1 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
3 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
4 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
5 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
7 //! It does not manage routing logic (see ln::router for that) nor does it manage constructing
8 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
9 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
13 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
14 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
15 use bitcoin::util::hash::BitcoinHash;
17 use bitcoin_hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
18 use bitcoin_hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
19 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
20 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
21 use bitcoin_hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
23 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
24 use secp256k1::Secp256k1;
25 use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
28 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ChainListener,FeeEstimator};
29 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
30 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
31 use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, ManyChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
32 use ln::router::Route;
33 use ln::features::InitFeatures;
36 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
37 use chain::keysinterface::{ChannelKeys, KeysInterface};
38 use util::config::UserConfig;
39 use util::{byte_utils, events};
40 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
41 use util::chacha20::ChaCha20;
42 use util::logger::Logger;
43 use util::errors::APIError;
46 use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map, HashSet};
48 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock};
49 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
50 use std::time::Duration;
52 const SIXTY_FIVE_ZEROS: [u8; 65] = [0; 65];
54 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
56 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
57 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
58 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
60 // When a Channel forwards an HTLC to its peer, it will give us back the PendingForwardHTLCInfo
61 // which we will use to construct an outbound HTLC, with a relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData
62 // filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use to either fail-backwards or fulfill
63 // the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
64 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
65 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
66 /// Stores the info we will need to send when we want to forward an HTLC onwards
67 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
68 pub(super) struct PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
69 onion_packet: Option<msgs::OnionPacket>,
70 incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
71 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
72 short_channel_id: u64,
73 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
74 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
77 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
78 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
79 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
80 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
83 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
84 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
85 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
86 Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo),
90 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
91 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
92 pub(super) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
93 short_channel_id: u64,
95 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
98 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
99 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
100 pub(super) enum HTLCSource {
101 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
104 session_priv: SecretKey,
105 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
106 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
107 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
112 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
113 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
114 route: Route { hops: Vec::new() },
115 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
116 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
121 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
122 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
124 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
132 /// payment_hash type, use to cross-lock hop
133 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
134 pub struct PaymentHash(pub [u8;32]);
135 /// payment_preimage type, use to route payment between hop
136 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
137 pub struct PaymentPreimage(pub [u8;32]);
139 type ShutdownResult = (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
141 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
142 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
143 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
144 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
145 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
147 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
148 err: msgs::LightningError,
149 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
151 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
153 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
155 err: LightningError {
157 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
158 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
160 data: err.to_string()
164 shutdown_finish: None,
168 fn ignore_no_close(err: &'static str) -> Self {
170 err: LightningError {
172 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
174 shutdown_finish: None,
178 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
179 Self { err, shutdown_finish: None }
182 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32], shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
184 err: LightningError {
186 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
187 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
189 data: err.to_string()
193 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
197 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
200 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
202 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
204 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
206 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
207 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
209 data: msg.to_string()
213 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { msg, .. } => LightningError {
215 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
216 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
218 data: msg.to_string()
223 shutdown_finish: None,
228 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
229 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
230 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
231 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
232 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
234 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
236 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
238 forward_info: PendingForwardHTLCInfo,
242 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
246 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
247 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
248 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
249 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
250 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
251 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
252 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
254 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
258 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
259 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> {
260 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<ChanSigner>>,
261 pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
262 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
263 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
264 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
265 /// ids in the PendingForwardHTLCInfo!
266 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
267 /// payment_hash -> Vec<(amount_received, htlc_source)> for tracking things that were to us and
268 /// can be failed/claimed by the user
269 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
270 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
272 pub(super) claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<(u64, HTLCPreviousHopData)>>,
273 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
274 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
275 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>,
278 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
279 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
281 latest_features: InitFeatures,
284 #[cfg(not(any(target_pointer_width = "32", target_pointer_width = "64")))]
285 const ERR: () = "You need at least 32 bit pointers (well, usize, but we'll assume they're the same) for ChannelManager::latest_block_height";
287 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
288 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
290 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
291 /// to individual Channels.
293 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
294 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
295 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
296 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
298 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
299 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
300 /// returning from ManyChannelMonitor::add_update_monitor, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
301 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
302 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
303 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
304 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
306 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager), which
307 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
308 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
309 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
312 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
313 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
314 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
315 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
316 /// timer_chan_freshness_every_min roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfec.
317 pub struct ChannelManager<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> {
318 default_configuration: UserConfig,
319 genesis_hash: Sha256dHash,
320 fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
321 monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
322 tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
325 pub(super) latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
327 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
328 last_block_hash: Mutex<Sha256dHash>,
329 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
332 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>,
334 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>,
335 our_network_key: SecretKey,
337 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
338 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
339 /// are currently open with that peer.
340 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
341 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
343 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
345 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
346 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
347 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
348 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
349 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
351 keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>>,
356 /// The amount of time we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time between when
357 /// we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
358 pub(crate) const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
359 /// The amount of time we're willing to wait to claim money back to us
360 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24 * 7;
362 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
363 /// HTLC's CLTV. This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
364 /// ie the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
365 /// the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
366 /// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
367 const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 12; //TODO?
368 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
370 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
371 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
372 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
373 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
374 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
375 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
378 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
380 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying inbound claim. See
381 // ChannelMontior::would_broadcast_at_height for a description of why this is needed.
384 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
386 macro_rules! secp_call {
387 ( $res: expr, $err: expr ) => {
390 Err(_) => return Err($err),
395 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
396 pub struct ChannelDetails {
397 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
398 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
399 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
400 /// lifetime of the channel.
401 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
402 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
403 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
404 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
405 /// The node_id of our counterparty
406 pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
407 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
408 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
409 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
410 pub counterparty_features: InitFeatures,
411 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
412 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
413 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
415 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
416 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
417 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
418 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
419 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
420 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
421 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
422 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
423 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
424 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
425 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
426 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b)
427 /// the peer is connected, and (c) no monitor update failure is pending resolution.
