1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`find_route`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 //! [`find_route`]: crate::routing::router::find_route
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
24 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
25 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
27 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
30 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
32 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
35 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
38 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
39 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
40 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
41 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
42 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
43 // construct one themselves.
44 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
45 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
46 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
47 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
48 use crate::ln::features::InvoiceFeatures;
49 use crate::routing::router::{InFlightHtlcs, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RoutePath, RouteParameters};
51 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
52 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
53 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
54 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, Recipient};
55 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig};
56 use crate::util::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
57 use crate::util::{byte_utils, events};
58 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
59 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
60 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
61 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
62 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
65 use crate::prelude::*;
67 use core::cell::RefCell;
69 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock};
70 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
71 use core::time::Duration;
74 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
76 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
77 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
78 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
80 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
81 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
82 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
83 // before we forward it.
85 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
86 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
87 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
88 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
89 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
91 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
92 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
94 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
95 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
96 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
97 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
100 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
101 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
102 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
105 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
106 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
110 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
111 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
112 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
113 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
114 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
115 pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
116 pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
117 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
120 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
121 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
122 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
123 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
126 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
127 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
128 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
129 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
130 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
133 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
134 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
136 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
137 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
138 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
141 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
142 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
144 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
145 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
148 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
149 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
152 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
156 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
157 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
158 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
159 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
160 short_channel_id: u64,
162 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
163 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
165 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
166 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
171 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
173 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
174 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
175 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
177 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
178 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
181 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
182 struct ClaimableHTLC {
183 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
185 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
187 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
189 /// The sum total of all MPP parts
193 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
194 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
195 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
196 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
198 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
199 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
204 impl Readable for PaymentId {
205 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
206 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
211 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
212 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
213 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
214 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
216 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
217 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
222 impl Readable for InterceptId {
223 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
224 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
228 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
229 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
230 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
231 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
232 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
235 session_priv: SecretKey,
236 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
237 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
238 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
239 payment_id: PaymentId,
240 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
241 payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters>,
244 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
245 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
246 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
248 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
250 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
252 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_secret, first_hop_htlc_msat, payment_params } => {
255 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
256 payment_id.hash(hasher);
257 payment_secret.hash(hasher);
258 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
259 payment_params.hash(hasher);
264 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
267 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
268 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
270 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
271 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
272 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
273 payment_secret: None,
274 payment_params: None,
279 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
280 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
282 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
290 impl core::fmt::Debug for HTLCFailReason {
291 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut core::fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), core::fmt::Error> {
293 HTLCFailReason::Reason { ref failure_code, .. } => {
294 write!(f, "HTLC error code {}", failure_code)
296 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { .. } => {
297 write!(f, "pre-built LightningError")
303 impl HTLCFailReason {
304 pub(super) fn reason(failure_code: u16, data: Vec<u8>) -> Self {
305 Self::Reason { failure_code, data }
308 pub(super) fn from_failure_code(failure_code: u16) -> Self {
309 Self::Reason { failure_code, data: Vec::new() }
312 fn get_encrypted_failure_packet(&self, incoming_packet_shared_secret: &[u8; 32], phantom_shared_secret: &Option<[u8; 32]>) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
314 HTLCFailReason::Reason { ref failure_code, ref data } => {
315 if let Some(phantom_ss) = phantom_shared_secret {
316 let phantom_packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(phantom_ss, *failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
317 let encrypted_phantom_packet = onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(phantom_ss, &phantom_packet);
318 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, &encrypted_phantom_packet.data[..])
320 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, *failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
321 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
324 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
325 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
330 fn decode_onion_failure<T: secp256k1::Signing, L: Deref>(&self, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, logger: &L, htlc_source: &HTLCSource) -> (Option<crate::routing::gossip::NetworkUpdate>, Option<u64>, bool, Option<u16>, Option<Vec<u8>>) where L::Target: Logger {
332 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
333 onion_utils::process_onion_failure(secp_ctx, logger, &htlc_source, err.data.clone())
335 HTLCFailReason::Reason { ref failure_code, ref data, .. } => {
336 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
337 // TODO: We'd like to generate a NetworkUpdate for temporary
338 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as find_route
339 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
341 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
342 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
343 if let &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, .. } = htlc_source {
344 (None, Some(path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id), true, Some(*failure_code), Some(data.clone()))
345 } else { unreachable!(); }
351 struct ReceiveError {
357 /// Return value for claim_funds_from_hop
358 enum ClaimFundsFromHop {
360 MonitorUpdateFail(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal, Option<u64>),
365 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>);
367 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
368 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
369 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
370 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
371 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
373 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
374 err: msgs::LightningError,
375 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
376 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
378 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
380 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
382 err: LightningError {
384 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
385 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
392 shutdown_finish: None,
396 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
398 err: LightningError {
400 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
403 shutdown_finish: None,
407 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
408 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
411 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
413 err: LightningError {
415 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
416 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
422 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
423 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
427 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
430 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
432 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
433 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
437 log_level: Level::Warn,
440 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
442 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
444 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
446 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
447 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
455 shutdown_finish: None,
460 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
461 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
462 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
463 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
464 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
466 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
467 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
468 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
469 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
470 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
471 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
472 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
474 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
478 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
479 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<Signer: Sign> {
480 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
481 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
482 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
483 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
486 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
487 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
488 /// quite some time lag.
489 enum BackgroundEvent {
490 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
491 /// commitment transaction.
492 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
495 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
496 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
498 latest_features: InitFeatures,
501 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
502 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
504 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
507 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
508 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
509 struct PendingInboundPayment {
510 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
511 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
512 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
513 /// this payment being removed.
515 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
516 user_payment_id: u64,
517 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
518 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
519 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
522 /// Stores the session_priv for each part of a payment that is still pending. For versions 0.0.102
523 /// and later, also stores information for retrying the payment.
524 pub(crate) enum PendingOutboundPayment {
526 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
529 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
530 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
531 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
532 pending_amt_msat: u64,
533 /// Used to track the fee paid. Only present if the payment was serialized on 0.0.103+.
534 pending_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
535 /// The total payment amount across all paths, used to verify that a retry is not overpaying.
537 /// Our best known block height at the time this payment was initiated.
538 starting_block_height: u32,
540 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
541 /// been resolved. This ensures we don't look up pending payments in ChannelMonitors on restart
542 /// and add a pending payment that was already fulfilled.
544 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
545 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
546 timer_ticks_without_htlcs: u8,
548 /// When a payer gives up trying to retry a payment, they inform us, letting us generate a
549 /// `PaymentFailed` event when all HTLCs have irrevocably failed. This avoids a number of race
550 /// conditions in MPP-aware payment retriers (1), where the possibility of multiple
551 /// `PaymentPathFailed` events with `all_paths_failed` can be pending at once, confusing a
552 /// downstream event handler as to when a payment has actually failed.
554 /// (1) https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1164
556 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
557 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
561 impl PendingOutboundPayment {
562 fn is_fulfilled(&self) -> bool {
564 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => true,
568 fn abandoned(&self) -> bool {
570 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => true,
574 fn get_pending_fee_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
576 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { pending_fee_msat, .. } => pending_fee_msat.clone(),
581 fn payment_hash(&self) -> Option<PaymentHash> {
583 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None,
584 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
585 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => *payment_hash,
586 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
590 fn mark_fulfilled(&mut self) {
591 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
592 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
593 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
594 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
595 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
596 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. }
599 let payment_hash = self.payment_hash();
600 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, payment_hash, timer_ticks_without_htlcs: 0 };
603 fn mark_abandoned(&mut self) -> Result<(), ()> {
604 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
605 let our_payment_hash;
606 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
607 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } |
608 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } =>
610 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } |
611 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } => {
612 our_payment_hash = *payment_hash;
616 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash: our_payment_hash };
620 /// panics if path is None and !self.is_fulfilled
621 fn remove(&mut self, session_priv: &[u8; 32], path: Option<&Vec<RouteHop>>) -> bool {
622 let remove_res = match self {
623 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
624 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
625 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
626 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => {
627 session_privs.remove(session_priv)
631 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
632 let path = path.expect("Fulfilling a payment should always come with a path");
633 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
634 *pending_amt_msat -= path_last_hop.fee_msat;
635 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
636 *fee_msat -= path.get_path_fees();
643 fn insert(&mut self, session_priv: [u8; 32], path: &Vec<RouteHop>) -> bool {
644 let insert_res = match self {
645 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
646 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
647 session_privs.insert(session_priv)
649 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => false,
650 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => false,
653 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
654 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
655 *pending_amt_msat += path_last_hop.fee_msat;
656 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
657 *fee_msat += path.get_path_fees();
664 fn remaining_parts(&self) -> usize {
666 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
667 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
668 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
669 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => {
676 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
677 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
678 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
679 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
680 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
681 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
682 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
684 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
685 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>;
687 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
688 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
689 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
690 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
691 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
692 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
693 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
694 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
696 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
697 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<&'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
699 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
700 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
702 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
703 /// to individual Channels.
705 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
706 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
707 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
708 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
710 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
711 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
712 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
713 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
714 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
715 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
716 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
718 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
719 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
720 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
721 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
724 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
725 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
726 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
727 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
728 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
730 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
731 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
732 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
733 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
734 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
737 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
738 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
739 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
740 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
741 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
745 // `total_consistency_lock`
747 // |__`forward_htlcs`
749 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
751 // |__`pending_inbound_payments`
753 // | |__`claimable_htlcs`
755 // | |__`pending_outbound_payments`
757 // | |__`channel_state`
761 // | |__`short_to_chan_info`
763 // | |__`per_peer_state`
765 // | |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
769 // | |__`pending_events`
771 // | |__`pending_background_events`
773 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
774 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
775 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
776 K::Target: KeysInterface,
777 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
780 default_configuration: UserConfig,
781 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
782 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
786 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
788 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
790 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
791 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
793 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
794 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
795 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>>,
796 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
797 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>>,
799 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
800 /// expose them to users via a PaymentReceived event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
801 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
802 /// after we generate a PaymentReceived upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
804 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
805 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
807 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
808 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
809 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
810 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
811 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
812 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
813 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
814 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
816 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
818 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
819 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment>>,
821 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
823 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
824 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
825 /// and via the classic SCID.
827 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
828 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
830 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
832 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
834 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
835 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
836 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
838 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
839 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
841 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
842 /// failed/claimed by the user.
844 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
845 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
847 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
848 claimable_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, (events::PaymentPurpose, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>)>>,
850 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
851 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
852 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
853 /// active channel list on load.
855 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
856 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
858 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
860 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
861 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
862 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
864 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
865 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
866 /// the handling of the events.
869 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
870 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
871 /// would break backwards compatability.
872 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
873 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
874 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
876 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
877 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<[u8; 32], PublicKey>>,
879 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
881 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
882 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
883 /// confirmation depth.
885 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
886 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
887 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
889 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
891 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
893 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
895 our_network_key: SecretKey,
896 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
898 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
900 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
901 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
902 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
904 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
905 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
907 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
908 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
909 /// keeping additional state.
910 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
912 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
913 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
914 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
915 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
917 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
918 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
919 /// are currently open with that peer.
920 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
921 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
924 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
925 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
927 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
928 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
929 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
930 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
931 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
932 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
933 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
934 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
935 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
936 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
937 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
939 persistence_notifier: Notifier,
946 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
948 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
949 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
950 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
951 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
952 pub struct ChainParameters {
953 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
954 pub network: Network,
956 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
958 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
959 pub best_block: BestBlock,
962 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
968 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
969 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
970 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
971 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
972 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
973 /// updates are ready for persistence).
975 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
976 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
977 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
978 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
979 persistence_notifier: &'a Notifier,
981 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
982 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
985 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
986 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
987 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
990 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
991 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
993 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
994 persistence_notifier: notifier,
995 should_persist: persist_check,
996 _read_guard: read_guard,
1001 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1002 fn drop(&mut self) {
1003 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
1004 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
1009 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1010 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1012 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1014 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1015 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1016 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1017 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1018 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1020 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1021 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1023 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1025 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1026 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1027 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1028 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1029 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1030 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1031 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
1032 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
1033 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
1034 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
1035 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
1036 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
1037 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
1039 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1040 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry` field to at least
1042 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1043 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1044 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1045 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 3;
1047 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1048 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1049 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1050 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1051 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1052 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1055 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1057 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1058 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1061 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1063 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1064 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1066 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until we time-out the
1067 /// idempotency of payments by [`PaymentId`]. See
1068 /// [`ChannelManager::remove_stale_resolved_payments`].
1069 pub(crate) const IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 7;
1071 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1072 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1073 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1074 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1075 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1076 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1077 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1078 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1079 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1080 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1081 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1084 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1085 /// to better separate parameters.
1086 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1087 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1088 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1089 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1090 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1091 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1092 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1093 pub features: InitFeatures,
1094 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1095 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1096 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1098 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1100 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1101 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1102 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1103 /// payments to us through this channel.
