1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::{genesis_block, ChainHash};
23 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
25 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
27 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
29 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
31 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
34 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
39 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
40 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
41 // construct one themselves.
42 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, ChannelId, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
43 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelPhase, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UnfundedChannelContext, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel};
44 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
45 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
46 use crate::ln::features::Bolt11InvoiceFeatures;
47 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
48 use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteParameters, Router};
49 use crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters};
51 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
52 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
53 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
55 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
56 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment, SendAlongPathArgs};
57 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
58 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
59 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
60 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
61 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
62 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
63 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
64 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
65 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
67 use alloc::collections::{btree_map, BTreeMap};
70 use crate::prelude::*;
72 use core::cell::RefCell;
74 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
75 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, AtomicBool, Ordering};
76 use core::time::Duration;
79 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
80 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, ProbeSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
81 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
83 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
85 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
86 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
87 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
89 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
90 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
91 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
92 // before we forward it.
94 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
95 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
96 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
97 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
98 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
100 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
101 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
103 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
104 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
105 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
106 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
109 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
110 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
111 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
112 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
113 /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`] for more info.
114 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
117 /// This was added in 0.0.116 and will break deserialization on downgrades.
118 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
119 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
120 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
121 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
122 /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`] for more info.
123 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
127 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
128 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
129 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
130 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
131 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
133 pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
134 /// Sender intended amount to forward or receive (actual amount received
135 /// may overshoot this in either case)
136 pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
137 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
138 /// The fee being skimmed off the top of this HTLC. If this is a forward, it'll be the fee we are
139 /// skimming. If we're receiving this HTLC, it's the fee that our counterparty skimmed.
140 pub(super) skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
143 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
144 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
145 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
146 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
149 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
150 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
151 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
152 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
153 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
156 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
157 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
159 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
160 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
161 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
164 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
165 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
167 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
168 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
171 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
172 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
175 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
179 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
180 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
181 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
182 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
183 short_channel_id: u64,
184 user_channel_id: Option<u128>,
186 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
187 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
189 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
190 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
195 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
197 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
198 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
199 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
201 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
202 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
205 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
206 struct ClaimableHTLC {
207 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
209 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
211 /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
212 /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
213 sender_intended_value: u64,
214 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
216 /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
217 /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
218 total_value_received: Option<u64>,
219 /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
221 /// The extra fee our counterparty skimmed off the top of this HTLC.
222 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
225 impl From<&ClaimableHTLC> for events::ClaimedHTLC {
226 fn from(val: &ClaimableHTLC) -> Self {
227 events::ClaimedHTLC {
228 channel_id: val.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
229 user_channel_id: val.prev_hop.user_channel_id.unwrap_or(0),
230 cltv_expiry: val.cltv_expiry,
231 value_msat: val.value,
236 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
237 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
239 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
240 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
241 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; Self::LENGTH]);
244 /// Number of bytes in the id.
245 pub const LENGTH: usize = 32;
248 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
249 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
254 impl Readable for PaymentId {
255 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
256 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
261 impl core::fmt::Display for PaymentId {
262 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut core::fmt::Formatter) -> core::fmt::Result {
263 crate::util::logger::DebugBytes(&self.0).fmt(f)
267 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
269 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
270 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
271 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
273 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
274 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
279 impl Readable for InterceptId {
280 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
281 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
286 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
287 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
288 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
289 PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
290 OutboundRoute { session_priv: SecretKey },
293 pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
295 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
296 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
297 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
299 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
300 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: *session_priv },
304 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
305 (0, PreviousHopData) => {
306 (0, short_channel_id, required),
307 (2, htlc_id, required),
309 (2, OutboundRoute) => {
310 (0, session_priv, required),
315 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
316 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
317 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
318 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
319 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
322 session_priv: SecretKey,
323 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
324 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
325 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
326 payment_id: PaymentId,
329 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
330 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
331 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
333 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
335 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
337 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
340 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
341 payment_id.hash(hasher);
342 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
348 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
350 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
351 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
352 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
353 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
354 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
355 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
359 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
360 /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
361 /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
362 pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
363 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
364 *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
366 // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
372 struct InboundOnionErr {
378 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
379 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
381 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
382 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
383 pub enum FailureCode {
384 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
385 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
386 TemporaryNodeFailure,
387 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
388 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
389 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing,
390 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
391 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
392 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
393 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
394 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails,
395 /// We failed to process the payload after the onion was decrypted. You may wish to
396 /// use this when receiving custom HTLC TLVs with even type numbers that you don't recognize.
398 /// If available, the tuple data may include the type number and byte offset in the
399 /// decrypted byte stream where the failure occurred.
400 InvalidOnionPayload(Option<(u64, u16)>),
403 impl Into<u16> for FailureCode {
404 fn into(self) -> u16 {
406 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => 0x2000 | 2,
407 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
408 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => 0x4000 | 15,
409 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(_) => 0x4000 | 22,
414 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
415 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
416 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
417 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
418 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
420 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
421 err: msgs::LightningError,
422 chan_id: Option<(ChannelId, u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
423 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
424 channel_capacity: Option<u64>,
426 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
428 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
430 err: LightningError {
432 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
433 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
440 shutdown_finish: None,
441 channel_capacity: None,
445 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
446 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None, channel_capacity: None }
449 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId, user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>, channel_capacity: u64) -> Self {
451 err: LightningError {
453 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
454 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
460 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
461 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
462 channel_capacity: Some(channel_capacity)
466 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
469 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
471 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
472 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
476 log_level: Level::Warn,
479 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
481 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
483 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
485 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
486 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
494 shutdown_finish: None,
495 channel_capacity: None,
499 fn closes_channel(&self) -> bool {
500 self.chan_id.is_some()
504 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
505 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
506 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
507 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
508 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
510 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
511 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
512 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
513 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
514 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
515 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
516 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
518 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
522 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
523 struct ClaimingPayment {
525 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
526 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
527 htlcs: Vec<events::ClaimedHTLC>,
528 sender_intended_value: Option<u64>,
530 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
531 (0, amount_msat, required),
532 (2, payment_purpose, required),
533 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
534 (5, htlcs, optional_vec),
535 (7, sender_intended_value, option),
538 struct ClaimablePayment {
539 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
540 onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
541 htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
544 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
545 struct ClaimablePayments {
546 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
547 /// failed/claimed by the user.
549 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
550 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
552 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
553 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
554 claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
556 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
557 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
558 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
559 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
562 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be processed immediately at the generation site
563 /// usually because we're running pre-full-init. They are handled immediately once we detect we are
564 /// running normally, and specifically must be processed before any other non-background
565 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are applied.
566 enum BackgroundEvent {
567 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which closes the channel or for an already-closed channel.
568 /// This is only separated from [`Self::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`] as the
569 /// maybe-non-closing variant needs a public key to handle channel resumption, whereas if the
570 /// channel has been force-closed we do not need the counterparty node_id.
572 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
573 /// are regenerated on startup.
574 ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
575 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which may or may not close the channel and may unblock the
576 /// channel to continue normal operation.
578 /// In general this should be used rather than
579 /// [`Self::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`], however in cases where the
580 /// `counterparty_node_id` is not available as the channel has closed from a [`ChannelMonitor`]
581 /// error the other variant is acceptable.
583 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
584 /// are regenerated on startup.
585 MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
586 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
587 funding_txo: OutPoint,
588 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate
590 /// Some [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (s) completed before we were serialized but we still have
591 /// them marked pending, thus we need to run any [`MonitorUpdateCompletionAction`] (s) pending
593 MonitorUpdatesComplete {
594 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
595 channel_id: ChannelId,
600 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
601 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
602 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
603 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
604 /// event can be generated.
605 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
606 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user and possibly resume the
607 /// operation of another channel.
609 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
610 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
611 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. In that case, after the inbound
612 /// edge completes, we will surface an [`Event::PaymentForwarded`] as well as unblock the
614 EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
615 event: events::Event,
616 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction)>,
620 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
621 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
622 (2, EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel) => {
623 (0, event, upgradable_required),
624 // LDK prior to 0.0.116 did not have this field as the monitor update application order was
625 // required by clients. If we downgrade to something prior to 0.0.116 this may result in
626 // monitor updates which aren't properly blocked or resumed, however that's fine - we don't
627 // support async monitor updates even in LDK 0.0.116 and once we do we'll require no
628 // downgrades to prior versions.
629 (1, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint, option),
633 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
634 pub(crate) enum EventCompletionAction {
635 ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
636 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
637 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
640 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(EventCompletionAction,
641 (0, ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate) => {
642 (0, channel_funding_outpoint, required),
643 (2, counterparty_node_id, required),
647 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
648 /// If something is blocked on the completion of an RAA-generated [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] we track
649 /// the blocked action here. See enum variants for more info.
650 pub(crate) enum RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
651 /// A forwarded payment was claimed. We block the downstream channel completing its monitor
652 /// update which removes the HTLC preimage until the upstream channel has gotten the preimage
654 ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
655 /// The upstream channel ID (i.e. the inbound edge).
656 channel_id: ChannelId,
657 /// The HTLC ID on the inbound edge.
662 impl RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
663 fn from_prev_hop_data(prev_hop: &HTLCPreviousHopData) -> Self {
664 Self::ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
665 channel_id: prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
666 htlc_id: prev_hop.htlc_id,
671 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
672 (0, ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim) => { (0, channel_id, required), (2, htlc_id, required) }
676 /// State we hold per-peer.
677 pub(super) struct PeerState<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
678 /// `channel_id` -> `ChannelPhase`
680 /// Holds all channels within corresponding `ChannelPhase`s where the peer is the counterparty.
681 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>,
682 /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `InboundChannelRequest`.
684 /// When manual channel acceptance is enabled, this holds all unaccepted inbound channels where
685 /// the peer is the counterparty. If the channel is accepted, then the entry in this table is
686 /// removed, and an InboundV1Channel is created and placed in the `inbound_v1_channel_by_id` table. If
687 /// the channel is rejected, then the entry is simply removed.
688 pub(super) inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, InboundChannelRequest>,
689 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
690 latest_features: InitFeatures,
691 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
692 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
693 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
694 /// Map from Channel IDs to pending [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s which have been passed to the
695 /// user but which have not yet completed.
697 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example if the channel was closed but we
698 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
699 /// for a missing channel.
700 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<OutPoint, Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>,
701 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
702 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
704 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
705 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
706 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
707 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
709 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
710 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
711 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
712 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
713 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
714 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
715 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
716 /// If another channel's [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] needs to complete before a channel we have
717 /// with this peer can complete an RAA [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (e.g. because the RAA update
718 /// will remove a preimage that needs to be durably in an upstream channel first), we put an
719 /// entry here to note that the channel with the key's ID is blocked on a set of actions.
720 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
721 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
722 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
723 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
727 impl <SP: Deref> PeerState<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
728 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
729 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
730 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
731 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
732 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
735 self.channel_by_id.iter().filter(|(_, phase)| matches!(phase, ChannelPhase::Funded(_))).count() == 0
736 && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
737 && self.in_flight_monitor_updates.is_empty()
740 // Returns a count of all channels we have with this peer, including unfunded channels.
741 fn total_channel_count(&self) -> usize {
742 self.channel_by_id.len() + self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
745 // Returns a bool indicating if the given `channel_id` matches a channel we have with this peer.
746 fn has_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId) -> bool {
747 self.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
748 self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.contains_key(channel_id)
752 /// A not-yet-accepted inbound (from counterparty) channel. Once
753 /// accepted, the parameters will be used to construct a channel.
754 pub(super) struct InboundChannelRequest {
755 /// The original OpenChannel message.
756 pub open_channel_msg: msgs::OpenChannel,
757 /// The number of ticks remaining before the request expires.
758 pub ticks_remaining: i32,
761 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unaccepted inbound channel to be
762 /// accepted. An unaccepted channel that exceeds this limit will be abandoned.
763 const UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: i32 = 2;
765 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
766 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
768 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
771 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
772 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
773 struct PendingInboundPayment {
774 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
775 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
776 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
777 /// this payment being removed.
779 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
780 user_payment_id: u64,
781 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
782 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
783 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
786 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
787 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
788 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
789 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
790 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
791 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
792 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
793 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
795 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
796 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
804 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
806 Arc<Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>,
807 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
808 ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>,
813 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
814 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
815 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
816 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
817 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
818 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
819 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
820 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
821 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
823 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
824 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> =
833 &'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>,
835 &'h Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>,
836 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
837 ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>
842 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`].
843 pub trait AChannelManager {
844 /// A type implementing [`chain::Watch`].
845 type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
846 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Watch`].
847 type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
848 /// A type implementing [`BroadcasterInterface`].
849 type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface + ?Sized;
850 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Broadcaster`].
851 type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
852 /// A type implementing [`EntropySource`].
853 type EntropySource: EntropySource + ?Sized;
854 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::EntropySource`].
855 type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
856 /// A type implementing [`NodeSigner`].
857 type NodeSigner: NodeSigner + ?Sized;
858 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::NodeSigner`].
859 type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
860 /// A type implementing [`WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner`].
861 type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner + Sized;
862 /// A type implementing [`SignerProvider`] for [`Self::Signer`].
863 type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<Signer = Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
864 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::SignerProvider`].
865 type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
866 /// A type implementing [`FeeEstimator`].
867 type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator + ?Sized;
868 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::FeeEstimator`].
869 type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
870 /// A type implementing [`Router`].
871 type Router: Router + ?Sized;
872 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Router`].
873 type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
874 /// A type implementing [`Logger`].
875 type Logger: Logger + ?Sized;
876 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Logger`].
877 type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
878 /// Returns a reference to the actual [`ChannelManager`] object.
879 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
882 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
883 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
885 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
886 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
887 ES::Target: EntropySource,
888 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
889 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
890 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
894 type Watch = M::Target;
896 type Broadcaster = T::Target;
898 type EntropySource = ES::Target;
900 type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
902 type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer;
903 type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
905 type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
907 type Router = R::Target;
909 type Logger = L::Target;
911 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
914 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
915 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
917 /// Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
918 /// to individual Channels.
920 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
921 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
922 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
923 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
925 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
926 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST durably write each
927 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] before returning from
928 /// [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`] or before completing async writes. With
929 /// `ChannelManager`s, writing updates happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other
930 /// `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during the serialization process). If the
931 /// deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to
932 /// [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds
933 /// will be lost (modulo on-chain transaction fees).
935 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
936 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
937 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
939 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
940 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
941 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
942 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
943 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
945 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
946 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
947 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
948 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
950 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
951 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
952 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
954 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
955 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
956 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
957 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
958 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
960 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
961 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
962 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
963 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
964 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
965 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
966 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
967 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
970 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
971 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
972 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
973 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
974 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
978 // `total_consistency_lock`
980 // |__`forward_htlcs`
982 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
984 // |__`per_peer_state`
986 // | |__`pending_inbound_payments`
988 // | |__`claimable_payments`
990 // | |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
996 // | |__`short_to_chan_info`
998 // | |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
1000 // | |__`best_block`
1002 // | |__`pending_events`
1004 // | |__`pending_background_events`
1006 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
1008 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
1009 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1010 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1011 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1012 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1013 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1017 default_configuration: UserConfig,
1018 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
1019 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1025 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1027 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1029 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1030 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
1032 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
1033 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
1034 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
1035 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
1037 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1038 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
1040 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
1041 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
1042 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
1043 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
1044 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
1045 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
1046 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
1047 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
1049 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
1051 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1052 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
1054 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
1056 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
1057 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
1058 /// and via the classic SCID.
1060 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
1061 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
1063 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1065 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1067 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1068 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
1069 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
1071 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1072 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
1074 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
1075 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
1077 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1078 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
1080 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
1081 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
1082 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
1083 /// active channel list on load.
1085 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1086 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
1088 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
1090 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
1091 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
1092 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
1094 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
1095 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
1096 /// the handling of the events.
1098 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
1099 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
1102 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
1103 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
1104 /// would break backwards compatability.
1105 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
1106 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
1107 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
1109 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1110 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<ChannelId, PublicKey>>,
1112 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
1114 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
1115 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
1116 /// confirmation depth.
1118 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
1119 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
1120 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
1122 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1124 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1126 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1128 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
1130 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
1132 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
1133 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
1134 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
1136 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
1137 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
1139 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
1140 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
1141 /// keeping additional state.
1142 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
1144 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
1145 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
1146 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
1147 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
1149 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
1150 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
1152 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
1153 /// are currently open with that peer.
1155 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
1156 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
1159 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
1161 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1162 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1163 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1164 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1165 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1167 /// The set of events which we need to give to the user to handle. In some cases an event may
1168 /// require some further action after the user handles it (currently only blocking a monitor
1169 /// update from being handed to the user to ensure the included changes to the channel state
1170 /// are handled by the user before they're persisted durably to disk). In that case, the second
1171 /// element in the tuple is set to `Some` with further details of the action.
1173 /// Note that events MUST NOT be removed from pending_events after deserialization, as they
1174 /// could be in the middle of being processed without the direct mutex held.
1176 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1177 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1178 pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1179 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1180 pub(crate) pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1182 /// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
1183 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
1185 /// If we are running during init (either directly during the deserialization method or in
1186 /// block connection methods which run after deserialization but before normal operation) we
1187 /// cannot provide the user with [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s through the normal update flow -
1188 /// prior to normal operation the user may not have loaded the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into their
1189 /// [`ChainMonitor`] and thus attempting to update it will fail or panic.
1191 /// Thus, we place them here to be handled as soon as possible once we are running normally.
1193 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1195 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
1196 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
1197 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
1198 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
1199 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
1200 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
1201 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
1202 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
1203 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
1204 /// Tracks the progress of channels going through batch funding by whether funding_signed was
1205 /// received and the monitor has been persisted.
1207 /// This information does not need to be persisted as funding nodes can forget
1208 /// unfunded channels upon disconnection.
1209 funding_batch_states: Mutex<BTreeMap<Txid, Vec<(ChannelId, PublicKey, bool)>>>,
1211 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool,
1213 event_persist_notifier: Notifier,
1214 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool,
1218 signer_provider: SP,
1223 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
1225 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
1226 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
1227 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
1228 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
1229 pub struct ChainParameters {
1230 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
1231 pub network: Network,
1233 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
1235 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
1236 pub best_block: BestBlock,
1239 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
1243 SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1244 SkipPersistNoEvents,
1247 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
1248 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
1249 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
1250 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
1251 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
1252 /// updates are ready for persistence).
1254 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
1255 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
1256 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
1257 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1258 event_persist_notifier: &'a Notifier,
1259 needs_persist_flag: &'a AtomicBool,
1261 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
1262 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
1265 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
1266 /// Notifies any waiters and indicates that we need to persist, in addition to possibly having
1267 /// events to handle.
1269 /// This must always be called if the changes included a `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, as well as in
1270 /// other cases where losing the changes on restart may result in a force-close or otherwise
1272 fn notify_on_drop<C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1273 Self::optionally_notify(cm, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
1276 fn optionally_notify<F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C, mut persist_check: F)
1277 -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1278 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1279 let force_notify = cm.get_cm().process_background_events();
1281 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1282 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1283 needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1284 should_persist: move || {
1285 // Pick the "most" action between `persist_check` and the background events
1286 // processing and return that.
1287 let notify = persist_check();
1288 match (notify, force_notify) {
1289 (NotifyOption::DoPersist, _) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1290 (_, NotifyOption::DoPersist) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1291 (NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents, _) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1292 (_, NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1293 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
1296 _read_guard: read_guard,
1300 /// Note that if any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are possibly generated,
1301 /// [`ChannelManager::process_background_events`] MUST be called first (or
1302 /// [`Self::optionally_notify`] used).
