1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
23 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
25 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
27 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
29 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
31 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
34 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
38 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
39 // construct one themselves.
40 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
41 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
42 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
43 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
44 use crate::ln::features::InvoiceFeatures;
45 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
46 use crate::routing::router::{DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, RoutePath, Router};
47 use crate::routing::scoring::ProbabilisticScorer;
49 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
50 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
51 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
53 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
54 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment};
55 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
56 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider, ChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
57 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig};
58 use crate::util::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
59 use crate::util::events;
60 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
61 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
62 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
63 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
64 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
66 use alloc::collections::BTreeMap;
69 use crate::prelude::*;
71 use core::cell::RefCell;
73 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
74 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
75 use core::time::Duration;
78 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
79 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure};
81 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
83 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
84 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
85 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
87 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
88 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
89 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
90 // before we forward it.
92 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
93 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
94 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
95 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
96 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
98 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
99 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
101 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
102 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
103 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
104 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
107 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
108 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
109 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
112 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
113 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
117 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
118 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
119 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
120 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
121 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
122 pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
123 pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
124 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
127 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
128 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
129 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
130 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
133 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
134 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
135 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
136 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
137 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
140 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
141 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
143 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
144 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
145 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
148 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
149 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
151 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
152 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
155 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
156 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
159 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
163 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
164 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
165 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
166 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
167 short_channel_id: u64,
169 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
170 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
172 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
173 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
178 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
180 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
181 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
182 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
184 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
185 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
188 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
189 struct ClaimableHTLC {
190 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
192 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
194 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
196 /// The sum total of all MPP parts
200 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
202 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
203 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
204 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
206 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
207 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
212 impl Readable for PaymentId {
213 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
214 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
219 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
221 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
222 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
223 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
225 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
226 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
231 impl Readable for InterceptId {
232 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
233 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
238 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
239 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
240 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
241 PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
242 OutboundRoute { session_priv: SecretKey },
245 pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
247 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
248 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
249 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
251 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
252 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: *session_priv },
256 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
257 (0, PreviousHopData) => {
258 (0, short_channel_id, required),
259 (2, htlc_id, required),
261 (2, OutboundRoute) => {
262 (0, session_priv, required),
267 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
268 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
269 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
270 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
271 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
274 session_priv: SecretKey,
275 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
276 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
277 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
278 payment_id: PaymentId,
279 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
282 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
283 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
284 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
286 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
288 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
290 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_secret, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
293 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
294 payment_id.hash(hasher);
295 payment_secret.hash(hasher);
296 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
301 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
304 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
305 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
307 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
308 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
309 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
310 payment_secret: None,
315 struct ReceiveError {
321 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
322 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
324 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
325 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
326 pub enum FailureCode {
327 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
328 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
329 TemporaryNodeFailure = 0x2000 | 2,
330 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
331 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
332 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing = 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
333 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
334 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
335 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
336 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
337 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails = 0x4000 | 15,
340 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>);
342 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
343 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
344 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
345 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
346 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
348 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
349 err: msgs::LightningError,
350 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
351 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
353 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
355 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
357 err: LightningError {
359 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
360 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
367 shutdown_finish: None,
371 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
372 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
375 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
377 err: LightningError {
379 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
380 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
386 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
387 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
391 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
394 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
396 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
397 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
401 log_level: Level::Warn,
404 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
406 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
408 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
410 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
411 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
419 shutdown_finish: None,
424 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
425 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
426 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
427 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
428 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
430 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
431 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
432 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
433 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
434 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
435 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
436 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
438 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
442 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
443 struct ClaimingPayment {
445 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
446 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
448 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
449 (0, amount_msat, required),
450 (2, payment_purpose, required),
451 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
454 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
455 struct ClaimablePayments {
456 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
457 /// failed/claimed by the user.
459 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
460 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
462 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
463 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
464 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, (events::PaymentPurpose, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>)>,
466 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
467 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
468 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
469 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
472 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
473 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
474 /// quite some time lag.
475 enum BackgroundEvent {
476 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
477 /// commitment transaction.
478 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
482 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
483 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
484 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
485 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
486 /// event can be generated.
487 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
488 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user.
489 EmitEvent { event: events::Event },
492 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
493 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
494 (2, EmitEvent) => { (0, event, upgradable_required) },
497 /// State we hold per-peer.
498 pub(super) struct PeerState<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
499 /// `temporary_channel_id` or `channel_id` -> `channel`.
501 /// Holds all channels where the peer is the counterparty. Once a channel has been assigned a
502 /// `channel_id`, the `temporary_channel_id` key in the map is updated and is replaced by the
504 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
505 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
506 latest_features: InitFeatures,
507 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
508 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
509 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
510 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
511 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
513 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
514 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
515 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
516 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
518 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
519 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
520 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
521 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
522 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
523 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
524 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
525 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
526 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
527 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
531 impl <Signer: ChannelSigner> PeerState<Signer> {
532 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
533 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
534 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
535 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
536 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
539 self.channel_by_id.is_empty() && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
543 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
544 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
546 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
549 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
550 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
551 struct PendingInboundPayment {
552 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
553 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
554 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
555 /// this payment being removed.
557 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
558 user_payment_id: u64,
559 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
560 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
561 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
564 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
565 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
566 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
567 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
568 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
569 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
570 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
571 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
573 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
574 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
582 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
584 Arc<Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>
589 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
590 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
591 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
592 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
593 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
594 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
595 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
596 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
597 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
599 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
600 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<&'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e DefaultRouter<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L, &'h Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>>, &'g L>;
602 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
603 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
605 /// Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
606 /// to individual Channels.
608 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
609 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
610 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
611 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
613 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
614 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
615 /// returning from [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`], with ChannelManagers, writing updates
616 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during
617 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
618 /// [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the
619 /// `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
621 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
622 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
623 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
625 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
626 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
627 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
628 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
629 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
631 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
632 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
633 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
634 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
636 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
637 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
638 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
640 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
641 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
642 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
643 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
644 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
646 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
647 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
648 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
649 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
650 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
651 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
652 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
653 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
656 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
657 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
658 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
659 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
660 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
664 // `total_consistency_lock`
666 // |__`forward_htlcs`
668 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
670 // |__`per_peer_state`
672 // | |__`pending_inbound_payments`
674 // | |__`claimable_payments`
676 // | |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
682 // | |__`short_to_chan_info`
684 // | |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
688 // | |__`pending_events`
690 // | |__`pending_background_events`
692 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
694 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
695 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
696 ES::Target: EntropySource,
697 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
698 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
699 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
703 default_configuration: UserConfig,
704 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
705 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
711 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
713 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
715 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
716 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
718 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
719 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
720 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
721 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
723 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
724 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
726 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
727 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
728 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
729 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
730 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
731 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
732 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
733 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
735 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
737 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
738 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
740 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
742 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
743 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
744 /// and via the classic SCID.
746 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
747 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
749 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
751 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
753 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
754 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
755 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
757 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
758 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
760 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
761 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
763 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
764 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
766 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
767 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
768 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
769 /// active channel list on load.
771 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
772 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
774 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
776 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
777 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
778 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
780 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
781 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
782 /// the handling of the events.
784 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
785 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
788 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
789 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
790 /// would break backwards compatability.
791 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
792 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
793 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
795 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
796 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<[u8; 32], PublicKey>>,
798 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
800 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
801 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
802 /// confirmation depth.
804 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
805 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
806 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
808 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
810 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
812 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
814 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
816 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
818 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
819 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
820 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
822 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
823 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
825 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
826 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
827 /// keeping additional state.
828 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
830 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
831 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
832 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
833 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
835 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
836 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
838 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
839 /// are currently open with that peer.
841 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
842 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
845 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
847 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
848 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
849 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
850 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
851 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
853 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
854 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
855 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
856 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
857 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
858 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
859 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
860 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
861 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
862 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
863 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
865 persistence_notifier: Notifier,
874 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
876 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
877 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
878 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
879 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
880 pub struct ChainParameters {
881 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
882 pub network: Network,
884 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
886 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
887 pub best_block: BestBlock,
890 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
896 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
897 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
898 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
899 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
900 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
901 /// updates are ready for persistence).
903 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
904 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
905 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
906 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
907 persistence_notifier: &'a Notifier,
909 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
910 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
913 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
914 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
915 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
918 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
919 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
921 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
922 persistence_notifier: notifier,
923 should_persist: persist_check,
924 _read_guard: read_guard,
929 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
931 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
932 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
937 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
938 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
940 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
942 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
943 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
944 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
945 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
946 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
948 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
949 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
951 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
953 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
954 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
955 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
956 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
957 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
958 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
959 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
960 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
961 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
962 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
963 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
964 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
965 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
967 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
968 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
970 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
971 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
972 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
973 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
975 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
976 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
977 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
978 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
979 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
980 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
983 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
985 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
986 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
989 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
991 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
992 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
994 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until we time-out the
995 /// idempotency of payments by [`PaymentId`]. See
996 /// [`OutboundPayments::remove_stale_resolved_payments`].
997 pub(crate) const IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 7;
999 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
1000 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
1001 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
1002 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1004 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1005 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1006 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1008 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1009 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1010 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1012 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1013 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1014 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1015 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1016 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1017 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1018 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1019 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1020 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1021 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1022 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1025 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1026 /// to better separate parameters.
1027 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1028 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1029 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1030 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1031 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1032 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1033 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1034 pub features: InitFeatures,
1035 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1036 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1037 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1039 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1041 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1042 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1043 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1044 /// payments to us through this channel.
1045 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1046 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1047 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1048 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1049 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1050 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1051 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1054 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
1055 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1056 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1057 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1058 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1059 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1060 /// lifetime of the channel.
1061 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
1062 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1063 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1064 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1065 /// our counterparty already.
1067 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1068 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1069 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1070 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1072 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1073 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1074 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1075 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1077 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1078 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1080 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1081 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1083 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1084 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1085 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1086 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1087 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1088 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1089 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1090 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1091 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1094 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1096 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1097 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1098 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1099 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1100 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1101 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1102 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1104 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1105 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1107 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1108 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1109 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1110 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1111 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1112 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1113 /// this value on chain.
1115 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1117 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1119 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1120 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1121 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or a random value if the channel was
1122 /// inbound. This may be zero for inbound channels serialized with LDK versions prior to
1124 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1125 /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
1126 /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
1128 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
1129 pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
1130 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1131 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1132 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1134 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1135 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1136 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1137 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1139 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1140 pub balance_msat: u64,
1141 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1142 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1143 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1144 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1146 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1148 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1149 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1150 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1151 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1152 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1153 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1154 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1155 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1157 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`] and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1158 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1159 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1160 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1161 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1162 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1163 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1165 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1166 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1167 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1168 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1169 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1170 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1171 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1172 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1173 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1175 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1177 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1178 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1179 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1180 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1181 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1183 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1184 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1185 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1186 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1187 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1188 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1189 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1191 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1192 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1193 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1194 pub is_outbound: bool,
1195 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1196 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1197 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1198 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1199 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1201 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1202 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1203 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1204 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1206 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1207 pub is_usable: bool,
1208 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1209 pub is_public: bool,
1210 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1211 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1212 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1213 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1214 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1215 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1217 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1218 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1221 impl ChannelDetails {
1222 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1223 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1224 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1226 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1227 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1228 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1229 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1232 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1233 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1234 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1236 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1237 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1238 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1239 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1242 fn from_channel<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner>(channel: &Channel<Signer>,
1243 best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures) -> Self {
1245 let balance = channel.get_available_balances();
1246 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1247 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1249 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1250 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1251 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1252 features: latest_features,
1253 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1254 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1255 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1256 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1257 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1258 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1259 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1260 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if channel.have_received_message() {
1261 Some(channel.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1262 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1264 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1265 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1266 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1267 channel_type: if channel.have_received_message() { Some(channel.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1268 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1269 outbound_scid_alias: if channel.is_usable() { Some(channel.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1270 inbound_scid_alias: channel.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1271 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1272 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(channel.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
1273 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1274 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1275 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1276 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1277 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1278 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1279 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1280 confirmations: Some(channel.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1281 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1282 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1283 is_channel_ready: channel.is_usable(),
1284 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1285 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1286 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1287 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1288 config: Some(channel.config()),
1293 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1294 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1295 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1296 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1297 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1299 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1301 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1302 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1303 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1306 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1307 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1308 /// payment is removed from tracking.