1104 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1105 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1106 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1107 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1108 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1109 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1110 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1113 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
1114 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1115 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1116 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1117 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1118 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1119 /// lifetime of the channel.
1120 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
1121 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1122 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1123 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1124 /// our counterparty already.
1126 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1127 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1128 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1129 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1131 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1132 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1133 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1134 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1136 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1137 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1139 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1140 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1142 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1143 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1144 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1145 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1146 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1147 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1148 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1149 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1150 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1153 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1155 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1156 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1157 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1158 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1159 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1160 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1161 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1163 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1164 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1166 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1167 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1168 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1169 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1170 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1171 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1172 /// this value on chain.
1174 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1176 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1178 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1179 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1180 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or a random value if the channel was
1181 /// inbound. This may be zero for inbound channels serialized with LDK versions prior to
1183 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1184 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1185 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1186 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1188 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1189 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1190 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1191 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1193 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1194 pub balance_msat: u64,
1195 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1196 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1197 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1198 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1200 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1202 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1203 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1204 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1205 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1206 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1207 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1208 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1209 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1211 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`] and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1212 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1213 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1214 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1215 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1216 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1217 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1219 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1220 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1221 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1222 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1223 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1224 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1225 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1226 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1227 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1229 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1231 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1232 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1233 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1234 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1235 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1237 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1238 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1239 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1240 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1241 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1242 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1243 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1245 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1246 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1247 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1248 pub is_outbound: bool,
1249 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1250 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1251 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1252 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1253 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1255 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1256 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1257 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1258 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1260 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1261 pub is_usable: bool,
1262 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1263 pub is_public: bool,
1264 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1265 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1266 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1267 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1268 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1269 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1271 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1272 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1275 impl ChannelDetails {
1276 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1277 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1278 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1280 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1281 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1282 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1283 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1286 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1287 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1288 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1290 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1291 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1292 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1293 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1297 /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
1298 /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
1299 /// states for more.
1300 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
1301 pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
1302 /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
1303 /// send the payment at all.
1305 /// You can freely resend the payment in full (with the parameter error fixed).
1307 /// Because the payment failed outright, no payment tracking is done, you do not need to call
1308 /// [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] and [`ChannelManager::retry_payment`] will *not* work
1309 /// for this payment.
1310 ParameterError(APIError),
1311 /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us
1312 /// from attempting to send the payment at all.
1314 /// You can freely resend the payment in full (with the parameter error fixed).
1316 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
1319 /// Because the payment failed outright, no payment tracking is done, you do not need to call
1320 /// [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] and [`ChannelManager::retry_payment`] will *not* work
1321 /// for this payment.
1322 PathParameterError(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
1323 /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
1324 /// You can freely resend the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
1325 /// paths than the ones selected).
1327 /// Because the payment failed outright, no payment tracking is done, you do not need to call
1328 /// [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] and [`ChannelManager::retry_payment`] will *not* work
1329 /// for this payment.
1330 AllFailedResendSafe(Vec<APIError>),
1331 /// Indicates that a payment for the provided [`PaymentId`] is already in-flight and has not
1332 /// yet completed (i.e. generated an [`Event::PaymentSent`]) or been abandoned (via
1333 /// [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`]).
1335 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
1337 /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
1338 /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
1339 /// in over-/re-payment.
1341 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
1342 /// send_payment, and any `Err`s which are not [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] can be
1343 /// safely retried via [`ChannelManager::retry_payment`].
1345 /// Any entries which contain `Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInprogress)` or `Ok(())` MUST NOT be
1346 /// retried as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent
1347 /// (in the case of `Ok(())`) or will send once a [`MonitorEvent::Completed`] is provided for
1348 /// the next-hop channel with the latest update_id.
1350 /// The errors themselves, in the same order as the route hops.
1351 results: Vec<Result<(), APIError>>,
1352 /// If some paths failed without irrevocably committing to the new HTLC(s), this will
1353 /// contain a [`RouteParameters`] object which can be used to calculate a new route that
1354 /// will pay all remaining unpaid balance.
1355 failed_paths_retry: Option<RouteParameters>,
1356 /// The payment id for the payment, which is now at least partially pending.
1357 payment_id: PaymentId,
1361 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1363 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
1365 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1366 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1367 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1368 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1370 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1371 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1372 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1375 macro_rules! handle_error {
1376 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
1379 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1380 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1382 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1383 // entering the macro.
1384 assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
1385 assert!($self.pending_events.try_lock().is_ok());
1388 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1390 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1391 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1392 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1393 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1397 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1398 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1399 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1400 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1405 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1406 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1408 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1409 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1410 action: err.action.clone()
1414 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1415 $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1418 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1425 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1426 ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {{
1427 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.channel_id());
1428 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1429 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1430 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1432 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1433 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1434 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1435 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1436 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1438 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1439 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1441 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1445 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1446 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1447 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1449 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1450 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1452 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1453 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1455 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1456 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1457 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel);
1458 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1459 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1460 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1466 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1467 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1471 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1473 $entry.remove_entry();
1481 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1482 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1486 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1488 $entry.remove_entry();
1496 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1497 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1499 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1500 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, channel);
1506 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_res {
1507 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_channel_ready: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
1509 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
1510 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..]));
1511 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $chan);
1512 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
1513 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
1514 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
1515 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
1516 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
1517 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
1518 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
1519 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
1520 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
1521 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id, $chan.get_user_id(),
1522 $chan.force_shutdown(false), $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok() ));
1525 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
1526 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update in progress. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards, {} fails, and {} fulfill finalizations",
1527 log_bytes!($chan_id[..]),
1528 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
1529 match $action_type {
1530 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
1531 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
1533 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
1534 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
1536 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
1537 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len(),
1538 (&$failed_finalized_fulfills as &Vec<HTLCSource>).len());
1539 if !$resend_commitment {
1540 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
1543 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
1545 $chan.monitor_updating_paused($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $resend_channel_ready, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills);
1546 (Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$chan_id)), false)
1548 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
1553 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_channel_ready: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr) => { {
1554 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $resend_channel_ready, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills, $entry.key());
1556 $entry.remove_entry();
1560 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY) => { {
1561 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
1562 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
1564 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, NO_UPDATE) => {
1565 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
1567 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_channel_ready: expr, OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED) => {
1568 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, false, false, $resend_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1570 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1571 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1573 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1574 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, Vec::new())
1578 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1579 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
1580 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1581 node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1582 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1584 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1585 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1586 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1587 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1588 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1589 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1590 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1591 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1592 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1593 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1598 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
1599 ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1600 if $channel.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
1602 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1603 pending_events.push(events::Event::ChannelReady {
1604 channel_id: $channel.channel_id(),
1605 user_channel_id: $channel.get_user_id(),
1606 counterparty_node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1607 channel_type: $channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
1610 $channel.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
1615 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
1616 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
1617 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1618 K::Target: KeysInterface,
1619 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1622 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
1624 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1625 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
1627 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1629 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
1630 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
1631 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
1632 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1633 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1634 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
1635 let inbound_pmt_key_material = keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
1636 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
1638 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1639 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1640 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
1644 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1646 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
1647 by_id: HashMap::new(),
1648 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
1650 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
1651 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1652 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1653 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1654 claimable_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1655 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1656 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1657 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1659 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
1660 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap()),
1663 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
1664 fake_scid_rand_bytes: keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1666 probing_cookie_secret: keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1668 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1670 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1672 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1673 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1674 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1675 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
1683 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
1684 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1685 &self.default_configuration
1688 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1689 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1690 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
1693 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
1694 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
1696 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager);
1698 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
1702 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
1707 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1709 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1710 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1711 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
1712 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
1713 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
1715 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1716 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1718 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1719 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1720 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1722 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1723 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1724 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1725 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1726 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1727 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1729 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1730 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1731 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1732 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1733 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1734 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1738 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1739 match per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key) {
1740 Some(peer_state) => {
1741 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
1742 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1743 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1744 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1745 match Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key,
1746 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
1747 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
1751 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
1756 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) }),
1759 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1761 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1762 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1763 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1765 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1766 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1767 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1768 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1770 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1772 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1775 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1777 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1778 node_id: their_network_key,
1781 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1784 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1785 let mut res = Vec::new();
1787 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1788 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1789 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
1790 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1791 let balance = channel.get_available_balances();
1792 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1793 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1794 res.push(ChannelDetails {
1795 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
1796 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1797 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1798 features: InitFeatures::empty(),
1799 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1800 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1801 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1802 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1803 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1804 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1805 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1806 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if channel.have_received_message() {
1807 Some(channel.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1808 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1810 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1811 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1812 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1813 channel_type: if channel.have_received_message() { Some(channel.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1814 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1815 outbound_scid_alias: if channel.is_usable() { Some(channel.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1816 inbound_scid_alias: channel.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1817 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1818 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1819 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1820 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1821 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1822 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1823 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1824 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1825 confirmations: Some(channel.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1826 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1827 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1828 is_channel_ready: channel.is_usable(),
1829 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1830 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1831 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1832 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1833 config: Some(channel.config()),
1837 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1838 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
1839 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.counterparty.node_id) {
1840 chan.counterparty.features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
1846 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
1847 /// more information.
1848 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1849 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1852 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to [`find_route`]
1853 /// to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1855 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1856 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1859 /// [`find_route`]: crate::routing::router::find_route
1860 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1861 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1862 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1863 // really wanted anyway.
1864 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1867 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
1868 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
1869 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1870 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
1871 Some(transaction) => {
1872 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::DiscardFunding { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction })
1876 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1877 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1878 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1879 reason: closure_reason
1883 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1884 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1886 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
1887 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
1888 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1889 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1890 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1891 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1892 if *counterparty_node_id != chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id(){
1893 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The passed counterparty_node_id doesn't match the channel's counterparty node_id".to_owned() });
1895 let (shutdown_msg, monitor_update, htlcs) = {
1896 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1897 match per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
1898 Some(peer_state) => {
1899 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1900 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1901 chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown(&self.keys_manager, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?
1903 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", counterparty_node_id) }),
1906 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
1908 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
1909 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
1910 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
1911 let (result, is_permanent) =
1912 handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
1914 remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
1919 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1920 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
1924 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1925 let channel = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
1926 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
1927 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1931 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1935 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()})
1939 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1940 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
1941 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
1942 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
1945 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
1949 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1950 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1951 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1953 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
1954 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1956 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
1957 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
1958 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
1959 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
1961 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1963 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1964 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1965 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1966 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1967 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None)
1970 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1971 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1972 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1974 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
1975 /// the channel being closed or not:
1976 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
1977 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
1978 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1979 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
1980 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
1981 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
1982 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
1984 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1986 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1987 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1988 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1989 pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1990 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
1994 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1995 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1996 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1997 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1998 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
1999 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2000 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2001 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
2003 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
2004 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2005 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2006 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2007 // ignore the result here.
2008 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
2012 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2013 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2014 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
2015 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2017 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2018 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2019 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2020 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *peer_node_id {
2021 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
2023 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2024 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: peer_msg.to_string() });
2026 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2028 remove_channel!(self, chan)
2030 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
2033 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2034 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(broadcast));
2035 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2036 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2037 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2042 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
2045 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2046 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2047 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2048 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2049 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
2050 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2051 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2052 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
2053 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
2063 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2064 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2065 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2067 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2068 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2069 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2072 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2073 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2074 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2076 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2077 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2078 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2079 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2080 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2083 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2084 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2085 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2086 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2087 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2091 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2092 /// local transaction(s).
2093 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2094 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2095 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2099 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(&self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
2100 payment_hash: PaymentHash, amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError>
2102 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2103 if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != cltv_expiry {
2104 return Err(ReceiveError {
2105 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value",
2107 err_data: byte_utils::be32_to_array(cltv_expiry).to_vec()
2110 // final_expiry_too_soon
2111 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2112 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2113 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2114 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2115 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2116 if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2117 return Err(ReceiveError {
2119 err_data: Vec::new(),
2120 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2123 if hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat {
2124 return Err(ReceiveError {
2126 err_data: byte_utils::be64_to_array(amt_msat).to_vec(),
2127 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2131 let routing = match hop_data.format {
2132 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => {
2133 return Err(ReceiveError {
2134 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2135 err_data: Vec::new(),
2136 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2139 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
2140 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
2141 return Err(ReceiveError {
2142 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2143 err_data: Vec::new(),
2144 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2146 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2147 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2149 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2150 phantom_shared_secret,
2152 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2153 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2154 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2155 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2156 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2157 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2158 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2159 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2160 return Err(ReceiveError {
2161 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2162 err_data: Vec::new(),
2163 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2167 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2169 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2172 return Err(ReceiveError {
2173 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2174 err_data: Vec::new(),
2175 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2180 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2183 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2184 incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
2185 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_msat,
2186 outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2190 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
2191 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2192 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2194 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2195 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2196 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2197 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2198 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2199 failure_code: $err_code,
2205 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2206 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2209 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key).secret_bytes();
2211 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2212 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2213 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2214 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2215 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2216 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2217 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2218 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2220 macro_rules! return_err {
2221 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2223 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2224 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2225 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2226 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2227 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
2233 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2235 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2236 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2238 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2239 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2243 let pending_forward_info = match next_hop {
2244 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
2246 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None) {
2248 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
2249 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
2250 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
2251 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
2252 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
2254 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
2257 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
2258 let new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
2259 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2261 public_key: onion_utils::next_hop_packet_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx, new_pubkey, &shared_secret),
2262 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2263 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
2266 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
2267 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2268 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
2269 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2273 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2274 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2275 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2278 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2279 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2280 incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
2281 outgoing_amt_msat: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2282 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2287 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref outgoing_amt_msat, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
2288 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
2289 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
2290 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
2291 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
2292 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
2293 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
2294 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2295 let forwarding_id_opt = match id_option {
2296 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2297 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2298 // phantom or an intercept.