1303 fn optionally_notify_skipping_background_events<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>
1304 (cm: &'a C, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1305 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1307 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1308 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1309 needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1310 should_persist: persist_check,
1311 _read_guard: read_guard,
1316 impl<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1317 fn drop(&mut self) {
1318 match (self.should_persist)() {
1319 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
1320 self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
1321 self.event_persist_notifier.notify()
1323 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
1324 self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
1325 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
1330 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1331 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1333 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1335 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1336 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1337 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1338 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1339 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1341 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1342 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1344 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1346 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1347 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1348 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1349 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1350 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1351 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1352 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
1353 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
1354 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
1355 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
1356 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
1357 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
1358 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
1360 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1361 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
1363 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1364 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1365 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1366 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
1368 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1369 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1370 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1371 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1372 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1373 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1376 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1378 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1379 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1382 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1384 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1385 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1387 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
1388 /// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
1389 pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
1391 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is connected until
1392 /// we mark the channel enabled and gossip the update.
1393 pub(crate) const ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 5;
1395 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
1396 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
1397 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
1398 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1400 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1401 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1402 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1404 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1405 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1406 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1408 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1409 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1410 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1411 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1412 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1413 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1414 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1415 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1416 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1417 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1418 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1421 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1422 /// to better separate parameters.
1423 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1424 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1425 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1426 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1427 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1428 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1429 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1430 pub features: InitFeatures,
1431 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1432 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1433 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1435 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1437 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1438 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1439 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1440 /// payments to us through this channel.
1441 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1442 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1443 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1444 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1445 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1446 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1447 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1450 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
1452 /// Balances of a channel are available through [`ChainMonitor::get_claimable_balances`] and
1453 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_claimable_balances`], calculated with respect to the corresponding on-chain
1456 /// [`ChainMonitor::get_claimable_balances`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor::get_claimable_balances
1457 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1458 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1459 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1460 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1461 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1462 /// lifetime of the channel.
1463 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
1464 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1465 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1466 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1467 /// our counterparty already.
1469 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1470 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1471 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1472 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1474 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1475 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1476 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1477 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1479 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1480 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1482 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1483 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1485 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1486 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1487 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1488 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1489 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1490 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1491 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1492 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1493 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1496 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1498 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1499 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1500 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1501 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1502 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1503 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1504 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1506 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1507 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1509 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1510 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1511 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1512 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1513 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1514 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1515 /// this value on chain.
1517 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1519 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1521 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1522 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1523 /// The `user_channel_id` value passed in to [`ChannelManager::create_channel`] for outbound
1524 /// channels, or to [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`] for inbound channels if
1525 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] config flag is set to true. Otherwise
1526 /// `user_channel_id` will be randomized for an inbound channel. This may be zero for objects
1527 /// serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1529 /// [`ChannelManager::create_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_channel
1530 /// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel
1531 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels
1532 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1533 /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
1534 /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
1536 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
1537 pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
1538 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1539 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1540 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1541 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1543 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1544 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1545 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1546 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1547 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1548 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1549 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1550 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1552 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat`] and
1553 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1554 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1555 /// The minimum value for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is the equivalent of
1556 /// [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat`] but represents a lower-bound, rather than
1557 /// an upper-bound. This is intended for use when routing, allowing us to ensure we pick a
1558 /// route which is valid.
1559 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1560 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1561 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1562 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1563 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1564 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1566 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1567 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1568 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1569 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1570 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1571 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1572 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1573 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1574 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1576 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1578 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1579 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1580 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1581 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1582 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1584 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1585 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1586 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1587 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1588 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1589 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1590 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1592 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1593 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1594 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1595 pub is_outbound: bool,
1596 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1597 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1598 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1599 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1600 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1602 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1603 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1604 /// The stage of the channel's shutdown.
1605 /// `None` for `ChannelDetails` serialized on LDK versions prior to 0.0.116.
1606 pub channel_shutdown_state: Option<ChannelShutdownState>,
1607 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1608 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1610 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1611 pub is_usable: bool,
1612 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1613 pub is_public: bool,
1614 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1615 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1616 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1617 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1618 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1619 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1621 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1622 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1625 impl ChannelDetails {
1626 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1627 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1628 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1630 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1631 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1632 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1633 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1636 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1637 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1638 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1640 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1641 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1642 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1643 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1646 fn from_channel_context<SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
1647 context: &ChannelContext<SP>, best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures,
1648 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
1651 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1652 F::Target: FeeEstimator
1654 let balance = context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
1655 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1656 context.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1658 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
1659 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1660 node_id: context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1661 features: latest_features,
1662 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1663 forwarding_info: context.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1664 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1665 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1666 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1667 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1668 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1669 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if context.have_received_message() {
1670 Some(context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1671 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1673 funding_txo: context.get_funding_txo(),
1674 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1675 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1676 channel_type: if context.have_received_message() { Some(context.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1677 short_channel_id: context.get_short_channel_id(),
1678 outbound_scid_alias: if context.is_usable() { Some(context.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1679 inbound_scid_alias: context.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1680 channel_value_satoshis: context.get_value_satoshis(),
1681 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
1682 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1683 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1684 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1685 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1686 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1687 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
1688 confirmations_required: context.minimum_depth(),
1689 confirmations: Some(context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1690 force_close_spend_delay: context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1691 is_outbound: context.is_outbound(),
1692 is_channel_ready: context.is_usable(),
1693 is_usable: context.is_live(),
1694 is_public: context.should_announce(),
1695 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(context.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1696 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1697 config: Some(context.config()),
1698 channel_shutdown_state: Some(context.shutdown_state()),
1703 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1704 /// Further information on the details of the channel shutdown.
1705 /// Upon channels being forced closed (i.e. commitment transaction confirmation detected
1706 /// by `ChainMonitor`), ChannelShutdownState will be set to `ShutdownComplete` or
1707 /// the channel will be removed shortly.
1708 /// Also note, that in normal operation, peers could disconnect at any of these states
1709 /// and require peer re-connection before making progress onto other states
1710 pub enum ChannelShutdownState {
1711 /// Channel has not sent or received a shutdown message.
1713 /// Local node has sent a shutdown message for this channel.
1715 /// Shutdown message exchanges have concluded and the channels are in the midst of
1716 /// resolving all existing open HTLCs before closing can continue.
1718 /// All HTLCs have been resolved, nodes are currently negotiating channel close onchain fee rates.
1719 NegotiatingClosingFee,
1720 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point `ChannelManager` is about
1721 /// to drop the channel.
1725 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1726 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1727 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1728 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1729 /// When an invoice was requested and thus a payment has not yet been sent.
1731 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1732 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1733 payment_id: PaymentId,
1735 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1737 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1738 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1739 payment_id: PaymentId,
1740 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1742 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1743 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1744 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1747 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1748 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1749 /// payment is removed from tracking.
1751 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1752 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1753 payment_id: PaymentId,
1754 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1755 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1756 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1758 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1759 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1760 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1762 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1763 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1764 payment_id: PaymentId,
1765 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1766 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1770 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1772 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
1774 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1775 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1776 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1777 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1779 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1780 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1781 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1784 macro_rules! handle_error {
1785 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
1786 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1787 // entering the macro.
1788 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1789 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1793 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish, channel_capacity }) => {
1794 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1796 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1797 $self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1798 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1799 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1803 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1804 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1805 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1806 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() },
1807 counterparty_node_id: Some($counterparty_node_id),
1808 channel_capacity_sats: channel_capacity,
1813 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1814 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1816 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1817 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1818 action: err.action.clone()
1822 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1823 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1824 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1825 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1826 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1830 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1835 ($self: ident, $internal: expr) => {
1838 Err((chan, msg_handle_err)) => {
1839 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
1840 handle_error!($self, Err(msg_handle_err), counterparty_node_id).map_err(|err| (chan, err))
1846 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1847 ($self: expr, $channel_context: expr) => {{
1848 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.channel_id());
1849 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1850 if let Some(short_id) = $channel_context.get_short_channel_id() {
1851 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1853 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1854 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1855 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1856 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1857 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1859 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
1860 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1862 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
1866 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1867 macro_rules! convert_chan_phase_err {
1868 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, $channel_update: expr) => {
1870 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1871 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), *$channel_id))
1873 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1874 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), *$channel_id))
1876 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1877 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", $channel_id, msg);
1878 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel.context);
1879 let shutdown_res = $channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
1880 let user_id = $channel.context.get_user_id();
1881 let channel_capacity_satoshis = $channel.context.get_value_satoshis();
1883 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, user_id,
1884 shutdown_res, $channel_update, channel_capacity_satoshis))
1888 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, FUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
1889 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, { $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast($channel).ok() })
1891 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
1892 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, None)
1894 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_phase: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1895 match $channel_phase {
1896 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
1897 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL)
1899 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel) => {
1900 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
1902 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel) => {
1903 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
1909 macro_rules! break_chan_phase_entry {
1910 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1914 let key = *$entry.key();
1915 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
1917 $entry.remove_entry();
1925 macro_rules! try_chan_phase_entry {
1926 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1930 let key = *$entry.key();
1931 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
1933 $entry.remove_entry();
1941 macro_rules! remove_channel_phase {
1942 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1944 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1945 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &channel.context());
1951 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1952 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
1953 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1954 node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1955 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1957 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1958 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1959 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1960 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.context.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
1961 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
1962 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1963 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
1964 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
1965 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
1966 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1971 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
1972 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1973 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
1974 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelPending {
1975 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
1976 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.context.temporary_channel_id(),
1977 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1978 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
1979 funding_txo: $channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
1981 $channel.context.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
1986 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
1987 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1988 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
1989 debug_assert!($channel.context.channel_pending_event_emitted());
1990 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelReady {
1991 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
1992 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
1993 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1994 channel_type: $channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
1996 $channel.context.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
2001 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
2002 ($self: ident, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2003 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&$self.logger,
2004 &$self.node_signer, $self.genesis_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
2005 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
2006 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
2007 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.context.is_usable() {
2008 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
2009 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
2010 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
2011 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
2013 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
2014 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2015 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2021 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
2022 .remove(&$chan.context.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
2024 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
2025 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
2026 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
2027 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
2028 updates.announcement_sigs);
2029 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
2030 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
2033 let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id();
2034 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = $chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2035 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
2036 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
2038 // If the channel belongs to a batch funding transaction, the progress of the batch
2039 // should be updated as we have received funding_signed and persisted the monitor.
2040 if let Some(txid) = unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2041 let mut funding_batch_states = $self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2042 let mut batch_completed = false;
2043 if let Some(batch_state) = funding_batch_states.get_mut(&txid) {
2044 let channel_state = batch_state.iter_mut().find(|(chan_id, pubkey, _)| (
2045 *chan_id == channel_id &&
2046 *pubkey == counterparty_node_id
2048 if let Some(channel_state) = channel_state {
2049 channel_state.2 = true;
2051 debug_assert!(false, "Missing channel batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2053 batch_completed = batch_state.iter().all(|(_, _, completed)| *completed);
2055 debug_assert!(false, "Missing batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2058 // When all channels in a batched funding transaction have become ready, it is not necessary
2059 // to track the progress of the batch anymore and the state of the channels can be updated.
2060 if batch_completed {
2061 let removed_batch_state = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2062 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2063 let mut batch_funding_tx = None;
2064 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, _) in removed_batch_state {
2065 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2066 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2067 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
2068 batch_funding_tx = batch_funding_tx.or_else(|| chan.context.unbroadcasted_funding());
2069 chan.set_batch_ready();
2070 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2071 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, chan);
2075 if let Some(tx) = batch_funding_tx {
2076 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting batch funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
2077 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
2082 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
2084 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
2085 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
2087 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
2088 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2089 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2090 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
2095 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
2096 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $chan: expr, _internal, $completed: expr) => { {
2097 debug_assert!($self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire));
2099 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::UnrecoverableError => {
2100 let err_str = "ChannelMonitor[Update] persistence failed unrecoverably. This indicates we cannot continue normal operation and must shut down.";
2101 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err_str);
2102 panic!("{}", err_str);
2104 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
2105 log_debug!($self.logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
2106 &$chan.context.channel_id());
2109 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
2115 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, INITIAL_MONITOR) => {
2116 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $chan, _internal,
2117 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan))
2119 ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2120 let in_flight_updates = $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.entry($funding_txo)
2121 .or_insert_with(Vec::new);
2122 // During startup, we push monitor updates as background events through to here in
2123 // order to replay updates that were in-flight when we shut down. Thus, we have to
2124 // filter for uniqueness here.
2125 let idx = in_flight_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd == &$update)
2126 .unwrap_or_else(|| {
2127 in_flight_updates.push($update);
2128 in_flight_updates.len() - 1
2130 let update_res = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($funding_txo, &in_flight_updates[idx]);
2131 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, update_res, $chan, _internal,
2133 let _ = in_flight_updates.remove(idx);
2134 if in_flight_updates.is_empty() && $chan.blocked_monitor_updates_pending() == 0 {
2135 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
2141 macro_rules! process_events_body {
2142 ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
2143 let mut processed_all_events = false;
2144 while !processed_all_events {
2145 if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
2152 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
2153 // persists happen while processing monitor events.
2154 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2156 // Because `handle_post_event_actions` may send `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to the user we must
2157 // ensure any startup-generated background events are handled first.
2158 result = $self.process_background_events();
2160 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
2161 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
2162 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
2163 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2167 let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
2168 let num_events = pending_events.len();
2169 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
2170 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2173 let mut post_event_actions = Vec::new();
2175 for (event, action_opt) in pending_events {
2176 $event_to_handle = event;
2178 if let Some(action) = action_opt {
2179 post_event_actions.push(action);
2184 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2185 pending_events.drain(..num_events);
2186 processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
2187 // Note that `push_pending_forwards_ev` relies on `pending_events_processor` being
2188 // updated here with the `pending_events` lock acquired.
2189 $self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
2192 if !post_event_actions.is_empty() {
2193 $self.handle_post_event_actions(post_event_actions);
2194 // If we had some actions, go around again as we may have more events now
2195 processed_all_events = false;
2199 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
2200 $self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
2201 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify();
2203 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
2204 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
2205 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
2211 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
2213 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
2214 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2215 ES::Target: EntropySource,
2216 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2217 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2218 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2222 /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
2224 /// The current time or latest block header time can be provided as the `current_timestamp`.
2226 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
2227 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
2229 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
2231 /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
2232 /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
2233 /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
2236 /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
2237 /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
2238 /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
2240 fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES,
2241 node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters,
2242 current_timestamp: u32,
2244 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2245 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
2246 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
2247 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
2249 default_configuration: config.clone(),
2250 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
2251 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
2256 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
2258 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
2259 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2260 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
2261 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2262 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
2263 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2264 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2265 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2267 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
2270 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
2271 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2273 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2275 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(current_timestamp as usize),
2277 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2279 pending_events: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
2280 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
2281 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2282 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
2283 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
2284 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
2285 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
2286 funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
2296 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
2297 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
2298 &self.default_configuration
2301 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
2302 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2303 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
2306 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
2307 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
2309 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
2311 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
2315 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
2320 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
2322 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
2323 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
2324 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
2325 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
2326 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
2328 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
2329 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
2331 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to
2332 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2333 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`].
2335 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
2336 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
2337 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
2339 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
2340 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
2341 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
2342 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
2343 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
2344 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
2346 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
2347 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
2348 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
2349 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<ChannelId, APIError> {
2350 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
2351 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
2354 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2355 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
2356 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2358 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2360 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
2361 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
2363 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2365 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
2366 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2367 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
2368 match OutboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
2369 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
2370 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
2374 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
2379 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
2381 let temporary_channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
2382 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
2383 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2385 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
2387 panic!("RNG is bad???");
2390 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel)); }
2393 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
2394 node_id: their_network_key,
2397 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
2400 fn list_funded_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&ChannelId, &Channel<SP>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2401 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2402 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2403 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2404 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2405 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2406 // the same channel.
2407 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2409 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2410 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2411 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2412 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2413 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2414 res.extend(peer_state.channel_by_id.iter()
2415 .filter_map(|(chan_id, phase)| match phase {
2416 // Only `Channels` in the `ChannelPhase::Funded` phase can be considered funded.
2417 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => Some((chan_id, chan)),
2421 .map(|(_channel_id, channel)| {
2422 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2423 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2431 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
2432 /// more information.
2433 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2434 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2435 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2436 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2437 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2438 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2439 // the same channel.
2440 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2442 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2443 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2444 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2445 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2446 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2447 for context in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().map(|(_, phase)| phase.context()) {
2448 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height,
2449 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2457 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
2458 /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
2460 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
2461 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
2463 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2464 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
2465 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
2466 // really wanted anyway.
2467 self.list_funded_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.context.is_live())
2470 /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
2471 pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2472 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2473 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2475 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
2476 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2477 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2478 let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2479 let context_to_details = |context| {
2480 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height, features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2482 return peer_state.channel_by_id
2484 .map(|(_, phase)| phase.context())
2485 .map(context_to_details)
2491 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
2492 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
2494 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
2495 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
2496 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
2498 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2499 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
2500 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
2501 .filter_map(|(payment_id, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
2502 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {
2503 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2505 // InvoiceReceived is an intermediate state and doesn't need to be exposed
2506 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {
2507 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2509 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
2510 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
2511 payment_id: *payment_id,
2512 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2513 total_msat: *total_msat,
2516 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
2517 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2519 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
2520 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2522 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
2527 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
2528 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, context: &ChannelContext<SP>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
2529 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2530 match context.unbroadcasted_funding() {
2531 Some(transaction) => {
2532 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::DiscardFunding {
2533 channel_id: context.channel_id(), transaction
2538 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
2539 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
2540 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
2541 reason: closure_reason,
2542 counterparty_node_id: Some(context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
2543 channel_capacity_sats: Some(context.get_value_satoshis()),
2547 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2548 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2550 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
2551 let mut shutdown_result = None;
2553 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2555 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2556 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2558 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2559 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2561 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2562 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
2563 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
2564 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
2565 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2566 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2567 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) =
2568 chan.get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
2569 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
2571 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
2572 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
2573 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
2574 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2575 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
2579 debug_assert!(monitor_update_opt.is_none() || !chan.is_shutdown(),
2580 "We can't both complete shutdown and generate a monitor update");
2582 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
2583 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
2584 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
2585 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
2589 if chan.is_shutdown() {
2590 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
2591 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2592 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2596 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2597 shutdown_result = Some((None, Vec::new(), unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid));
2603 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
2604 // If we reach this point, it means that the channel_id either refers to an unfunded channel or
2605 // it does not exist for this peer. Either way, we can attempt to force-close it.
2607 // An appropriate error will be returned for non-existence of the channel if that's the case.
2608 return self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, false).map(|_| ())
2613 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2614 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2615 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
2616 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
2619 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
2620 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
2626 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2627 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2628 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2630 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
2631 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2633 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
2634 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
2635 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
2636 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
2638 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2640 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2641 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2642 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2645 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2646 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2647 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2648 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2649 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2650 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None)
2653 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2654 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2655 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2657 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
2658 /// the channel being closed or not:
2659 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
2660 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
2661 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2662 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
2663 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
2664 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
2665 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
2667 /// The `shutdown_script` provided will be used as the `scriptPubKey` for the closing transaction.
2668 /// Will fail if a shutdown script has already been set for this channel by
2669 /// ['ChannelHandshakeConfig::commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey`]. The given shutdown script must
2670 /// also be compatible with our and the counterparty's features.
2672 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2674 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2675 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2676 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2679 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2680 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2681 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2682 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2683 pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2684 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script)
2687 fn finish_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
2688 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2689 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2690 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
2691 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2694 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs, unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid) = shutdown_res;
2695 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
2696 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2697 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
2698 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2699 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2700 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
2702 if let Some((_, funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
2703 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2704 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2705 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2706 // ignore the result here.