1310 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1311 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1312 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1314 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1315 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1316 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1318 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1319 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1323 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1325 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
1327 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1328 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1329 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1330 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1332 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1333 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1334 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1337 macro_rules! handle_error {
1338 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
1341 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1342 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1343 // entering the macro.
1344 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1345 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1347 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1349 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1350 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1351 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1352 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1356 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1357 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1358 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1359 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1364 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1365 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1367 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1368 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1369 action: err.action.clone()
1373 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1374 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1375 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1376 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1377 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1381 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1388 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1389 ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {{
1390 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.channel_id());
1391 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1392 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1393 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1395 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1396 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1397 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1398 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1399 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1401 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1402 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1404 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1408 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1409 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1410 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1412 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1413 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1415 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1416 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1418 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1419 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1420 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel);
1421 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1422 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1423 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1429 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1430 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1434 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1436 $entry.remove_entry();
1444 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1445 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1449 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1451 $entry.remove_entry();
1459 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1460 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1462 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1463 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, channel);
1469 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1470 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
1471 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1472 node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1473 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1475 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1476 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1477 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1478 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1479 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1480 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1481 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1482 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1483 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1484 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1489 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
1490 ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1491 if $channel.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
1493 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1494 pending_events.push(events::Event::ChannelReady {
1495 channel_id: $channel.channel_id(),
1496 user_channel_id: $channel.get_user_id(),
1497 counterparty_node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1498 channel_type: $channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
1501 $channel.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
1506 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
1507 ($self: ident, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
1508 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&$self.logger,
1509 &$self.node_signer, $self.genesis_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
1510 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
1511 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
1512 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.is_usable() {
1513 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
1514 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
1515 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
1516 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
1518 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
1519 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
1520 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1526 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
1527 .remove(&$chan.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
1529 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
1530 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
1531 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
1532 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
1533 updates.announcement_sigs);
1534 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
1535 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
1538 let channel_id = $chan.channel_id();
1539 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
1540 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
1542 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
1544 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1545 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1547 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
1548 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1549 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
1550 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
1555 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
1556 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, MANUALLY_REMOVING, $remove: expr) => { {
1557 // update_maps_on_chan_removal needs to be able to take id_to_peer, so make sure we can in
1558 // any case so that it won't deadlock.
1559 debug_assert!($self.id_to_peer.try_lock().is_ok());
1561 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
1562 log_debug!($self.logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
1563 log_bytes!($chan.channel_id()[..]));
1566 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
1567 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure",
1568 log_bytes!($chan.channel_id()[..]));
1569 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $chan);
1570 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(
1571 "ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), $chan.channel_id(),
1572 $chan.get_user_id(), $chan.force_shutdown(false),
1573 $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok()));
1577 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
1578 if ($update_id == 0 || $chan.get_next_monitor_update()
1579 .expect("We can't be processing a monitor update if it isn't queued")
1580 .update_id == $update_id) &&
1581 $chan.get_latest_monitor_update_id() == $update_id
1583 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $update_id, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
1589 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan_entry: expr) => {
1590 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $update_id, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan_entry.get_mut(), MANUALLY_REMOVING, $chan_entry.remove_entry())
1594 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
1596 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
1597 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1598 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1599 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1600 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1601 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1605 /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
1607 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1608 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
1610 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1612 /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
1613 /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
1614 /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
1617 /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
1618 /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
1619 /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
1620 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1621 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1622 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1623 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
1624 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
1626 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1627 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1628 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
1633 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1635 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
1636 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1637 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
1638 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1639 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
1640 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1641 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1642 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1644 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
1647 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
1648 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1650 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1652 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1654 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1656 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1657 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1658 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1659 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
1669 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
1670 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1671 &self.default_configuration
1674 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1675 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1676 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
1679 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
1680 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
1682 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
1684 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
1688 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
1693 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1695 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1696 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1697 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
1698 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
1699 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
1701 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1702 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1704 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1705 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1706 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1708 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1709 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1710 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1711 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1712 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1713 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1715 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1716 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1717 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1718 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1719 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1720 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1723 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1724 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1725 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1727 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1729 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
1730 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
1732 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1734 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
1735 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1736 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1737 match Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
1738 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
1739 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
1743 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
1748 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1750 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1751 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1752 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1754 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1756 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1759 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1762 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1763 node_id: their_network_key,
1766 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1769 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1770 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
1771 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
1772 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
1773 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
1774 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
1775 // the same channel.
1776 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
1778 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1779 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1780 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
1781 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1782 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1783 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1784 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel(channel, best_block_height,
1785 peer_state.latest_features.clone());
1793 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
1794 /// more information.
1795 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1796 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1799 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
1800 /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1802 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1803 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1805 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1806 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1807 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1808 // really wanted anyway.
1809 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1812 /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
1813 pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1814 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1815 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1817 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
1818 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1819 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1820 let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1821 return peer_state.channel_by_id
1824 ChannelDetails::from_channel(channel, best_block_height, features.clone()))
1830 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
1831 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1833 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
1834 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
1835 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
1837 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
1838 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
1839 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
1840 .filter_map(|(_, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
1841 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
1842 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
1843 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
1844 total_msat: *total_msat,
1847 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
1848 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
1850 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
1851 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
1853 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
1858 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
1859 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
1860 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1861 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
1862 Some(transaction) => {
1863 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::DiscardFunding { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction })
1867 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1868 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1869 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1870 reason: closure_reason
1874 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1875 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1877 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
1878 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
1879 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1881 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
1882 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
1884 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1885 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1886 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1887 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1888 let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo();
1889 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1890 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut()
1891 .get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?;
1892 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
1894 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
1895 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
1896 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
1897 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1898 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
1902 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
1903 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
1904 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
1905 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update);
1906 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry);
1909 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1910 let channel = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
1911 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
1912 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1916 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1920 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id) })
1924 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1925 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
1926 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
1927 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
1930 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
1934 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1935 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1936 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1938 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
1939 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1941 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
1942 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
1943 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
1944 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
1946 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
1948 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1949 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1950 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1951 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::util::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
1952 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1953 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None)
1956 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1957 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1958 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1960 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
1961 /// the channel being closed or not:
1962 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
1963 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
1964 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1965 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
1966 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
1967 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
1968 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
1970 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
1972 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1973 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1974 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1975 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::util::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
1976 pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1977 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
1981 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1982 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1983 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1984 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1985 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
1986 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
1987 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
1988 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
1990 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
1991 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
1992 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
1993 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
1994 // ignore the result here.
1995 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
1999 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2000 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2001 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
2002 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2003 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2004 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2005 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
2007 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2008 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2009 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2010 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2011 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: peer_msg.to_string() });
2013 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2015 remove_channel!(self, chan)
2017 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), peer_node_id) });
2020 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2021 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(broadcast));
2022 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2023 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2024 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2029 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
2032 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2033 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2034 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2035 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2036 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2037 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2038 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2039 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
2040 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2041 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2042 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
2043 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
2054 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2055 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2056 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2058 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2059 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2060 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2063 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2064 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2065 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2067 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2068 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2069 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2070 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2071 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2074 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2075 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2076 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2077 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2078 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2082 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2083 /// local transaction(s).
2084 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2085 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2086 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2090 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(&self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
2091 payment_hash: PaymentHash, amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError>
2093 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2094 if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != cltv_expiry {
2095 return Err(ReceiveError {
2096 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value",
2098 err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
2101 // final_expiry_too_soon
2102 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2103 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2105 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2106 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2107 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2108 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2109 if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= current_height as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2110 let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12);
2111 err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes());
2112 err_data.extend_from_slice(¤t_height.to_be_bytes());
2113 return Err(ReceiveError {
2114 err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data,
2115 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2118 if hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat {
2119 return Err(ReceiveError {
2121 err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
2122 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2126 let routing = match hop_data.format {
2127 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => {
2128 return Err(ReceiveError {
2129 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2130 err_data: Vec::new(),
2131 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2134 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
2135 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
2136 return Err(ReceiveError {
2137 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2138 err_data: Vec::new(),
2139 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2141 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2142 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2144 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2145 phantom_shared_secret,
2147 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2148 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2149 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2150 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2151 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2152 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2153 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2154 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2155 return Err(ReceiveError {
2156 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2157 err_data: Vec::new(),
2158 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2162 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2164 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2167 return Err(ReceiveError {
2168 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2169 err_data: Vec::new(),
2170 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2175 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2178 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2179 incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
2180 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_msat,
2181 outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2185 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
2186 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2187 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2189 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2190 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2191 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2192 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2193 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2194 failure_code: $err_code,
2200 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2201 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2204 let shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(
2205 Recipient::Node, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None
2206 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
2208 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2209 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2210 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2211 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2212 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2213 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2214 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2215 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2217 macro_rules! return_err {
2218 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2220 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2221 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2222 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2223 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2224 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
2225 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
2231 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2233 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2234 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2236 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2237 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2241 let pending_forward_info = match next_hop {
2242 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
2244 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None) {
2246 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
2247 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
2248 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
2249 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
2250 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
2252 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
2255 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
2256 let new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
2257 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2259 public_key: onion_utils::next_hop_packet_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx, new_pubkey, &shared_secret),
2260 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2261 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
2264 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
2265 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2266 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
2267 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2271 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2272 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2273 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2276 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2277 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2278 incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
2279 outgoing_amt_msat: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2280 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2285 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref outgoing_amt_msat, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
2286 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
2287 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
2288 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
2289 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
2290 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
2291 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(short_channel_id).cloned();
2292 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
2293 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2294 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2295 // phantom or an intercept.
2296 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
2297 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)) ||
2298 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)
2302 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2305 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
2307 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
2308 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2309 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
2310 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
2311 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2313 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
2314 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2315 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id) {
2317 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
2318 // have no consistency guarantees.
2319 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2323 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2324 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2325 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2326 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2327 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2329 if chan.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && *short_channel_id != chan.outbound_scid_alias() {
2330 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
2331 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
2332 // we don't have the channel here.
