1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
23 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
25 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
27 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
29 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
31 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
34 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
39 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
40 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
41 // construct one themselves.
42 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
43 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
44 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
45 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
46 use crate::ln::features::InvoiceFeatures;
47 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
48 use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, Path, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, Router};
49 use crate::routing::scoring::ProbabilisticScorer;
51 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
52 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
53 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
55 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
56 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment};
57 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
58 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider, ChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
59 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig};
60 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
61 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
62 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
63 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
64 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
65 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
67 use alloc::collections::BTreeMap;
70 use crate::prelude::*;
72 use core::cell::RefCell;
74 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
75 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, AtomicBool, Ordering};
76 use core::time::Duration;
79 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
80 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
81 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
83 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
85 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
86 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
87 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
89 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
90 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
91 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
92 // before we forward it.
94 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
95 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
96 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
97 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
98 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
100 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
101 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
103 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
104 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
105 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
106 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
109 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
110 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
111 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
112 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
115 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
116 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
117 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
121 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
122 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
123 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
124 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
125 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
127 pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
128 /// Sender intended amount to forward or receive (actual amount received
129 /// may overshoot this in either case)
130 pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
131 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
134 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
135 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
136 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
137 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
140 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
141 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
142 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
143 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
144 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
147 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
148 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
150 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
151 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
152 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
155 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
156 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
158 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
159 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
162 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
163 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
166 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
170 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
171 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
172 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
173 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
174 short_channel_id: u64,
176 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
177 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
179 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
180 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
185 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
187 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
188 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
189 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
191 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
192 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
195 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
196 struct ClaimableHTLC {
197 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
199 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
201 /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
202 /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
203 sender_intended_value: u64,
204 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
206 /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
207 /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
208 total_value_received: Option<u64>,
209 /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
213 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
215 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
216 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
217 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
219 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
220 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
225 impl Readable for PaymentId {
226 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
227 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
232 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
234 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
235 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
236 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
238 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
239 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
244 impl Readable for InterceptId {
245 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
246 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
251 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
252 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
253 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
254 PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
255 OutboundRoute { session_priv: SecretKey },
258 pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
260 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
261 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
262 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
264 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
265 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: *session_priv },
269 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
270 (0, PreviousHopData) => {
271 (0, short_channel_id, required),
272 (2, htlc_id, required),
274 (2, OutboundRoute) => {
275 (0, session_priv, required),
280 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
281 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
282 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
283 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
284 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
287 session_priv: SecretKey,
288 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
289 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
290 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
291 payment_id: PaymentId,
294 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
295 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
296 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
298 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
300 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
302 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
305 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
306 payment_id.hash(hasher);
307 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
313 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
315 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
316 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
317 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
318 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
319 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
320 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
324 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
325 /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
326 /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
327 pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
328 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
329 *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
331 // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
337 struct ReceiveError {
343 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
344 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
346 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
347 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
348 pub enum FailureCode {
349 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
350 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
351 TemporaryNodeFailure = 0x2000 | 2,
352 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
353 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
354 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing = 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
355 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
356 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
357 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
358 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
359 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails = 0x4000 | 15,
362 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>);
364 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
365 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
366 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
367 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
368 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
370 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
371 err: msgs::LightningError,
372 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
373 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
375 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
377 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
379 err: LightningError {
381 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
382 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
389 shutdown_finish: None,
393 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
394 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
397 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
399 err: LightningError {
401 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
402 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
408 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
409 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
413 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
416 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
418 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
419 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
423 log_level: Level::Warn,
426 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
428 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
430 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
432 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
433 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
441 shutdown_finish: None,
446 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
447 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
448 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
449 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
450 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
452 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
453 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
454 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
455 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
456 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
457 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
458 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
460 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
464 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
465 struct ClaimingPayment {
467 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
468 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
470 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
471 (0, amount_msat, required),
472 (2, payment_purpose, required),
473 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
476 struct ClaimablePayment {
477 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
478 onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
479 htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
482 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
483 struct ClaimablePayments {
484 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
485 /// failed/claimed by the user.
487 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
488 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
490 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
491 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
492 claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
494 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
495 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
496 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
497 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
500 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
501 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
502 /// quite some time lag.
503 enum BackgroundEvent {
504 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
505 /// commitment transaction.
506 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
510 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
511 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
512 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
513 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
514 /// event can be generated.
515 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
516 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user.
517 EmitEvent { event: events::Event },
520 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
521 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
522 (2, EmitEvent) => { (0, event, upgradable_required) },
525 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
526 pub(crate) enum EventCompletionAction {
527 ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
528 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
529 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
532 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(EventCompletionAction,
533 (0, ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate) => {
534 (0, channel_funding_outpoint, required),
535 (2, counterparty_node_id, required),
539 /// State we hold per-peer.
540 pub(super) struct PeerState<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
541 /// `temporary_channel_id` or `channel_id` -> `channel`.
543 /// Holds all channels where the peer is the counterparty. Once a channel has been assigned a
544 /// `channel_id`, the `temporary_channel_id` key in the map is updated and is replaced by the
546 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
547 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
548 latest_features: InitFeatures,
549 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
550 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
551 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
552 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
553 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
555 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
556 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
557 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
558 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
560 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
561 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
562 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
563 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
564 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
565 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
566 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
567 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
568 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
569 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
573 impl <Signer: ChannelSigner> PeerState<Signer> {
574 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
575 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
576 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
577 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
578 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
581 self.channel_by_id.is_empty() && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
585 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
586 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
588 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
591 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
592 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
593 struct PendingInboundPayment {
594 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
595 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
596 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
597 /// this payment being removed.
599 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
600 user_payment_id: u64,
601 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
602 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
603 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
606 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
607 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
608 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
609 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
610 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
611 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
612 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
613 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
615 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
616 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
624 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
626 Arc<Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>
631 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
632 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
633 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
634 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
635 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
636 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
637 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
638 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
639 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
641 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
642 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<&'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e DefaultRouter<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L, &'h Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>>, &'g L>;
644 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`] used in testing.
645 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
646 pub trait AChannelManager {
647 type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer>;
648 type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
649 type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface;
650 type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
651 type EntropySource: EntropySource;
652 type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
653 type NodeSigner: NodeSigner;
654 type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
655 type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner;
656 type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<Signer = Self::Signer>;
657 type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
658 type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator;
659 type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
661 type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
663 type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
664 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
666 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
667 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
668 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
670 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> + Sized,
671 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface + Sized,
672 ES::Target: EntropySource + Sized,
673 NS::Target: NodeSigner + Sized,
674 SP::Target: SignerProvider + Sized,
675 F::Target: FeeEstimator + Sized,
676 R::Target: Router + Sized,
677 L::Target: Logger + Sized,
679 type Watch = M::Target;
681 type Broadcaster = T::Target;
683 type EntropySource = ES::Target;
685 type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
687 type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer;
688 type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
690 type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
692 type Router = R::Target;
694 type Logger = L::Target;
696 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
699 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
700 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
702 /// Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
703 /// to individual Channels.
705 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
706 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
707 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
708 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
710 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
711 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
712 /// returning from [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`], with ChannelManagers, writing updates
713 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during
714 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
715 /// [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the
716 /// `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
718 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
719 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
720 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
722 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
723 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
724 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
725 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
726 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
728 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
729 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
730 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
731 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
733 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
734 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
735 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
737 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
738 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
739 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
740 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
741 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
743 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
744 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
745 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
746 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
747 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
748 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
749 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
750 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
753 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
754 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
755 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
756 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
757 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
761 // `total_consistency_lock`
763 // |__`forward_htlcs`
765 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
767 // |__`per_peer_state`
769 // | |__`pending_inbound_payments`
771 // | |__`claimable_payments`
773 // | |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
779 // | |__`short_to_chan_info`
781 // | |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
785 // | |__`pending_events`
787 // | |__`pending_background_events`
789 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
791 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
792 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
793 ES::Target: EntropySource,
794 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
795 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
796 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
800 default_configuration: UserConfig,
801 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
802 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
808 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
810 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
812 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
813 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
815 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
816 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
817 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
818 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
820 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
821 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
823 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
824 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
825 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
826 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
827 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
828 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
829 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
830 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
832 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
834 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
835 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
837 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
839 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
840 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
841 /// and via the classic SCID.
843 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
844 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
846 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
848 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
850 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
851 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
852 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
854 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
855 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
857 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
858 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
860 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
861 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
863 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
864 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
865 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
866 /// active channel list on load.
868 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
869 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
871 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
873 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
874 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
875 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
877 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
878 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
879 /// the handling of the events.
881 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
882 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
885 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
886 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
887 /// would break backwards compatability.
888 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
889 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
890 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
892 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
893 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<[u8; 32], PublicKey>>,
895 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
897 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
898 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
899 /// confirmation depth.
901 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
902 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
903 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
905 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
907 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
909 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
911 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
913 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
915 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
916 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
917 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
919 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
920 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
922 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
923 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
924 /// keeping additional state.
925 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
927 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
928 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
929 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
930 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
932 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
933 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
935 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
936 /// are currently open with that peer.
938 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
939 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
942 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
944 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
945 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
946 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
947 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
948 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
950 /// The set of events which we need to give to the user to handle. In some cases an event may
951 /// require some further action after the user handles it (currently only blocking a monitor
952 /// update from being handed to the user to ensure the included changes to the channel state
953 /// are handled by the user before they're persisted durably to disk). In that case, the second
954 /// element in the tuple is set to `Some` with further details of the action.
956 /// Note that events MUST NOT be removed from pending_events after deserialization, as they
957 /// could be in the middle of being processed without the direct mutex held.
959 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
960 pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
961 /// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
962 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
963 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
964 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
965 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
966 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
967 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
968 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
969 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
970 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
971 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
973 persistence_notifier: Notifier,
982 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
984 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
985 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
986 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
987 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
988 pub struct ChainParameters {
989 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
990 pub network: Network,
992 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
994 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
995 pub best_block: BestBlock,
998 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
1004 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
1005 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
1006 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
1007 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
1008 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
1009 /// updates are ready for persistence).
1011 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
1012 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
1013 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
1014 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
1015 persistence_notifier: &'a Notifier,
1017 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
1018 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
1021 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
1022 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
1023 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
1026 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1027 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
1029 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1030 persistence_notifier: notifier,
1031 should_persist: persist_check,
1032 _read_guard: read_guard,
1037 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1038 fn drop(&mut self) {
1039 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
1040 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
1045 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1046 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1048 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1050 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1051 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1052 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1053 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1054 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1056 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1057 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1059 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1061 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1062 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1063 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1064 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1065 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1066 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1067 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
1068 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
1069 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
1070 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
1071 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
1072 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
1073 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
1075 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1076 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
1078 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1079 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1080 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1081 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
1083 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1084 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1085 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1086 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1087 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1088 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1091 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1093 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1094 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1097 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1099 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1100 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1102 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until we time-out the
1103 /// idempotency of payments by [`PaymentId`]. See
1104 /// [`OutboundPayments::remove_stale_resolved_payments`].
1105 pub(crate) const IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 7;
1107 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
1108 /// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
1109 pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
1111 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is connected until
1112 /// we mark the channel enabled and gossip the update.
1113 pub(crate) const ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 5;
1115 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
1116 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
1117 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
1118 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1120 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1121 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1122 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1124 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1125 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1126 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1128 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1129 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1130 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1131 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1132 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1133 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1134 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1135 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1136 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1137 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1138 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1141 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1142 /// to better separate parameters.
1143 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1144 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1145 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1146 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1147 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1148 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1149 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1150 pub features: InitFeatures,
1151 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1152 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1153 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1155 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1157 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1158 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1159 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1160 /// payments to us through this channel.
1161 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1162 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1163 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1164 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1165 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1166 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1167 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1170 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
1171 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1172 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1173 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1174 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1175 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1176 /// lifetime of the channel.
1177 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
1178 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1179 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1180 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1181 /// our counterparty already.
