]> git.bitcoin.ninja Git - rust-lightning/blob - lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs
3d698603551d75d1d8a4a58e788de3e74ed4a72d
[rust-lightning] / lightning / src / ln / channelmanager.rs
1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
2 // history.
3 //
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
8 // licenses.
9
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
11 //!
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
15 //!
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
19
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
23 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
24
25 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
27 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
28
29 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
31 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
32
33 use crate::blinded_path::BlindedPath;
34 use crate::blinded_path::payment::{PaymentConstraints, ReceiveTlvs};
35 use crate::chain;
36 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
37 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
38 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
39 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
40 use crate::events;
41 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
42 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
43 // construct one themselves.
44 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, ChannelId, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
45 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelPhase, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UnfundedChannelContext, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel};
46 use crate::ln::features::{Bolt12InvoiceFeatures, ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
47 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
48 use crate::ln::features::Bolt11InvoiceFeatures;
49 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
50 use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteParameters, Router};
51 use crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters};
52 use crate::ln::msgs;
53 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
54 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
55 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
56 #[cfg(test)]
57 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
58 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{Bolt12PaymentError, OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment, SendAlongPathArgs, StaleExpiration};
59 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
60 use crate::offers::invoice::{BlindedPayInfo, Bolt12Invoice, DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY, DerivedSigningPubkey, InvoiceBuilder};
61 use crate::offers::invoice_error::InvoiceError;
62 use crate::offers::merkle::SignError;
63 use crate::offers::offer::{DerivedMetadata, Offer, OfferBuilder};
64 use crate::offers::parse::Bolt12SemanticError;
65 use crate::offers::refund::{Refund, RefundBuilder};
66 use crate::onion_message::{Destination, OffersMessage, OffersMessageHandler, PendingOnionMessage, new_pending_onion_message};
67 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
68 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
69 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
70 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
71 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
72 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
73 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
74 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
75
76 use alloc::collections::{btree_map, BTreeMap};
77
78 use crate::io;
79 use crate::prelude::*;
80 use core::{cmp, mem};
81 use core::cell::RefCell;
82 use crate::io::Read;
83 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
84 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, AtomicBool, Ordering};
85 use core::time::Duration;
86 use core::ops::Deref;
87
88 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
89 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, ProbeSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
90 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
91
92 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
93 //
94 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
95 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
96 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
97 //
98 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
99 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
100 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
101 // before we forward it.
102 //
103 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
104 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
105 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
106 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
107 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
108
109 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
110 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
111         Forward {
112                 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
113                 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
114                 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
115                 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
116         },
117         Receive {
118                 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
119                 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
120                 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
121                 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
122                 /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`] for more info.
123                 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
124         },
125         ReceiveKeysend {
126                 /// This was added in 0.0.116 and will break deserialization on downgrades.
127                 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
128                 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
129                 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
130                 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
131                 /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`] for more info.
132                 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
133         },
134 }
135
136 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
137 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
138         pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
139         pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
140         payment_hash: PaymentHash,
141         /// Amount received
142         pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
143         /// Sender intended amount to forward or receive (actual amount received
144         /// may overshoot this in either case)
145         pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
146         pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
147         /// The fee being skimmed off the top of this HTLC. If this is a forward, it'll be the fee we are
148         /// skimming. If we're receiving this HTLC, it's the fee that our counterparty skimmed.
149         pub(super) skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
150 }
151
152 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
153 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
154         Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
155         Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
156 }
157
158 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
159 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
160 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
161         Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
162         Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
163 }
164
165 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
166         pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
167
168         // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
169         // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
170         // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
171         // HTLCs.
172         //
173         // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
174         prev_short_channel_id: u64,
175         prev_htlc_id: u64,
176         prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
177         prev_user_channel_id: u128,
178 }
179
180 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
181         AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
182         FailHTLC {
183                 htlc_id: u64,
184                 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
185         },
186 }
187
188 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
189 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
190 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
191         // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
192         short_channel_id: u64,
193         user_channel_id: Option<u128>,
194         htlc_id: u64,
195         incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
196         phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
197
198         // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
199         // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
200         outpoint: OutPoint,
201 }
202
203 enum OnionPayload {
204         /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
205         Invoice {
206                 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
207                 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
208                 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
209         },
210         /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
211         Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
212 }
213
214 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
215 struct ClaimableHTLC {
216         prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
217         cltv_expiry: u32,
218         /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
219         value: u64,
220         /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
221         /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
222         sender_intended_value: u64,
223         onion_payload: OnionPayload,
224         timer_ticks: u8,
225         /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
226         /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
227         total_value_received: Option<u64>,
228         /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
229         total_msat: u64,
230         /// The extra fee our counterparty skimmed off the top of this HTLC.
231         counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
232 }
233
234 impl From<&ClaimableHTLC> for events::ClaimedHTLC {
235         fn from(val: &ClaimableHTLC) -> Self {
236                 events::ClaimedHTLC {
237                         channel_id: val.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
238                         user_channel_id: val.prev_hop.user_channel_id.unwrap_or(0),
239                         cltv_expiry: val.cltv_expiry,
240                         value_msat: val.value,
241                         counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: val.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0),
242                 }
243         }
244 }
245
246 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
247 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
248 ///
249 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
250 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
251 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; Self::LENGTH]);
252
253 impl PaymentId {
254         /// Number of bytes in the id.
255         pub const LENGTH: usize = 32;
256 }
257
258 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
259         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
260                 self.0.write(w)
261         }
262 }
263
264 impl Readable for PaymentId {
265         fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
266                 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
267                 Ok(PaymentId(buf))
268         }
269 }
270
271 impl core::fmt::Display for PaymentId {
272         fn fmt(&self, f: &mut core::fmt::Formatter) -> core::fmt::Result {
273                 crate::util::logger::DebugBytes(&self.0).fmt(f)
274         }
275 }
276
277 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
278 ///
279 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
280 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
281 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
282
283 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
284         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
285                 self.0.write(w)
286         }
287 }
288
289 impl Readable for InterceptId {
290         fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
291                 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
292                 Ok(InterceptId(buf))
293         }
294 }
295
296 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
297 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
298 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
299         PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
300         OutboundRoute { session_priv: SecretKey },
301 }
302 impl SentHTLCId {
303         pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
304                 match source {
305                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
306                                 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
307                                 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
308                         },
309                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
310                                 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: *session_priv },
311                 }
312         }
313 }
314 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
315         (0, PreviousHopData) => {
316                 (0, short_channel_id, required),
317                 (2, htlc_id, required),
318         },
319         (2, OutboundRoute) => {
320                 (0, session_priv, required),
321         };
322 );
323
324
325 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
326 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
327 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
328 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
329         PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
330         OutboundRoute {
331                 path: Path,
332                 session_priv: SecretKey,
333                 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
334                 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
335                 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
336                 payment_id: PaymentId,
337         },
338 }
339 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
340 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
341         fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
342                 match self {
343                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
344                                 0u8.hash(hasher);
345                                 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
346                         },
347                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
348                                 1u8.hash(hasher);
349                                 path.hash(hasher);
350                                 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
351                                 payment_id.hash(hasher);
352                                 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
353                         },
354                 }
355         }
356 }
357 impl HTLCSource {
358         #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
359         #[cfg(test)]
360         pub fn dummy() -> Self {
361                 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
362                         path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
363                         session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
364                         first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
365                         payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
366                 }
367         }
368
369         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
370         /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
371         /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
372         pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
373                 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
374                         *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
375                 } else {
376                         // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
377                         true
378                 }
379         }
380 }
381
382 struct InboundOnionErr {
383         err_code: u16,
384         err_data: Vec<u8>,
385         msg: &'static str,
386 }
387
388 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
389 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
390 ///
391 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
392 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
393 pub enum FailureCode {
394         /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
395         /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
396         TemporaryNodeFailure,
397         /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
398         /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
399         RequiredNodeFeatureMissing,
400         /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
401         /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
402         /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
403         /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
404         IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails,
405         /// We failed to process the payload after the onion was decrypted. You may wish to
406         /// use this when receiving custom HTLC TLVs with even type numbers that you don't recognize.
407         ///
408         /// If available, the tuple data may include the type number and byte offset in the
409         /// decrypted byte stream where the failure occurred.
410         InvalidOnionPayload(Option<(u64, u16)>),
411 }
412
413 impl Into<u16> for FailureCode {
414     fn into(self) -> u16 {
415                 match self {
416                         FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => 0x2000 | 2,
417                         FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
418                         FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => 0x4000 | 15,
419                         FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(_) => 0x4000 | 22,
420                 }
421         }
422 }
423
424 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
425 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
426 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
427 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
428 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
429
430 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
431         err: msgs::LightningError,
432         chan_id: Option<(ChannelId, u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
433         shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
434         channel_capacity: Option<u64>,
435 }
436 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
437         #[inline]
438         fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
439                 Self {
440                         err: LightningError {
441                                 err: err.clone(),
442                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
443                                         msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
444                                                 channel_id,
445                                                 data: err
446                                         },
447                                 },
448                         },
449                         chan_id: None,
450                         shutdown_finish: None,
451                         channel_capacity: None,
452                 }
453         }
454         #[inline]
455         fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
456                 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None, channel_capacity: None }
457         }
458         #[inline]
459         fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId, user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>, channel_capacity: u64) -> Self {
460                 let err_msg = msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: err.clone() };
461                 let action = if shutdown_res.monitor_update.is_some() {
462                         // We have a closing `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, which means the channel was funded and we
463                         // should disconnect our peer such that we force them to broadcast their latest
464                         // commitment upon reconnecting.
465                         msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(err_msg) }
466                 } else {
467                         msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: err_msg }
468                 };
469                 Self {
470                         err: LightningError { err, action },
471                         chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
472                         shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
473                         channel_capacity: Some(channel_capacity)
474                 }
475         }
476         #[inline]
477         fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
478                 Self {
479                         err: match err {
480                                 ChannelError::Warn(msg) =>  LightningError {
481                                         err: msg.clone(),
482                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
483                                                 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
484                                                         channel_id,
485                                                         data: msg
486                                                 },
487                                                 log_level: Level::Warn,
488                                         },
489                                 },
490                                 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
491                                         err: msg,
492                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
493                                 },
494                                 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
495                                         err: msg.clone(),
496                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
497                                                 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
498                                                         channel_id,
499                                                         data: msg
500                                                 },
501                                         },
502                                 },
503                         },
504                         chan_id: None,
505                         shutdown_finish: None,
506                         channel_capacity: None,
507                 }
508         }
509
510         fn closes_channel(&self) -> bool {
511                 self.chan_id.is_some()
512         }
513 }
514
515 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
516 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
517 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
518 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
519 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
520
521 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
522 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
523 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
524 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
525 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
526 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
527         /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
528         CommitmentFirst,
529         /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
530         RevokeAndACKFirst,
531 }
532
533 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
534 struct ClaimingPayment {
535         amount_msat: u64,
536         payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
537         receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
538         htlcs: Vec<events::ClaimedHTLC>,
539         sender_intended_value: Option<u64>,
540 }
541 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
542         (0, amount_msat, required),
543         (2, payment_purpose, required),
544         (4, receiver_node_id, required),
545         (5, htlcs, optional_vec),
546         (7, sender_intended_value, option),
547 });
548
549 struct ClaimablePayment {
550         purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
551         onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
552         htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
553 }
554
555 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
556 struct ClaimablePayments {
557         /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
558         /// failed/claimed by the user.
559         ///
560         /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
561         /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
562         ///
563         /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
564         /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
565         claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
566
567         /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
568         /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
569         /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
570         pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
571 }
572
573 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be processed immediately at the generation site
574 /// usually because we're running pre-full-init. They are handled immediately once we detect we are
575 /// running normally, and specifically must be processed before any other non-background
576 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are applied.
577 #[derive(Debug)]
578 enum BackgroundEvent {
579         /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which closes the channel or for an already-closed channel.
580         /// This is only separated from [`Self::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`] as the
581         /// maybe-non-closing variant needs a public key to handle channel resumption, whereas if the
582         /// channel has been force-closed we do not need the counterparty node_id.
583         ///
584         /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
585         /// are regenerated on startup.
586         ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
587         /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which may or may not close the channel and may unblock the
588         /// channel to continue normal operation.
589         ///
590         /// In general this should be used rather than
591         /// [`Self::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`], however in cases where the
592         /// `counterparty_node_id` is not available as the channel has closed from a [`ChannelMonitor`]
593         /// error the other variant is acceptable.
594         ///
595         /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
596         /// are regenerated on startup.
597         MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
598                 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
599                 funding_txo: OutPoint,
600                 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate
601         },
602         /// Some [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (s) completed before we were serialized but we still have
603         /// them marked pending, thus we need to run any [`MonitorUpdateCompletionAction`] (s) pending
604         /// on a channel.
605         MonitorUpdatesComplete {
606                 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
607                 channel_id: ChannelId,
608         },
609 }
610
611 #[derive(Debug)]
612 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
613         /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
614         /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
615         /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
616         /// event can be generated.
617         PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
618         /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user and possibly resume the
619         /// operation of another channel.
620         ///
621         /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
622         /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
623         /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. In that case, after the inbound
624         /// edge completes, we will surface an [`Event::PaymentForwarded`] as well as unblock the
625         /// outbound edge.
626         EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
627                 event: events::Event,
628                 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction)>,
629         },
630         /// Indicates we should immediately resume the operation of another channel, unless there is
631         /// some other reason why the channel is blocked. In practice this simply means immediately
632         /// removing the [`RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction`] provided from the blocking set.
633         ///
634         /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
635         /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
636         /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. However, we use this variant
637         /// instead of [`Self::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel`] when we discover that the claim was in
638         /// fact duplicative and we simply want to resume the outbound edge channel immediately.
639         ///
640         /// This variant should thus never be written to disk, as it is processed inline rather than
641         /// stored for later processing.
642         FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
643                 downstream_counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
644                 downstream_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
645                 blocking_action: RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
646         },
647 }
648
649 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
650         (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
651         // Note that FreeOtherChannelImmediately should never be written - we were supposed to free
652         // *immediately*. However, for simplicity we implement read/write here.
653         (1, FreeOtherChannelImmediately) => {
654                 (0, downstream_counterparty_node_id, required),
655                 (2, downstream_funding_outpoint, required),
656                 (4, blocking_action, required),
657         },
658         (2, EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel) => {
659                 (0, event, upgradable_required),
660                 // LDK prior to 0.0.116 did not have this field as the monitor update application order was
661                 // required by clients. If we downgrade to something prior to 0.0.116 this may result in
662                 // monitor updates which aren't properly blocked or resumed, however that's fine - we don't
663                 // support async monitor updates even in LDK 0.0.116 and once we do we'll require no
664                 // downgrades to prior versions.
665                 (1, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint, option),
666         },
667 );
668
669 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
670 pub(crate) enum EventCompletionAction {
671         ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
672                 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
673                 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
674         },
675 }
676 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(EventCompletionAction,
677         (0, ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate) => {
678                 (0, channel_funding_outpoint, required),
679                 (2, counterparty_node_id, required),
680         };
681 );
682
683 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
684 /// If something is blocked on the completion of an RAA-generated [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] we track
685 /// the blocked action here. See enum variants for more info.
686 pub(crate) enum RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
687         /// A forwarded payment was claimed. We block the downstream channel completing its monitor
688         /// update which removes the HTLC preimage until the upstream channel has gotten the preimage
689         /// durably to disk.
690         ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
691                 /// The upstream channel ID (i.e. the inbound edge).
692                 channel_id: ChannelId,
693                 /// The HTLC ID on the inbound edge.
694                 htlc_id: u64,
695         },
696 }
697
698 impl RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
699         fn from_prev_hop_data(prev_hop: &HTLCPreviousHopData) -> Self {
700                 Self::ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
701                         channel_id: prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
702                         htlc_id: prev_hop.htlc_id,
703                 }
704         }
705 }
706
707 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
708         (0, ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim) => { (0, channel_id, required), (2, htlc_id, required) }
709 ;);
710
711
712 /// State we hold per-peer.
713 pub(super) struct PeerState<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
714         /// `channel_id` -> `ChannelPhase`
715         ///
716         /// Holds all channels within corresponding `ChannelPhase`s where the peer is the counterparty.
717         pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>,
718         /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `InboundChannelRequest`.
719         ///
720         /// When manual channel acceptance is enabled, this holds all unaccepted inbound channels where
721         /// the peer is the counterparty. If the channel is accepted, then the entry in this table is
722         /// removed, and an InboundV1Channel is created and placed in the `inbound_v1_channel_by_id` table. If
723         /// the channel is rejected, then the entry is simply removed.
724         pub(super) inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, InboundChannelRequest>,
725         /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
726         latest_features: InitFeatures,
727         /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
728         /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
729         pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
730         /// Map from Channel IDs to pending [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s which have been passed to the
731         /// user but which have not yet completed.
732         ///
733         /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example if the channel was closed but we
734         /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
735         /// for a missing channel.
736         in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<OutPoint, Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>,
737         /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
738         /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
739         ///
740         /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
741         /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
742         /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
743         /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
744         ///
745         /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
746         /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
747         /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
748         /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
749         /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
750         /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
751         monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
752         /// If another channel's [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] needs to complete before a channel we have
753         /// with this peer can complete an RAA [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (e.g. because the RAA update
754         /// will remove a preimage that needs to be durably in an upstream channel first), we put an
755         /// entry here to note that the channel with the key's ID is blocked on a set of actions.
756         actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
757         /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
758         /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
759         /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
760         is_connected: bool,
761 }
762
763 impl <SP: Deref> PeerState<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
764         /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
765         /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
766         /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
767         fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
768                 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
769                         return false
770                 }
771                 self.channel_by_id.iter().filter(|(_, phase)| matches!(phase, ChannelPhase::Funded(_))).count() == 0
772                         && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
773                         && self.in_flight_monitor_updates.is_empty()
774         }
775
776         // Returns a count of all channels we have with this peer, including unfunded channels.
777         fn total_channel_count(&self) -> usize {
778                 self.channel_by_id.len() + self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
779         }
780
781         // Returns a bool indicating if the given `channel_id` matches a channel we have with this peer.
782         fn has_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId) -> bool {
783                 self.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
784                         self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.contains_key(channel_id)
785         }
786 }
787
788 /// A not-yet-accepted inbound (from counterparty) channel. Once
789 /// accepted, the parameters will be used to construct a channel.
790 pub(super) struct InboundChannelRequest {
791         /// The original OpenChannel message.
792         pub open_channel_msg: msgs::OpenChannel,
793         /// The number of ticks remaining before the request expires.
794         pub ticks_remaining: i32,
795 }
796
797 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unaccepted inbound channel to be
798 /// accepted. An unaccepted channel that exceeds this limit will be abandoned.
799 const UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: i32 = 2;
800
801 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
802 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
803 ///
804 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
805 /// here.
806 ///
807 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
808 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
809 struct PendingInboundPayment {
810         /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
811         payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
812         /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
813         /// this payment being removed.
814         expiry_time: u64,
815         /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
816         user_payment_id: u64,
817         // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
818         payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
819         min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
820 }
821
822 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
823 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
824 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
825 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
826 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
827 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
828 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
829 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
830 ///
831 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
832 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
833 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
834         Arc<M>,
835         Arc<T>,
836         Arc<KeysManager>,
837         Arc<KeysManager>,
838         Arc<KeysManager>,
839         Arc<F>,
840         Arc<DefaultRouter<
841                 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
842                 Arc<L>,
843                 Arc<RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>,
844                 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
845                 ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>,
846         >>,
847         Arc<L>
848 >;
849
850 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
851 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
852 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
853 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
854 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
855 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
856 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
857 /// or, respectively, [`Router`]  for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
858 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
859 ///
860 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
861 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
862 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> =
863         ChannelManager<
864                 &'a M,
865                 &'b T,
866                 &'c KeysManager,
867                 &'c KeysManager,
868                 &'c KeysManager,
869                 &'d F,
870                 &'e DefaultRouter<
871                         &'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>,
872                         &'g L,
873                         &'h RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>,
874                         ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
875                         ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>
876                 >,
877                 &'g L
878         >;
879
880 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`].
881 ///
882 /// This is not exported to bindings users as general cover traits aren't useful in other
883 /// languages.
884 pub trait AChannelManager {
885         /// A type implementing [`chain::Watch`].
886         type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
887         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Watch`].
888         type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
889         /// A type implementing [`BroadcasterInterface`].
890         type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface + ?Sized;
891         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Broadcaster`].
892         type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
893         /// A type implementing [`EntropySource`].
894         type EntropySource: EntropySource + ?Sized;
895         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::EntropySource`].
896         type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
897         /// A type implementing [`NodeSigner`].
898         type NodeSigner: NodeSigner + ?Sized;
899         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::NodeSigner`].
900         type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
901         /// A type implementing [`WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner`].
902         type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner + Sized;
903         /// A type implementing [`SignerProvider`] for [`Self::Signer`].
904         type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<Signer = Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
905         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::SignerProvider`].
906         type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
907         /// A type implementing [`FeeEstimator`].
908         type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator + ?Sized;
909         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::FeeEstimator`].
910         type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
911         /// A type implementing [`Router`].
912         type Router: Router + ?Sized;
913         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Router`].
914         type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
915         /// A type implementing [`Logger`].
916         type Logger: Logger + ?Sized;
917         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Logger`].
918         type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
919         /// Returns a reference to the actual [`ChannelManager`] object.