2333 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2335 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(*short_channel_id, chan).ok();
2337 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2338 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2339 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2340 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2341 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2342 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2343 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2345 if *outgoing_amt_msat < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2346 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
2348 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, *outgoing_amt_msat, *outgoing_cltv_value) {
2349 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
2353 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
2354 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
2355 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
2356 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
2358 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
2365 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2366 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2367 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2368 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2369 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2370 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2372 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2373 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2375 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2376 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2377 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2378 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2379 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2380 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2381 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2382 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2383 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2384 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2390 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
2391 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2392 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2393 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2395 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2396 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2398 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2399 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
2400 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2402 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2403 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2404 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2405 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
2406 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
2407 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
2408 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
2412 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
2417 pending_forward_info
2420 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2421 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2422 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2424 /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
2425 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
2426 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
2428 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2429 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
2430 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2431 if !chan.should_announce() {
2432 return Err(LightningError {
2433 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2434 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2437 if chan.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
2438 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
2440 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2441 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2444 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2445 /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
2446 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2447 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2449 /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
2450 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
2451 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
2453 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2454 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
2455 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2456 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2457 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
2458 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2462 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
2464 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2465 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2466 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2468 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2469 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2471 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2472 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
2473 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2474 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2475 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
2476 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2477 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2478 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2480 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
2481 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
2482 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
2484 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
2486 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2493 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2494 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2495 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv_bytes)
2498 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2499 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
2500 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2502 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2503 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
2504 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2506 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2507 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected".to_owned()})?;
2508 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2509 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
2510 return Err(APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Route size too large considering onion data".to_owned()});
2512 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
2514 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2515 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2516 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2517 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
2520 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2521 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
2522 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
2523 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2524 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2525 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
2526 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2527 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
2529 let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2530 let send_res = chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
2531 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2533 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2534 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2536 payment_secret: payment_secret.clone(),
2537 }, onion_packet, &self.logger);
2538 match break_chan_entry!(self, send_res, chan) {
2539 Some(monitor_update) => {
2540 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2541 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
2542 if let Err(e) = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
2545 if update_res == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress {
2546 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
2547 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
2548 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
2549 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
2550 // which we do in the send_payment check for
2551 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
2552 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
2558 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
2559 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
2560 // `channel_by_id` map.
2561 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
2562 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
2567 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2568 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2570 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2575 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2577 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
2578 /// fields for more info.
2580 /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
2581 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
2583 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
2585 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
2586 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
2587 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
2588 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
2589 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
2591 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
2592 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
2593 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
2594 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
2595 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
2597 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
2598 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
2599 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
2600 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
2602 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
2604 /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
2605 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2606 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
2608 /// In general, a path may raise:
2609 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2610 /// node public key) is specified.
2611 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2612 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2614 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2615 /// relevant updates.
2617 /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
2618 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2619 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2621 /// # A caution on `payment_secret`
2623 /// `payment_secret` is unrelated to `payment_hash` (or [`PaymentPreimage`]) and exists to
2624 /// authenticate the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization)
2625 /// attacks. For newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one,
2626 /// the [`Route`] must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a
2627 /// recipient-provided `payment_secret`.
2629 /// If a `payment_secret` *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret
2630 /// feature bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the
2631 /// [`Route`], we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
2633 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2634 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2635 /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
2636 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
2637 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
2638 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2639 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2640 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2641 self.pending_outbound_payments
2642 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2643 |path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2644 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2647 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment`], but will automatically find a route based on
2648 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
2649 pub fn send_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
2650 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2651 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2652 self.pending_outbound_payments
2653 .send_payment(payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
2654 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
2655 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
2656 &self.pending_events,
2657 |path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2658 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2662 fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2663 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2664 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2665 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2666 |path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2667 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2671 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
2672 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2673 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
2677 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
2678 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
2679 /// retries are exhausted.
2681 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
2682 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
2684 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
2685 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
2686 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
2688 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event is generated and we restart without this
2689 /// [`ChannelManager`] having been persisted, another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated.
2691 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2692 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2693 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
2694 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2695 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, &self.pending_events);
2698 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2699 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2700 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2701 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2702 /// never reach the recipient.
2704 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
2705 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
2707 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2708 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2710 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2712 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2713 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
2714 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2715 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2716 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
2717 route, payment_preimage, payment_id, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer,
2719 |path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2720 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2723 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
2724 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
2726 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
2729 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
2730 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
2731 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2732 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2733 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, payment_id,
2734 retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
2735 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2736 &self.logger, &self.pending_events,
2737 |path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2738 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2741 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
2742 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
2743 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
2744 pub fn send_probe(&self, hops: Vec<RouteHop>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2745 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2746 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2747 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(hops, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2748 |path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2749 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2752 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
2755 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
2756 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
2759 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2760 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2761 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
2762 &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
2763 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2764 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2765 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2766 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2768 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2769 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2772 match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2774 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2776 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2777 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2778 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2779 } else { unreachable!(); })
2782 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id) }) },
2785 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
2786 Ok(funding_msg) => {
2789 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2790 err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
2795 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2796 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2799 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2800 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2801 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2803 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2804 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
2805 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.channel_id(), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
2806 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
2815 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2816 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2817 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2821 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2823 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2824 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2826 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
2827 /// across the p2p network.
2829 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
2830 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
2832 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2833 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
2834 /// keys per-channel).
2836 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
2837 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
2838 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
2840 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
2841 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
2842 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2844 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
2845 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
2846 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
2847 /// for more details.
2849 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2850 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::util::events::Event::ChannelClosed
2851 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2852 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2854 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
2855 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
2856 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2857 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
2862 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2863 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools at the next block. However, the modules
2864 // constituting our Lightning node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if
2865 // the wallet module is in advance on the LDK view, allow one more block of headroom.
2866 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 2 {
2867 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2868 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
2872 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
2873 let mut output_index = None;
2874 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
2875 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2876 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
2877 if output_index.is_some() {
2878 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2879 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
2882 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
2883 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2884 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
2887 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
2890 if output_index.is_none() {
2891 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2892 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
2895 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
2899 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
2901 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
2902 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
2903 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
2904 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
2906 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
2907 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
2909 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
2910 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
2912 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
2914 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
2915 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
2916 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
2917 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
2918 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2919 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
2920 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
2921 pub fn update_channel_config(
2922 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config: &ChannelConfig,
2923 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2924 if config.cltv_expiry_delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA {
2925 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2926 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
2930 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(
2931 &self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier,
2933 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2934 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2935 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2936 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2937 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2938 for channel_id in channel_ids {
2939 if !peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) {
2940 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2941 err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
2945 for channel_id in channel_ids {
2946 let channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id).unwrap();
2947 if !channel.update_config(config) {
2950 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
2951 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
2952 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
2953 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2954 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2962 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
2963 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
2965 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
2966 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
2968 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
2969 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
2970 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
2971 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
2972 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
2974 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
2975 /// you from forwarding more than you received.
2977 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
2980 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
2981 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
2982 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
2983 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
2984 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &[u8; 32], next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2985 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2987 let next_hop_scid = {
2988 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2989 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
2990 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
2991 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2992 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2993 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
2995 if !chan.is_usable() {
2996 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2997 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id))
3000 chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.outbound_scid_alias())
3002 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3003 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id), next_node_id)
3008 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3009 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3010 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3013 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
3014 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => {
3015 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid }
3017 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3019 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
3020 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
3023 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
3024 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3025 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3026 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
3027 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
3029 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
3033 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
3034 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
3036 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3039 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3040 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3041 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3043 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3044 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3045 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3048 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
3049 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3050 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3051 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3052 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
3053 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
3054 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3057 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
3058 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
3059 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3060 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3065 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
3067 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
3068 /// Will likely generate further events.
3069 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
3070 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3072 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
3073 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
3074 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
3076 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
3077 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
3079 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
3080 if short_chan_id != 0 {
3081 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
3083 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3084 match forward_info {
3085 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3086 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3087 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3088 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
3089 outgoing_cltv_value, incoming_amt_msat: _
3092 macro_rules! failure_handler {
3093 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
3094 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3096 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3097 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3098 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3099 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3100 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3101 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
3104 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
3105 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
3107 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
3110 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3111 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
3117 macro_rules! fail_forward {
3118 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3120 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
3124 macro_rules! failed_payment {
3125 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3127 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
3131 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
3132 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
3133 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.genesis_hash) {
3134 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
3135 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
3137 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3138 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
3139 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
3140 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
3141 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
3143 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
3145 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3146 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
3150 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
3151 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) {
3152 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
3153 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
3159 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3162 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3165 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3166 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
3167 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
3168 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
3169 // problem, not ours.
3175 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id) {
3176 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3178 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3182 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3183 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3184 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3185 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3188 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3189 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3190 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
3191 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3192 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3195 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3196 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3197 match forward_info {
3198 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3199 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id: _,
3200 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3201 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
3202 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, incoming_amt_msat: _,
3205 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
3206 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3207 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3208 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3209 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3210 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3211 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
3212 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3214 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
3215 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
3216 onion_packet, &self.logger)
3218 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3219 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
3221 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3223 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
3224 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3225 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
3226 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
3231 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3232 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3234 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3235 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3236 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_fail_htlc(
3237 htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger
3239 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3240 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3242 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
3244 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3245 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3246 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3255 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3256 match forward_info {
3257 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3258 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3259 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3260 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, ..
3263 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret) = match routing {
3264 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } => {
3265 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
3266 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data }, Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret)
3268 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
3269 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage), None, None),
3271 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3274 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3275 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3276 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3277 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3278 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3279 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3280 phantom_shared_secret,
3282 value: outgoing_amt_msat,
3284 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
3289 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3290 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
3291 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3292 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3293 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
3295 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3296 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
3297 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3298 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3299 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3300 phantom_shared_secret,
3302 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
3303 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
3307 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
3308 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
3309 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
3310 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
3311 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
3314 macro_rules! check_total_value {
3315 ($payment_data: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{
3316 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
3318 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
3319 payment_preimage: $payment_preimage,
3320 payment_secret: $payment_data.payment_secret,
3323 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3324 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3325 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3328 let (_, htlcs) = claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
3329 .or_insert_with(|| (purpose(), Vec::new()));
3330 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
3331 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3332 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3333 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3337 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.value;
3338 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3339 total_value += htlc.value;
3340 match &htlc.onion_payload {
3341 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3342 if htlc.total_msat != $payment_data.total_msat {
3343 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
3344 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $payment_data.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
3345 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
3347 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
3349 _ => unreachable!(),
3352 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > $payment_data.total_msat {
3353 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
3354 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, $payment_data.total_msat);
3355 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3356 } else if total_value == $payment_data.total_msat {
3357 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3358 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3359 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3360 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3363 amount_msat: total_value,
3364 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3365 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3367 payment_claimable_generated = true;
3369 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
3370 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
3372 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3374 payment_claimable_generated
3378 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
3379 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
3380 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
3381 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
3382 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
3383 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
3384 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3385 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3386 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3387 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3388 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3389 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3390 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
3391 Ok(result) => result,
3393 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3394 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3398 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
3399 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
3400 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
3401 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
3402 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
3403 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3407 check_total_value!(payment_data, payment_preimage);
3409 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
3410 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3411 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3412 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3415 match claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
3416 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3417 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
3418 e.insert((purpose.clone(), vec![claimable_htlc]));
3419 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3420 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3421 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3423 amount_msat: outgoing_amt_msat,
3425 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3426 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3429 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3430 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3431 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3437 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
3438 if payment_data.is_none() {
3439 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3440 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3443 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3444 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
3445 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3446 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3447 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
3448 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
3449 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
3450 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3452 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage);
3453 if payment_claimable_generated {
3454 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
3460 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3461 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
3469 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3470 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
3471 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3472 &self.pending_events, &self.logger,
3473 |path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
3474 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv));
3476 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
3477 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3479 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
3481 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
3482 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
3483 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
3485 self.check_free_holding_cells();
3487 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
3488 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3489 events.append(&mut new_events);
3492 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
3494 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
3495 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
3497 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
3498 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
3499 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
3500 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
3501 if background_events.is_empty() {
3505 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
3507 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
3508 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
3509 // monitor updating completing.