1183 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1184 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1185 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1186 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1188 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1189 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1190 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1191 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1193 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1194 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1196 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1197 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1199 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1200 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1201 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1202 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1203 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1204 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1205 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1206 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1207 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1210 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1212 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1213 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1214 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1215 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1216 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1217 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1218 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1220 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1221 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1223 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1224 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1225 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1226 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1227 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1228 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1229 /// this value on chain.
1231 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1233 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1235 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1236 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1237 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or a random value if the channel was
1238 /// inbound. This may be zero for inbound channels serialized with LDK versions prior to
1240 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1241 /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
1242 /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
1244 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
1245 pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
1246 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1247 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1248 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1250 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1251 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1252 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1253 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1255 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1256 pub balance_msat: u64,
1257 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1258 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1259 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1260 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1262 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1264 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1265 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1266 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1267 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1268 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1269 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1270 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1271 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1273 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`] and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1274 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1275 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1276 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1277 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1278 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1279 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1281 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1282 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1283 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1284 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1285 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1286 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1287 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1288 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1289 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1291 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1293 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1294 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1295 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1296 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1297 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1299 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1300 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1301 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1302 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1303 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1304 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1305 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1307 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1308 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1309 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1310 pub is_outbound: bool,
1311 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1312 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1313 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1314 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1315 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1317 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1318 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1319 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1320 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1322 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1323 pub is_usable: bool,
1324 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1325 pub is_public: bool,
1326 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1327 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1328 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1329 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1330 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1331 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1333 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1334 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1337 impl ChannelDetails {
1338 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1339 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1340 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1342 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1343 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1344 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1345 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1348 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1349 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1350 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1352 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1353 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1354 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1355 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1358 fn from_channel<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner>(channel: &Channel<Signer>,
1359 best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures) -> Self {
1361 let balance = channel.get_available_balances();
1362 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1363 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1365 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1366 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1367 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1368 features: latest_features,
1369 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1370 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1371 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1372 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1373 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1374 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1375 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1376 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if channel.have_received_message() {
1377 Some(channel.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1378 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1380 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1381 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1382 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1383 channel_type: if channel.have_received_message() { Some(channel.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1384 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1385 outbound_scid_alias: if channel.is_usable() { Some(channel.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1386 inbound_scid_alias: channel.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1387 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1388 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(channel.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
1389 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1390 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1391 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1392 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1393 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1394 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1395 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1396 confirmations: Some(channel.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1397 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1398 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1399 is_channel_ready: channel.is_usable(),
1400 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1401 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1402 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1403 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1404 config: Some(channel.config()),
1409 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1410 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1411 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1412 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1413 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1415 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1417 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1418 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1419 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1422 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1423 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1424 /// payment is removed from tracking.
1426 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1427 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1428 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1430 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1431 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1432 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1434 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1435 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1439 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1441 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
1443 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1444 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1445 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1446 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1448 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1449 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1450 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1453 macro_rules! handle_error {
1454 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
1455 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1456 // entering the macro.
1457 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1458 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1462 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1463 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1465 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1466 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1467 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1468 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1472 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1473 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1474 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1475 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1480 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1481 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1483 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1484 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1485 action: err.action.clone()
1489 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1490 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1491 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1492 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1493 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1497 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1504 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1505 ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {{
1506 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.channel_id());
1507 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1508 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1509 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1511 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1512 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1513 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1514 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1515 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1517 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1518 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1520 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1524 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1525 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1526 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1528 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1529 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1531 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1532 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1534 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1535 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1536 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel);
1537 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1538 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1539 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1545 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1546 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1550 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1552 $entry.remove_entry();
1560 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1561 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1565 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1567 $entry.remove_entry();
1575 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1576 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1578 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1579 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, channel);
1585 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1586 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
1587 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1588 node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1589 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1591 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1592 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1593 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1594 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1595 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1596 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1597 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1598 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1599 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1600 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1605 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
1606 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1607 if $channel.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
1608 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelPending {
1609 channel_id: $channel.channel_id(),
1610 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.temporary_channel_id(),
1611 counterparty_node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1612 user_channel_id: $channel.get_user_id(),
1613 funding_txo: $channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
1615 $channel.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
1620 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
1621 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1622 if $channel.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
1623 debug_assert!($channel.channel_pending_event_emitted());
1624 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelReady {
1625 channel_id: $channel.channel_id(),
1626 user_channel_id: $channel.get_user_id(),
1627 counterparty_node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1628 channel_type: $channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
1630 $channel.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
1635 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
1636 ($self: ident, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
1637 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&$self.logger,
1638 &$self.node_signer, $self.genesis_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
1639 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
1640 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
1641 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.is_usable() {
1642 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
1643 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
1644 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
1645 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
1647 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
1648 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
1649 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1655 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
1656 .remove(&$chan.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
1658 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
1659 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
1660 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
1661 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
1662 updates.announcement_sigs);
1663 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
1664 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
1667 let channel_id = $chan.channel_id();
1668 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
1669 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
1671 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
1673 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1674 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1676 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
1677 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1678 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
1679 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
1684 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
1685 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, MANUALLY_REMOVING, $remove: expr) => { {
1686 // update_maps_on_chan_removal needs to be able to take id_to_peer, so make sure we can in
1687 // any case so that it won't deadlock.
1688 debug_assert_ne!($self.id_to_peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1690 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
1691 log_debug!($self.logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
1692 log_bytes!($chan.channel_id()[..]));
1695 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
1696 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure",
1697 log_bytes!($chan.channel_id()[..]));
1698 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $chan);
1699 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(
1700 "ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), $chan.channel_id(),
1701 $chan.get_user_id(), $chan.force_shutdown(false),
1702 $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok()));
1706 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
1707 $chan.complete_one_mon_update($update_id);
1708 if $chan.no_monitor_updates_pending() {
1709 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $update_id, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
1715 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan_entry: expr) => {
1716 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $update_id, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan_entry.get_mut(), MANUALLY_REMOVING, $chan_entry.remove_entry())
1720 macro_rules! process_events_body {
1721 ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
1722 let mut processed_all_events = false;
1723 while !processed_all_events {
1724 if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
1728 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
1731 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
1732 // persists happen while processing monitor events.
1733 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1735 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
1736 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
1737 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
1738 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
1742 let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
1743 let num_events = pending_events.len();
1744 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
1745 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
1748 let mut post_event_actions = Vec::new();
1750 for (event, action_opt) in pending_events {
1751 $event_to_handle = event;
1753 if let Some(action) = action_opt {
1754 post_event_actions.push(action);
1759 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1760 pending_events.drain(..num_events);
1761 processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
1762 $self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
1765 if !post_event_actions.is_empty() {
1766 $self.handle_post_event_actions(post_event_actions);
1767 // If we had some actions, go around again as we may have more events now
1768 processed_all_events = false;
1771 if result == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
1772 $self.persistence_notifier.notify();
1778 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
1780 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
1781 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1782 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1783 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1784 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1785 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1789 /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
1791 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1792 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
1794 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1796 /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
1797 /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
1798 /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
1801 /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
1802 /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
1803 /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
1804 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1805 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1806 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1807 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
1808 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
1810 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1811 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1812 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
1817 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1819 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
1820 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1821 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
1822 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1823 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
1824 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1825 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1826 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1828 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
1831 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
1832 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1834 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1836 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1838 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1840 pending_events: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
1841 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
1842 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1843 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1844 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
1854 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
1855 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1856 &self.default_configuration
1859 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1860 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1861 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
1864 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
1865 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
1867 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
1869 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
1873 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
1878 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1880 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1881 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1882 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
1883 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
1884 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
1886 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1887 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1889 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to
1890 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
1891 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`].
1893 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1894 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1895 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1897 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1898 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1899 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1900 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1901 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1902 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1904 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1905 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1906 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1907 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1908 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1909 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1912 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1913 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1914 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1916 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1918 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
1919 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
1921 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1923 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
1924 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1925 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1926 match Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
1927 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
1928 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
1932 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
1937 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1939 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1940 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1941 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1943 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1945 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1948 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1951 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1952 node_id: their_network_key,
1955 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1958 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1959 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
1960 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
1961 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
1962 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
1963 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
1964 // the same channel.
1965 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
1967 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1968 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1969 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
1970 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1971 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1972 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1973 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel(channel, best_block_height,
1974 peer_state.latest_features.clone());
1982 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
1983 /// more information.
1984 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1985 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1988 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
1989 /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1991 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1992 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1994 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1995 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1996 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1997 // really wanted anyway.
1998 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
2001 /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
2002 pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2003 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2004 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2006 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
2007 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2008 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2009 let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2010 return peer_state.channel_by_id
2013 ChannelDetails::from_channel(channel, best_block_height, features.clone()))
2019 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
2020 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
2022 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
2023 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
2024 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
2026 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2027 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
2028 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
2029 .filter_map(|(_, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
2030 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
2031 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
2032 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2033 total_msat: *total_msat,
2036 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
2037 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2039 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
2040 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2042 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
2047 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
2048 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
2049 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2050 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
2051 Some(transaction) => {
2052 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::DiscardFunding {
2053 channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction
2058 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
2059 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
2060 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
2061 reason: closure_reason
2065 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2066 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2068 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
2069 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
2070 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2072 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2073 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2075 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2076 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2077 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2078 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2079 let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo();
2080 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2081 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut()
2082 .get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
2083 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
2085 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
2086 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
2087 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
2088 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2089 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
2093 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
2094 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
2095 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2096 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update);
2097 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry);
2100 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
2101 let channel = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
2102 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
2103 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2107 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2111 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id) })
2115 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2116 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2117 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
2118 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
2121 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
2125 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2126 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2127 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2129 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
2130 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2132 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
2133 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
2134 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
2135 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
2137 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2139 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2140 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2141 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2144 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2145 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2146 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2147 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2148 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2149 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None)
2152 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2153 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2154 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2156 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
2157 /// the channel being closed or not:
2158 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
2159 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
2160 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2161 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
2162 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
2163 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
2164 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
2166 /// The `shutdown_script` provided will be used as the `scriptPubKey` for the closing transaction.
2167 /// Will fail if a shutdown script has already been set for this channel by
2168 /// ['ChannelHandshakeConfig::commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey`]. The given shutdown script must
2169 /// also be compatible with our and the counterparty's features.
2171 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2173 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2174 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2175 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2178 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2179 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2180 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2181 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2182 pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2183 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script)
2187 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
2188 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
2189 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
2190 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2191 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
2192 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2193 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2194 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
2196 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
2197 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2198 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2199 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2200 // ignore the result here.
2201 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
2205 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2206 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2207 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
2208 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2209 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2210 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2211 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
2213 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2214 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2215 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2216 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2217 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) });
2219 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2221 remove_channel!(self, chan)
2223 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), peer_node_id) });
2226 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2227 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(broadcast));
2228 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2229 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2230 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2235 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
2238 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2239 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2240 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2241 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2242 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2243 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2244 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2245 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
2246 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2247 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2248 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
2249 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
2260 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2261 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2262 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2264 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2265 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2266 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2269 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2270 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2271 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2273 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2274 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2275 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2276 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2277 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2280 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2281 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2282 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2283 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2284 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2288 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2289 /// local transaction(s).