920         fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
921 }
922
923 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
924 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
925 where
926         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
927         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
928         ES::Target: EntropySource,
929         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
930         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
931         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
932         R::Target: Router,
933         L::Target: Logger,
934 {
935         type Watch = M::Target;
936         type M = M;
937         type Broadcaster = T::Target;
938         type T = T;
939         type EntropySource = ES::Target;
940         type ES = ES;
941         type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
942         type NS = NS;
943         type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer;
944         type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
945         type SP = SP;
946         type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
947         type F = F;
948         type Router = R::Target;
949         type R = R;
950         type Logger = L::Target;
951         type L = L;
952         fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
953 }
954
955 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
956 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
957 ///
958 /// Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
959 /// to individual Channels.
960 ///
961 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
962 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
963 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
964 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
965 ///
966 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
967 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST durably write each
968 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] before returning from
969 /// [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`] or before completing async writes. With
970 /// `ChannelManager`s, writing updates happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other
971 /// `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during the serialization process). If the
972 /// deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to
973 /// [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds
974 /// will be lost (modulo on-chain transaction fees).
975 ///
976 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
977 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
978 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
979 ///
980 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
981 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
982 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
983 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
984 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
985 ///
986 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
987 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
988 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
989 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
990 ///
991 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
992 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
993 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
994 ///
995 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
996 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
997 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
998 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
999 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
1000 ///
1001 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
1002 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
1003 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
1004 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
1005 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
1006 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
1007 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
1008 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
1009 //
1010 // Lock order:
1011 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
1012 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
1013 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
1014 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
1015 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
1016 //
1017 // Lock order tree:
1018 //
1019 // `pending_offers_messages`
1020 //
1021 // `total_consistency_lock`
1022 //  |
1023 //  |__`forward_htlcs`
1024 //  |   |
1025 //  |   |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
1026 //  |
1027 //  |__`per_peer_state`
1028 //      |
1029 //      |__`pending_inbound_payments`
1030 //          |
1031 //          |__`claimable_payments`
1032 //          |
1033 //          |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
1034 //              |
1035 //              |__`peer_state`
1036 //                  |
1037 //                  |__`id_to_peer`
1038 //                  |
1039 //                  |__`short_to_chan_info`
1040 //                  |
1041 //                  |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
1042 //                  |
1043 //                  |__`best_block`
1044 //                  |
1045 //                  |__`pending_events`
1046 //                      |
1047 //                      |__`pending_background_events`
1048 //
1049 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
1050 where
1051         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
1052         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1053         ES::Target: EntropySource,
1054         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1055         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1056         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1057         R::Target: Router,
1058         L::Target: Logger,
1059 {
1060         default_configuration: UserConfig,
1061         chain_hash: ChainHash,
1062         fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1063         chain_monitor: M,
1064         tx_broadcaster: T,
1065         #[allow(unused)]
1066         router: R,
1067
1068         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1069         #[cfg(test)]
1070         pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1071         #[cfg(not(test))]
1072         best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1073         secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
1074
1075         /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
1076         /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
1077         /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
1078         /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
1079         ///
1080         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1081         pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
1082
1083         /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
1084         /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
1085         /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
1086         /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
1087         /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
1088         /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
1089         /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
1090         /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
1091         ///
1092         /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
1093         ///
1094         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1095         pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
1096
1097         /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
1098         ///
1099         /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
1100         /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
1101         /// and via the classic SCID.
1102         ///
1103         /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
1104         /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
1105         ///
1106         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1107         #[cfg(test)]
1108         pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1109         #[cfg(not(test))]
1110         forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1111         /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
1112         /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
1113         ///
1114         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1115         pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
1116
1117         /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
1118         /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
1119         ///
1120         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1121         claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
1122
1123         /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
1124         /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
1125         /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
1126         /// active channel list on load.
1127         ///
1128         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1129         outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
1130
1131         /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
1132         ///
1133         /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
1134         /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
1135         /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
1136         ///
1137         /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
1138         /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
1139         /// the handling of the events.
1140         ///
1141         /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
1142         /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
1143         ///
1144         /// TODO:
1145         /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
1146         /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
1147         /// would break backwards compatability.
1148         /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
1149         /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
1150         /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
1151         ///
1152         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1153         id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<ChannelId, PublicKey>>,
1154
1155         /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
1156         ///
1157         /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
1158         /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
1159         /// confirmation depth.
1160         ///
1161         /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
1162         /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
1163         /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
1164         ///
1165         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1166         #[cfg(test)]
1167         pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1168         #[cfg(not(test))]
1169         short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1170
1171         our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
1172
1173         inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
1174
1175         /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
1176         /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
1177         /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
1178         ///
1179         /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
1180         fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
1181
1182         /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
1183         /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
1184         /// keeping additional state.
1185         probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
1186
1187         /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
1188         /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
1189         /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
1190         highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
1191
1192         /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
1193         /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
1194         ///
1195         /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
1196         /// are currently open with that peer.
1197         ///
1198         /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
1199         /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
1200         /// channels.
1201         ///
1202         /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
1203         ///
1204         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1205         #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1206         per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1207         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1208         pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1209
1210         /// The set of events which we need to give to the user to handle. In some cases an event may
1211         /// require some further action after the user handles it (currently only blocking a monitor
1212         /// update from being handed to the user to ensure the included changes to the channel state
1213         /// are handled by the user before they're persisted durably to disk). In that case, the second
1214         /// element in the tuple is set to `Some` with further details of the action.
1215         ///
1216         /// Note that events MUST NOT be removed from pending_events after deserialization, as they
1217         /// could be in the middle of being processed without the direct mutex held.
1218         ///
1219         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1220         #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1221         pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1222         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1223         pub(crate) pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1224
1225         /// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
1226         pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
1227
1228         /// If we are running during init (either directly during the deserialization method or in
1229         /// block connection methods which run after deserialization but before normal operation) we
1230         /// cannot provide the user with [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s through the normal update flow -
1231         /// prior to normal operation the user may not have loaded the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into their
1232         /// [`ChainMonitor`] and thus attempting to update it will fail or panic.
1233         ///
1234         /// Thus, we place them here to be handled as soon as possible once we are running normally.
1235         ///
1236         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1237         ///
1238         /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
1239         pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
1240         /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
1241         /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
1242         /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
1243         /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
1244         /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
1245         /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
1246         total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
1247         /// Tracks the progress of channels going through batch funding by whether funding_signed was
1248         /// received and the monitor has been persisted.
1249         ///
1250         /// This information does not need to be persisted as funding nodes can forget
1251         /// unfunded channels upon disconnection.
1252         funding_batch_states: Mutex<BTreeMap<Txid, Vec<(ChannelId, PublicKey, bool)>>>,
1253
1254         background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool,
1255
1256         event_persist_notifier: Notifier,
1257         needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool,
1258
1259         pending_offers_messages: Mutex<Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>>>,
1260
1261         entropy_source: ES,
1262         node_signer: NS,
1263         signer_provider: SP,
1264
1265         logger: L,
1266 }
1267
1268 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
1269 ///
1270 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
1271 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
1272 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
1273 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
1274 pub struct ChainParameters {
1275         /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
1276         pub network: Network,
1277
1278         /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
1279         ///
1280         /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
1281         pub best_block: BestBlock,
1282 }
1283
1284 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
1285 #[must_use]
1286 enum NotifyOption {
1287         DoPersist,
1288         SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1289         SkipPersistNoEvents,
1290 }
1291
1292 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
1293 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
1294 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
1295 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
1296 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
1297 /// updates are ready for persistence).
1298 ///
1299 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
1300 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
1301 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
1302 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1303         event_persist_notifier: &'a Notifier,
1304         needs_persist_flag: &'a AtomicBool,
1305         should_persist: F,
1306         // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
1307         _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
1308 }
1309
1310 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
1311         /// Notifies any waiters and indicates that we need to persist, in addition to possibly having
1312         /// events to handle.
1313         ///
1314         /// This must always be called if the changes included a `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, as well as in
1315         /// other cases where losing the changes on restart may result in a force-close or otherwise
1316         /// isn't ideal.
1317         fn notify_on_drop<C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1318                 Self::optionally_notify(cm, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
1319         }
1320
1321         fn optionally_notify<F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C, mut persist_check: F)
1322         -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1323                 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1324                 let force_notify = cm.get_cm().process_background_events();
1325
1326                 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1327                         event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1328                         needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1329                         should_persist: move || {
1330                                 // Pick the "most" action between `persist_check` and the background events
1331                                 // processing and return that.
1332                                 let notify = persist_check();
1333                                 match (notify, force_notify) {
1334                                         (NotifyOption::DoPersist, _) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1335                                         (_, NotifyOption::DoPersist) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1336                                         (NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents, _) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1337                                         (_, NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1338                                         _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
1339                                 }
1340                         },
1341                         _read_guard: read_guard,
1342                 }
1343         }
1344
1345         /// Note that if any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are possibly generated,
1346         /// [`ChannelManager::process_background_events`] MUST be called first (or
1347         /// [`Self::optionally_notify`] used).
1348         fn optionally_notify_skipping_background_events<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>
1349         (cm: &'a C, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1350                 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1351
1352                 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1353                         event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1354                         needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1355                         should_persist: persist_check,
1356                         _read_guard: read_guard,
1357                 }
1358         }
1359 }
1360
1361 impl<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1362         fn drop(&mut self) {
1363                 match (self.should_persist)() {
1364                         NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
1365                                 self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
1366                                 self.event_persist_notifier.notify()
1367                         },
1368                         NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
1369                                 self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
1370                         NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
1371                 }
1372         }
1373 }
1374
1375 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1376 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1377 ///
1378 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1379 ///
1380 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1381 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1382 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1383 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1384 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1385
1386 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1387 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1388 ///
1389 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1390 ///
1391 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1392 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1393 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1394 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1395 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1396 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1397 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
1398 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
1399 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
1400 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
1401 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
1402 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
1403 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
1404
1405 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1406 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
1407 /// this value.
1408 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1409 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1410 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1411 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
1412
1413 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1414 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1415 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1416 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1417 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1418 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1419 #[deny(const_err)]
1420 #[allow(dead_code)]
1421 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1422
1423 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1424 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1425 #[deny(const_err)]
1426 #[allow(dead_code)]
1427 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1428
1429 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1430 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1431
1432 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
1433 /// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
1434 pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
1435
1436 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is connected until
1437 /// we mark the channel enabled and gossip the update.
1438 pub(crate) const ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 5;
1439
1440 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
1441 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
1442 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
1443 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1444
1445 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1446 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1447 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1448
1449 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1450 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1451 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1452
1453 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1454 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1455 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1456         /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1457         pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1458         /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1459         pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1460         /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1461         /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1462         /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1463         pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1464 }
1465
1466 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1467 /// to better separate parameters.
1468 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1469 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1470         /// The node_id of our counterparty
1471         pub node_id: PublicKey,
1472         /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1473         /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1474         /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1475         pub features: InitFeatures,
1476         /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1477         /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1478         /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1479         ///
1480         /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1481         ///
1482         /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1483         pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1484         /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1485         /// payments to us through this channel.
1486         pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1487         /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1488         /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1489         /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1490         pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1491         /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1492         pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1493 }
1494
1495 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
1496 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1497 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1498         /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1499         /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1500         /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1501         /// lifetime of the channel.
1502         pub channel_id: ChannelId,
1503         /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1504         pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1505         /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1506         /// our counterparty already.
1507         ///
1508         /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1509         /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1510         pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1511         /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1512         ///
1513         /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1514         pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1515         /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1516         /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1517         ///
1518         /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1519         /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1520         ///
1521         /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1522         /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1523         ///
1524         /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1525         /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1526         /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1527         /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1528         /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1529         pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1530         /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1531         /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1532         /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1533         /// `Some(0)`).
1534         ///
1535         /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1536         ///
1537         /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1538         /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1539         pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1540         /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1541         /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1542         /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1543         /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1544         ///
1545         /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1546         /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1547         ///
1548         /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1549         pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1550         /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1551         pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1552         /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1553         /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1554         /// this value on chain.
1555         ///
1556         /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1557         ///
1558         /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1559         ///
1560         /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1561         pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1562         /// The `user_channel_id` value passed in to [`ChannelManager::create_channel`] for outbound
1563         /// channels, or to [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`] for inbound channels if
1564         /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] config flag is set to true. Otherwise
1565         /// `user_channel_id` will be randomized for an inbound channel.  This may be zero for objects
1566         /// serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1567         ///
1568         /// [`ChannelManager::create_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_channel
1569         /// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel
1570         /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels
1571         pub user_channel_id: u128,
1572         /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
1573         /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
1574         ///
1575         /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
1576         pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
1577         /// Our total balance.  This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1578         /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1579         /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1580         ///
1581         /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1582         /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1583         /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1584         /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1585         ///
1586         /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1587         pub balance_msat: u64,
1588         /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1589         /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1590         /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1591         /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1592         ///
1593         /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1594         ///
1595         /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1596         /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1597         /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1598         pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1599         /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1600         /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1601         /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1602         /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1603         ///
1604         /// See also [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat`],
1605         /// [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`], and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1606         pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1607         /// The minimum value for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is the equivalent of
1608         /// [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat`] but represents a lower-bound, rather than
1609         /// an upper-bound. This is intended for use when routing, allowing us to ensure we pick a
1610         /// route which is valid.
1611         pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1612         /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1613         /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1614         /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1615         /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1616         /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1617         ///
1618         /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1619         /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1620         /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1621         pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1622         /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1623         /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1624         /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1625         /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1626         /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1627         ///
1628         /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1629         ///
1630         /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1631         /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1632         /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1633         pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1634         /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1635         ///
1636         /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1637         pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1638         /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1639         /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1640         /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1641         /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1642         /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1643         ///
1644         /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1645         pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1646         /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1647         pub is_outbound: bool,
1648         /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1649         /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1650         /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1651         /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1652         /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1653         ///
1654         /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1655         pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1656         /// The stage of the channel's shutdown.
1657         /// `None` for `ChannelDetails` serialized on LDK versions prior to 0.0.116.
1658         pub channel_shutdown_state: Option<ChannelShutdownState>,
1659         /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1660         /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1661         ///
1662         /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1663         pub is_usable: bool,
1664         /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1665         pub is_public: bool,
1666         /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1667         /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1668         pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1669         /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1670         pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1671         /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1672         ///
1673         /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1674         pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1675 }
1676
1677 impl ChannelDetails {
1678         /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1679         /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1680         /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1681         ///
1682         /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1683         /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1684         pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1685                 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1686         }
1687
1688         /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1689         /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1690         /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1691         ///
1692         /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1693         /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1694         pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1695                 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1696         }
1697
1698         fn from_channel_context<SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
1699                 context: &ChannelContext<SP>, best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures,
1700                 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
1701         ) -> Self
1702         where
1703                 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1704                 F::Target: FeeEstimator
1705         {
1706                 let balance = context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
1707                 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1708                         context.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1709                 ChannelDetails {
1710                         channel_id: context.channel_id(),
1711                         counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1712                                 node_id: context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1713                                 features: latest_features,
1714                                 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1715                                 forwarding_info: context.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1716                                 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1717                                 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1718                                 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1719                                 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1720                                 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1721                                 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if context.have_received_message() {
1722                                         Some(context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1723                                 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1724                         },
1725                         funding_txo: context.get_funding_txo(),
1726                         // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1727                         // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1728                         channel_type: if context.have_received_message() { Some(context.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1729                         short_channel_id: context.get_short_channel_id(),
1730                         outbound_scid_alias: if context.is_usable() { Some(context.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1731                         inbound_scid_alias: context.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1732                         channel_value_satoshis: context.get_value_satoshis(),
1733                         feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
1734                         unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1735                         balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1736                         inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1737                         outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1738                         next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1739                         next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1740                         user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
1741                         confirmations_required: context.minimum_depth(),
1742                         confirmations: Some(context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1743                         force_close_spend_delay: context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1744                         is_outbound: context.is_outbound(),
1745                         is_channel_ready: context.is_usable(),
1746                         is_usable: context.is_live(),
1747                         is_public: context.should_announce(),
1748                         inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(context.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1749                         inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1750                         config: Some(context.config()),
1751                         channel_shutdown_state: Some(context.shutdown_state()),
1752                 }
1753         }
1754 }
1755
1756 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1757 /// Further information on the details of the channel shutdown.
1758 /// Upon channels being forced closed (i.e. commitment transaction confirmation detected
1759 /// by `ChainMonitor`), ChannelShutdownState will be set to `ShutdownComplete` or
1760 /// the channel will be removed shortly.
1761 /// Also note, that in normal operation, peers could disconnect at any of these states
1762 /// and require peer re-connection before making progress onto other states
1763 pub enum ChannelShutdownState {
1764         /// Channel has not sent or received a shutdown message.
1765         NotShuttingDown,
1766         /// Local node has sent a shutdown message for this channel.
1767         ShutdownInitiated,
1768         /// Shutdown message exchanges have concluded and the channels are in the midst of
1769         /// resolving all existing open HTLCs before closing can continue.
1770         ResolvingHTLCs,
1771         /// All HTLCs have been resolved, nodes are currently negotiating channel close onchain fee rates.
1772         NegotiatingClosingFee,
1773         /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point `ChannelManager` is about
1774         /// to drop the channel.
1775         ShutdownComplete,
1776 }
1777
1778 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1779 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1780 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1781 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1782         /// When an invoice was requested and thus a payment has not yet been sent.
1783         AwaitingInvoice {
1784                 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1785                 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1786                 payment_id: PaymentId,
1787         },
1788         /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1789         Pending {
1790                 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1791                 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1792                 payment_id: PaymentId,
1793                 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1794                 /// abandoned.
1795                 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1796                 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1797                 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1798                 total_msat: u64,
1799         },
1800         /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1801         /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1802         /// payment is removed from tracking.
1803         Fulfilled {
1804                 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1805                 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1806                 payment_id: PaymentId,
1807                 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1808                 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1809                 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1810         },
1811         /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1812         /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1813         /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1814         Abandoned {
1815                 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1816                 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1817                 payment_id: PaymentId,
1818                 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1819                 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1820         },
1821 }
1822
1823 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1824 ///
1825 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
1826 #[derive(Clone)]
1827 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1828         /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1829         pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1830         /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1831         /// route hints.
1832         pub phantom_scid: u64,
1833         /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1834         pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1835 }
1836
1837 macro_rules! handle_error {
1838         ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
1839                 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1840                 // entering the macro.
1841                 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1842                 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1843
1844                 match $internal {
1845                         Ok(msg) => Ok(msg),
1846                         Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish, channel_capacity }) => {
1847                                 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1848
1849                                 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1850                                         $self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1851                                         if let Some(update) = update_option {
1852                                                 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1853                                                         msg: update
1854                                                 });
1855                                         }
1856                                         if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1857                                                 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1858                                                         channel_id, user_channel_id,
1859                                                         reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() },
1860                                                         counterparty_node_id: Some($counterparty_node_id),
1861                                                         channel_capacity_sats: channel_capacity,
1862                                                 }, None));
1863                                         }
1864                                 }
1865
1866                                 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1867                                 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1868                                 } else {
1869                                         msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1870                                                 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1871                                                 action: err.action.clone()
1872                                         });
1873                                 }
1874
1875                                 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1876                                         let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1877                                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1878                                                 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1879                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1880                                         }
1881                                 }
1882
1883                                 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1884                                 Err(err)
1885                         },
1886                 }
1887         } };
1888         ($self: ident, $internal: expr) => {
1889                 match $internal {
1890                         Ok(res) => Ok(res),
1891                         Err((chan, msg_handle_err)) => {
1892                                 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
1893                                 handle_error!($self, Err(msg_handle_err), counterparty_node_id).map_err(|err| (chan, err))
1894                         },
1895                 }
1896         };
1897 }
1898
1899 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1900         ($self: expr, $channel_context: expr) => {{
1901                 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.channel_id());
1902                 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1903                 if let Some(short_id) = $channel_context.get_short_channel_id() {
1904                         short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1905                 } else {
1906                         // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1907                         // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1908                         // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1909                         // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1910                         // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1911                         // stage.