2707 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
2709 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
2710 if let Some(txid) = unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2711 let mut funding_batch_states = self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2712 let affected_channels = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2713 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2714 let mut has_uncompleted_channel = None;
2715 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, state) in affected_channels {
2716 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2717 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2718 if let Some(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id) {
2719 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
2720 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context(), ClosureReason::FundingBatchClosure);
2721 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
2724 has_uncompleted_channel = Some(has_uncompleted_channel.map_or(!state, |v| v || !state));
2727 has_uncompleted_channel.unwrap_or(true),
2728 "Closing a batch where all channels have completed initial monitor update",
2731 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
2732 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
2736 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2737 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2738 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
2739 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2740 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2741 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2742 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
2743 let (update_opt, counterparty_node_id) = {
2744 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2745 let closure_reason = if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2746 ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) }
2748 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
2750 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2751 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", channel_id);
2752 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan_phase_entry.get().context(), closure_reason);
2753 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
2754 mem::drop(peer_state);
2755 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
2757 ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) => {
2758 self.finish_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(broadcast));
2759 (self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan).ok(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2761 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {
2762 self.finish_close_channel(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
2763 // Unfunded channel has no update
2764 (None, chan_phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id())
2767 } else if peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(channel_id).is_some() {
2768 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", &channel_id);
2769 // N.B. that we don't send any channel close event here: we
2770 // don't have a user_channel_id, and we never sent any opening
2772 (None, *peer_node_id)
2774 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, peer_node_id) });
2777 if let Some(update) = update_opt {
2778 // Try to send the `BroadcastChannelUpdate` to the peer we just force-closed on, but if
2779 // not try to broadcast it via whatever peer we have.
2780 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2781 let a_peer_state_opt = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2782 .ok_or(per_peer_state.values().next());
2783 if let Ok(a_peer_state_mutex) = a_peer_state_opt {
2784 let mut a_peer_state = a_peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2785 a_peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2791 Ok(counterparty_node_id)
2794 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2795 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2796 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2797 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2798 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2799 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2800 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2801 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
2802 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2803 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2804 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
2805 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
2816 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2817 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2818 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2820 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2821 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2822 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2825 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2826 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2827 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2829 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2830 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2831 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2832 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2833 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2836 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2837 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2838 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2839 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2840 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2844 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2845 /// local transaction(s).
2846 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2847 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2848 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2852 fn construct_fwd_pending_htlc_info(
2853 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload, hop_hmac: [u8; 32],
2854 new_packet_bytes: [u8; onion_utils::ONION_DATA_LEN], shared_secret: [u8; 32],
2855 next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>
2856 ) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, InboundOnionErr> {
2857 debug_assert!(next_packet_pubkey_opt.is_some());
2858 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2860 public_key: next_packet_pubkey_opt.unwrap_or(Err(secp256k1::Error::InvalidPublicKey)),
2861 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2865 let (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value) = match hop_data {
2866 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward { short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value } =>
2867 (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value),
2868 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { .. } | msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedReceive { .. } =>
2869 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2870 msg: "Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node",
2871 err_code: 0x4000 | 22,
2872 err_data: Vec::new(),
2876 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2877 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2878 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2881 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2882 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2883 incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
2884 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward,
2885 outgoing_cltv_value,
2886 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
2890 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(
2891 &self, hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload, shared_secret: [u8; 32], payment_hash: PaymentHash,
2892 amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>, allow_underpay: bool,
2893 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
2894 ) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, InboundOnionErr> {
2895 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, onion_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata) = match hop_data {
2896 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
2897 payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata, ..
2899 (payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata),
2900 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedReceive {
2901 amt_msat, total_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_secret, ..
2903 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData { payment_secret, total_msat };
2904 (Some(payment_data), None, Vec::new(), amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, None)
2906 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward { .. } => {
2907 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2908 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2909 err_data: Vec::new(),
2910 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2914 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2915 if outgoing_cltv_value > cltv_expiry {
2916 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2917 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to less than the CLTV set by the sender",
2919 err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
2922 // final_expiry_too_soon
2923 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2924 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2926 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2927 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2928 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2929 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2930 if (outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= current_height as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2931 let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12);
2932 err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes());
2933 err_data.extend_from_slice(¤t_height.to_be_bytes());
2934 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2935 err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data,
2936 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2939 if (!allow_underpay && onion_amt_msat > amt_msat) ||
2940 (allow_underpay && onion_amt_msat >
2941 amt_msat.saturating_add(counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)))
2943 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2945 err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
2946 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2950 let routing = if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2951 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2952 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2953 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2954 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2955 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2956 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2957 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2958 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2959 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2960 err_data: Vec::new(),
2961 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2964 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && payment_data.is_some() {
2965 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2966 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2967 err_data: Vec::new(),
2968 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2971 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2975 incoming_cltv_expiry: outgoing_cltv_value,
2978 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2979 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2982 incoming_cltv_expiry: outgoing_cltv_value,
2983 phantom_shared_secret,
2987 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2988 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2989 err_data: Vec::new(),
2990 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2993 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2996 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2997 incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
2998 outgoing_amt_msat: onion_amt_msat,
2999 outgoing_cltv_value,
3000 skimmed_fee_msat: counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
3004 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(
3005 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC
3006 ) -> Result<(onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>), HTLCFailureMsg> {
3007 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
3008 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
3010 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3011 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3012 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3013 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3014 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
3015 failure_code: $err_code,
3021 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
3022 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
3025 let shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(
3026 Recipient::Node, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None
3027 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
3029 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
3030 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
3031 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
3032 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
3033 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
3034 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
3035 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
3036 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
3038 macro_rules! return_err {
3039 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3041 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3042 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3043 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3044 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3045 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
3046 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3052 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(
3053 shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac,
3054 msg.payment_hash, &self.node_signer
3057 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3058 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
3060 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3061 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
3064 let (outgoing_scid, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, next_packet_pk_opt) = match next_hop {
3065 onion_utils::Hop::Forward {
3066 next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward {
3067 short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value
3070 let next_packet_pk = onion_utils::next_hop_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx,
3071 msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &shared_secret);
3072 (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(next_packet_pk))
3074 // We'll do receive checks in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] so we have access to the
3075 // inbound channel's state.
3076 onion_utils::Hop::Receive { .. } => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)),
3077 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { .. }, .. } |
3078 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedReceive { .. }, .. } =>
3080 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0; 0]);
3084 // Perform outbound checks here instead of in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] because we
3085 // can't hold the outbound peer state lock at the same time as the inbound peer state lock.
3086 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
3087 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&outgoing_scid).cloned();
3088 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
3089 None => { // unknown_next_peer
3090 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
3091 // phantom or an intercept.
3092 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
3093 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.genesis_hash)) ||
3094 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.genesis_hash)
3098 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3101 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
3103 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
3104 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3105 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3106 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3107 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3109 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3110 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3111 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).map(
3112 |chan_phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
3115 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
3116 // have no consistency guarantees.
3117 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3121 if !chan.context.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
3122 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
3123 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
3124 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
3125 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3127 if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && outgoing_scid != chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() {
3128 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
3129 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
3130 // we don't have the channel here.
3131 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3133 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
3135 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
3136 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
3137 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
3138 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
3139 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
3140 if !chan.context.is_live() { // channel_disabled
3141 // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
3142 // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
3143 // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
3144 if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
3145 break Some(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
3147 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
3150 if outgoing_amt_msat < chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
3151 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
3153 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value) {
3154 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
3158 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
3159 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
3160 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
3161 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
3163 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
3170 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3171 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
3172 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
3173 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
3174 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
3175 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
3177 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
3178 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
3180 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
3181 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
3182 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
3183 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
3184 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
3185 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
3186 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
3187 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
3188 if (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
3189 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
3195 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
3196 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
3197 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
3198 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3200 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
3201 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3203 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3204 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
3205 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3207 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3208 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3209 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3210 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
3211 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
3212 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
3213 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
3217 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
3219 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt))
3222 fn construct_pending_htlc_status<'a>(
3223 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, shared_secret: [u8; 32], decoded_hop: onion_utils::Hop,
3224 allow_underpay: bool, next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>
3225 ) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
3226 macro_rules! return_err {
3227 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3229 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3230 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3231 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3232 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3233 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
3234 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3240 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
3242 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash,
3243 msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None, allow_underpay, msg.skimmed_fee_msat)
3246 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
3247 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
3248 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
3249 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
3250 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
3252 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3255 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
3256 match self.construct_fwd_pending_htlc_info(msg, next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac,
3257 new_packet_bytes, shared_secret, next_packet_pubkey_opt) {
3258 Ok(info) => PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info),
3259 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3265 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
3266 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
3267 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
3269 /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
3270 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
3271 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3273 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3274 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3275 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3276 if !chan.context.should_announce() {
3277 return Err(LightningError {
3278 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
3279 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
3282 if chan.context.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
3283 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
3285 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3286 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
3289 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
3290 /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
3291 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
3292 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
3294 /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
3295 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
3296 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3298 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3299 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3300 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3301 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3302 let short_channel_id = match chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
3303 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
3307 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
3310 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3311 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3312 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
3314 let enabled = chan.context.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
3315 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
3316 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
3317 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
3318 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => false,
3321 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
3322 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
3324 timestamp: chan.context.get_update_time_counter(),
3325 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
3326 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.context.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
3327 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
3328 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.context.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
3329 fee_base_msat: chan.context.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
3330 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.context.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
3331 excess_data: Vec::new(),
3333 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
3334 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
3335 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
3337 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
3339 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
3346 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3347 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3348 self.send_payment_along_path(SendAlongPathArgs {
3349 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3354 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, args: SendAlongPathArgs) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3355 let SendAlongPathArgs {
3356 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3359 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
3360 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
3362 log_trace!(self.logger,
3363 "Attempting to send payment with payment hash {} along path with next hop {}",
3364 payment_hash, path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
3365 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
3366 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
3368 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
3369 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected".to_owned()})?;
3370 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
3372 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash)
3373 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute { err: "Route size too large considering onion data".to_owned()})?;
3375 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
3376 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
3377 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
3378 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3381 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3382 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3383 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
3384 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3385 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3386 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
3387 match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
3388 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
3389 if !chan.context.is_live() {
3390 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
3392 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
3393 let send_res = chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
3394 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3396 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
3397 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
3399 }, onion_packet, None, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
3400 match break_chan_phase_entry!(self, send_res, chan_phase_entry) {
3401 Some(monitor_update) => {
3402 match handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
3404 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
3405 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
3406 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
3407 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
3408 // which we do in the send_payment check for
3409 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
3410 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
3418 _ => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel to first hop is unfunded".to_owned()}),
3421 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
3422 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
3423 // `channel_by_id` map.
3424 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
3425 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
3430 match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
3431 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3433 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
3438 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
3440 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
3441 /// fields for more info.
3443 /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
3444 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
3446 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
3448 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
3449 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
3450 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
3451 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
3452 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
3454 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
3455 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
3456 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
3457 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
3458 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
3460 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
3461 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
3462 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
3463 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
3465 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
3467 /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
3468 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
3469 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
3471 /// In general, a path may raise:
3472 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
3473 /// node public key) is specified.
3474 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
3475 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
3477 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
3478 /// relevant updates.
3480 /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
3481 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
3482 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
3484 /// [`RouteHop`]: crate::routing::router::RouteHop
3485 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3486 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
3487 /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
3488 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
3489 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3490 pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3491 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3492 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3493 self.pending_outbound_payments
3494 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id,
3495 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3496 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3499 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route`], but will automatically find a route based on
3500 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3501 pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
3502 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3503 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3504 self.pending_outbound_payments
3505 .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
3506 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
3507 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
3508 &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3512 pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3513 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3514 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3515 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion,
3516 keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer,
3517 best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3521 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
3522 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3523 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
3527 pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
3528 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
3532 /// Signals that no further attempts for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
3533 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
3534 /// retries are exhausted.
3536 /// # Event Generation
3538 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
3539 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
3541 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
3542 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
3543 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
3545 /// # Requested Invoices
3547 /// In the case of paying a [`Bolt12Invoice`], abandoning the payment prior to receiving the
3548 /// invoice will result in an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`] and prevent any attempts at paying
3549 /// it once received. The other events may only be generated once the invoice has been received.
3551 /// # Restart Behavior
3553 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated and we restart without first persisting the
3554 /// [`ChannelManager`], another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated; likewise for
3555 /// [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
3557 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
3558 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
3559 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3560 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
3563 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
3564 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
3565 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
3566 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
3567 /// never reach the recipient.
3569 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
3570 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
3572 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
3573 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
3575 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
3576 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
3577 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3578 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3579 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
3580 route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
3581 &self.node_signer, best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3584 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
3585 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3587 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
3590 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
3591 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
3592 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3593 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3594 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
3595 payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3596 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3597 &self.logger, &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3600 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
3601 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
3602 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
3603 pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
3604 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3605 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3606 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret,
3607 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3608 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3611 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
3614 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
3615 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
3618 /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay the given
3619 /// amount to the given `node_id`.
3621 /// See [`ChannelManager::send_preflight_probes`] for more information.
3622 pub fn send_spontaneous_preflight_probes(
3623 &self, node_id: PublicKey, amount_msat: u64, final_cltv_expiry_delta: u32,
3624 liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
3625 ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
3626 let payment_params =
3627 PaymentParameters::from_node_id(node_id, final_cltv_expiry_delta);
3629 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, amount_msat);
3631 self.send_preflight_probes(route_params, liquidity_limit_multiplier)
3634 /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay a route found
3635 /// according to the given [`RouteParameters`].
3637 /// This may be used to send "pre-flight" probes, i.e., to train our scorer before conducting
3638 /// the actual payment. Note this is only useful if there likely is sufficient time for the
3639 /// probe to settle before sending out the actual payment, e.g., when waiting for user
3640 /// confirmation in a wallet UI.
3642 /// Otherwise, there is a chance the probe could take up some liquidity needed to complete the
3643 /// actual payment. Users should therefore be cautious and might avoid sending probes if
3644 /// liquidity is scarce and/or they don't expect the probe to return before they send the
3645 /// payment. To mitigate this issue, channels with available liquidity less than the required
3646 /// amount times the given `liquidity_limit_multiplier` won't be used to send pre-flight
3647 /// probes. If `None` is given as `liquidity_limit_multiplier`, it defaults to `3`.
3648 pub fn send_preflight_probes(
3649 &self, route_params: RouteParameters, liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
3650 ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
3651 let liquidity_limit_multiplier = liquidity_limit_multiplier.unwrap_or(3);
3653 let payer = self.get_our_node_id();
3654 let usable_channels = self.list_usable_channels();
3655 let first_hops = usable_channels.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>();
3656 let inflight_htlcs = self.compute_inflight_htlcs();
3660 .find_route(&payer, &route_params, Some(&first_hops), inflight_htlcs)
3662 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to find path for payment probe: {:?}", e);
3663 ProbeSendFailure::RouteNotFound
3666 let mut used_liquidity_map = HashMap::with_capacity(first_hops.len());
3668 let mut res = Vec::new();
3670 for mut path in route.paths {
3671 // If the last hop is probably an unannounced channel we refrain from probing all the
3672 // way through to the end and instead probe up to the second-to-last channel.
3673 while let Some(last_path_hop) = path.hops.last() {
3674 if last_path_hop.maybe_announced_channel {
3675 // We found a potentially announced last hop.
3678 // Drop the last hop, as it's likely unannounced.
3681 "Avoided sending payment probe all the way to last hop {} as it is likely unannounced.",
3682 last_path_hop.short_channel_id
3684 let final_value_msat = path.final_value_msat();
3686 if let Some(new_last) = path.hops.last_mut() {
3687 new_last.fee_msat += final_value_msat;
3692 if path.hops.len() < 2 {
3695 "Skipped sending payment probe over path with less than two hops."
3700 if let Some(first_path_hop) = path.hops.first() {
3701 if let Some(first_hop) = first_hops.iter().find(|h| {
3702 h.get_outbound_payment_scid() == Some(first_path_hop.short_channel_id)
3704 let path_value = path.final_value_msat() + path.fee_msat();
3705 let used_liquidity =
3706 used_liquidity_map.entry(first_path_hop.short_channel_id).or_insert(0);
3708 if first_hop.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat
3709 < (*used_liquidity + path_value) * liquidity_limit_multiplier
3711 log_debug!(self.logger, "Skipped sending payment probe to avoid putting channel {} under the liquidity limit.", first_path_hop.short_channel_id);
3714 *used_liquidity += path_value;
3719 res.push(self.send_probe(path).map_err(|e| {
3720 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to send pre-flight probe: {:?}", e);
3721 ProbeSendFailure::SendingFailed(e)
3728 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
3729 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
3730 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: FnMut(&OutboundV1Channel<SP>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
3731 &self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, is_batch_funding: bool,
3732 mut find_funding_output: FundingOutput,
3733 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3734 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3735 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3736 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3738 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3739 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3740 let (chan, msg) = match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
3741 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan)) => {
3742 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
3744 let funding_res = chan.get_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, is_batch_funding, &self.logger)
3745 .map_err(|(mut chan, e)| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
3746 let channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
3747 let user_id = chan.context.get_user_id();
3748 let shutdown_res = chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
3749 let channel_capacity = chan.context.get_value_satoshis();
3750 (chan, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None, channel_capacity))
3751 } else { unreachable!(); });
3753 Ok((chan, funding_msg)) => (chan, funding_msg),
3754 Err((chan, err)) => {
3755 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
3756 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3758 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(err), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
3759 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3760 err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
3766 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(*temporary_channel_id, phase);
3767 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3769 "Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is not an unfunded, outbound V1 channel",
3770 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3773 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {err: format!(
3774 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
3775 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3779 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
3780 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3783 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
3784 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3785 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
3787 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3788 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
3789 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.context.channel_id(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
3790 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
3792 e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan));
3799 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3800 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, false, |_, tx| {
3801 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
3805 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
3807 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
3808 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
3810 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
3811 /// across the p2p network.
3813 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
3814 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
3816 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
3817 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
3818 /// keys per-channel).
3820 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
3821 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
3822 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
3824 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
3825 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
3826 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
3828 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
3829 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
3830 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
3831 /// for more details.
3833 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
3834 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
3835 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3836 self.batch_funding_transaction_generated(&[(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id)], funding_transaction)
3839 /// Call this upon creation of a batch funding transaction for the given channels.
3841 /// Return values are identical to [`Self::funding_transaction_generated`], respective to
3842 /// each individual channel and transaction output.
3844 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. This batch funding transcaction
3845 /// will only be broadcast when we have safely received and persisted the counterparty's
3846 /// signature for each channel.
3848 /// If there is an error, all channels in the batch are to be considered closed.
3849 pub fn batch_funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channels: &[(&ChannelId, &PublicKey)], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3850 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3851 let mut result = Ok(());
3853 if !funding_transaction.is_coin_base() {
3854 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
3855 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
3856 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3857 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
3862 if funding_transaction.output.len() > u16::max_value() as usize {
3863 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3864 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
3868 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3869 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools if their locktime is strictly
3870 // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
3871 // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
3872 // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
3873 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 1 {
3874 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3875 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
3880 let txid = funding_transaction.txid();
3881 let is_batch_funding = temporary_channels.len() > 1;
3882 let mut funding_batch_states = if is_batch_funding {
3883 Some(self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap())
3887 let mut funding_batch_state = funding_batch_states.as_mut().and_then(|states| {
3888 match states.entry(txid) {
3889 btree_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3890 result = result.clone().and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3891 err: "Batch funding transaction with the same txid already exists".to_owned()
3895 btree_map::Entry::Vacant(vacant) => Some(vacant.insert(Vec::new())),
3898 for (channel_idx, &(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id)) in temporary_channels.iter().enumerate() {
3899 result = result.and_then(|_| self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(
3900 temporary_channel_id,
3901 counterparty_node_id,
3902 funding_transaction.clone(),
3905 let mut output_index = None;
3906 let expected_spk = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
3907 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3908 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.context.get_value_satoshis() {
3909 if output_index.is_some() {
3910 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3911 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
3914 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
3917 if output_index.is_none() {
3918 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3919 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
3922 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() };
3923 if let Some(funding_batch_state) = funding_batch_state.as_mut() {
3924 funding_batch_state.push((outpoint.to_channel_id(), *counterparty_node_id, false));
3930 if let Err(ref e) = result {
3931 // Remaining channels need to be removed on any error.
