
10757 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
10758 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
10761 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
10763 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
10764 // as it has the funding transaction.
10765 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10766 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
10767 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
10770 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
10772 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10774 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
10776 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10777 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
10778 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
10780 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10783 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
10784 // as it has the funding transaction.
10785 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10786 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
10787 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
10789 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10790 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10791 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
10792 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10793 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10794 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
10795 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
10796 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
10798 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
10799 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
10800 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10801 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
10803 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10804 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
10806 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
10807 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
10808 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
10809 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
10810 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10811 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
10812 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
10816 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
10817 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
10818 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
10819 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
10820 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10821 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
10822 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
10825 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
10827 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
10828 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
10829 // closing transaction).
10830 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
10831 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
10832 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
10834 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
10835 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
10836 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10837 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
10838 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
10841 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10843 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
10845 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
10846 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
10847 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
10849 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10851 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
10852 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
10855 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
10856 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
10857 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
10860 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
10861 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
10862 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
10865 fn check_channel_unavailable_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_channel_id: ChannelId, peer_node_id: PublicKey) {
10866 let expected_message = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_channel_id, peer_node_id);
10867 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
10870 fn check_api_misuse_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
10871 let expected_message = "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_string();
10872 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
10875 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
10877 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
10878 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
10880 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
10881 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
10883 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
10884 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
10889 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
10890 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
10891 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
10892 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
10893 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10894 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
10895 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
10896 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
10899 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
10900 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
10901 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
10903 // Test the API functions.
10904 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None), unkown_public_key);
10906 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
10908 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
10910 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
10912 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
10914 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
10916 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
10920 fn test_api_calls_with_unavailable_channel() {
10921 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` and a `channel_id`
10922 // as input, behaves as expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is a known peer in the
10923 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map, but the peer state doesn't contain a channel with
10924 // the given `channel_id`.
10925 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10926 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
10927 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
10928 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
10930 let counterparty_node_id = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
10933 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
10935 // Test the API functions.
10936 check_api_misuse_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, 42));
10938 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
10940 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
10942 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
10944 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(InterceptId([0; 32]), &channel_id, counterparty_node_id, 1_000_000), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
10946 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&counterparty_node_id, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
10950 fn test_connection_limiting() {
10951 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
10952 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10953 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10954 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10955 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10957 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
10959 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10960 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10962 let mut funding_tx = None;
10963 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
10964 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10965 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10968 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
10969 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
10970 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
10971 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
10972 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10974 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
10975 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10976 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10978 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10980 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
10981 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10982 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10984 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
10987 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
10988 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
10989 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10990 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
10991 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
10993 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
10994 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
10996 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
10997 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
10998 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
10999 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11000 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
11001 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11002 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11005 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11006 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11007 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11008 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11009 }, true).unwrap_err();
11011 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
11012 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
11013 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11014 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11015 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
11016 for ev in chan_closed_events {
11017 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
11019 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11020 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11022 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
11023 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11024 }, true).unwrap_err();
11026 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
11027 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
11028 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11029 }, false).unwrap();
11030 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11032 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
11033 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
11035 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
11036 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
11037 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
11038 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
11039 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11041 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11042 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
11043 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11045 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
11046 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
11047 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
11049 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
11050 // "protected" and can connect again.
11051 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
11052 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
11053 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11055 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11057 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
11059 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11060 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
11064 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
11065 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
11066 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11067 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11068 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11069 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11071 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
11073 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
11074 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11076 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
11077 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11078 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11079 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11082 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
11084 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11085 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
11086 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11088 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
11089 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
11090 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11092 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
11093 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11094 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
11095 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11099 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
11100 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
11101 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
11102 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11103 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11104 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
11105 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
11106 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
11107 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11109 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
11111 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
11112 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11114 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
11115 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
11116 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11117 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11118 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11119 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11122 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11123 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11125 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
11126 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
11128 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11130 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
11131 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11134 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
11135 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11136 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11137 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11138 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11140 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11141 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11143 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
11144 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
11145 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
11146 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
11150 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11152 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
11153 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11155 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
11156 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11157 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11159 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
11160 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
11162 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11164 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
11168 fn reject_excessively_underpaying_htlcs() {
11169 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
11170 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
11171 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
11172 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11173 let sender_intended_amt_msat = 100;
11174 let extra_fee_msat = 10;
11175 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
11177 outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
11178 payment_metadata: None,
11179 keysend_preimage: None,
11180 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
11181 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
11183 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
11185 // Check that if the amount we received + the penultimate hop extra fee is less than the sender
11186 // intended amount, we fail the payment.