1912                         let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
1913                         debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1914                 }
1915                 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
1916         }}
1917 }
1918
1919 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1920 macro_rules! convert_chan_phase_err {
1921         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, $channel_update: expr) => {
1922                 match $err {
1923                         ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1924                                 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), *$channel_id))
1925                         },
1926                         ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1927                                 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), *$channel_id))
1928                         },
1929                         ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1930                                 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", $channel_id, msg);
1931                                 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel.context);
1932                                 let shutdown_res = $channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
1933                                 let user_id = $channel.context.get_user_id();
1934                                 let channel_capacity_satoshis = $channel.context.get_value_satoshis();
1935
1936                                 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, user_id,
1937                                         shutdown_res, $channel_update, channel_capacity_satoshis))
1938                         },
1939                 }
1940         };
1941         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, FUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
1942                 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, { $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast($channel).ok() })
1943         };
1944         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
1945                 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, None)
1946         };
1947         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_phase: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1948                 match $channel_phase {
1949                         ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
1950                                 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL)
1951                         },
1952                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel) => {
1953                                 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
1954                         },
1955                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel) => {
1956                                 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
1957                         },
1958                 }
1959         };
1960 }
1961
1962 macro_rules! break_chan_phase_entry {
1963         ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1964                 match $res {
1965                         Ok(res) => res,
1966                         Err(e) => {
1967                                 let key = *$entry.key();
1968                                 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
1969                                 if drop {
1970                                         $entry.remove_entry();
1971                                 }
1972                                 break Err(res);
1973                         }
1974                 }
1975         }
1976 }
1977
1978 macro_rules! try_chan_phase_entry {
1979         ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1980                 match $res {
1981                         Ok(res) => res,
1982                         Err(e) => {
1983                                 let key = *$entry.key();
1984                                 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
1985                                 if drop {
1986                                         $entry.remove_entry();
1987                                 }
1988                                 return Err(res);
1989                         }
1990                 }
1991         }
1992 }
1993
1994 macro_rules! remove_channel_phase {
1995         ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1996                 {
1997                         let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1998                         update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &channel.context());
1999                         channel
2000                 }
2001         }
2002 }
2003
2004 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
2005         ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
2006                 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
2007                         node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2008                         msg: $channel_ready_msg,
2009                 });
2010                 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
2011                 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
2012                 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
2013                 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.context.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2014                 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2015                         "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2016                 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
2017                         let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2018                         assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2019                                 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2020                 }
2021         }}
2022 }
2023
2024 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
2025         ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2026                 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
2027                         $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelPending {
2028                                 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2029                                 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.context.temporary_channel_id(),
2030                                 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2031                                 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2032                                 funding_txo: $channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
2033                         }, None));
2034                         $channel.context.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
2035                 }
2036         }
2037 }
2038
2039 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
2040         ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2041                 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
2042                         debug_assert!($channel.context.channel_pending_event_emitted());
2043                         $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelReady {
2044                                 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2045                                 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2046                                 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2047                                 channel_type: $channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
2048                         }, None));
2049                         $channel.context.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
2050                 }
2051         }
2052 }
2053
2054 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
2055         ($self: ident, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2056                 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&$self.logger,
2057                         &$self.node_signer, $self.chain_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
2058                         $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
2059                 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
2060                 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.context.is_usable() {
2061                         // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
2062                         // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
2063                         // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
2064                         // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
2065                         // now.
2066                         if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
2067                                 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2068                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2069                                         msg,
2070                                 })
2071                         } else { None }
2072                 } else { None };
2073
2074                 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
2075                         .remove(&$chan.context.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
2076
2077                 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
2078                         &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
2079                         updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
2080                         updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
2081                         updates.announcement_sigs);
2082                 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
2083                         $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
2084                 }
2085
2086                 let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id();
2087                 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = $chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2088                 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
2089                 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
2090
2091                 // If the channel belongs to a batch funding transaction, the progress of the batch
2092                 // should be updated as we have received funding_signed and persisted the monitor.
2093                 if let Some(txid) = unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2094                         let mut funding_batch_states = $self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2095                         let mut batch_completed = false;
2096                         if let Some(batch_state) = funding_batch_states.get_mut(&txid) {
2097                                 let channel_state = batch_state.iter_mut().find(|(chan_id, pubkey, _)| (
2098                                         *chan_id == channel_id &&
2099                                         *pubkey == counterparty_node_id
2100                                 ));
2101                                 if let Some(channel_state) = channel_state {
2102                                         channel_state.2 = true;
2103                                 } else {
2104                                         debug_assert!(false, "Missing channel batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2105                                 }
2106                                 batch_completed = batch_state.iter().all(|(_, _, completed)| *completed);
2107                         } else {
2108                                 debug_assert!(false, "Missing batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2109                         }
2110
2111                         // When all channels in a batched funding transaction have become ready, it is not necessary
2112                         // to track the progress of the batch anymore and the state of the channels can be updated.
2113                         if batch_completed {
2114                                 let removed_batch_state = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2115                                 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2116                                 let mut batch_funding_tx = None;
2117                                 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, _) in removed_batch_state {
2118                                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2119                                                 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2120                                                 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
2121                                                         batch_funding_tx = batch_funding_tx.or_else(|| chan.context.unbroadcasted_funding());
2122                                                         chan.set_batch_ready();
2123                                                         let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2124                                                         emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, chan);
2125                                                 }
2126                                         }
2127                                 }
2128                                 if let Some(tx) = batch_funding_tx {
2129                                         log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting batch funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
2130                                         $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
2131                                 }
2132                         }
2133                 }
2134
2135                 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
2136
2137                 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
2138                         $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
2139                 }
2140                 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
2141                 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2142                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2143                         $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
2144                 }
2145         } }
2146 }
2147
2148 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
2149         ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $chan: expr, _internal, $completed: expr) => { {
2150                 debug_assert!($self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire));
2151                 match $update_res {
2152                         ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::UnrecoverableError => {
2153                                 let err_str = "ChannelMonitor[Update] persistence failed unrecoverably. This indicates we cannot continue normal operation and must shut down.";
2154                                 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err_str);
2155                                 panic!("{}", err_str);
2156                         },
2157                         ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
2158                                 log_debug!($self.logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
2159                                         &$chan.context.channel_id());
2160                                 false
2161                         },
2162                         ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
2163                                 $completed;
2164                                 true
2165                         },
2166                 }
2167         } };
2168         ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, INITIAL_MONITOR) => {
2169                 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $chan, _internal,
2170                         handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan))
2171         };
2172         ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2173                 let in_flight_updates = $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.entry($funding_txo)
2174                         .or_insert_with(Vec::new);
2175                 // During startup, we push monitor updates as background events through to here in
2176                 // order to replay updates that were in-flight when we shut down. Thus, we have to
2177                 // filter for uniqueness here.
2178                 let idx = in_flight_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd == &$update)
2179                         .unwrap_or_else(|| {
2180                                 in_flight_updates.push($update);
2181                                 in_flight_updates.len() - 1
2182                         });
2183                 let update_res = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($funding_txo, &in_flight_updates[idx]);
2184                 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, update_res, $chan, _internal,
2185                         {
2186                                 let _ = in_flight_updates.remove(idx);
2187                                 if in_flight_updates.is_empty() && $chan.blocked_monitor_updates_pending() == 0 {
2188                                         handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
2189                                 }
2190                         })
2191         } };
2192 }
2193
2194 macro_rules! process_events_body {
2195         ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
2196                 let mut processed_all_events = false;
2197                 while !processed_all_events {
2198                         if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
2199                                 return;
2200                         }
2201
2202                         let mut result;
2203
2204                         {
2205                                 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
2206                                 // persists happen while processing monitor events.
2207                                 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2208
2209                                 // Because `handle_post_event_actions` may send `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to the user we must
2210                                 // ensure any startup-generated background events are handled first.
2211                                 result = $self.process_background_events();
2212
2213                                 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
2214                                 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
2215                                 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
2216                                         result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2217                                 }
2218                         }
2219
2220                         let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
2221                         let num_events = pending_events.len();
2222                         if !pending_events.is_empty() {
2223                                 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2224                         }
2225
2226                         let mut post_event_actions = Vec::new();
2227
2228                         for (event, action_opt) in pending_events {
2229                                 $event_to_handle = event;
2230                                 $handle_event;
2231                                 if let Some(action) = action_opt {
2232                                         post_event_actions.push(action);
2233                                 }
2234                         }
2235
2236                         {
2237                                 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2238                                 pending_events.drain(..num_events);
2239                                 processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
2240                                 // Note that `push_pending_forwards_ev` relies on `pending_events_processor` being
2241                                 // updated here with the `pending_events` lock acquired.
2242                                 $self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
2243                         }
2244
2245                         if !post_event_actions.is_empty() {
2246                                 $self.handle_post_event_actions(post_event_actions);
2247                                 // If we had some actions, go around again as we may have more events now
2248                                 processed_all_events = false;
2249                         }
2250
2251                         match result {
2252                                 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
2253                                         $self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
2254                                         $self.event_persist_notifier.notify();
2255                                 },
2256                                 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
2257                                         $self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
2258                                 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
2259                         }
2260                 }
2261         }
2262 }
2263
2264 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
2265 where
2266         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
2267         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2268         ES::Target: EntropySource,
2269         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2270         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2271         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2272         R::Target: Router,
2273         L::Target: Logger,
2274 {
2275         /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
2276         ///
2277         /// The current time or latest block header time can be provided as the `current_timestamp`.
2278         ///
2279         /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
2280         /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
2281         ///
2282         /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
2283         ///
2284         /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
2285         /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
2286         /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
2287         /// more details.
2288         ///
2289         /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
2290         /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
2291         /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
2292         pub fn new(
2293                 fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES,
2294                 node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters,
2295                 current_timestamp: u32,
2296         ) -> Self {
2297                 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2298                 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
2299                 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
2300                 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
2301                 ChannelManager {
2302                         default_configuration: config.clone(),
2303                         chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(params.network),
2304                         fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
2305                         chain_monitor,
2306                         tx_broadcaster,
2307                         router,
2308
2309                         best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
2310
2311                         outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
2312                         pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2313                         pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
2314                         forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2315                         claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
2316                         pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2317                         id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2318                         short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2319
2320                         our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
2321                         secp_ctx,
2322
2323                         inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
2324                         fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2325
2326                         probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2327
2328                         highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(current_timestamp as usize),
2329
2330                         per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2331
2332                         pending_events: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
2333                         pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
2334                         pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2335                         total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
2336                         background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
2337                         event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
2338                         needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
2339                         funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
2340
2341                         pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2342
2343                         entropy_source,
2344                         node_signer,
2345                         signer_provider,
2346
2347                         logger,
2348                 }
2349         }
2350
2351         /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
2352         pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
2353                 &self.default_configuration
2354         }
2355
2356         fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
2357                 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2358                 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
2359                 let mut i = 0;
2360                 loop {
2361                         if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
2362                                 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
2363                         } else {
2364                                 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
2365                         }
2366                         if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
2367                                 break;
2368                         }
2369                         i += 1;
2370                         if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
2371                 }
2372                 outbound_scid_alias
2373         }
2374
2375         /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
2376         ///
2377         /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
2378         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
2379         /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
2380         /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
2381         /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
2382         ///
2383         /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
2384         /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
2385         ///
2386         /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to
2387         /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2388         /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`].
2389         ///
2390         /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
2391         /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
2392         /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
2393         ///
2394         /// If `temporary_channel_id` is specified, it will be used as the temporary channel ID of the
2395         /// channel. Otherwise, a random one will be generated for you.
2396         ///
2397         /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
2398         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
2399         /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
2400         /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
2401         /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
2402         /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
2403         ///
2404         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
2405         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
2406         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
2407         pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<ChannelId, APIError> {
2408                 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
2409                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
2410                 }
2411
2412                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2413                 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
2414                 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2415
2416                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2417
2418                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
2419                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
2420
2421                 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2422
2423                 if let Some(temporary_channel_id) = temporary_channel_id {
2424                         if peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(&temporary_channel_id) {
2425                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Channel with temporary channel ID {} already exists!", temporary_channel_id)});
2426                         }
2427                 }
2428
2429                 let channel = {
2430                         let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
2431                         let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2432                         let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
2433                         match OutboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
2434                                 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
2435                                 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias, temporary_channel_id)
2436                         {
2437                                 Ok(res) => res,
2438                                 Err(e) => {
2439                                         self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
2440                                         return Err(e);
2441                                 },
2442                         }
2443                 };
2444                 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.chain_hash);
2445
2446                 let temporary_channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
2447                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
2448                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2449                                 if cfg!(fuzzing) {
2450                                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
2451                                 } else {
2452                                         panic!("RNG is bad???");
2453                                 }
2454                         },
2455                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel)); }
2456                 }
2457
2458                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
2459                         node_id: their_network_key,
2460                         msg: res,
2461                 });
2462                 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
2463         }
2464
2465         fn list_funded_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&ChannelId, &Channel<SP>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2466                 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2467                 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2468                 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2469                 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2470                 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2471                 // the same channel.
2472                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2473                 {
2474                         let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2475                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2476                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2477                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2478                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2479                                 res.extend(peer_state.channel_by_id.iter()
2480                                         .filter_map(|(chan_id, phase)| match phase {
2481                                                 // Only `Channels` in the `ChannelPhase::Funded` phase can be considered funded.
2482                                                 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => Some((chan_id, chan)),
2483                                                 _ => None,
2484                                         })
2485                                         .filter(f)
2486                                         .map(|(_channel_id, channel)| {
2487                                                 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2488                                                         peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2489                                         })
2490                                 );
2491                         }
2492                 }
2493                 res
2494         }
2495
2496         /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
2497         /// more information.
2498         pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2499                 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2500                 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2501                 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2502                 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2503                 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2504                 // the same channel.
2505                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2506                 {
2507                         let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2508                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2509                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2510                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2511                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2512                                 for context in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().map(|(_, phase)| phase.context()) {
2513                                         let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height,
2514                                                 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2515                                         res.push(details);
2516                                 }
2517                         }
2518                 }
2519                 res
2520         }
2521
2522         /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
2523         /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
2524         ///
2525         /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
2526         /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
2527         /// are.
2528         pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2529                 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
2530                 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
2531                 // really wanted anyway.
2532                 self.list_funded_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.context.is_live())
2533         }
2534
2535         /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
2536         pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2537                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2538                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2539
2540                 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
2541                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2542                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2543                         let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2544                         let context_to_details = |context| {
2545                                 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height, features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2546                         };
2547                         return peer_state.channel_by_id
2548                                 .iter()
2549                                 .map(|(_, phase)| phase.context())
2550                                 .map(context_to_details)
2551                                 .collect();
2552                 }
2553                 vec![]
2554         }
2555
2556         /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
2557         /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
2558         ///
2559         /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
2560         /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
2561         /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
2562         ///
2563         /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2564         pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
2565                 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
2566                         .filter_map(|(payment_id, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
2567                                 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {
2568                                         Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2569                                 },
2570                                 // InvoiceReceived is an intermediate state and doesn't need to be exposed
2571                                 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {
2572                                         Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2573                                 },
2574                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
2575                                         Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
2576                                                 payment_id: *payment_id,
2577                                                 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2578                                                 total_msat: *total_msat,
2579                                         })
2580                                 },
2581                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
2582                                         Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2583                                 },
2584                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
2585                                         Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2586                                 },
2587                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
2588                         })
2589                         .collect()
2590         }
2591
2592         /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
2593         fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, context: &ChannelContext<SP>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
2594                 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2595                 match context.unbroadcasted_funding() {
2596                         Some(transaction) => {
2597                                 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::DiscardFunding {
2598                                         channel_id: context.channel_id(), transaction
2599                                 }, None));
2600                         },
2601                         None => {},
2602                 }
2603                 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
2604                         channel_id: context.channel_id(),
2605                         user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
2606                         reason: closure_reason,
2607                         counterparty_node_id: Some(context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
2608                         channel_capacity_sats: Some(context.get_value_satoshis()),
2609                 }, None));
2610         }
2611
2612         fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2613                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2614
2615                 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
2616                 let shutdown_result;
2617                 loop {
2618                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2619
2620                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2621                                 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2622
2623                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2624                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2625
2626                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2627                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
2628                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
2629                                                 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
2630                                                 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2631                                                 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs, local_shutdown_result) =
2632                                                         chan.get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
2633                                                 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
2634                                                 shutdown_result = local_shutdown_result;
2635                                                 debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
2636
2637                                                 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
2638                                                 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
2639                                                 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
2640                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2641                                                         node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
2642                                                         msg: shutdown_msg,
2643                                                 });
2644
2645                                                 debug_assert!(monitor_update_opt.is_none() || !chan.is_shutdown(),
2646                                                         "We can't both complete shutdown and generate a monitor update");
2647
2648                                                 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
2649                                                 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
2650                                                         handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
2651                                                                 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
2652                                                         break;
2653                                                 }
2654
2655                                                 if chan.is_shutdown() {
2656                                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
2657                                                                 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2658                                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2659                                                                                 msg: channel_update
2660                                                                         });
2661                                                                 }
2662                                                                 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2663                                                         }
2664                                                 }
2665                                                 break;
2666                                         }
2667                                 },
2668                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
2669                                         // If we reach this point, it means that the channel_id either refers to an unfunded channel or
2670                                         // it does not exist for this peer. Either way, we can attempt to force-close it.
2671                                         //
2672                                         // An appropriate error will be returned for non-existence of the channel if that's the case.
2673                                         mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
2674                                         mem::drop(per_peer_state);
2675                                         return self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, false).map(|_| ())
2676                                 },
2677                         }
2678                 }
2679
2680                 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2681                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2682                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
2683                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
2684                 }
2685
2686                 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
2687                         self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
2688                 }
2689
2690                 Ok(())
2691         }
2692
2693         /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2694         /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2695         /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2696         ///
2697         ///  * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] and
2698         ///    [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
2699         ///    fee estimate.
2700         ///  * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
2701         ///    transaction feerate of at least our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] feerate or the feerate which
2702         ///    would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
2703         ///    counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
2704         ///
2705         /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2706         ///
2707         /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2708         /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2709         /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2710         /// channel.
2711         ///
2712         /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2713         /// [`ChannelCloseMinimum`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum
2714         /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
2715         /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2716         pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2717                 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None)
2718         }
2719
2720         /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2721         /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2722         /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2723         ///
2724         /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
2725         /// the channel being closed or not:
2726         ///  * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
2727         ///    transaction. The upper-bound is set by
2728         ///    [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
2729         ///    fee estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
2730         ///  * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
2731         ///    transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
2732         ///    will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
2733         ///
2734         /// The `shutdown_script` provided  will be used as the `scriptPubKey` for the closing transaction.
2735         /// Will fail if a shutdown script has already been set for this channel by
2736         /// ['ChannelHandshakeConfig::commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey`]. The given shutdown script must
2737         /// also be compatible with our and the counterparty's features.
2738         ///
2739         /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2740         ///
2741         /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2742         /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2743         /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2744         /// channel.
2745         ///
2746         /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2747         /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
2748         /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2749         pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2750                 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script)
2751         }
2752
2753         fn finish_close_channel(&self, mut shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
2754                 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2755                 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2756                 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
2757                         debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2758                 }
2759
2760                 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.len());
2761                 for htlc_source in shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.drain(..) {
2762                         let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
2763                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2764                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2765                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
2766                 }
2767                 if let Some((_, funding_txo, monitor_update)) = shutdown_res.monitor_update {
2768                         // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2769                         // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2770                         // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2771                         // ignore the result here.
2772                         let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
2773                 }
2774                 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
2775                 if let Some(txid) = shutdown_res.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2776                         let mut funding_batch_states = self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2777                         let affected_channels = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2778                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2779                         let mut has_uncompleted_channel = None;
2780                         for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, state) in affected_channels {
2781                                 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2782                                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2783                                         if let Some(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id) {
2784                                                 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
2785                                                 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context(), ClosureReason::FundingBatchClosure);
2786                                                 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
2787                                         }
2788                                 }
2789                                 has_uncompleted_channel = Some(has_uncompleted_channel.map_or(!state, |v| v || !state));
2790                         }
2791                         debug_assert!(
2792                                 has_uncompleted_channel.unwrap_or(true),
2793                                 "Closing a batch where all channels have completed initial monitor update",
2794                         );
2795                 }
2796                 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
2797                         self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
2798                 }
2799         }
2800
2801         /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2802         /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2803         fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
2804         -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2805                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2806                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2807                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
2808                 let (update_opt, counterparty_node_id) = {
2809                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2810                         let closure_reason = if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2811                                 ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) }
2812                         } else {
2813                                 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
2814                         };
2815                         if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2816                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", channel_id);
2817                                 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan_phase_entry.get().context(), closure_reason);
2818                                 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
2819                                 mem::drop(peer_state);
2820                                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
2821                                 match chan_phase {
2822                                         ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) => {
2823                                                 self.finish_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(broadcast));
2824                                                 (self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan).ok(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2825                                         },
2826                                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {
2827                                                 self.finish_close_channel(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
2828                                                 // Unfunded channel has no update
2829                                                 (None, chan_phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id())
2830                                         },
2831                                 }
2832                         } else if peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(channel_id).is_some() {
2833                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", &channel_id);
2834                                 // N.B. that we don't send any channel close event here: we
2835                                 // don't have a user_channel_id, and we never sent any opening
2836                                 // events anyway.
2837                                 (None, *peer_node_id)
2838                         } else {
2839                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, peer_node_id) });
2840                         }
2841                 };
2842                 if let Some(update) = update_opt {
2843                         // Try to send the `BroadcastChannelUpdate` to the peer we just force-closed on, but if
2844                         // not try to broadcast it via whatever peer we have.
2845                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2846                         let a_peer_state_opt = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2847                                 .ok_or(per_peer_state.values().next());
2848                         if let Ok(a_peer_state_mutex) = a_peer_state_opt {
2849                                 let mut a_peer_state = a_peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2850                                 a_peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2851                                         msg: update
2852                                 });
2853                         }
2854                 }
2855
2856                 Ok(counterparty_node_id)
2857         }
2858
2859         fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2860                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2861                 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2862                         Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2863                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2864                                 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2865                                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2866                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
2867                                                 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2868                                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2869                                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
2870                                                                 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() })
2871                                                         },
2872                                                 }
2873                                         );
2874                                 }
2875                                 Ok(())
2876                         },
2877                         Err(e) => Err(e)
2878                 }
2879         }
2880
2881         /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2882         /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2883         /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2884         /// channel.
2885         pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2886         -> Result<(), APIError> {
2887                 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2888         }
2889
2890         /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2891         /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2892         /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2893         ///
2894         /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2895         /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2896         pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2897         -> Result<(), APIError> {
2898                 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2899         }
2900
2901         /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2902         /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2903         pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2904                 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2905                         let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2906                 }
2907         }
2908
2909         /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2910         /// local transaction(s).