3510 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
3517 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3518 /// Process background events, for functional testing
3519 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
3520 self.process_background_events();
3523 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
3524 if !chan.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersist; }
3525 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
3526 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
3527 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3528 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
3529 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3531 if !chan.is_live() {
3532 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
3533 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
3534 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3536 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3537 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
3539 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.logger);
3540 NotifyOption::DoPersist
3544 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
3545 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
3546 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
3547 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
3548 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
3549 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3550 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3552 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3554 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3555 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3556 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3557 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3558 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
3559 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3560 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3568 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
3570 /// This currently includes:
3571 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
3572 /// * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
3573 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
3575 /// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
3576 /// with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
3577 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
3579 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
3580 /// estimate fetches.
3582 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3583 /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
3584 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
3585 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3586 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3587 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3589 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3591 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
3592 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
3593 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
3595 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3596 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3597 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3598 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3599 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
3600 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
3601 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3602 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3603 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3605 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
3606 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id);
3607 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
3608 if needs_close { return false; }
3611 match chan.channel_update_status() {
3612 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
3613 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
3614 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3615 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3616 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
3617 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3618 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3622 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3623 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3625 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
3626 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3627 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3631 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3632 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3637 chan.maybe_expire_prev_config();
3641 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
3642 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
3647 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
3648 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
3649 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
3650 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
3651 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
3652 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
3653 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
3654 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
3655 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
3656 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
3657 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
3658 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
3659 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
3660 // have no channels to the peer.
3661 let remove_entry = {
3662 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
3663 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
3666 entry.remove_entry();
3669 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
3674 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
3675 if htlcs.is_empty() {
3676 // This should be unreachable
3677 debug_assert!(false);
3680 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3681 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
3682 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
3683 if htlcs[0].total_msat == htlcs.iter().fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.value) {
3685 } else if htlcs.into_iter().any(|htlc| {
3686 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
3687 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
3689 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(htlcs.drain(..).map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
3696 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
3697 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
3698 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
3699 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
3700 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
3703 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3704 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3707 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_resolved_payments(&self.pending_events);
3709 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
3710 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
3711 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
3712 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
3713 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3720 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
3721 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
3722 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
3724 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
3725 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
3726 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
3727 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
3729 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
3730 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
3731 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
3732 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
3733 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
3734 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
3737 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
3738 /// reason for the failure.
3740 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
3741 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
3742 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3744 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
3745 if let Some((_, mut sources)) = removed_source {
3746 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3747 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
3748 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
3749 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
3750 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3755 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
3756 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
3757 match failure_code {
3758 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code as u16),
3759 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code as u16),
3760 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
3761 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3762 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
3763 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code as u16, htlc_msat_height_data)
3768 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3769 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3771 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
3773 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3774 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
3775 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
3776 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
3777 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
3778 let scid_pref = if chan.should_announce() {
3779 chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
3781 chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.get_short_channel_id())
3783 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
3784 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
3786 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3791 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3792 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3793 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3794 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
3795 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
3796 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
3797 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3798 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
3799 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
3800 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3802 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3803 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3804 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3805 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
3807 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
3808 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
3809 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
3810 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
3811 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3815 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
3816 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
3817 // be surfaced to the user.
3818 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
3819 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32],
3820 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
3822 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
3823 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3824 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
3825 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3826 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3827 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3828 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
3829 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
3831 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3833 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
3836 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
3837 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
3838 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
3839 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3843 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
3844 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
3845 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
3846 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
3847 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
3848 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
3849 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
3850 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
3851 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
3854 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
3855 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
3856 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
3859 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3860 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
3861 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3863 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
3864 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
3865 session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
3866 &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
3867 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
3869 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint }) => {
3870 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), onion_error);
3871 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
3873 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
3874 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
3875 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3876 push_forward_ev = true;
3878 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
3879 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3880 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
3882 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3883 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
3886 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
3887 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
3888 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3889 pending_events.push(events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
3890 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
3891 failed_next_destination: destination,
3897 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
3898 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
3900 /// Note that calling this method does *not* guarantee that the payment has been claimed. You
3901 /// *must* wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] event which upon a successful claim will be
3902 /// provided to your [`EventHandler`] when [`process_pending_events`] is next called.
3904 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
3905 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
3906 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
3907 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
3909 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
3910 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
3911 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
3912 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
3913 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
3914 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
3915 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3917 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3920 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3921 if let Some((payment_purpose, sources)) = claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
3922 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
3923 for htlc in sources.iter() {
3924 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
3925 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
3926 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
3927 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
3932 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
3933 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: sources.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
3934 payment_purpose, receiver_node_id,
3936 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
3937 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
3938 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
3939 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3944 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
3946 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we check that all channels which contain a claimable
3947 // HTLC still exist. While this isn't guaranteed to remain true if a channel closes while
3948 // we're claiming (or even after we claim, before the commitment update dance completes),
3949 // it should be a relatively rare race, and we'd rather not claim HTLCs that require us to
3950 // go on-chain (and lose the on-chain fee to do so) than just reject the payment.
3952 // Note that we'll still always get our funds - as long as the generated
3953 // `ChannelMonitorUpdate` makes it out to the relevant monitor we can claim on-chain.
3955 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
3956 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
3957 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
3958 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
3959 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
3961 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
3962 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
3963 let mut valid_mpp = true;
3964 let mut errs = Vec::new();
3965 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3966 for htlc in sources.iter() {
3967 let (counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3968 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3975 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3976 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3981 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3982 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3984 if peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&chan_id).is_none() {
3989 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
3990 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
3991 debug_assert!(false);
3996 expected_amt_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
3997 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = &htlc.onion_payload {
3998 // We don't currently support MPP for spontaneous payments, so just check
3999 // that there's one payment here and move on.
4000 if sources.len() != 1 {
4001 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP spontaneous payment - this should not be reachable!");
4002 debug_assert!(false);
4008 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
4010 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4011 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
4012 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4013 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
4016 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
4017 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4018 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
4019 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
4023 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4024 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
4025 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
4026 |_| Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash }))
4028 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
4029 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
4030 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
4031 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
4032 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
4037 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4038 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4039 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
4040 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4041 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
4042 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
4043 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4045 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4048 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
4049 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
4050 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4051 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
4055 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
4056 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
4057 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
4058 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
4060 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4061 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
4062 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
4063 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
4067 let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
4068 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id).map(
4069 |peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap()
4073 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
4074 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
4075 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4076 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4077 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
4078 let fulfill_res = chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger);
4080 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = fulfill_res {
4081 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)) {
4082 log_trace!(self.logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
4083 log_bytes!(chan_id), action);
4084 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
4086 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4087 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update);
4088 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock,
4089 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4090 if let Err(e) = res {
4091 // TODO: This is a *critical* error - we probably updated the outbound edge
4092 // of the HTLC's monitor with a preimage. We should retry this monitor
4093 // update over and over again until morale improves.
4094 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}", payment_preimage);
4095 return Err((counterparty_node_id, e));
4101 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4102 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
4103 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
4107 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
4108 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
4109 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
4110 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
4111 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
4112 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
4113 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
4114 // again on restart.
4115 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4116 payment_preimage, update_res);
4118 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
4119 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
4120 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
4121 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
4122 // `PaymentForwarded`).
4123 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
4127 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
4128 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
4131 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
4133 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
4134 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage, session_priv, path, from_onchain, &self.pending_events, &self.logger);
4136 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
4137 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
4138 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
4139 |htlc_claim_value_msat| {
4140 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
4141 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
4142 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
4145 let prev_channel_id = Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id());
4146 let next_channel_id = Some(next_channel_id);
4148 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEvent { event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
4150 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
4156 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
4157 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4158 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
4164 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
4165 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4166 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
4169 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
4170 for action in actions.into_iter() {
4172 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
4173 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4174 if let Some(ClaimingPayment { amount_msat, payment_purpose: purpose, receiver_node_id }) = payment {
4175 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
4176 payment_hash, purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4180 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEvent { event } => {
4181 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(event);
4187 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
4188 /// update completion.
4189 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4190 channel: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
4191 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
4192 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
4193 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
4194 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
4195 log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
4196 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()),
4197 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
4198 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
4199 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
4200 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
4201 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
4203 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
4205 let counterparty_node_id = channel.get_counterparty_node_id();
4206 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4207 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.outbound_scid_alias()),
4208 channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
4211 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4212 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
4214 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
4215 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4216 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4221 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, channel);
4223 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
4224 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
4225 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4226 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4231 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
4232 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
4233 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4234 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4235 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4240 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
4244 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
4250 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
4251 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
4252 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
4258 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
4259 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
4261 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
4262 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4264 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
4265 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
4266 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4267 match id_to_peer.get(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4268 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4273 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4274 let mut peer_state_lock;
4275 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4276 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
4277 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4278 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4280 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()){
4281 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
4282 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
4285 log_trace!(self.logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}",
4286 highest_applied_update_id, channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id());
4287 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
4290 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, highest_applied_update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel.get_mut());
4293 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
4295 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
4296 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
4299 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4300 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4301 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4303 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
4304 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
4305 /// used to accept such channels.
4307 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4308 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4309 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4310 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
4313 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
4314 /// it as confirmed immediately.
4316 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4317 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4318 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4320 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
4321 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
4323 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
4324 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
4326 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
4327 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
4329 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4330 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4331 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4332 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
4335 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4336 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4338 let peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| !peer.channel_by_id.is_empty());
4339 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4340 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4341 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4342 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4343 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4344 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.len() == 1;
4345 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4346 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
4347 if !channel.get().inbound_is_awaiting_accept() {
4348 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
4351 channel.get_mut().set_0conf();
4352 } else if channel.get().get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4353 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4354 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4355 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4356 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
4359 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4360 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4361 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
4363 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
4364 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
4365 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
4366 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
4367 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4368 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4369 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4370 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
4373 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4374 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4375 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned() });
4379 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4380 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4381 msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4384 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4385 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id) });
4391 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
4392 /// or 0-conf channels.