11187 if let Err(crate::ln::channelmanager::InboundOnionErr { err_code, .. }) =
11188 node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
11189 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat - 1, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat))
11191 assert_eq!(err_code, 19);
11192 } else { panic!(); }
11194 // If amt_received + extra_fee is equal to the sender intended amount, we're fine.
11195 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { // This is the same payload as above, InboundOnionPayload doesn't implement Clone
11197 outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
11198 payment_metadata: None,
11199 keysend_preimage: None,
11200 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
11201 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
11203 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
11205 assert!(node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
11206 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat)).is_ok());
11210 fn test_final_incorrect_cltv(){
11211 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
11212 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
11213 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
11214 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11216 let result = node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
11218 outgoing_cltv_value: 22,
11219 payment_metadata: None,
11220 keysend_preimage: None,
11221 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
11222 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: 100,
11224 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
11225 }, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]), 100, 23, None, true, None);
11227 // Should not return an error as this condition:
11228 // https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/4dcc377209509b13cf89a4b91fde7d478f5b46d8/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L334
11229 // is not satisfied.
11230 assert!(result.is_ok());
11234 fn test_inbound_anchors_manual_acceptance() {
11235 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
11236 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
11237 let mut anchors_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
11238 anchors_cfg.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
11240 let mut anchors_manual_accept_cfg = anchors_cfg.clone();
11241 anchors_manual_accept_cfg.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
11243 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
11244 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
11245 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs,
11246 &[Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_manual_accept_cfg.clone())]);
11247 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11249 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
11250 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11252 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11253 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
11254 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11255 match &msg_events[0] {
11256 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } => {
11257 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11259 ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } =>
11260 assert_eq!(msg.data, "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned()),
11261 _ => panic!("Unexpected error action"),
11264 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11267 nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11268 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11270 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } =>
11271 nodes[2].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap(),
11272 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11274 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11278 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
11279 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
11280 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
11281 // the channel without the anchors feature.
11282 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11283 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11284 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
11285 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
11286 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
11287 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
11288 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11290 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None).unwrap();
11291 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11292 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
11294 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11295 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11297 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
11298 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
11300 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11303 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11304 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
11306 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11307 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
11309 // Since nodes[1] should not have accepted the channel, it should
11310 // not have generated any events.
11311 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
11315 fn test_update_channel_config() {
11316 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11317 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
11318 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
11319 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
11320 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11321 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11322 let channel = &nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0];
11324 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
11325 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11326 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
11328 user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat += 10;
11329 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
11330 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_base_msat, user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat);
11331 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11332 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11334 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
11335 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
11338 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate::default()).unwrap();
11339 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11340 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
11342 let new_cltv_expiry_delta = user_config.channel_config.cltv_expiry_delta + 6;
11343 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
11344 cltv_expiry_delta: Some(new_cltv_expiry_delta),
11345 ..Default::default()
11347 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
11348 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11349 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11351 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
11352 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
11355 let new_fee = user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths + 100;
11356 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
11357 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
11358 ..Default::default()
11360 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
11361 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, new_fee);
11362 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11363 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11365 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
11366 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
11369 // If we provide a channel_id not associated with the peer, we should get an error and no updates
11370 // should be applied to ensure update atomicity as specified in the API docs.
11371 let bad_channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_txid(&[10; 32], 10);
11372 let current_fee = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths;
11373 let new_fee = current_fee + 100;
11376 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id, bad_channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
11377 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
11378 ..Default::default()
11380 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: _ }),
11383 // Check that the fee hasn't changed for the channel that exists.