2911         pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2912                 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2913                         let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2914                 }
2915         }
2916
2917         fn construct_fwd_pending_htlc_info(
2918                 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload, hop_hmac: [u8; 32],
2919                 new_packet_bytes: [u8; onion_utils::ONION_DATA_LEN], shared_secret: [u8; 32],
2920                 next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>
2921         ) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, InboundOnionErr> {
2922                 debug_assert!(next_packet_pubkey_opt.is_some());
2923                 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2924                         version: 0,
2925                         public_key: next_packet_pubkey_opt.unwrap_or(Err(secp256k1::Error::InvalidPublicKey)),
2926                         hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2927                         hmac: hop_hmac,
2928                 };
2929
2930                 let (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value) = match hop_data {
2931                         msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward { short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value } =>
2932                                 (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value),
2933                         msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { .. } | msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedReceive { .. } =>
2934                                 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2935                                         msg: "Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node",
2936                                         err_code: 0x4000 | 22,
2937                                         err_data: Vec::new(),
2938                                 }),
2939                 };
2940
2941                 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2942                         routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2943                                 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2944                                 short_channel_id,
2945                         },
2946                         payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2947                         incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2948                         incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
2949                         outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward,
2950                         outgoing_cltv_value,
2951                         skimmed_fee_msat: None,
2952                 })
2953         }
2954
2955         fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(
2956                 &self, hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload, shared_secret: [u8; 32], payment_hash: PaymentHash,
2957                 amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>, allow_underpay: bool,
2958                 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
2959         ) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, InboundOnionErr> {
2960                 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, onion_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata) = match hop_data {
2961                         msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
2962                                 payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata, ..
2963                         } =>
2964                                 (payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata),
2965                         msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedReceive {
2966                                 amt_msat, total_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_secret, ..
2967                         } => {
2968                                 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData { payment_secret, total_msat };
2969                                 (Some(payment_data), None, Vec::new(), amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, None)
2970                         }
2971                         msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward { .. } => {
2972                                 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2973                                         err_code: 0x4000|22,
2974                                         err_data: Vec::new(),
2975                                         msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2976                                 })
2977                         },
2978                 };
2979                 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2980                 if outgoing_cltv_value > cltv_expiry {
2981                         return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2982                                 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to less than the CLTV set by the sender",
2983                                 err_code: 18,
2984                                 err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
2985                         })
2986                 }
2987                 // final_expiry_too_soon
2988                 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2989                 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2990                 //
2991                 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2992                 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2993                 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2994                 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2995                 if cltv_expiry <= current_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 {
2996                         let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12);
2997                         err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes());
2998                         err_data.extend_from_slice(&current_height.to_be_bytes());
2999                         return Err(InboundOnionErr {
3000                                 err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data,
3001                                 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
3002                         });
3003                 }
3004                 if (!allow_underpay && onion_amt_msat > amt_msat) ||
3005                         (allow_underpay && onion_amt_msat >
3006                          amt_msat.saturating_add(counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)))
3007                 {
3008                         return Err(InboundOnionErr {
3009                                 err_code: 19,
3010                                 err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
3011                                 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
3012                         });
3013                 }
3014
3015                 let routing = if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
3016                         // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
3017                         // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
3018                         // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
3019                         // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
3020                         // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
3021                         let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3022                         if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
3023                                 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
3024                                         err_code: 0x4000|22,
3025                                         err_data: Vec::new(),
3026                                         msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
3027                                 });
3028                         }
3029                         if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && payment_data.is_some() {
3030                                 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
3031                                         err_code: 0x4000|22,
3032                                         err_data: Vec::new(),
3033                                         msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
3034                                 });
3035                         }
3036                         PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
3037                                 payment_data,
3038                                 payment_preimage,
3039                                 payment_metadata,
3040                                 incoming_cltv_expiry: outgoing_cltv_value,
3041                                 custom_tlvs,
3042                         }
3043                 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
3044                         PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
3045                                 payment_data: data,
3046                                 payment_metadata,
3047                                 incoming_cltv_expiry: outgoing_cltv_value,
3048                                 phantom_shared_secret,
3049                                 custom_tlvs,
3050                         }
3051                 } else {
3052                         return Err(InboundOnionErr {
3053                                 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
3054                                 err_data: Vec::new(),
3055                                 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
3056                         });
3057                 };
3058                 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
3059                         routing,
3060                         payment_hash,
3061                         incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
3062                         incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
3063                         outgoing_amt_msat: onion_amt_msat,
3064                         outgoing_cltv_value,
3065                         skimmed_fee_msat: counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
3066                 })
3067         }
3068
3069         fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(
3070                 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC
3071         ) -> Result<(onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>), HTLCFailureMsg> {
3072                 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
3073                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
3074                                 {
3075                                         log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3076                                         return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3077                                                 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3078                                                 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3079                                                 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
3080                                                 failure_code: $err_code,
3081                                         }));
3082                                 }
3083                         }
3084                 }
3085
3086                 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
3087                         return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
3088                 }
3089
3090                 let shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(
3091                         Recipient::Node, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None
3092                 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
3093
3094                 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
3095                         //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
3096                         //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
3097                         //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
3098                         //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
3099                         //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
3100                         //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
3101                         return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
3102                 }
3103                 macro_rules! return_err {
3104                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3105                                 {
3106                                         log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3107                                         return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3108                                                 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3109                                                 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3110                                                 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
3111                                                         .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3112                                         }));
3113                                 }
3114                         }
3115                 }
3116
3117                 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(
3118                         shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac,
3119                         msg.payment_hash, &self.node_signer
3120                 ) {
3121                         Ok(res) => res,
3122                         Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3123                                 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
3124                         },
3125                         Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3126                                 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
3127                         },
3128                 };
3129                 let (outgoing_scid, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, next_packet_pk_opt) = match next_hop {
3130                         onion_utils::Hop::Forward {
3131                                 next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward {
3132                                         short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value
3133                                 }, ..
3134                         } => {
3135                                 let next_packet_pk = onion_utils::next_hop_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx,
3136                                         msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &shared_secret);
3137                                 (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(next_packet_pk))
3138                         },
3139                         // We'll do receive checks in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] so we have access to the
3140                         // inbound channel's state.
3141                         onion_utils::Hop::Receive { .. } => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)),
3142                         onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { .. }, .. } |
3143                                 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedReceive { .. }, .. } =>
3144                         {
3145                                 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0; 0]);
3146                         }
3147                 };
3148
3149                 // Perform outbound checks here instead of in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] because we
3150                 // can't hold the outbound peer state lock at the same time as the inbound peer state lock.
3151                 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
3152                         let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&outgoing_scid).cloned();
3153                         let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
3154                                 None => { // unknown_next_peer
3155                                         // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
3156                                         // phantom or an intercept.
3157                                         if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
3158                                                 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)) ||
3159                                                 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)
3160                                         {
3161                                                 None
3162                                         } else {
3163                                                 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3164                                         }
3165                                 },
3166                                 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
3167                         };
3168                         let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
3169                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3170                                 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3171                                 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3172                                         break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3173                                 }
3174                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3175                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3176                                 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).map(
3177                                         |chan_phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
3178                                 ).flatten() {
3179                                         None => {
3180                                                 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
3181                                                 // have no consistency guarantees.
3182                                                 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3183                                         },
3184                                         Some(chan) => chan
3185                                 };
3186                                 if !chan.context.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
3187                                         // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
3188                                         // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
3189                                         // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
3190                                         break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3191                                 }
3192                                 if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && outgoing_scid != chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() {
3193                                         // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
3194                                         // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
3195                                         // we don't have the channel here.
3196                                         break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3197                                 }
3198                                 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
3199
3200                                 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
3201                                 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
3202                                 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
3203                                 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
3204                                 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
3205                                 if !chan.context.is_live() { // channel_disabled
3206                                         // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
3207                                         // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
3208                                         // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
3209                                         if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
3210                                                 break Some(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
3211                                         } else {
3212                                                 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
3213                                         }
3214                                 }
3215                                 if outgoing_amt_msat < chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
3216                                         break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
3217                                 }
3218                                 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value) {
3219                                         break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
3220                                 }
3221                                 chan_update_opt
3222                         } else {
3223                                 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
3224                                         // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
3225                                         // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
3226                                         // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
3227                                         break Some((
3228                                                         "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
3229                                                         0x2000 | 2, None,
3230                                         ));
3231                                 }
3232                                 None
3233                         };
3234
3235                         let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3236                         // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
3237                         // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
3238                         // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
3239                         if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
3240                                 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
3241                         }
3242                         if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
3243                                 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
3244                         }
3245                         // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
3246                         // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
3247                         // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
3248                         // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
3249                         // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
3250                         // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
3251                         // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
3252                         // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
3253                         if (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
3254                                 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
3255                         }
3256
3257                         break None;
3258                 }
3259                 {
3260                         let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
3261                         if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
3262                                 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
3263                                         msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3264                                 }
3265                                 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
3266                                         msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3267                                 }
3268                                 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3269                                         // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
3270                                         0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3271                                 }
3272                                 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3273                                 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3274                                 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3275                         } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
3276                                 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
3277                                 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
3278                                 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
3279                                 // instead.
3280                                 code = 0x2000 | 2;
3281                         }
3282                         return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
3283                 }
3284                 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt))
3285         }
3286
3287         fn construct_pending_htlc_status<'a>(
3288                 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, shared_secret: [u8; 32], decoded_hop: onion_utils::Hop,
3289                 allow_underpay: bool, next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>
3290         ) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
3291                 macro_rules! return_err {
3292                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3293                                 {
3294                                         log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3295                                         return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3296                                                 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3297                                                 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3298                                                 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
3299                                                         .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3300                                         }));
3301                                 }
3302                         }
3303                 }
3304                 match decoded_hop {
3305                         onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
3306                                 // OUR PAYMENT!
3307                                 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash,
3308                                         msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None, allow_underpay, msg.skimmed_fee_msat)
3309                                 {
3310                                         Ok(info) => {
3311                                                 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
3312                                                 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
3313                                                 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
3314                                                 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
3315                                                 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
3316                                         },
3317                                         Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3318                                 }
3319                         },
3320                         onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
3321                                 match self.construct_fwd_pending_htlc_info(msg, next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac,
3322                                         new_packet_bytes, shared_secret, next_packet_pubkey_opt) {
3323                                         Ok(info) => PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info),
3324                                         Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3325                                 }
3326                         }
3327                 }
3328         }
3329
3330         /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
3331         /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
3332         /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
3333         ///
3334         /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
3335         /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
3336         /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3337         ///
3338         /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3339         /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3340         fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3341                 if !chan.context.should_announce() {
3342                         return Err(LightningError {
3343                                 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
3344                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
3345                         });
3346                 }
3347                 if chan.context.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
3348                         return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
3349                 }
3350                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3351                 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
3352         }
3353
3354         /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
3355         /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
3356         /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
3357         /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
3358         ///
3359         /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
3360         /// `peer_state`  corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
3361         /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3362         ///
3363         /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3364         /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3365         fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3366                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3367                 let short_channel_id = match chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
3368                         None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
3369                         Some(id) => id,
3370                 };
3371
3372                 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
3373         }
3374
3375         fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3376                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3377                 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
3378
3379                 let enabled = chan.context.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
3380                         ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
3381                         ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
3382                         ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
3383                         ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => false,
3384                 };
3385
3386                 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
3387                         chain_hash: self.chain_hash,
3388                         short_channel_id,
3389                         timestamp: chan.context.get_update_time_counter(),
3390                         flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
3391                         cltv_expiry_delta: chan.context.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
3392                         htlc_minimum_msat: chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
3393                         htlc_maximum_msat: chan.context.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
3394                         fee_base_msat: chan.context.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
3395                         fee_proportional_millionths: chan.context.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
3396                         excess_data: Vec::new(),
3397                 };
3398                 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
3399                 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
3400                 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
3401                 // channel.
3402                 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
3403
3404                 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
3405                         signature: sig,
3406                         contents: unsigned
3407                 })
3408         }
3409
3410         #[cfg(test)]
3411         pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3412                 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3413                 self.send_payment_along_path(SendAlongPathArgs {
3414                         path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3415                         session_priv_bytes
3416                 })
3417         }
3418
3419         fn send_payment_along_path(&self, args: SendAlongPathArgs) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3420                 let SendAlongPathArgs {
3421                         path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3422                         session_priv_bytes
3423                 } = args;
3424                 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
3425                 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
3426
3427                 log_trace!(self.logger,
3428                         "Attempting to send payment with payment hash {} along path with next hop {}",
3429                         payment_hash, path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
3430                 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
3431                 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
3432
3433                 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
3434                         .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected".to_owned()})?;
3435                 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
3436
3437                 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash)
3438                         .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute { err: "Route size too large considering onion data".to_owned()})?;
3439
3440                 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
3441                         let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
3442                                 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
3443                                 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3444                         };
3445
3446                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3447                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3448                                 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
3449                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3450                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3451                         if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
3452                                 match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
3453                                         ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
3454                                                 if !chan.context.is_live() {
3455                                                         return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
3456                                                 }
3457                                                 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
3458                                                 let send_res = chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
3459                                                         htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3460                                                                 path: path.clone(),
3461                                                                 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
3462                                                                 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
3463                                                                 payment_id,
3464                                                         }, onion_packet, None, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
3465                                                 match break_chan_phase_entry!(self, send_res, chan_phase_entry) {
3466                                                         Some(monitor_update) => {
3467                                                                 match handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
3468                                                                         false => {
3469                                                                                 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
3470                                                                                 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
3471                                                                                 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
3472                                                                                 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
3473                                                                                 // which we do in the send_payment check for
3474                                                                                 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
3475                                                                                 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
3476                                                                         },
3477                                                                         true => {},
3478                                                                 }
3479                                                         },
3480                                                         None => {},
3481                                                 }
3482                                         },
3483                                         _ => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel to first hop is unfunded".to_owned()}),
3484                                 };
3485                         } else {
3486                                 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
3487                                 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
3488                                 // `channel_by_id` map.
3489                                 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
3490                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
3491                         }
3492                         return Ok(());
3493                 };
3494
3495                 match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
3496                         Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3497                         Err(e) => {
3498                                 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
3499                         },
3500                 }
3501         }
3502
3503         /// Sends a payment along a given route.
3504         ///
3505         /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
3506         /// fields for more info.
3507         ///
3508         /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
3509         /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
3510         ///
3511         /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
3512         ///
3513         /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
3514         /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
3515         /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
3516         /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
3517         /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
3518         ///
3519         /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
3520         /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
3521         /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
3522         /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
3523         /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
3524         ///
3525         /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
3526         /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
3527         /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
3528         /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
3529         ///
3530         /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
3531         ///
3532         /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
3533         /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
3534         /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
3535         ///
3536         /// In general, a path may raise:
3537         ///  * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
3538         ///    node public key) is specified.
3539         ///  * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available as it has been
3540         ///    closed, doesn't exist, or the peer is currently disconnected.
3541         ///  * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
3542         ///    relevant updates.
3543         ///
3544         /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
3545         /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
3546         /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
3547         ///
3548         /// [`RouteHop`]: crate::routing::router::RouteHop
3549         /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3550         /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
3551         /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
3552         /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
3553         /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3554         pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3555                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3556                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3557                 self.pending_outbound_payments
3558                         .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id,
3559                                 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3560                                 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3561         }
3562
3563         /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route`], but will automatically find a route based on
3564         /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3565         pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
3566                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3567                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3568                 self.pending_outbound_payments
3569                         .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
3570                                 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
3571                                 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
3572                                 &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3573         }
3574
3575         #[cfg(test)]
3576         pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3577                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3578                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3579                 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion,
3580                         keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer,
3581                         best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3582         }
3583
3584         #[cfg(test)]
3585         pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
3586                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3587                 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
3588         }
3589
3590         #[cfg(test)]
3591         pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
3592                 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
3593         }
3594
3595         pub(super) fn send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&self, invoice: &Bolt12Invoice, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), Bolt12PaymentError> {
3596                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3597                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3598                 self.pending_outbound_payments
3599                         .send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(
3600                                 invoice, payment_id, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3601                                 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer,
3602                                 best_block_height, &self.logger, &self.pending_events,
3603                                 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args)
3604                         )
3605         }
3606
3607         /// Signals that no further attempts for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
3608         /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
3609         /// retries are exhausted.
3610         ///
3611         /// # Event Generation
3612         ///
3613         /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
3614         /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
3615         ///
3616         /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
3617         /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
3618         /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
3619         ///
3620         /// # Requested Invoices
3621         ///
3622         /// In the case of paying a [`Bolt12Invoice`] via [`ChannelManager::pay_for_offer`], abandoning
3623         /// the payment prior to receiving the invoice will result in an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`]
3624         /// and prevent any attempts at paying it once received. The other events may only be generated
3625         /// once the invoice has been received.
3626         ///
3627         /// # Restart Behavior
3628         ///
3629         /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated and we restart without first persisting the
3630         /// [`ChannelManager`], another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated; likewise for
3631         /// [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
3632         ///
3633         /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
3634         pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
3635                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3636                 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
3637         }
3638
3639         /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
3640         /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
3641         /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
3642         /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
3643         /// never reach the recipient.
3644         ///
3645         /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
3646         /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
3647         ///
3648         /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
3649         /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
3650         ///
3651         /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
3652         pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
3653                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3654                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3655                 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
3656                         route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
3657                         &self.node_signer, best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3658         }
3659
3660         /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
3661         /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3662         ///
3663         /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
3664         /// payments.
3665         ///
3666         /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
3667         pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
3668                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3669                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3670                 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
3671                         payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3672                         || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),  &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3673                         &self.logger, &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3674         }
3675
3676         /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
3677         /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
3678         /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
3679         pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
3680                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3681                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3682                 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret,
3683                         &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3684                         |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3685         }
3686
3687         /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
3688         /// payment probe.
3689         #[cfg(test)]
3690         pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
3691                 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
3692         }
3693
3694         /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay the given
3695         /// amount to the given `node_id`.
3696         ///
3697         /// See [`ChannelManager::send_preflight_probes`] for more information.
3698         pub fn send_spontaneous_preflight_probes(
3699                 &self, node_id: PublicKey, amount_msat: u64, final_cltv_expiry_delta: u32,
3700                 liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
3701         ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
3702                 let payment_params =
3703                         PaymentParameters::from_node_id(node_id, final_cltv_expiry_delta);
3704
3705                 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, amount_msat);
3706
3707                 self.send_preflight_probes(route_params, liquidity_limit_multiplier)
3708         }
3709
3710         /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay a route found
3711         /// according to the given [`RouteParameters`].
3712         ///
3713         /// This may be used to send "pre-flight" probes, i.e., to train our scorer before conducting
3714         /// the actual payment. Note this is only useful if there likely is sufficient time for the
3715         /// probe to settle before sending out the actual payment, e.g., when waiting for user
3716         /// confirmation in a wallet UI.
3717         ///
3718         /// Otherwise, there is a chance the probe could take up some liquidity needed to complete the
3719         /// actual payment. Users should therefore be cautious and might avoid sending probes if
3720         /// liquidity is scarce and/or they don't expect the probe to return before they send the
3721         /// payment. To mitigate this issue, channels with available liquidity less than the required
3722         /// amount times the given `liquidity_limit_multiplier` won't be used to send pre-flight
3723         /// probes. If `None` is given as `liquidity_limit_multiplier`, it defaults to `3`.
3724         pub fn send_preflight_probes(
3725                 &self, route_params: RouteParameters, liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
3726         ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
3727                 let liquidity_limit_multiplier = liquidity_limit_multiplier.unwrap_or(3);
3728
3729                 let payer = self.get_our_node_id();
3730                 let usable_channels = self.list_usable_channels();
3731                 let first_hops = usable_channels.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>();
3732                 let inflight_htlcs = self.compute_inflight_htlcs();
3733
3734                 let route = self
3735                         .router
3736                         .find_route(&payer, &route_params, Some(&first_hops), inflight_htlcs)
3737                         .map_err(|e| {
3738                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to find path for payment probe: {:?}", e);
3739                                 ProbeSendFailure::RouteNotFound
3740                         })?;
3741
3742                 let mut used_liquidity_map = HashMap::with_capacity(first_hops.len());
3743
3744                 let mut res = Vec::new();
3745
3746                 for mut path in route.paths {
3747                         // If the last hop is probably an unannounced channel we refrain from probing all the
3748                         // way through to the end and instead probe up to the second-to-last channel.
3749                         while let Some(last_path_hop) = path.hops.last() {
3750                                 if last_path_hop.maybe_announced_channel {
3751                                         // We found a potentially announced last hop.
3752                                         break;
3753                                 } else {
3754                                         // Drop the last hop, as it's likely unannounced.
3755                                         log_debug!(
3756                                                 self.logger,
3757                                                 "Avoided sending payment probe all the way to last hop {} as it is likely unannounced.",
3758                                                 last_path_hop.short_channel_id
3759                                         );
3760                                         let final_value_msat = path.final_value_msat();
3761                                         path.hops.pop();
3762                                         if let Some(new_last) = path.hops.last_mut() {
3763                                                 new_last.fee_msat += final_value_msat;
3764                                         }
3765                                 }
3766                         }
3767
3768                         if path.hops.len() < 2 {
3769                                 log_debug!(
3770                                         self.logger,
3771                                         "Skipped sending payment probe over path with less than two hops."