2299 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
2300 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)) ||
2301 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)
2305 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2308 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => Some(chan_id.clone()),
2310 let chan_update_opt = if let Some(forwarding_id) = forwarding_id_opt {
2311 let chan = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id) {
2313 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and by_id maps have
2314 // no consistency guarantees.
2315 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2319 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2320 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2321 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2322 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2323 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2325 if chan.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && *short_channel_id != chan.outbound_scid_alias() {
2326 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
2327 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
2328 // we don't have the channel here.
2329 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2331 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(*short_channel_id, chan).ok();
2333 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2334 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2335 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2336 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2337 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2338 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2339 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2341 if *outgoing_amt_msat < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2342 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
2344 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, *outgoing_amt_msat, *outgoing_cltv_value) {
2345 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
2349 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
2351 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
2358 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2359 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2360 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2361 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2362 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2363 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2365 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2366 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2368 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2369 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2370 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2371 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2372 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2373 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2374 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2375 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2376 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2377 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2383 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
2384 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2385 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2386 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2388 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2389 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2391 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2392 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
2393 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2395 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2396 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2397 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2399 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
2404 pending_forward_info
2407 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2408 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2409 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2411 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2412 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2413 if !chan.should_announce() {
2414 return Err(LightningError {
2415 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2416 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2419 if chan.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
2420 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
2422 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2423 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2426 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2427 /// is public (only returning an Err if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id),
2428 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2429 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2430 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2431 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2432 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2433 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
2434 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2438 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
2440 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2441 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2442 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2444 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2445 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2447 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2448 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
2449 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2450 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2451 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
2452 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2453 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2454 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2457 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
2458 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
2460 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2466 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
2467 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_params: &Option<PaymentParameters>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2468 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2469 let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2470 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2472 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2473 .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
2474 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2475 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
2476 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
2478 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
2480 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2482 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2483 let id = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2484 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2485 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
2488 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2489 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2490 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
2492 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
2493 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
2495 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2496 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
2498 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(
2499 htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2501 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2502 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2504 payment_secret: payment_secret.clone(),
2505 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2506 }, onion_packet, &self.logger),
2509 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
2510 let update_err = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
2511 let chan_id = chan.get().channel_id();
2513 handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_err, chan,
2514 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true))
2516 (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure, Err(e)) => break Err(e),
2517 (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed, Ok(())) => {},
2518 (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress, Err(_)) => {
2519 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
2520 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
2521 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
2522 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
2523 // which we do in the send_payment check for
2524 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
2525 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
2527 _ => unreachable!(),
2530 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan_id));
2531 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2532 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
2533 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2534 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
2535 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2536 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2537 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2546 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
2547 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the `by_id` map.
2548 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
2549 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
2554 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2555 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2557 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2562 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2564 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
2565 /// fields for more info.
2567 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
2568 /// method will error with an [`APIError::RouteError`]. Note, however, that once a payment
2569 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
2570 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a second payment with the same
2573 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
2574 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
2575 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
2576 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
2577 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
2579 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
2580 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
2582 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
2583 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2584 /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
2586 /// In general, a path may raise:
2587 /// * [`APIError::RouteError`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2588 /// node public key) is specified.
2589 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2590 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2592 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2593 /// relevant updates.
2595 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
2596 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2597 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2599 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
2600 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
2601 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
2602 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
2605 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
2606 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
2607 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
2609 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2610 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
2611 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2612 let onion_session_privs = self.add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, *payment_secret, payment_id, route)?;
2613 self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, None, payment_id, None, onion_session_privs)
2617 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
2618 self.add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, route)
2621 fn add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
2622 let mut onion_session_privs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
2623 for _ in 0..route.paths.len() {
2624 onion_session_privs.push(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
2627 let mut pending_outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2628 match pending_outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
2629 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => Err(PaymentSendFailure::DuplicatePayment),
2630 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2631 let payment = entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2632 session_privs: HashSet::new(),
2633 pending_amt_msat: 0,
2634 pending_fee_msat: Some(0),
2637 starting_block_height: self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
2638 total_msat: route.get_total_amount(),
2641 for (path, session_priv_bytes) in route.paths.iter().zip(onion_session_privs.iter()) {
2642 assert!(payment.insert(*session_priv_bytes, path));
2645 Ok(onion_session_privs)
2650 fn send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2651 if route.paths.len() < 1 {
2652 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
2654 if payment_secret.is_none() && route.paths.len() > 1 {
2655 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Payment secret is required for multi-path payments".to_string()}));
2657 let mut total_value = 0;
2658 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2659 let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
2660 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
2661 if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
2662 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
2663 continue 'path_check;
2665 for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
2666 if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
2667 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
2668 continue 'path_check;
2671 total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2672 path_errs.push(Ok(()));
2674 if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
2675 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
2677 if let Some(amt_msat) = recv_value_msat {
2678 debug_assert!(amt_msat >= total_value);
2679 total_value = amt_msat;
2682 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2683 let mut results = Vec::new();
2684 debug_assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), onion_session_privs.len());
2685 for (path, session_priv) in route.paths.iter().zip(onion_session_privs.into_iter()) {
2686 let mut path_res = self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &route.payment_params, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, &keysend_preimage, session_priv);
2689 Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress) => {
2690 // While a MonitorUpdateInProgress is an Err(_), the payment is still
2691 // considered "in flight" and we shouldn't remove it from the
2692 // PendingOutboundPayment set.
2695 let mut pending_outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2696 if let Some(payment) = pending_outbounds.get_mut(&payment_id) {
2697 let removed = payment.remove(&session_priv, Some(path));
2698 debug_assert!(removed, "This can't happen as the payment has an entry for this path added by callers");
2700 debug_assert!(false, "This can't happen as the payment was added by callers");
2701 path_res = Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Internal error: payment disappeared during processing. Please report this bug!".to_owned() });
2705 results.push(path_res);
2707 let mut has_ok = false;
2708 let mut has_err = false;
2709 let mut pending_amt_unsent = 0;
2710 let mut max_unsent_cltv_delta = 0;
2711 for (res, path) in results.iter().zip(route.paths.iter()) {
2712 if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
2713 if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
2714 if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress) = res {
2715 // MonitorUpdateInProgress is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
2719 } else if res.is_err() {
2720 pending_amt_unsent += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2721 max_unsent_cltv_delta = cmp::max(max_unsent_cltv_delta, path.last().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta);
2724 if has_err && has_ok {
2725 Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure {
2728 failed_paths_retry: if pending_amt_unsent != 0 {
2729 if let Some(payment_params) = &route.payment_params {
2730 Some(RouteParameters {
2731 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2732 final_value_msat: pending_amt_unsent,
2733 final_cltv_expiry_delta: max_unsent_cltv_delta,
2739 // If we failed to send any paths, we should remove the new PaymentId from the
2740 // `pending_outbound_payments` map, as the user isn't expected to `abandon_payment`.
2741 let removed = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().remove(&payment_id).is_some();
2742 debug_assert!(removed, "We should always have a pending payment to remove here");
2743 Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedResendSafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
2749 /// Retries a payment along the given [`Route`].
2751 /// Errors returned are a superset of those returned from [`send_payment`], so see
2752 /// [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on errors. This method will also error if the
2753 /// retry amount puts the payment more than 10% over the payment's total amount, if the payment
2754 /// for the given `payment_id` cannot be found (likely due to timeout or success), or if
2755 /// further retries have been disabled with [`abandon_payment`].
2757 /// [`send_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::send_payment`]
2758 /// [`abandon_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`]
2759 pub fn retry_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2760 const RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE: u64 = 10;
2761 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2762 if path.len() == 0 {
2763 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2764 err: "length-0 path in route".to_string()
2769 let mut onion_session_privs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
2770 for _ in 0..route.paths.len() {
2771 onion_session_privs.push(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
2774 let (total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret) = {
2775 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2776 match outbounds.get_mut(&payment_id) {
2778 let res = match payment {
2779 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2780 total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret, pending_amt_msat, ..
2782 let retry_amt_msat: u64 = route.paths.iter().map(|path| path.last().unwrap().fee_msat).sum();
2783 if retry_amt_msat + *pending_amt_msat > *total_msat * (100 + RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE) / 100 {
2784 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2785 err: format!("retry_amt_msat of {} will put pending_amt_msat (currently: {}) more than 10% over total_payment_amt_msat of {}", retry_amt_msat, pending_amt_msat, total_msat).to_string()
2788 (*total_msat, *payment_hash, *payment_secret)
2790 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => {
2791 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2792 err: "Unable to retry payments that were initially sent on LDK versions prior to 0.0.102".to_string()
2795 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {
2796 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2797 err: "Payment already completed".to_owned()
2800 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {
2801 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2802 err: "Payment already abandoned (with some HTLCs still pending)".to_owned()
2806 for (path, session_priv_bytes) in route.paths.iter().zip(onion_session_privs.iter()) {
2807 assert!(payment.insert(*session_priv_bytes, path));
2812 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2813 err: format!("Payment with ID {} not found", log_bytes!(payment_id.0)),
2817 self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &payment_secret, None, payment_id, Some(total_msat), onion_session_privs)
2820 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment will occur.
2822 /// After this method returns, any future calls to [`retry_payment`] for the given `payment_id`
2823 /// will fail with [`PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError`]. If no such event has been generated,
2824 /// an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event will be generated as soon as there are no remaining
2825 /// pending HTLCs for this payment.
2827 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
2828 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
2829 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
2831 /// [`retry_payment`]: Self::retry_payment
2832 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2833 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2834 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
2835 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2837 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2838 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
2839 if let Ok(()) = payment.get_mut().mark_abandoned() {
2840 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
2841 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2843 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
2851 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2852 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2853 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2854 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2855 /// never reach the recipient.
2857 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
2858 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
2860 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2861 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2863 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2865 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2866 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
2867 let preimage = match payment_preimage {
2869 None => PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()),
2871 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0).into_inner());
2872 let onion_session_privs = self.add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, None, payment_id, &route)?;
2874 match self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &None, Some(preimage), payment_id, None, onion_session_privs) {
2875 Ok(()) => Ok(payment_hash),
2880 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
2881 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
2882 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
2883 pub fn send_probe(&self, hops: Vec<RouteHop>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2884 let payment_id = PaymentId(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
2886 let payment_hash = self.probing_cookie_from_id(&payment_id);
2889 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2890 err: "No need probing a path with less than two hops".to_string()
2894 let route = Route { paths: vec![hops], payment_params: None };
2895 let onion_session_privs = self.add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, None, payment_id, &route)?;
2897 match self.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &None, None, payment_id, None, onion_session_privs) {
2898 Ok(()) => Ok((payment_hash, payment_id)),
2903 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
2905 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
2906 let target_payment_hash = self.probing_cookie_from_id(payment_id);
2907 target_payment_hash == *payment_hash
2910 /// Returns the 'probing cookie' for the given [`PaymentId`].
2911 fn probing_cookie_from_id(&self, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> PaymentHash {
2912 let mut preimage = [0u8; 64];
2913 preimage[..32].copy_from_slice(&self.probing_cookie_secret);
2914 preimage[32..].copy_from_slice(&payment_id.0);
2915 PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage).into_inner())
2918 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2919 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2920 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
2921 &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], _counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
2922 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2924 let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2926 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2928 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2929 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2930 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2931 } else { unreachable!(); })
2934 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "No such channel".to_owned() }) },
2936 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
2937 Ok(funding_msg) => {
2940 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2941 err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
2946 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2947 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2948 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2951 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2952 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2953 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2955 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2956 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
2957 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.channel_id(), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
2958 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
2967 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2968 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2969 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2973 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2975 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2976 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2978 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
2979 /// across the p2p network.
2981 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
2982 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
2984 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2985 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
2986 /// keys per-channel).
2988 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
2989 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
2990 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
2992 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
2993 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
2994 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2996 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
2997 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
2998 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
2999 /// for more details.
3001 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
3002 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::util::events::Event::ChannelClosed
3003 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3004 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3006 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
3007 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
3008 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3009 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
3014 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3015 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools at the next block. However, the modules
3016 // constituting our Lightning node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if
3017 // the wallet module is in advance on the LDK view, allow one more block of headroom.