431 macro_rules! handle_error {
432 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $their_node_id: expr, $locked_channel_state: expr) => {
435 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish }) => {
436 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
437 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
438 if let Some(update) = update_option {
439 $locked_channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
444 log_error!($self, "{}", err.err);
445 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
446 } else { $locked_channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id: $their_node_id, action: err.action.clone() }); }
447 // Return error in case higher-API need one
454 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
455 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
458 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
459 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
461 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
462 log_trace!($self, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
463 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
464 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
465 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
467 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
469 Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { .. }) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
474 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
475 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
478 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
479 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
481 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
482 log_trace!($self, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
483 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
484 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
485 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
487 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
489 Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { msg, update }) => {
490 log_error!($self, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
491 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
492 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
493 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
495 if let Some(update) = update {
496 if let Err(e) = $self.monitor.add_update_monitor(update.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update) {
498 // Upstream channel is dead, but we want at least to fail backward HTLCs to save
499 // downstream channels. In case of PermanentFailure, we are not going to be able
500 // to claim back to_remote output on remote commitment transaction. Doesn't
501 // make a difference here, we are concern about HTLCs circuit, not onchain funds.
502 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {},
503 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {},
507 let mut shutdown_res = chan.force_shutdown();
508 if shutdown_res.0.len() >= 1 {
509 log_error!($self, "You have a toxic local commitment transaction {} avaible in channel monitor, read comment in ChannelMonitor::get_latest_local_commitment_txn to be informed of manual action to take", shutdown_res.0[0].txid());
511 shutdown_res.0.clear();
512 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
518 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
519 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
520 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
522 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
524 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
525 log_error!($self, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]));
526 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
527 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
528 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
530 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
531 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
532 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
533 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
534 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
535 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
536 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
537 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
538 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
539 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure", channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()));
542 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
543 log_info!($self, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards and {} fails",
544 log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]),
545 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
547 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
548 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
550 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
551 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
553 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
554 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len());
555 if !$resend_commitment {
556 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
559 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
561 $entry.get_mut().monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
562 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor"), *$entry.key()))
568 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
569 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
570 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
572 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
573 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
577 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
578 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
579 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
580 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
581 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
584 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
589 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> ChannelManager<ChanSigner> {
590 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
592 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
593 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
595 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
597 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
599 /// Users must provide the current blockchain height from which to track onchain channel
600 /// funding outpoints and send payments with reliable timelocks.
602 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
603 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods.
604 /// However, rather than calling these methods directly, the user should register
605 /// the ChannelManager as a listener to the BlockNotifier and call the BlockNotifier's
606 /// `block_(dis)connected` methods, which will notify all registered listeners in one
608 pub fn new(network: Network, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>, monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>, tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>,keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>>, config: UserConfig, current_blockchain_height: usize) -> Result<Arc<ChannelManager<ChanSigner>>, secp256k1::Error> {
609 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
611 let res = Arc::new(ChannelManager {
612 default_configuration: config.clone(),
613 genesis_hash: genesis_block(network).header.bitcoin_hash(),
614 fee_estimator: feeest.clone(),
615 monitor: monitor.clone(),
618 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(current_blockchain_height),
619 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(Default::default()),
622 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
623 by_id: HashMap::new(),
624 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
625 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
626 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
627 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
629 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
631 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
633 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
634 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
644 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
646 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady and
647 /// FundingBroadcastSafe events to allow tracking of which events correspond with which
648 /// create_channel call. Note that user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you
649 /// may wish to avoid using 0 for user_id here.
651 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel message event, so you should probably poll
652 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
654 /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat is
655 /// greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k or channel_value_satoshis is < 1000.
656 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
657 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
658 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "channel_value must be at least 1000 satoshis" });
661 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&*self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_id, Arc::clone(&self.logger), &self.default_configuration)?;
662 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone(), &*self.fee_estimator);
664 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
665 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
666 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
667 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
668 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
669 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG" });
671 panic!("RNG is bad???");
674 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
676 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
677 node_id: their_network_key,
683 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
684 /// more information.
685 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
686 let mut res = Vec::new();
688 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
689 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
690 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
691 let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
692 res.push(ChannelDetails {
693 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
694 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
695 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
696 counterparty_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
697 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
698 inbound_capacity_msat,
699 outbound_capacity_msat,
700 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
701 is_live: channel.is_live(),
705 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
706 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
707 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.remote_network_id) {
708 chan.counterparty_features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
714 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
715 /// Router::get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
717 /// These are guaranteed to have their is_live value set to true, see the documentation for
718 /// ChannelDetails::is_live for more info on exactly what the criteria are.
719 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
720 let mut res = Vec::new();
722 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
723 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
724 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
725 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
726 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
727 // really wanted anyway.
728 if channel.is_live() {
729 let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
730 res.push(ChannelDetails {
731 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
732 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
733 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
734 counterparty_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
735 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
736 inbound_capacity_msat,
737 outbound_capacity_msat,
738 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
744 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
745 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
746 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.remote_network_id) {
747 chan.counterparty_features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
753 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
754 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
755 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
757 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
758 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
759 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
761 let (mut failed_htlcs, chan_option) = {
762 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
763 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
764 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
765 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
766 let (shutdown_msg, failed_htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
767 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
768 node_id: chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(),
771 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
772 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
773 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
775 (failed_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
776 } else { (failed_htlcs, None) }
778 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel"})
781 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
782 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
784 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
785 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
790 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
791 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
792 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
801 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
802 let (local_txn, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
803 log_trace!(self, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} transactions to broadcast and {} HTLCs to fail", local_txn.len(), failed_htlcs.len());
804 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
805 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
807 for tx in local_txn {
808 log_trace!(self, "Broadcast onchain {}", log_tx!(tx));
809 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
813 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
814 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel.
815 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) {
816 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
819 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
820 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
821 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id) {
822 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
823 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
830 log_trace!(self, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
831 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown());
832 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
833 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
834 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
840 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
841 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
842 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
843 for chan in self.list_channels() {
844 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
848 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>) {
849 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
850 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
852 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
853 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
854 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
855 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
856 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
857 failure_code: $err_code,
858 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
863 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
864 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
867 let shared_secret = {
868 let mut arr = [0; 32];
869 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
872 let (rho, mu) = onion_utils::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
874 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
875 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
876 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
877 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
878 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
879 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
880 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
881 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
884 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&mu);
885 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
886 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash.0[..]);
887 if !fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
888 return_malformed_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5);
891 let mut channel_state = None;
892 macro_rules! return_err {
893 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
895 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
896 if channel_state.is_none() {
897 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
899 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
900 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
901 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
902 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
903 })), channel_state.unwrap());
908 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
909 let next_hop_data = {
910 let mut decoded = [0; 65];
911 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[0..65], &mut decoded);
912 match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut Cursor::new(&decoded[..])) {
914 let error_code = match err {
915 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
916 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
918 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
924 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_data.hmac == [0; 32] {
927 // In tests, make sure that the initial onion pcket data is, at least, non-0.