4394 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
4395 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
4396 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
4397 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> bool {
4398 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
4399 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4401 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4402 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
4403 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
4404 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
4405 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
4406 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.channel_by_id.len() {
4407 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
4411 return peers_without_funded_channels;
4414 fn unfunded_channel_count(
4415 peer: &PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, best_block_height: u32
4417 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
4418 for (_, chan) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
4419 if !chan.is_outbound() && chan.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
4420 chan.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
4422 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
4425 num_unfunded_channels
4428 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4429 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
4430 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4433 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
4434 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4437 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
4438 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
4439 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
4440 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
4442 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
4443 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
4444 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
4445 let channeled_peers_without_funding = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| !node.channel_by_id.is_empty());
4447 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4448 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4450 debug_assert!(false);
4451 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())
4453 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4454 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4456 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
4457 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
4458 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
4459 if peer_state.channel_by_id.is_empty() &&
4460 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
4461 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
4463 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4464 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
4465 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4468 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4469 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
4470 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4471 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
4472 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4475 let mut channel = match Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
4476 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
4477 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias)
4480 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4481 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
4485 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
4486 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4487 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4488 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
4490 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4491 if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
4492 if channel.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4493 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4495 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4496 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4497 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4500 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4501 pending_events.push(
4502 events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
4503 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
4504 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4505 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
4506 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
4507 channel_type: channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
4512 entry.insert(channel);
4518 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4519 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
4520 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4521 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4523 debug_assert!(false);
4524 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
4526 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4527 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4528 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4529 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4530 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), chan);
4531 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
4533 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4536 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4537 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
4538 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
4539 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4540 channel_value_satoshis: value,
4542 user_channel_id: user_id,
4547 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4548 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4550 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4551 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4553 debug_assert!(false);
4554 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
4557 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4558 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4559 let ((funding_msg, monitor), chan) =
4560 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4561 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4562 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan), chan.remove())
4564 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4567 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
4568 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4569 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
4571 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4572 match self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().entry(chan.channel_id()) {
4573 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4574 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4575 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
4576 funding_msg.channel_id))
4578 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
4579 i_e.insert(chan.get_counterparty_node_id());
4583 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
4584 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
4585 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
4586 // until we have persisted our monitor.
4587 let new_channel_id = funding_msg.channel_id;
4588 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
4589 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4593 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
4595 let chan = e.insert(chan);
4596 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, monitor_res, 0, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
4597 per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING, { peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&new_channel_id) });
4599 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
4600 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
4601 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
4602 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
4603 // We do not propagate the monitor update to the user as it would be for a monitor
4604 // that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we don't respond
4605 // with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
4606 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { shutdown_finish: Some((res, _)), .. }) = &mut res {
4614 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4615 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4616 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4617 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4619 debug_assert!(false);
4620 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4623 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4624 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4625 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4626 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4627 let monitor = try_chan_entry!(self,
4628 chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan);
4629 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor);
4630 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, 0, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4631 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
4632 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
4633 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
4634 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
4635 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
4636 shutdown_finish.0.take();
4641 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4645 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4646 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4647 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4649 debug_assert!(false);
4650 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4652 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4653 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4654 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4655 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4656 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
4657 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan);
4658 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
4659 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4660 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4661 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4662 msg: announcement_sigs,
4664 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4665 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
4666 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
4667 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
4668 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
4669 // announcement_signatures.
4670 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4671 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
4672 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4673 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4679 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, chan.get_mut());
4683 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4687 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4688 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
4689 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
4690 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4691 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4693 debug_assert!(false);
4694 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4696 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4697 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4698 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4699 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4701 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
4702 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
4703 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
4704 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
4707 let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo();
4708 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self,
4709 chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_entry);
4710 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
4712 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4713 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
4714 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
4715 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
4716 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4717 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4722 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
4723 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
4724 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4725 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update);
4726 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry);
4730 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4733 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
4734 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
4735 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
4736 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
4742 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4743 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4744 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4746 debug_assert!(false);
4747 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4749 let (tx, chan_option) = {
4750 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4751 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4752 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4753 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4754 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_entry);
4755 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
4756 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4757 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4762 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
4763 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
4764 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
4765 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
4766 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
4767 (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, chan_entry)))
4768 } else { (tx, None) }
4770 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4773 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
4774 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
4775 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
4777 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
4778 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4779 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4780 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4781 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4785 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4790 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4791 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
4792 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
4793 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
4795 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
4796 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
4797 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
4798 //but we should prevent it anyway.
4800 let pending_forward_info = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
4801 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4802 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4804 debug_assert!(false);
4805 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4807 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4808 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4809 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4810 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4812 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
4813 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
4814 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
4815 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
4816 match pending_forward_info {
4817 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
4818 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
4819 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
4820 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
4822 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
4823 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
4824 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4825 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
4826 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
4829 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
4831 _ => pending_forward_info
4834 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), chan);
4836 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4841 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4842 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
4843 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4844 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4846 debug_assert!(false);
4847 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4849 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4850 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4851 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4852 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4853 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan)
4855 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4858 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, msg.channel_id);
4862 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4863 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4864 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4866 debug_assert!(false);
4867 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4869 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4870 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4871 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4872 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4873 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan);
4875 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4880 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4881 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4882 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4884 debug_assert!(false);
4885 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4887 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4888 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4889 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4890 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4891 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
4892 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
4893 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan);
4895 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan);
4898 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4902 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4903 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4904 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4906 debug_assert!(false);
4907 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4909 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4910 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4911 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4912 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4913 let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo();
4914 let monitor_update = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
4915 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update);
4916 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4917 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock,
4918 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan)
4920 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4925 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
4926 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
4927 let mut push_forward_event = false;
4928 let mut new_intercept_events = Vec::new();
4929 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
4930 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4931 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4932 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
4933 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
4934 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
4935 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
4937 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
4938 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
4940 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4941 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
4942 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
4943 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4944 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4945 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
4947 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4948 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
4949 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.genesis_hash)
4951 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).into_inner());
4952 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4953 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
4954 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4955 new_intercept_events.push(events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
4956 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
4957 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
4958 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
4959 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
4962 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4963 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
4965 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4966 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
4967 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4968 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4969 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4970 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4971 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
4972 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4975 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
4976 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
4977 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
4982 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
4983 // payments are being processed.
4984 if forward_htlcs_empty {
4985 push_forward_event = true;
4987 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4988 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
4995 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
4996 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4999 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
5000 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5001 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
5003 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
5007 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued.
5008 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
5009 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5010 let forward_ev_exists = pending_events.iter()
5011 .find(|ev| if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false })
5013 if !forward_ev_exists {
5014 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
5016 Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
5021 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5022 let (htlcs_to_fail, res) = {
5023 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5024 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5026 debug_assert!(false);
5027 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5028 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
5029 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5030 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5031 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5032 let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo();
5033 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
5034 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update);
5035 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5036 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id,
5037 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5038 (htlcs_to_fail, res)
5040 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5043 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
5047 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5048 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5049 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5051 debug_assert!(false);
5052 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5054 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5055 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5056 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5057 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5058 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan);
5060 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5065 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5066 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5067 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5069 debug_assert!(false);
5070 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5072 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5073 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5074 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5075 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5076 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
5077 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
5080 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5081 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
5082 &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
5083 msg, &self.default_configuration
5085 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5086 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5087 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap()),
5090 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5095 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
5096 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5097 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
5098 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
5100 // It's not a local channel
5101 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5104 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5105 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
5106 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
5107 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5109 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5110 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5111 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5112 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5113 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5114 if chan.get().should_announce() {
5115 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
5116 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
5117 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
5118 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5120 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
5122 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
5123 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
5124 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
5125 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5127 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", log_bytes!(chan_id));
5128 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), chan);
5131 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5133 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
5136 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5138 let need_lnd_workaround = {
5139 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5141 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5143 debug_assert!(false);
5144 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5146 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5147 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5148 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5149 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5150 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
5151 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
5152 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
5153 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
5154 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
5155 msg, &self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash,
5156 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan);
5157 let mut channel_update = None;
5158 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
5159 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5160 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5163 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
5164 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
5165 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
5166 // they have the latest channel parameters.
5167 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
5168 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5169 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
5174 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
5175 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
5176 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get_mut(), responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
5177 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
5178 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
5179 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
5183 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5187 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
5188 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
5191 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
5192 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
5197 /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
5198 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
5199 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
5201 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5202 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
5203 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
5204 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
5205 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
5206 match monitor_event {
5207 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
5208 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
5209 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
5210 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
5212 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
5213 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
5214 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
5215 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5218 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
5219 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
5220 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
5221 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
5223 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5224 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
5225 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5226 id_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).cloned()
5229 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
5230 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5231 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
5232 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5233 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5234 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5235 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
5236 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
5237 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
5238 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5239 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5243 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
5244 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
5246 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
5248 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
5249 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5250 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5251 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5252 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5259 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
5260 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
5266 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5267 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5270 has_pending_monitor_events
5273 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
5274 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
5275 /// update events as a separate process method here.
5277 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
5278 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5279 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5280 NotifyOption::DoPersist
5282 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
5287 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
5288 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
5289 /// update was applied.
5290 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
5291 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
5292 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5293 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
5295 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
5296 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
5297 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
5298 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
5300 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5301 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5303 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5304 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5305 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
5306 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
5307 let funding_txo = chan.get_funding_txo();
5308 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
5309 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger);
5310 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
5311 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
5313 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
5314 has_monitor_update = true;
5316 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(
5317 funding_txo.expect("channel is live"), monitor_update);
5318 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5319 let channel_id: [u8; 32] = *channel_id;
5320 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id,
5321 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING,
5322 peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id));
5324 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, res));
5326 continue 'peer_loop;
5335 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
5336 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
5337 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
5340 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5341 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5347 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
5348 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
5349 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
5350 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
5351 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
5352 let mut has_update = false;
5354 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5356 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5357 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5358 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5359 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5360 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5361 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
5362 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
5363 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
5365 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5366 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
5369 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
5370 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
5371 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
5372 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5373 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5378 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5380 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
5381 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
5382 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
5388 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
5389 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5397 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5398 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5404 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
5405 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
5407 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
5408 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5409 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
5410 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
5411 // reorganized out of the main chain.
5412 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
5413 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
5414 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
5415 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
5416 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
5417 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
5418 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
5419 assert!(should_broadcast);
5420 } else { unreachable!(); }
5421 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
5423 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5427 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5428 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
5430 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
5431 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("min_value_msat of {} greater than total 21 million bitcoin supply", min_value_msat.unwrap()) });
5434 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5436 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5437 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5438 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5439 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5440 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
5441 payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
5442 user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
5443 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
5444 // it's updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
5445 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
5446 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
5447 // never fail a payment too early.
5448 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
5450 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
5453 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
5458 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
5461 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
5462 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
5464 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
5465 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
5466 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
5467 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
5469 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
5471 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5472 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5476 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5477 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5479 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5481 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
5482 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
5484 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5485 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5486 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
5487 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
5488 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
5489 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5490 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
5491 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
5492 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
5493 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
5494 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
5497 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5498 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5500 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5503 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5505 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5507 pub fn create_inbound_payment_legacy(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), APIError> {
5508 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5509 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5510 let payment_secret = self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)?;
5511 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret))
5514 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
5515 /// stored external to LDK.
5517 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
5518 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
5519 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
5521 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
5522 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
5525 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
5526 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
5527 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
5528 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
5530 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
5531 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
5532 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
5533 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
5534 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
5536 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
5537 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
5538 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
5539 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
5540 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
5542 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
5543 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
5545 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5546 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5550 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5551 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5553 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5555 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
5556 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
5558 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5559 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5560 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
5561 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
5562 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
5563 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
5564 min_final_cltv_expiry)
5567 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5568 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5570 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5573 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5575 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5577 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5578 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
5581 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
5582 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
5584 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5585 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
5586 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
5589 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
5590 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
5592 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5593 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5594 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5595 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5597 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
5598 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5599 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
5600 Some(_) => continue,
5601 None => return scid_candidate
5606 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
5608 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5609 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
5611 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
5612 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
5613 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
5617 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
5618 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
5619 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
5621 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
5622 /// times to get a unique scid.