2290 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2291 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2292 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2296 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(&self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
2297 payment_hash: PaymentHash, amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError>
2299 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2300 if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value > cltv_expiry {
2301 return Err(ReceiveError {
2302 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to less than the CLTV set by the sender",
2304 err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
2307 // final_expiry_too_soon
2308 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2309 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2311 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2312 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2313 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2314 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2315 if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= current_height as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2316 let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12);
2317 err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes());
2318 err_data.extend_from_slice(¤t_height.to_be_bytes());
2319 return Err(ReceiveError {
2320 err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data,
2321 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2324 if hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat {
2325 return Err(ReceiveError {
2327 err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
2328 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2332 let routing = match hop_data.format {
2333 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => {
2334 return Err(ReceiveError {
2335 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2336 err_data: Vec::new(),
2337 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2340 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage, payment_metadata } => {
2341 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
2342 return Err(ReceiveError {
2343 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2344 err_data: Vec::new(),
2345 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2347 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2348 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2351 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2352 phantom_shared_secret,
2354 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2355 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2356 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2357 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2358 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2359 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2360 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2361 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2362 return Err(ReceiveError {
2363 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2364 err_data: Vec::new(),
2365 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2369 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2372 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2375 return Err(ReceiveError {
2376 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2377 err_data: Vec::new(),
2378 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2383 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2386 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2387 incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
2388 outgoing_amt_msat: hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2389 outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2393 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
2394 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2395 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2397 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2398 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2399 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2400 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2401 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2402 failure_code: $err_code,
2408 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2409 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2412 let shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(
2413 Recipient::Node, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None
2414 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
2416 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2417 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2418 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2419 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2420 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2421 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2422 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2423 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2425 macro_rules! return_err {
2426 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2428 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2429 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2430 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2431 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2432 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
2433 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
2439 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2441 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2442 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2444 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2445 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2449 let pending_forward_info = match next_hop {
2450 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
2452 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None) {
2454 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
2455 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
2456 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
2457 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
2458 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
2460 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
2463 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
2464 let new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
2465 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2467 public_key: onion_utils::next_hop_packet_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx, new_pubkey, &shared_secret),
2468 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2469 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
2472 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
2473 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2474 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
2475 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2479 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2480 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2481 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2484 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2485 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2486 incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
2487 outgoing_amt_msat: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2488 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2493 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref outgoing_amt_msat, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
2494 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
2495 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
2496 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
2497 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
2498 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
2499 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(short_channel_id).cloned();
2500 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
2501 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2502 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2503 // phantom or an intercept.
2504 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
2505 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)) ||
2506 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)
2510 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2513 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
2515 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
2516 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2517 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
2518 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
2519 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2521 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
2522 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2523 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id) {
2525 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
2526 // have no consistency guarantees.
2527 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2531 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2532 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2533 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2534 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2535 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2537 if chan.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && *short_channel_id != chan.outbound_scid_alias() {
2538 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
2539 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
2540 // we don't have the channel here.
2541 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2543 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(*short_channel_id, chan).ok();
2545 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2546 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2547 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2548 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2549 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2550 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2551 // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
2552 // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
2553 // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
2554 if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
2555 break Some(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2557 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
2560 if *outgoing_amt_msat < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2561 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
2563 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, *outgoing_amt_msat, *outgoing_cltv_value) {
2564 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
2568 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
2569 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
2570 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
2571 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
2573 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
2580 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2581 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2582 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2583 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2584 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2585 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2587 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2588 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2590 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2591 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2592 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2593 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2594 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2595 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2596 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2597 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2598 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2599 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2605 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
2606 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2607 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2608 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2610 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2611 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2613 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2614 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
2615 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2617 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2618 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2619 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2620 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
2621 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
2622 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
2623 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
2627 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
2632 pending_forward_info
2635 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2636 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2637 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2639 /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
2640 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
2641 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
2643 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2644 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
2645 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2646 if !chan.should_announce() {
2647 return Err(LightningError {
2648 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2649 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2652 if chan.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
2653 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
2655 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2656 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2659 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2660 /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
2661 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2662 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2664 /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
2665 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
2666 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
2668 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2669 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
2670 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2671 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2672 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
2673 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2677 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
2679 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2680 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2681 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2683 let enabled = chan.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
2684 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
2685 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
2686 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
2687 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => false,
2690 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2691 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2693 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2694 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
2695 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2696 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2697 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
2698 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2699 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2700 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2702 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
2703 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
2704 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
2706 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
2708 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2715 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2716 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2717 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv_bytes)
2720 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2721 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
2722 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2724 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2725 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
2726 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2728 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2729 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected".to_owned()})?;
2730 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2731 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
2732 return Err(APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Route size too large considering onion data".to_owned()});
2734 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
2736 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2737 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2738 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2739 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
2742 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2743 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
2744 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
2745 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2746 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2747 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
2748 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2749 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
2751 let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2752 let send_res = chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
2753 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2755 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2756 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2758 }, onion_packet, &self.logger);
2759 match break_chan_entry!(self, send_res, chan) {
2760 Some(monitor_update) => {
2761 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2762 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
2763 if let Err(e) = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
2766 if update_res == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress {
2767 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
2768 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
2769 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
2770 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
2771 // which we do in the send_payment check for
2772 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
2773 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
2779 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
2780 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
2781 // `channel_by_id` map.
2782 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
2783 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
2788 match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2789 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2791 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2796 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2798 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
2799 /// fields for more info.
2801 /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
2802 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
2804 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
2806 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
2807 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
2808 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
2809 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
2810 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
2812 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
2813 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
2814 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
2815 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
2816 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
2818 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
2819 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
2820 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
2821 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
2823 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
2825 /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
2826 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2827 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
2829 /// In general, a path may raise:
2830 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2831 /// node public key) is specified.
2832 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2833 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2835 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2836 /// relevant updates.
2838 /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
2839 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2840 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2842 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2843 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2844 /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
2845 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
2846 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
2847 pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2848 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2849 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2850 self.pending_outbound_payments
2851 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2852 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2853 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2856 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment`], but will automatically find a route based on
2857 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
2858 pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
2859 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2860 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2861 self.pending_outbound_payments
2862 .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
2863 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
2864 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
2865 &self.pending_events,
2866 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2867 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2871 pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2872 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2873 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2874 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2875 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2876 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2880 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
2881 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2882 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
2886 pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
2887 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
2891 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
2892 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
2893 /// retries are exhausted.
2895 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
2896 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
2898 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
2899 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
2900 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
2902 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event is generated and we restart without this
2903 /// [`ChannelManager`] having been persisted, another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated.
2905 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2906 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2907 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
2908 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2909 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
2912 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2913 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2914 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2915 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2916 /// never reach the recipient.
2918 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
2919 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
2921 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2922 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2924 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2926 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2927 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
2928 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2929 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2930 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
2931 route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
2932 &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2933 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2934 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2937 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
2938 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
2940 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
2943 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
2944 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
2945 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2946 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2947 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
2948 payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
2949 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2950 &self.logger, &self.pending_events,
2951 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2952 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2955 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
2956 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
2957 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
2958 pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2959 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2960 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2961 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2962 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2963 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2966 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
2969 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
2970 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
2973 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2974 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2975 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
2976 &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
2977 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2978 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2979 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2980 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2982 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2983 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2984 let (msg, chan) = match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2986 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2988 let funding_res = chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2989 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2990 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2991 } else { unreachable!(); });
2993 Ok(funding_msg) => (funding_msg, chan),
2995 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
2996 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
2998 let _ = handle_error!(self, funding_res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id());
2999 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3000 err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
3006 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3008 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
3009 log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
3014 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
3015 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3018 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
3019 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3020 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
3022 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3023 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
3024 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.channel_id(), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
3025 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
3034 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3035 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
3036 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
3040 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
3042 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
3043 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
3045 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
3046 /// across the p2p network.
3048 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
3049 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
3051 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
3052 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
3053 /// keys per-channel).
3055 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
3056 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
3057 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
3059 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
3060 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
3061 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
3063 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
3064 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
3065 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
3066 /// for more details.
3068 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
3069 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
3070 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3071 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3073 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
3074 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
3075 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3076 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
3081 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3082 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools if their locktime is strictly
3083 // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
3084 // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
3085 // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
3086 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 1 {
3087 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3088 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
3092 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
3093 let mut output_index = None;
3094 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
3095 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3096 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
3097 if output_index.is_some() {
3098 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3099 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
3102 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
3103 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3104 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
3107 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
3110 if output_index.is_none() {
3111 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3112 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
3115 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
3119 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
3121 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3122 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3123 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3124 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3126 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3127 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3129 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3130 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3132 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3134 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3135 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3136 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3137 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3138 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3139 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3140 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3141 pub fn update_channel_config(
3142 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config: &ChannelConfig,
3143 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3144 if config.cltv_expiry_delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA {
3145 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3146 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
3150 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(
3151 &self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier,
3153 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3154 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3155 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3156 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3157 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3158 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3159 if !peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) {
3160 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3161 err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
3165 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3166 let channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id).unwrap();
3167 if !channel.update_config(config) {
3170 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
3171 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
3172 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
3173 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3174 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3182 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
3183 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
3185 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
3186 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
3188 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
3189 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
3190 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
3191 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
3192 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
3194 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
3195 /// you from forwarding more than you received.
3197 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3200 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
3201 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3202 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
3203 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
3204 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &[u8; 32], next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3205 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3207 let next_hop_scid = {
3208 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3209 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
3210 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
3211 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3212 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3213 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
3215 if !chan.is_usable() {
3216 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3217 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id))
3220 chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.outbound_scid_alias())
3222 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3223 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id), next_node_id)
3228 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3229 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3230 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3233 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
3234 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => {
3235 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid }
3237 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3239 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
3240 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
3243 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
3244 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3245 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3246 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
3247 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
3249 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
3253 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
3254 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
3256 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3259 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3260 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3261 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3263 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3264 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3265 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3268 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
3269 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3270 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3271 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3272 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
3273 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
3274 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3277 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
3278 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
3279 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3280 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3285 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
3287 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
3288 /// Will likely generate further events.
3289 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
3290 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3292 let mut new_events = VecDeque::new();
3293 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
3294 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
3296 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
3297 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
3299 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
3300 if short_chan_id != 0 {
3301 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
3303 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3304 match forward_info {
3305 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3306 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3307 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3308 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
3309 outgoing_cltv_value, incoming_amt_msat: _
3312 macro_rules! failure_handler {
3313 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
3314 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3316 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3317 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3318 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3319 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3320 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3321 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
3324 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
3325 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
3327 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
3330 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3331 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
3337 macro_rules! fail_forward {
3338 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3340 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
3344 macro_rules! failed_payment {
3345 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3347 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
3351 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
3352 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
3353 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.genesis_hash) {
3354 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
3355 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
3357 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3358 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
3359 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
3360 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
3361 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
3363 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
3365 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3366 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
3370 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
3371 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) {
3372 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
3373 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
3379 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3382 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3385 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3386 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
3387 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
3388 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
3389 // problem, not ours.
3395 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id) {
3396 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3398 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3402 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3403 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3404 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3405 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3408 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3409 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3410 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
3411 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3412 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3415 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3416 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3417 match forward_info {
3418 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3419 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id: _,
3420 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3421 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
3422 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, incoming_amt_msat: _,
3425 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
3426 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3427 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3428 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3429 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3430 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3431 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
3432 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3434 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
3435 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
3436 onion_packet, &self.logger)
3438 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3439 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
3441 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3443 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
3444 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3445 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
3446 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
3451 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3452 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3454 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3455 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3456 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_fail_htlc(
3457 htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger
3459 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3460 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3462 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
3464 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3465 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3466 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3475 'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3476 match forward_info {
3477 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3478 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3479 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3480 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat, ..