3018 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 2 {
3019 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3020 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
3024 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
3025 let mut output_index = None;
3026 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
3027 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3028 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
3029 if output_index.is_some() {
3030 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3031 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
3034 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
3035 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3036 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
3039 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
3042 if output_index.is_none() {
3043 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3044 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
3047 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
3051 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
3053 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3054 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3055 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3056 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3058 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3059 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3061 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3062 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3064 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3066 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3067 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3068 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3069 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3070 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3071 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3072 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3073 pub fn update_channel_config(
3074 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config: &ChannelConfig,
3075 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3076 if config.cltv_expiry_delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA {
3077 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3078 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
3082 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(
3083 &self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier,
3086 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3087 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3088 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3089 let channel_counterparty_node_id = channel_state.by_id.get(channel_id)
3090 .ok_or(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3091 err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found", log_bytes!(*channel_id)),
3093 .get_counterparty_node_id();
3094 if channel_counterparty_node_id != *counterparty_node_id {
3095 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3096 err: "counterparty node id mismatch".to_owned(),
3100 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3101 let channel = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(channel_id).unwrap();
3102 if !channel.update_config(config) {
3105 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
3106 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
3107 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
3108 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3109 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3118 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
3119 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
3121 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
3122 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
3124 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
3125 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
3126 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
3127 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
3128 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
3130 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
3131 /// you from forwarding more than you received.
3133 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3136 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
3137 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3138 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
3139 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
3140 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &[u8; 32], _next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3141 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3143 let next_hop_scid = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
3145 if !chan.is_usable() {
3146 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3147 err: format!("Channel with id {:?} not fully established", next_hop_channel_id)
3150 chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.outbound_scid_alias())
3152 None => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3153 err: format!("Channel with id {:?} not found", next_hop_channel_id)
3157 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3158 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3159 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {:?} not found", intercept_id.0)
3162 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
3163 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => {
3164 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid }
3166 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3168 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
3169 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
3172 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
3173 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3174 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3175 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
3176 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
3178 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
3182 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
3183 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
3185 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3188 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3189 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3190 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3192 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3193 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3194 err: format!("Payment with InterceptId {:?} not found", intercept_id)
3197 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
3198 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3199 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3200 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3201 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
3202 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
3203 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3206 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
3207 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
3208 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3209 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3214 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
3216 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
3217 /// Will likely generate further events.
3218 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
3219 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3221 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
3222 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
3223 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
3224 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3226 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
3227 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
3229 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
3230 if short_chan_id != 0 {
3231 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
3233 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3234 match forward_info {
3235 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3236 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3237 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3238 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
3239 outgoing_cltv_value, incoming_amt_msat: _
3242 macro_rules! failure_handler {
3243 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
3244 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3246 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3247 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3248 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3249 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3250 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3251 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
3254 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
3255 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
3257 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
3260 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3261 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
3267 macro_rules! fail_forward {
3268 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3270 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
3274 macro_rules! failed_payment {
3275 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3277 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
3281 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
3282 let phantom_secret_res = self.keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::PhantomNode);
3283 if phantom_secret_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.genesis_hash) {
3284 let phantom_shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &phantom_secret_res.unwrap()).secret_bytes();
3285 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
3287 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3288 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
3289 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
3290 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
3291 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
3293 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
3295 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3296 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
3300 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
3301 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) {
3302 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
3303 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
3309 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3312 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3315 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3316 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
3317 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
3318 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
3319 // problem, not ours.
3325 let forward_chan_id = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id) {
3326 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
3328 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3332 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3333 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3334 match channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
3335 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3336 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3339 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3340 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
3341 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
3342 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3343 match forward_info {
3344 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3345 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id: _,
3346 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3347 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
3348 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, incoming_amt_msat: _,
3351 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
3352 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3353 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3354 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3355 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3356 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3357 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
3358 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3360 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet, &self.logger) {
3362 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3363 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
3365 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3367 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
3368 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3369 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
3370 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
3376 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
3378 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
3379 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
3380 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
3381 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
3382 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
3383 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
3384 // this channel currently :/.
3390 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3391 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3393 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3394 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3395 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger) {
3397 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3398 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3400 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
3402 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3403 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3404 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3407 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
3409 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
3410 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
3411 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
3412 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
3413 // messages when we can.
3414 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
3415 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
3416 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
3423 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
3424 let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) {
3427 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
3428 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
3429 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3430 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
3431 ChannelError::Ignore(_) | ChannelError::Warn(_) => {
3432 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
3434 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
3435 log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
3436 let mut channel = remove_channel!(self, chan);
3437 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us.
3438 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel.channel_id(), channel.get_user_id(), channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel).ok()))
3441 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, err));
3445 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3446 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
3448 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
3452 log_debug!(self.logger, "Forwarding HTLCs resulted in a commitment update with {} HTLCs added and {} HTLCs failed for channel {}",
3453 add_htlc_msgs.len(), fail_htlc_msgs.len(), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3454 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3455 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3456 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3457 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
3458 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3459 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
3460 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3462 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
3469 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3470 match forward_info {
3471 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3472 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3473 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3474 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, ..
3477 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret) = match routing {
3478 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } => {
3479 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
3480 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data }, Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret)
3482 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
3483 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage), None, None),
3485 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3488 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3489 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3490 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3491 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3492 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3493 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3494 phantom_shared_secret,
3496 value: outgoing_amt_msat,
3498 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
3503 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3504 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
3505 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc.value).to_vec();
3506 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3507 &byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()),
3509 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3510 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
3511 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3512 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3513 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3514 phantom_shared_secret,
3516 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
3517 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
3521 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
3522 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
3523 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
3524 receiver_node_id = self.keys_manager.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
3525 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
3528 macro_rules! check_total_value {
3529 ($payment_data: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{
3530 let mut payment_received_generated = false;
3532 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
3533 payment_preimage: $payment_preimage,
3534 payment_secret: $payment_data.payment_secret,
3537 let mut claimable_htlcs = self.claimable_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
3538 let (_, htlcs) = claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
3539 .or_insert_with(|| (purpose(), Vec::new()));
3540 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
3541 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3542 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3543 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3547 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.value;
3548 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3549 total_value += htlc.value;
3550 match &htlc.onion_payload {
3551 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3552 if htlc.total_msat != $payment_data.total_msat {
3553 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
3554 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $payment_data.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
3555 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
3557 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
3559 _ => unreachable!(),
3562 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > $payment_data.total_msat {
3563 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
3564 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, $payment_data.total_msat);
3565 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3566 } else if total_value == $payment_data.total_msat {
3567 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3568 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3569 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
3570 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3573 amount_msat: total_value,
3574 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3575 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3577 payment_received_generated = true;
3579 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
3580 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
3582 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3584 payment_received_generated
3588 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
3589 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
3590 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
3591 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
3592 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
3593 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
3594 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3595 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3596 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3597 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3598 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3599 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3600 let payment_preimage = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
3601 Ok(payment_preimage) => payment_preimage,
3603 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3607 check_total_value!(payment_data, payment_preimage);
3609 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
3610 match self.claimable_htlcs.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_hash) {
3611 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3612 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
3613 e.insert((purpose.clone(), vec![claimable_htlc]));
3614 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3615 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
3616 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3618 amount_msat: outgoing_amt_msat,
3620 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3621 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3624 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3625 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3626 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3632 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
3633 if payment_data.is_none() {
3634 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3635 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3638 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3639 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
3640 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3641 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3642 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
3643 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
3644 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
3645 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3647 let payment_received_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage);
3648 if payment_received_generated {
3649 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
3655 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3656 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
3664 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
3665 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3667 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
3669 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3670 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3673 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
3674 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3675 events.append(&mut new_events);
3678 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
3680 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
3681 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
3683 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
3684 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
3685 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
3686 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
3687 if background_events.is_empty() {
3691 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
3693 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
3694 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
3695 // monitor updating completing.
3696 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update);
3703 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3704 /// Process background events, for functional testing
3705 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
3706 self.process_background_events();
3709 fn update_channel_fee(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> (bool, NotifyOption, Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal>) {
3710 if !chan.is_outbound() { return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(())); }
3711 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
3712 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate() {
3713 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3714 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3715 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
3717 if !chan.is_live() {
3718 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
3719 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3720 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
3722 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3723 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3725 let mut retain_channel = true;
3726 let res = match chan.send_update_fee_and_commit(new_feerate, &self.logger) {
3729 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id);
3730 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
3734 let ret_err = match res {
3735 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update))) => {
3736 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3737 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
3738 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3739 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3740 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3741 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3742 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3743 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3744 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3745 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
3752 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY);
3753 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
3761 (retain_channel, NotifyOption::DoPersist, ret_err)
3765 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
3766 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
3767 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
3768 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
3769 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
3770 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3771 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3773 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3775 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3777 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3778 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3779 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3780 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3781 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3782 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3784 handle_errors.push(err);
3794 fn remove_stale_resolved_payments(&self) {
3795 // If an outbound payment was completed, and no pending HTLCs remain, we should remove it
3796 // from the map. However, if we did that immediately when the last payment HTLC is claimed,
3797 // this could race the user making a duplicate send_payment call and our idempotency
3798 // guarantees would be violated. Instead, we wait a few timer ticks to do the actual
3799 // removal. This should be more than sufficient to ensure the idempotency of any
3800 // `send_payment` calls that were made at the same time the `PaymentSent` event was being
3802 let mut pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3803 let pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3804 pending_outbound_payments.retain(|payment_id, payment| {
3805 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, timer_ticks_without_htlcs, .. } = payment {
3806 let mut no_remaining_entries = session_privs.is_empty();
3807 if no_remaining_entries {
3808 for ev in pending_events.iter() {
3810 events::Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: Some(ev_payment_id), .. } |
3811 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ev_payment_id, .. } |
3812 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_id: Some(ev_payment_id), .. } => {
3813 if payment_id == ev_payment_id {
3814 no_remaining_entries = false;
3822 if no_remaining_entries {
3823 *timer_ticks_without_htlcs += 1;
3824 *timer_ticks_without_htlcs <= IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS
3826 *timer_ticks_without_htlcs = 0;
3833 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
3835 /// This currently includes:
3836 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
3837 /// * Broadcasting `ChannelUpdate` messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
3838 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
3840 /// * Expiring a channel's previous `ChannelConfig` if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
3841 /// with the current `ChannelConfig`.
3843 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through `chain::Watch::update_channel` calls or feerate
3844 /// estimate fetches.
3845 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
3846 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3847 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3848 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3850 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3852 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3853 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
3855 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3856 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3857 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3858 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3859 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
3860 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3861 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3863 handle_errors.push((err, counterparty_node_id));
3865 if !retain_channel { return false; }
3867 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
3868 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id);
3869 handle_errors.push((Err(err), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()));
3870 if needs_close { return false; }
3873 match chan.channel_update_status() {
3874 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
3875 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
3876 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3877 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3878 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
3879 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3880 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3884 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3885 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3887 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
3888 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3889 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3893 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3894 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3899 chan.maybe_expire_prev_config();
3905 self.claimable_htlcs.lock().unwrap().retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
3906 if htlcs.is_empty() {
3907 // This should be unreachable
3908 debug_assert!(false);
3911 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3912 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
3913 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
3914 if htlcs[0].total_msat == htlcs.iter().fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.value) {
3916 } else if htlcs.into_iter().any(|htlc| {
3917 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
3918 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
3920 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(htlcs.drain(..).map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
3927 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
3928 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
3929 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
3930 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
3931 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
3934 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3935 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3938 self.remove_stale_resolved_payments();
3944 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
3945 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
3946 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
3948 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
3949 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
3950 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentReceived`] event. Alternatively, the payment
3951 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
3953 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
3954 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
3955 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
3956 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
3957 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
3958 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3960 let removed_source = self.claimable_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(payment_hash);
3961 if let Some((_, mut sources)) = removed_source {
3962 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3963 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3964 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
3965 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
3966 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
3967 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
3968 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
3969 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3974 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3975 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3977 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
3979 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3980 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
3981 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
3982 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
3983 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
3984 let scid_pref = if chan.should_announce() {
3985 chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
3987 chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.get_short_channel_id())
3989 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
3990 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
3992 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3997 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3998 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3999 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
4000 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
4001 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
4002 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
4003 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
4004 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
4005 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
4006 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4008 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4009 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4010 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4011 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
4013 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
4014 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
4015 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
4016 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
4017 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4021 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
4022 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
4023 // be surfaced to the user.
4024 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
4025 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32],
4026 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
4028 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
4029 match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
4030 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
4031 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
4033 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4036 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
4037 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
4038 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
4039 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4043 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
4044 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
4045 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
4046 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
4048 // Ensure that the `channel_state` lock is not held when calling this function.
4049 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock_order requirement for
4050 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `channel_state` lock, which calling this
4051 // function with the `channel_state` locked would.