928 // We could do some fancy randomness test here, but, ehh, whatever.
929 // This checks for the issue where you can calculate the path length given the
930 // onion data as all the path entries that the originator sent will be here
931 // as-is (and were originally 0s).
932 // Of course reverse path calculation is still pretty easy given naive routing
933 // algorithms, but this fixes the most-obvious case.
934 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 19*65];
935 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[65..], &mut new_packet_data[0..19*65]);
936 assert_ne!(new_packet_data[0..65], [0; 65][..]);
937 assert_ne!(new_packet_data[..], [0; 19*65][..]);
941 // final_expiry_too_soon
942 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + (CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
943 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
945 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
946 if next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
947 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
949 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
950 if next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
951 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
954 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
955 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
956 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
957 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
959 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
961 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
963 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
964 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
965 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
968 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
969 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[65..], &mut new_packet_data[0..19*65]);
970 chacha.process(&SIXTY_FIVE_ZEROS[..], &mut new_packet_data[19*65..]);
972 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
974 let blinding_factor = {
975 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
976 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
977 sha.input(&shared_secret);
978 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
981 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
983 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
985 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
988 hop_data: new_packet_data,
989 hmac: next_hop_data.hmac.clone(),
992 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
993 onion_packet: Some(outgoing_packet),
994 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
995 short_channel_id: next_hop_data.data.short_channel_id,
996 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
997 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
998 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1002 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1003 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { ref onion_packet, ref short_channel_id, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
1004 if onion_packet.is_some() { // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject them in the body here
1005 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
1006 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
1007 None => { // unknown_next_peer
1008 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
1010 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1012 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
1013 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
1015 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
1016 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
1017 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
1018 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
1019 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
1020 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
1021 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1023 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_their_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
1024 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1026 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
1027 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
1028 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1030 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
1031 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1033 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1034 // We want to have at least LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS to fail prior to going on chain CLAIM_BUFFER blocks before expiration
1035 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
1036 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1038 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
1039 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
1044 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
1045 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
1046 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
1047 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1049 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
1050 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1052 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
1053 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(chan_update.contents.flags));
1055 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1057 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
1062 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
1065 /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
1066 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1067 fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel<ChanSigner>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
1068 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1069 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established", action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
1073 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_their_node_id().serialize()[..];
1075 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1076 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
1077 short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
1078 timestamp: chan.get_channel_update_count(),
1079 flags: (!were_node_one) as u16 | ((!chan.is_live() as u16) << 1),
1080 cltv_expiry_delta: CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
1081 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(),
1082 fee_base_msat: chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator),
1083 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
1084 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1087 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
1088 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
1090 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
1096 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
1098 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
1099 /// fields for more info.
1101 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
1102 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
1103 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
1104 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
1105 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
1106 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
1108 /// May generate a SendHTLCs message event on success, which should be relayed.
1110 /// Raises APIError::RoutError when invalid route or forward parameter
1111 /// (cltv_delta, fee, node public key) is specified.
1112 /// Raises APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
1113 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update failure).
1114 /// Raised APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
1115 /// relevant updates.
1117 /// In case of APIError::RouteError/APIError::ChannelUnavailable, the payment send has failed
1118 /// and you may wish to retry via a different route immediately.
1119 /// In case of APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed, the commitment update has been irrevocably
1120 /// committed on our end and we're just waiting for a monitor update to send it. Do NOT retry
1121 /// the payment via a different route unless you intend to pay twice!
1122 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1123 if route.hops.len() < 1 || route.hops.len() > 20 {
1124 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"});
1126 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1127 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate() {
1128 if idx != route.hops.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
1129 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"});
1133 let (session_priv, prng_seed) = self.keys_manager.get_onion_rand();
1135 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1137 let onion_keys = secp_call!(onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv),
1138 APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"});
1139 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height)?;
1140 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, &payment_hash);
1142 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1144 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1145 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
1147 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&route.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1148 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!"}),
1149 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1152 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
1153 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
1155 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1156 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1158 if !chan.get().is_live() {
1159 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!"});
1161 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1162 route: route.clone(),
1163 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1164 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
1165 }, onion_packet), channel_state, chan)
1167 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) => {
1168 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1169 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
1170 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
1171 // that we will resent the commitment update once we unfree monitor
1172 // updating, so we have to take special care that we don't return
1173 // something else in case we will resend later!
1174 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1177 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1178 node_id: route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1179 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1180 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1181 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1182 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1183 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1191 } else { unreachable!(); }
1195 match handle_error!(self, err, route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey, channel_lock) {
1196 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
1197 Err(e) => { Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err }) }
1201 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
1203 /// Note that ALL inputs in the transaction pointed to by funding_txo MUST spend SegWit outputs
1204 /// or your counterparty can steal your funds!
1206 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
1208 /// May panic if the funding_txo is duplicative with some other channel (note that this should
1209 /// be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction keys per-channel).
1210 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_txo: OutPoint) {
1211 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1213 let (mut chan, msg, chan_monitor) = {
1214 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1215 let (res, chan) = match channel_state.by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
1217 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo)
1218 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
1219 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.force_shutdown(), None)
1220 } else { unreachable!(); })
1225 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_their_node_id(), channel_state) {
1226 Ok(funding_msg) => {
1227 (chan, funding_msg.0, funding_msg.1)
1229 Err(_) => { return; }
1232 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
1233 // lock before add_update_monitor
1234 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1236 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1238 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1239 match handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure", *temporary_channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), None)), chan.get_their_node_id(), channel_state) {
1240 Err(_) => { return; },
1241 Ok(()) => unreachable!(),
1245 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
1246 // Its completely fine to continue with a FundingCreated until the monitor
1247 // update is persisted, as long as we don't generate the FundingBroadcastSafe
1248 // until the monitor has been safely persisted (as funding broadcast is not,
1250 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new());
1255 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1256 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
1257 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1260 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
1261 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1262 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
1264 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1270 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel<ChanSigner>) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
1271 if !chan.should_announce() { return None }
1273 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
1275 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
1277 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1278 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1280 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
1281 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
1282 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
1283 node_signature: our_node_sig,
1284 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
1288 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
1290 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
1291 /// Will likely generate further events.