3932 let e = format!("Error in transaction funding: {:?}", e);
3933 let mut channels_to_remove = Vec::new();
3934 channels_to_remove.extend(funding_batch_states.as_mut()
3935 .and_then(|states| states.remove(&txid))
3936 .into_iter().flatten()
3937 .map(|(chan_id, node_id, _state)| (chan_id, node_id))
3939 channels_to_remove.extend(temporary_channels.iter()
3940 .map(|(&chan_id, &node_id)| (chan_id, node_id))
3942 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
3944 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3945 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in channels_to_remove {
3946 per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3947 .map(|peer_state_mutex| peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap())
3948 .and_then(|mut peer_state| peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id))
3950 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
3951 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context(), ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: e.clone() });
3952 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
3956 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
3957 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
3963 /// Atomically applies partial updates to the [`ChannelConfig`] of the given channels.
3965 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3966 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3967 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3968 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3970 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3971 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3973 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3974 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3976 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3978 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3979 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3980 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3981 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3982 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3983 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3984 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3985 pub fn update_partial_channel_config(
3986 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config_update: &ChannelConfigUpdate,
3987 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3988 if config_update.cltv_expiry_delta.map(|delta| delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA).unwrap_or(false) {
3989 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3990 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
3994 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3995 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3996 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3997 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3998 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3999 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4000 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4001 if !peer_state.has_channel(channel_id) {
4002 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4003 err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4007 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4008 if let Some(channel_phase) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
4009 let mut config = channel_phase.context().config();
4010 config.apply(config_update);
4011 if !channel_phase.context_mut().update_config(&config) {
4014 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = channel_phase {
4015 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
4016 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
4017 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
4018 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4019 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4026 // This should not be reachable as we've already checked for non-existence in the previous channel_id loop.
4027 debug_assert!(false);
4028 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4030 "Channel with ID {} for passed counterparty_node_id {} disappeared after we confirmed its existence - this should not be reachable!",
4031 channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4038 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
4040 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
4041 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
4042 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
4043 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
4045 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
4046 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
4048 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
4049 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
4051 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
4053 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4054 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
4055 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
4056 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
4057 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4058 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
4059 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
4060 pub fn update_channel_config(
4061 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config: &ChannelConfig,
4062 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4063 return self.update_partial_channel_config(counterparty_node_id, channel_ids, &(*config).into());
4066 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
4067 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
4069 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
4070 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
4072 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
4073 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
4074 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
4075 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
4076 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
4078 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
4079 /// you from forwarding more than you received. See
4080 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`] for more on forwarding a different amount
4083 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4086 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
4087 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4088 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
4089 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
4090 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
4091 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &ChannelId, next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4092 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4094 let next_hop_scid = {
4095 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4096 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
4097 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
4098 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4099 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4100 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
4101 Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) => {
4102 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
4103 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4104 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", next_hop_channel_id)
4107 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias())
4109 Some(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4110 err: format!("Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is still opening.",
4111 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id)
4113 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4114 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}.",
4115 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id)
4120 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4121 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4122 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4125 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
4126 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => {
4127 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid }
4129 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4131 let skimmed_fee_msat =
4132 payment.forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat.saturating_sub(amt_to_forward_msat);
4133 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
4134 skimmed_fee_msat: if skimmed_fee_msat == 0 { None } else { Some(skimmed_fee_msat) },
4135 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
4138 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
4139 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4140 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4141 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
4142 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
4144 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
4148 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
4149 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
4151 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4154 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4155 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4156 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4158 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4159 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4160 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4163 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
4164 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4165 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4166 user_channel_id: Some(payment.prev_user_channel_id),
4167 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4168 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
4169 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
4170 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4173 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
4174 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
4175 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4176 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4181 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
4183 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
4184 /// Will likely generate further events.
4185 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
4186 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4188 let mut new_events = VecDeque::new();
4189 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
4190 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
4192 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
4193 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
4195 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
4196 if short_chan_id != 0 {
4197 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
4199 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4200 match forward_info {
4201 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4202 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4203 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4204 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4205 outgoing_cltv_value, ..
4208 macro_rules! failure_handler {
4209 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
4210 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
4212 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4213 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4214 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4215 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4216 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4217 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4218 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
4221 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
4222 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
4224 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
4227 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4228 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
4234 macro_rules! fail_forward {
4235 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4237 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
4241 macro_rules! failed_payment {
4242 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4244 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
4248 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
4249 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
4250 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.genesis_hash) {
4251 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
4252 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(
4253 phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac,
4254 payment_hash, &self.node_signer
4257 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4258 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
4259 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
4260 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
4261 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
4263 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
4265 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4266 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
4270 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
4271 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data,
4272 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4273 outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret), false, None)
4275 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
4276 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
4282 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4285 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4288 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
4289 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
4290 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
4291 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
4292 // problem, not ours.
4298 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id) {
4299 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
4301 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4305 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4306 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4307 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
4308 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4311 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4312 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4313 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id) {
4314 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4315 match forward_info {
4316 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4317 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4318 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4319 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
4320 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4323 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, &payment_hash, short_chan_id);
4324 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4325 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4326 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4327 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4328 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4329 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4330 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
4331 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4333 if let Err(e) = chan.queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
4334 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
4335 onion_packet, skimmed_fee_msat, &self.fee_estimator,
4338 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4339 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", &payment_hash, msg);
4341 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
4343 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan);
4344 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4345 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
4346 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
4351 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
4352 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
4354 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
4355 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
4356 if let Err(e) = chan.queue_fail_htlc(
4357 htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger
4359 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4360 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
4362 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
4364 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
4365 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
4366 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
4373 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4377 'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4378 match forward_info {
4379 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4380 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4381 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4382 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat,
4383 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4386 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
4387 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret, custom_tlvs } => {
4388 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
4389 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret),
4390 payment_metadata, custom_tlvs };
4391 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
4392 Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
4394 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_data, payment_preimage, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, custom_tlvs } => {
4395 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields {
4396 payment_secret: payment_data.as_ref().map(|data| data.payment_secret),
4400 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
4401 payment_data, None, onion_fields)
4404 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
4407 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
4408 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
4409 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4410 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4411 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4412 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4413 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4414 phantom_shared_secret,
4416 // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
4417 // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
4418 // if routing nodes overpay
4419 value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
4420 sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
4422 total_value_received: None,
4423 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
4426 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
4429 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
4431 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
4432 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
4433 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
4434 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4435 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
4436 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
4438 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4439 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
4440 user_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.user_channel_id,
4441 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4442 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
4443 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
4444 phantom_shared_secret,
4446 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
4447 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
4449 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
4452 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
4453 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4454 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4455 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4456 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4459 macro_rules! check_total_value {
4460 ($purpose: expr) => {{
4461 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
4462 let is_keysend = match $purpose {
4463 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(_) => true,
4464 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { .. } => false,
4466 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4467 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
4468 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4470 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
4471 .entry(payment_hash)
4472 // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
4473 .or_insert_with(|| {
4474 committed_to_claimable = true;
4476 purpose: $purpose.clone(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
4479 if $purpose != claimable_payment.purpose {
4480 let log_keysend = |keysend| if keysend { "keysend" } else { "non-keysend" };
4481 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new {} HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing {} HTLC with the same payment hash", log_keysend(is_keysend), &payment_hash, log_keysend(!is_keysend));
4482 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4484 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && is_keysend && !claimable_payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4485 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash and our config states we don't accept MPP keysend", &payment_hash);
4486 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4488 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
4489 if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
4490 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4493 claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
4495 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
4496 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
4497 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
4498 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
4499 total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
4500 earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
4501 if htlc.total_msat != claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4502 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
4503 &payment_hash, claimable_htlc.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
4504 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
4506 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
4508 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
4509 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
4510 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
4511 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4512 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4513 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
4515 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4516 } else if total_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4517 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4518 committed_to_claimable = true;
4520 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
4521 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4522 let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
4523 htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
4524 let counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat = htlcs.iter()
4525 .map(|htlc| htlc.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)).sum();
4526 debug_assert!(total_value.saturating_sub(amount_msat) <=
4527 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat);
4528 new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
4529 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4533 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
4534 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
4535 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4536 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
4537 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
4539 payment_claimable_generated = true;
4541 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
4542 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
4544 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4545 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4546 committed_to_claimable = true;
4549 payment_claimable_generated
4553 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
4554 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
4555 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
4556 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
4557 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
4558 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
4559 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4560 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
4561 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4562 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4563 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
4564 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4565 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
4566 Ok(result) => result,
4568 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", &payment_hash);
4569 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4572 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
4573 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
4574 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
4575 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
4576 &payment_hash, cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
4577 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4580 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4581 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4582 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4584 check_total_value!(purpose);
4586 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
4587 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
4588 check_total_value!(purpose);
4592 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
4593 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4594 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", &payment_hash);
4595 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4597 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4598 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
4599 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", &payment_hash);
4600 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4601 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
4602 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
4603 &payment_hash, payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
4604 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4606 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4607 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
4608 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4610 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(purpose);
4611 if payment_claimable_generated {
4612 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
4618 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
4619 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
4627 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4628 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
4629 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4630 &self.pending_events, &self.logger, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args));
4632 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
4633 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4635 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
4637 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
4638 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
4639 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
4641 self.check_free_holding_cells();
4643 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
4644 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4645 events.append(&mut new_events);
4648 /// Free the background events, generally called from [`PersistenceNotifierGuard`] constructors.
4650 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
4651 fn process_background_events(&self) -> NotifyOption {
4652 debug_assert_ne!(self.total_consistency_lock.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::NotHeldByThread);
4654 self.background_events_processed_since_startup.store(true, Ordering::Release);
4656 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
4657 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
4658 if background_events.is_empty() {
4659 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4662 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
4664 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, update)) => {
4665 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
4666 // monitor updating completing.
4667 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4669 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup { counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update } => {
4670 let mut updated_chan = false;
4672 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4673 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4674 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4675 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4676 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4677 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase) => {
4678 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase.get_mut() {
4679 updated_chan = true;
4680 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, update.clone(),
4681 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4683 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't have an update for a non-funded channel");
4686 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {},
4691 // TODO: Track this as in-flight even though the channel is closed.
4692 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4695 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete { counterparty_node_id, channel_id } => {
4696 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4697 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4698 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4699 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4700 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
4701 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4703 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
4704 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
4705 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
4706 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4707 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
4713 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4716 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
4717 /// Process background events, for functional testing
4718 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
4719 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
4720 let _ = self.process_background_events();
4723 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &ChannelId, chan: &mut Channel<SP>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
4724 if !chan.context.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents; }
4725 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
4726 if new_feerate <= chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4727 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4728 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4729 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4731 if !chan.context.is_live() {
4732 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
4733 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4734 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4736 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4737 &chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4739 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
4740 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4744 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
4745 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
4746 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
4747 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
4748 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
4749 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
4750 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4752 let normal_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4753 let min_mempool_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::MempoolMinimum);
4755 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4756 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4757 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4758 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4759 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
4760 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
4762 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4767 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4768 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4776 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
4778 /// This currently includes:
4779 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
4780 /// * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
4781 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
4783 /// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
4784 /// with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
4785 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
4786 /// * Force-closing and removing channels which have not completed establishment in a timely manner.
4788 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
4789 /// estimate fetches.
4791 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4792 /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
4793 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
4794 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
4795 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4797 let normal_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4798 let min_mempool_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::MempoolMinimum);
4800 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
4801 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
4802 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
4803 let mut shutdown_channels = Vec::new();
4805 let mut process_unfunded_channel_tick = |
4806 chan_id: &ChannelId,
4807 context: &mut ChannelContext<SP>,
4808 unfunded_context: &mut UnfundedChannelContext,
4809 pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4810 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
4812 context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4813 if unfunded_context.should_expire_unfunded_channel() {
4814 log_error!(self.logger,
4815 "Force-closing pending channel with ID {} for not establishing in a timely manner", chan_id);
4816 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
4817 self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4818 shutdown_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false));
4819 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4820 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4821 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4822 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
4823 channel_id: *chan_id,
4824 data: "Force-closing pending channel due to timeout awaiting establishment handshake".to_owned(),
4835 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4836 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4837 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4838 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4839 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
4840 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
4841 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, phase| {
4843 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
4844 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4849 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4850 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4852 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
4853 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
4854 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
4855 if needs_close { return false; }
4858 match chan.channel_update_status() {
4859 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
4860 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
4861 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.context.is_live()
4862 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
4863 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.context.is_live()
4864 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
4865 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.context.is_live() => {
4867 if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4868 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
4869 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4870 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4874 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4876 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
4879 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.context.is_live() => {
4881 if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4882 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
4883 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4884 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4888 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4890 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
4896 chan.context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4898 if chan.should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response() {
4899 log_debug!(self.logger, "Disconnecting peer {} due to not making any progress on channel {}",
4900 counterparty_node_id, chan_id);
4901 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4902 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4903 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning {
4904 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
4905 channel_id: *chan_id,
4906 data: "Disconnecting due to timeout awaiting response".to_owned(),
4914 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
4915 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
4916 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
4918 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
4919 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
4920 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
4925 for (chan_id, req) in peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.iter_mut() {
4926 if { req.ticks_remaining -= 1 ; req.ticks_remaining } <= 0 {
4927 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing unaccepted inbound channel {} for not accepting in a timely manner", &chan_id);
4928 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
4929 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4930 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4931 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4932 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_id.clone(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
4938 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.retain(|_, req| req.ticks_remaining > 0);
4940 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
4941 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
4946 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
4947 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
4948 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
4949 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
4950 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
4951 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
4952 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
4953 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
4954 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
4955 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
4956 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
4957 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
4958 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
4959 // have no channels to the peer.
4960 let remove_entry = {
4961 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
4962 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
4965 entry.remove_entry();
4968 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
4973 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
4974 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4975 // This should be unreachable
4976 debug_assert!(false);
4979 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
4980 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
4981 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
4982 // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
4983 // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
4984 if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
4985 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
4988 } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
4989 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
4990 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
4992 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
4993 .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
5000 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
5001 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
5002 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
5003 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
5004 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
5007 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5008 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5011 for shutdown_res in shutdown_channels {
5012 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
5015 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_payments(&self.pending_events);
5017 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
5018 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
5019 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
5020 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5021 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5028 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
5029 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
5030 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
5032 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
5033 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
5034 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
5035 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
5037 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
5038 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
5039 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
5040 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
5041 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
5042 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
5045 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
5046 /// reason for the failure.
5048 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
5049 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
5050 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5052 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
5053 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
5054 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5055 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
5056 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5057 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
5058 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5063 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
5064 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
5065 match failure_code {
5066 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
5067 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
5068 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
5069 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5070 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
5071 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), htlc_msat_height_data)
5073 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(data) => {
5074 let fail_data = match data {
5075 Some((typ, offset)) => [BigSize(typ).encode(), offset.encode()].concat(),
5078 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), fail_data)
5083 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5084 /// that we want to return and a channel.
5086 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
5088 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5089 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
5090 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
5091 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
5092 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
5093 let scid_pref = if chan.context.should_announce() {
5094 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
5096 chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.context.get_short_channel_id())
5098 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
5099 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
5101 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5106 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5107 /// that we want to return and a channel.
5108 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5109 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
5110 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
5111 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
5112 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
5113 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
5114 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
5115 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5117 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5118 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5119 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5120 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
5122 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
5123 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
5124 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
5125 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
5126 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5130 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
5131 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
5132 // be surfaced to the user.
5133 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
5134 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: ChannelId,
5135 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
5137 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
5138 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5139 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
5140 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5141 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5142 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
5143 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
5144 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get() {
5145 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan)
5147 // We shouldn't be trying to fail holding cell HTLCs on an unfunded channel.
5148 debug_assert!(false);
5149 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5152 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5154 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
5157 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
5158 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
5159 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
5160 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5164 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
5165 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
5166 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
5167 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
5168 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
5169 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
5170 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
5171 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5172 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
5173 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5176 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
5177 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
5178 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
5181 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5182 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
5183 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5185 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
5186 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
5187 session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
5188 &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
5189 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5191 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint, .. }) => {
5192 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", &payment_hash, onion_error);
5193 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
5195 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
5196 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5197 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
5198 push_forward_ev = true;
5200 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
5201 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5202 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
5204 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5205 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
5208 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
5209 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5210 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5211 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
5212 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
5213 failed_next_destination: destination,
5219 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
5220 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
5222 /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
5223 /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
5224 /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
5225 /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
5227 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
5228 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
5229 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
5230 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
5232 /// This function will fail the payment if it has custom TLVs with even type numbers, as we
5233 /// will assume they are unknown. If you intend to accept even custom TLVs, you should use
5234 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`].
5236 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5237 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
5238 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
5239 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
5240 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5241 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5242 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`]: Self::claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs
5243 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5244 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, false);
5247 /// This is a variant of [`claim_funds`] that allows accepting a payment with custom TLVs with
5248 /// even type numbers.
5252 /// You MUST check you've understood all even TLVs before using this to
5253 /// claim, otherwise you may unintentionally agree to some protocol you do not understand.
5255 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5256 pub fn claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5257 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, true);
5260 fn claim_payment_internal(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, custom_tlvs_known: bool) {
5261 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5263 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5266 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
5267 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
5268 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
5269 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
5270 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
5271 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
5272 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
5273 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
5278 let htlcs = payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect();
5279 let sender_intended_value = payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat);
5280 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
5281 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
5282 payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id, htlcs, sender_intended_value
5284 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
5285 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
5286 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
5290 if let Some(RecipientOnionFields { ref custom_tlvs, .. }) = payment.onion_fields {
5291 if !custom_tlvs_known && custom_tlvs.iter().any(|(typ, _)| typ % 2 == 0) {
5292 log_info!(self.logger, "Rejecting payment with payment hash {} as we cannot accept payment with unknown even TLVs: {}",
5293 &payment_hash, log_iter!(custom_tlvs.iter().map(|(typ, _)| typ).filter(|typ| *typ % 2 == 0)));
5294 claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5295 mem::drop(claimable_payments);
5296 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5297 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(None), &htlc);
5298 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5299 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5300 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5309 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
5311 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
5312 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
5313 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
5314 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
5315 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
5316 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
5317 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
5318 let mut valid_mpp = true;
5319 let mut errs = Vec::new();
5320 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5321 for htlc in sources.iter() {
5322 if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
5323 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5324 debug_assert!(false);
5328 prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
5330 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
5331 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5332 debug_assert!(false);
5336 expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
5337 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
5339 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5340 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
5341 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5342 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
5345 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
5346 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5347 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
5348 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
5352 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5353 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
5354 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
5355 |_| Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash }))
5357 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
5358 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
5359 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
5360 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
5361 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
5366 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5367 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5368 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
5369 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5370 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
5371 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5372 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5374 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5377 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
5378 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
5379 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5380 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
5384 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
5385 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
5386 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
5387 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
5389 // If we haven't yet run background events assume we're still deserializing and shouldn't
5390 // actually pass `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to users yet. Instead, queue them up as
5391 // `BackgroundEvent`s.
5392 let during_init = !self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5395 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5396 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
5397 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
5398 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
5402 let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
5403 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5404 .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
5407 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
5408 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
5409 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5410 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5411 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
5412 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5413 let fulfill_res = chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger);
5415 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = fulfill_res {
5416 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)) {
5417 log_trace!(self.logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
5419 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
5422 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
5423 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5425 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly -
5426 // they probably haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the
5427 // monitor update as a background event.
5428 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5429 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5430 counterparty_node_id,
5431 funding_txo: prev_hop.outpoint,
5432 update: monitor_update.clone(),
5441 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5442 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
5443 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5449 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
5450 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
5451 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
5452 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
5453 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
5454 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
5455 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
5456 // again on restart.