3483 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
3484 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } => {
3485 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
3487 RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret), payment_metadata };
3488 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
3489 Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
3491 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry } => {
3492 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: None, payment_metadata };
3493 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
3494 None, None, onion_fields)
3497 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3500 let mut claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3501 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3502 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3503 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3504 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3505 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3506 phantom_shared_secret,
3508 // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
3509 // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
3510 // if routing nodes overpay
3511 value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
3512 sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
3514 total_value_received: None,
3515 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
3520 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
3522 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3523 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
3524 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
3525 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3526 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3527 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
3529 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3530 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
3531 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3532 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3533 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3534 phantom_shared_secret,
3536 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
3537 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
3539 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
3542 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
3543 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
3544 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
3545 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
3546 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
3549 macro_rules! check_total_value {
3550 ($payment_data: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{
3551 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
3553 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
3554 payment_preimage: $payment_preimage,
3555 payment_secret: $payment_data.payment_secret,
3558 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3559 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3560 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3562 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
3563 .entry(payment_hash)
3564 // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
3565 .or_insert_with(|| {
3566 committed_to_claimable = true;
3568 purpose: purpose(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
3571 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
3572 if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
3573 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3576 claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
3578 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
3579 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
3580 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3581 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3582 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3585 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
3586 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
3587 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3588 total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
3589 earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
3590 match &htlc.onion_payload {
3591 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3592 if htlc.total_msat != $payment_data.total_msat {
3593 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
3594 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $payment_data.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
3595 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
3597 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
3599 _ => unreachable!(),
3602 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
3603 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
3604 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
3605 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3606 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= $payment_data.total_msat {
3607 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
3608 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3609 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3610 } else if total_value >= $payment_data.total_msat {
3611 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
3612 committed_to_claimable = true;
3614 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3615 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3616 let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
3617 htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
3618 new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3619 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3623 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3624 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3625 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
3626 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
3628 payment_claimable_generated = true;
3630 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
3631 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
3633 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3634 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
3635 committed_to_claimable = true;
3638 payment_claimable_generated
3642 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
3643 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
3644 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
3645 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
3646 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
3647 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
3648 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3649 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3650 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3651 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3652 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3653 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3654 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
3655 Ok(result) => result,
3657 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3658 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3661 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
3662 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
3663 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
3664 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
3665 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
3666 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3669 check_total_value!(payment_data, payment_preimage);
3671 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
3672 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3673 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3674 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3676 match claimable_payments.claimable_payments.entry(payment_hash) {
3677 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3678 let amount_msat = claimable_htlc.value;
3679 claimable_htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat);
3680 let claim_deadline = Some(claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER);
3681 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
3682 e.insert(ClaimablePayment {
3683 purpose: purpose.clone(),
3684 onion_fields: Some(onion_fields.clone()),
3685 htlcs: vec![claimable_htlc],
3687 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3688 new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3689 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3693 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3694 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3696 onion_fields: Some(onion_fields),
3699 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3700 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3701 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3707 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
3708 if payment_data.is_none() {
3709 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3710 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3712 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3713 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
3714 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3715 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3716 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
3717 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
3718 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
3719 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3721 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage);
3722 if payment_claimable_generated {
3723 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
3729 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3730 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
3738 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3739 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
3740 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3741 &self.pending_events, &self.logger,
3742 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
3743 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv));
3745 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
3746 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3748 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
3750 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
3751 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
3752 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
3754 self.check_free_holding_cells();
3756 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
3757 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3758 events.append(&mut new_events);
3761 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
3763 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
3764 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
3766 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
3767 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
3768 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
3769 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
3770 if background_events.is_empty() {
3774 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
3776 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
3777 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
3778 // monitor updating completing.
3779 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
3786 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3787 /// Process background events, for functional testing
3788 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
3789 self.process_background_events();
3792 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
3793 if !chan.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersist; }
3794 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
3795 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
3796 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3797 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
3798 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3800 if !chan.is_live() {
3801 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
3802 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
3803 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3805 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3806 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
3808 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.logger);
3809 NotifyOption::DoPersist
3813 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
3814 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
3815 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
3816 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
3817 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
3818 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3819 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3821 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3823 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3824 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3825 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3826 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3827 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
3828 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3829 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3837 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
3839 /// This currently includes:
3840 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
3841 /// * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
3842 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
3844 /// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
3845 /// with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
3846 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
3848 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
3849 /// estimate fetches.
3851 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3852 /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
3853 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
3854 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3855 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3856 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3858 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3860 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
3861 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
3862 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
3864 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3865 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3866 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3867 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3868 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
3869 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
3870 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3871 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3872 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3874 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
3875 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id);
3876 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
3877 if needs_close { return false; }
3880 match chan.channel_update_status() {
3881 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
3882 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
3883 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.is_live()
3884 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3885 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.is_live()
3886 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3887 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.is_live() => {
3889 if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
3890 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3891 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3892 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3896 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3898 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
3901 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.is_live() => {
3903 if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
3904 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3905 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3906 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3910 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3912 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
3918 chan.maybe_expire_prev_config();
3922 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
3923 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
3928 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
3929 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
3930 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
3931 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
3932 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
3933 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
3934 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
3935 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
3936 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
3937 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
3938 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
3939 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
3940 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
3941 // have no channels to the peer.
3942 let remove_entry = {
3943 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
3944 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
3947 entry.remove_entry();
3950 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
3955 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
3956 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
3957 // This should be unreachable
3958 debug_assert!(false);
3961 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3962 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
3963 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
3964 // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
3965 // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
3966 if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
3967 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
3970 } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
3971 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
3972 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
3974 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
3975 .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
3982 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
3983 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
3984 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
3985 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
3986 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
3989 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3990 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3993 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_resolved_payments(&self.pending_events);
3995 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
3996 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
3997 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
3998 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
3999 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4006 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
4007 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
4008 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
4010 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
4011 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
4012 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
4013 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
4015 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
4016 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
4017 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
4018 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
4019 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
4020 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
4023 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
4024 /// reason for the failure.
4026 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
4027 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
4028 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4030 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
4031 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
4032 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
4033 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
4034 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4035 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
4036 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4041 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
4042 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
4043 match failure_code {
4044 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code as u16),
4045 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code as u16),
4046 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
4047 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4048 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
4049 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code as u16, htlc_msat_height_data)
4054 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
4055 /// that we want to return and a channel.
4057 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
4059 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
4060 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
4061 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
4062 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
4063 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
4064 let scid_pref = if chan.should_announce() {
4065 chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
4067 chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.get_short_channel_id())
4069 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
4070 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
4072 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4077 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
4078 /// that we want to return and a channel.
4079 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
4080 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
4081 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
4082 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
4083 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
4084 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
4085 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
4086 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4088 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4089 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4090 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4091 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
4093 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
4094 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
4095 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
4096 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
4097 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4101 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
4102 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
4103 // be surfaced to the user.
4104 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
4105 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32],
4106 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
4108 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
4109 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4110 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
4111 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4112 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4113 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
4114 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
4115 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
4117 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4119 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
4122 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
4123 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
4124 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
4125 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4129 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
4130 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
4131 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
4132 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
4133 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
4134 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
4135 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
4136 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
4137 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
4140 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
4141 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
4142 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
4145 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4146 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
4147 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4149 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
4150 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
4151 session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
4152 &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
4153 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
4155 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint }) => {
4156 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), onion_error);
4157 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
4159 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
4160 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4161 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
4162 push_forward_ev = true;
4164 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
4165 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4166 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
4168 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4169 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
4172 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
4173 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
4174 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4175 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
4176 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
4177 failed_next_destination: destination,
4183 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
4184 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
4186 /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
4187 /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
4188 /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
4189 /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
4191 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
4192 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
4193 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
4194 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
4196 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
4197 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
4198 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
4199 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
4200 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
4201 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
4202 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
4203 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4205 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4208 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4209 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
4210 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4211 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
4212 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4213 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4214 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4215 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
4220 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
4221 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
4222 payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id,
4224 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
4225 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
4226 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
4227 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4232 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
4234 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
4235 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
4236 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
4237 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
4238 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
4239 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
4240 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
4241 let mut valid_mpp = true;
4242 let mut errs = Vec::new();
4243 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4244 for htlc in sources.iter() {
4245 if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
4246 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4247 debug_assert!(false);
4251 prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
4253 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
4254 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4255 debug_assert!(false);
4259 expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
4261 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = &htlc.onion_payload {
4262 // We don't currently support MPP for spontaneous payments, so just check
4263 // that there's one payment here and move on.
4264 if sources.len() != 1 {
4265 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP spontaneous payment - this should not be reachable!");
4266 debug_assert!(false);
4272 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
4274 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4275 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
4276 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4277 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
4280 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
4281 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4282 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
4283 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
4287 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4288 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
4289 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
4290 |_| Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash }))
4292 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
4293 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
4294 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
4295 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
4296 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
4301 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4302 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4303 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
4304 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4305 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
4306 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
4307 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4309 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4312 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
4313 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
4314 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4315 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
4319 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
4320 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
4321 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
4322 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
4325 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4326 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
4327 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
4328 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
4332 let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
4333 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4334 .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
4337 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
4338 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
4339 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4340 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4341 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
4342 let fulfill_res = chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger);
4344 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = fulfill_res {
4345 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)) {
4346 log_trace!(self.logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
4347 log_bytes!(chan_id), action);
4348 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
4350 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4351 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update);
4352 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock,
4353 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4354 if let Err(e) = res {
4355 // TODO: This is a *critical* error - we probably updated the outbound edge
4356 // of the HTLC's monitor with a preimage. We should retry this monitor
4357 // update over and over again until morale improves.
4358 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}", payment_preimage);
4359 return Err((counterparty_node_id, e));
4366 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4367 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
4368 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
4372 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
4373 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
4374 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
4375 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
4376 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
4377 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
4378 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
4379 // again on restart.
4380 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4381 payment_preimage, update_res);
4383 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
4384 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
4385 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
4386 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
4387 // `PaymentForwarded`).
4388 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
4392 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
4393 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
4396 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
4398 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
4399 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage, session_priv, path, from_onchain, &self.pending_events, &self.logger);
4401 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
4402 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
4403 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
4404 |htlc_claim_value_msat| {
4405 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
4406 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
4407 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
4410 let prev_channel_id = Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id());
4411 let next_channel_id = Some(next_channel_id);
4413 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEvent { event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
4415 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
4418 outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
4422 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
4423 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4424 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
4430 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
4431 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4432 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
4435 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
4436 for action in actions.into_iter() {
4438 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
4439 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4440 if let Some(ClaimingPayment { amount_msat, payment_purpose: purpose, receiver_node_id }) = payment {
4441 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
4442 payment_hash, purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4446 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEvent { event } => {
4447 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
4453 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
4454 /// update completion.
4455 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4456 channel: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
4457 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
4458 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
4459 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
4460 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
4461 log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
4462 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()),
4463 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
4464 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
4465 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
4466 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
4467 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
4469 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
4471 let counterparty_node_id = channel.get_counterparty_node_id();
4472 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4473 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.outbound_scid_alias()),
4474 channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
4477 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4478 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
4480 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
4481 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4482 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4487 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
4488 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
4489 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4490 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4495 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
4496 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
4497 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4498 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4499 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4504 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
4508 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
4514 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
4515 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
4516 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
4520 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4521 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
4522 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
4528 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
4529 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
4531 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
4532 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4534 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
4535 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
4536 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4537 match id_to_peer.get(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4538 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4543 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4544 let mut peer_state_lock;
4545 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4546 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
4547 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4548 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4550 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()){
4551 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
4552 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
4555 log_trace!(self.logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}",
4556 highest_applied_update_id, channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id());
4557 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
4560 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, highest_applied_update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel.get_mut());
4563 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
4565 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
4566 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
4569 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4570 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4571 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4573 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
4574 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
4575 /// used to accept such channels.
4577 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4578 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4579 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4580 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
4583 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
4584 /// it as confirmed immediately.
4586 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4587 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4588 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4590 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
4591 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
4593 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
4594 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
4596 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
4597 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
4599 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4600 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4601 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4602 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
4605 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4606 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4608 let peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| !peer.channel_by_id.is_empty());
4609 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4610 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4611 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4612 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4613 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4614 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.len() == 1;
4615 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4616 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
4617 if !channel.get().inbound_is_awaiting_accept() {
4618 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
4621 channel.get_mut().set_0conf();
4622 } else if channel.get().get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4623 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4624 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4625 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4626 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
4629 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4630 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4631 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
4633 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
4634 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
4635 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
4636 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
4637 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4638 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4639 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4640 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
4643 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4644 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4645 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned() });
4649 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4650 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4651 msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4654 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4655 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id) });
4661 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
4662 /// or 0-conf channels.