1292 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
1293 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1295 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1296 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
1297 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
1299 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1300 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1302 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
1303 if short_chan_id != 0 {
1304 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
1305 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1307 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
1308 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1309 match forward_info {
1310 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } => {
1311 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1312 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1313 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1314 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1316 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x4000 | 10, None));
1318 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
1319 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
1320 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
1321 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
1322 // problem, not ours.
1329 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
1330 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1331 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1332 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1333 match forward_info {
1334 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } => {
1335 log_trace!(self, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", log_bytes!(forward_info.payment_hash.0), prev_short_channel_id, short_chan_id);
1336 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1337 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1338 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1339 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1341 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(forward_info.amt_to_forward, forward_info.payment_hash, forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), forward_info.onion_packet.unwrap()) {
1343 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
1344 log_trace!(self, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(forward_info.payment_hash.0), msg);
1346 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
1348 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap();
1349 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x1000 | 7, Some(chan_update)));
1354 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1356 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1357 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
1358 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
1359 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
1360 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
1361 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
1362 // this channel currently :/.
1368 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
1369 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} after delay", short_chan_id);
1370 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet) {
1372 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
1373 log_trace!(self, "Failed to fail backwards to short_id {}: {}", short_chan_id, msg);
1375 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
1377 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
1378 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
1379 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
1382 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1384 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1385 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
1386 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
1387 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
1388 // messages when we can.
1389 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
1390 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
1391 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
1398 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
1399 let (commitment_msg, monitor) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment() {
1402 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
1403 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
1404 let their_node_id = chan.get().get_their_node_id();
1405 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
1406 ChannelError::Ignore(_) => {
1407 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
1409 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1410 log_trace!(self, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
1411 let (channel_id, mut channel) = chan.remove_entry();
1412 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1413 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1415 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, channel.force_shutdown(), self.get_channel_update(&channel).ok()))
1417 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { .. } => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
1419 match handle_error!(self, err, their_node_id, channel_state) {
1420 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
1421 Err(_) => { continue; },
1425 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
1426 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_their_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
1429 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1430 node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
1431 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1432 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
1433 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1434 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
1435 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1437 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1445 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1446 match forward_info {
1447 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } => {
1448 let prev_hop_data = HTLCPreviousHopData {
1449 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1450 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1451 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1453 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(forward_info.payment_hash) {
1454 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => entry.get_mut().push((forward_info.amt_to_forward, prev_hop_data)),
1455 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(vec![(forward_info.amt_to_forward, prev_hop_data)]); },
1457 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1458 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
1459 amt: forward_info.amt_to_forward,
1462 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
1463 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
1471 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_code, update) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
1473 None => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: Vec::new() }),
1474 Some(chan_update) => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }),
1478 if handle_errors.len() > 0 {
1479 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1480 for (their_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
1481 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
1485 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
1486 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1487 events.append(&mut new_events);
1490 /// If a peer is disconnected we mark any channels with that peer as 'disabled'.
1491 /// After some time, if channels are still disabled we need to broadcast a ChannelUpdate
1492 /// to inform the network about the uselessness of these channels.
1494 /// This method handles all the details, and must be called roughly once per minute.
1495 pub fn timer_chan_freshness_every_min(&self) {
1496 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1497 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1498 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1499 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter_mut() {
1500 if chan.is_disabled_staged() && !chan.is_live() {
1501 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1502 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1507 } else if chan.is_disabled_staged() && chan.is_live() {
1509 } else if chan.is_disabled_marked() {
1510 chan.to_disabled_staged();
1515 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
1516 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
1517 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
1518 /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
1519 /// HTLC backwards has been started.
1520 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) -> bool {
1521 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1523 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1524 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
1525 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1526 for (recvd_value, htlc_with_hash) in sources.drain(..) {
1527 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1528 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
1529 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_hash,
1530 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: byte_utils::be64_to_array(recvd_value).to_vec() });
1536 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
1537 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
1538 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
1539 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
1540 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
1541 /// still-available channels.
1542 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
1543 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
1544 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
1545 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
1548 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, .. } => {
1549 log_trace!(self, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
1550 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1551 match &onion_error {
1552 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
1554 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, onion_error_code) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
1556 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
1557 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
1558 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
1559 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
1560 if let Some(update) = channel_update {
1561 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1562 events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate {
1567 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
1568 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1569 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1570 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
1572 error_code: onion_error_code
1576 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
1580 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
1581 // TODO: We'd like to generate a PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate for temporary
1582 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as Router::get_route
1583 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
1585 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
1586 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
1587 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
1588 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1589 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1590 rejected_by_dest: route.hops.len() == 1,
1592 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
1598 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret }) => {
1599 let err_packet = match onion_error {
1600 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
1601 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
1602 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
1603 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
1605 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
1606 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
1607 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
1611 let mut forward_event = None;
1612 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
1613 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
1615 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
1616 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1617 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
1619 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1620 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
1623 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1624 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
1625 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1626 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
1627 time_forwardable: time
1634 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
1635 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
1636 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
1638 /// You must specify the expected amounts for this HTLC, and we will only claim HTLCs
1639 /// available within a few percent of the expected amount. This is critical for several
1640 /// reasons : a) it avoids providing senders with `proof-of-payment` (in the form of the
1641 /// payment_preimage without having provided the full value and b) it avoids certain
1642 /// privacy-breaking recipient-probing attacks which may reveal payment activity to
1643 /// motivated attackers.
1645 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
1646 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, expected_amount: u64) -> bool {
1647 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
1649 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1651 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1652 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
1653 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1654 for (received_amount, htlc_with_hash) in sources.drain(..) {
1655 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1656 if received_amount < expected_amount || received_amount > expected_amount * 2 {
1657 let mut htlc_msat_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(received_amount).to_vec();
1658 let mut height_data = byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).to_vec();
1659 htlc_msat_data.append(&mut height_data);
1660 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
1661 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), &payment_hash,
1662 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_data });
1664 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_preimage);
1670 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
1671 let (their_node_id, err) = loop {
1673 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1674 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1675 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1676 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
1680 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, .. }) => {
1681 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
1682 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1684 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1685 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1687 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1688 // learn the preimage as the channel already hit the chain and that's
1689 // why it's missing.