5623 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5624 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5625 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5627 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
5628 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5629 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
5630 return scid_candidate
5634 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
5635 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
5636 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
5637 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
5639 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5640 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5641 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5642 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5643 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
5644 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
5645 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
5646 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
5655 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5656 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
5657 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5658 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
5659 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
5663 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
5664 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
5665 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5670 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
5671 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5672 if events.is_empty() { None } else { Some(events.remove(0)) }
5676 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
5677 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
5681 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
5682 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
5685 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
5686 /// using the given event handler.
5688 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
5689 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
5692 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock until the returned future completes so that
5693 // we can be sure no other persists happen while processing events.
5694 let _read_guard = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
5696 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5698 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5699 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5700 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5701 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5704 let pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5705 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5706 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5709 for event in pending_events {
5710 handler(event).await;
5713 if result == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
5714 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
5719 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5721 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5722 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5723 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5724 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5725 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5726 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5730 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
5731 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
5732 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
5733 /// is always placed next to each other.
5735 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
5736 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
5737 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
5738 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
5740 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
5741 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
5742 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
5743 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
5744 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5745 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5746 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5748 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5749 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5750 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5751 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5754 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5755 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5757 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
5758 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5761 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
5762 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5763 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5764 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5765 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5766 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
5767 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
5771 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5772 events.replace(pending_events);
5781 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5783 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5784 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5785 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5786 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5787 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5788 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5792 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
5794 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
5795 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
5796 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
5797 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5798 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5800 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5801 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5802 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5803 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5806 let pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5807 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5808 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5811 for event in pending_events {
5812 handler.handle_event(event);
5820 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5822 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5823 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5824 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5825 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5826 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5827 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5831 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5833 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5834 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
5835 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
5836 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
5837 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
5840 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
5841 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
5844 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5845 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5846 let new_height = height - 1;
5848 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
5849 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
5850 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
5851 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
5852 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
5853 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
5856 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
5860 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5862 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5863 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5864 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5865 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5866 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5867 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5871 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5872 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5873 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5874 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5876 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5877 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
5879 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5880 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)
5881 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
5883 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5884 if height < last_best_block_height {
5885 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5886 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
5890 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5891 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5892 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5893 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5895 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5896 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
5898 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5900 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
5902 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
5904 macro_rules! max_time {
5905 ($timestamp: expr) => {
5907 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
5908 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
5909 // having an explicit local time source.
5910 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
5911 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
5912 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5913 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
5914 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
5920 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
5921 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5922 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
5923 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
5927 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
5928 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
5929 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
5930 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5931 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5932 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
5933 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(block_hash)) = (chan.get_funding_txo(), chan.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
5934 res.push((funding_txo.txid, Some(block_hash)));
5941 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
5942 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5943 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
5944 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
5945 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
5946 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
5947 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5948 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5953 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5955 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5956 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5957 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5958 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5959 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5960 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5964 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
5965 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
5967 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
5968 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
5969 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5970 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5971 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5973 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5974 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5976 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5977 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5978 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5979 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5980 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5981 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
5982 let res = f(channel);
5983 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
5984 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
5985 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
5986 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
5987 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.channel_id() }));
5989 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
5990 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
5991 if channel.is_usable() {
5992 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5993 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
5994 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5995 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6000 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6004 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, channel);
6006 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
6007 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6008 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6009 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6010 msg: announcement_sigs,
6012 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6013 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
6014 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
6016 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
6017 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
6018 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
6023 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
6024 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
6025 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
6026 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
6027 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
6028 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
6029 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
6030 // is always consistent.
6031 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
6032 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
6033 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()),
6034 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
6035 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
6038 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
6039 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, channel);
6040 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
6041 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
6042 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
6043 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
6044 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6048 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
6049 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
6050 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6051 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6052 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
6053 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
6054 data: reason_message,
6064 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6065 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
6066 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
6067 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
6068 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
6069 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
6070 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
6071 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6072 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
6073 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
6075 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
6076 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
6077 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
6081 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
6084 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6085 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
6086 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6087 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6088 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
6089 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
6090 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6091 phantom_shared_secret: None,
6092 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
6095 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
6096 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6097 _ => unreachable!(),
6099 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
6100 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
6101 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
6102 log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
6108 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
6110 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
6111 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
6115 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
6116 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
6117 /// [`await_persistable_update`], [`await_persistable_update_timeout`], or a future returned by
6118 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`] is guaranteed to be woken up.
6120 /// Note that this method is not available with the `no-std` feature.
6122 /// [`await_persistable_update`]: Self::await_persistable_update
6123 /// [`await_persistable_update_timeout`]: Self::await_persistable_update_timeout
6124 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`]: Self::get_persistable_update_future
6125 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
6126 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
6127 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
6130 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
6131 /// [`await_persistable_update`], `await_persistable_update_timeout`, or a future returned by
6132 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`] is guaranteed to be woken up.
6134 /// [`await_persistable_update`]: Self::await_persistable_update
6135 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`]: Self::get_persistable_update_future
6136 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
6137 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
6140 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when a persistable update is available. Note that
6141 /// callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this [`ChannelManager`] and
6142 /// should instead register actions to be taken later.
6143 pub fn get_persistable_update_future(&self) -> Future {
6144 self.persistence_notifier.get_future()
6147 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6148 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
6149 self.persistence_notifier.notify_pending()
6152 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
6153 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
6154 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
6155 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
6158 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6159 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6160 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6161 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
6164 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6165 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6167 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6168 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6169 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6170 pub fn invoice_features(&self) -> InvoiceFeatures {
6171 provided_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
6174 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6175 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6176 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
6177 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
6180 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6181 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6182 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6183 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
6186 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6187 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6188 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
6189 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
6193 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
6194 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6196 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6197 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6198 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6199 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6200 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6201 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6205 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
6206 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6207 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6210 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
6211 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6212 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6215 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
6216 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6217 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6220 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
6221 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6222 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6225 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
6226 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6227 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6230 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
6231 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6232 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6235 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
6236 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6237 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6240 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
6241 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6242 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6245 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
6246 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6247 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6250 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
6251 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6252 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6255 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
6256 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6257 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6260 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
6261 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6262 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6265 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
6266 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6267 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6270 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
6271 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6272 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6275 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
6276 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6277 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6280 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
6281 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6282 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
6285 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
6290 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
6291 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6292 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6295 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
6296 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6297 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6298 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6300 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
6301 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6302 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
6303 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6304 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6305 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6306 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6307 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
6308 if chan.is_shutdown() {
6309 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
6310 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
6315 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
6317 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
6318 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
6319 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
6320 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
6321 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
6322 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
6323 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
6324 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
6325 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
6326 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
6327 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
6328 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
6329 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6330 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
6331 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6332 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
6333 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
6334 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
6335 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
6336 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
6337 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
6340 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
6341 peer_state.is_connected = false;
6342 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
6343 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
6346 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
6348 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6350 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6351 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6355 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
6356 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
6357 log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6361 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6363 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
6364 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
6365 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
6366 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
6367 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
6368 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
6371 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6372 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
6373 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6374 if inbound_peer_limited {
6377 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
6378 channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
6379 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
6380 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
6381 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
6385 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
6386 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
6387 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
6389 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6390 if inbound_peer_limited &&
6391 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
6392 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
6397 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
6398 peer_state.is_connected = true;
6403 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6405 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6406 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6407 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6408 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6409 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6410 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6411 let retain = if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
6412 if !chan.have_received_message() {
6413 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
6414 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
6415 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
6419 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
6420 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6421 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
6426 if retain && chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6427 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.default_configuration) {
6428 if let Ok(update_msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
6429 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement {
6430 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6439 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
6443 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
6444 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6446 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
6447 let channel_ids: Vec<[u8; 32]> = {
6448 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6449 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
6450 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
6451 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6452 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6453 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
6455 for channel_id in channel_ids {
6456 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6457 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6461 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
6462 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6463 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
6464 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
6465 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6466 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6467 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
6468 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash) {
6469 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
6470 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6478 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6479 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6483 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6484 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
6487 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
6488 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
6492 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6493 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6494 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
6495 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6498 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6499 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6501 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6502 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6503 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6504 pub(crate) fn provided_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InvoiceFeatures {
6505 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6508 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6509 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6510 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
6511 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6514 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6515 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6516 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6517 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
6520 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6521 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6522 pub fn provided_init_features(_config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
6523 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
6524 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
6525 // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
6526 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
6527 features.set_data_loss_protect_optional();
6528 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
6529 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
6530 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
6531 features.set_payment_secret_required();
6532 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
6533 features.set_wumbo_optional();
6534 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
6535 features.set_channel_type_optional();
6536 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
6537 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
6539 { // Attributes are not allowed on if expressions on our current MSRV of 1.41.
6540 if _config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
6541 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
6547 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6548 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6550 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
6551 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
6552 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
6553 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
6556 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
6557 (2, node_id, required),
6558 (4, features, required),
6559 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
6560 (8, forwarding_info, option),
6561 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6562 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6565 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
6566 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6567 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6568 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6569 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
6570 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
6571 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6572 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
6573 (2, self.channel_id, required),
6574 (3, self.channel_type, option),
6575 (4, self.counterparty, required),
6576 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
6577 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
6578 (7, self.config, option),
6579 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
6580 (9, self.confirmations, option),
6581 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
6582 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6583 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6584 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
6585 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6586 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6587 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6588 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6589 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6590 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
6591 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
6592 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
6593 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
6594 (30, self.is_usable, required),
6595 (32, self.is_public, required),
6596 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6597 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6598 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6599 (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
6605 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
6606 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6607 _init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6608 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
6609 (2, channel_id, required),
6610 (3, channel_type, option),
6611 (4, counterparty, required),
6612 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6613 (6, funding_txo, option),
6614 (7, config, option),
6615 (8, short_channel_id, option),
6616 (9, confirmations, option),
6617 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
6618 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6619 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6620 (16, balance_msat, required),
6621 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6622 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6623 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6624 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6625 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6626 (22, confirmations_required, option),
6627 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
6628 (26, is_outbound, required),
6629 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
6630 (30, is_usable, required),
6631 (32, is_public, required),
6632 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6633 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6634 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6635 (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
6638 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6639 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6640 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
6641 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
6642 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
6646 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
6648 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
6649 outbound_scid_alias,
6653 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
6654 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
6656 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
6657 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
6658 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
6659 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
6660 confirmations_required,
6662 force_close_spend_delay,
6663 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
6664 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
6665 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
6666 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
6667 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
6668 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
6669 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
6674 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
6675 (2, channels, vec_type),
6676 (4, phantom_scid, required),
6677 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
6680 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
6682 (0, onion_packet, required),
6683 (2, short_channel_id, required),
6686 (0, payment_data, required),
6687 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6688 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6690 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
6691 (0, payment_preimage, required),
6692 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6696 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
6697 (0, routing, required),
6698 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
6699 (4, payment_hash, required),
6700 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
6701 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
6702 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
6706 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6707 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6709 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
6711 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6712 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6713 reason.write(writer)?;
6715 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6716 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
6719 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6720 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6721 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
6722 failure_code.write(writer)?;
6729 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6730 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6731 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6734 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6735 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6736 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6737 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
6741 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6742 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6743 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6744 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
6745 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
6748 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
6749 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
6750 // messages contained in the variants.