4664 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
4665 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
4666 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
4667 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> bool {
4668 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
4669 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4671 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4672 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
4673 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
4674 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
4675 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
4676 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.channel_by_id.len() {
4677 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
4681 return peers_without_funded_channels;
4684 fn unfunded_channel_count(
4685 peer: &PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, best_block_height: u32
4687 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
4688 for (_, chan) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
4689 if !chan.is_outbound() && chan.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
4690 chan.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
4692 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
4695 num_unfunded_channels
4698 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4699 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
4700 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4703 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
4704 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4707 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
4708 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
4709 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
4710 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
4712 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
4713 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
4714 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
4715 let channeled_peers_without_funding = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| !node.channel_by_id.is_empty());
4717 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4718 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4720 debug_assert!(false);
4721 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())
4723 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4724 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4726 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
4727 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
4728 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
4729 if peer_state.channel_by_id.is_empty() &&
4730 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
4731 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
4733 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4734 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
4735 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4738 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4739 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
4740 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4741 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
4742 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4745 let mut channel = match Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
4746 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
4747 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias)
4750 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4751 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
4755 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
4756 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4757 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4758 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
4760 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4761 if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
4762 if channel.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4763 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4765 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4766 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4767 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4770 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4771 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
4772 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
4773 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4774 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
4775 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
4776 channel_type: channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
4780 entry.insert(channel);
4786 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4787 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
4788 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4789 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4791 debug_assert!(false);
4792 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
4794 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4795 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4796 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4797 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4798 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), chan);
4799 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
4801 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4804 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4805 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
4806 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
4807 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4808 channel_value_satoshis: value,
4810 user_channel_id: user_id,
4815 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4816 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4818 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4819 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4821 debug_assert!(false);
4822 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
4825 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4826 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4827 let ((funding_msg, monitor), chan) =
4828 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4829 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4830 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan), chan.remove())
4832 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4835 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
4836 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4837 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
4839 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4840 match self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().entry(chan.channel_id()) {
4841 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4842 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4843 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
4844 funding_msg.channel_id))
4846 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
4847 i_e.insert(chan.get_counterparty_node_id());
4851 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
4852 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
4853 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
4854 // until we have persisted our monitor.
4855 let new_channel_id = funding_msg.channel_id;
4856 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
4857 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4861 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
4863 let chan = e.insert(chan);
4864 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, monitor_res, 0, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
4865 per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING, { peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&new_channel_id) });
4867 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
4868 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
4869 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
4870 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
4871 // We do not propagate the monitor update to the user as it would be for a monitor
4872 // that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we don't respond
4873 // with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
4874 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { shutdown_finish: Some((res, _)), .. }) = &mut res {
4882 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4883 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4884 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4885 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4887 debug_assert!(false);
4888 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4891 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4892 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4893 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4894 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4895 let monitor = try_chan_entry!(self,
4896 chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan);
4897 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor);
4898 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, 0, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4899 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
4900 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
4901 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
4902 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
4903 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
4904 shutdown_finish.0.take();
4909 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4913 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4914 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4915 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4917 debug_assert!(false);
4918 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4920 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4921 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4922 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4923 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4924 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
4925 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan);
4926 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
4927 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4928 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4929 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4930 msg: announcement_sigs,
4932 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4933 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
4934 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
4935 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
4936 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
4937 // announcement_signatures.
4938 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4939 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
4940 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4941 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4948 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4949 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan.get_mut());
4954 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4958 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4959 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
4960 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
4961 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4962 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4964 debug_assert!(false);
4965 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4967 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4968 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4969 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4970 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4972 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
4973 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
4974 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
4975 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
4978 let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo();
4979 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self,
4980 chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_entry);
4981 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
4983 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4984 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
4985 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
4986 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
4987 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4988 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4993 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
4994 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
4995 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4996 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update);
4997 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry);
5001 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5004 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
5005 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
5006 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
5007 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
5013 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5014 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5015 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5017 debug_assert!(false);
5018 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5020 let (tx, chan_option) = {
5021 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5022 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5023 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
5024 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
5025 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_entry);
5026 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
5027 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5028 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5033 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
5034 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
5035 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
5036 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
5037 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
5038 (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, chan_entry)))
5039 } else { (tx, None) }
5041 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5044 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
5045 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
5046 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
5048 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
5049 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5050 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5051 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5052 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5056 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5061 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5062 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
5063 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
5064 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
5066 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
5067 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
5068 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
5069 //but we should prevent it anyway.
5071 let pending_forward_info = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
5072 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5073 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5075 debug_assert!(false);
5076 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5078 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5079 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5080 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5081 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5083 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
5084 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
5085 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
5086 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
5087 match pending_forward_info {
5088 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
5089 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
5090 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
5091 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
5093 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
5094 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
5095 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
5096 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
5097 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
5100 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
5102 _ => pending_forward_info
5105 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), chan);
5107 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5112 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5113 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
5114 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5115 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5117 debug_assert!(false);
5118 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5120 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5121 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5122 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5123 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5124 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan)
5126 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5129 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, msg.channel_id);
5133 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5134 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5135 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5137 debug_assert!(false);
5138 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5140 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5141 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5142 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5143 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5144 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan);
5146 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5151 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5152 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5153 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5155 debug_assert!(false);
5156 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5158 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5159 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5160 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5161 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5162 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
5163 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
5164 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan);
5166 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan);
5169 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5173 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5174 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5175 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5177 debug_assert!(false);
5178 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5180 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5181 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5182 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5183 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5184 let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo();
5185 let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
5186 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
5187 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update);
5188 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5189 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock,
5190 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan)
5193 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5198 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
5199 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
5200 let mut push_forward_event = false;
5201 let mut new_intercept_events = VecDeque::new();
5202 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
5203 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5204 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
5205 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
5206 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
5207 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
5208 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
5210 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
5211 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
5213 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5214 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
5215 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
5216 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5217 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5218 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
5220 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5221 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
5222 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.genesis_hash)
5224 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).into_inner());
5225 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5226 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
5227 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5228 new_intercept_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
5229 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
5230 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
5231 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
5232 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
5235 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5236 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
5238 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
5239 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
5240 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5241 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
5242 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
5243 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
5244 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
5245 phantom_shared_secret: None,
5248 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
5249 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
5250 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
5255 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
5256 // payments are being processed.
5257 if forward_htlcs_empty {
5258 push_forward_event = true;
5260 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5261 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
5268 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
5269 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
5272 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
5273 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5274 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
5276 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
5280 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued.
5281 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
5282 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5283 let forward_ev_exists = pending_events.iter()
5284 .find(|(ev, _)| if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false })
5286 if !forward_ev_exists {
5287 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
5289 Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
5294 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5295 let (htlcs_to_fail, res) = {
5296 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5297 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5299 debug_assert!(false);
5300 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5301 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
5302 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5303 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5304 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5305 let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo();
5306 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
5307 let res = if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
5308 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update);
5309 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5310 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id,
5311 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan)
5313 (htlcs_to_fail, res)
5315 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5318 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
5322 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5323 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5324 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5326 debug_assert!(false);
5327 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5329 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5330 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5331 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5332 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5333 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan);
5335 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5340 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5341 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5342 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5344 debug_assert!(false);
5345 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5347 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5348 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5349 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5350 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5351 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
5352 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
5355 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5356 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
5357 &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
5358 msg, &self.default_configuration
5360 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5361 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5362 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap()),
5365 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5370 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
5371 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5372 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
5373 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
5375 // It's not a local channel
5376 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5379 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5380 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
5381 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
5382 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5384 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5385 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5386 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5387 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5388 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5389 if chan.get().should_announce() {
5390 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
5391 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
5392 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
5393 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5395 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
5397 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
5398 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
5399 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
5400 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5402 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", log_bytes!(chan_id));
5403 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), chan);
5406 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5408 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
5411 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5413 let need_lnd_workaround = {
5414 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5416 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5418 debug_assert!(false);
5419 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5421 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5422 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5423 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5424 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5425 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
5426 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
5427 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
5428 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
5429 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
5430 msg, &self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash,
5431 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan);
5432 let mut channel_update = None;
5433 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
5434 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5435 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5438 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
5439 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
5440 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
5441 // they have the latest channel parameters.
5442 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
5443 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5444 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
5449 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
5450 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
5451 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get_mut(), responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
5452 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
5453 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
5454 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
5458 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5462 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
5463 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
5466 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
5467 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
5472 /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
5473 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
5474 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
5476 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5477 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
5478 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
5479 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
5480 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
5481 match monitor_event {
5482 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
5483 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
5484 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
5485 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
5487 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
5488 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
5489 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
5490 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5493 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
5494 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
5495 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
5496 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
5498 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5499 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
5500 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5501 id_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).cloned()
5504 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
5505 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5506 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
5507 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5508 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5509 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5510 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
5511 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
5512 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
5513 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5514 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5518 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
5519 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
5521 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
5523 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
5524 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5525 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5526 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5527 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5534 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
5535 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
5541 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5542 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5545 has_pending_monitor_events
5548 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
5549 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
5550 /// update events as a separate process method here.
5552 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
5553 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5554 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5555 NotifyOption::DoPersist
5557 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
5562 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
5563 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
5564 /// update was applied.
5565 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
5566 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
5567 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5568 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
5570 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
5571 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
5572 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
5573 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
5575 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5576 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5578 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5579 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5580 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
5581 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
5582 let funding_txo = chan.get_funding_txo();
5583 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
5584 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger);
5585 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
5586 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
5588 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
5589 has_monitor_update = true;
5591 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(
5592 funding_txo.expect("channel is live"), monitor_update);
5593 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5594 let channel_id: [u8; 32] = *channel_id;
5595 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id,
5596 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING,
5597 peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id));
5599 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, res));
5601 continue 'peer_loop;
5610 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
5611 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
5612 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
5615 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5616 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5622 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
5623 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
5624 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
5625 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
5626 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
5627 let mut has_update = false;
5629 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5631 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5632 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5633 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5634 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5635 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5636 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
5637 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
5638 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
5640 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5641 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
5644 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
5645 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
5646 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
5647 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5648 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5653 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5655 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
5656 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
5657 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
5663 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
5664 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5672 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5673 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5679 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
5680 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
5682 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
5683 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5684 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
5685 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
5686 // reorganized out of the main chain.
5687 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
5688 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
5689 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
5690 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
5691 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
5692 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
5693 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
5694 assert!(should_broadcast);
5695 } else { unreachable!(); }
5696 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
5698 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5702 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5703 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
5705 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
5706 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("min_value_msat of {} greater than total 21 million bitcoin supply", min_value_msat.unwrap()) });
5709 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5711 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5712 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5713 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5714 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5715 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
5716 payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
5717 user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
5718 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
5719 // it's updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
5720 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
5721 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
5722 // never fail a payment too early.
5723 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
5725 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
5728 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
5733 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
5736 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
5737 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
5739 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
5740 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
5741 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
5742 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
5744 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
5746 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5747 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5751 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5752 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5754 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5756 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
5757 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
5759 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5760 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5761 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
5762 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
5763 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
5764 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5765 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
5766 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
5767 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
5768 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
5769 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
5772 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5773 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5775 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5778 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5780 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5782 pub fn create_inbound_payment_legacy(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), APIError> {
5783 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5784 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5785 let payment_secret = self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)?;
5786 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret))
5789 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
5790 /// stored external to LDK.
5792 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
5793 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
5794 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
5796 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
5797 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
5800 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
5801 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
5802 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
5803 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
5805 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
5806 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
5807 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
5808 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
5809 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
5811 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
5812 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
5813 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
5814 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
5815 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
5817 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
5818 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
5820 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5821 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5825 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5826 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5828 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5830 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
5831 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
5833 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5834 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5835 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
5836 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
5837 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
5838 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
5839 min_final_cltv_expiry)
5842 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5843 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5845 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5848 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5850 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5852 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5853 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
5856 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
5857 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
5859 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5860 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
5861 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
5864 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
5865 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
5867 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
5868 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5869 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5870 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5872 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
5873 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5874 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
5875 Some(_) => continue,
5876 None => return scid_candidate
5881 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
5883 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
5884 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
5886 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
5887 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
5888 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
5892 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
5893 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
5894 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
5896 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
5897 /// times to get a unique scid.
5898 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5899 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5900 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5902 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
5903 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5904 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
5905 return scid_candidate
5909 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
5910 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
5911 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
5912 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
5914 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5915 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5916 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5917 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5918 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
5919 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
5920 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
5921 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
5930 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5931 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
5932 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5933 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
5934 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
5938 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
5939 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
5940 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5941 events.push_back((event, None));
5945 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
5946 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5947 events.pop_front().map(|(e, _)| e)
5951 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
5952 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
5956 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
5957 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
5960 fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint) {
5961 let mut errors = Vec::new();
5963 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5964 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
5965 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5966 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
5967 if self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().iter()
5968 .any(|(_ev, action_opt)| action_opt == &Some(EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
5969 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id
5972 // Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have another event
5973 // blocking any monitor updates for this channel. If we do, let those
5974 // events be the ones that ultimately release the monitor update(s).