1694 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
1695 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
1696 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, payment_preimage) {
1697 Ok((msgs, monitor_option)) => {
1698 if let Some(chan_monitor) = monitor_option {
1699 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1700 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
1701 assert!(msgs.is_none());
1703 break (chan.get().get_their_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()));
1707 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
1708 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1709 node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
1710 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1711 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1712 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
1713 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1714 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1722 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1723 // learn the preimage as the channel may be about to hit the chain.
1724 //TODO: Do something with e?
1728 } else { unreachable!(); }
1734 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
1737 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
1738 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1739 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key)
1742 /// Used to restore channels to normal operation after a
1743 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
1745 pub fn test_restore_channel_monitor(&self) {
1746 let mut close_results = Vec::new();
1747 let mut htlc_forwards = Vec::new();
1748 let mut htlc_failures = Vec::new();
1749 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
1750 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1753 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1754 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
1755 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
1756 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
1757 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
1758 if channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
1759 let chan_monitor = channel.channel_monitor().clone();
1760 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1762 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1763 // TODO: There may be some pending HTLCs that we intended to fail
1764 // backwards when a monitor update failed. We should make sure
1765 // knowledge of those gets moved into the appropriate in-memory
1766 // ChannelMonitor and they get failed backwards once we get
1767 // on-chain confirmations.
1768 // Note I think #198 addresses this, so once it's merged a test
1769 // should be written.
1770 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1771 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1773 close_results.push(channel.force_shutdown());
1774 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
1775 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1781 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => true,
1784 let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, needs_broadcast_safe, funding_locked) = channel.monitor_updating_restored();
1785 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
1786 htlc_forwards.push((channel.get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"), pending_forwards));
1788 htlc_failures.append(&mut pending_failures);
1790 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1791 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
1792 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1793 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1798 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1799 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
1800 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1801 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1802 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1807 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1811 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1816 if needs_broadcast_safe {
1817 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
1818 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap(),
1819 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1822 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
1823 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
1824 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1827 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
1828 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1829 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1830 msg: announcement_sigs,
1833 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
1841 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().append(&mut pending_events);
1843 for failure in htlc_failures.drain(..) {
1844 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
1846 self.forward_htlcs(&mut htlc_forwards[..]);
1848 for res in close_results.drain(..) {
1849 self.finish_force_close_channel(res);
1853 fn internal_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1854 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
1855 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
1858 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&*self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_node_id.clone(), their_features, msg, 0, Arc::clone(&self.logger), &self.default_configuration)
1859 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
1860 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1861 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1862 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
1863 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
1864 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1865 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
1866 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1867 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
1869 entry.insert(channel);
1875 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1876 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
1877 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1878 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
1879 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1880 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1881 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1882 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1884 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration, their_features), channel_state, chan);
1885 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
1887 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1890 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1891 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
1892 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1893 channel_value_satoshis: value,
1894 output_script: output_script,
1895 user_channel_id: user_id,
1900 fn internal_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1901 let ((funding_msg, monitor_update), mut chan) = {
1902 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1903 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
1904 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
1905 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1906 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1907 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1909 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
1911 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1914 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
1915 // lock before add_update_monitor
1916 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor_update.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1918 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1919 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
1920 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
1921 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
1922 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
1923 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure", funding_msg.channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), None));
1925 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
1926 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
1927 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
1928 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our funding_locked
1929 // until we have persisted our monitor.
1930 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new());
1934 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1935 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1936 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
1937 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1938 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id", funding_msg.channel_id))
1940 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1941 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
1942 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1951 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1952 let (funding_txo, user_id) = {
1953 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1954 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
1955 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
1956 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1957 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1958 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1960 let chan_monitor = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg), channel_state, chan);
1961 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1962 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, false, false);
1964 (chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get().get_user_id())
1966 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1969 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1970 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
1971 funding_txo: funding_txo,
1972 user_channel_id: user_id,
1977 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1978 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1979 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1980 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
1981 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1982 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1983 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1985 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg), channel_state, chan);
1986 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
1987 // If we see locking block before receiving remote funding_locked, we broadcast our
1988 // announcement_sigs at remote funding_locked reception. If we receive remote
1989 // funding_locked before seeing locking block, we broadcast our announcement_sigs at locking
1990 // block connection. We should guanrantee to broadcast announcement_sigs to our peer whatever
1991 // the order of the events but our peer may not receive it due to disconnection. The specs
1992 // lacking an acknowledgement for announcement_sigs we may have to re-send them at peer
1993 // connection in the future if simultaneous misses by both peers due to network/hardware
1994 // failures is an issue. Note, to achieve its goal, only one of the announcement_sigs needs
1995 // to be received, from then sigs are going to be flood to the whole network.
1996 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1997 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1998 msg: announcement_sigs,
2003 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2007 fn internal_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2008 let (mut dropped_htlcs, chan_option) = {
2009 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2010 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2012 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
2013 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2014 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2015 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2017 let (shutdown, closing_signed, dropped_htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
2018 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
2019 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2020 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2024 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2025 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2026 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2030 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
2031 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
2032 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2034 (dropped_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
2035 } else { (dropped_htlcs, None) }
2037 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2040 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
2041 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2043 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
2044 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2045 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2046 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2054 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2055 let (tx, chan_option) = {
2056 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2057 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2058 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
2059 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2060 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2061 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2063 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
2064 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2065 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2066 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2071 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
2072 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
2073 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
2074 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
2075 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
2076 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
2077 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2079 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
2080 } else { (tx, None) }
2082 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2085 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
2086 log_trace!(self, "Broadcast onchain {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
2087 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
2089 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
2090 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2091 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2092 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2100 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2101 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
2102 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
2103 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
2105 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
2106 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
2107 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
2108 //but we should prevent it anyway.