3772                                 );
3773                                 continue;
3774                         }
3775
3776                         if let Some(first_path_hop) = path.hops.first() {
3777                                 if let Some(first_hop) = first_hops.iter().find(|h| {
3778                                         h.get_outbound_payment_scid() == Some(first_path_hop.short_channel_id)
3779                                 }) {
3780                                         let path_value = path.final_value_msat() + path.fee_msat();
3781                                         let used_liquidity =
3782                                                 used_liquidity_map.entry(first_path_hop.short_channel_id).or_insert(0);
3783
3784                                         if first_hop.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat
3785                                                 < (*used_liquidity + path_value) * liquidity_limit_multiplier
3786                                         {
3787                                                 log_debug!(self.logger, "Skipped sending payment probe to avoid putting channel {} under the liquidity limit.", first_path_hop.short_channel_id);
3788                                                 continue;
3789                                         } else {
3790                                                 *used_liquidity += path_value;
3791                                         }
3792                                 }
3793                         }
3794
3795                         res.push(self.send_probe(path).map_err(|e| {
3796                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to send pre-flight probe: {:?}", e);
3797                                 ProbeSendFailure::SendingFailed(e)
3798                         })?);
3799                 }
3800
3801                 Ok(res)
3802         }
3803
3804         /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
3805         /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
3806         fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: FnMut(&OutboundV1Channel<SP>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
3807                 &self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, is_batch_funding: bool,
3808                 mut find_funding_output: FundingOutput,
3809         ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3810                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3811                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3812                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3813
3814                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3815                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3816                 let (chan, msg_opt) = match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
3817                         Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan)) => {
3818                                 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
3819
3820                                 let funding_res = chan.get_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, is_batch_funding, &self.logger)
3821                                         .map_err(|(mut chan, e)| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
3822                                                 let channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
3823                                                 let user_id = chan.context.get_user_id();
3824                                                 let shutdown_res = chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
3825                                                 let channel_capacity = chan.context.get_value_satoshis();
3826                                                 (chan, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None, channel_capacity))
3827                                         } else { unreachable!(); });
3828                                 match funding_res {
3829                                         Ok((chan, funding_msg)) => (chan, funding_msg),
3830                                         Err((chan, err)) => {
3831                                                 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
3832                                                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3833
3834                                                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(err), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
3835                                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3836                                                         err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
3837                                                 });
3838                                         },
3839                                 }
3840                         },
3841                         Some(phase) => {
3842                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(*temporary_channel_id, phase);
3843                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3844                                         err: format!(
3845                                                 "Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is not an unfunded, outbound V1 channel",
3846                                                 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3847                                 })
3848                         },
3849                         None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {err: format!(
3850                                 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
3851                                 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3852                                 }),
3853                 };
3854
3855                 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
3856                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
3857                                 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3858                                 msg,
3859                         });
3860                 }
3861                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
3862                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3863                                 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
3864                         },
3865                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3866                                 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
3867                                 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.context.channel_id(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
3868                                         panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
3869                                 }
3870                                 e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan));
3871                         }
3872                 }
3873                 Ok(())
3874         }
3875
3876         #[cfg(test)]
3877         pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3878                 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, false, |_, tx| {
3879                         Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
3880                 })
3881         }
3882
3883         /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
3884         ///
3885         /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
3886         /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
3887         ///
3888         /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
3889         /// across the p2p network.
3890         ///
3891         /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
3892         /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
3893         ///
3894         /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
3895         /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
3896         /// keys per-channel).
3897         ///
3898         /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
3899         /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
3900         /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
3901         ///
3902         /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
3903         /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
3904         /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
3905         ///
3906         /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
3907         /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
3908         /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
3909         /// for more details.
3910         ///
3911         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
3912         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
3913         pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3914                 self.batch_funding_transaction_generated(&[(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id)], funding_transaction)
3915         }
3916
3917         /// Call this upon creation of a batch funding transaction for the given channels.
3918         ///
3919         /// Return values are identical to [`Self::funding_transaction_generated`], respective to
3920         /// each individual channel and transaction output.
3921         ///
3922         /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. This batch funding transaction
3923         /// will only be broadcast when we have safely received and persisted the counterparty's
3924         /// signature for each channel.
3925         ///
3926         /// If there is an error, all channels in the batch are to be considered closed.
3927         pub fn batch_funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channels: &[(&ChannelId, &PublicKey)], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3928                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3929                 let mut result = Ok(());
3930
3931                 if !funding_transaction.is_coin_base() {
3932                         for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
3933                                 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
3934                                         result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3935                                                 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
3936                                         }));
3937                                 }
3938                         }
3939                 }
3940                 if funding_transaction.output.len() > u16::max_value() as usize {
3941                         result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3942                                 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
3943                         }));
3944                 }
3945                 {
3946                         let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3947                         // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools if their locktime is strictly
3948                         // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
3949                         // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
3950                         // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
3951                         if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 1 {
3952                                 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3953                                         err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
3954                                 }));
3955                         }
3956                 }
3957
3958                 let txid = funding_transaction.txid();
3959                 let is_batch_funding = temporary_channels.len() > 1;
3960                 let mut funding_batch_states = if is_batch_funding {
3961                         Some(self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap())
3962                 } else {
3963                         None
3964                 };
3965                 let mut funding_batch_state = funding_batch_states.as_mut().and_then(|states| {
3966                         match states.entry(txid) {
3967                                 btree_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3968                                         result = result.clone().and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3969                                                 err: "Batch funding transaction with the same txid already exists".to_owned()
3970                                         }));
3971                                         None
3972                                 },
3973                                 btree_map::Entry::Vacant(vacant) => Some(vacant.insert(Vec::new())),
3974                         }
3975                 });
3976                 for &(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in temporary_channels {
3977                         result = result.and_then(|_| self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(
3978                                 temporary_channel_id,
3979                                 counterparty_node_id,
3980                                 funding_transaction.clone(),
3981                                 is_batch_funding,
3982                                 |chan, tx| {
3983                                         let mut output_index = None;
3984                                         let expected_spk = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
3985                                         for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3986                                                 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.context.get_value_satoshis() {
3987                                                         if output_index.is_some() {
3988                                                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3989                                                                         err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
3990                                                                 });
3991                                                         }
3992                                                         output_index = Some(idx as u16);
3993                                                 }
3994                                         }
3995                                         if output_index.is_none() {
3996                                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3997                                                         err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
3998                                                 });
3999                                         }
4000                                         let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() };
4001                                         if let Some(funding_batch_state) = funding_batch_state.as_mut() {
4002                                                 funding_batch_state.push((outpoint.to_channel_id(), *counterparty_node_id, false));
4003                                         }
4004                                         Ok(outpoint)
4005                                 })
4006                         );
4007                 }
4008                 if let Err(ref e) = result {
4009                         // Remaining channels need to be removed on any error.
4010                         let e = format!("Error in transaction funding: {:?}", e);
4011                         let mut channels_to_remove = Vec::new();
4012                         channels_to_remove.extend(funding_batch_states.as_mut()
4013                                 .and_then(|states| states.remove(&txid))
4014                                 .into_iter().flatten()
4015                                 .map(|(chan_id, node_id, _state)| (chan_id, node_id))
4016                         );
4017                         channels_to_remove.extend(temporary_channels.iter()
4018                                 .map(|(&chan_id, &node_id)| (chan_id, node_id))
4019                         );
4020                         let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
4021                         {
4022                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4023                                 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in channels_to_remove {
4024                                         per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
4025                                                 .map(|peer_state_mutex| peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap())
4026                                                 .and_then(|mut peer_state| peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id))
4027                                                 .map(|mut chan| {
4028                                                         update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
4029                                                         self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context(), ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: e.clone() });
4030                                                         shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
4031                                                 });
4032                                 }
4033                         }
4034                         for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
4035                                 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
4036                         }
4037                 }
4038                 result
4039         }
4040
4041         /// Atomically applies partial updates to the [`ChannelConfig`] of the given channels.
4042         ///
4043         /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
4044         /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
4045         /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
4046         /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
4047         ///
4048         /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
4049         /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
4050         ///
4051         /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
4052         /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
4053         ///
4054         /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
4055         ///
4056         /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4057         /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
4058         /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
4059         /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
4060         /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4061         /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
4062         /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
4063         pub fn update_partial_channel_config(
4064                 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config_update: &ChannelConfigUpdate,
4065         ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4066                 if config_update.cltv_expiry_delta.map(|delta| delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA).unwrap_or(false) {
4067                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4068                                 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
4069                         });
4070                 }
4071
4072                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4073                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4074                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4075                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4076                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4077                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4078                 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4079                         if !peer_state.has_channel(channel_id) {
4080                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4081                                         err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4082                                 });
4083                         };
4084                 }
4085                 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4086                         if let Some(channel_phase) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
4087                                 let mut config = channel_phase.context().config();
4088                                 config.apply(config_update);
4089                                 if !channel_phase.context_mut().update_config(&config) {
4090                                         continue;
4091                                 }
4092                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = channel_phase {
4093                                         if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
4094                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
4095                                         } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
4096                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4097                                                         node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4098                                                         msg,
4099                                                 });
4100                                         }
4101                                 }
4102                                 continue;
4103                         } else {
4104                                 // This should not be reachable as we've already checked for non-existence in the previous channel_id loop.
4105                                 debug_assert!(false);
4106                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4107                                         err: format!(
4108                                                 "Channel with ID {} for passed counterparty_node_id {} disappeared after we confirmed its existence - this should not be reachable!",
4109                                                 channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4110                                 });
4111                         };
4112                 }
4113                 Ok(())
4114         }
4115
4116         /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
4117         ///
4118         /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
4119         /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
4120         /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
4121         /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
4122         ///
4123         /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
4124         /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
4125         ///
4126         /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
4127         /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
4128         ///
4129         /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
4130         ///
4131         /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4132         /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
4133         /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
4134         /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
4135         /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4136         /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
4137         /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
4138         pub fn update_channel_config(
4139                 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config: &ChannelConfig,
4140         ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4141                 return self.update_partial_channel_config(counterparty_node_id, channel_ids, &(*config).into());
4142         }
4143
4144         /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
4145         /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
4146         ///
4147         /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
4148         /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
4149         ///
4150         /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
4151         /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
4152         /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
4153         /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
4154         /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
4155         ///
4156         /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
4157         /// you from forwarding more than you received. See
4158         /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`] for more on forwarding a different amount
4159         /// than expected.
4160         ///
4161         /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4162         /// backwards.
4163         ///
4164         /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
4165         /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4166         /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
4167         // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
4168         // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
4169         pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &ChannelId, next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4170                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4171
4172                 let next_hop_scid = {
4173                         let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4174                         let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
4175                                 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
4176                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4177                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4178                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
4179                                 Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) => {
4180                                         if !chan.context.is_usable() {
4181                                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4182                                                         err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", next_hop_channel_id)
4183                                                 })
4184                                         }
4185                                         chan.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias())
4186                                 },
4187                                 Some(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4188                                         err: format!("Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is still opening.",
4189                                                 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id)
4190                                 }),
4191                                 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4192                                         err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
4193                                                 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id)
4194                                 })
4195                         }
4196                 };
4197
4198                 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4199                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4200                                 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4201                         })?;
4202
4203                 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
4204                         PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => {
4205                                 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid }
4206                         },
4207                         _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4208                 };
4209                 let skimmed_fee_msat =
4210                         payment.forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat.saturating_sub(amt_to_forward_msat);
4211                 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
4212                         skimmed_fee_msat: if skimmed_fee_msat == 0 { None } else { Some(skimmed_fee_msat) },
4213                         outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
4214                 };
4215
4216                 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
4217                         payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4218                         payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4219                         payment.prev_user_channel_id,
4220                         vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
4221                 )];
4222                 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
4223                 Ok(())
4224         }
4225
4226         /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
4227         /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
4228         ///
4229         /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4230         /// backwards.
4231         ///
4232         /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4233         pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4234                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4235
4236                 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4237                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4238                                 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4239                         })?;
4240
4241                 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
4242                         let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4243                                 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4244                                 user_channel_id: Some(payment.prev_user_channel_id),
4245                                 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4246                                 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
4247                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
4248                                 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4249                         });
4250
4251                         let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
4252                         let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
4253                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4254                 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4255
4256                 Ok(())
4257         }
4258
4259         /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
4260         ///
4261         /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
4262         /// Will likely generate further events.
4263         pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
4264                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4265
4266                 let mut new_events = VecDeque::new();
4267                 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
4268                 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
4269                 {
4270                         let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
4271                         mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
4272
4273                         for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
4274                                 if short_chan_id != 0 {
4275                                         macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
4276                                                 () => {
4277                                                         for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4278                                                                 match forward_info {
4279                                                                         HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4280                                                                                 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4281                                                                                 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4282                                                                                         routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4283                                                                                         outgoing_cltv_value, ..
4284                                                                                 }
4285                                                                         }) => {
4286                                                                                 macro_rules! failure_handler {
4287                                                                                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
4288                                                                                                 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
4289
4290                                                                                                 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4291                                                                                                         short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4292                                                                                                         user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4293                                                                                                         outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4294                                                                                                         htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4295                                                                                                         incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4296                                                                                                         phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
4297                                                                                                 });
4298
4299                                                                                                 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
4300                                                                                                         HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
4301                                                                                                 } else {
4302                                                                                                         HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
4303                                                                                                 };
4304
4305                                                                                                 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4306                                                                                                         HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
4307                                                                                                         reason
4308                                                                                                 ));
4309                                                                                                 continue;
4310                                                                                         }
4311                                                                                 }
4312                                                                                 macro_rules! fail_forward {
4313                                                                                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4314                                                                                                 {
4315                                                                                                         failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
4316                                                                                                 }
4317                                                                                         }
4318                                                                                 }
4319                                                                                 macro_rules! failed_payment {
4320                                                                                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4321                                                                                                 {
4322                                                                                                         failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
4323                                                                                                 }
4324                                                                                         }
4325                                                                                 }
4326                                                                                 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
4327                                                                                         let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
4328                                                                                         if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.chain_hash) {
4329                                                                                                 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
4330                                                                                                 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(
4331                                                                                                         phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac,
4332                                                                                                         payment_hash, &self.node_signer
4333                                                                                                 ) {
4334                                                                                                         Ok(res) => res,
4335                                                                                                         Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4336                                                                                                                 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
4337                                                                                                                 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
4338                                                                                                                 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
4339                                                                                                                 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
4340                                                                                                                 // of the onion.
4341                                                                                                                 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
4342                                                                                                         },
4343                                                                                                         Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4344                                                                                                                 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
4345                                                                                                         },
4346                                                                                                 };
4347                                                                                                 match next_hop {
4348                                                                                                         onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
4349                                                                                                                 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data,
4350                                                                                                                         incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4351                                                                                                                         outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret), false, None)
4352                                                                                                                 {
4353                                                                                                                         Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
4354                                                                                                                         Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
4355                                                                                                                 }
4356                                                                                                         },
4357                                                                                                         _ => panic!(),
4358                                                                                                 }
4359                                                                                         } else {
4360                                                                                                 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4361                                                                                         }
4362                                                                                 } else {
4363                                                                                         fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4364                                                                                 }
4365                                                                         },
4366                                                                         HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
4367                                                                                 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
4368                                                                                 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
4369                                                                                 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
4370                                                                                 // problem, not ours.
4371                                                                         }
4372                                                                 }
4373                                                         }
4374                                                 }
4375                                         }
4376                                         let chan_info_opt = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id).cloned();
4377                                         let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match chan_info_opt {
4378                                                 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id, chan_id),
4379                                                 None => {
4380                                                         forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4381                                                         continue;
4382                                                 }
4383                                         };
4384                                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4385                                         let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4386                                         if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
4387                                                 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4388                                                 continue;
4389                                         }
4390                                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4391                                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4392                                         if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id) {
4393                                                 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4394                                                         match forward_info {
4395                                                                 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4396                                                                         prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4397                                                                         forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4398                                                                                 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
4399                                                                                 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4400                                                                         },
4401                                                                 }) => {
4402                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, &payment_hash, short_chan_id);
4403                                                                         let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4404                                                                                 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4405                                                                                 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4406                                                                                 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4407                                                                                 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4408                                                                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4409                                                                                 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
4410                                                                                 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4411                                                                         });
4412                                                                         if let Err(e) = chan.queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
4413                                                                                 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
4414                                                                                 onion_packet, skimmed_fee_msat, &self.fee_estimator,
4415                                                                                 &self.logger)
4416                                                                         {
4417                                                                                 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4418                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", &payment_hash, msg);
4419                                                                                 } else {
4420                                                                                         panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
4421                                                                                 }
4422                                                                                 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan);
4423                                                                                 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4424                                                                                         HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
4425                                                                                         HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
4426                                                                                 ));
4427                                                                                 continue;
4428                                                                         }
4429                                                                 },
4430                                                                 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
4431                                                                         panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
4432                                                                 },
4433                                                                 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
4434                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
4435                                                                         if let Err(e) = chan.queue_fail_htlc(
4436                                                                                 htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger
4437                                                                         ) {
4438                                                                                 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4439                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
4440                                                                                 } else {
4441                                                                                         panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
4442                                                                                 }
4443                                                                                 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
4444                                                                                 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
4445                                                                                 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
4446                                                                                 continue;
4447                                                                         }
4448                                                                 },
4449                                                         }
4450                                                 }
4451                                         } else {
4452                                                 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4453                                                 continue;
4454                                         }
4455                                 } else {
4456                                         'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4457                                                 match forward_info {
4458                                                         HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4459                                                                 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4460                                                                 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4461                                                                         routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat,
4462                                                                         skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4463                                                                 }
4464                                                         }) => {
4465                                                                 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
4466                                                                         PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret, custom_tlvs } => {
4467                                                                                 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
4468                                                                                 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret),
4469                                                                                                 payment_metadata, custom_tlvs };
4470                                                                                 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
4471                                                                                         Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
4472                                                                         },
4473                                                                         PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_data, payment_preimage, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, custom_tlvs } => {
4474                                                                                 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields {
4475                                                                                         payment_secret: payment_data.as_ref().map(|data| data.payment_secret),
4476                                                                                         payment_metadata,
4477                                                                                         custom_tlvs,
4478                                                                                 };
4479                                                                                 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
4480                                                                                         payment_data, None, onion_fields)
4481                                                                         },
4482                                                                         _ => {
4483                                                                                 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
4484                                                                         }
4485                                                                 };
4486                                                                 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
4487                                                                         prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
4488                                                                                 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4489                                                                                 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4490                                                                                 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4491                                                                                 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4492                                                                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4493                                                                                 phantom_shared_secret,
4494                                                                         },
4495                                                                         // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
4496                                                                         // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
4497                                                                         // if routing nodes overpay
4498                                                                         value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
4499                                                                         sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
4500                                                                         timer_ticks: 0,
4501                                                                         total_value_received: None,
4502                                                                         total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
4503                                                                         cltv_expiry,
4504                                                                         onion_payload,
4505                                                                         counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
4506                                                                 };
4507
4508                                                                 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
4509
4510                                                                 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
4511                                                                         ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
4512                                                                                 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
4513                                                                                 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4514                                                                                 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
4515                                                                                         &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
4516                                                                                 );
4517                                                                                 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4518                                                                                                 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
4519                                                                                                 user_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.user_channel_id,
4520                                                                                                 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4521                                                                                                 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
4522                                                                                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
4523                                                                                                 phantom_shared_secret,
4524                                                                                         }), payment_hash,
4525                                                                                         HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
4526                                                                                         HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
4527                                                                                 ));
4528                                                                                 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
4529                                                                         }
4530                                                                 }
4531                                                                 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
4532                                                                 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4533                                                                 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4534                                                                         receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4535                                                                                 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4536                                                                 }
4537
4538                                                                 macro_rules! check_total_value {
4539                                                                         ($purpose: expr) => {{
4540                                                                                 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
4541                                                                                 let is_keysend = match $purpose {
4542                                                                                         events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(_) => true,
4543                                                                                         events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { .. } => false,
4544                                                                                 };
4545                                                                                 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4546                                                                                 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
4547                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4548                                                                                 }
4549                                                                                 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
4550                                                                                         .entry(payment_hash)
4551                                                                                         // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
4552                                                                                         .or_insert_with(|| {
4553                                                                                                 committed_to_claimable = true;
4554                                                                                                 ClaimablePayment {
4555                                                                                                         purpose: $purpose.clone(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
4556                                                                                                 }
4557                                                                                         });
4558                                                                                 if $purpose != claimable_payment.purpose {
4559                                                                                         let log_keysend = |keysend| if keysend { "keysend" } else { "non-keysend" };
4560                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new {} HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing {} HTLC with the same payment hash", log_keysend(is_keysend), &payment_hash, log_keysend(!is_keysend));
4561                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4562                                                                                 }
4563                                                                                 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && is_keysend && !claimable_payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4564                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash and our config states we don't accept MPP keysend", &payment_hash);
4565                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4566                                                                                 }
4567                                                                                 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
4568                                                                                         if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
4569                                                                                                 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4570                                                                                         }
4571                                                                                 } else {
4572                                                                                         claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
4573                                                                                 }
4574                                                                                 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
4575                                                                                 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
4576                                                                                 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
4577                                                                                 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
4578                                                                                         total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
4579                                                                                         earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
4580                                                                                         if htlc.total_msat != claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4581                                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
4582                                                                                                         &payment_hash, claimable_htlc.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
4583                                                                                                 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
4584                                                                                         }
4585                                                                                         if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
4586                                                                                 }
4587                                                                                 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
4588                                                                                 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
4589                                                                                 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
4590                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4591                                                                                 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4592                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
4593                                                                                                 &payment_hash);
4594                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4595                                                                                 } else if total_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4596                                                                                         #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4597                                                                                                 committed_to_claimable = true;
4598                                                                                         }
4599                                                                                         let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
4600                                                                                         htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4601                                                                                         let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
4602                                                                                         htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
4603                                                                                         let counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat = htlcs.iter()
4604                                                                                                 .map(|htlc| htlc.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)).sum();
4605                                                                                         debug_assert!(total_value.saturating_sub(amount_msat) <=
4606                                                                                                 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat);
4607                                                                                         new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
4608                                                                                                 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4609                                                                                                 payment_hash,
4610                                                                                                 purpose: $purpose,
4611                                                                                                 amount_msat,
4612                                                                                                 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
4613                                                                                                 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
4614                                                                                                 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4615                                                                                                 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
4616                                                                                                 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
4617                                                                                         }, None));
4618                                                                                         payment_claimable_generated = true;
4619                                                                                 } else {
4620                                                                                         // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
4621                                                                                         // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
4622                                                                                         // MPP parts.