5975 log_trace!(self.logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another event is pending",
5976 log_bytes!(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
5979 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
5980 debug_assert_eq!(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
5981 if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.get_mut().unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
5982 log_debug!(self.logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
5983 log_bytes!(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
5984 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update);
5985 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5986 if let Err(e) = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id,
5987 peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan)
5989 errors.push((e, counterparty_node_id));
5991 if further_update_exists {
5992 // If there are more `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to process, restart at the
5997 log_trace!(self.logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
5998 log_bytes!(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
6002 log_debug!(self.logger,
6003 "Got a release post-RAA monitor update for peer {} but the channel is gone",
6004 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6008 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in errors {
6009 let res = Err::<(), _>(err);
6010 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
6014 fn handle_post_event_actions(&self, actions: Vec<EventCompletionAction>) {
6015 for action in actions {
6017 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
6018 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id
6020 self.handle_monitor_update_release(counterparty_node_id, channel_funding_outpoint);
6026 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
6027 /// using the given event handler.
6029 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
6030 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
6034 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
6038 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6040 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6041 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6042 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6043 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6044 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6045 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6049 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
6050 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
6051 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
6052 /// is always placed next to each other.
6054 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
6055 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
6056 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
6057 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
6059 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
6060 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
6061 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
6062 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
6063 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
6064 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6065 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
6067 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
6068 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
6069 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
6070 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6073 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
6074 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6076 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
6077 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6080 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
6081 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6082 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6083 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6084 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6085 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
6086 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
6090 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
6091 events.replace(pending_events);
6100 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6102 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6103 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6104 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6105 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6106 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6107 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6111 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
6113 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
6114 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
6115 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
6117 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
6121 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6123 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6124 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6125 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6126 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6127 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6128 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6132 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
6134 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6135 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
6136 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
6137 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
6138 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
6141 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
6142 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
6145 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
6146 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6147 let new_height = height - 1;
6149 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
6150 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
6151 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
6152 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
6153 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
6154 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
6157 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
6161 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6163 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6164 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6165 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6166 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6167 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6168 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6172 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
6173 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6174 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6175 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6177 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
6178 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
6180 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6181 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)
6182 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
6184 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6185 if height < last_best_block_height {
6186 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6187 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
6191 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
6192 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6193 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6194 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6196 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
6197 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
6199 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6201 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
6203 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
6205 macro_rules! max_time {
6206 ($timestamp: expr) => {
6208 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
6209 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
6210 // having an explicit local time source.
6211 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
6212 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
6213 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6214 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
6215 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
6221 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
6222 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6223 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
6224 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
6228 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
6229 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
6230 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
6231 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6232 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6233 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
6234 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(block_hash)) = (chan.get_funding_txo(), chan.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
6235 res.push((funding_txo.txid, Some(block_hash)));
6242 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
6243 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6244 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
6245 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
6246 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
6247 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
6248 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
6249 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
6254 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6256 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6257 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6258 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6259 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6260 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6261 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6265 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
6266 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
6268 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
6269 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
6270 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6271 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6272 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6274 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6275 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
6277 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6278 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6279 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6280 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6281 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6282 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
6283 let res = f(channel);
6284 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
6285 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
6286 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
6287 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
6288 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.channel_id() }));
6290 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
6291 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
6292 if channel.is_usable() {
6293 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6294 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
6295 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6296 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6301 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6306 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6307 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
6310 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
6311 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6312 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6313 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6314 msg: announcement_sigs,
6316 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6317 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
6318 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
6320 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
6321 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
6322 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
6327 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
6328 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
6329 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
6330 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
6331 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
6332 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
6333 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
6334 // is always consistent.
6335 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
6336 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
6337 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()),
6338 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
6339 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
6342 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
6343 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, channel);
6344 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
6345 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
6346 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
6347 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
6348 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6352 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
6353 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
6354 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6355 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6356 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
6357 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
6358 data: reason_message,
6368 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6369 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
6370 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
6371 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
6372 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
6373 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
6374 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
6375 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6376 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
6377 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
6379 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
6380 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
6381 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
6385 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
6388 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6389 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
6390 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6391 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6392 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
6393 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
6394 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6395 phantom_shared_secret: None,
6396 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
6399 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
6400 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6401 _ => unreachable!(),
6403 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
6404 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
6405 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
6406 log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
6412 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
6414 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
6415 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
6419 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
6421 /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
6422 /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
6424 pub fn get_persistable_update_future(&self) -> Future {
6425 self.persistence_notifier.get_future()
6428 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6429 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
6430 self.persistence_notifier.notify_pending()
6433 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
6434 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
6435 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
6436 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
6439 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6440 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6441 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6442 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
6445 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6446 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6448 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6449 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6450 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6451 pub fn invoice_features(&self) -> InvoiceFeatures {
6452 provided_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
6455 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6456 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6457 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
6458 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
6461 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6462 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6463 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6464 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
6467 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6468 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6469 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
6470 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
6474 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
6475 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6477 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6478 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6479 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6480 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6481 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6482 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6486 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
6487 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6488 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6491 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
6492 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6493 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6496 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
6497 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6498 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6501 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
6502 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6503 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6506 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
6507 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6508 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6511 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
6512 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6513 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6516 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
6517 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6518 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6521 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
6522 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6523 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6526 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
6527 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6528 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6531 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
6532 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6533 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6536 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
6537 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6538 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6541 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
6542 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6543 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6546 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
6547 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6548 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6551 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
6552 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6553 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6556 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
6557 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6558 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6561 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
6562 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6563 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
6566 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
6571 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
6572 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6573 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6576 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
6577 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6578 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6579 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6581 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
6582 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6583 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
6584 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6585 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6586 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6587 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6588 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
6589 if chan.is_shutdown() {
6590 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
6591 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
6596 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
6598 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
6599 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
6600 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
6601 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
6602 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
6603 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
6604 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
6605 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
6606 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
6607 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
6608 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
6609 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
6610 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6611 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
6612 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6613 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
6614 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
6615 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
6616 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
6617 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
6618 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
6621 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
6622 peer_state.is_connected = false;
6623 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
6624 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
6627 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
6629 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6631 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6632 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6636 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
6637 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
6638 log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6642 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6644 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
6645 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
6646 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
6647 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
6648 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
6649 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
6652 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6653 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
6654 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6655 if inbound_peer_limited {
6658 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
6659 channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
6660 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
6661 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
6662 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
6666 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
6667 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
6668 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
6670 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6671 if inbound_peer_limited &&
6672 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
6673 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
6678 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
6679 peer_state.is_connected = true;
6684 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6686 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6687 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6688 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6689 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6690 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6691 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6692 let retain = if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
6693 if !chan.have_received_message() {
6694 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
6695 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
6696 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
6700 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
6701 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6702 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
6707 if retain && chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6708 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.default_configuration) {
6709 if let Ok(update_msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
6710 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement {
6711 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6720 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
6724 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
6725 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6727 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
6728 let channel_ids: Vec<[u8; 32]> = {
6729 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6730 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
6731 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
6732 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6733 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6734 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
6736 for channel_id in channel_ids {
6737 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6738 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6742 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
6743 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6744 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
6745 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
6746 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6747 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6748 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
6749 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash) {
6750 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
6751 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6759 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6760 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6764 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6765 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
6768 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
6769 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
6773 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6774 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6775 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
6776 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6779 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6780 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6782 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6783 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6784 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6785 pub(crate) fn provided_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InvoiceFeatures {
6786 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6789 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6790 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6791 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
6792 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6795 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6796 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6797 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6798 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
6801 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6802 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6803 pub fn provided_init_features(_config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
6804 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
6805 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
6806 // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
6807 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
6808 features.set_data_loss_protect_required();
6809 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
6810 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
6811 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
6812 features.set_payment_secret_required();
6813 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
6814 features.set_wumbo_optional();
6815 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
6816 features.set_channel_type_optional();
6817 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
6818 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
6820 { // Attributes are not allowed on if expressions on our current MSRV of 1.41.
6821 if _config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
6822 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
6828 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6829 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6831 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
6832 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
6833 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
6834 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
6837 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
6838 (2, node_id, required),
6839 (4, features, required),
6840 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
6841 (8, forwarding_info, option),
6842 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6843 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6846 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
6847 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6848 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6849 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6850 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
6851 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
6852 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6853 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
6854 (2, self.channel_id, required),
6855 (3, self.channel_type, option),
6856 (4, self.counterparty, required),
6857 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
6858 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
6859 (7, self.config, option),
6860 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
6861 (9, self.confirmations, option),
6862 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
6863 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6864 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6865 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
6866 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6867 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6868 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6869 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6870 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6871 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
6872 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
6873 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
6874 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
6875 (30, self.is_usable, required),
6876 (32, self.is_public, required),
6877 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6878 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6879 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6880 (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
6886 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
6887 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6888 _init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6889 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
6890 (2, channel_id, required),
6891 (3, channel_type, option),
6892 (4, counterparty, required),
6893 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6894 (6, funding_txo, option),
6895 (7, config, option),
6896 (8, short_channel_id, option),
6897 (9, confirmations, option),
6898 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
6899 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6900 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6901 (16, balance_msat, required),
6902 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6903 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6904 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6905 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6906 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6907 (22, confirmations_required, option),
6908 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
6909 (26, is_outbound, required),
6910 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
6911 (30, is_usable, required),
6912 (32, is_public, required),
6913 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6914 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6915 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6916 (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
6919 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6920 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6921 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
6922 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
6923 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
6927 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
6929 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
6930 outbound_scid_alias,
6934 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
6935 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
6937 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
6938 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
6939 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
6940 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
6941 confirmations_required,
6943 force_close_spend_delay,
6944 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
6945 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
6946 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
6947 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
6948 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
6949 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
6950 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
6955 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
6956 (2, channels, vec_type),
6957 (4, phantom_scid, required),
6958 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
6961 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
6963 (0, onion_packet, required),
6964 (2, short_channel_id, required),
6967 (0, payment_data, required),
6968 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6969 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6970 (3, payment_metadata, option),
6972 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
6973 (0, payment_preimage, required),
6974 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6975 (3, payment_metadata, option),
6979 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
6980 (0, routing, required),
6981 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
6982 (4, payment_hash, required),
6983 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
6984 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
6985 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
6989 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6990 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6992 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
6994 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6995 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6996 reason.write(writer)?;
6998 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6999 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
7002 channel_id.write(writer)?;
7003 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7004 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
7005 failure_code.write(writer)?;
7012 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
7013 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7014 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7017 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
7018 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7019 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7020 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
7024 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
7025 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7026 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7027 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
7028 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
7031 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
7032 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
7033 // messages contained in the variants.