4052 assert!(self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
4055 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
4056 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
4057 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
4060 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4061 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
4062 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4064 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, ref payment_params, .. } => {
4065 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
4066 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
4067 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4068 let mut all_paths_failed = false;
4069 let mut full_failure_ev = None;
4070 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(*payment_id) {
4071 if !payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
4072 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4075 if payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
4076 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received failure of HTLC with payment_hash {} after payment completion", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4079 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
4080 all_paths_failed = true;
4081 if payment.get().abandoned() {
4082 full_failure_ev = Some(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
4083 payment_id: *payment_id,
4084 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
4090 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4093 let mut retry = if let Some(payment_params_data) = payment_params {
4094 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
4095 Some(RouteParameters {
4096 payment_params: payment_params_data.clone(),
4097 final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat,
4098 final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta,
4101 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4103 let path_failure = {
4105 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_error.decode_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source);
4107 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_error.decode_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source);
4109 if self.payment_is_probe(payment_hash, &payment_id) {
4110 if !payment_retryable {
4111 events::Event::ProbeSuccessful {
4112 payment_id: *payment_id,
4113 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
4117 events::Event::ProbeFailed {
4118 payment_id: *payment_id,
4119 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
4125 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
4126 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
4127 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
4128 if let Some(scid) = short_channel_id {
4129 retry.as_mut().map(|r| r.payment_params.previously_failed_channels.push(scid));
4131 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
4132 payment_id: Some(*payment_id),
4133 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
4134 payment_failed_permanently: !payment_retryable,
4141 error_code: onion_error_code,
4143 error_data: onion_error_data
4147 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4148 pending_events.push(path_failure);
4149 if let Some(ev) = full_failure_ev { pending_events.push(ev); }
4151 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint }) => {
4152 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), onion_error);
4153 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
4155 let mut forward_event = None;
4156 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4157 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
4158 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
4160 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
4161 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4162 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
4164 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4165 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
4168 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
4169 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4170 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
4171 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
4172 time_forwardable: time
4175 pending_events.push(events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
4176 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
4177 failed_next_destination: destination,
4183 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentReceived`], generating any
4184 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
4186 /// Note that calling this method does *not* guarantee that the payment has been claimed. You
4187 /// *must* wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] event which upon a successful claim will be
4188 /// provided to your [`EventHandler`] when [`process_pending_events`] is next called.
4190 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
4191 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentReceived`
4192 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
4193 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
4195 /// [`Event::PaymentReceived`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentReceived
4196 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
4197 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
4198 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
4199 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
4200 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
4201 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
4202 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4204 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4206 let removed_source = self.claimable_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&payment_hash);
4207 if let Some((payment_purpose, mut sources)) = removed_source {
4208 assert!(!sources.is_empty());
4210 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we have to take special care to ensure that each
4211 // channel exists before claiming all of the payments (inside one lock).
4212 // Note that channel existance is sufficient as we should always get a monitor update
4213 // which will take care of the real HTLC claim enforcement.
4215 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
4216 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
4217 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
4218 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
4219 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
4221 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
4222 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
4223 let mut valid_mpp = true;
4224 let mut errs = Vec::new();
4225 let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
4226 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4227 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4228 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(self.our_network_pubkey);
4229 for htlc in sources.iter() {
4230 let chan_id = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
4231 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
4238 if let None = channel_state.by_id.get(&chan_id) {
4243 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
4244 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4245 debug_assert!(false);
4249 expected_amt_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
4250 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = &htlc.onion_payload {
4251 // We don't currently support MPP for spontaneous payments, so just check
4252 // that there's one payment here and move on.
4253 if sources.len() != 1 {
4254 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP spontaneous payment - this should not be reachable!");
4255 debug_assert!(false);
4260 let phantom_shared_secret = htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
4261 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4262 let phantom_pubkey = self.keys_manager.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4263 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4264 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
4267 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
4269 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
4270 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
4273 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
4274 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
4275 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
4279 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4280 match self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
4281 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) => {
4282 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
4283 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
4284 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
4285 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
4286 claimed_any_htlcs = true;
4287 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
4289 ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"),
4290 ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim => {
4291 // While we should never get here in most cases, if we do, it likely
4292 // indicates that the HTLC was timed out some time ago and is no longer
4293 // available to be claimed. Thus, it does not make sense to set
4294 // `claimed_any_htlcs`.
4296 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(_) => claimed_any_htlcs = true,
4300 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4302 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4303 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
4304 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
4305 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
4306 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4307 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
4308 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
4309 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4313 if claimed_any_htlcs {
4314 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
4317 purpose: payment_purpose,
4318 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
4322 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
4323 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
4324 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4325 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
4330 fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> ClaimFundsFromHop {
4331 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
4333 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
4334 let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock;
4335 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4336 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
4337 Ok(msgs_monitor_option) => {
4338 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { msgs, htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = msgs_monitor_option {
4339 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4340 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
4342 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Debug },
4343 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4344 payment_preimage, e);
4345 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(
4346 chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4347 handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err(),
4348 Some(htlc_value_msat)
4352 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
4353 log_debug!(self.logger, "Claiming funds for HTLC with preimage {} resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}",
4354 log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4355 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4356 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4357 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4358 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4359 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
4360 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4361 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4367 return ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(htlc_value_msat);
4369 return ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim;
4372 Err((e, monitor_update)) => {
4373 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4374 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
4376 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Info },
4377 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?} immediately prior to force-close: {:?}",
4378 payment_preimage, e);
4381 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
4382 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan.get_mut(), &chan_id);
4384 chan.remove_entry();
4386 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(counterparty_node_id, res, None);
4389 } else { return ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed }
4392 fn finalize_claims(&self, mut sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
4393 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4394 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4395 for source in sources.drain(..) {
4396 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } = source {
4397 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
4398 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
4399 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
4400 assert!(payment.get().is_fulfilled());
4401 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, None) {
4402 pending_events.push(
4403 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
4405 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash(),
4415 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
4417 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
4418 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4419 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
4420 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
4421 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4422 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
4423 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4424 if !payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
4425 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4426 let fee_paid_msat = payment.get().get_pending_fee_msat();
4427 pending_events.push(
4428 events::Event::PaymentSent {
4429 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
4435 payment.get_mut().mark_fulfilled();
4439 // We currently immediately remove HTLCs which were fulfilled on-chain.
4440 // This could potentially lead to removing a pending payment too early,
4441 // with a reorg of one block causing us to re-add the fulfilled payment on
4443 // TODO: We should have a second monitor event that informs us of payments
4444 // irrevocably fulfilled.
4445 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
4446 let payment_hash = Some(PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner()));
4447 pending_events.push(
4448 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
4457 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fulfill for HTLC with payment_preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0));
4460 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
4461 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
4462 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage);
4463 let claimed_htlc = if let ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim = res { false } else { true };
4464 let htlc_claim_value_msat = match res {
4465 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(_, _, amt_opt) => amt_opt,
4466 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(amt) => Some(amt),
4469 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed = res {
4470 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4471 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
4472 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
4473 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4476 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
4477 // receiving an offchain preimage event from the forward link (the
4478 // event being update_fulfill_htlc).
4479 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_outpoint, preimage_update);
4480 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
4481 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
4482 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
4483 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
4484 // again on restart.
4485 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4486 payment_preimage, update_res);
4488 // Note that we do *not* set `claimed_htlc` to false here. In fact, this
4489 // totally could be a duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing
4490 // without interrogating the `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above
4491 // update to. Instead, we simply document in `PaymentForwarded` that this
4494 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4495 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) = res {
4496 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4497 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
4501 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
4502 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
4503 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
4506 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4507 let prev_channel_id = Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id());
4508 let next_channel_id = Some(next_channel_id);
4510 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
4512 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
4522 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
4523 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4524 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
4527 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
4528 /// update completion.
4529 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4530 channel: &mut Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
4531 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
4532 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
4533 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
4534 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
4535 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
4537 let counterparty_node_id = channel.get_counterparty_node_id();
4538 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4539 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.outbound_scid_alias()),
4540 channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
4543 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4544 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
4546 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
4547 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4548 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4553 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, channel);
4555 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
4556 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
4557 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4558 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4563 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
4564 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
4565 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4566 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4567 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4572 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
4576 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
4582 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
4583 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
4584 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
4590 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
4591 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4594 let (mut pending_failures, finalized_claims, counterparty_node_id) = {
4595 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4596 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4597 let mut channel = match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4598 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
4599 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
4601 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
4605 let counterparty_node_id = channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
4606 let updates = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
4607 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && channel.get().is_usable() {
4608 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
4609 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
4610 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
4611 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
4613 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel.get()) {
4614 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4615 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4620 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(&mut channel_state.pending_msg_events, channel.get_mut(), updates.raa, updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs, updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready, updates.announcement_sigs);
4621 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
4622 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
4625 (updates.failed_htlcs, updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs, counterparty_node_id)
4627 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
4628 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
4630 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claims);
4631 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4632 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id: funding_txo.to_channel_id() };
4633 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
4637 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
4639 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
4640 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
4643 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4644 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4645 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4647 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
4648 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
4649 /// used to accept such channels.
4651 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4652 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4653 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4654 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
4657 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
4658 /// it as confirmed immediately.
4660 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4661 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4662 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4664 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
4665 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
4667 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
4668 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
4670 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
4671 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
4673 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4674 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4675 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4676 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
4679 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4680 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4682 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4683 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4684 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4685 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
4686 if !channel.get().inbound_is_awaiting_accept() {
4687 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
4689 if *counterparty_node_id != channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id() {
4690 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The passed counterparty_node_id doesn't match the channel's counterparty node_id".to_owned() });
4693 channel.get_mut().set_0conf();
4694 } else if channel.get().get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4695 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4696 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4697 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4698 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
4701 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4702 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4703 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
4706 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4707 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4708 msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4711 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4712 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Can't accept a channel that doesn't exist".to_owned() });
4718 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4719 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
4720 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4723 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
4724 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4727 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
4728 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
4729 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
4731 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
4732 let mut channel = match Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager,
4733 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &their_features, msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration,
4734 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias)
4737 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4738 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
4742 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4743 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4744 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
4745 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4746 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4747 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
4749 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4750 if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
4751 if channel.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4752 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4754 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4755 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4756 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4759 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4760 pending_events.push(
4761 events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
4762 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
4763 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4764 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
4765 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
4766 channel_type: channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
4771 entry.insert(channel);
4777 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4778 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
4779 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4780 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4781 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4782 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4783 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4784 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
4786 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &their_features), chan);
4787 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
4789 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4792 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4793 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
4794 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
4795 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4796 channel_value_satoshis: value,
4798 user_channel_id: user_id,
4803 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4804 let ((funding_msg, monitor, mut channel_ready), mut chan) = {
4805 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4806 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4807 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4808 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4809 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4810 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4811 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
4813 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.logger), chan), chan.remove())
4815 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4818 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
4819 // lock before watch_channel
4820 match self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
4821 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
4822 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
4823 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
4824 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
4825 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
4826 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
4827 // We do not propagate the monitor update to the user as it would be for a monitor
4828 // that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we don't respond
4829 // with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
4830 let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(false);
4831 assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4832 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
4834 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
4835 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
4836 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
4837 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
4838 // until we have persisted our monitor.
4839 chan.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, channel_ready.is_some(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4840 channel_ready = None; // Don't send the channel_ready now
4843 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4844 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4845 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
4846 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4847 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
4849 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4850 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4851 match id_to_peer.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
4852 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4853 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4854 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
4855 funding_msg.channel_id))
4857 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
4858 i_e.insert(chan.get_counterparty_node_id());
4861 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
4862 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4865 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4866 send_channel_ready!(self, channel_state.pending_msg_events, chan, msg);
4874 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4876 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4877 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4878 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4879 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4880 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4881 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4882 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4884 let (monitor, funding_tx, channel_ready) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.logger) {
4885 Ok(update) => update,
4886 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan),
4888 match self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
4889 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
4891 let mut res = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, channel_ready.is_some(), OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED);
4892 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
4893 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
4894 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
4895 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
4896 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
4897 shutdown_finish.0.take();
4903 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4904 send_channel_ready!(self, channel_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get(), msg);
4908 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4911 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid());
4912 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
4916 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4917 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4918 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4919 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4920 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4921 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4922 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4924 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, self.get_our_node_id(),
4925 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan);
4926 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
4927 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4928 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4929 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4930 msg: announcement_sigs,
4932 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4933 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
4934 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
4935 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
4936 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
4937 // announcement_signatures.
4938 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4939 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
4940 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4941 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4947 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, chan.get_mut());
4951 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4955 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4956 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
4957 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
4958 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4959 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4961 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4962 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4963 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4964 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4967 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
4968 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
4969 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
4970 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
4973 let (shutdown, monitor_update, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.keys_manager, &their_features, &msg), chan_entry);
4974 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
4976 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
4977 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
4978 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
4979 let (result, is_permanent) =
4980 handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
4982 remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
4987 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4988 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4989 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4996 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4999 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
5000 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
5001 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
5002 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
5005 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
5009 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5010 let (tx, chan_option) = {
5011 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5012 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5013 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
5014 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
5015 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5016 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5018 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_entry);
5019 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
5020 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5021 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5026 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
5027 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
5028 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
5029 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
5030 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
5031 (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, chan_entry)))
5032 } else { (tx, None) }
5034 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5037 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
5038 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
5039 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
5041 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
5042 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5043 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5044 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5048 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5053 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5054 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
5055 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
5056 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
5058 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
5059 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
5060 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
5061 //but we should prevent it anyway.