11384 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, current_fee);
11385 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11386 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
11390 fn test_payment_display() {
11391 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
11392 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_id), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
11393 let payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
11394 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_hash), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
11395 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11396 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_preimage), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
11400 fn test_trigger_lnd_force_close() {
11401 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11402 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
11403 let user_config = test_default_channel_config();
11404 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
11405 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11407 // Open a channel, immediately disconnect each other, and broadcast Alice's latest state.
11408 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11409 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11410 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11411 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
11412 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
11413 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
11414 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
11416 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
11417 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
11418 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
11421 // Since they're disconnected, Bob won't receive Alice's `Error` message. Reconnect them
11422 // such that Bob sends a `ChannelReestablish` to Alice since the channel is still open from
11424 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
11425 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11427 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
11428 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11429 }, false).unwrap();
11430 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
11431 let channel_reestablish = get_event_msg!(
11432 nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()
11434 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channel_reestablish);
11436 // Alice should respond with an error since the channel isn't known, but a bogus
11437 // `ChannelReestablish` should be sent first, such that we actually trigger Bob to force
11438 // close even if it was an lnd node.
11439 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11440 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
11441 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { node_id, msg } = &msg_events[0] {
11442 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11443 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 0);
11444 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0);
11445 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
11446 } else { panic!() };
11447 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[1], 1, true);
11448 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
11449 let expected_close_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError {
11450 err: "Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_string()
11452 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, expected_close_reason, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
11454 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
11455 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
11456 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
11463 use crate::chain::Listen;
11464 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
11465 use crate::sign::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
11466 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
11467 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
11468 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
11469 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
11470 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
11471 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
11472 use crate::util::test_utils;
11473 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
11475 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
11476 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
11477 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
11479 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock};
11481 use criterion::Criterion;
11483 type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
11484 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
11485 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
11486 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
11487 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
11488 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
11489 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
11491 struct ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
11492 node: &'node_cfg Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>,
11494 impl<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg, P> {
11495 type CM = Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>;
11497 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P> { self.node }
11499 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
11502 pub fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Criterion) {
11503 bench_two_sends(bench, "bench_sends", test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
11506 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Criterion, bench_name: &str, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
11507 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
11508 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
11510 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
11511 let genesis_block = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network);
11513 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
11514 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
11515 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
11516 let scorer = RwLock::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
11517 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &scorer);
11519 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
11520 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(5_000_000 / 253);
11521 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
11523 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
11524 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
11525 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
11526 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
11528 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
11529 }, genesis_block.header.time);
11530 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
11532 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
11533 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
11534 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
11535 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
11536 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
11538 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
11539 }, genesis_block.header.time);
11540 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
11542 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
11543 features: node_b.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11545 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
11546 features: node_a.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11547 }, false).unwrap();
11548 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
11549 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
11550 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
11553 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
11554 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
11555 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
11557 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
11558 } else { panic!(); }
11560 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
11561 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11562 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
11563 match events_b[0] {
11564 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
11565 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
11567 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11570 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
11571 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11572 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
11573 match events_a[0] {
11574 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
11575 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
11577 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11580 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
11582 let block = create_dummy_block(BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash(), 42, vec![tx]);
11583 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
11584 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
11586 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
11587 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11588 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
11589 match msg_events[0] {
11590 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
11591 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
11592 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
11596 match msg_events[1] {
11597 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
11601 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11602 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
11603 match events_a[0] {
11604 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
11605 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
11607 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11610 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11611 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
11612 match events_b[0] {
11613 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
11614 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
11616 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11619 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
11620 macro_rules! send_payment {
11621 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
11622 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
11623 .with_bolt11_features($node_b.invoice_features()).unwrap();
11624 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
11625 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
11626 payment_count += 1;
11627 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
11628 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
11630 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
11631 PaymentId(payment_hash.0),
11632 RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 10_000),
11633 Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
11634 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
11635 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11636 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
11637 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
11638 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
11639 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
11640 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
11642 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
11643 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
11644 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
11645 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
11647 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
11648 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
11649 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
11650 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
11651 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
11653 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
11656 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
11657 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
11658 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
11659 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
11661 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
11665 bench.bench_function(bench_name, |b| b.iter(|| {
11666 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
11667 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);