7034 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
7035 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
7036 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
7038 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
7039 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
7040 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
7041 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
7042 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
7045 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
7046 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
7047 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
7048 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
7049 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
7051 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
7056 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
7061 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
7062 (0, short_channel_id, required),
7063 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
7064 (2, outpoint, required),
7065 (4, htlc_id, required),
7066 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
7069 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
7070 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7071 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
7072 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
7073 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
7075 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7076 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
7077 (1, self.total_msat, required),
7078 (2, self.value, required),
7079 (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
7080 (4, payment_data, option),
7081 (5, self.total_value_received, option),
7082 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
7083 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
7089 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
7090 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7091 let mut prev_hop = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
7093 let mut sender_intended_value = None;
7094 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
7095 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
7096 let mut total_value_received = None;
7097 let mut total_msat = None;
7098 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
7099 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7100 (0, prev_hop, required),
7101 (1, total_msat, option),
7102 (2, value, required),
7103 (3, sender_intended_value, option),
7104 (4, payment_data, option),
7105 (5, total_value_received, option),
7106 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
7107 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
7109 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
7111 if payment_data.is_some() {
7112 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7114 if total_msat.is_none() {
7115 total_msat = Some(value);
7117 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
7120 if total_msat.is_none() {
7121 if payment_data.is_none() {
7122 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7124 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
7126 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
7130 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
7133 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
7134 total_value_received,
7135 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
7142 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
7143 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7144 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7147 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
7148 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
7149 let mut path_hops: Option<Vec<RouteHop>> = Some(Vec::new());
7150 let mut payment_id = None;
7151 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
7152 let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
7153 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7154 (0, session_priv, required),
7155 (1, payment_id, option),
7156 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
7157 (4, path_hops, vec_type),
7158 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
7159 (6, blinded_tail, option),
7161 if payment_id.is_none() {
7162 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
7164 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
7166 let path = Path { hops: path_hops.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?, blinded_tail };
7167 if path.hops.len() == 0 {
7168 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7170 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
7171 if params.final_cltv_expiry_delta == 0 {
7172 params.final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.final_cltv_expiry_delta().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7175 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
7176 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
7177 first_hop_htlc_msat,
7179 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
7182 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
7183 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
7188 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
7189 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
7191 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
7193 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
7194 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7195 (0, session_priv, required),
7196 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
7197 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
7198 // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
7199 (4, path.hops, vec_type),
7200 (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
7201 (6, path.blinded_tail, option),
7204 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
7206 field.write(writer)?;
7213 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
7214 (0, forward_info, required),
7215 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
7216 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
7217 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
7218 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
7221 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
7223 (0, htlc_id, required),
7224 (2, err_packet, required),
7229 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
7230 (0, payment_secret, required),
7231 (2, expiry_time, required),
7232 (4, user_payment_id, required),
7233 (6, payment_preimage, required),
7234 (8, min_value_msat, required),
7237 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7239 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7240 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7241 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7242 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7243 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7244 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7248 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7249 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
7251 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7253 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
7255 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
7256 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
7257 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
7260 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
7262 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7263 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
7264 let mut number_of_channels = 0;
7265 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7266 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7267 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7268 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
7269 serializable_peer_count += 1;
7271 number_of_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.len();
7272 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
7273 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7274 unfunded_channels += 1;
7279 ((number_of_channels - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
7281 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7282 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7283 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7284 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
7285 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7286 channel.write(writer)?;
7293 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7294 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7295 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
7296 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
7297 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7298 for forward in pending_forwards {
7299 forward.write(writer)?;
7304 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
7306 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7307 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
7308 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7310 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
7311 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
7312 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7313 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
7314 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7315 (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7316 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
7317 htlc.write(writer)?;
7319 htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
7320 htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
7323 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
7324 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
7325 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7326 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
7327 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
7328 // per_peer_state lock at all.
7329 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
7332 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
7333 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
7334 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
7335 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
7336 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
7338 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
7339 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
7340 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
7341 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
7342 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
7343 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
7344 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
7349 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7350 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.115 don't support post-event actions, thus if there's no
7351 // actions at all, skip writing the required TLV. Otherwise, pre-0.0.115 versions will
7352 // refuse to read the new ChannelManager.
7353 let events_not_backwards_compatible = events.iter().any(|(_, action)| action.is_some());
7354 if events_not_backwards_compatible {
7355 // If we're gonna write a even TLV that will overwrite our events anyway we might as
7356 // well save the space and not write any events here.
7357 0u64.write(writer)?;
7359 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7360 for (event, _) in events.iter() {
7361 event.write(writer)?;
7365 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
7366 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7367 for event in background_events.iter() {
7369 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
7371 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
7372 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
7377 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
7378 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
7379 // likely to be identical.
7380 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
7381 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
7383 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7384 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
7385 hash.write(writer)?;
7386 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
7389 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
7390 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
7391 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7392 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
7393 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
7396 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
7397 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7399 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7400 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7401 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
7402 session_priv.write(writer)?;
7405 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
7406 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
7410 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
7411 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
7412 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7414 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7415 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7416 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
7422 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
7423 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7424 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
7425 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
7428 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
7429 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
7430 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
7431 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
7432 pending_claiming_payments = None;
7435 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7436 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
7437 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7438 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
7439 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
7440 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
7441 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
7442 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
7443 (8, if events_not_backwards_compatible { Some(&*events) } else { None }, option),
7444 (9, htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7445 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
7446 (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
7453 impl Writeable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
7454 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7455 (self.len() as u64).write(w)?;
7456 for (event, action) in self.iter() {
7459 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
7460 // Events are MaybeReadable, in some cases indicating that they shouldn't actually
7461 // be persisted and are regenerated on restart. However, if such an event has a
7462 // post-event-handling action we'll write nothing for the event and would have to
7463 // either forget the action or fail on deserialization (which we do below). Thus,
7464 // check that the event is sane here.
7465 let event_encoded = event.encode();
7466 let event_read: Option<Event> =
7467 MaybeReadable::read(&mut &event_encoded[..]).unwrap();
7468 if action.is_some() { assert!(event_read.is_some()); }
7474 impl Readable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
7475 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7476 let len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7477 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 1024 * 16;
7478 let mut events: Self = VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(
7479 MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>() as u64,
7482 let ev_opt = MaybeReadable::read(reader)?;
7483 let action = Readable::read(reader)?;
7484 if let Some(ev) = ev_opt {
7485 events.push_back((ev, action));
7486 } else if action.is_some() {
7487 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7494 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
7496 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
7498 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7499 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
7500 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
7501 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
7502 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
7503 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
7504 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
7505 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
7506 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7507 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
7508 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
7509 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
7510 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
7512 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
7513 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
7515 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
7516 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
7518 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
7519 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
7520 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
7521 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
7522 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
7523 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
7525 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
7526 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7528 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7529 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7530 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7531 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7532 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7533 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7537 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
7538 pub entropy_source: ES,
7540 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
7541 pub node_signer: NS,
7543 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
7544 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
7546 pub signer_provider: SP,
7548 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7550 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
7551 pub fee_estimator: F,
7552 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7554 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
7555 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
7556 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
7557 pub chain_monitor: M,
7559 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
7560 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
7561 /// force-closed during deserialization.
7562 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
7563 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
7564 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
7566 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
7568 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
7569 /// deserialization.
7571 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
7572 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
7573 pub default_config: UserConfig,
7575 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
7576 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
7578 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
7579 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
7580 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
7581 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
7583 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
7586 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
7587 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>,
7590 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7591 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7593 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7594 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7595 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7596 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7597 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7598 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7602 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
7603 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
7604 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
7605 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
7606 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>) -> Self {
7608 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
7609 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
7614 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
7615 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
7616 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7617 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
7619 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7620 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7621 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7622 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7623 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7624 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7628 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7629 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
7630 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
7634 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7635 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
7637 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7638 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7639 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7640 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7641 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7642 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7646 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7647 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7649 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7650 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7651 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7653 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
7655 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7656 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7657 let mut peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7658 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7659 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7660 let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
7661 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
7662 for _ in 0..channel_count {
7663 let mut channel: Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (
7664 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
7666 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7667 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
7668 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
7669 if channel.get_latest_complete_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7670 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
7671 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
7672 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7673 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_complete_monitor_update_id());
7674 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7675 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7676 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7677 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7678 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7679 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7680 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7681 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7682 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7683 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
7684 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
7685 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
7686 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7687 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7688 let (monitor_update, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
7689 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
7690 pending_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate(monitor_update));
7692 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
7693 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7694 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7695 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7696 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
7698 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
7699 let mut found_htlc = false;
7700 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
7701 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
7704 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
7705 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
7706 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
7707 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
7708 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
7709 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
7710 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
7711 log_info!(args.logger,
7712 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
7713 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7714 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7718 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7719 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
7720 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7722 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7723 id_to_peer.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel.get_counterparty_node_id());
7725 match peer_channels.entry(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
7726 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7727 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
7728 by_id_map.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
7730 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7731 let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
7732 by_id_map.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
7733 entry.insert(by_id_map);
7737 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
7738 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
7739 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
7740 // safely discard the channel.
7741 let _ = channel.force_shutdown(false);
7742 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7743 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7744 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7745 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
7748 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7749 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7750 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7751 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7752 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7753 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7757 for (funding_txo, _) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7758 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
7759 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
7760 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
7761 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
7763 pending_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((*funding_txo, monitor_update)));
7767 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
7768 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7769 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7770 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
7771 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7772 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7773 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
7774 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
7775 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
7777 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
7780 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7781 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7782 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
7783 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7784 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7785 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
7786 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
7787 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
7789 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
7792 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7793 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>)>()));
7794 for _ in 0..peer_count {
7795 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7796 let peer_state = PeerState {
7797 channel_by_id: peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new()),
7798 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
7799 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
7800 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
7801 is_connected: false,
7803 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
7806 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7807 let mut pending_events_read: VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> =
7808 VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>()));
7809 for _ in 0..event_count {
7810 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
7811 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push_back((event, None)),
7816 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7817 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
7818 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7820 let (funding_txo, monitor_update): (OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate) = (Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?);
7821 if pending_background_events.iter().find(|e| {
7822 let BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((pending_funding_txo, pending_monitor_update)) = e;
7823 *pending_funding_txo == funding_txo && *pending_monitor_update == monitor_update
7825 pending_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)));
7828 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7832 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
7833 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7835 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7836 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
7837 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
7838 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
7839 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7843 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7844 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
7845 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
7846 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
7847 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
7848 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
7849 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
7851 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
7852 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7856 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
7857 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
7858 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
7859 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
7860 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
7861 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7862 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7863 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
7864 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
7865 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
7866 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = Some(Vec::new());
7867 let mut events_override = None;
7868 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7869 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
7870 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7871 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
7872 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
7873 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
7874 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
7875 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
7876 (8, events_override, option),
7877 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7878 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
7879 (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
7881 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
7882 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7885 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
7886 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7889 if let Some(events) = events_override {
7890 pending_events_read = events;
7893 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
7894 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
7897 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
7898 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
7899 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
7900 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
7901 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
7902 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
7904 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
7906 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
7907 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
7908 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
7912 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
7913 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
7914 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
7915 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
7916 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
7917 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
7918 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
7920 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7921 if id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
7922 for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
7923 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
7924 if path.hops.is_empty() {
7925 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
7926 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7929 let path_amt = path.final_value_msat();
7930 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
7931 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
7932 match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
7933 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7934 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
7935 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
7936 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
7938 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7939 let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
7940 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
7941 retry_strategy: None,
7942 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
7943 payment_params: None,
7944 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
7945 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
7946 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
7947 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
7948 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
7949 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
7950 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
7951 total_msat: path_amt,
7952 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
7954 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
7955 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
7960 for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
7962 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
7963 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
7964 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
7965 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
7967 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
7968 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
7969 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
7970 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
7971 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
7972 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
7973 forwards.retain(|forward| {
7974 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
7975 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
7976 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
7977 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
7982 !forwards.is_empty()
7984 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
7985 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
7986 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
7987 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
7988 pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
7989 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
7990 intercepted_id != ev_id
7997 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
7998 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
7999 let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
8000 // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
8001 // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
8002 // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
8003 // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
8004 // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
8005 // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
8006 // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
8007 // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
8008 pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv, path, false, &pending_events, &args.logger);
8009 pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
8018 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
8019 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
8020 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
8021 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
8022 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
8023 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
8024 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
8025 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
8029 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
8030 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
8032 let mut claimable_payments = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
8033 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
8034 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
8035 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8037 if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
8038 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
8039 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8041 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
8042 purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
8044 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
8045 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
8047 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
8050 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
8051 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
8052 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
8054 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
8058 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
8059 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
8060 for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
8061 if htlcs.is_empty() {
8062 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8064 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
8065 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
8066 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
8067 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
8068 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
8069 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
8070 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
8071 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
8073 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
8074 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8078 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
8080 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
8082 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
8083 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
8085 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
8086 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
8091 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8092 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
8094 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
8096 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
8098 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
8099 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
8100 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
8101 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8105 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
8106 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
8107 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8108 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8109 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
8110 if chan.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
8111 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
8113 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
8114 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
8115 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
8117 chan.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
8118 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias()) {
8119 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
8120 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
8121 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
8122 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8124 if chan.is_usable() {
8125 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
8126 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
8127 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
8128 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
8129 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8135 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
8137 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
8138 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
8139 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
8140 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
8141 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
8142 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
8143 let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
8144 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
8145 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
8146 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
8147 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
8149 for claimable_htlc in payment.htlcs {
8150 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
8152 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
8153 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
8154 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
8155 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
8157 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
8158 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
8159 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
8160 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
8162 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
8163 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
8164 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
8165 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
8167 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
8168 if let Some(peer_node_id) = id_to_peer.get(&previous_channel_id){
8169 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
8170 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8171 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8172 if let Some(channel) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
8173 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
8176 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
8177 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
8180 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
8183 purpose: payment.purpose,
8184 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
8190 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
8191 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get_mut(&node_id) {
8192 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
8194 log_error!(args.logger, "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
8195 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8199 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
8201 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
8202 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
8203 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
8204 router: args.router,
8206 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
8208 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
8209 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
8210 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
8211 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
8213 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
8214 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
8215 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
8216 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
8217 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
8218 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
8220 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
8225 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
8227 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
8229 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
8230 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
8231 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
8232 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
8233 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
8235 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
8236 node_signer: args.node_signer,
8237 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
8239 logger: args.logger,
8240 default_configuration: args.default_config,
8243 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
8244 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
8245 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
8246 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
8247 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
8250 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
8251 //connection or two.