5063 let pending_forward_info = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
5064 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5065 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5067 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5068 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5069 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5070 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5073 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
5074 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
5075 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
5076 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
5077 match pending_forward_info {
5078 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
5079 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
5080 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
5081 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, real_code, &error_data)
5083 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &[])
5085 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
5086 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
5087 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
5090 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
5092 _ => pending_forward_info
5095 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), chan);
5097 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5102 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5103 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5104 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
5105 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5106 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5107 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5108 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5109 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5111 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan)
5113 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5116 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, msg.channel_id);
5120 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5121 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5122 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5123 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5124 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5125 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5126 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5128 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), chan);
5130 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5135 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5136 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5137 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5138 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5139 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5140 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5141 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5143 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
5144 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
5145 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan);
5147 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(msg.failure_code)), chan);
5150 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5154 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5155 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5156 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5157 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5158 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5159 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5160 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5162 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, monitor_update) =
5163 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger) {
5164 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan),
5165 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
5166 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
5167 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
5168 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan);
5173 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
5174 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some()) {
5178 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
5179 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5180 msg: revoke_and_ack,
5182 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
5183 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5184 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5185 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
5186 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5187 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5188 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5189 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5191 commitment_signed: msg,
5197 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5202 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
5203 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
5204 let mut forward_event = None;
5205 let mut new_intercept_events = Vec::new();
5206 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
5207 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5208 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
5209 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
5210 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
5211 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
5212 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
5214 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
5215 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
5217 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5218 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
5219 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
5220 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5221 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5222 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
5224 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5225 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
5226 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.genesis_hash)
5228 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).into_inner());
5229 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5230 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
5231 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5232 new_intercept_events.push(events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
5233 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
5234 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
5235 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
5236 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
5239 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5240 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
5242 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
5243 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
5244 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5245 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
5246 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
5247 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
5248 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
5249 phantom_shared_secret: None,
5252 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
5253 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
5254 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
5259 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
5260 // payments are being processed.
5261 if forward_htlcs_empty {
5262 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
5264 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5265 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
5272 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
5273 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
5276 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
5277 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5278 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
5281 match forward_event {
5283 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5284 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
5285 time_forwardable: time
5293 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5294 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
5296 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5297 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5298 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5299 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5300 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5301 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5303 let was_paused_for_mon_update = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
5304 let raa_updates = break_chan_entry!(self,
5305 chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
5306 htlcs_to_fail = raa_updates.holding_cell_failed_htlcs;
5307 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), raa_updates.monitor_update);
5308 if was_paused_for_mon_update {
5309 assert!(update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
5310 assert!(raa_updates.commitment_update.is_none());
5311 assert!(raa_updates.accepted_htlcs.is_empty());
5312 assert!(raa_updates.failed_htlcs.is_empty());
5313 assert!(raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs.is_empty());
5314 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Existing pending monitor update prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
5316 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
5317 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan,
5318 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false,
5319 raa_updates.commitment_update.is_some(), false,
5320 raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
5321 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs) {
5323 } else { unreachable!(); }
5325 if let Some(updates) = raa_updates.commitment_update {
5326 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5327 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5331 break Ok((raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
5332 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs,
5333 chan.get().get_short_channel_id()
5334 .unwrap_or(chan.get().outbound_scid_alias()),
5335 chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(),
5336 chan.get().get_user_id()))
5338 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5341 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
5343 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, finalized_claim_htlcs,
5344 short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, user_channel_id)) =>
5346 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
5347 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: channel_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
5348 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
5350 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, user_channel_id, pending_forwards)]);
5351 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claim_htlcs);
5358 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5359 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5360 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5361 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5362 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5363 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5364 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5366 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan);
5368 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5373 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5374 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5375 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5377 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5378 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5379 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5380 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5382 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
5383 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
5386 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5387 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
5388 self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), msg), chan),
5389 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5390 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5391 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
5394 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5399 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
5400 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5401 let chan_id = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
5402 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
5404 // It's not a local channel
5405 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5408 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5409 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5410 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5411 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5412 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5413 if chan.get().should_announce() {
5414 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
5415 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
5416 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
5417 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5419 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
5421 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
5422 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
5423 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
5424 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5426 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", log_bytes!(chan_id));
5427 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), chan);
5430 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5432 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
5435 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5437 let need_lnd_workaround = {
5438 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5439 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5441 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5442 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5443 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5444 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5446 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
5447 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
5448 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
5449 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
5450 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
5451 msg, &self.logger, self.our_network_pubkey.clone(), self.genesis_hash,
5452 &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan);
5453 let mut channel_update = None;
5454 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
5455 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5456 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5459 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
5460 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
5461 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
5462 // they have the latest channel parameters.
5463 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
5464 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5465 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
5470 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
5471 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
5472 &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get_mut(), responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
5473 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
5474 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
5475 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
5479 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5483 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
5484 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
5487 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
5488 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
5493 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed.
5494 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
5495 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5496 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
5497 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
5498 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
5499 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
5500 match monitor_event {
5501 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
5502 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
5503 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
5504 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
5506 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
5507 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
5508 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
5509 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5512 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
5513 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
5514 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5515 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5516 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
5517 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5518 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
5519 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
5520 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
5521 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5522 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5526 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
5527 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
5529 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
5531 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
5532 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5533 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5534 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5535 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5540 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
5541 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id);
5547 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5548 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5551 has_pending_monitor_events
5554 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
5555 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
5556 /// update events as a separate process method here.
5558 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
5559 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
5562 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
5563 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
5564 /// update was applied.
5566 /// This should only apply to HTLCs which were added to the holding cell because we were
5567 /// waiting on a monitor update to finish. In that case, we don't want to free the holding cell
5568 /// directly in `channel_monitor_updated` as it may introduce deadlocks calling back into user
5569 /// code to inform them of a channel monitor update.
5570 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
5571 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
5572 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5573 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
5575 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5576 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5577 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
5578 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5580 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5581 match chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger) {
5582 Ok((commitment_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
5583 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
5585 holding_cell_failed_htlcs,
5587 chan.get_counterparty_node_id()
5590 if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt {
5591 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
5592 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
5593 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5594 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5595 updates: commitment_update,
5599 has_monitor_update = true;
5600 let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, channel_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY);
5601 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res));
5602 if close_channel { return false; }
5609 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
5610 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5611 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us
5618 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
5619 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
5620 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
5623 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5624 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5630 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
5631 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
5632 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
5633 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
5634 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
5635 let mut has_update = false;
5637 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5638 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5639 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
5640 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5642 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5643 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
5644 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
5645 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
5647 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5648 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
5651 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
5652 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
5653 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
5654 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5655 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5660 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5662 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
5663 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
5664 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
5670 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
5671 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5678 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5679 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5685 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
5686 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
5688 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
5689 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5690 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
5691 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
5692 // reorganized out of the main chain.
5693 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
5694 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
5695 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
5696 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
5697 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
5698 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
5699 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
5700 assert!(should_broadcast);
5701 } else { unreachable!(); }
5702 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
5704 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5708 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5709 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
5711 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
5712 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("min_value_msat of {} greater than total 21 million bitcoin supply", min_value_msat.unwrap()) });
5715 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5717 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5718 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5719 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5720 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5721 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
5722 payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
5723 user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
5724 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
5725 // it's updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
5726 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
5727 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
5728 // never fail a payment too early.
5729 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
5731 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
5734 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
5739 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
5742 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
5743 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
5745 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentReceived`], which
5746 /// will have the [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
5747 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
5749 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
5751 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5752 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5756 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5757 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5759 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5761 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5762 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
5763 /// [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::payment_preimage
5764 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5765 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
5766 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, &self.keys_manager, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5769 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5770 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5772 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5775 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5777 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5779 pub fn create_inbound_payment_legacy(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), APIError> {
5780 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5781 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5782 let payment_secret = self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)?;
5783 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret))
5786 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
5787 /// stored external to LDK.
5789 /// A [`PaymentReceived`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
5790 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
5791 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
5793 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
5794 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
5797 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
5798 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
5799 /// before a [`PaymentReceived`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
5800 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
5802 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
5803 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
5804 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
5805 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
5806 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
5808 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
5809 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
5810 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentReceived`] event for some time after the expiry.
5811 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
5812 /// [`PaymentReceived`].
5814 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry`
5815 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY`].
5817 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5818 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5822 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5823 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5825 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5827 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5828 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
5829 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
5830 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5833 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5834 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5836 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5839 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5841 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5843 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5844 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
5847 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
5848 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
5850 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5851 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
5852 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
5855 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
5856 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
5858 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5859 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5860 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5861 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5863 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager);
5864 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5865 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
5866 Some(_) => continue,
5867 None => return scid_candidate
5872 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
5874 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5875 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
5877 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
5878 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
5879 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
5883 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
5884 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
5885 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
5887 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
5888 /// times to get a unique scid.
5889 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5890 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5891 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5893 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager);
5894 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5895 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
5896 return scid_candidate
5900 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
5901 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
5902 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
5903 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
5905 for chan in self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.values() {
5906 for htlc_source in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
5907 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
5908 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
5916 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5917 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
5918 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5919 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
5920 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
5925 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
5926 !self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().is_empty()
5930 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
5931 self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().clear()
5934 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
5935 /// using the given event handler.
5937 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
5938 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
5941 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock until the returned future completes so that
5942 // we can be sure no other persists happen while processing events.
5943 let _read_guard = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
5945 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5947 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5948 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5949 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5950 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5953 let pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5954 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5955 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5958 for event in pending_events {
5959 handler(event).await;
5962 if result == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
5963 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
5968 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
5969 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
5970 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5971 K::Target: KeysInterface,
5972 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5975 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
5976 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5977 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5978 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5980 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5981 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5982 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5983 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5986 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5987 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5989 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
5990 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5993 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
5994 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5995 mem::swap(&mut pending_events, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
5997 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5998 events.replace(pending_events);
6007 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
6009 M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
6010 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6011 K::Target: KeysInterface,
6012 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6015 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
6017 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
6018 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
6019 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
6020 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6021 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
6023 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
6024 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
6025 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
6026 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6029 let pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
6030 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
6031 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6034 for event in pending_events {
6035 handler.handle_event(event);
6043 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
6045 M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
6046 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6047 K::Target: KeysInterface,
6048 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6051 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
6053 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6054 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
6055 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
6056 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
6057 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
6060 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
6061 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
6064 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
6065 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6066 let new_height = height - 1;
6068 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
6069 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
6070 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
6071 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
6072 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
6073 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
6076 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
6080 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
6082 M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
6083 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6084 K::Target: KeysInterface,
6085 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6088 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
6089 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6090 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6091 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6093 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
6094 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
6096 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6097 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger)
6098 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
6100 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6101 if height < last_best_block_height {
6102 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6103 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
6107 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
6108 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6109 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6110 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6112 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
6113 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
6115 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6117 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
6119 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
6121 macro_rules! max_time {
6122 ($timestamp: expr) => {
6124 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
6125 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
6126 // having an explicit local time source.
6127 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
6128 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
6129 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6130 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
6131 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
6137 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
6138 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6139 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
6140 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
6144 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
6145 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6146 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
6147 for chan in channel_state.by_id.values() {
6148 if let (Some(funding_txo), block_hash) = (chan.get_funding_txo(), chan.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
6149 res.push((funding_txo.txid, block_hash));
6155 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
6156 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6157 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
6158 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
6159 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
6160 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
6161 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
6162 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
6167 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
6169 M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
6170 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6171 K::Target: KeysInterface,
6172 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6175 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
6176 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
6178 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
6179 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
6180 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6181 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6182 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6184 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6185 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
6187 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6188 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
6189 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
6190 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
6191 let res = f(channel);
6192 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
6193 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
6194 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
6195 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
6196 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.channel_id() }));
6198 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
6199 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
6200 if channel.is_usable() {
6201 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6202 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
6203 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6204 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6209 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6213 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, channel);
6215 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
6216 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6217 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6218 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6219 msg: announcement_sigs,
6221 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6222 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, height) {
6223 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
6225 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
6226 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
6227 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap(),
6232 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
6233 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
6234 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
6235 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
6236 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
6237 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
6238 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
6239 // is always consistent.