6751 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
6752 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
6753 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
6755 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6756 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6757 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6758 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6759 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
6762 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6763 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6764 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6765 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6766 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
6768 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6773 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
6778 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
6779 (0, short_channel_id, required),
6780 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6781 (2, outpoint, required),
6782 (4, htlc_id, required),
6783 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
6786 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
6787 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6788 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
6789 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
6790 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
6792 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6793 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
6794 (1, self.total_msat, required),
6795 (2, self.value, required),
6796 (4, payment_data, option),
6797 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
6798 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
6804 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
6805 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6806 let mut prev_hop = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
6808 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
6809 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
6810 let mut total_msat = None;
6811 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
6812 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6813 (0, prev_hop, required),
6814 (1, total_msat, option),
6815 (2, value, required),
6816 (4, payment_data, option),
6817 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
6818 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
6820 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
6822 if payment_data.is_some() {
6823 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6825 if total_msat.is_none() {
6826 total_msat = Some(value);
6828 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
6831 if total_msat.is_none() {
6832 if payment_data.is_none() {
6833 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6835 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
6837 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
6841 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
6844 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
6851 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
6852 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6853 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6856 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
6857 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
6858 let mut path: Option<Vec<RouteHop>> = Some(Vec::new());
6859 let mut payment_id = None;
6860 let mut payment_secret = None;
6861 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
6862 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6863 (0, session_priv, required),
6864 (1, payment_id, option),
6865 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6866 (3, payment_secret, option),
6867 (4, path, vec_type),
6868 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
6870 if payment_id.is_none() {
6871 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
6873 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
6875 if path.is_none() || path.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
6876 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6878 let path = path.unwrap();
6879 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
6880 if params.final_cltv_expiry_delta == 0 {
6881 params.final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.last().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta;
6884 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
6885 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
6886 first_hop_htlc_msat,
6888 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
6892 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6893 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6898 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
6899 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
6901 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id, payment_secret } => {
6903 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
6904 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6905 (0, session_priv, required),
6906 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
6907 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6908 (3, payment_secret, option),
6909 (4, *path, vec_type),
6910 (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
6913 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
6915 field.write(writer)?;
6922 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
6923 (0, forward_info, required),
6924 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
6925 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
6926 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
6927 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
6930 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
6932 (0, htlc_id, required),
6933 (2, err_packet, required),
6938 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
6939 (0, payment_secret, required),
6940 (2, expiry_time, required),
6941 (4, user_payment_id, required),
6942 (6, payment_preimage, required),
6943 (8, min_value_msat, required),
6946 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6948 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6949 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6950 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6951 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6952 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6953 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6957 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6958 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
6960 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6962 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
6964 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6965 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
6966 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
6969 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
6971 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6972 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
6973 let mut number_of_channels = 0;
6974 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6975 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6976 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6977 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
6978 serializable_peer_count += 1;
6980 number_of_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.len();
6981 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
6982 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6983 unfunded_channels += 1;
6988 ((number_of_channels - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
6990 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6991 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6992 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6993 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
6994 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6995 channel.write(writer)?;
7002 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7003 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7004 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
7005 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
7006 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7007 for forward in pending_forwards {
7008 forward.write(writer)?;
7013 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
7015 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7016 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
7017 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7019 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
7020 (claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7021 for (payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops)) in claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
7022 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7023 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7024 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
7025 htlc.write(writer)?;
7027 htlc_purposes.push(purpose);
7030 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
7031 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
7032 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7033 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
7034 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
7035 // per_peer_state lock at all.
7036 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
7039 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
7040 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
7041 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
7042 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
7043 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
7045 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
7046 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
7047 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
7048 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
7049 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
7050 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
7051 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
7056 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7057 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7058 for event in events.iter() {
7059 event.write(writer)?;
7062 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
7063 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7064 for event in background_events.iter() {
7066 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
7068 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
7069 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
7074 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
7075 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
7076 // likely to be identical.
7077 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
7078 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
7080 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7081 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
7082 hash.write(writer)?;
7083 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
7086 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
7087 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
7088 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7089 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
7090 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
7093 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
7094 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7096 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7097 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7098 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
7099 session_priv.write(writer)?;
7102 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
7103 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
7107 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
7108 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
7109 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7111 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7112 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7113 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
7119 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
7120 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7121 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
7122 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
7125 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
7126 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
7127 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
7128 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
7129 pending_claiming_payments = None;
7132 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7133 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
7134 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7135 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
7136 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
7137 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
7138 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
7139 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
7140 (9, htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7141 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
7148 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
7150 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
7152 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7153 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
7154 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
7155 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
7156 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
7157 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
7158 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
7159 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
7160 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7161 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
7162 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
7163 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
7164 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
7166 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
7167 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
7169 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
7170 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
7172 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
7173 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
7174 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
7175 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
7176 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
7177 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
7179 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
7180 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7182 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7183 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7184 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7185 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7186 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7187 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7191 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
7192 pub entropy_source: ES,
7194 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
7195 pub node_signer: NS,
7197 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
7198 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
7200 pub signer_provider: SP,
7202 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7204 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
7205 pub fee_estimator: F,
7206 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7208 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
7209 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
7210 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
7211 pub chain_monitor: M,
7213 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
7214 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
7215 /// force-closed during deserialization.
7216 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
7217 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
7218 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
7220 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
7222 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
7223 /// deserialization.
7225 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
7226 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
7227 pub default_config: UserConfig,
7229 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
7230 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
7232 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
7233 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
7234 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
7235 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
7237 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
7240 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
7241 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>,
7244 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7245 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7247 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7248 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7249 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7250 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7251 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7252 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7256 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
7257 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
7258 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
7259 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
7260 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>) -> Self {
7262 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
7263 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
7268 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
7269 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
7270 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7271 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
7273 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7274 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7275 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7276 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7277 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7278 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7282 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7283 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
7284 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
7288 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7289 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
7291 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7292 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7293 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7294 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7295 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7296 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7300 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7301 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7303 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7304 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7305 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7307 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
7309 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7310 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7311 let mut peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7312 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7313 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7314 let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
7315 for _ in 0..channel_count {
7316 let mut channel: Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (
7317 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
7319 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7320 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
7321 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
7322 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7323 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7324 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7325 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7326 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
7327 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
7328 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7329 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7330 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7331 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7332 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7333 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7334 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7335 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7336 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7337 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7338 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7339 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
7340 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
7341 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
7342 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7343 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7344 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
7345 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
7346 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
7347 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7348 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7349 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7350 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
7352 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
7353 let mut found_htlc = false;
7354 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
7355 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
7358 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
7359 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
7360 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
7361 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
7362 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
7363 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
7364 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
7365 log_info!(args.logger,
7366 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
7367 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7368 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7372 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7373 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
7374 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7376 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7377 id_to_peer.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel.get_counterparty_node_id());
7379 match peer_channels.entry(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
7380 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7381 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
7382 by_id_map.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
7384 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7385 let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
7386 by_id_map.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
7387 entry.insert(by_id_map);
7391 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
7392 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
7393 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
7394 // safely discard the channel.
7395 let _ = channel.force_shutdown(false);
7396 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7397 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7398 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7399 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
7402 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7403 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7404 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7405 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7406 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7407 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7411 for (funding_txo, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
7412 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
7413 log_info!(args.logger, "Broadcasting latest holder commitment transaction for closed channel {}", log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
7414 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
7418 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
7419 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7420 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7421 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
7422 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7423 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7424 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
7425 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
7426 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
7428 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
7431 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7432 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7433 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
7434 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7435 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7436 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
7437 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
7438 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
7440 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
7443 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7444 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>)>()));
7445 for _ in 0..peer_count {
7446 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7447 let peer_state = PeerState {
7448 channel_by_id: peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new()),
7449 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
7450 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
7451 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
7452 is_connected: false,
7454 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
7457 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7458 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
7459 for _ in 0..event_count {
7460 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
7461 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
7466 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7467 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
7468 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
7469 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7470 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
7471 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7475 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
7476 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7478 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7479 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
7480 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
7481 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
7482 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7486 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7487 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
7488 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
7489 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
7490 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
7491 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
7492 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
7494 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
7495 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7499 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
7500 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
7501 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
7502 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
7503 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
7504 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7505 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7506 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
7507 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
7508 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = Some(Vec::new());
7509 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7510 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
7511 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7512 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
7513 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
7514 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
7515 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
7516 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
7517 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7518 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
7520 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
7521 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7524 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
7525 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7528 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
7529 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
7532 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
7533 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
7534 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
7535 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
7536 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
7537 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
7539 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
7541 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
7542 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
7543 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
7547 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
7548 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
7549 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
7550 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
7551 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
7552 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
7553 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
7555 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7556 if id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
7557 for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
7558 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, payment_secret, .. } = htlc_source {
7559 if path.is_empty() {
7560 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
7561 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7564 let path_amt = path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
7565 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
7566 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
7567 match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
7568 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7569 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
7570 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
7571 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
7573 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7574 let path_fee = path.get_path_fees();
7575 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
7576 retry_strategy: None,
7577 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
7578 payment_params: None,
7579 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
7580 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
7582 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
7583 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
7584 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
7585 total_msat: path_amt,
7586 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
7588 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
7589 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
7594 for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
7596 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
7597 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
7598 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
7599 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
7601 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
7602 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
7603 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
7604 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
7605 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
7606 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
7607 forwards.retain(|forward| {
7608 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
7609 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
7610 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
7611 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
7616 !forwards.is_empty()
7618 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
7619 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
7620 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
7621 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
7622 pending_events_read.retain(|event| {
7623 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
7624 intercepted_id != ev_id
7631 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
7632 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
7633 let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
7634 // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
7635 // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
7636 // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
7637 // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
7638 // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
7639 // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
7640 // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
7641 // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
7642 pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv, path, false, &pending_events, &args.logger);
7643 pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
7652 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
7653 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
7654 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
7655 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
7656 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
7657 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
7658 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
7659 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
7663 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
7664 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
7666 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
7667 if let Some(mut purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
7668 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
7669 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7671 for (purpose, (payment_hash, previous_hops)) in purposes.drain(..).zip(claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..)) {
7672 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7675 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
7676 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
7677 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
7678 if previous_hops.is_empty() {
7679 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7681 let purpose = match &previous_hops[0].onion_payload {
7682 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
7683 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
7684 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
7685 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
7686 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
7687 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
7688 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
7690 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7691 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7695 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
7697 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
7699 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
7700 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
7702 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7706 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7707 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7709 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
7711 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7713 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
7714 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
7715 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
7716 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7720 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
7721 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
7722 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7723 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7724 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
7725 if chan.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
7726 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
7728 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
7729 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
7730 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
7732 chan.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
7733 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias()) {
7734 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7735 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7736 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7737 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7739 if chan.is_usable() {
7740 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
7741 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7742 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7743 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7744 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7750 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
7752 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7753 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
7754 if let Some((payment_purpose, claimable_htlcs)) = claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
7755 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7756 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
7757 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
7758 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
7759 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
7760 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
7761 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
7762 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
7764 for claimable_htlc in claimable_htlcs {
7765 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
7767 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
7768 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
7769 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
7770 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
7772 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
7773 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
7774 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
7775 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
7777 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
7778 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
7779 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
7780 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
7782 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
7783 if let Some(peer_node_id) = id_to_peer.get(&previous_channel_id){
7784 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
7785 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7786 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7787 if let Some(channel) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
7788 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
7791 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
7792 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
7795 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
7798 purpose: payment_purpose,
7799 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
7805 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
7806 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get_mut(&node_id) {
7807 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
7809 log_error!(args.logger, "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
7810 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7814 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
7816 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
7817 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
7818 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
7819 router: args.router,
7821 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
7823 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
7824 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
7825 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
7826 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
7828 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
7829 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_htlcs, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
7830 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
7831 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
7832 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
7833 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
7835 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
7840 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
7842 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
7844 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
7845 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
7846 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
7847 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
7849 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
7850 node_signer: args.node_signer,
7851 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
7853 logger: args.logger,
7854 default_configuration: args.default_config,
7857 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7858 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
7859 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
7860 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
7861 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
7864 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
7865 //connection or two.