4623                                                                                         htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4624                                                                                         #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4625                                                                                                 committed_to_claimable = true;
4626                                                                                         }
4627                                                                                 }
4628                                                                                 payment_claimable_generated
4629                                                                         }}
4630                                                                 }
4631
4632                                                                 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
4633                                                                 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
4634                                                                 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
4635                                                                 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
4636                                                                 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
4637                                                                 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
4638                                                                 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4639                                                                 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
4640                                                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4641                                                                                 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4642                                                                                         OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
4643                                                                                                 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4644                                                                                                 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
4645                                                                                                         Ok(result) => result,
4646                                                                                                         Err(()) => {
4647                                                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", &payment_hash);
4648                                                                                                                 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4649                                                                                                         }
4650                                                                                                 };
4651                                                                                                 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
4652                                                                                                         let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
4653                                                                                                         if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
4654                                                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
4655                                                                                                                         &payment_hash, cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
4656                                                                                                                 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4657                                                                                                         }
4658                                                                                                 }
4659                                                                                                 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4660                                                                                                         payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4661                                                                                                         payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4662                                                                                                 };
4663                                                                                                 check_total_value!(purpose);
4664                                                                                         },
4665                                                                                         OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
4666                                                                                                 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
4667                                                                                                 check_total_value!(purpose);
4668                                                                                         }
4669                                                                                 }
4670                                                                         },
4671                                                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
4672                                                                                 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4673                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", &payment_hash);
4674                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4675                                                                                 }
4676                                                                                 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4677                                                                                 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
4678                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", &payment_hash);
4679                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4680                                                                                 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
4681                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
4682                                                                                                 &payment_hash, payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
4683                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4684                                                                                 } else {
4685                                                                                         let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4686                                                                                                 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
4687                                                                                                 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4688                                                                                         };
4689                                                                                         let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(purpose);
4690                                                                                         if payment_claimable_generated {
4691                                                                                                 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
4692                                                                                         }
4693                                                                                 }
4694                                                                         },
4695                                                                 };
4696                                                         },
4697                                                         HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
4698                                                                 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
4699                                                         }
4700                                                 }
4701                                         }
4702                                 }
4703                         }
4704                 }
4705
4706                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4707                 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
4708                         || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4709                         &self.pending_events, &self.logger, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args));
4710
4711                 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
4712                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4713                 }
4714                 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
4715
4716                 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
4717                 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
4718                 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
4719                 // network stack.
4720                 self.check_free_holding_cells();
4721
4722                 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
4723                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4724                 events.append(&mut new_events);
4725         }
4726
4727         /// Free the background events, generally called from [`PersistenceNotifierGuard`] constructors.
4728         ///
4729         /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
4730         fn process_background_events(&self) -> NotifyOption {
4731                 debug_assert_ne!(self.total_consistency_lock.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::NotHeldByThread);
4732
4733                 self.background_events_processed_since_startup.store(true, Ordering::Release);
4734
4735                 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
4736                 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
4737                 if background_events.is_empty() {
4738                         return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4739                 }
4740
4741                 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
4742                         match event {
4743                                 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, update)) => {
4744                                         // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
4745                                         // monitor updating completing.
4746                                         let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4747                                 },
4748                                 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup { counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update } => {
4749                                         let mut updated_chan = false;
4750                                         {
4751                                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4752                                                 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4753                                                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4754                                                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4755                                                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4756                                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase) => {
4757                                                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase.get_mut() {
4758                                                                                 updated_chan = true;
4759                                                                                 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, update.clone(),
4760                                                                                         peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4761                                                                         } else {
4762                                                                                 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't have an update for a non-funded channel");
4763                                                                         }
4764                                                                 },
4765                                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {},
4766                                                         }
4767                                                 }
4768                                         }
4769                                         if !updated_chan {
4770                                                 // TODO: Track this as in-flight even though the channel is closed.
4771                                                 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4772                                         }
4773                                 },
4774                                 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete { counterparty_node_id, channel_id } => {
4775                                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4776                                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4777                                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4778                                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4779                                                 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
4780                                                         handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4781                                                 } else {
4782                                                         let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
4783                                                                 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
4784                                                         mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
4785                                                         mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4786                                                         self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
4787                                                 }
4788                                         }
4789                                 },
4790                         }
4791                 }
4792                 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4793         }
4794
4795         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
4796         /// Process background events, for functional testing
4797         pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
4798                 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
4799                 let _ = self.process_background_events();
4800         }
4801
4802         fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &ChannelId, chan: &mut Channel<SP>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
4803                 if !chan.context.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents; }
4804                 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
4805                 if new_feerate <= chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4806                         if new_feerate != chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4807                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4808                                 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4809                         }
4810                         return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4811                 }
4812                 if !chan.context.is_live() {
4813                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
4814                                 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4815                         return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4816                 }
4817                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4818                         &chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4819
4820                 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
4821                 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4822         }
4823
4824         #[cfg(fuzzing)]
4825         /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
4826         /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
4827         /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
4828         /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
4829         pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
4830                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
4831                         let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4832
4833                         let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
4834                         let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
4835
4836                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4837                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4838                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4839                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4840                                 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
4841                                         |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
4842                                 ) {
4843                                         let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4844                                                 anchor_feerate
4845                                         } else {
4846                                                 non_anchor_feerate
4847                                         };
4848                                         let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4849                                         if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4850                                 }
4851                         }
4852
4853                         should_persist
4854                 });
4855         }
4856
4857         /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
4858         ///
4859         /// This currently includes:
4860         ///  * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
4861         ///  * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
4862         ///    than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
4863         ///    the channel.
4864         ///  * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
4865         ///    with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
4866         ///  * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
4867         ///  * Force-closing and removing channels which have not completed establishment in a timely manner.
4868         ///  * Forgetting about stale outbound payments, either those that have already been fulfilled
4869         ///    or those awaiting an invoice that hasn't been delivered in the necessary amount of time.
4870         ///    The latter is determined using the system clock in `std` and the highest seen block time
4871         ///    minus two hours in `no-std`.
4872         ///
4873         /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
4874         /// estimate fetches.
4875         ///
4876         /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4877         /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
4878         pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
4879                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
4880                         let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4881
4882                         let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
4883                         let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
4884
4885                         let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
4886                         let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
4887                         let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
4888                         let mut shutdown_channels = Vec::new();
4889
4890                         let mut process_unfunded_channel_tick = |
4891                                 chan_id: &ChannelId,
4892                                 context: &mut ChannelContext<SP>,
4893                                 unfunded_context: &mut UnfundedChannelContext,
4894                                 pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4895                                 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
4896                         | {
4897                                 context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4898                                 if unfunded_context.should_expire_unfunded_channel() {
4899                                         log_error!(self.logger,
4900                                                 "Force-closing pending channel with ID {} for not establishing in a timely manner", chan_id);
4901                                         update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
4902                                         self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4903                                         shutdown_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false));
4904                                         pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4905                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4906                                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4907                                                         msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
4908                                                                 channel_id: *chan_id,
4909                                                                 data: "Force-closing pending channel due to timeout awaiting establishment handshake".to_owned(),
4910                                                         },
4911                                                 },
4912                                         });
4913                                         false
4914                                 } else {
4915                                         true
4916                                 }
4917                         };
4918
4919                         {
4920                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4921                                 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4922                                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4923                                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4924                                         let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
4925                                         let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
4926                                         peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, phase| {
4927                                                 match phase {
4928                                                         ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
4929                                                                 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4930                                                                         anchor_feerate
4931                                                                 } else {
4932                                                                         non_anchor_feerate
4933                                                                 };
4934                                                                 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4935                                                                 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4936
4937                                                                 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
4938                                                                         let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
4939                                                                         handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
4940                                                                         if needs_close { return false; }
4941                                                                 }
4942
4943                                                                 match chan.channel_update_status() {
4944                                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
4945                                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
4946                                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.context.is_live()
4947                                                                                 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
4948                                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.context.is_live()
4949                                                                                 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
4950                                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.context.is_live() => {
4951                                                                                 n += 1;
4952                                                                                 if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4953                                                                                         chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
4954                                                                                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4955                                                                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4956                                                                                                         msg: update
4957                                                                                                 });
4958                                                                                         }
4959                                                                                         should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4960                                                                                 } else {
4961                                                                                         chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
4962                                                                                 }
4963                                                                         },
4964                                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.context.is_live() => {
4965                                                                                 n += 1;
4966                                                                                 if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4967                                                                                         chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
4968                                                                                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4969                                                                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4970                                                                                                         msg: update
4971                                                                                                 });
4972                                                                                         }
4973                                                                                         should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4974                                                                                 } else {
4975                                                                                         chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
4976                                                                                 }
4977                                                                         },
4978                                                                         _ => {},
4979                                                                 }
4980
4981                                                                 chan.context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4982
4983                                                                 if chan.should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response() {
4984                                                                         log_debug!(self.logger, "Disconnecting peer {} due to not making any progress on channel {}",
4985                                                                                         counterparty_node_id, chan_id);
4986                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4987                                                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4988                                                                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning {
4989                                                                                         msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
4990                                                                                                 channel_id: *chan_id,
4991                                                                                                 data: "Disconnecting due to timeout awaiting response".to_owned(),
4992                                                                                         },
4993                                                                                 },
4994                                                                         });
4995                                                                 }
4996
4997                                                                 true
4998                                                         },
4999                                                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
5000                                                                 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5001                                                                         pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5002                                                         },
5003                                                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
5004                                                                 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5005                                                                         pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5006                                                         },
5007                                                 }
5008                                         });
5009
5010                                         for (chan_id, req) in peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.iter_mut() {
5011                                                 if { req.ticks_remaining -= 1 ; req.ticks_remaining } <= 0 {
5012                                                         log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing unaccepted inbound channel {} for not accepting in a timely manner", &chan_id);
5013                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
5014                                                                 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5015                                                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5016                                                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5017                                                                                 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_id.clone(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5018                                                                         },
5019                                                                 }
5020                                                         );
5021                                                 }
5022                                         }
5023                                         peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.retain(|_, req| req.ticks_remaining > 0);
5024
5025                                         if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
5026                                                 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
5027                                         }
5028                                 }
5029                         }
5030
5031                         // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
5032                         // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
5033                         // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
5034                         // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
5035                         // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
5036                         // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
5037                         // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
5038                         if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
5039                                 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
5040                                 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
5041                                         match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
5042                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
5043                                                         // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
5044                                                         // have no channels to the peer.
5045                                                         let remove_entry = {
5046                                                                 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
5047                                                                 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
5048                                                         };
5049                                                         if remove_entry {
5050                                                                 entry.remove_entry();
5051                                                         }
5052                                                 },
5053                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
5054                                         }
5055                                 }
5056                         }
5057
5058                         self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
5059                                 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
5060                                         // This should be unreachable
5061                                         debug_assert!(false);
5062                                         return false;
5063                                 }
5064                                 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
5065                                         // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
5066                                         // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
5067                                         // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
5068                                         // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
5069                                         if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
5070                                                 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
5071                                         {
5072                                                 return true;
5073                                         } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
5074                                                 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
5075                                                 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
5076                                         }) {
5077                                                 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
5078                                                         .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
5079                                                 return false;
5080                                         }
5081                                 }
5082                                 true
5083                         });
5084
5085                         for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
5086                                 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
5087                                 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
5088                                 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
5089                                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
5090                         }
5091
5092                         for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5093                                 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5094                         }
5095
5096                         for shutdown_res in shutdown_channels {
5097                                 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
5098                         }
5099
5100                         #[cfg(feature = "std")]
5101                         let duration_since_epoch = std::time::SystemTime::now()
5102                                 .duration_since(std::time::SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH)
5103                                 .expect("SystemTime::now() should come after SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH");
5104                         #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
5105                         let duration_since_epoch = Duration::from_secs(
5106                                 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire).saturating_sub(7200) as u64
5107                         );
5108
5109                         self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_payments(
5110                                 duration_since_epoch, &self.pending_events
5111                         );
5112
5113                         // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
5114                         // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
5115                         // than block the message queueing pipeline.
5116                         if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5117                                 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5118                         }
5119
5120                         should_persist
5121                 });
5122         }
5123
5124         /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
5125         /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
5126         /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
5127         ///
5128         /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
5129         /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
5130         /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
5131         /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
5132         ///
5133         /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
5134         /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
5135         /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
5136         /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
5137         pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
5138                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
5139         }
5140
5141         /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
5142         /// reason for the failure.
5143         ///
5144         /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
5145         pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
5146                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5147
5148                 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
5149                 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
5150                         for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5151                                 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
5152                                 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5153                                 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
5154                                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5155                         }
5156                 }
5157         }
5158
5159         /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
5160         fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
5161                 match failure_code {
5162                         FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
5163                         FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
5164                         FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
5165                                 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5166                                 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
5167                                 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), htlc_msat_height_data)
5168                         },
5169                         FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(data) => {
5170                                 let fail_data = match data {
5171                                         Some((typ, offset)) => [BigSize(typ).encode(), offset.encode()].concat(),
5172                                         None => Vec::new(),
5173                                 };
5174                                 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), fail_data)
5175                         }
5176                 }
5177         }
5178
5179         /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5180         /// that we want to return and a channel.
5181         ///
5182         /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
5183         /// forwarding
5184         fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5185                 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
5186                 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
5187                 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
5188                 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
5189                 let scid_pref = if chan.context.should_announce() {
5190                         chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
5191                 } else {
5192                         chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.context.get_short_channel_id())
5193                 };
5194                 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
5195                         self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
5196                 } else {
5197                         (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5198                 }
5199         }
5200
5201
5202         /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5203         /// that we want to return and a channel.
5204         fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5205                 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
5206                 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
5207                         let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
5208                         if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
5209                                 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
5210                                 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
5211                                 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5212                         }
5213                         (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5214                         msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5215                         upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5216                         (desired_err_code, enc.0)
5217                 } else {
5218                         // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
5219                         // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
5220                         // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
5221                         // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
5222                         (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5223                 }
5224         }
5225
5226         // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
5227         // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
5228         // be surfaced to the user.
5229         fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
5230                 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: ChannelId,
5231                 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
5232         ) {
5233                 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
5234                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5235                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
5236                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5237                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5238                                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
5239                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
5240                                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get() {
5241                                                         self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan)
5242                                                 } else {
5243                                                         // We shouldn't be trying to fail holding cell HTLCs on an unfunded channel.
5244                                                         debug_assert!(false);
5245                                                         (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5246                                                 }
5247                                         },
5248                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5249                                 }
5250                         } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
5251                 };
5252
5253                 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
5254                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
5255                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
5256                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5257                 }
5258         }
5259
5260         /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
5261         /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
5262         fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
5263                 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
5264                 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
5265                 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
5266                 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
5267                 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5268                 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
5269                         debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5270                 }
5271
5272                 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
5273                 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
5274                 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
5275                 //timer handling.
5276
5277                 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5278                 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
5279                 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5280                 match source {
5281                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
5282                                 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
5283                                         session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
5284                                         &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
5285                                 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5286                         },
5287                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint, .. }) => {
5288                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", &payment_hash, onion_error);
5289                                 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
5290
5291                                 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
5292                                 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5293                                 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
5294                                         push_forward_ev = true;
5295                                 }
5296                                 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
5297                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5298                                                 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
5299                                         },
5300                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5301                                                 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
5302                                         }
5303                                 }
5304                                 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
5305                                 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5306                                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5307                                 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
5308                                         prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
5309                                         failed_next_destination: destination,
5310                                 }, None));
5311                         },
5312                 }
5313         }
5314
5315         /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
5316         /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
5317         ///
5318         /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
5319         /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
5320         /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
5321         /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
5322         ///
5323         /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
5324         /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
5325         /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
5326         /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
5327         ///
5328         /// This function will fail the payment if it has custom TLVs with even type numbers, as we
5329         /// will assume they are unknown. If you intend to accept even custom TLVs, you should use
5330         /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`].
5331         ///
5332         /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5333         /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
5334         /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
5335         /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
5336         /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5337         /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5338         /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`]: Self::claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs
5339         pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5340                 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, false);
5341         }
5342
5343         /// This is a variant of [`claim_funds`] that allows accepting a payment with custom TLVs with
5344         /// even type numbers.
5345         ///
5346         /// # Note
5347         ///
5348         /// You MUST check you've understood all even TLVs before using this to
5349         /// claim, otherwise you may unintentionally agree to some protocol you do not understand.
5350         ///
5351         /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5352         pub fn claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5353                 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, true);
5354         }
5355
5356         fn claim_payment_internal(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, custom_tlvs_known: bool) {
5357                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5358
5359                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5360
5361                 let mut sources = {
5362                         let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
5363                         if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
5364                                 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
5365                                 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
5366                                         if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
5367                                                 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
5368                                                         .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
5369                                                 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
5370                                                 break;
5371                                         }
5372                                 }
5373
5374                                 let htlcs = payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect();
5375                                 let sender_intended_value = payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat);
5376                                 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
5377                                         ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
5378                                         payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id, htlcs, sender_intended_value
5379                                 });
5380                                 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
5381                                         debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
5382                                         log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
5383                                                 &payment_hash);
5384                                 }
5385
5386                                 if let Some(RecipientOnionFields { ref custom_tlvs, .. }) = payment.onion_fields {
5387                                         if !custom_tlvs_known && custom_tlvs.iter().any(|(typ, _)| typ % 2 == 0) {
5388                                                 log_info!(self.logger, "Rejecting payment with payment hash {} as we cannot accept payment with unknown even TLVs: {}",
5389                                                         &payment_hash, log_iter!(custom_tlvs.iter().map(|(typ, _)| typ).filter(|typ| *typ % 2 == 0)));
5390                                                 claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5391                                                 mem::drop(claimable_payments);
5392                                                 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5393                                                         let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(None), &htlc);
5394                                                         let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5395                                                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5396                                                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5397                                                 }
5398                                                 return;
5399                                         }
5400                                 }
5401
5402                                 payment.htlcs
5403                         } else { return; }
5404                 };
5405                 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
5406
5407                 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
5408                 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
5409                 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
5410                 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
5411                 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
5412                 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
5413                 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
5414                 let mut valid_mpp = true;
5415                 let mut errs = Vec::new();
5416                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5417                 for htlc in sources.iter() {
5418                         if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
5419                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5420                                 debug_assert!(false);
5421                                 valid_mpp = false;
5422                                 break;
5423                         }
5424                         prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
5425
5426                         if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
5427                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5428                                 debug_assert!(false);
5429                                 valid_mpp = false;
5430                                 break;
5431                         }
5432                         expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
5433                         claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
5434                 }
5435                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5436                 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
5437                         self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5438                         log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
5439                         return;
5440                 }
5441                 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
5442                         self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5443                         log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
5444                                 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
5445                         return;
5446                 }
5447                 if valid_mpp {
5448                         for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5449                                 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
5450                                         htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
5451                                         |_, definitely_duplicate| {
5452                                                 debug_assert!(!definitely_duplicate, "We shouldn't claim duplicatively from a payment");
5453                                                 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash })
5454                                         }
5455                                 ) {
5456                                         if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
5457                                                 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
5458                                                 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
5459                                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
5460                                         } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
5461                                 }
5462                         }
5463                 }
5464                 if !valid_mpp {
5465                         for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5466                                 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5467                                 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
5468                                 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5469                                 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
5470                                 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5471                                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5472                         }
5473                         self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5474                 }
5475
5476                 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
5477                 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
5478                         let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5479                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
5480                 }
5481         }
5482
5483         fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>, bool) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
5484                 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
5485         -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
5486                 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
5487
5488                 // If we haven't yet run background events assume we're still deserializing and shouldn't
5489                 // actually pass `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to users yet. Instead, queue them up as
5490                 // `BackgroundEvent`s.
5491                 let during_init = !self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5492
5493                 // As we may call handle_monitor_update_completion_actions in rather rare cases, check that
5494                 // the required mutexes are not held before we start.
5495                 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5496                 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5497
5498                 {
5499                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5500                         let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
5501                         let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
5502                                 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
5503                                 None => None
5504                         };
5505
5506                         let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
5507                                 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5508                                         .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
5509                         ).unwrap_or(None);
5510
5511                         if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
5512                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
5513                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5514                                 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5515                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
5516                                                 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5517                                                 let fulfill_res = chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger);
5518
5519                                                 match fulfill_res {
5520                                                         UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } => {
5521                                                                 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat), false) {
5522                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
5523                                                                                 chan_id, action);
5524                                                                         peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
5525                                                                 }
5526                                                                 if !during_init {
5527                                                                         handle_new_monitor_update!(self, prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
5528                                                                                 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5529                                                                 } else {
5530                                                                         // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly -
5531                                                                         // they probably haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the
5532                                                                         // monitor update as a background event.