6240 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
6241 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
6242 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()),
6243 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
6244 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
6247 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
6248 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, channel);
6249 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
6250 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
6251 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
6252 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
6253 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6257 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
6258 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
6259 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6260 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6261 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
6262 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
6263 data: reason_message,
6272 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6273 self.claimable_htlcs.lock().unwrap().retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
6274 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
6275 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
6276 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
6277 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
6278 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
6279 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6280 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
6281 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(height));
6283 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
6284 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
6285 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
6289 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
6292 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6293 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
6294 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6295 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6296 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
6297 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
6298 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6299 phantom_shared_secret: None,
6300 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
6303 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
6304 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6305 _ => unreachable!(),
6307 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
6308 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
6309 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
6310 log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
6316 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
6318 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
6319 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
6323 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
6324 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
6325 /// [`await_persistable_update`], [`await_persistable_update_timeout`], or a future returned by
6326 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`] is guaranteed to be woken up.
6328 /// Note that this method is not available with the `no-std` feature.
6330 /// [`await_persistable_update`]: Self::await_persistable_update
6331 /// [`await_persistable_update_timeout`]: Self::await_persistable_update_timeout
6332 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`]: Self::get_persistable_update_future
6333 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
6334 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
6335 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
6338 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
6339 /// [`await_persistable_update`], `await_persistable_update_timeout`, or a future returned by
6340 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`] is guaranteed to be woken up.
6342 /// [`await_persistable_update`]: Self::await_persistable_update
6343 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`]: Self::get_persistable_update_future
6344 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
6345 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
6348 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when a persistable update is available. Note that
6349 /// callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this [`ChannelManager`] and
6350 /// should instead register actions to be taken later.
6351 pub fn get_persistable_update_future(&self) -> Future {
6352 self.persistence_notifier.get_future()
6355 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6356 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
6357 self.persistence_notifier.notify_pending()
6360 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
6361 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
6362 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
6363 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
6367 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref >
6368 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
6369 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
6370 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6371 K::Target: KeysInterface,
6372 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6375 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
6376 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6377 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6380 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
6381 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6382 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6385 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
6386 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6387 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6390 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
6391 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6392 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6395 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
6396 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6397 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6400 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
6401 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6402 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6405 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
6406 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6407 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6410 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
6411 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6412 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6415 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
6416 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6417 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6420 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
6421 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6422 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6425 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
6426 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6427 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6430 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
6431 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6432 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6435 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
6436 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6437 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6440 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
6441 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6442 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6445 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
6446 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6447 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6450 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
6451 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6452 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
6455 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
6460 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
6461 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6462 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6465 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
6466 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6467 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6468 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
6470 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6471 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
6472 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
6473 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates. We believe we {} make future connections to this peer.",
6474 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id), if no_connection_possible { "cannot" } else { "can" });
6475 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6476 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
6477 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
6478 if chan.is_shutdown() {
6479 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
6480 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
6483 no_channels_remain = false;
6488 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
6490 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6491 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6492 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6493 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6494 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6495 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6496 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6497 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6498 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6499 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6500 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6501 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6502 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6503 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
6504 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6505 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6506 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
6507 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
6508 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
6509 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
6513 if no_channels_remain {
6514 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id);
6517 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6518 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6522 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) -> Result<(), ()> {
6523 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
6524 log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting with no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6528 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6530 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6533 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6534 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
6535 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6536 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
6537 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
6540 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
6541 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
6546 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6547 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
6548 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
6549 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6550 let retain = if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
6551 if !chan.have_received_message() {
6552 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
6553 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
6554 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
6558 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
6559 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6560 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
6565 if retain && chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6566 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()) {
6567 if let Ok(update_msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
6568 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement {
6569 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6577 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
6581 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
6582 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6584 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
6585 for chan in self.list_channels() {
6586 if chan.counterparty.node_id == *counterparty_node_id {
6587 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6588 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6593 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
6594 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6595 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
6596 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6599 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash) {
6600 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
6601 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6609 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6610 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6614 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6615 provided_node_features()
6618 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
6619 provided_init_features()
6623 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6624 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6625 pub fn provided_node_features() -> NodeFeatures {
6626 provided_init_features().to_context()
6629 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6630 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6632 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6633 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6634 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6635 pub fn provided_invoice_features() -> InvoiceFeatures {
6636 provided_init_features().to_context()
6639 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6640 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6641 pub fn provided_channel_features() -> ChannelFeatures {
6642 provided_init_features().to_context()
6645 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6646 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6647 pub fn provided_init_features() -> InitFeatures {
6648 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
6649 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the ChannelMessageHandler impl for
6650 // ErroringMessageHandler.
6651 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
6652 features.set_data_loss_protect_optional();
6653 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
6654 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
6655 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
6656 features.set_payment_secret_required();
6657 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
6658 features.set_wumbo_optional();
6659 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
6660 features.set_channel_type_optional();
6661 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
6662 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
6666 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6667 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6669 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
6670 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
6671 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
6672 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
6675 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
6676 (2, node_id, required),
6677 (4, features, required),
6678 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
6679 (8, forwarding_info, option),
6680 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6681 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6684 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
6685 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6686 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6687 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6688 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
6689 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
6690 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6691 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
6692 (2, self.channel_id, required),
6693 (3, self.channel_type, option),
6694 (4, self.counterparty, required),
6695 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
6696 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
6697 (7, self.config, option),
6698 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
6699 (9, self.confirmations, option),
6700 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
6701 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6702 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6703 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
6704 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6705 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6706 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6707 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6708 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6709 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
6710 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
6711 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
6712 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
6713 (30, self.is_usable, required),
6714 (32, self.is_public, required),
6715 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6716 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6717 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6723 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
6724 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6725 init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6726 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
6727 (2, channel_id, required),
6728 (3, channel_type, option),
6729 (4, counterparty, required),
6730 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6731 (6, funding_txo, option),
6732 (7, config, option),
6733 (8, short_channel_id, option),
6734 (9, confirmations, option),
6735 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
6736 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6737 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6738 (16, balance_msat, required),
6739 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6740 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6741 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6742 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6743 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6744 (22, confirmations_required, option),
6745 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
6746 (26, is_outbound, required),
6747 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
6748 (30, is_usable, required),
6749 (32, is_public, required),
6750 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6751 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6752 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6755 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6756 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6757 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
6758 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
6759 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
6763 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
6765 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
6766 outbound_scid_alias,
6770 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
6771 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
6773 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
6774 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
6775 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
6776 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
6777 confirmations_required,
6779 force_close_spend_delay,
6780 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
6781 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
6782 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
6783 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
6784 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
6785 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
6790 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
6791 (2, channels, vec_type),
6792 (4, phantom_scid, required),
6793 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
6796 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
6798 (0, onion_packet, required),
6799 (2, short_channel_id, required),
6802 (0, payment_data, required),
6803 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6804 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6806 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
6807 (0, payment_preimage, required),
6808 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6812 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
6813 (0, routing, required),
6814 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
6815 (4, payment_hash, required),
6816 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
6817 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
6818 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
6822 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6823 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6825 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
6827 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6828 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6829 reason.write(writer)?;
6831 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6832 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
6835 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6836 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6837 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
6838 failure_code.write(writer)?;
6845 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6846 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6847 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6850 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6851 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6852 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6853 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
6857 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6858 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6859 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6860 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
6861 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
6864 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
6865 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
6866 // messages contained in the variants.
6867 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
6868 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
6869 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
6871 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6872 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6873 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6874 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6875 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
6878 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6879 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6880 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6881 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6882 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
6884 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6889 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
6894 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
6895 (0, short_channel_id, required),
6896 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6897 (2, outpoint, required),
6898 (4, htlc_id, required),
6899 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
6902 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
6903 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6904 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
6905 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
6906 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
6908 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6909 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
6910 (1, self.total_msat, required),
6911 (2, self.value, required),
6912 (4, payment_data, option),
6913 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
6914 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
6920 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
6921 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6922 let mut prev_hop = crate::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6924 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
6925 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
6926 let mut total_msat = None;
6927 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
6928 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6929 (0, prev_hop, required),
6930 (1, total_msat, option),
6931 (2, value, required),
6932 (4, payment_data, option),
6933 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
6934 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
6936 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
6938 if payment_data.is_some() {
6939 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6941 if total_msat.is_none() {
6942 total_msat = Some(value);
6944 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
6947 if total_msat.is_none() {
6948 if payment_data.is_none() {
6949 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6951 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
6953 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
6957 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
6960 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
6967 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
6968 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6969 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6972 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6973 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
6974 let mut path = Some(Vec::new());
6975 let mut payment_id = None;
6976 let mut payment_secret = None;
6977 let mut payment_params = None;
6978 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6979 (0, session_priv, required),
6980 (1, payment_id, option),
6981 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6982 (3, payment_secret, option),
6983 (4, path, vec_type),
6984 (5, payment_params, option),
6986 if payment_id.is_none() {
6987 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
6989 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
6991 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
6992 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
6993 first_hop_htlc_msat,
6994 path: path.unwrap(),
6995 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
7000 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
7001 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
7006 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
7007 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
7009 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id, payment_secret, payment_params } => {
7011 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
7012 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7013 (0, session_priv, required),
7014 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
7015 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
7016 (3, payment_secret, option),
7017 (4, *path, vec_type),
7018 (5, payment_params, option),
7021 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
7023 field.write(writer)?;
7030 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCFailReason,
7031 (0, LightningError) => {
7035 (0, failure_code, required),
7036 (2, data, vec_type),
7040 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
7041 (0, forward_info, required),
7042 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
7043 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
7044 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
7045 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
7048 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
7050 (0, htlc_id, required),
7051 (2, err_packet, required),
7056 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
7057 (0, payment_secret, required),
7058 (2, expiry_time, required),
7059 (4, user_payment_id, required),
7060 (6, payment_preimage, required),
7061 (8, min_value_msat, required),
7064 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(PendingOutboundPayment,
7066 (0, session_privs, required),
7069 (0, session_privs, required),
7070 (1, payment_hash, option),
7071 (3, timer_ticks_without_htlcs, (default_value, 0)),
7074 (0, session_privs, required),
7075 (1, pending_fee_msat, option),
7076 (2, payment_hash, required),
7077 (4, payment_secret, option),
7078 (6, total_msat, required),
7079 (8, pending_amt_msat, required),
7080 (10, starting_block_height, required),
7083 (0, session_privs, required),
7084 (2, payment_hash, required),
7088 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
7089 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
7090 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7091 K::Target: KeysInterface,
7092 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7095 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7096 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
7098 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7100 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
7102 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
7103 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
7104 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
7108 // Take `channel_state` lock temporarily to avoid creating a lock order that requires
7109 // that the `forward_htlcs` lock is taken after `channel_state`
7110 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
7111 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
7112 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
7113 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7114 unfunded_channels += 1;
7117 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
7118 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
7119 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7120 channel.write(writer)?;
7126 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7127 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7128 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
7129 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
7130 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7131 for forward in pending_forwards {
7132 forward.write(writer)?;
7137 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7138 let claimable_htlcs = self.claimable_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7139 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7141 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
7142 (claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7143 for (payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops)) in claimable_htlcs.iter() {
7144 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7145 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7146 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
7147 htlc.write(writer)?;
7149 htlc_purposes.push(purpose);
7152 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
7153 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7154 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7155 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
7156 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7157 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
7160 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7161 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7162 for event in events.iter() {
7163 event.write(writer)?;
7166 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
7167 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7168 for event in background_events.iter() {
7170 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
7172 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
7173 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
7178 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
7179 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
7180 // likely to be identical.
7181 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
7182 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
7184 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7185 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
7186 hash.write(writer)?;
7187 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
7190 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
7191 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
7192 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7193 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
7194 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
7197 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
7198 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7200 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7201 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7202 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
7203 session_priv.write(writer)?;
7206 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
7207 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
7211 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
7212 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
7213 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7215 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7216 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7217 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
7223 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
7224 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7225 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
7226 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
7228 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7229 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
7230 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7231 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
7232 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
7233 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
7234 (9, htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7235 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
7242 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
7244 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
7246 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7247 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
7248 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
7249 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
7250 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
7251 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
7252 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
7253 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
7254 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7255 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
7256 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
7257 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
7258 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
7260 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
7261 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
7263 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
7264 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
7266 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
7267 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
7268 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
7269 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
7270 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
7271 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
7273 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
7274 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
7275 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
7276 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7277 K::Target: KeysInterface,
7278 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7281 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
7282 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
7284 pub keys_manager: K,
7286 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7288 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
7289 pub fee_estimator: F,
7290 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7292 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
7293 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
7294 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
7295 pub chain_monitor: M,
7297 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
7298 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
7299 /// force-closed during deserialization.
7300 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
7301 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
7302 /// deserialization.