7867 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
7873 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7874 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7875 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
7876 use core::time::Duration;
7877 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
7878 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
7879 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, InterceptId};
7880 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
7881 use crate::ln::msgs;
7882 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
7883 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
7884 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7885 use crate::util::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
7886 use crate::util::test_utils;
7887 use crate::util::config::ChannelConfig;
7888 use crate::chain::keysinterface::EntropySource;
7891 fn test_notify_limits() {
7892 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
7893 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
7894 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7895 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7896 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7897 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7899 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
7900 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
7901 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7902 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7903 assert!(nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7905 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7907 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
7908 // to connect messages with new values
7909 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7910 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7911 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
7912 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
7913 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
7914 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
7916 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
7917 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7918 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7919 // ... but the last node should not.
7920 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7921 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
7922 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7923 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7925 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
7926 // about the channel.
7927 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7928 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7929 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7931 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
7933 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7934 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7935 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7936 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7937 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7938 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7940 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
7941 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7942 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7944 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
7945 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
7946 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
7947 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
7948 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
7949 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
7951 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
7952 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
7953 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7954 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7955 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7956 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7957 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7958 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7960 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
7961 // the channel info has updated.
7962 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7963 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7964 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7965 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7966 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7967 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7971 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
7972 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
7974 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7975 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7976 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7977 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7978 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7980 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
7981 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
7982 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
7983 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
7985 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
7986 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
7987 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
7988 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
7989 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
7990 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
7991 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7992 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7993 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7994 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
7996 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
7997 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
7998 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7999 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8000 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8001 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8002 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8003 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8004 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8005 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8006 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8007 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
8008 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8009 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8010 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8011 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8012 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8013 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8014 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8015 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8016 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8017 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
8019 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
8020 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
8021 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8022 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8023 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8024 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
8026 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
8027 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
8028 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
8029 // lightning messages manually.
8030 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8031 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
8032 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8034 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8035 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8036 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
8037 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8038 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8039 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
8040 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8041 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8042 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
8043 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8044 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8045 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8046 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
8047 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8048 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8049 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
8050 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8051 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8052 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
8053 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8054 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
8055 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8056 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8057 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
8058 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8060 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
8061 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
8062 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8063 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
8065 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
8066 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
8067 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
8068 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
8070 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8073 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
8074 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
8075 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
8076 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
8078 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8081 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
8082 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
8083 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
8084 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
8086 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8091 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
8092 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
8093 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
8094 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
8095 // fails as expected.
8096 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8097 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8098 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8099 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8100 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8101 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8102 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8104 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
8105 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
8106 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
8108 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
8109 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8110 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV),
8111 final_value_msat: 100_000,
8113 let route = find_route(
8114 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
8115 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8117 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8118 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8119 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8120 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8121 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8122 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8123 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8124 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8125 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8126 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
8127 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
8128 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8129 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
8130 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8131 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8132 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8133 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8134 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8135 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8136 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8137 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8138 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8139 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
8141 // Finally, claim the original payment.
8142 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
8144 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
8145 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8146 let route = find_route(
8147 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
8148 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8150 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8151 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8152 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8153 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8154 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
8155 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
8156 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
8158 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
8159 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8160 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8161 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8162 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8163 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8164 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8165 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8166 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8167 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8168 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8169 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8170 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
8171 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8172 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8173 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8174 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8175 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8176 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8177 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8178 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8179 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8180 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
8182 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
8183 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
8187 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
8188 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
8189 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
8190 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8191 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8192 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8193 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8195 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8196 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8198 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
8199 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8200 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
8201 final_value_msat: 10_000,
8203 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
8204 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
8205 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8206 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8207 let route = find_route(
8208 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
8209 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8212 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8213 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
8214 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash, None, PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
8215 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
8216 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8218 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8219 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8220 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8221 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8222 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8223 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8224 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8226 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
8230 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
8231 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
8232 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8233 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8234 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8235 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8237 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8238 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8240 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
8241 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8242 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
8243 final_value_msat: 10_000,
8245 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
8246 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
8247 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8248 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8249 let route = find_route(
8250 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
8251 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8254 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8255 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8256 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
8257 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, Some(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
8258 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
8259 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8261 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8262 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8263 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8264 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8265 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8266 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8267 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8269 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
8273 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
8274 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8275 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8276 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8277 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8279 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8280 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8281 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8282 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8284 // Marshall an MPP route.
8285 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8286 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8287 route.paths.push(path);
8288 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8289 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8290 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8291 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8292 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8293 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8295 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None, PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap_err() {
8296 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
8297 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
8299 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
8304 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
8305 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8306 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8307 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8308 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8310 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8312 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8313 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8315 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8316 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8317 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8318 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8321 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
8322 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
8323 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8324 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
8325 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
8326 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
8329 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
8332 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
8333 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
8338 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
8339 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
8340 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8341 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8342 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8343 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8345 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
8346 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
8348 total_msat: 100_000,
8351 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
8352 // payment verification fails as expected.
8353 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
8354 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
8355 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
8356 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
8358 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
8362 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
8363 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
8367 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
8368 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
8369 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
8370 // the channel is successfully closed.
8371 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8372 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8373 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8374 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8376 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8377 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8378 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
8379 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8380 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
8382 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
8383 let channel_id = &tx.txid().into_inner();
8385 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
8386 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
8387 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8388 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8391 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8393 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8394 // as it has the funding transaction.
8395 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8396 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8397 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8400 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8402 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8404 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8406 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8407 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8408 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8412 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8413 // as it has the funding transaction.
8414 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8415 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8416 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8418 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8419 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8420 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
8421 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8422 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
8423 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
8424 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
8426 nodes[0].node.close_channel(channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8427 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8428 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8429 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
8431 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8432 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
8434 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
8435 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
8436 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
8437 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
8438 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8439 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8440 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8444 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
8445 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
8446 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
8447 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
8448 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8449 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8450 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8453 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8455 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
8456 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
8457 // closing transaction).
8458 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
8459 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
8460 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8462 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
8463 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
8464 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8465 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8466 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8469 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8471 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
8473 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
8474 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
8475 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8477 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8479 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8480 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8483 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
8484 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
8485 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
8488 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
8489 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
8490 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
8493 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
8495 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
8496 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
8498 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
8499 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
8501 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
8502 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
8507 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
8508 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
8509 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
8510 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
8511 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8512 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
8513 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
8514 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
8517 let channel_id = [4; 32];
8518 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8519 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
8521 // Test the API functions.
8522 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None), unkown_public_key);
8524 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
8526 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8528 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8530 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8532 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
8534 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
8538 fn test_connection_limiting() {
8539 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
8540 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8541 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8542 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8543 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8545 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
8547 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8548 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8550 let mut funding_tx = None;
8551 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
8552 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8553 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8556 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
8557 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
8558 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
8559 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
8560 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8562 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8563 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8564 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8566 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
8567 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8569 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8572 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
8573 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8574 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8575 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
8576 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8578 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
8579 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
8581 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
8582 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
8583 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
8584 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
8585 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
8586 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8587 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8589 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
8590 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
8591 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8592 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap_err();
8594 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
8595 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
8596 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8597 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8598 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
8599 for ev in chan_closed_events {
8600 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
8602 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8603 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8604 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
8605 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap_err();
8607 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
8608 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
8609 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
8610 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8612 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
8613 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
8615 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
8616 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
8617 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
8618 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
8619 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8621 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8622 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
8623 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8625 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
8626 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8627 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
8629 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
8630 // "protected" and can connect again.
8631 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
8632 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
8633 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8634 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8636 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
8638 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8639 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
8643 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
8644 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
8645 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8646 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8647 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8648 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8650 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
8652 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8653 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8655 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
8656 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8657 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8658 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8661 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
8663 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8664 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
8665 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8667 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
8668 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8669 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8671 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
8672 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8673 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
8674 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8678 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
8679 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
8680 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
8681 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8682 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8683 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
8684 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8685 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
8686 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8688 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
8690 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8691 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8693 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
8694 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
8695 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
8696 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
8697 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8698 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8700 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8701 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8703 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8704 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
8706 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8708 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
8709 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8712 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
8713 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
8714 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
8715 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8716 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8717 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8718 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8720 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8721 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
8722 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
8723 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
8727 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8729 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
8730 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8732 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
8733 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8734 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8736 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8737 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
8739 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8741 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
8746 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
8747 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
8748 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
8749 // the channel without the anchors feature.
8750 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8751 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8752 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
8753 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
8754 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8755 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
8756 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8758 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None).unwrap();
8759 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8760 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8762 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8763 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8765 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8766 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8768 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8771 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8772 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
8774 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8775 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8777 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8781 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
8783 use crate::chain::Listen;
8784 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
8785 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{EntropySource, KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
8786 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId};
8787 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
8788 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
8789 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
8790 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, get_route};
8791 use crate::util::test_utils;
8792 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
8793 use crate::util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
8795 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
8796 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
8797 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
8799 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
8803 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
8804 node: &'a ChannelManager<
8805 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
8806 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
8807 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
8808 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
8809 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
8810 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>,
8815 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
8816 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
8819 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
8820 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
8821 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
8823 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
8825 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
8826 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
8827 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
8828 let scorer = Mutex::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
8829 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &scorer);
8831 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
8832 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
8834 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
8835 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
8836 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
8837 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
8839 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
8841 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
8843 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
8844 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
8845 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
8846 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
8847 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
8849 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
8851 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
8853 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: node_b.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8854 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: node_a.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
8855 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8856 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8857 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8860 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
8861 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8862 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
8864 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8865 } else { panic!(); }
8867 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8868 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8870 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
8873 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
8876 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
8877 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
8879 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8880 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8881 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
8882 match msg_events[0] {
8883 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
8884 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
8885 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
8889 match msg_events[1] {
8890 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8894 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8895 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
8897 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8898 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
8900 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8903 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8904 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
8906 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8907 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
8909 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8912 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a);
8914 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
8915 macro_rules! send_payment {
8916 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
8917 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
8918 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
8919 .with_features($node_b.invoice_features());
8920 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8921 let seed = [3u8; 32];
8922 let keys_manager = KeysManager::new(&seed, 42, 42);
8923 let random_seed_bytes = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8924 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &dummy_graph.read_only(),
8925 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
8927 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
8928 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
8930 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
8931 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
8933 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8934 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
8935 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8936 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
8937 let (raa, cs) = do_get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
8938 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
8939 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
8940 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8942 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
8943 expect_payment_claimable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
8944 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8945 expect_payment_claimed!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
8947 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
8948 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
8949 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
8950 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8951 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
8953 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
8956 let (raa, cs) = do_get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
8957 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
8958 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
8959 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8961 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
8966 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
8967 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);