2110 let (mut pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
2111 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2113 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2114 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2115 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2116 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2118 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
2119 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
2120 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
2121 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
2122 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { incoming_shared_secret, .. }) = pending_forward_info {
2123 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan.get());
2124 pending_forward_info = PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2125 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2126 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2127 reason: if let Ok(update) = chan_update {
2128 // TODO: Note that |20 is defined as "channel FROM the processing
2129 // node has been disabled" (emphasis mine), which seems to imply
2130 // that we can't return |20 for an inbound channel being disabled.
2131 // This probably needs a spec update but should definitely be
2133 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x1000|20, &{
2134 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
2135 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(update.contents.flags));
2136 res.extend_from_slice(&update.encode_with_len()[..]);
2140 // This can only happen if the channel isn't in the fully-funded
2141 // state yet, implying our counterparty is trying to route payments
2142 // over the channel back to themselves (cause no one else should
2143 // know the short_id is a lightning channel yet). We should have no
2144 // problem just calling this unknown_next_peer
2145 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
2150 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info), channel_state, chan);
2152 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2157 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2158 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2160 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2161 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2162 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2163 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2164 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2166 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
2168 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2171 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone());
2175 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2176 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2177 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2178 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2179 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2180 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2181 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2183 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
2185 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2190 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2191 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2192 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2193 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2194 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2195 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2196 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2198 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
2199 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set")), channel_state, chan);
2201 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
2204 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2208 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2209 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2210 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2211 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2212 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2213 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2214 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2216 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, closing_signed, chan_monitor) =
2217 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &*self.fee_estimator), channel_state, chan);
2218 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2219 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
2220 //TODO: Rebroadcast closing_signed if present on monitor update restoration
2222 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2223 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2224 msg: revoke_and_ack,
2226 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
2227 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2228 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2229 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2230 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2231 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2232 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2233 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2235 commitment_signed: msg,
2239 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2240 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2241 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2247 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2252 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
2253 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
2254 let mut forward_event = None;
2255 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
2256 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2257 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
2258 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
2260 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2261 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(forward_info.short_channel_id) {
2262 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2263 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
2265 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2266 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
2271 match forward_event {
2273 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2274 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
2275 time_forwardable: time
2283 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2284 let (pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, short_channel_id) = {
2285 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2286 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2287 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2288 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2289 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2290 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2292 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
2293 let (commitment_update, pending_forwards, pending_failures, closing_signed, chan_monitor) =
2294 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &*self.fee_estimator), channel_state, chan);
2295 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2296 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
2297 assert!(commitment_update.is_none() && closing_signed.is_none() && pending_forwards.is_empty() && pending_failures.is_empty());
2298 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA"));
2300 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, commitment_update.is_some(), pending_forwards, pending_failures);
2303 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2304 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2305 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2309 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2310 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2311 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2315 (pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"))
2317 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2320 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
2321 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
2323 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, pending_forwards)]);
2328 fn internal_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2329 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2330 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2331 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2332 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2333 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2334 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2336 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
2338 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2343 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2344 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2345 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2347 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2348 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2349 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2350 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2352 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
2353 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it", action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
2356 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2357 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) =
2358 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone()), channel_state, chan);
2360 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
2361 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2362 if self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 }).is_err() ||
2363 self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 }).is_err() {
2364 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close("Bad announcement_signatures node_signature")), channel_state, chan);
2367 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2369 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2370 msg: msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
2371 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
2372 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
2373 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
2374 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
2375 contents: announcement,
2377 update_msg: self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap(), // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
2380 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2385 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2386 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2387 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2389 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2390 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2391 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2392 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2394 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, channel_monitor, mut order, shutdown) =
2395 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg), channel_state, chan);
2396 if let Some(monitor) = channel_monitor {
2397 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
2398 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
2399 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
2400 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
2401 if revoke_and_ack.is_none() {
2402 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
2404 if commitment_update.is_none() {
2405 order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
2407 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, order, revoke_and_ack.is_some(), commitment_update.is_some());
2408 //TODO: Resend the funding_locked if needed once we get the monitor running again
2411 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
2412 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2413 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2417 macro_rules! send_raa { () => {
2418 if let Some(msg) = revoke_and_ack {
2419 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2420 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2425 macro_rules! send_cu { () => {
2426 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2427 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2428 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2434 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
2438 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
2443 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
2444 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2445 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2451 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2455 /// Begin Update fee process. Allowed only on an outbound channel.
2456 /// If successful, will generate a UpdateHTLCs event, so you should probably poll
2457 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
2458 /// Note: This API is likely to change!
2460 pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2461 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2462 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2464 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2465 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2467 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id) {
2468 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel"}),
2469 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2470 if !chan.get().is_outbound() {
2471 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "update_fee cannot be sent for an inbound channel"});
2473 if chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
2474 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2476 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2477 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel is either not yet fully established or peer is currently disconnected"});
2479 their_node_id = chan.get().get_their_node_id();
2480 if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) =
2481 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw), channel_state, chan)
2483 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2486 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2487 node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
2488 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2489 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2490 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2491 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2492 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2493 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
2503 match handle_error!(self, err, their_node_id, channel_state_lock) {
2504 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2505 Err(e) => { Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: e.err })}
2510 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> events::MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<ChanSigner> {
2511 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<events::MessageSendEvent> {
2512 // TODO: Event release to users and serialization is currently race-y: it's very easy for a
2513 // user to serialize a ChannelManager with pending events in it and lose those events on
2514 // restart. This is doubly true for the fail/fulfill-backs from monitor events!
2516 //TODO: This behavior should be documented.
2517 for htlc_update in self.monitor.fetch_pending_htlc_updated() {
2518 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
2519 log_trace!(self, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
2520 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
2522 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
2523 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2528 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2529 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2530 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
2535 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> events::EventsProvider for ChannelManager<ChanSigner> {
2536 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
2537 // TODO: Event release to users and serialization is currently race-y: it's very easy for a
2538 // user to serialize a ChannelManager with pending events in it and lose those events on
2539 // restart. This is doubly true for the fail/fulfill-backs from monitor events!
2541 //TODO: This behavior should be documented.