7304 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
7305 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
7306 pub default_config: UserConfig,
7308 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
7309 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
7311 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
7312 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
7313 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
7314 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
7316 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
7319 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
7320 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>>,
7323 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
7324 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, K, F, L>
7325 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
7326 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7327 K::Target: KeysInterface,
7328 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7331 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
7332 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
7333 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
7334 pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
7335 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>>) -> Self {
7337 keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config,
7338 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
7343 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
7344 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
7345 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
7346 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>>)
7347 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
7348 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7349 K::Target: KeysInterface,
7350 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7353 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7354 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
7355 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
7359 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
7360 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>)
7361 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
7362 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7363 K::Target: KeysInterface,
7364 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7367 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7368 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7370 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7371 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7372 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7374 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
7376 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7377 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7378 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7379 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7380 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7381 let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
7382 for _ in 0..channel_count {
7383 let mut channel: Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (&args.keys_manager, best_block_height))?;
7384 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7385 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
7386 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
7387 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7388 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7389 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7390 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7391 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
7392 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
7393 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7394 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7395 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7396 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7397 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7398 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7399 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7400 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7401 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7402 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7403 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7404 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
7405 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
7406 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
7407 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7408 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7409 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
7410 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
7411 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
7412 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7413 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7414 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7415 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
7418 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7419 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
7420 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7422 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7423 id_to_peer.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel.get_counterparty_node_id());
7425 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
7427 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
7428 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
7429 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
7430 // safely discard the channel.
7431 let _ = channel.force_shutdown(false);
7432 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7433 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7434 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7435 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
7438 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7439 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7440 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7441 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7442 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7443 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7447 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
7448 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
7449 log_info!(args.logger, "Broadcasting latest holder commitment transaction for closed channel {}", log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
7450 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
7454 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
7455 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7456 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7457 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
7458 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7459 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7460 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
7461 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
7462 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
7464 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
7467 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7468 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7469 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
7470 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7471 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7472 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
7473 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
7474 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
7476 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
7479 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7480 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>)>()));
7481 for _ in 0..peer_count {
7482 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7483 let peer_state = PeerState {
7484 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
7486 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
7489 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7490 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
7491 for _ in 0..event_count {
7492 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
7493 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
7497 if forward_htlcs_count > 0 {
7498 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
7499 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
7500 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
7501 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
7502 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
7503 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
7504 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
7508 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7509 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
7510 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
7511 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7512 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
7513 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7517 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
7518 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7520 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7521 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
7522 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
7523 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
7524 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7528 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7529 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
7530 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
7531 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
7532 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
7533 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
7534 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
7536 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
7537 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7541 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
7542 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
7543 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
7544 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
7545 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
7546 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7547 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7548 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
7549 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7550 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
7551 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7552 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
7553 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
7554 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
7555 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7556 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
7558 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
7559 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
7562 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
7563 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
7566 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
7567 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
7568 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
7569 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
7570 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
7571 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
7573 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
7575 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
7576 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
7577 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
7578 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
7579 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
7580 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
7581 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
7583 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7584 if by_id.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
7585 for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_pending_outbound_htlcs() {
7586 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, payment_secret, .. } = htlc_source {
7587 if path.is_empty() {
7588 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
7589 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7591 let path_amt = path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
7592 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
7593 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
7594 match pending_outbound_payments.as_mut().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
7595 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7596 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
7597 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
7598 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
7600 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7601 let path_fee = path.get_path_fees();
7602 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
7603 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
7604 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
7606 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
7607 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
7608 total_msat: path_amt,
7609 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
7611 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
7612 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
7621 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
7622 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
7624 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
7625 if let Some(mut purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
7626 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
7627 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7629 for (purpose, (payment_hash, previous_hops)) in purposes.drain(..).zip(claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..)) {
7630 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7633 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
7634 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
7635 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
7636 if previous_hops.is_empty() {
7637 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7639 let purpose = match &previous_hops[0].onion_payload {
7640 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
7641 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
7642 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
7643 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
7644 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
7645 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
7646 Ok(payment_preimage) => payment_preimage,
7648 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7649 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7653 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
7655 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
7657 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
7658 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
7660 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7664 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7665 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
7667 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
7668 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
7671 let our_network_key = match args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node) {
7673 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7675 let our_network_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &our_network_key);
7676 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
7677 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
7678 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
7679 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7683 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
7684 for (chan_id, chan) in by_id.iter_mut() {
7685 if chan.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
7686 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
7688 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
7689 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.keys_manager);
7690 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
7692 chan.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
7693 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias()) {
7694 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7695 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7696 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7697 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7699 if chan.is_usable() {
7700 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
7701 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7702 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7703 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7704 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7709 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
7711 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7712 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
7713 if let Some((payment_purpose, claimable_htlcs)) = claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
7714 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7715 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
7716 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
7717 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
7718 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
7719 let phantom_pubkey = args.keys_manager.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
7720 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
7721 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
7723 for claimable_htlc in claimable_htlcs {
7724 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
7726 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
7727 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
7728 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
7729 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
7731 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
7732 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
7733 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
7734 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
7736 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
7737 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
7738 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
7739 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
7741 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
7742 if let Some(channel) = by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
7743 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
7745 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
7746 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
7749 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
7752 purpose: payment_purpose,
7753 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
7759 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
7761 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
7762 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
7763 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
7765 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
7767 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
7769 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
7771 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
7772 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
7773 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
7774 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
7776 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
7777 claimable_htlcs: Mutex::new(claimable_htlcs),
7778 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
7779 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
7780 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
7781 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
7783 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
7789 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
7791 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
7793 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
7794 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
7795 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
7796 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
7798 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
7799 logger: args.logger,
7800 default_configuration: args.default_config,
7803 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7804 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
7805 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
7806 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
7807 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
7810 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
7811 //connection or two.
7813 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
7819 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7820 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7821 use core::time::Duration;
7822 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
7823 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
7824 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure};
7825 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
7826 use crate::ln::msgs;
7827 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
7828 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
7829 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7830 use crate::util::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
7831 use crate::util::test_utils;
7832 use crate::chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
7835 fn test_notify_limits() {
7836 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
7837 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
7838 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7839 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7840 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7841 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7843 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
7844 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
7845 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7846 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7847 assert!(nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7849 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7851 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
7852 // to connect messages with new values
7853 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7854 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7855 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
7856 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
7858 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
7859 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7860 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7861 // ... but the last node should not.
7862 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7863 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
7864 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7865 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7867 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
7868 // about the channel.
7869 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7870 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7871 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7873 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
7875 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7876 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7877 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7878 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7879 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7880 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7882 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
7883 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7884 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7886 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
7887 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
7888 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
7889 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
7890 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
7891 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
7893 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
7894 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
7895 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7896 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7897 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7898 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7899 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7900 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7902 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
7903 // the channel info has updated.
7904 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7905 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7906 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7907 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7908 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7909 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7913 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
7914 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
7916 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7917 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7918 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7919 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7920 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7922 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
7923 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
7924 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
7925 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
7927 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
7928 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
7929 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
7930 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
7931 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
7932 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
7933 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7934 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7935 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7936 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
7938 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
7939 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
7940 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7941 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7942 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7943 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7944 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7945 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7946 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7947 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7948 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7949 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
7950 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7951 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7952 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7953 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7954 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7955 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7956 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7957 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7958 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7959 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
7961 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
7962 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
7963 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7964 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7965 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7966 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
7968 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
7969 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
7970 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
7971 // lightning messages manually.
7972 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7973 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
7974 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7976 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7977 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7978 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
7979 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7980 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7981 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
7982 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7983 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7984 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
7985 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7986 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7987 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7988 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
7989 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7990 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7991 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
7992 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7993 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7994 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
7995 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7996 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
7997 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7998 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7999 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
8000 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8002 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
8003 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
8004 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8005 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
8007 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
8008 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
8009 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
8010 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
8012 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8015 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
8016 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
8017 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
8018 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
8020 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8023 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
8024 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
8025 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
8026 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
8028 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8033 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
8034 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
8035 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
8036 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
8037 // fails as expected.
8038 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8039 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8040 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8041 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8042 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8043 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
8044 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8046 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
8047 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
8048 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
8050 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
8051 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8052 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id()),
8053 final_value_msat: 100_000,
8054 final_cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
8056 let route = find_route(
8057 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
8058 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8060 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8061 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8062 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8063 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8064 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8065 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8066 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8067 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8068 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8069 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
8070 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
8071 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8072 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
8073 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8074 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8075 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8076 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8077 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8078 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8079 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8080 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8081 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8082 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
8084 // Finally, claim the original payment.
8085 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
8087 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
8088 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8089 let route = find_route(
8090 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
8091 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8093 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8094 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8095 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8096 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8097 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
8098 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
8099 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
8101 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
8102 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8103 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8104 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8105 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8106 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8107 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8108 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8109 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8110 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8111 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8112 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8113 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
8114 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8115 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8116 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8117 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8118 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8119 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8120 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8121 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8122 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8123 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
8125 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
8126 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
8130 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
8131 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
8132 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
8133 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8134 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8135 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8136 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8138 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8139 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8140 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
8141 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
8143 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8144 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8145 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
8146 final_value_msat: 10_000,
8147 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
8149 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
8150 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
8151 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
8152 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8153 let route = find_route(
8154 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
8155 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8158 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8159 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
8160 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash, None, PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
8161 nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
8162 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8164 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8165 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8166 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8167 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8168 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8169 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8170 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8172 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash".to_string(), 1);
8176 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
8177 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
8178 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8179 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8180 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8181 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8183 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8184 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8185 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
8186 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
8188 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8189 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8190 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
8191 final_value_msat: 10_000,
8192 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
8194 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
8195 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
8196 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
8197 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8198 let route = find_route(
8199 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
8200 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8203 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8204 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8205 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
8206 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, Some(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
8207 nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
8208 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8210 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8211 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8212 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8213 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8214 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8215 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8216 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8218 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "We don't support MPP keysend payments".to_string(), 1);
8222 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
8223 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8224 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8225 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8226 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8228 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8229 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8230 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8231 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8233 // Marshall an MPP route.
8234 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8235 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8236 route.paths.push(path);
8237 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8238 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8239 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8240 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8241 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8242 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8244 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None, PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap_err() {
8245 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
8246 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err)) },
8247 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
8252 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
8253 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
8254 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8255 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8256 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8257 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8259 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
8260 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
8262 total_msat: 100_000,
8265 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
8266 // payment verification fails as expected.
8267 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
8268 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
8269 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
8270 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
8272 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment".to_string(), "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash".to_string(), 1);
8276 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
8277 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
8281 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
8282 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
8283 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
8284 // the channel is successfully closed.
8285 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8286 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8287 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8288 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8290 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8291 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8292 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel);
8293 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8294 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_channel);
8296 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
8297 let channel_id = &tx.txid().into_inner();
8299 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
8300 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
8301 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8302 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8305 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8307 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8308 // as it has the funding transaction.
8309 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8310 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8311 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8313 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8316 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8318 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8320 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8321 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8322 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8324 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8325 // as it has the funding transaction.
8326 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8327 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8328 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8330 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8331 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8332 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
8333 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8334 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
8335 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
8336 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
8338 nodes[0].node.close_channel(channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8339 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8340 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8341 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
8343 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8344 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
8346 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
8347 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
8348 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
8349 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
8350 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8351 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8352 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8354 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
8355 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
8356 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
8357 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
8358 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8359 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8360 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8363 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8365 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
8366 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
8367 // closing transaction).
8368 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
8369 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
8370 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8372 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
8373 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
8374 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8375 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8376 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8379 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8381 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
8383 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
8384 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
8385 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8387 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8389 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8390 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8394 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
8396 use crate::chain::Listen;
8397 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
8398 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, KeysInterface, InMemorySigner};
8399 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId};
8400 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
8401 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
8402 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
8403 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, get_route};
8404 use crate::util::test_utils;
8405 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
8406 use crate::util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
8408 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
8409 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
8410 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
8412 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
8416 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
8417 node: &'a ChannelManager<
8418 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
8419 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
8420 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
8421 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager,
8422 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestLogger>,
8427 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
8428 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
8431 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
8432 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
8433 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
8435 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
8436 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
8438 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
8439 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
8441 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
8442 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
8444 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
8445 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
8446 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
8447 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
8448 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
8450 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
8452 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
8454 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
8455 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
8456 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
8457 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
8458 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
8460 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
8462 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
8464 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
8465 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
8466 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8467 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8468 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8471 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
8472 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8473 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
8475 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8476 } else { panic!(); }
8478 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8479 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8481 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
8484 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
8487 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
8488 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
8490 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8491 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8492 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
8493 match msg_events[0] {
8494 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
8495 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
8496 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
8500 match msg_events[1] {
8501 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8505 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8506 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
8508 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8509 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
8511 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8514 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8515 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
8517 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8518 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
8520 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8523 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger_a);
8525 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
8526 macro_rules! send_payment {
8527 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
8528 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
8529 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id())
8530 .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
8531 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
8532 let seed = [3u8; 32];
8533 let keys_manager = KeysManager::new(&seed, 42, 42);
8534 let random_seed_bytes = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8535 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &dummy_graph.read_only(),
8536 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
8538 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
8539 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
8541 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
8542 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
8544 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8545 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
8546 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8547 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
8548 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
8549 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
8550 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
8551 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8553 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
8554 expect_payment_received!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
8555 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8556 expect_payment_claimed!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
8558 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
8559 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
8560 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
8561 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8562 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
8564 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
8567 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
8568 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
8569 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
8570 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8572 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
8577 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
8578 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);