5457 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
5458 payment_preimage, update_res);
5461 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly - they probably
5462 // haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the monitor update as a background
5464 // Note that while it's safe to use `ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup` here (the
5465 // channel is already closed) we need to ultimately handle the monitor update
5466 // completion action only after we've completed the monitor update. This is the only
5467 // way to guarantee this update *will* be regenerated on startup (otherwise if this was
5468 // from a forwarded HTLC the downstream preimage may be deleted before we claim
5469 // upstream). Thus, we need to transition to some new `BackgroundEvent` type which will
5470 // complete the monitor update completion action from `completion_action`.
5471 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5472 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((
5473 prev_hop.outpoint, preimage_update,
5476 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
5477 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
5478 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
5479 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
5480 // `PaymentForwarded`).
5481 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
5485 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
5486 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
5489 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
5490 forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool,
5491 next_channel_counterparty_node_id: Option<PublicKey>, next_channel_outpoint: OutPoint
5494 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
5495 debug_assert!(self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire),
5496 "We don't support claim_htlc claims during startup - monitors may not be available yet");
5497 if let Some(pubkey) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
5498 debug_assert_eq!(pubkey, path.hops[0].pubkey);
5500 let ev_completion_action = EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
5501 channel_funding_outpoint: next_channel_outpoint,
5502 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
5504 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage,
5505 session_priv, path, from_onchain, ev_completion_action, &self.pending_events,
5508 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
5509 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
5510 let completed_blocker = RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&hop_data);
5511 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
5512 |htlc_claim_value_msat| {
5513 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
5514 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
5515 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
5518 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5519 event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
5521 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
5522 prev_channel_id: Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
5523 next_channel_id: Some(next_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
5524 outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
5526 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
5527 if let Some(node_id) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
5528 Some((node_id, next_channel_outpoint, completed_blocker))
5530 // We can only get `None` here if we are processing a
5531 // `ChannelMonitor`-originated event, in which case we
5532 // don't care about ensuring we wake the downstream
5533 // channel's monitor updating - the channel is already
5540 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
5541 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5542 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
5548 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
5549 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
5550 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
5553 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
5554 for action in actions.into_iter() {
5556 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
5557 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5558 if let Some(ClaimingPayment {
5560 payment_purpose: purpose,
5563 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_total_msat,
5565 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
5569 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
5571 sender_intended_total_msat,
5575 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5576 event, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint
5578 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
5579 if let Some((node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker)) = downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint {
5580 self.handle_monitor_update_release(node_id, funding_outpoint, Some(blocker));
5587 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
5588 /// update completion.
5589 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
5590 channel: &mut Channel<SP>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
5591 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
5592 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
5593 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
5594 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
5595 log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
5596 &channel.context.channel_id(),
5597 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
5598 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
5599 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
5600 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
5601 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
5603 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
5605 let counterparty_node_id = channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5606 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5607 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.context.outbound_scid_alias()),
5608 channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.context.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
5611 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
5612 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
5614 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
5615 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5616 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5621 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
5622 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
5623 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5624 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5629 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
5630 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
5631 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
5632 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5633 msg: revoke_and_ack,
5638 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
5642 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
5648 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
5649 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
5650 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
5654 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5655 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
5656 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
5662 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
5663 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
5665 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
5666 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5668 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5669 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
5670 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5671 match id_to_peer.get(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
5672 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5677 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5678 let mut peer_state_lock;
5679 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
5680 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
5681 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5682 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5684 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
5687 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
5688 .remove(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
5689 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5690 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5691 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
5694 let remaining_in_flight =
5695 if let Some(pending) = peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.get_mut(funding_txo) {
5696 pending.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > highest_applied_update_id);
5699 log_trace!(self.logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}. {} pending in-flight updates.",
5700 highest_applied_update_id, channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
5701 remaining_in_flight);
5702 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
5705 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel);
5708 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
5710 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
5711 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
5714 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5715 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5716 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5718 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
5719 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
5720 /// used to accept such channels.
5722 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5723 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5724 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5725 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
5728 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
5729 /// it as confirmed immediately.
5731 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5732 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5733 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5735 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
5736 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
5738 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
5739 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
5741 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
5742 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
5744 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5745 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5746 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5747 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
5750 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5751 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5753 let peers_without_funded_channels =
5754 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| { peer.total_channel_count() > 0 });
5755 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5756 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5757 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
5758 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5759 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5760 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.total_channel_count() == 1;
5762 // Find (and remove) the channel in the unaccepted table. If it's not there, something weird is
5763 // happening and return an error. N.B. that we create channel with an outbound SCID of zero so
5764 // that we can delay allocating the SCID until after we're sure that the checks below will
5766 let mut channel = match peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
5767 Some(unaccepted_channel) => {
5768 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5769 InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
5770 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features,
5771 &unaccepted_channel.open_channel_msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration, best_block_height,
5772 &self.logger, accept_0conf).map_err(|e| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.to_string() })
5774 _ => Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() })
5778 // This should have been correctly configured by the call to InboundV1Channel::new.
5779 debug_assert!(channel.context.minimum_depth().unwrap() == 0);
5780 } else if channel.context.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
5781 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5782 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5783 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
5784 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
5787 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
5788 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
5790 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
5791 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
5792 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
5793 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
5794 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5795 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5796 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
5797 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
5800 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
5801 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned() });
5805 // Now that we know we have a channel, assign an outbound SCID alias.
5806 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
5807 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
5809 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
5810 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5811 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
5814 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(temporary_channel_id.clone(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
5819 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
5820 /// or 0-conf channels.
5822 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
5823 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
5824 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
5825 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<SP>) -> bool {
5826 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
5827 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5829 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5830 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
5831 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5832 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
5833 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
5834 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.total_channel_count() {
5835 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
5839 return peers_without_funded_channels;
5842 fn unfunded_channel_count(
5843 peer: &PeerState<SP>, best_block_height: u32
5845 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
5846 for (_, phase) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
5848 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
5849 // This covers non-zero-conf inbound `Channel`s that we are currently monitoring, but those
5850 // which have not yet had any confirmations on-chain.
5851 if !chan.context.is_outbound() && chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
5852 chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
5854 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
5857 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
5858 if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 {
5859 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
5862 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
5863 // Outbound channels don't contribute to the unfunded count in the DoS context.
5868 num_unfunded_channels + peer.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
5871 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5872 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
5873 // likely to be lost on restart!
5874 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
5875 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5878 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
5879 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5882 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
5883 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
5884 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
5885 let channeled_peers_without_funding =
5886 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.total_channel_count() > 0);
5888 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5889 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5891 debug_assert!(false);
5892 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())
5894 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5895 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5897 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
5898 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
5899 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
5900 if peer_state.total_channel_count() == 0 &&
5901 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
5902 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
5904 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
5905 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
5906 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5909 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5910 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
5911 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
5912 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
5913 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5916 let channel_id = msg.temporary_channel_id;
5917 let channel_exists = peer_state.has_channel(&channel_id);
5919 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5922 // If we're doing manual acceptance checks on the channel, then defer creation until we're sure we want to accept.
5923 if self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
5924 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5925 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
5926 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
5927 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5928 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
5929 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
5930 channel_type: msg.channel_type.clone().unwrap(),
5932 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.insert(channel_id, InboundChannelRequest {
5933 open_channel_msg: msg.clone(),
5934 ticks_remaining: UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS,
5939 // Otherwise create the channel right now.
5940 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
5941 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
5942 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
5943 let mut channel = match InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
5944 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
5945 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, /*is_0conf=*/false)
5948 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
5953 let channel_type = channel.context.get_channel_type();
5954 if channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
5955 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5957 if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5958 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5961 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
5962 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
5964 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
5965 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5966 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
5968 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(channel_id, ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
5972 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5973 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
5974 // likely to be lost on restart!
5975 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
5976 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5977 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5979 debug_assert!(false);
5980 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
5982 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5983 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5984 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
5985 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut phase) => {
5986 match phase.get_mut() {
5987 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
5988 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), phase);
5989 (chan.context.get_value_satoshis(), chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.context.get_user_id())
5992 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected accept_channel message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id));
5996 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
5999 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6000 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
6001 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
6002 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6003 channel_value_satoshis: value,
6005 user_channel_id: user_id,
6010 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6011 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6013 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6014 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6016 debug_assert!(false);
6017 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
6020 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6021 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6022 let (chan, funding_msg, monitor) =
6023 match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
6024 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan)) => {
6025 match inbound_chan.funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger) {
6027 Err((mut inbound_chan, err)) => {
6028 // We've already removed this inbound channel from the map in `PeerState`
6029 // above so at this point we just need to clean up any lingering entries
6030 // concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
6031 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &inbound_chan.context);
6032 let user_id = inbound_chan.context.get_user_id();
6033 let shutdown_res = inbound_chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
6034 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(format!("{}", err),
6035 msg.temporary_channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None, inbound_chan.context.get_value_satoshis()));
6039 Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(_)) | Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_)) => {
6040 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected funding_created message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id));
6042 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
6045 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
6046 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6047 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
6049 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6050 let mut id_to_peer_lock = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6051 match id_to_peer_lock.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
6052 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6053 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6054 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
6055 funding_msg.channel_id))
6057 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
6058 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
6059 if let Ok(persist_state) = monitor_res {
6060 i_e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
6061 mem::drop(id_to_peer_lock);
6063 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
6064 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
6065 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
6066 // until we have persisted our monitor.
6067 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
6068 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6072 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) {
6073 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_state, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
6074 per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
6076 unreachable!("This must be a funded channel as we just inserted it.");
6080 log_error!(self.logger, "Persisting initial ChannelMonitor failed, implying the funding outpoint was duplicated");
6081 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6082 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
6083 funding_msg.channel_id));
6091 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6092 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6093 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6094 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6096 debug_assert!(false);
6097 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6100 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6101 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6102 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6103 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6104 match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6105 ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) => {
6106 let monitor = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6107 chan.funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6108 if let Ok(persist_status) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
6109 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_status, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
6112 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel funding outpoint was a duplicate".to_owned())), chan_phase_entry)
6116 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
6120 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
6124 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6125 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6126 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6127 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6128 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6130 debug_assert!(false);
6131 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6133 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6134 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6135 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6136 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6137 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6138 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
6139 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6140 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
6141 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
6142 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6143 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6144 msg: announcement_sigs,
6146 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
6147 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
6148 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
6149 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
6150 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
6151 // announcement_signatures.
6152 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
6153 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
6154 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6155 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6162 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6163 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan);
6168 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6169 "Got a channel_ready message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry)
6172 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
6173 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6178 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6179 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
6180 let mut finish_shutdown = None;
6182 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6183 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6185 debug_assert!(false);
6186 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6188 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6189 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6190 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
6191 let phase = chan_phase_entry.get_mut();
6193 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
6194 if !chan.received_shutdown() {
6195 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
6197 if chan.sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
6200 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6201 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6202 chan.shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
6203 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
6205 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
6206 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
6207 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
6208 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
6209 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
6210 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6214 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
6215 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6216 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
6217 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6220 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
6221 let context = phase.context_mut();
6222 log_error!(self.logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
6223 self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel);
6224 let mut chan = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
6225 finish_shutdown = Some(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
6229 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6232 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
6233 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
6234 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
6235 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
6237 if let Some(shutdown_res) = finish_shutdown {
6238 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
6244 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6245 let mut shutdown_result = None;
6246 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid;
6247 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6248 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6250 debug_assert!(false);
6251 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6253 let (tx, chan_option) = {
6254 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6255 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6256 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
6257 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6258 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6259 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
6260 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
6261 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
6262 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
6263 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6268 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
6269 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
6270 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
6271 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
6272 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
6273 (tx, Some(remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry)))
6274 } else { (tx, None) }
6276 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6277 "Got a closing_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6280 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6283 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
6284 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
6285 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&broadcast_tx]);
6287 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = chan_option {
6288 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6289 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6290 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6291 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6295 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
6296 shutdown_result = Some((None, Vec::new(), unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid));
6298 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6299 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
6300 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
6305 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6306 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
6307 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
6308 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
6310 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
6311 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
6312 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
6313 //but we should prevent it anyway.
6315 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6316 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6318 let decoded_hop_res = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
6319 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6320 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6322 debug_assert!(false);
6323 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6325 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6326 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6327 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6328 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6329 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6330 let pending_forward_info = match decoded_hop_res {
6331 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt)) =>
6332 self.construct_pending_htlc_status(msg, shared_secret, next_hop,
6333 chan.context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_pk_opt),
6334 Err(e) => PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(e)
6336 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<SP>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
6337 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
6338 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
6339 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
6340 match pending_forward_info {
6341 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
6342 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
6343 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
6344 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
6346 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
6347 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
6348 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6349 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
6350 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
6353 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
6355 _ => pending_forward_info
6358 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6360 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6361 "Got an update_add_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6364 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6369 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6371 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
6372 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6373 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6375 debug_assert!(false);
6376 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6378 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6379 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6380 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6381 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6382 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6383 let res = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
6384 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop) = &res.0 {
6385 peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates.entry(msg.channel_id)
6386 .or_insert_with(Vec::new)
6387 .push(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&prev_hop));
6389 // Note that we do not need to push an `actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates`
6390 // entry here, even though we *do* need to block the next RAA monitor update.
6391 // We do this instead in the `claim_funds_internal` by attaching a
6392 // `ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate` action to the event generated when the
6393 // outbound HTLC is claimed. This is guaranteed to all complete before we
6394 // process the RAA as messages are processed from single peers serially.
6395 funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().expect("We won't accept a fulfill until funded");
6398 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6399 "Got an update_fulfill_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6402 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6405 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, Some(*counterparty_node_id), funding_txo);
6409 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6410 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6411 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6412 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6413 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6415 debug_assert!(false);
6416 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6418 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6419 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6420 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6421 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6422 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6423 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan_phase_entry);
6425 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6426 "Got an update_fail_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6429 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6434 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6435 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6436 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6437 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6438 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6440 debug_assert!(false);
6441 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6443 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6444 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6445 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6446 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6447 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
6448 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
6449 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan_phase_entry);
6451 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6452 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan_phase_entry);
6454 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6455 "Got an update_fail_malformed_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6459 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6463 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6464 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6465 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6467 debug_assert!(false);
6468 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6470 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6471 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6472 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6473 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6474 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6475 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6476 let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6477 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6478 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
6479 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6483 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6484 "Got a commitment_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6487 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6492 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
6493 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
6494 let mut push_forward_event = false;
6495 let mut new_intercept_events = VecDeque::new();
6496 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
6497 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
6498 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
6499 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
6500 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6501 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
6502 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
6504 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
6505 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
6507 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6508 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
6509 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
6510 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
6511 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6512 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
6514 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6515 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
6516 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.genesis_hash)
6518 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).into_inner());
6519 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6520 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
6521 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6522 new_intercept_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
6523 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
6524 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
6525 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
6526 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
6529 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6530 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
6532 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6533 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
6534 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6535 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
6536 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
6537 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
6538 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
6539 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6540 phantom_shared_secret: None,
6543 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
6544 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
6545 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
6550 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
6551 // payments are being processed.
6552 if forward_htlcs_empty {
6553 push_forward_event = true;
6555 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6556 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
6563 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
6564 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
6567 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
6568 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6569 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
6571 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
6575 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
6576 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6577 let is_processing_events = self.pending_events_processor.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6578 let num_forward_events = pending_events.iter().filter(|(ev, _)|
6579 if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false }
6581 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued. Processing
6582 // events is done in batches and they are not removed until we're done processing each
6583 // batch. Since handling a `PendingHTLCsForwardable` event will call back into the
6584 // `ChannelManager`, we'll still see the original forwarding event not removed. Phantom
6585 // payments will need an additional forwarding event before being claimed to make them look
6586 // real by taking more time.
6587 if (is_processing_events && num_forward_events <= 1) || num_forward_events < 1 {
6588 pending_events.push_back((Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
6589 time_forwardable: Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
6594 /// Checks whether [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s generated by the receipt of a remote
6595 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] should be held for the given channel until some other action
6596 /// completes. Note that this needs to happen in the same [`PeerState`] mutex as any release of
6597 /// the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in question.
6598 fn raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
6599 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: &BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
6600 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
6602 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
6603 .get(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).map(|v| !v.is_empty()).unwrap_or(false)
6604 || self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().iter().any(|(_, action)| {
6605 action == &Some(EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
6606 channel_funding_outpoint,
6607 counterparty_node_id,
6612 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6613 pub(crate) fn test_raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
6614 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_id: ChannelId
6616 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6617 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
6618 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6619 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
6621 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&channel_id) {
6622 return self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
6623 chan.context().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), counterparty_node_id);
6629 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6630 let htlcs_to_fail = {
6631 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6632 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6634 debug_assert!(false);
6635 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6636 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
6637 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6638 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6639 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6640 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6641 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6642 let mon_update_blocked = if let Some(funding_txo) = funding_txo_opt {
6643 self.raa_monitor_updates_held(
6644 &peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates, funding_txo,
6645 *counterparty_node_id)
6647 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6648 chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger, mon_update_blocked), chan_phase_entry);
6649 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6650 let funding_txo = funding_txo_opt
6651 .expect("Funding outpoint must have been set for RAA handling to succeed");
6652 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update,
6653 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6657 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6658 "Got a revoke_and_ack message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6661 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6664 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
6668 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6669 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6670 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6672 debug_assert!(false);
6673 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6675 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6676 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6677 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6678 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6679 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6680 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6682 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6683 "Got an update_fee message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6686 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6691 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6692 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6693 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6695 debug_assert!(false);
6696 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6698 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6699 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6700 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6701 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6702 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6703 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
6704 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
6707 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
6708 msg: try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.announcement_signatures(
6709 &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
6710 msg, &self.default_configuration
6711 ), chan_phase_entry),
6712 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
6713 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
6714 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan).unwrap()),
6717 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6718 "Got an announcement_signatures message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6721 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6726 /// Returns DoPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersistNoEvents or an Err.
6727 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6728 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
6729 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
6731 // It's not a local channel
6732 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
6735 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6736 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
6737 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
6738 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
6740 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6741 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6742 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
6743 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6744 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6745 if chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6746 if chan.context.should_announce() {
6747 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
6748 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
6749 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
6750 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
6752 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
6754 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
6755 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
6756 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
6757 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
6759 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update {:?} for channel {}.", msg, chan_id);
6760 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_update(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
6763 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6764 "Got a channel_update for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6767 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
6769 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
6772 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6774 let need_lnd_workaround = {
6775 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6777 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6779 debug_assert!(false);
6780 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6782 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6783 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6784 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6785 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6786 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6787 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
6788 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
6789 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
6790 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
6791 let responses = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_reestablish(
6792 msg, &self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash,
6793 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan_phase_entry);
6794 let mut channel_update = None;
6795 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
6796 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
6797 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6800 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
6801 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
6802 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
6803 // they have the latest channel parameters.
6804 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
6805 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6806 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6811 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
6812 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
6813 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
6814 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
6815 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
6816 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
6820 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6821 "Got a channel_reestablish message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6824 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6828 let mut persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
6829 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
6830 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
6831 persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6834 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
6835 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
6840 /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
6841 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
6842 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
6844 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6845 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
6846 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
6847 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
6848 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
6849 match monitor_event {
6850 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
6851 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
6852 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", preimage);
6853 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, counterparty_node_id, funding_outpoint);
6855 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", &htlc_update.payment_hash);
6856 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
6857 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
6858 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
6861 MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(funding_outpoint) => {
6862 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
6863 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
6865 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
6866 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
6867 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6868 id_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).cloned()
6871 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
6872 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6873 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
6874 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6875 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6876 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6877 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
6878 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
6879 failed_channels.push(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
6880 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6881 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6885 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
6886 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6887 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6888 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
6889 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.context.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
6897 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
6898 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
6904 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6905 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
6908 has_pending_monitor_events
6911 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
6912 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
6913 /// update events as a separate process method here.
6915 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
6916 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6917 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
6920 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
6921 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
6922 /// update was applied.