5533                                                                         self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5534                                                                                 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5535                                                                                         counterparty_node_id,
5536                                                                                         funding_txo: prev_hop.outpoint,
5537                                                                                         update: monitor_update.clone(),
5538                                                                                 });
5539                                                                 }
5540                                                         }
5541                                                         UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => {
5542                                                                 let action = if let Some(action) = completion_action(None, true) {
5543                                                                         action
5544                                                                 } else {
5545                                                                         return Ok(());
5546                                                                 };
5547                                                                 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5548
5549                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Completing monitor update completion action for channel {} as claim was redundant: {:?}",
5550                                                                         chan_id, action);
5551                                                                 let (node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker) =
5552                                                                 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5553                                                                         downstream_counterparty_node_id: node_id,
5554                                                                         downstream_funding_outpoint: funding_outpoint,
5555                                                                         blocking_action: blocker,
5556                                                                 } = action {
5557                                                                         (node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker)
5558                                                                 } else {
5559                                                                         debug_assert!(false,
5560                                                                                 "Duplicate claims should always free another channel immediately");
5561                                                                         return Ok(());
5562                                                                 };
5563                                                                 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
5564                                                                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5565                                                                         if let Some(blockers) = peer_state
5566                                                                                 .actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
5567                                                                                 .get_mut(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
5568                                                                         {
5569                                                                                 let mut found_blocker = false;
5570                                                                                 blockers.retain(|iter| {
5571                                                                                         // Note that we could actually be blocked, in
5572                                                                                         // which case we need to only remove the one
5573                                                                                         // blocker which was added duplicatively.
5574                                                                                         let first_blocker = !found_blocker;
5575                                                                                         if *iter == blocker { found_blocker = true; }
5576                                                                                         *iter != blocker || !first_blocker
5577                                                                                 });
5578                                                                                 debug_assert!(found_blocker);
5579                                                                         }
5580                                                                 } else {
5581                                                                         debug_assert!(false);
5582                                                                 }
5583                                                         }
5584                                                 }
5585                                         }
5586                                         return Ok(());
5587                                 }
5588                         }
5589                 }
5590                 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5591                         update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
5592                         updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5593                                 payment_preimage,
5594                         }],
5595                 };
5596
5597                 if !during_init {
5598                         // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
5599                         // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
5600                         let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
5601                         if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
5602                                 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
5603                                 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
5604                                 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
5605                                 // again on restart.
5606                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
5607                                         payment_preimage, update_res);
5608                         }
5609                 } else {
5610                         // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly - they probably
5611                         // haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the monitor update as a background
5612                         // event.
5613                         // Note that while it's safe to use `ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup` here (the
5614                         // channel is already closed) we need to ultimately handle the monitor update
5615                         // completion action only after we've completed the monitor update. This is the only
5616                         // way to guarantee this update *will* be regenerated on startup (otherwise if this was
5617                         // from a forwarded HTLC the downstream preimage may be deleted before we claim
5618                         // upstream). Thus, we need to transition to some new `BackgroundEvent` type which will
5619                         // complete the monitor update completion action from `completion_action`.
5620                         self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5621                                 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((
5622                                         prev_hop.outpoint, preimage_update,
5623                                 )));
5624                 }
5625                 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
5626                 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
5627                 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
5628                 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
5629                 // `PaymentForwarded`).
5630                 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None, false));
5631                 Ok(())
5632         }
5633
5634         fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
5635                 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
5636         }
5637
5638         fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
5639                 forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, startup_replay: bool,
5640                 next_channel_counterparty_node_id: Option<PublicKey>, next_channel_outpoint: OutPoint
5641         ) {
5642                 match source {
5643                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
5644                                 debug_assert!(self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire),
5645                                         "We don't support claim_htlc claims during startup - monitors may not be available yet");
5646                                 if let Some(pubkey) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
5647                                         debug_assert_eq!(pubkey, path.hops[0].pubkey);
5648                                 }
5649                                 let ev_completion_action = EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
5650                                         channel_funding_outpoint: next_channel_outpoint,
5651                                         counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
5652                                 };
5653                                 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage,
5654                                         session_priv, path, from_onchain, ev_completion_action, &self.pending_events,
5655                                         &self.logger);
5656                         },
5657                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
5658                                 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
5659                                 let completed_blocker = RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&hop_data);
5660                                 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5661                                 let claiming_chan_funding_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
5662                                 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
5663                                         |htlc_claim_value_msat, definitely_duplicate| {
5664                                                 let chan_to_release =
5665                                                         if let Some(node_id) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
5666                                                                 Some((node_id, next_channel_outpoint, completed_blocker))
5667                                                         } else {
5668                                                                 // We can only get `None` here if we are processing a
5669                                                                 // `ChannelMonitor`-originated event, in which case we
5670                                                                 // don't care about ensuring we wake the downstream
5671                                                                 // channel's monitor updating - the channel is already
5672                                                                 // closed.
5673                                                                 None
5674                                                         };
5675
5676                                                 if definitely_duplicate && startup_replay {
5677                                                         // On startup we may get redundant claims which are related to
5678                                                         // monitor updates still in flight. In that case, we shouldn't
5679                                                         // immediately free, but instead let that monitor update complete
5680                                                         // in the background.
5681                                                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
5682                                                                 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
5683                                                                 // There should be a `BackgroundEvent` pending...
5684                                                                 assert!(background_events.iter().any(|ev| {
5685                                                                         match ev {
5686                                                                                 // to apply a monitor update that blocked the claiming channel,
5687                                                                                 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5688                                                                                         funding_txo, update, ..
5689                                                                                 } => {
5690                                                                                         if *funding_txo == claiming_chan_funding_outpoint {
5691                                                                                                 assert!(update.updates.iter().any(|upd|
5692                                                                                                         if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5693                                                                                                                 payment_preimage: update_preimage
5694                                                                                                         } = upd {
5695                                                                                                                 payment_preimage == *update_preimage
5696                                                                                                         } else { false }
5697                                                                                                 ), "{:?}", update);
5698                                                                                                 true
5699                                                                                         } else { false }
5700                                                                                 },
5701                                                                                 // or the channel we'd unblock is already closed,
5702                                                                                 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup(
5703                                                                                         (funding_txo, monitor_update)
5704                                                                                 ) => {
5705                                                                                         if *funding_txo == next_channel_outpoint {
5706                                                                                                 assert_eq!(monitor_update.updates.len(), 1);
5707                                                                                                 assert!(matches!(
5708                                                                                                         monitor_update.updates[0],
5709                                                                                                         ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { .. }
5710                                                                                                 ));
5711                                                                                                 true
5712                                                                                         } else { false }
5713                                                                                 },
5714                                                                                 // or the monitor update has completed and will unblock
5715                                                                                 // immediately once we get going.
5716                                                                                 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
5717                                                                                         channel_id, ..
5718                                                                                 } =>
5719                                                                                         *channel_id == claiming_chan_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(),
5720                                                                         }
5721                                                                 }), "{:?}", *background_events);
5722                                                         }
5723                                                         None
5724                                                 } else if definitely_duplicate {
5725                                                         if let Some(other_chan) = chan_to_release {
5726                                                                 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5727                                                                         downstream_counterparty_node_id: other_chan.0,
5728                                                                         downstream_funding_outpoint: other_chan.1,
5729                                                                         blocking_action: other_chan.2,
5730                                                                 })
5731                                                         } else { None }
5732                                                 } else {
5733                                                         let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
5734                                                                 if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
5735                                                                         Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
5736                                                                 } else { None }
5737                                                         } else { None };
5738                                                         Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5739                                                                 event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
5740                                                                         fee_earned_msat,
5741                                                                         claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
5742                                                                         prev_channel_id: Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
5743                                                                         next_channel_id: Some(next_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
5744                                                                         outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
5745                                                                 },
5746                                                                 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: chan_to_release,
5747                                                         })
5748                                                 }
5749                                         });
5750                                 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
5751                                         let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5752                                         let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
5753                                 }
5754                         },
5755                 }
5756         }
5757
5758         /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
5759         pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
5760                 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
5761         }
5762
5763         fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
5764                 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5765                 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5766                 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5767
5768                 for action in actions.into_iter() {
5769                         match action {
5770                                 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
5771                                         let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5772                                         if let Some(ClaimingPayment {
5773                                                 amount_msat,
5774                                                 payment_purpose: purpose,
5775                                                 receiver_node_id,
5776                                                 htlcs,
5777                                                 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_total_msat,
5778                                         }) = payment {
5779                                                 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
5780                                                         payment_hash,
5781                                                         purpose,
5782                                                         amount_msat,
5783                                                         receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
5784                                                         htlcs,
5785                                                         sender_intended_total_msat,
5786                                                 }, None));
5787                                         }
5788                                 },
5789                                 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5790                                         event, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint
5791                                 } => {
5792                                         self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
5793                                         if let Some((node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker)) = downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint {
5794                                                 self.handle_monitor_update_release(node_id, funding_outpoint, Some(blocker));
5795                                         }
5796                                 },
5797                                 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5798                                         downstream_counterparty_node_id, downstream_funding_outpoint, blocking_action,
5799                                 } => {
5800                                         self.handle_monitor_update_release(
5801                                                 downstream_counterparty_node_id,
5802                                                 downstream_funding_outpoint,
5803                                                 Some(blocking_action),
5804                                         );
5805                                 },
5806                         }
5807                 }
5808         }
5809
5810         /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
5811         /// update completion.
5812         fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
5813                 channel: &mut Channel<SP>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
5814                 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
5815                 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
5816                 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
5817         -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
5818                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
5819                         &channel.context.channel_id(),
5820                         if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
5821                         if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
5822                         if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
5823                         if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
5824                         if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
5825
5826                 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
5827
5828                 let counterparty_node_id = channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5829                 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5830                         htlc_forwards = Some((channel.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.context.outbound_scid_alias()),
5831                                 channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.context.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
5832                 }
5833
5834                 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
5835                         send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
5836                 }
5837                 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
5838                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5839                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5840                                 msg,
5841                         });
5842                 }
5843
5844                 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
5845                         if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
5846                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5847                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5848                                         updates: update,
5849                                 });
5850                         }
5851                 } }
5852                 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
5853                         if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
5854                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
5855                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5856                                         msg: revoke_and_ack,
5857                                 });
5858                         }
5859                 } }
5860                 match order {
5861                         RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
5862                                 handle_cs!();
5863                                 handle_raa!();
5864                         },
5865                         RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
5866                                 handle_raa!();
5867                                 handle_cs!();
5868                         },
5869                 }
5870
5871                 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
5872                         log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
5873                         self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
5874                 }
5875
5876                 {
5877                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5878                         emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
5879                         emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
5880                 }
5881
5882                 htlc_forwards
5883         }
5884
5885         fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
5886                 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
5887
5888                 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
5889                         Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5890                         None => {
5891                                 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5892                                 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
5893                                 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5894                                 match id_to_peer.get(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
5895                                         Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5896                                         None => return,
5897                                 }
5898                         }
5899                 };
5900                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5901                 let mut peer_state_lock;
5902                 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
5903                 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
5904                 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5905                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5906                 let channel =
5907                         if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
5908                                 chan
5909                         } else {
5910                                 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
5911                                         .remove(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
5912                                 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5913                                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5914                                 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
5915                                 return;
5916                         };
5917                 let remaining_in_flight =
5918                         if let Some(pending) = peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.get_mut(funding_txo) {
5919                                 pending.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > highest_applied_update_id);
5920                                 pending.len()
5921                         } else { 0 };
5922                 log_trace!(self.logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}. {} pending in-flight updates.",
5923                         highest_applied_update_id, channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
5924                         remaining_in_flight);
5925                 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
5926                         return;
5927                 }
5928                 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel);
5929         }
5930
5931         /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
5932         ///
5933         /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
5934         /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
5935         /// the channel.
5936         ///
5937         /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5938         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5939         /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5940         ///
5941         /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
5942         /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
5943         /// used to accept such channels.
5944         ///
5945         /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5946         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5947         pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5948                 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
5949         }
5950
5951         /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
5952         /// it as confirmed immediately.
5953         ///
5954         /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5955         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5956         /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5957         ///
5958         /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
5959         /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
5960         ///
5961         /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
5962         /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
5963         ///
5964         /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
5965         /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
5966         ///
5967         /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5968         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5969         pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5970                 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
5971         }
5972
5973         fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5974                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5975
5976                 let peers_without_funded_channels =
5977                         self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| { peer.total_channel_count() > 0 });
5978                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5979                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5980                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
5981                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5982                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5983                 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.total_channel_count() == 1;
5984
5985                 // Find (and remove) the channel in the unaccepted table. If it's not there, something weird is
5986                 // happening and return an error. N.B. that we create channel with an outbound SCID of zero so
5987                 // that we can delay allocating the SCID until after we're sure that the checks below will
5988                 // succeed.
5989                 let mut channel = match peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
5990                         Some(unaccepted_channel) => {
5991                                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5992                                 InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
5993                                         counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features,
5994                                         &unaccepted_channel.open_channel_msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration, best_block_height,
5995                                         &self.logger, accept_0conf).map_err(|e| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.to_string() })
5996                         }
5997                         _ => Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() })
5998                 }?;
5999
6000                 if accept_0conf {
6001                         // This should have been correctly configured by the call to InboundV1Channel::new.
6002                         debug_assert!(channel.context.minimum_depth().unwrap() == 0);
6003                 } else if channel.context.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
6004                         let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6005                                 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6006                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
6007                                         msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
6008                                 }
6009                         };
6010                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
6011                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
6012                 } else {
6013                         // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
6014                         // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
6015                         // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
6016                         if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
6017                                 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6018                                         node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6019                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
6020                                                 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
6021                                         }
6022                                 };
6023                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
6024                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned() });
6025                         }
6026                 }
6027
6028                 // Now that we know we have a channel, assign an outbound SCID alias.
6029                 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
6030                 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
6031
6032                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
6033                         node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6034                         msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
6035                 });
6036
6037                 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(temporary_channel_id.clone(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
6038
6039                 Ok(())
6040         }
6041
6042         /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
6043         /// or 0-conf channels.
6044         ///
6045         /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
6046         /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
6047         fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
6048         where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<SP>) -> bool {
6049                 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
6050                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6051                 {
6052                         let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6053                         for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
6054                                 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6055                                 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
6056                                 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
6057                                 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.total_channel_count() {
6058                                         peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
6059                                 }
6060                         }
6061                 }
6062                 return peers_without_funded_channels;
6063         }
6064
6065         fn unfunded_channel_count(
6066                 peer: &PeerState<SP>, best_block_height: u32
6067         ) -> usize {
6068                 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
6069                 for (_, phase) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
6070                         match phase {
6071                                 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
6072                                         // This covers non-zero-conf inbound `Channel`s that we are currently monitoring, but those
6073                                         // which have not yet had any confirmations on-chain.
6074                                         if !chan.context.is_outbound() && chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
6075                                                 chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
6076                                         {
6077                                                 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6078                                         }
6079                                 },
6080                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
6081                                         if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 {
6082                                                 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6083                                         }
6084                                 },
6085                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
6086                                         // Outbound channels don't contribute to the unfunded count in the DoS context.
6087                                         continue;
6088                                 }
6089                         }
6090                 }
6091                 num_unfunded_channels + peer.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
6092         }
6093
6094         fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6095                 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
6096                 // likely to be lost on restart!
6097                 if msg.chain_hash != self.chain_hash {
6098                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6099                 }
6100
6101                 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
6102                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6103                 }
6104
6105                 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
6106                 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
6107                 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
6108                 let channeled_peers_without_funding =
6109                         self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.total_channel_count() > 0);
6110
6111                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6112                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6113                     .ok_or_else(|| {
6114                                 debug_assert!(false);
6115                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())
6116                         })?;
6117                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6118                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6119
6120                 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
6121                 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
6122                 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
6123                 if peer_state.total_channel_count() == 0 &&
6124                         channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
6125                         !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
6126                 {
6127                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6128                                 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
6129                                 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6130                 }
6131
6132                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6133                 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
6134                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6135                                 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
6136                                 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6137                 }
6138
6139                 let channel_id = msg.temporary_channel_id;
6140                 let channel_exists = peer_state.has_channel(&channel_id);
6141                 if channel_exists {
6142                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6143                 }
6144
6145                 // If we're doing manual acceptance checks on the channel, then defer creation until we're sure we want to accept.
6146                 if self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
6147                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6148                         pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
6149                                 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
6150                                 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6151                                 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
6152                                 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
6153                                 channel_type: msg.channel_type.clone().unwrap(),
6154                         }, None));
6155                         peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.insert(channel_id, InboundChannelRequest {
6156                                 open_channel_msg: msg.clone(),
6157                                 ticks_remaining: UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS,
6158                         });
6159                         return Ok(());
6160                 }
6161
6162                 // Otherwise create the channel right now.
6163                 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
6164                 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
6165                 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
6166                 let mut channel = match InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
6167                         counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
6168                         &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, /*is_0conf=*/false)
6169                 {
6170                         Err(e) => {
6171                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
6172                         },
6173                         Ok(res) => res
6174                 };
6175
6176                 let channel_type = channel.context.get_channel_type();
6177                 if channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
6178                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6179                 }
6180                 if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6181                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6182                 }
6183
6184                 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
6185                 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
6186
6187                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
6188                         node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6189                         msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
6190                 });
6191                 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(channel_id, ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
6192                 Ok(())
6193         }
6194
6195         fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6196                 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
6197                 // likely to be lost on restart!
6198                 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
6199                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6200                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6201                                 .ok_or_else(|| {
6202                                         debug_assert!(false);
6203                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
6204                                 })?;
6205                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6206                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6207                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
6208                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut phase) => {
6209                                         match phase.get_mut() {
6210                                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
6211                                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), phase);
6212                                                         (chan.context.get_value_satoshis(), chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.context.get_user_id())
6213                                                 },
6214                                                 _ => {
6215                                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected accept_channel message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id));
6216                                                 }
6217                                         }
6218                                 },
6219                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
6220                         }
6221                 };
6222                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6223                 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
6224                         temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
6225                         counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6226                         channel_value_satoshis: value,
6227                         output_script,
6228                         user_channel_id: user_id,
6229                 }, None));
6230                 Ok(())
6231         }
6232
6233         fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6234                 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6235
6236                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6237                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6238                         .ok_or_else(|| {
6239                                 debug_assert!(false);
6240                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
6241                         })?;
6242
6243                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6244                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6245                 let (chan, funding_msg_opt, monitor) =
6246                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
6247                                 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan)) => {
6248                                         match inbound_chan.funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger) {
6249                                                 Ok(res) => res,
6250                                                 Err((mut inbound_chan, err)) => {
6251                                                         // We've already removed this inbound channel from the map in `PeerState`
6252                                                         // above so at this point we just need to clean up any lingering entries
6253                                                         // concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
6254                                                         update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &inbound_chan.context);
6255                                                         let user_id = inbound_chan.context.get_user_id();
6256                                                         let shutdown_res = inbound_chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
6257                                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(format!("{}", err),
6258                                                                 msg.temporary_channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None, inbound_chan.context.get_value_satoshis()));
6259                                                 },
6260                                         }
6261                                 },
6262                                 Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(_)) | Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_)) => {
6263                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected funding_created message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id));
6264                                 },
6265                                 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
6266                         };
6267
6268                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
6269                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6270                                 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6271                                         "Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(),
6272                                         chan.context.channel_id()
6273                                 ))
6274                         },
6275                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6276                                 let mut id_to_peer_lock = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6277                                 match id_to_peer_lock.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
6278                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6279                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6280                                                         "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
6281                                                         chan.context.channel_id()))
6282                                         },
6283                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
6284                                                 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
6285                                                 if let Ok(persist_state) = monitor_res {
6286                                                         i_e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
6287                                                         mem::drop(id_to_peer_lock);
6288
6289                                                         // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
6290                                                         // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
6291                                                         // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
6292                                                         // until we have persisted our monitor.
6293                                                         if let Some(msg) = funding_msg_opt {
6294                                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
6295                                                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6296                                                                         msg,
6297                                                                 });
6298                                                         }
6299
6300                                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) {
6301                                                                 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_state, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
6302                                                                         per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
6303                                                         } else {
6304                                                                 unreachable!("This must be a funded channel as we just inserted it.");
6305                                                         }
6306                                                         Ok(())
6307                                                 } else {
6308                                                         log_error!(self.logger, "Persisting initial ChannelMonitor failed, implying the funding outpoint was duplicated");
6309                                                         let channel_id = match funding_msg_opt {
6310                                                                 Some(msg) => msg.channel_id,
6311                                                                 None => chan.context.channel_id(),
6312                                                         };
6313                                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6314                                                                 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
6315                                                                 channel_id));
6316                                                 }
6317                                         }
6318                                 }
6319                         }
6320                 }
6321         }
6322
6323         fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6324                 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6325                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6326                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6327                         .ok_or_else(|| {
6328                                 debug_assert!(false);
6329                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6330                         })?;
6331
6332                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6333                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6334                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6335                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6336                                 match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6337                                         ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) => {
6338                                                 let monitor = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6339                                                         chan.funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6340                                                 if let Ok(persist_status) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
6341                                                         handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_status, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
6342                                                         Ok(())
6343                                                 } else {
6344                                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel funding outpoint was a duplicate".to_owned())), chan_phase_entry)
6345                                                 }
6346                                         },
6347                                         _ => {
6348                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
6349                                         },
6350                                 }
6351                         },
6352                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
6353                 }
6354         }
6355
6356         fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6357                 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6358                 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6359                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6360                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6361                         .ok_or_else(|| {
6362                                 debug_assert!(false);
6363                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6364                         })?;
6365                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6366                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6367                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6368                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6369                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6370                                         let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
6371                                                 self.chain_hash, &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6372                                         if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
6373                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
6374                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6375                                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6376                                                         msg: announcement_sigs,
6377                                                 });
6378                                         } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
6379                                                 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
6380                                                 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
6381                                                 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
6382                                                 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
6383                                                 // announcement_signatures.