8253 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
8259 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
8260 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
8261 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
8262 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
8263 use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
8264 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
8265 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
8266 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
8267 use crate::ln::msgs;
8268 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
8269 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
8270 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
8271 use crate::util::test_utils;
8272 use crate::util::config::ChannelConfig;
8273 use crate::sign::EntropySource;
8276 fn test_notify_limits() {
8277 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
8278 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
8279 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8280 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8281 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8282 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8284 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
8285 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
8286 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8287 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8288 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8290 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8292 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
8293 // to connect messages with new values
8294 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
8295 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
8296 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
8297 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
8298 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
8299 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
8301 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
8302 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8303 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8304 // ... but the last node should not.
8305 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8306 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
8307 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8308 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8310 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
8311 // about the channel.
8312 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
8313 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
8314 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8316 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
8318 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
8319 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
8320 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
8321 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
8322 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8323 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8325 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
8326 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
8327 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
8329 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
8330 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
8331 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
8332 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
8333 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
8334 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
8336 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
8337 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
8338 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
8339 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
8340 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8341 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8342 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
8343 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
8345 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
8346 // the channel info has updated.
8347 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
8348 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
8349 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8350 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8351 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
8352 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
8356 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
8357 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
8359 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8360 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8361 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8362 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8363 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8365 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
8366 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8367 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
8368 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
8370 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
8371 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
8372 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
8373 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
8374 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
8375 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
8376 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
8377 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
8378 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8379 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8380 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8381 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
8383 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
8384 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
8385 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8386 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8387 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8388 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8389 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8390 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8391 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8392 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8393 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8394 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8395 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
8396 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8397 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8398 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8399 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8400 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8401 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8402 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8403 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8404 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8405 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
8407 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
8408 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
8409 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
8410 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8411 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8412 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8413 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
8415 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
8416 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
8417 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
8418 // lightning messages manually.
8419 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8420 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
8421 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8423 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8424 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8425 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
8426 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8427 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8428 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
8429 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8430 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8431 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
8432 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8433 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8434 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8435 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
8436 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8437 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8438 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
8439 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8440 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8441 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
8442 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8443 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
8444 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8445 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8446 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
8447 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8449 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
8450 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
8451 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8452 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
8454 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
8455 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
8456 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
8457 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
8459 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8462 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
8463 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
8464 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
8465 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
8467 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8470 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
8471 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
8472 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
8473 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
8475 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8480 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
8481 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
8482 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
8483 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
8484 // fails as expected.
8485 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8486 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8487 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8488 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8489 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8490 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8491 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8493 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
8494 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
8495 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
8497 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
8498 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8499 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV),
8500 final_value_msat: 100_000,
8502 let route = find_route(
8503 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
8504 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8506 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
8507 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8508 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8509 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8510 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8511 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8512 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8513 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8514 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8515 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8516 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
8517 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
8518 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8519 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
8520 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8521 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8522 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8523 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8524 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8525 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8526 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8527 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8528 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8529 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
8531 // Finally, claim the original payment.
8532 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
8534 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
8535 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8536 let route = find_route(
8537 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
8538 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8540 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
8541 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8542 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8543 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8544 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8545 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
8546 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
8547 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
8549 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
8550 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8551 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
8552 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8553 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8554 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8555 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8556 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8557 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8558 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8559 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8560 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8561 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8562 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
8563 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8564 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8565 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8566 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8567 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8568 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8569 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8570 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8571 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8572 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
8574 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
8575 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
8579 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
8580 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
8581 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
8582 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8583 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8584 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8585 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8587 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8588 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8590 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
8591 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8592 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
8593 final_value_msat: 10_000,
8595 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
8596 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
8597 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8598 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8599 let route = find_route(
8600 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
8601 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8604 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8605 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
8606 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
8607 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
8608 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
8609 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
8610 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8612 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8613 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8614 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8615 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8616 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8617 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8618 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8620 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
8624 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
8625 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
8626 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8627 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8628 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8629 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8631 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8632 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8634 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
8635 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8636 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
8637 final_value_msat: 10_000,
8639 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
8640 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
8641 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8642 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8643 let route = find_route(
8644 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
8645 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8648 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8649 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8650 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
8651 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
8652 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
8653 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
8654 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
8655 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
8656 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8658 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8659 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8660 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8661 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8662 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8663 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8664 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8666 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
8670 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
8671 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8672 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8673 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8674 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8676 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8677 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8678 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8679 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8681 // Marshall an MPP route.
8682 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8683 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8684 route.paths.push(path);
8685 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8686 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8687 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8688 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8689 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8690 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8692 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
8693 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
8695 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
8696 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
8698 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
8703 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
8704 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8705 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8706 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8707 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8709 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8711 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8712 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8714 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8715 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8716 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8717 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8720 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
8721 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
8722 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8723 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
8724 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
8725 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
8728 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
8731 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
8732 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
8737 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
8738 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
8739 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8740 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8741 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8742 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8744 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
8745 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
8747 total_msat: 100_000,
8750 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
8751 // payment verification fails as expected.
8752 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
8753 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
8754 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
8755 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
8757 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
8761 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
8762 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
8766 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
8767 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
8768 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
8769 // the channel is successfully closed.
8770 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8771 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8772 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8773 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8775 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8776 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8777 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
8778 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8779 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
8781 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
8782 let channel_id = &tx.txid().into_inner();
8784 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
8785 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
8786 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8787 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8790 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8792 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8793 // as it has the funding transaction.
8794 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8795 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8796 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8799 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8801 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8803 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8805 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8806 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8807 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8809 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8812 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8813 // as it has the funding transaction.
8814 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8815 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8816 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8818 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8819 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8820 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
8821 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8822 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8823 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
8824 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
8825 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
8827 nodes[0].node.close_channel(channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8828 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8829 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8830 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
8832 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8833 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
8835 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
8836 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
8837 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
8838 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
8839 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8840 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8841 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8845 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
8846 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
8847 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
8848 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
8849 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8850 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8851 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8854 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8856 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
8857 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
8858 // closing transaction).
8859 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
8860 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
8861 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8863 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
8864 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
8865 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8866 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8867 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8870 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8872 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
8874 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
8875 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
8876 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8878 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8880 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8881 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8884 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
8885 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
8886 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
8889 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
8890 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
8891 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
8894 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
8896 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
8897 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
8899 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
8900 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
8902 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
8903 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
8908 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
8909 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
8910 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
8911 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
8912 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8913 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
8914 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
8915 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
8918 let channel_id = [4; 32];
8919 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8920 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
8922 // Test the API functions.
8923 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None), unkown_public_key);
8925 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
8927 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8929 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8931 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8933 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
8935 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
8939 fn test_connection_limiting() {
8940 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
8941 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8942 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8943 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8944 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8946 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
8948 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8949 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8951 let mut funding_tx = None;
8952 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
8953 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8954 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8957 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
8958 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
8959 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
8960 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
8961 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8963 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8964 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8965 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8967 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8969 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
8970 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8971 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8973 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8976 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
8977 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8978 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8979 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
8980 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8982 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
8983 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
8985 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
8986 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
8987 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
8988 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
8989 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
8990 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8991 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8993 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
8994 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
8995 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8996 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap_err();
8998 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
8999 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
9000 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9001 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9002 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
9003 for ev in chan_closed_events {
9004 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
9006 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
9007 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
9008 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
9009 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap_err();
9011 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
9012 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
9013 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
9014 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9016 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
9017 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
9019 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
9020 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
9021 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
9022 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
9023 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9025 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
9026 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
9027 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9029 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
9030 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9031 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
9033 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
9034 // "protected" and can connect again.
9035 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
9036 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
9037 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
9038 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9040 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
9042 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
9043 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
9047 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
9048 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
9049 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9050 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9051 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9052 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9054 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
9056 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9057 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9059 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
9060 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9061 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9062 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9065 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
9067 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9068 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
9069 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9071 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
9072 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9073 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9075 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
9076 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9077 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
9078 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9082 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
9083 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
9084 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
9085 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9086 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9087 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
9088 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
9089 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
9090 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9092 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
9094 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9095 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9097 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
9098 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
9099 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
9100 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
9101 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
9102 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
9104 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
9105 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9107 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
9108 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
9110 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9112 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
9113 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9116 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
9117 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
9118 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
9119 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
9120 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
9121 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
9122 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9124 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
9125 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
9126 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
9127 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
9131 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9133 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
9134 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9136 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
9137 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
9138 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9140 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
9141 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
9143 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9145 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
9150 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
9151 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
9152 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
9153 // the channel without the anchors feature.
9154 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9155 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9156 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
9157 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
9158 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
9159 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
9160 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9162 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None).unwrap();
9163 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9164 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
9166 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9167 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9169 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
9170 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
9172 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9175 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9176 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
9178 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9179 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
9181 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
9185 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
9187 use crate::chain::Listen;
9188 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
9189 use crate::sign::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
9190 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
9191 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
9192 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
9193 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
9194 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
9195 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
9196 use crate::util::test_utils;
9197 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
9199 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
9200 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
9201 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
9203 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
9207 type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
9208 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
9209 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
9210 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
9211 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
9212 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
9213 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
9215 struct ANodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
9216 node: &'a Manager<'a, P>,
9218 impl<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'a, P> {
9219 type CM = Manager<'a, P>;
9221 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'a, P> { self.node }
9223 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
9228 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
9229 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
9232 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
9233 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
9234 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
9236 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
9238 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
9239 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
9240 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
9241 let scorer = Mutex::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
9242 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &scorer);
9244 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
9245 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
9247 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
9248 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
9249 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
9250 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
9252 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
9254 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
9256 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
9257 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
9258 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
9259 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
9260 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
9262 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
9264 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
9266 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: node_b.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
9267 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: node_a.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
9268 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9269 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
9270 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
9273 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
9274 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
9275 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
9277 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9278 } else { panic!(); }
9280 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
9281 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9282 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
9284 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
9285 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
9287 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9290 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
9291 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9292 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
9294 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
9295 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
9297 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9300 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
9303 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
9306 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
9307 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
9309 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
9310 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9311 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
9312 match msg_events[0] {
9313 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
9314 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
9315 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
9319 match msg_events[1] {
9320 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9324 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9325 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
9327 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
9328 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
9330 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9333 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9334 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
9336 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
9337 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
9339 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9342 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
9343 macro_rules! send_payment {
9344 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
9345 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
9346 .with_features($node_b.invoice_features());
9347 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
9348 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
9350 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
9351 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
9353 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
9354 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), RouteParameters {
9355 payment_params, final_value_msat: 10_000,
9356 }, Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
9357 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
9358 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9359 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
9360 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
9361 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
9362 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
9363 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
9365 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
9366 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
9367 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
9368 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
9370 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
9371 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
9372 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
9373 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
9374 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
9376 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
9379 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
9380 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
9381 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
9382 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
9384 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
9389 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
9390 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);