6923 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
6924 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
6925 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
6927 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
6928 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
6929 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
6930 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
6932 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6933 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6935 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6936 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6937 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
6938 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
6940 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
6941 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6942 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
6943 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
6944 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
6945 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
6947 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
6948 has_monitor_update = true;
6950 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update,
6951 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6952 continue 'peer_loop;
6961 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty();
6962 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
6963 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
6969 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
6970 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
6971 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
6972 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
6973 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
6974 let mut has_update = false;
6975 let mut shutdown_result = None;
6976 let mut unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = None;
6978 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6980 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6981 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6982 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6983 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6984 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, phase| {
6986 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
6987 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
6988 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
6989 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
6990 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
6992 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
6993 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
6996 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
6997 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
6998 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
6999 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7000 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7005 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
7007 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
7008 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
7009 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
7010 shutdown_result = Some((None, Vec::new(), unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid));
7016 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
7017 handle_errors.push((chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
7022 _ => true, // Retain unfunded channels if present.
7028 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
7029 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
7032 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
7033 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
7039 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
7040 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
7042 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
7043 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7044 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
7045 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
7046 // reorganized out of the main chain.
7047 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
7048 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
7049 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
7050 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
7051 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
7052 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
7053 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
7054 assert!(should_broadcast);
7055 } else { unreachable!(); }
7056 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
7057 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
7058 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
7061 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
7065 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
7068 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
7069 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
7071 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
7072 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
7073 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
7074 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
7076 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
7078 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
7079 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
7083 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
7084 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
7086 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
7088 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
7089 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
7091 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
7092 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
7093 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
7094 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
7095 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
7096 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
7097 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
7098 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
7099 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
7100 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
7101 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
7104 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
7105 /// stored external to LDK.
7107 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
7108 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
7109 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
7111 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
7112 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
7115 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
7116 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
7117 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
7118 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
7120 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
7121 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
7122 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
7123 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
7124 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
7126 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
7127 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
7128 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
7129 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
7130 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
7132 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
7133 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
7135 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
7136 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
7140 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
7141 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
7143 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
7145 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
7146 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
7148 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
7149 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
7150 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
7151 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
7152 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
7153 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
7154 min_final_cltv_expiry)
7157 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
7158 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
7160 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
7161 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
7162 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
7165 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
7166 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
7168 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
7169 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
7170 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7171 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
7173 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
7174 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
7175 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
7176 Some(_) => continue,
7177 None => return scid_candidate
7182 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
7184 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
7185 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
7187 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
7188 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
7189 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
7193 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
7194 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
7195 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
7197 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
7198 /// times to get a unique scid.
7199 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
7200 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7201 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
7203 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
7204 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
7205 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
7206 return scid_candidate
7210 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
7211 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
7212 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
7213 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
7215 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7216 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7217 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7218 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7219 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(
7220 |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
7222 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
7223 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
7224 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
7233 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
7234 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
7235 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
7236 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
7237 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
7241 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
7242 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
7243 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7244 events.push_back((event, None));
7248 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
7249 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7250 events.pop_front().map(|(e, _)| e)
7254 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
7255 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
7259 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
7260 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
7263 /// When something which was blocking a channel from updating its [`ChannelMonitor`] (e.g. an
7264 /// [`Event`] being handled) completes, this should be called to restore the channel to normal
7265 /// operation. It will double-check that nothing *else* is also blocking the same channel from
7266 /// making progress and then let any blocked [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s fly.
7267 fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, mut completed_blocker: Option<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>) {
7269 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7270 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7271 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
7272 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
7274 if let Some(blocker) = completed_blocker.take() {
7275 // Only do this on the first iteration of the loop.
7276 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
7277 .get_mut(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
7279 blockers.retain(|iter| iter != &blocker);
7283 if self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
7284 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id) {
7285 // Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have anything else
7286 // blocking monitor updates for this channel. If we do, release the monitor
7287 // update(s) when those blockers complete.
7288 log_trace!(self.logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another channel's mon update needs to complete first",
7289 &channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
7293 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
7294 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7295 debug_assert_eq!(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
7296 if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
7297 log_debug!(self.logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
7298 channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
7299 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update,
7300 peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7301 if further_update_exists {
7302 // If there are more `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to process, restart at the
7307 log_trace!(self.logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
7308 channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
7313 log_debug!(self.logger,
7314 "Got a release post-RAA monitor update for peer {} but the channel is gone",
7315 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
7321 fn handle_post_event_actions(&self, actions: Vec<EventCompletionAction>) {
7322 for action in actions {
7324 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
7325 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id
7327 self.handle_monitor_update_release(counterparty_node_id, channel_funding_outpoint, None);
7333 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
7334 /// using the given event handler.
7336 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
7337 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
7341 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
7345 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7347 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7348 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7349 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7350 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7351 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7352 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7356 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
7357 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
7358 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
7359 /// is always placed next to each other.
7361 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
7362 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
7363 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
7364 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
7366 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
7367 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
7368 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
7369 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
7370 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
7371 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
7372 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
7374 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
7375 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
7376 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
7377 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7380 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
7381 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7383 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
7384 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7387 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
7388 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7389 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7390 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7391 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7392 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
7393 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
7397 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
7398 events.replace(pending_events);
7407 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7409 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7410 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7411 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7412 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7413 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7414 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7418 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
7420 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
7421 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
7422 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
7424 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
7428 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7430 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7431 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7432 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7433 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7434 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7435 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7439 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
7441 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
7442 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
7443 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
7444 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
7445 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
7448 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
7449 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
7452 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
7453 let _persistence_guard =
7454 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
7455 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
7456 let new_height = height - 1;
7458 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
7459 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
7460 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
7461 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
7462 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
7463 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
7466 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
7470 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7472 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7473 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7474 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7475 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7476 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7477 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7481 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
7482 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
7483 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
7484 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
7486 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
7487 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
7489 let _persistence_guard =
7490 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
7491 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
7492 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)
7493 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
7495 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7496 if height < last_best_block_height {
7497 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
7498 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
7502 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
7503 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
7504 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
7505 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
7507 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
7508 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
7510 let _persistence_guard =
7511 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
7512 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
7513 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
7515 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
7517 macro_rules! max_time {
7518 ($timestamp: expr) => {
7520 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
7521 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
7522 // having an explicit local time source.
7523 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
7524 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
7525 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
7526 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
7527 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
7533 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
7534 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7535 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
7536 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
7540 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
7541 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
7542 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
7543 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7544 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7545 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(|phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }) {
7546 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(block_hash)) = (chan.context.get_funding_txo(), chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
7547 res.push((funding_txo.txid, Some(block_hash)));
7554 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
7555 let _persistence_guard =
7556 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
7557 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
7558 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
7559 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
7560 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
7561 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
7562 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
7563 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
7568 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7570 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7571 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7572 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7573 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7574 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7575 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7579 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
7580 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
7582 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<SP>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
7583 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
7584 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
7585 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
7586 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
7588 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
7589 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
7591 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7592 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7593 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7594 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7595 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7596 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
7598 // Retain unfunded channels.
7599 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => true,
7600 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
7601 let res = f(channel);
7602 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
7603 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
7604 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
7605 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
7606 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.context.channel_id() }));
7608 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
7609 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
7610 if channel.context.is_usable() {
7611 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
7612 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
7613 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
7614 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7619 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", channel.context.channel_id());
7624 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7625 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
7628 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
7629 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
7630 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
7631 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7632 msg: announcement_sigs,
7634 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
7635 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
7636 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
7638 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
7639 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
7640 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
7645 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
7646 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
7647 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
7648 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
7649 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
7650 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
7651 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
7652 // is always consistent.
7653 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
7654 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
7655 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()),
7656 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
7657 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
7660 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
7661 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &channel.context);
7662 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
7663 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
7664 failed_channels.push(channel.context.force_shutdown(true));
7665 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
7666 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7670 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
7671 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel.context, reason);
7672 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
7673 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7674 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
7675 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
7676 data: reason_message,
7688 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
7689 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
7690 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
7691 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
7692 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
7693 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
7694 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
7695 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
7696 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
7697 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
7699 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
7700 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
7701 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
7705 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
7708 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7709 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
7710 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
7711 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
7712 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
7713 user_channel_id: Some(htlc.prev_user_channel_id),
7714 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
7715 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
7716 phantom_shared_secret: None,
7717 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
7720 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
7721 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
7722 _ => unreachable!(),
7724 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
7725 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
7726 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
7727 log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
7733 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
7735 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
7736 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
7740 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] may need to be persisted or
7741 /// may have events that need processing.
7743 /// In order to check if this [`ChannelManager`] needs persisting, call
7744 /// [`Self::get_and_clear_needs_persistence`].
7746 /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
7747 /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
7748 pub fn get_event_or_persistence_needed_future(&self) -> Future {
7749 self.event_persist_notifier.get_future()
7752 /// Returns true if this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
7753 pub fn get_and_clear_needs_persistence(&self) -> bool {
7754 self.needs_persist_flag.swap(false, Ordering::AcqRel)
7757 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
7758 pub fn get_event_or_persist_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
7759 self.event_persist_notifier.notify_pending()
7762 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
7763 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
7764 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
7765 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
7768 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7769 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7770 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
7771 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
7774 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7775 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7777 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
7778 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
7779 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
7780 pub fn invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
7781 provided_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
7784 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7785 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7786 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
7787 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
7790 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7791 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7792 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
7793 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
7796 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7797 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7798 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
7799 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
7803 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7804 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7806 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7807 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7808 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7809 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7810 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7811 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7815 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
7816 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
7817 // open_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
7818 // change to the contents.
7819 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
7820 let res = self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg);
7821 let persist = match &res {
7822 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => {
7823 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't close a new channel");
7824 NotifyOption::DoPersist
7826 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
7828 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
7833 fn handle_open_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2) {
7834 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7835 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7836 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7839 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
7840 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
7841 // accept_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
7842 // change to the contents.
7843 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
7844 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7845 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents
7849 fn handle_accept_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannelV2) {
7850 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7851 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7852 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7855 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
7856 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7857 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7860 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
7861 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7862 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7865 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
7866 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
7867 // channel_ready message - while the channel's state will change, any channel_ready message
7868 // will ultimately be re-sent on startup and the `ChannelMonitor` won't be updated so we
7869 // will not force-close the channel on startup.
7870 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
7871 let res = self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg);
7872 let persist = match &res {
7873 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
7874 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
7876 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
7881 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
7882 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7883 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7886 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
7887 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7888 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7891 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
7892 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
7893 // update_add_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
7894 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
7895 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
7896 let res = self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
7897 let persist = match &res {
7898 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
7899 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
7900 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
7902 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
7907 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
7908 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7909 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7912 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
7913 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
7914 // update_fail_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
7915 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
7916 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
7917 let res = self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
7918 let persist = match &res {
7919 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
7920 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
7921 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
7923 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
7928 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
7929 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
7930 // update_fail_malformed_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state
7931 // only the `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
7932 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
7933 let res = self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
7934 let persist = match &res {
7935 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
7936 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
7937 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
7939 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
7944 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
7945 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7946 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7949 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
7950 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7951 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7954 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
7955 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
7956 // update_fee message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
7957 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
7958 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
7959 let res = self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg);
7960 let persist = match &res {
7961 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
7962 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
7963 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
7965 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
7970 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
7971 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7972 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7975 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
7976 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
7977 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
7980 NotifyOption::DoPersist
7985 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
7986 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
7987 let res = self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg);
7988 let persist = match &res {
7989 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
7990 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
7991 Ok(persist) => *persist,
7993 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
7998 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
7999 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(
8000 self, || NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents);
8001 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
8002 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
8004 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
8005 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8006 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
8007 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8008 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8009 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8010 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
8011 let context = match phase {
8012 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
8013 if chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger).is_ok() {
8014 // We only retain funded channels that are not shutdown.
8019 // Unfunded channels will always be removed.
8020 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
8023 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
8027 // Clean up for removal.
8028 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
8029 self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
8030 failed_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false));
8033 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
8034 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
8035 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
8036 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
8038 // V1 Channel Establishment
8039 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
8040 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
8041 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
8042 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
8043 // V2 Channel Establishment
8044 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannelV2 { .. } => false,
8045 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 { .. } => false,
8046 // Common Channel Establishment
8047 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
8048 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
8049 // Interactive Transaction Construction
8050 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddInput { .. } => false,
8051 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddOutput { .. } => false,
8052 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveInput { .. } => false,
8053 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveOutput { .. } => false,
8054 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxComplete { .. } => false,
8055 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxSignatures { .. } => false,
8056 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxInitRbf { .. } => false,
8057 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAckRbf { .. } => false,
8058 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAbort { .. } => false,
8059 // Channel Operations
8060 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
8061 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
8062 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
8063 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
8064 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
8065 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
8067 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
8068 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
8069 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
8070 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
8071 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
8072 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
8073 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
8074 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
8075 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
8078 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
8079 peer_state.is_connected = false;
8080 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
8081 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
8084 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
8086 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
8088 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
8089 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
8093 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
8094 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
8095 log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8099 let mut res = Ok(());
8101 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8102 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
8103 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
8104 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
8105 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
8106 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
8107 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
8110 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
8111 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
8112 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
8113 if inbound_peer_limited {
8115 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
8117 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
8118 channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8119 inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8120 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
8121 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
8122 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8123 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
8124 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8128 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
8129 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
8130 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
8132 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
8133 if inbound_peer_limited &&
8134 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
8135 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
8138 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
8141 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
8142 peer_state.is_connected = true;
8147 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8149 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8150 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
8151 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8152 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8153 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8155 peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(|(_, phase)|
8156 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else {
8157 // Since unfunded channel maps are cleared upon disconnecting a peer, and they're not persisted
8158 // (so won't be recovered after a crash), they shouldn't exist here and we would never need to
8159 // worry about closing and removing them.
8160 debug_assert!(false);
8164 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
8165 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8166 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
8171 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
8172 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
8177 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
8178 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8180 match &msg.data as &str {
8181 "cannot co-op close channel w/ active htlcs"|
8182 "link failed to shutdown" =>
8184 // LND hasn't properly handled shutdown messages ever, and force-closes any time we
8185 // send one while HTLCs are still present. The issue is tracked at
8186 // https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/6039 and has had multiple patches
8187 // to fix it but none so far have managed to land upstream. The issue appears to be
8188 // very low priority for the LND team despite being marked "P1".
8189 // We're not going to bother handling this in a sensible way, instead simply
8190 // repeating the Shutdown message on repeat until morale improves.
8191 if !msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
8192 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8193 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
8194 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
8195 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
8196 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&msg.channel_id) {
8197 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_outbound_shutdown() {
8198 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
8199 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
8203 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
8204 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
8205 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
8206 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
8207 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
8208 data: "You appear to be exhibiting LND bug 6039, we'll keep sending you shutdown messages until you handle them correctly".to_owned()
8210 log_level: Level::Trace,
8220 if msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
8221 let channel_ids: Vec<ChannelId> = {
8222 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8223 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
8224 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
8225 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
8226 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8227 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
8228 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
8229 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
8230 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
8232 for channel_id in channel_ids {
8233 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
8234 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
8238 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
8239 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8240 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
8241 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
8242 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
8243 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8244 if let Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
8245 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
8246 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
8247 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
8255 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
8256 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
8260 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
8261 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
8264 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
8265 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
8268 fn get_genesis_hashes(&self) -> Option<Vec<ChainHash>> {
8269 Some(vec![ChainHash::from(&self.genesis_hash[..])])
8272 fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddInput) {
8273 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8274 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8275 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8278 fn handle_tx_add_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddOutput) {
8279 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8280 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8281 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8284 fn handle_tx_remove_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveInput) {
8285 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8286 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8287 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8290 fn handle_tx_remove_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveOutput) {
8291 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8292 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8293 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8296 fn handle_tx_complete(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxComplete) {
8297 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8298 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8299 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8302 fn handle_tx_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxSignatures) {
8303 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8304 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8305 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8308 fn handle_tx_init_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxInitRbf) {
8309 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8310 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8311 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8314 fn handle_tx_ack_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAckRbf) {
8315 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8316 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8317 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8320 fn handle_tx_abort(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAbort) {
8321 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8322 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8323 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8327 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
8328 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8329 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
8330 let mut node_features = provided_init_features(config).to_context();
8331 node_features.set_keysend_optional();
8335 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
8336 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8338 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
8339 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
8340 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
8341 pub(crate) fn provided_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
8342 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
8345 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
8346 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8347 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
8348 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
8351 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
8352 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8353 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
8354 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
8357 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
8358 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8359 pub fn provided_init_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
8360 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
8361 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
8362 // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
8363 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
8364 features.set_data_loss_protect_required();
8365 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
8366 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
8367 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
8368 features.set_payment_secret_required();
8369 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
8370 features.set_wumbo_optional();
8371 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
8372 features.set_channel_type_optional();
8373 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
8374 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
8375 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
8376 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
8381 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
8382 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
8384 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
8385 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
8386 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
8387 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
8390 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
8391 (2, node_id, required),
8392 (4, features, required),
8393 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
8394 (8, forwarding_info, option),
8395 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
8396 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
8399 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
8400 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8401 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
8402 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
8403 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
8404 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
8405 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
8406 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
8407 (2, self.channel_id, required),
8408 (3, self.channel_type, option),
8409 (4, self.counterparty, required),
8410 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
8411 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
8412 (7, self.config, option),
8413 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
8414 (9, self.confirmations, option),
8415 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
8416 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
8417 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
8418 (16, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required), // Forwards compatibility for removed balance_msat field.
8419 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
8420 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required),
8421 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
8422 (21, self.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, required),
8423 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
8424 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
8425 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
8426 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
8427 (30, self.is_usable, required),
8428 (32, self.is_public, required),
8429 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
8430 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
8431 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
8432 (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
8433 (41, self.channel_shutdown_state, option),
8439 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
8440 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8441 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
8442 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
8443 (2, channel_id, required),
8444 (3, channel_type, option),
8445 (4, counterparty, required),
8446 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
8447 (6, funding_txo, option),
8448 (7, config, option),
8449 (8, short_channel_id, option),
8450 (9, confirmations, option),
8451 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
8452 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
8453 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
8454 (16, _balance_msat, option), // Backwards compatibility for removed balance_msat field.
8455 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
8456 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
8457 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
8458 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
8459 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
8460 (21, next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, (default_value, 0)),
8461 (22, confirmations_required, option),
8462 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
8463 (26, is_outbound, required),
8464 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
8465 (30, is_usable, required),
8466 (32, is_public, required),
8467 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
8468 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
8469 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
8470 (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
8471 (41, channel_shutdown_state, option),
8474 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
8475 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
8476 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
8477 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
8478 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
8480 let _balance_msat: Option<u64> = _balance_msat;
8484 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
8486 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
8487 outbound_scid_alias,
8491 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
8492 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
8494 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
8495 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
8496 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat.0.unwrap(),
8497 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
8498 confirmations_required,
8500 force_close_spend_delay,
8501 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
8502 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
8503 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
8504 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
8505 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
8506 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
8507 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
8508 channel_shutdown_state,
8513 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
8514 (2, channels, required_vec),
8515 (4, phantom_scid, required),
8516 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
8519 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
8521 (0, onion_packet, required),
8522 (2, short_channel_id, required),
8525 (0, payment_data, required),
8526 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
8527 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
8528 (3, payment_metadata, option),
8529 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
8531 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
8532 (0, payment_preimage, required),
8533 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
8534 (3, payment_metadata, option),
8535 (4, payment_data, option), // Added in 0.0.116
8536 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
8540 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
8541 (0, routing, required),
8542 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
8543 (4, payment_hash, required),
8544 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
8545 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
8546 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
8547 (10, skimmed_fee_msat, option),
8551 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
8552 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8554 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
8556 channel_id.write(writer)?;
8557 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8558 reason.write(writer)?;
8560 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
8561 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
8564 channel_id.write(writer)?;
8565 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8566 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
8567 failure_code.write(writer)?;
8574 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
8575 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8576 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8579 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
8580 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8581 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8582 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
8586 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
8587 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8588 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8589 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
8590 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
8593 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
8594 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
8595 // messages contained in the variants.