2542 for htlc_update in self.monitor.fetch_pending_htlc_updated() {
2543 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
2544 log_trace!(self, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
2545 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
2547 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
2548 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2553 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2554 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2555 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
2560 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> ChainListener for ChannelManager<ChanSigner> {
2561 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
2562 let header_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
2563 log_trace!(self, "Block {} at height {} connected with {} txn matched", header_hash, height, txn_matched.len());
2564 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2565 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2567 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2568 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2569 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
2570 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2571 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
2572 let chan_res = channel.block_connected(header, height, txn_matched, indexes_of_txn_matched);
2573 if let Ok(Some(funding_locked)) = chan_res {
2574 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2575 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2576 msg: funding_locked,
2578 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
2579 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2580 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2581 msg: announcement_sigs,
2584 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
2585 } else if let Err(e) = chan_res {
2586 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2587 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2588 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: e },
2592 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
2593 for tx in txn_matched {
2594 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
2595 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
2596 log_trace!(self, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
2597 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2598 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2600 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain. We go ahead and
2601 // broadcast our latest local state as well here, just in case its
2602 // some kind of SPV attack, though we expect these to be dropped.
2603 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2604 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2605 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2614 if channel.is_funding_initiated() && channel.channel_monitor().would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
2615 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2616 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2618 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2619 // If would_broadcast_at_height() is true, the channel_monitor will broadcast
2620 // the latest local tx for us, so we should skip that here (it doesn't really
2621 // hurt anything, but does make tests a bit simpler).
2622 failed_channels.last_mut().unwrap().0 = Vec::new();
2623 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2624 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2633 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2634 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2636 self.latest_block_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release);
2637 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header_hash;
2640 /// We force-close the channel without letting our counterparty participate in the shutdown
2641 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, _: u32) {
2642 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2643 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2645 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2646 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2647 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
2648 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2649 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, v| {
2650 if v.block_disconnected(header) {
2651 if let Some(short_id) = v.get_short_channel_id() {
2652 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2654 failed_channels.push(v.force_shutdown());
2655 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&v) {
2656 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2666 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2667 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2669 self.latest_block_height.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
2670 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header.bitcoin_hash();
2674 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<ChanSigner> {
2675 fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
2676 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2677 let res = self.internal_open_channel(their_node_id, their_features, msg);
2679 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2680 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2684 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
2685 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2686 let res = self.internal_accept_channel(their_node_id, their_features, msg);
2688 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2689 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2693 fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
2694 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2695 let res = self.internal_funding_created(their_node_id, msg);
2697 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2698 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2702 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
2703 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2704 let res = self.internal_funding_signed(their_node_id, msg);
2706 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2707 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2711 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) {
2712 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2713 let res = self.internal_funding_locked(their_node_id, msg);
2715 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2716 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2720 fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
2721 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2722 let res = self.internal_shutdown(their_node_id, msg);
2724 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2725 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2729 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
2730 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2731 let res = self.internal_closing_signed(their_node_id, msg);
2733 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2734 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2738 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
2739 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2740 let res = self.internal_update_add_htlc(their_node_id, msg);
2742 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2743 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2747 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
2748 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2749 let res = self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(their_node_id, msg);
2751 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2752 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2756 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
2757 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2758 let res = self.internal_update_fail_htlc(their_node_id, msg);
2760 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2761 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2765 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
2766 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2767 let res = self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(their_node_id, msg);
2769 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2770 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2774 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
2775 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2776 let res = self.internal_commitment_signed(their_node_id, msg);
2778 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2779 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2783 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
2784 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2785 let res = self.internal_revoke_and_ack(their_node_id, msg);
2787 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2788 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2792 fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
2793 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2794 let res = self.internal_update_fee(their_node_id, msg);
2796 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2797 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2801 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
2802 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2803 let res = self.internal_announcement_signatures(their_node_id, msg);
2805 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2806 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2810 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
2811 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2812 let res = self.internal_channel_reestablish(their_node_id, msg);
2814 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2815 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2819 fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
2820 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2821 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2822 let mut failed_payments = Vec::new();
2823 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
2825 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2826 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2827 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
2828 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2829 if no_connection_possible {
2830 log_debug!(self, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2831 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2832 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2833 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2834 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2836 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown());
2837 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2838 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2848 log_debug!(self, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2849 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2850 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2851 let failed_adds = chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused();
2852 chan.to_disabled_marked();
2853 if !failed_adds.is_empty() {
2854 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&chan).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
2855 failed_payments.push((chan_update, failed_adds));
2857 if chan.is_shutdown() {
2858 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2859 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2863 no_channels_remain = false;
2869 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
2871 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2872 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2873 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2874 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2875 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2876 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2877 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2878 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2879 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2880 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2881 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2882 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
2883 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
2884 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2885 &events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => true,
2889 if no_channels_remain {
2890 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(their_node_id);
2893 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2894 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2896 for (chan_update, mut htlc_sources) in failed_payments {
2897 for (htlc_source, payment_hash) in htlc_sources.drain(..) {
2898 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.clone() });
2903 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) {
2904 log_debug!(self, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2906 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2909 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
2910 match peer_state_lock.entry(their_node_id.clone()) {
2911 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2912 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
2913 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
2916 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
2917 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
2922 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2923 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2924 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2925 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2926 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2927 if !chan.have_received_message() {
2928 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
2929 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
2930 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
2934 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
2935 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
2936 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(),
2942 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
2945 fn handle_error(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
2946 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2948 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2949 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2950 if chan.remote_network_id == *their_node_id {
2951 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
2955 self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2960 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
2961 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
2963 impl Writeable for PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
2964 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2965 self.onion_packet.write(writer)?;
2966 self.incoming_shared_secret.write(writer)?;