8596 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
8597 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
8598 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
8600 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
8601 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
8602 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
8603 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
8604 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
8607 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
8608 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
8609 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
8610 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
8611 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
8613 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
8618 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
8623 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
8624 (0, short_channel_id, required),
8625 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
8626 (2, outpoint, required),
8627 (4, htlc_id, required),
8628 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required),
8629 (7, user_channel_id, option),
8632 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
8633 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8634 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
8635 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
8636 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
8638 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
8639 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
8640 (1, self.total_msat, required),
8641 (2, self.value, required),
8642 (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
8643 (4, payment_data, option),
8644 (5, self.total_value_received, option),
8645 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
8646 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
8647 (10, self.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
8653 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
8654 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8655 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
8656 (0, prev_hop, required),
8657 (1, total_msat, option),
8658 (2, value_ser, required),
8659 (3, sender_intended_value, option),
8660 (4, payment_data_opt, option),
8661 (5, total_value_received, option),
8662 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
8663 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
8664 (10, counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
8666 let payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = payment_data_opt;
8667 let value = value_ser.0.unwrap();
8668 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
8670 if payment_data.is_some() {
8671 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
8673 if total_msat.is_none() {
8674 total_msat = Some(value);
8676 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
8679 if total_msat.is_none() {
8680 if payment_data.is_none() {
8681 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
8683 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
8685 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
8689 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
8692 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
8693 total_value_received,
8694 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
8696 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry.0.unwrap(),
8697 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
8702 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
8703 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8704 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8707 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
8708 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
8709 let mut path_hops = Vec::new();
8710 let mut payment_id = None;
8711 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
8712 let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
8713 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
8714 (0, session_priv, required),
8715 (1, payment_id, option),
8716 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
8717 (4, path_hops, required_vec),
8718 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
8719 (6, blinded_tail, option),
8721 if payment_id.is_none() {
8722 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
8724 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
8726 let path = Path { hops: path_hops, blinded_tail };
8727 if path.hops.len() == 0 {
8728 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8730 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
8731 if let Payee::Clear { ref mut final_cltv_expiry_delta, .. } = params.payee {
8732 if final_cltv_expiry_delta == &0 {
8733 *final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.final_cltv_expiry_delta().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8737 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
8738 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
8739 first_hop_htlc_msat,
8741 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
8744 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
8745 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
8750 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
8751 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
8753 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
8755 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
8756 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
8757 (0, session_priv, required),
8758 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
8759 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
8760 // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
8761 (4, path.hops, required_vec),
8762 (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
8763 (6, path.blinded_tail, option),
8766 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
8768 field.write(writer)?;
8775 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
8776 (0, forward_info, required),
8777 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
8778 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
8779 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
8780 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
8783 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
8785 (0, htlc_id, required),
8786 (2, err_packet, required),
8791 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
8792 (0, payment_secret, required),
8793 (2, expiry_time, required),
8794 (4, user_payment_id, required),
8795 (6, payment_preimage, required),
8796 (8, min_value_msat, required),
8799 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8801 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8802 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8803 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8804 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8805 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8806 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8810 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8811 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
8813 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
8815 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
8817 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
8818 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
8819 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
8822 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
8824 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8825 let mut number_of_funded_channels = 0;
8826 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8827 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8828 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8829 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
8830 serializable_peer_count += 1;
8833 number_of_funded_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(
8834 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { chan.context.is_funding_broadcast() } else { false }
8838 (number_of_funded_channels as u64).write(writer)?;
8840 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8841 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8842 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8843 for channel in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter_map(
8844 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = phase {
8845 if channel.context.is_funding_broadcast() { Some(channel) } else { None }
8848 channel.write(writer)?;
8854 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
8855 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8856 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
8857 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
8858 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8859 for forward in pending_forwards {
8860 forward.write(writer)?;
8865 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
8867 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
8868 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
8869 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
8871 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
8872 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
8873 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8874 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
8875 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
8876 (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8877 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
8878 htlc.write(writer)?;
8880 htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
8881 htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
8884 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
8885 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
8886 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8887 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
8888 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
8889 // per_peer_state lock at all.
8890 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
8893 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
8894 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
8895 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
8896 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
8897 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
8899 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
8900 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
8901 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
8902 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
8903 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
8904 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
8905 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
8910 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8911 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.115 don't support post-event actions, thus if there's no
8912 // actions at all, skip writing the required TLV. Otherwise, pre-0.0.115 versions will
8913 // refuse to read the new ChannelManager.
8914 let events_not_backwards_compatible = events.iter().any(|(_, action)| action.is_some());
8915 if events_not_backwards_compatible {
8916 // If we're gonna write a even TLV that will overwrite our events anyway we might as
8917 // well save the space and not write any events here.
8918 0u64.write(writer)?;
8920 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8921 for (event, _) in events.iter() {
8922 event.write(writer)?;
8926 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote the `pending_background_events`
8927 // `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here, however there was never a reason to do so -
8928 // the closing monitor updates were always effectively replayed on startup (either directly
8929 // by calling `broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn` on a `ChannelMonitor` during
8930 // deserialization or, in 0.0.115, by regenerating the monitor update itself).
8931 0u64.write(writer)?;
8933 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
8934 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
8935 // likely to be identical.
8936 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
8937 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
8939 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8940 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
8941 hash.write(writer)?;
8942 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
8945 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
8946 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
8947 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
8948 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
8949 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
8952 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
8953 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
8955 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
8956 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
8957 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
8958 session_priv.write(writer)?;
8961 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {},
8962 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {},
8963 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
8964 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
8968 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
8969 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
8970 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
8972 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
8973 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
8974 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
8980 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
8981 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
8982 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
8983 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
8986 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
8987 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
8988 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
8989 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
8990 pending_claiming_payments = None;
8993 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(&PublicKey, &OutPoint), &Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
8994 for ((counterparty_id, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
8995 for (funding_outpoint, updates) in peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.iter() {
8996 if !updates.is_empty() {
8997 if in_flight_monitor_updates.is_none() { in_flight_monitor_updates = Some(HashMap::new()); }
8998 in_flight_monitor_updates.as_mut().unwrap().insert((counterparty_id, funding_outpoint), updates);
9003 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9004 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
9005 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
9006 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
9007 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
9008 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
9009 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
9010 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
9011 (8, if events_not_backwards_compatible { Some(&*events) } else { None }, option),
9012 (9, htlc_purposes, required_vec),
9013 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
9014 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
9015 (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
9022 impl Writeable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
9023 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9024 (self.len() as u64).write(w)?;
9025 for (event, action) in self.iter() {
9028 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
9029 // Events are MaybeReadable, in some cases indicating that they shouldn't actually
9030 // be persisted and are regenerated on restart. However, if such an event has a
9031 // post-event-handling action we'll write nothing for the event and would have to
9032 // either forget the action or fail on deserialization (which we do below). Thus,
9033 // check that the event is sane here.
9034 let event_encoded = event.encode();
9035 let event_read: Option<Event> =
9036 MaybeReadable::read(&mut &event_encoded[..]).unwrap();
9037 if action.is_some() { assert!(event_read.is_some()); }
9043 impl Readable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
9044 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9045 let len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9046 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 1024 * 16;
9047 let mut events: Self = VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(
9048 MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>() as u64,
9051 let ev_opt = MaybeReadable::read(reader)?;
9052 let action = Readable::read(reader)?;
9053 if let Some(ev) = ev_opt {
9054 events.push_back((ev, action));
9055 } else if action.is_some() {
9056 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9063 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(ChannelShutdownState,
9064 (0, NotShuttingDown) => {},
9065 (2, ShutdownInitiated) => {},
9066 (4, ResolvingHTLCs) => {},
9067 (6, NegotiatingClosingFee) => {},
9068 (8, ShutdownComplete) => {}, ;
9071 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
9073 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
9075 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
9076 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
9077 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
9078 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
9079 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
9080 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
9081 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
9082 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
9083 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
9084 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
9085 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
9086 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
9087 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
9089 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
9090 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
9092 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
9093 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
9095 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
9096 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
9097 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
9098 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
9099 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
9100 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
9102 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
9103 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9105 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
9106 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9107 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9108 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9109 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9110 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9114 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
9115 pub entropy_source: ES,
9117 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
9118 pub node_signer: NS,
9120 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
9121 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
9123 pub signer_provider: SP,
9125 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
9127 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
9128 pub fee_estimator: F,
9129 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
9131 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
9132 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
9133 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
9134 pub chain_monitor: M,
9136 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
9137 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
9138 /// force-closed during deserialization.
9139 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
9140 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
9141 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
9143 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
9145 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
9146 /// deserialization.
9148 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
9149 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
9150 pub default_config: UserConfig,
9152 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
9153 /// value.context.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
9155 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
9156 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
9157 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
9158 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
9160 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
9163 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
9164 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>,
9167 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9168 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9170 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
9171 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9172 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9173 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9174 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9175 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9179 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
9180 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
9181 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
9182 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
9183 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>) -> Self {
9185 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
9186 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
9191 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
9192 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
9193 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9194 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
9196 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
9197 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9198 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9199 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9200 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9201 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9205 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9206 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
9207 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
9211 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9212 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
9214 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
9215 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9216 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9217 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9218 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9219 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9223 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9224 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
9226 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
9227 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9228 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
9230 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
9232 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9233 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
9234 let mut funded_peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
9235 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
9236 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
9237 let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
9238 let mut close_background_events = Vec::new();
9239 for _ in 0..channel_count {
9240 let mut channel: Channel<SP> = Channel::read(reader, (
9241 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
9243 let funding_txo = channel.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9244 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
9245 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
9246 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
9247 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
9248 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
9249 channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
9250 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
9251 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
9252 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
9253 if channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
9254 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
9255 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
9257 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() {
9258 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at holder commitment number {} but the ChannelManager is at holder commitment number {}.",
9259 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number());
9261 if channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() {
9262 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at revoked counterparty transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at revoked counterparty transaction number {}.",
9263 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
9265 if channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() {
9266 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at counterparty commitment transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at counterparty commitment transaction number {}.",
9267 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
9269 let (monitor_update, mut new_failed_htlcs, batch_funding_txid) = channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
9270 if batch_funding_txid.is_some() {
9271 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9273 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = monitor_update {
9274 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
9275 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
9278 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
9279 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
9280 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
9281 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
9282 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager,
9283 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
9284 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
9286 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
9287 let mut found_htlc = false;
9288 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
9289 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
9292 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
9293 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
9294 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
9295 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
9296 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
9297 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
9298 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
9299 log_info!(args.logger,
9300 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
9301 &channel.context.channel_id(), &payment_hash);
9302 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
9306 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {} at update_id {} against monitor at update id {}",
9307 &channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
9308 monitor.get_latest_update_id());
9309 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
9310 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
9312 if channel.context.is_funding_broadcast() {
9313 id_to_peer.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
9315 match funded_peer_channels.entry(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
9316 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
9317 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
9318 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
9320 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
9321 let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
9322 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
9323 entry.insert(by_id_map);
9327 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
9328 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
9329 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
9330 // safely discard the channel.
9331 let _ = channel.context.force_shutdown(false);
9332 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
9333 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
9334 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
9335 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
9336 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
9337 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
9340 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", &channel.context.channel_id());
9341 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
9342 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
9343 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
9344 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
9345 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9349 for (funding_txo, _) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
9350 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
9351 log_info!(args.logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
9352 &funding_txo.to_channel_id());
9353 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
9354 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
9355 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
9357 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, monitor_update)));
9361 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
9362 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9363 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
9364 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
9365 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
9366 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9367 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
9368 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
9369 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
9371 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
9374 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9375 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
9376 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
9377 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
9378 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9379 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
9380 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
9381 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
9383 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
9386 let peer_state_from_chans = |channel_by_id| {
9389 inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
9390 latest_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
9391 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
9392 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
9393 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
9394 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
9395 is_connected: false,
9399 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9400 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>)>()));
9401 for _ in 0..peer_count {
9402 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
9403 let peer_chans = funded_peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new());
9404 let mut peer_state = peer_state_from_chans(peer_chans);
9405 peer_state.latest_features = Readable::read(reader)?;
9406 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
9409 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9410 let mut pending_events_read: VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> =
9411 VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>()));
9412 for _ in 0..event_count {
9413 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
9414 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push_back((event, None)),
9419 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9420 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
9421 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
9423 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote pending `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here,
9424 // however we really don't (and never did) need them - we regenerate all
9425 // on-startup monitor updates.
9426 let _: OutPoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
9427 let _: ChannelMonitorUpdate = Readable::read(reader)?;
9429 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
9433 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
9434 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9436 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9437 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
9438 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
9439 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
9440 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9444 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9445 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
9446 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
9447 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
9448 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
9449 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
9450 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
9452 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
9453 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9457 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
9458 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
9459 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
9460 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
9461 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
9462 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
9463 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
9464 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
9465 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
9466 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
9467 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer: Option<Vec<(_, BTreeMap<_, Vec<_>>)>> = Some(Vec::new());
9468 let mut events_override = None;
9469 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(PublicKey, OutPoint), Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
9470 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9471 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
9472 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
9473 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
9474 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
9475 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
9476 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
9477 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
9478 (8, events_override, option),
9479 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, optional_vec),
9480 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
9481 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
9482 (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
9484 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
9485 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
9488 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
9489 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
9492 if let Some(events) = events_override {
9493 pending_events_read = events;
9496 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
9497 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
9500 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
9501 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
9502 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
9503 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
9504 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
9505 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
9507 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
9509 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
9510 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
9511 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
9514 // We have to replay (or skip, if they were completed after we wrote the `ChannelManager`)
9515 // each `ChannelMonitorUpdate` in `in_flight_monitor_updates`. After doing so, we have to
9516 // check that each channel we have isn't newer than the latest `ChannelMonitorUpdate`(s) we
9517 // replayed, and for each monitor update we have to replay we have to ensure there's a
9518 // `ChannelMonitor` for it.
9520 // In order to do so we first walk all of our live channels (so that we can check their
9521 // state immediately after doing the update replays, when we have the `update_id`s
9522 // available) and then walk any remaining in-flight updates.
9524 // Because the actual handling of the in-flight updates is the same, it's macro'ized here:
9525 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
9526 macro_rules! handle_in_flight_updates {
9527 ($counterparty_node_id: expr, $chan_in_flight_upds: expr, $funding_txo: expr,
9528 $monitor: expr, $peer_state: expr, $channel_info_log: expr
9530 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = 0;
9531 $chan_in_flight_upds.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > $monitor.get_latest_update_id());
9532 for update in $chan_in_flight_upds.iter() {
9533 log_trace!(args.logger, "Replaying ChannelMonitorUpdate {} for {}channel {}",
9534 update.update_id, $channel_info_log, &$funding_txo.to_channel_id());
9535 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id, update.update_id);
9536 pending_background_events.push(
9537 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
9538 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
9539 funding_txo: $funding_txo,
9540 update: update.clone(),
9543 if $chan_in_flight_upds.is_empty() {
9544 // We had some updates to apply, but it turns out they had completed before we
9545 // were serialized, we just weren't notified of that. Thus, we may have to run
9546 // the completion actions for any monitor updates, but otherwise are done.
9547 pending_background_events.push(
9548 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
9549 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
9550 channel_id: $funding_txo.to_channel_id(),
9553 if $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.insert($funding_txo, $chan_in_flight_upds).is_some() {
9554 log_error!(args.logger, "Duplicate in-flight monitor update set for the same channel!");
9555 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9557 max_in_flight_update_id
9561 for (counterparty_id, peer_state_mtx) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
9562 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
9563 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9564 for phase in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
9565 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
9566 // Channels that were persisted have to be funded, otherwise they should have been
9568 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9569 let monitor = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo)
9570 .expect("We already checked for monitor presence when loading channels");
9571 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = monitor.get_latest_update_id();
9572 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = &mut in_flight_monitor_updates {
9573 if let Some(mut chan_in_flight_upds) = in_flight_upds.remove(&(*counterparty_id, funding_txo)) {
9574 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id,
9575 handle_in_flight_updates!(*counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_upds,
9576 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, ""));
9579 if chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id() > max_in_flight_update_id {
9580 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
9581 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
9582 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} with update_id through {} in-flight",
9583 chan.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), max_in_flight_update_id);
9584 log_error!(args.logger, " but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.", chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id());
9585 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
9586 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
9587 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
9588 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
9589 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9592 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
9593 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
9594 debug_assert!(false);
9595 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9600 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = in_flight_monitor_updates {
9601 for ((counterparty_id, funding_txo), mut chan_in_flight_updates) in in_flight_upds {
9602 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
9603 // Now that we've removed all the in-flight monitor updates for channels that are
9604 // still open, we need to replay any monitor updates that are for closed channels,
9605 // creating the neccessary peer_state entries as we go.
9606 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_id).or_insert_with(|| {
9607 Mutex::new(peer_state_from_chans(HashMap::new()))
9609 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9610 handle_in_flight_updates!(counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_updates,
9611 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, "closed ");
9613 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is missing even though we have in-flight updates for it! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
9614 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is missing.",
9615 &funding_txo.to_channel_id());
9616 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
9617 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
9618 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
9619 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
9620 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9625 // Note that we have to do the above replays before we push new monitor updates.
9626 pending_background_events.append(&mut close_background_events);
9628 // If there's any preimages for forwarded HTLCs hanging around in ChannelMonitors we
9629 // should ensure we try them again on the inbound edge. We put them here and do so after we
9630 // have a fully-constructed `ChannelManager` at the end.
9631 let mut pending_claims_to_replay = Vec::new();
9634 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
9635 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
9636 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
9637 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
9638 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
9639 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
9640 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
9642 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
9643 let counterparty_opt = id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
9644 if counterparty_opt.is_none() {
9645 for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
9646 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
9647 if path.hops.is_empty() {
9648 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
9649 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9652 let path_amt = path.final_value_msat();
9653 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
9654 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
9655 match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
9656 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
9657 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
9658 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
9659 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), &htlc.payment_hash);
9661 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
9662 let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
9663 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
9664 retry_strategy: None,
9665 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
9666 payment_params: None,
9667 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
9668 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
9669 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
9670 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
9671 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
9672 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(), // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
9673 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
9674 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
9675 total_msat: path_amt,
9676 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
9677 remaining_max_total_routing_fee_msat: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
9679 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
9680 path_amt, &htlc.payment_hash, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
9685 for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
9687 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
9688 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
9689 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
9690 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
9692 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
9693 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
9694 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
9695 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
9696 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
9697 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
9698 forwards.retain(|forward| {
9699 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
9700 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
9701 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
9702 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
9707 !forwards.is_empty()
9709 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
9710 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
9711 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
9712 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
9713 pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
9714 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
9715 intercepted_id != ev_id
9722 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
9723 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
9724 let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
9725 // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
9726 // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
9727 // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
9728 // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
9729 // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
9730 // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
9731 // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
9732 // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
9734 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
9735 channel_funding_outpoint: monitor.get_funding_txo().0,
9736 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
9738 pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv,
9739 path, false, compl_action, &pending_events, &args.logger);
9740 pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
9747 // Whether the downstream channel was closed or not, try to re-apply any payment
9748 // preimages from it which may be needed in upstream channels for forwarded
9750 let outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter = monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs()
9752 .filter_map(|(htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt))| {
9753 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(_) = htlc_source {
9754 if let Some(payment_preimage) = preimage_opt {
9755 Some((htlc_source, payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat,
9756 // Check if `counterparty_opt.is_none()` to see if the
9757 // downstream chan is closed (because we don't have a
9758 // channel_id -> peer map entry).
9759 counterparty_opt.is_none(),
9760 counterparty_opt.cloned().or(monitor.get_counterparty_node_id()),
9761 monitor.get_funding_txo().0))
9764 // If it was an outbound payment, we've handled it above - if a preimage
9765 // came in and we persisted the `ChannelManager` we either handled it and
9766 // are good to go or the channel force-closed - we don't have to handle the
9767 // channel still live case here.