2967 self.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
2968 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
2969 self.amt_to_forward.write(writer)?;
2970 self.outgoing_cltv_value.write(writer)?;
2975 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
2976 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingForwardHTLCInfo, DecodeError> {
2977 Ok(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
2978 onion_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
2979 incoming_shared_secret: Readable::read(reader)?,
2980 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
2981 short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
2982 amt_to_forward: Readable::read(reader)?,
2983 outgoing_cltv_value: Readable::read(reader)?,
2988 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
2989 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2991 &HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(ref fail_msg) => {
2993 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
2995 &HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(ref fail_msg) => {
2997 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3004 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCFailureMsg {
3005 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailureMsg, DecodeError> {
3006 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3007 0 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3008 1 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3009 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3014 impl Writeable for PendingHTLCStatus {
3015 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3017 &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(ref forward_info) => {
3019 forward_info.write(writer)?;
3021 &PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(ref fail_msg) => {
3023 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3030 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for PendingHTLCStatus {
3031 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingHTLCStatus, DecodeError> {
3032 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3033 0 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3034 1 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3035 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3040 impl_writeable!(HTLCPreviousHopData, 0, {
3043 incoming_packet_shared_secret
3046 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
3047 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3049 &HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref hop_data) => {
3051 hop_data.write(writer)?;
3053 &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
3055 route.write(writer)?;
3056 session_priv.write(writer)?;
3057 first_hop_htlc_msat.write(writer)?;
3064 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCSource {
3065 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCSource, DecodeError> {
3066 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3067 0 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3068 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3069 route: Readable::read(reader)?,
3070 session_priv: Readable::read(reader)?,
3071 first_hop_htlc_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
3073 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3078 impl Writeable for HTLCFailReason {
3079 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3081 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
3085 &HTLCFailReason::Reason { ref failure_code, ref data } => {
3087 failure_code.write(writer)?;
3088 data.write(writer)?;
3095 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCFailReason {
3096 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailReason, DecodeError> {
3097 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3098 0 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: Readable::read(reader)? }),
3099 1 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3100 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
3101 data: Readable::read(reader)?,
3103 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3108 impl Writeable for HTLCForwardInfo {
3109 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3111 &HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { ref prev_short_channel_id, ref prev_htlc_id, ref forward_info } => {
3113 prev_short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
3114 prev_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3115 forward_info.write(writer)?;
3117 &HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3119 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3120 err_packet.write(writer)?;
3127 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCForwardInfo {
3128 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCForwardInfo, DecodeError> {
3129 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3130 0 => Ok(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC {
3131 prev_short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3132 prev_htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3133 forward_info: Readable::read(reader)?,
3135 1 => Ok(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC {
3136 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3137 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
3139 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3144 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Writeable> Writeable for ChannelManager<ChanSigner> {
3145 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3146 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
3148 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
3149 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
3151 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
3152 (self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
3153 self.last_block_hash.lock().unwrap().write(writer)?;
3155 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3156 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
3157 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
3158 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
3159 unfunded_channels += 1;
3162 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
3163 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
3164 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
3165 channel.write(writer)?;
3169 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3170 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
3171 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
3172 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3173 for forward in pending_forwards {
3174 forward.write(writer)?;
3178 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3179 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
3180 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
3181 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3182 for &(recvd_amt, ref previous_hop) in previous_hops.iter() {
3183 recvd_amt.write(writer)?;
3184 previous_hop.write(writer)?;
3188 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
3189 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3190 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3191 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
3192 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3193 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
3200 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
3202 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
3204 /// 1) Deserialize all stored ChannelMonitors.
3205 /// 2) Deserialize the ChannelManager by filling in this struct and calling <(Sha256dHash,
3206 /// ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args).
3207 /// This may result in closing some Channels if the ChannelMonitor is newer than the stored
3208 /// ChannelManager state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
3209 /// 3) Register all relevant ChannelMonitor outpoints with your chain watch mechanism using
3210 /// ChannelMonitor::get_monitored_outpoints and ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo().
3211 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your ChannelMonitors.
3212 /// 5) Move the ChannelMonitors into your local ManyChannelMonitor.
3213 /// 6) Disconnect/connect blocks on the ChannelManager.
3214 /// 7) Register the new ChannelManager with your ChainWatchInterface.
3215 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> {
3216 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
3217 /// deserialization.
3218 pub keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>>,
3220 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3222 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
3223 pub fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
3224 /// The ManyChannelMonitor for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3226 /// No calls to the ManyChannelMonitor will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
3227 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
3228 /// ManyChannelMonitor after deserializing this ChannelManager.
3229 pub monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
3231 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
3232 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
3233 /// force-closed during deserialization.
3234 pub tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
3235 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
3236 /// deserialization.
3237 pub logger: Arc<Logger>,
3238 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
3239 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
3240 pub default_config: UserConfig,
3242 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
3243 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
3245 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
3246 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
3247 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
3248 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
3250 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
3252 pub channel_monitors: &'a mut HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor>,
3255 impl<'a, R : ::std::io::Read, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable<R>> ReadableArgs<R, ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner>> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager<ChanSigner>) {
3256 fn read(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
3257 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3258 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3259 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
3260 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
3263 let genesis_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3264 let latest_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3265 let last_block_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3267 let mut closed_channels = Vec::new();
3269 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3270 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3271 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3272 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3273 for _ in 0..channel_count {
3274 let mut channel: Channel<ChanSigner> = ReadableArgs::read(reader, args.logger.clone())?;
3275 if channel.last_block_connected != last_block_hash {
3276 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3279 let funding_txo = channel.channel_monitor().get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
3280 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
3281 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
3282 if channel.get_cur_local_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_cur_local_commitment_number() ||
3283 channel.get_revoked_remote_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
3284 channel.get_cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_cur_remote_commitment_number() {
3285 let mut force_close_res = channel.force_shutdown();
3286 force_close_res.0 = monitor.get_latest_local_commitment_txn();
3287 closed_channels.push(force_close_res);
3289 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
3290 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
3292 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
3295 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3299 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
3300 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
3301 closed_channels.push((monitor.get_latest_local_commitment_txn(), Vec::new()));
3305 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3306 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
3307 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
3308 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
3309 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3310 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, 128));
3311 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
3312 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
3314 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
3317 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3318 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
3319 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
3320 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3321 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3322 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, 2));
3323 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
3324 previous_hops.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
3326 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
3329 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3330 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, 128));
3331 for _ in 0..peer_count {
3332 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
3333 let peer_state = PeerState {
3334 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
3336 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
3339 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
3341 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
3342 monitor: args.monitor,
3343 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
3345 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(latest_block_height as usize),
3346 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(last_block_hash),
3347 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
3349 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
3354 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
3356 our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
3358 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
3360 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
3361 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
3362 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
3363 logger: args.logger,
3364 default_configuration: args.default_config,
3367 for close_res in closed_channels.drain(..) {
3368 channel_manager.finish_force_close_channel(close_res);
3369 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
3370 //connection or two.
3373 Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))