9771 for tuple in outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter {
9772 pending_claims_to_replay.push(tuple);
9777 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
9778 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
9779 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
9780 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
9781 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
9782 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
9783 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
9784 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
9788 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
9789 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
9791 let mut claimable_payments = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
9792 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
9793 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
9794 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9796 if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
9797 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
9798 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9800 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
9801 purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
9803 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
9804 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
9806 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
9809 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
9810 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
9811 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
9813 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
9817 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
9818 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
9819 for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
9820 if htlcs.is_empty() {
9821 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9823 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
9824 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
9825 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
9826 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
9827 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
9828 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
9829 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
9830 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
9832 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", &payment_hash);
9833 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9837 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
9839 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
9841 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
9842 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
9844 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
9845 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
9850 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9851 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
9853 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
9855 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9857 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
9858 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
9859 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
9860 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9864 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
9865 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
9866 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9867 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9868 for (chan_id, phase) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
9869 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
9870 if chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
9871 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
9873 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
9874 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
9875 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
9877 chan.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
9878 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias()) {
9879 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
9880 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
9881 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
9882 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9884 if chan.context.is_usable() {
9885 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
9886 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
9887 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
9888 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
9889 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9893 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
9894 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
9895 debug_assert!(false);
9896 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9901 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
9903 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
9904 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
9905 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
9906 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", &payment_hash);
9907 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
9908 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
9909 let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
9910 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
9911 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
9912 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
9913 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
9915 for claimable_htlc in &payment.htlcs {
9916 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
9918 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
9919 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
9920 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
9921 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
9923 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
9924 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
9925 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
9926 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
9928 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
9929 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
9930 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
9931 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
9933 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
9934 if let Some(peer_node_id) = id_to_peer.get(&previous_channel_id){
9935 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
9936 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9937 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9938 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(channel)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
9939 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
9942 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
9943 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
9946 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
9949 purpose: payment.purpose,
9950 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
9951 htlcs: payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect(),
9952 sender_intended_total_msat: payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat),
9958 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
9959 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
9960 for (_, actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions.iter() {
9961 for action in actions.iter() {
9962 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
9963 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
9964 Some((blocked_node_id, blocked_channel_outpoint, blocking_action)), ..
9966 if let Some(blocked_peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&blocked_node_id) {
9967 blocked_peer_state.lock().unwrap().actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
9968 .entry(blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id())
9969 .or_insert_with(Vec::new).push(blocking_action.clone());
9971 // If the channel we were blocking has closed, we don't need to
9972 // worry about it - the blocked monitor update should never have
9973 // been released from the `Channel` object so it can't have
9974 // completed, and if the channel closed there's no reason to bother
9980 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
9982 log_error!(args.logger, "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
9983 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9987 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
9989 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
9990 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
9991 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
9992 router: args.router,
9994 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
9996 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
9997 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
9998 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
9999 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
10001 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
10002 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
10003 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
10004 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
10005 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
10006 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
10008 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
10010 our_network_pubkey,
10013 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
10015 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
10017 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
10018 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
10019 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
10020 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
10021 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
10023 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
10024 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
10026 funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
10028 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
10029 node_signer: args.node_signer,
10030 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
10032 logger: args.logger,
10033 default_configuration: args.default_config,
10036 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
10037 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
10038 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
10039 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
10040 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
10043 for (source, preimage, downstream_value, downstream_closed, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding) in pending_claims_to_replay {
10044 // We use `downstream_closed` in place of `from_onchain` here just as a guess - we
10045 // don't remember in the `ChannelMonitor` where we got a preimage from, but if the
10046 // channel is closed we just assume that it probably came from an on-chain claim.
10047 channel_manager.claim_funds_internal(source, preimage, Some(downstream_value),
10048 downstream_closed, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding);
10051 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
10052 //connection or two.
10054 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
10060 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
10061 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
10062 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
10063 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
10064 use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
10065 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
10066 use crate::ln::ChannelId;
10067 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
10068 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
10069 use crate::ln::msgs::{self, ErrorAction};
10070 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
10071 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
10072 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
10073 use crate::util::test_utils;
10074 use crate::util::config::{ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
10075 use crate::sign::EntropySource;
10078 fn test_notify_limits() {
10079 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
10080 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
10081 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
10082 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
10083 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
10084 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10086 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
10087 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
10088 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10089 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10090 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10092 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
10094 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
10095 // to connect messages with new values
10096 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
10097 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
10098 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
10099 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
10100 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
10101 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
10103 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
10104 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10105 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10106 // ... but the last node should not.
10107 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10108 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
10109 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10110 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10112 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
10113 // about the channel.
10114 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
10115 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
10116 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10118 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
10120 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
10121 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
10122 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
10123 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
10124 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10125 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10127 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
10128 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
10129 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
10131 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
10132 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
10133 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
10134 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
10135 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
10136 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
10138 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
10139 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
10140 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
10141 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
10142 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10143 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10144 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
10145 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
10147 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
10148 // the channel info has updated.
10149 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
10150 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
10151 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10152 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10153 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
10154 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
10158 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
10159 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
10161 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10162 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10163 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10164 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10165 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
10167 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
10168 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
10169 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
10170 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
10172 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
10173 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
10174 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
10175 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
10176 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
10177 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
10178 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
10179 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
10180 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10181 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10182 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10183 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
10185 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
10186 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
10187 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
10188 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10189 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10190 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10191 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
10192 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
10193 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10194 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
10195 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
10196 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
10197 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
10198 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10199 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10200 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
10201 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
10202 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
10203 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
10204 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
10205 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
10206 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
10207 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
10209 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
10210 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
10211 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
10212 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10213 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10214 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10215 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
10217 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
10218 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
10219 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
10220 // lightning messages manually.
10221 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
10222 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
10223 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
10225 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10226 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
10227 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
10228 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
10229 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10230 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10231 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
10232 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10233 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10234 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
10235 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10236 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10237 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
10238 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
10239 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10240 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10241 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
10242 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10243 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10244 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
10245 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10246 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
10247 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10248 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10249 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
10250 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10252 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
10253 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
10254 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10255 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
10257 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
10258 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
10259 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
10260 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
10262 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10265 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
10266 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
10267 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
10268 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
10270 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10275 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
10276 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(false);
10277 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(true);
10280 fn do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(accept_mpp_keysend: bool) {
10281 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
10282 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
10283 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
10284 // fails as expected.
10285 // (3): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend
10286 // payment fails as expected. When `accept_mpp_keysend` is false, this tests that we
10287 // reject MPP keysend payments, since in this case where the payment has no payment
10288 // secret, a keysend payment with a duplicate hash is basically an MPP keysend. If
10289 // `accept_mpp_keysend` is true, this tests that we only accept MPP keysends with
10290 // payment secrets and reject otherwise.
10291 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10292 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10293 let mut mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
10294 mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = accept_mpp_keysend;
10295 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
10296 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10297 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
10298 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
10299 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
10301 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
10302 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
10303 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
10305 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
10306 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
10307 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(),
10308 TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false), 100_000);
10309 let route = find_route(
10310 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
10311 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
10313 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
10314 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
10315 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10316 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10317 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10318 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
10319 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
10320 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10321 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
10322 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
10323 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
10324 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
10325 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
10326 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
10327 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10328 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10329 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
10330 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
10331 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
10332 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
10333 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
10334 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
10335 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
10336 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
10338 // Finally, claim the original payment.
10339 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
10341 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
10342 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
10343 let route = find_route(
10344 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
10345 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
10347 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
10348 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
10349 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10350 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10351 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10352 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
10353 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
10354 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
10356 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
10357 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
10358 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
10359 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
10360 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10361 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10362 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10363 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
10364 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
10365 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10366 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
10367 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
10368 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
10369 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
10370 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10371 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10372 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
10373 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
10374 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
10375 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
10376 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
10377 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
10378 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
10379 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
10381 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
10382 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
10384 // To start (3), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
10385 let payment_id_1 = PaymentId([44; 32]);
10386 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
10387 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_1).unwrap();
10388 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10389 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10390 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10391 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
10392 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
10393 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
10395 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
10396 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
10397 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
10400 let route = find_route(
10401 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
10402 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
10404 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId([45; 32]);
10405 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
10406 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_2).unwrap();
10407 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10408 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10409 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10410 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
10411 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
10412 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10413 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
10414 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
10415 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
10416 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
10417 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10418 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10419 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
10420 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
10421 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
10422 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
10423 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
10424 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
10425 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
10426 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
10428 // Finally, claim the original payment.
10429 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
10433 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
10434 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
10435 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
10436 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10437 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10438 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10439 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10441 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
10442 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
10444 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
10445 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
10446 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
10447 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
10448 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
10449 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
10450 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
10451 let route = find_route(
10452 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
10453 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
10456 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
10457 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
10458 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
10459 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
10460 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
10461 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
10462 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10464 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10465 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
10466 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
10467 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
10468 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
10469 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
10470 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
10472 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
10476 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
10477 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment
10478 // secret when we don't support MPP keysend.
10479 let mut reject_mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
10480 reject_mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = false;
10481 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10482 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10483 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(reject_mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
10484 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10486 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
10487 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
10489 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
10490 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
10491 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
10492 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
10493 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
10494 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
10495 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
10496 let route = find_route(
10497 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
10498 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
10501 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
10502 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
10503 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
10504 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
10505 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
10506 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
10507 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
10508 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
10509 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10511 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10512 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
10513 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
10514 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
10515 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
10516 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
10517 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
10519 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
10523 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
10524 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
10525 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
10526 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
10527 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10529 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
10530 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
10531 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
10532 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
10534 // Marshall an MPP route.
10535 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
10536 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
10537 route.paths.push(path);
10538 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
10539 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
10540 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
10541 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
10542 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
10543 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
10545 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
10546 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
10548 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
10549 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
10551 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
10556 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
10557 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10558 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10559 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10560 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10562 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
10564 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10565 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10567 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
10568 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
10569 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10570 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
10573 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
10574 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
10575 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
10576 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
10577 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
10578 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
10581 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10584 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
10585 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
10590 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
10591 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
10592 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10593 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10594 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10595 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10597 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
10598 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
10600 total_msat: 100_000,
10603 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
10604 // payment verification fails as expected.
10605 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
10606 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
10607 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
10608 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
10610 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
10614 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
10615 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
10619 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
10620 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
10621 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
10622 // the channel is successfully closed.
10623 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10624 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10625 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10626 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10628 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
10629 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10630 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
10631 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10632 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
10634 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
10635 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes(tx.txid().into_inner());
10637 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
10638 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
10639 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
10640 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
10643 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
10645 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
10646 // as it has the funding transaction.
10647 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10648 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
10649 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
10652 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
10654 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10656 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
10658 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10659 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
10660 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
10662 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10665 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
10666 // as it has the funding transaction.
10667 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10668 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
10669 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
10671 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10672 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10673 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
10674 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10675 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10676 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
10677 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
10678 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
10680 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
10681 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
10682 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10683 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
10685 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10686 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
10688 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
10689 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
10690 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
10691 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
10692 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10693 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
10694 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
10698 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
10699 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
10700 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
10701 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
10702 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10703 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
10704 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
10707 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
10709 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
10710 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
10711 // closing transaction).
10712 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
10713 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
10714 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
10716 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
10717 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
10718 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10719 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
10720 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
10723 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10725 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
10727 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
10728 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
10729 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
10731 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10733 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
10734 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
10737 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
10738 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
10739 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
10742 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
10743 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
10744 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
10747 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
10749 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
10750 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
10752 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
10753 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
10755 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
10756 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
10761 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
10762 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
10763 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
10764 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
10765 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10766 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
10767 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
10768 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
10771 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
10772 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
10773 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
10775 // Test the API functions.
10776 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None), unkown_public_key);
10778 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
10780 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
10782 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
10784 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
10786 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
10788 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
10792 fn test_connection_limiting() {
10793 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
10794 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10795 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10796 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10797 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10799 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
10801 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10802 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10804 let mut funding_tx = None;
10805 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
10806 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10807 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10810 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
10811 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
10812 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
10813 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
10814 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10816 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
10817 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10818 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10820 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10822 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
10823 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10824 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10826 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
10829 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
10830 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
10831 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10832 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
10833 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
10835 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
10836 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
10838 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
10839 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
10840 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
10841 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
10842 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
10843 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
10844 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10847 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
10848 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
10849 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
10850 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10851 }, true).unwrap_err();
10853 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
10854 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
10855 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10856 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10857 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
10858 for ev in chan_closed_events {
10859 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
10861 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
10862 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10864 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
10865 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10866 }, true).unwrap_err();
10868 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
10869 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
10870 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10871 }, false).unwrap();
10872 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10874 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
10875 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
10877 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
10878 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
10879 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
10880 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
10881 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
10883 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
10884 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
10885 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
10887 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
10888 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10889 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
10891 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
10892 // "protected" and can connect again.
10893 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
10894 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
10895 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10897 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10899 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
10901 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
10902 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
10906 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
10907 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
10908 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10909 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10910 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10911 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10913 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
10915 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10916 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10918 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
10919 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10920 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10921 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
10924 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
10926 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10927 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
10928 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
10930 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
10931 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10932 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10934 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
10935 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10936 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
10937 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
10941 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
10942 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
10943 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
10944 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10945 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10946 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
10947 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
10948 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
10949 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10951 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
10953 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10954 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10956 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
10957 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
10958 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
10959 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
10960 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
10961 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10964 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
10965 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10967 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
10968 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
10970 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10972 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
10973 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
10976 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
10977 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
10978 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
10979 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
10980 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10982 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
10983 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10985 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
10986 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
10987 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
10988 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
10992 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10994 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
10995 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
10997 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
10998 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
10999 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11001 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
11002 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
11004 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11006 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
11010 fn reject_excessively_underpaying_htlcs() {
11011 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
11012 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
11013 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
11014 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11015 let sender_intended_amt_msat = 100;
11016 let extra_fee_msat = 10;
11017 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
11019 outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
11020 payment_metadata: None,
11021 keysend_preimage: None,
11022 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
11023 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
11025 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
11027 // Check that if the amount we received + the penultimate hop extra fee is less than the sender
11028 // intended amount, we fail the payment.
11029 if let Err(crate::ln::channelmanager::InboundOnionErr { err_code, .. }) =
11030 node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
11031 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat - 1, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat))
11033 assert_eq!(err_code, 19);
11034 } else { panic!(); }
11036 // If amt_received + extra_fee is equal to the sender intended amount, we're fine.
11037 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { // This is the same payload as above, InboundOnionPayload doesn't implement Clone
11039 outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
11040 payment_metadata: None,
11041 keysend_preimage: None,
11042 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
11043 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
11045 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
11047 assert!(node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
11048 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat)).is_ok());
11052 fn test_inbound_anchors_manual_acceptance() {
11053 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
11054 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
11055 let mut anchors_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
11056 anchors_cfg.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
11058 let mut anchors_manual_accept_cfg = anchors_cfg.clone();
11059 anchors_manual_accept_cfg.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
11061 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
11062 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
11063 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs,
11064 &[Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_manual_accept_cfg.clone())]);
11065 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11067 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
11068 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11070 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11071 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
11072 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11073 match &msg_events[0] {
11074 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } => {
11075 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11077 ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } =>
11078 assert_eq!(msg.data, "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned()),
11079 _ => panic!("Unexpected error action"),
11082 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11085 nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11086 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11088 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } =>
11089 nodes[2].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap(),
11090 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11092 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11096 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
11097 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
11098 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
11099 // the channel without the anchors feature.
11100 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11101 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11102 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
11103 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
11104 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
11105 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
11106 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11108 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None).unwrap();
11109 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11110 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
11112 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11113 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11115 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
11116 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
11118 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11121 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11122 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
11124 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11125 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
11127 // Since nodes[1] should not have accepted the channel, it should
11128 // not have generated any events.
11129 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
11133 fn test_update_channel_config() {
11134 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11135 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
11136 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
11137 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
11138 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11139 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11140 let channel = &nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0];
11142 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
11143 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11144 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
11146 user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat += 10;
11147 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
11148 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_base_msat, user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat);
11149 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11150 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11152 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
11153 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
11156 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate::default()).unwrap();
11157 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11158 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
11160 let new_cltv_expiry_delta = user_config.channel_config.cltv_expiry_delta + 6;
11161 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
11162 cltv_expiry_delta: Some(new_cltv_expiry_delta),
11163 ..Default::default()
11165 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
11166 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11167 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11169 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
11170 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
11173 let new_fee = user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths + 100;
11174 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
11175 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
11176 ..Default::default()
11178 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
11179 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, new_fee);
11180 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11181 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11183 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
11184 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
11187 // If we provide a channel_id not associated with the peer, we should get an error and no updates
11188 // should be applied to ensure update atomicity as specified in the API docs.
11189 let bad_channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_txid(&[10; 32], 10);
11190 let current_fee = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths;
11191 let new_fee = current_fee + 100;
11194 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id, bad_channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
11195 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
11196 ..Default::default()
11198 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: _ }),
11201 // Check that the fee hasn't changed for the channel that exists.
11202 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, current_fee);
11203 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11204 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
11208 fn test_payment_display() {
11209 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
11210 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_id), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
11211 let payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
11212 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_hash), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
11213 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11214 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_preimage), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
11220 use crate::chain::Listen;
11221 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
11222 use crate::sign::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
11223 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
11224 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
11225 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
11226 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
11227 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
11228 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
11229 use crate::util::test_utils;
11230 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
11232 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
11233 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
11234 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
11236 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock};
11238 use criterion::Criterion;
11240 type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
11241 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
11242 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
11243 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
11244 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
11245 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
11246 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
11248 struct ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
11249 node: &'node_cfg Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>,
11251 impl<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg, P> {
11252 type CM = Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>;
11254 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P> { self.node }
11256 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
11259 pub fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Criterion) {
11260 bench_two_sends(bench, "bench_sends", test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
11263 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Criterion, bench_name: &str, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
11264 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
11265 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
11267 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
11268 let genesis_block = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network);
11270 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
11271 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
11272 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
11273 let scorer = RwLock::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
11274 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &scorer);
11276 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
11277 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(5_000_000 / 253);
11278 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
11280 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
11281 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
11282 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
11283 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
11285 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
11286 }, genesis_block.header.time);
11287 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
11289 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
11290 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
11291 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
11292 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
11293 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
11295 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
11296 }, genesis_block.header.time);
11297 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
11299 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
11300 features: node_b.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11302 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
11303 features: node_a.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11304 }, false).unwrap();
11305 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
11306 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
11307 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
11310 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
11311 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
11312 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
11314 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
11315 } else { panic!(); }
11317 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
11318 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11319 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
11320 match events_b[0] {
11321 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
11322 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
11324 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11327 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
11328 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11329 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
11330 match events_a[0] {
11331 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
11332 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
11334 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11337 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
11339 let block = create_dummy_block(BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash(), 42, vec![tx]);
11340 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
11341 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
11343 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
11344 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11345 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
11346 match msg_events[0] {
11347 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
11348 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
11349 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
11353 match msg_events[1] {
11354 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
11358 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11359 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
11360 match events_a[0] {
11361 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
11362 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
11364 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11367 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11368 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
11369 match events_b[0] {
11370 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
11371 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
11373 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11376 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
11377 macro_rules! send_payment {
11378 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
11379 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
11380 .with_bolt11_features($node_b.invoice_features()).unwrap();
11381 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
11382 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
11383 payment_count += 1;
11384 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
11385 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
11387 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
11388 PaymentId(payment_hash.0),
11389 RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 10_000),
11390 Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
11391 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
11392 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11393 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
11394 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
11395 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
11396 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
11397 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
11399 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
11400 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
11401 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
11402 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
11404 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
11405 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
11406 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
11407 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
11408 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
11410 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
11413 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
11414 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
11415 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
11416 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
11418 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
11422 bench.bench_function(bench_name, |b| b.iter(|| {
11423 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
11424 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);