6384                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
6385                                                 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
6386                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6387                                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6388                                                                 msg,
6389                                                         });
6390                                                 }
6391                                         }
6392
6393                                         {
6394                                                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6395                                                 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan);
6396                                         }
6397
6398                                         Ok(())
6399                                 } else {
6400                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6401                                                 "Got a channel_ready message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry)
6402                                 }
6403                         },
6404                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
6405                                 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6406                         }
6407                 }
6408         }
6409
6410         fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6411                 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
6412                 let mut finish_shutdown = None;
6413                 {
6414                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6415                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6416                                 .ok_or_else(|| {
6417                                         debug_assert!(false);
6418                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6419                                 })?;
6420                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6421                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6422                         if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
6423                                 let phase = chan_phase_entry.get_mut();
6424                                 match phase {
6425                                         ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
6426                                                 if !chan.received_shutdown() {
6427                                                         log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
6428                                                                 msg.channel_id,
6429                                                                 if chan.sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
6430                                                 }
6431
6432                                                 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6433                                                 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6434                                                         chan.shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
6435                                                 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
6436
6437                                                 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
6438                                                         // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
6439                                                         // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
6440                                                         // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
6441                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
6442                                                                 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6443                                                                 msg,
6444                                                         });
6445                                                 }
6446                                                 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
6447                                                 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6448                                                         handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
6449                                                                 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6450                                                 }
6451                                         },
6452                                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
6453                                                 let context = phase.context_mut();
6454                                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
6455                                                 self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel);
6456                                                 let mut chan = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
6457                                                 finish_shutdown = Some(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
6458                                         },
6459                                 }
6460                         } else {
6461                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6462                         }
6463                 }
6464                 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
6465                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
6466                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
6467                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
6468                 }
6469                 if let Some(shutdown_res) = finish_shutdown {
6470                         self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
6471                 }
6472
6473                 Ok(())
6474         }
6475
6476         fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6477                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6478                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6479                         .ok_or_else(|| {
6480                                 debug_assert!(false);
6481                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6482                         })?;
6483                 let (tx, chan_option, shutdown_result) = {
6484                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6485                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6486                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
6487                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6488                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6489                                                 let (closing_signed, tx, shutdown_result) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
6490                                                 debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
6491                                                 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
6492                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
6493                                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6494                                                                 msg,
6495                                                         });
6496                                                 }
6497                                                 if tx.is_some() {
6498                                                         // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
6499                                                         // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
6500                                                         // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
6501                                                         // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
6502                                                         // watch for old state broadcasts)!
6503                                                         (tx, Some(remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry)), shutdown_result)
6504                                                 } else { (tx, None, shutdown_result) }
6505                                         } else {
6506                                                 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6507                                                         "Got a closing_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6508                                         }
6509                                 },
6510                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6511                         }
6512                 };
6513                 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
6514                         log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
6515                         self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&broadcast_tx]);
6516                 }
6517                 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = chan_option {
6518                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6519                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6520                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6521                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6522                                         msg: update
6523                                 });
6524                         }
6525                         self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
6526                 }
6527                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6528                 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
6529                         self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
6530                 }
6531                 Ok(())
6532         }
6533
6534         fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6535                 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
6536                 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
6537                 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
6538                 //
6539                 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
6540                 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
6541                 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
6542                 //but we should prevent it anyway.
6543
6544                 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6545                 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6546
6547                 let decoded_hop_res = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
6548                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6549                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6550                         .ok_or_else(|| {
6551                                 debug_assert!(false);
6552                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6553                         })?;
6554                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6555                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6556                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6557                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6558                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6559                                         let pending_forward_info = match decoded_hop_res {
6560                                                 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt)) =>
6561                                                         self.construct_pending_htlc_status(msg, shared_secret, next_hop,
6562                                                                 chan.context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_pk_opt),
6563                                                 Err(e) => PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(e)
6564                                         };
6565                                         let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<SP>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
6566                                                 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
6567                                                 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
6568                                                 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
6569                                                 match pending_forward_info {
6570                                                         PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
6571                                                                 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
6572                                                                         let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
6573                                                                         HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
6574                                                                 } else {
6575                                                                         HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
6576                                                                 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
6577                                                                 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6578                                                                         channel_id: msg.channel_id,
6579                                                                         htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
6580                                                                         reason
6581                                                                 };
6582                                                                 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
6583                                                         },
6584                                                         _ => pending_forward_info
6585                                                 }
6586                                         };
6587                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6588                                 } else {
6589                                         return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6590                                                 "Got an update_add_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6591                                 }
6592                         },
6593                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6594                 }
6595                 Ok(())
6596         }
6597
6598         fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6599                 let funding_txo;
6600                 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
6601                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6602                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6603                                 .ok_or_else(|| {
6604                                         debug_assert!(false);
6605                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6606                                 })?;
6607                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6608                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6609                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6610                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6611                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6612                                                 let res = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
6613                                                 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop) = &res.0 {
6614                                                         log_trace!(self.logger,
6615                                                                 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
6616                                                                 msg.channel_id);
6617                                                         peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates.entry(msg.channel_id)
6618                                                                 .or_insert_with(Vec::new)
6619                                                                 .push(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&prev_hop));
6620                                                 }
6621                                                 // Note that we do not need to push an `actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates`
6622                                                 // entry here, even though we *do* need to block the next RAA monitor update.
6623                                                 // We do this instead in the `claim_funds_internal` by attaching a
6624                                                 // `ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate` action to the event generated when the
6625                                                 // outbound HTLC is claimed. This is guaranteed to all complete before we
6626                                                 // process the RAA as messages are processed from single peers serially.
6627                                                 funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().expect("We won't accept a fulfill until funded");
6628                                                 res
6629                                         } else {
6630                                                 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6631                                                         "Got an update_fulfill_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6632                                         }
6633                                 },
6634                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6635                         }
6636                 };
6637                 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, false, Some(*counterparty_node_id), funding_txo);
6638                 Ok(())
6639         }
6640
6641         fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6642                 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6643                 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6644                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6645                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6646                         .ok_or_else(|| {
6647                                 debug_assert!(false);
6648                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6649                         })?;
6650                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6651                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6652                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6653                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6654                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6655                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan_phase_entry);
6656                                 } else {
6657                                         return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6658                                                 "Got an update_fail_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6659                                 }
6660                         },
6661                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6662                 }
6663                 Ok(())
6664         }
6665
6666         fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6667                 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6668                 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6669                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6670                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6671                         .ok_or_else(|| {
6672                                 debug_assert!(false);
6673                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6674                         })?;
6675                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6676                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6677                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6678                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6679                                 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
6680                                         let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
6681                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan_phase_entry);
6682                                 }
6683                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6684                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan_phase_entry);
6685                                 } else {
6686                                         return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6687                                                 "Got an update_fail_malformed_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6688                                 }
6689                                 Ok(())
6690                         },
6691                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6692                 }
6693         }
6694
6695         fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6696                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6697                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6698                         .ok_or_else(|| {
6699                                 debug_assert!(false);
6700                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6701                         })?;
6702                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6703                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6704                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6705                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6706                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6707                                         let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6708                                         let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6709                                         if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6710                                                 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
6711                                                         peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6712                                         }
6713                                         Ok(())
6714                                 } else {
6715                                         return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6716                                                 "Got a commitment_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6717                                 }
6718                         },
6719                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6720                 }
6721         }
6722
6723         #[inline]
6724         fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
6725                 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
6726                         let mut push_forward_event = false;
6727                         let mut new_intercept_events = VecDeque::new();
6728                         let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
6729                         if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
6730                                 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
6731                                         let scid = match forward_info.routing {
6732                                                 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6733                                                 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
6734                                                 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
6735                                         };
6736                                         // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
6737                                         let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
6738
6739                                         let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6740                                         let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
6741                                         match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
6742                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
6743                                                         entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6744                                                                 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
6745                                                 },
6746                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6747                                                         if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
6748                                                            fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.chain_hash)
6749                                                         {
6750                                                                 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).into_inner());
6751                                                                 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6752                                                                 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
6753                                                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6754                                                                                 new_intercept_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
6755                                                                                         requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
6756                                                                                         payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
6757                                                                                         inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
6758                                                                                         expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
6759                                                                                         intercept_id
6760                                                                                 }, None));
6761                                                                                 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6762                                                                                         prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
6763                                                                         },
6764                                                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6765                                                                                 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
6766                                                                                 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6767                                                                                         short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
6768                                                                                         user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
6769                                                                                         outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
6770                                                                                         htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
6771                                                                                         incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6772                                                                                         phantom_shared_secret: None,
6773                                                                                 });
6774
6775                                                                                 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
6776                                                                                                 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
6777                                                                                                 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
6778                                                                                 ));
6779                                                                         }
6780                                                                 }
6781                                                         } else {
6782                                                                 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
6783                                                                 // payments are being processed.
6784                                                                 if forward_htlcs_empty {
6785                                                                         push_forward_event = true;
6786                                                                 }
6787                                                                 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6788                                                                         prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
6789                                                         }
6790                                                 }
6791                                         }
6792                                 }
6793                         }
6794
6795                         for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
6796                                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
6797                         }
6798
6799                         if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
6800                                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6801                                 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
6802                         }
6803                         if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
6804                 }
6805         }
6806
6807         fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
6808                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6809                 let is_processing_events = self.pending_events_processor.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6810                 let num_forward_events = pending_events.iter().filter(|(ev, _)|
6811                         if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false }
6812                 ).count();
6813                 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued. Processing
6814                 // events is done in batches and they are not removed until we're done processing each
6815                 // batch. Since handling a `PendingHTLCsForwardable` event will call back into the
6816                 // `ChannelManager`, we'll still see the original forwarding event not removed. Phantom
6817                 // payments will need an additional forwarding event before being claimed to make them look
6818                 // real by taking more time.
6819                 if (is_processing_events && num_forward_events <= 1) || num_forward_events < 1 {
6820                         pending_events.push_back((Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
6821                                 time_forwardable: Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
6822                         }, None));
6823                 }
6824         }
6825
6826         /// Checks whether [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s generated by the receipt of a remote
6827         /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] should be held for the given channel until some other action
6828         /// completes. Note that this needs to happen in the same [`PeerState`] mutex as any release of
6829         /// the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in question.
6830         fn raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
6831                 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: &BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
6832                 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
6833         ) -> bool {
6834                 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
6835                         .get(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).map(|v| !v.is_empty()).unwrap_or(false)
6836                 || self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().iter().any(|(_, action)| {
6837                         action == &Some(EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
6838                                 channel_funding_outpoint,
6839                                 counterparty_node_id,
6840                         })
6841                 })
6842         }
6843
6844         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6845         pub(crate) fn test_raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
6846                 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_id: ChannelId
6847         ) -> bool {
6848                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6849                 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
6850                         let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6851                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
6852
6853                         if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&channel_id) {
6854                                 return self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
6855                                         chan.context().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), counterparty_node_id);
6856                         }
6857                 }
6858                 false
6859         }
6860
6861         fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6862                 let htlcs_to_fail = {
6863                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6864                         let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6865                                 .ok_or_else(|| {
6866                                         debug_assert!(false);
6867                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6868                                 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
6869                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6870                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6871                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6872                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6873                                                 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6874                                                 let mon_update_blocked = if let Some(funding_txo) = funding_txo_opt {
6875                                                         self.raa_monitor_updates_held(
6876                                                                 &peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates, funding_txo,
6877                                                                 *counterparty_node_id)
6878                                                 } else { false };
6879                                                 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6880                                                         chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger, mon_update_blocked), chan_phase_entry);
6881                                                 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6882                                                         let funding_txo = funding_txo_opt
6883                                                                 .expect("Funding outpoint must have been set for RAA handling to succeed");
6884                                                         handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update,
6885                                                                 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6886                                                 }
6887                                                 htlcs_to_fail
6888                                         } else {
6889                                                 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6890                                                         "Got a revoke_and_ack message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6891                                         }
6892                                 },
6893                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6894                         }
6895                 };
6896                 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
6897                 Ok(())
6898         }
6899
6900         fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6901                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6902                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6903                         .ok_or_else(|| {
6904                                 debug_assert!(false);
6905                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6906                         })?;
6907                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6908                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6909                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6910                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6911                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6912                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6913                                 } else {
6914                                         return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6915                                                 "Got an update_fee message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6916                                 }
6917                         },
6918                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6919                 }
6920                 Ok(())
6921         }
6922
6923         fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6924                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6925                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6926                         .ok_or_else(|| {
6927                                 debug_assert!(false);
6928                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6929                         })?;
6930                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6931                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6932                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6933                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6934                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6935                                         if !chan.context.is_usable() {
6936                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
6937                                         }
6938
6939                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
6940                                                 msg: try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.announcement_signatures(
6941                                                         &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
6942                                                         msg, &self.default_configuration
6943                                                 ), chan_phase_entry),
6944                                                 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
6945                                                 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
6946                                                 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan).unwrap()),
6947                                         });
6948                                 } else {
6949                                         return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6950                                                 "Got an announcement_signatures message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6951                                 }
6952                         },
6953                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6954                 }
6955                 Ok(())
6956         }
6957
6958         /// Returns DoPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersistNoEvents or an Err.
6959         fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6960                 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
6961                         Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
6962                         None => {
6963                                 // It's not a local channel
6964                                 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
6965                         }
6966                 };
6967                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6968                 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
6969                 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
6970                         return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
6971                 }
6972                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6973                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6974                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
6975                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6976                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6977                                         if chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6978                                                 if chan.context.should_announce() {
6979                                                         // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
6980                                                         // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
6981                                                         // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
6982                                                         return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
6983                                                 }
6984                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
6985                                         }
6986                                         let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
6987                                         let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
6988                                         if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
6989                                                 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
6990                                         } else {
6991                                                 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update {:?} for channel {}.", msg, chan_id);
6992                                                 let did_change = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_update(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
6993                                                 // If nothing changed after applying their update, we don't need to bother
6994                                                 // persisting.
6995                                                 if !did_change {
6996                                                         return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
6997                                                 }
6998                                         }
6999                                 } else {
7000                                         return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7001                                                 "Got a channel_update for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7002                                 }
7003                         },
7004                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
7005                 }
7006                 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
7007         }
7008
7009         fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7010                 let htlc_forwards;
7011                 let need_lnd_workaround = {
7012                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7013
7014                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7015                                 .ok_or_else(|| {
7016                                         debug_assert!(false);
7017                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7018                                                 format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id),
7019                                                 msg.channel_id
7020                                         )
7021                                 })?;
7022                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7023                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7024                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7025                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7026                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7027                                                 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
7028                                                 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
7029                                                 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
7030                                                 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
7031                                                 let responses = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_reestablish(
7032                                                         msg, &self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash,
7033                                                         &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan_phase_entry);
7034                                                 let mut channel_update = None;
7035                                                 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
7036                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
7037                                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7038                                                                 msg,
7039                                                         });
7040                                                 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
7041                                                         // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
7042                                                         // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
7043                                                         // they have the latest channel parameters.
7044                                                         if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
7045                                                                 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
7046                                                                         node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7047                                                                         msg,
7048                                                                 });
7049                                                         }
7050                                                 }
7051                                                 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
7052                                                 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
7053                                                         &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
7054                                                         Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
7055                                                 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
7056                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
7057                                                 }
7058                                                 need_lnd_workaround
7059                                         } else {
7060                                                 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7061                                                         "Got a channel_reestablish message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7062                                         }
7063                                 },
7064                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
7065                                         log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending bogus ChannelReestablish for unknown channel {} to force channel closure",
7066                                                 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id.0));
7067                                         // Unfortunately, lnd doesn't force close on errors
7068                                         // (https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/blob/abb1e3463f3a83bbb843d5c399869dbe930ad94f/htlcswitch/link.go#L2119).
7069                                         // One of the few ways to get an lnd counterparty to force close is by
7070                                         // replicating what they do when restoring static channel backups (SCBs). They
7071                                         // send an invalid `ChannelReestablish` with `0` commitment numbers and an
7072                                         // invalid `your_last_per_commitment_secret`.
7073                                         //
7074                                         // Since we received a `ChannelReestablish` for a channel that doesn't exist, we
7075                                         // can assume it's likely the channel closed from our point of view, but it
7076                                         // remains open on the counterparty's side. By sending this bogus
7077                                         // `ChannelReestablish` message now as a response to theirs, we trigger them to
7078                                         // force close broadcasting their latest state. If the closing transaction from
7079                                         // our point of view remains unconfirmed, it'll enter a race with the
7080                                         // counterparty's to-be-broadcast latest commitment transaction.
7081                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
7082                                                 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7083                                                 msg: msgs::ChannelReestablish {
7084                                                         channel_id: msg.channel_id,
7085                                                         next_local_commitment_number: 0,
7086                                                         next_remote_commitment_number: 0,
7087                                                         your_last_per_commitment_secret: [1u8; 32],
7088                                                         my_current_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_slice(&[2u8; 33]).unwrap(),
7089                                                         next_funding_txid: None,
7090                                                 },
7091                                         });
7092                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7093                                                 format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}",
7094                                                         counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7095                                         )
7096                                 }
7097                         }
7098                 };
7099
7100                 let mut persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
7101                 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
7102                         self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
7103                         persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7104                 }
7105
7106                 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
7107                         self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
7108                 }
7109                 Ok(persist)
7110         }
7111
7112         /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
7113         fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
7114                 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
7115
7116                 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
7117                 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
7118                 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
7119                 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
7120                         for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
7121                                 match monitor_event {
7122                                         MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
7123                                                 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
7124                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", preimage);
7125                                                         self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, false, counterparty_node_id, funding_outpoint);
7126                                                 } else {
7127                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", &htlc_update.payment_hash);
7128                                                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
7129                                                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
7130                                                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
7131                                                 }
7132                                         },
7133                                         MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(funding_outpoint) => {
7134                                                 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
7135                                                         Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
7136                                                         None => {
7137                                                                 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
7138                                                                 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
7139                                                                 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7140                                                                 id_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).cloned()
7141                                                         }
7142                                                 };
7143                                                 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
7144                                                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7145                                                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7146                                                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7147                                                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7148                                                                 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7149                                                                 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
7150                                                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
7151                                                                                 failed_channels.push(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
7152                                                                                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7153                                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7154                                                                                                 msg: update
7155                                                                                         });
7156                                                                                 }
7157                                                                                 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
7158                                                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
7159                                                                                         node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7160                                                                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
7161                                                                                                 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.context.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() })
7162                                                                                         },
7163                                                                                 });
7164                                                                         }
7165                                                                 }
7166                                                         }
7167                                                 }
7168                                         },
7169                                         MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
7170                                                 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
7171                                         },
7172                                 }
7173                         }
7174                 }
7175
7176                 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7177                         self.finish_close_channel(failure);
7178                 }
7179
7180                 has_pending_monitor_events
7181         }
7182
7183         /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
7184         /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
7185         /// update events as a separate process method here.
7186         #[cfg(fuzzing)]
7187         pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
7188                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7189                 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
7190         }
7191
7192         /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
7193         /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
7194         /// update was applied.
7195         fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
7196                 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
7197                 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
7198
7199                 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
7200                 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
7201                 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
7202                 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
7203                 'peer_loop: loop {
7204                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7205                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7206                                 'chan_loop: loop {
7207                                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7208                                         let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7209                                         for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
7210                                                 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
7211                                         ) {
7212                                                 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
7213                                                 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
7214                                                 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
7215                                                         chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
7216                                                 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
7217                                                         failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
7218                                                 }
7219                                                 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
7220                                                         has_monitor_update = true;
7221
7222                                                         handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update,
7223                                                                 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7224                                                         continue 'peer_loop;
7225                                                 }
7226                                         }
7227                                         break 'chan_loop;
7228                                 }
7229                         }
7230                         break 'peer_loop;
7231                 }
7232
7233                 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty();
7234                 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7235                         self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
7236                 }
7237
7238                 has_update
7239         }
7240
7241         /// When a call to a [`ChannelSigner`] method returns an error, this indicates that the signer
7242         /// is (temporarily) unavailable, and the operation should be retried later.
7243         ///
7244         /// This method allows for that retry - either checking for any signer-pending messages to be
7245         /// attempted in every channel, or in the specifically provided channel.
7246         ///
7247         /// [`ChannelSigner`]: crate::sign::ChannelSigner
7248         #[cfg(test)] // This is only implemented for one signer method, and should be private until we
7249                      // actually finish implementing it fully.
7250         pub fn signer_unblocked(&self, channel_opt: Option<(PublicKey, ChannelId)>) {
7251                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7252
7253                 let unblock_chan = |phase: &mut ChannelPhase<SP>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>| {
7254                         let node_id = phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id();
7255                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
7256                                 let msgs = chan.signer_maybe_unblocked(&self.logger);
7257                                 if let Some(updates) = msgs.commitment_update {
7258                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
7259                                                 node_id,
7260                                                 updates,
7261                                         });
7262                                 }
7263                                 if let Some(msg) = msgs.funding_signed {
7264                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
7265                                                 node_id,
7266                                                 msg,
7267                                         });
7268                                 }
7269                                 if let Some(msg) = msgs.funding_created {
7270                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
7271                                                 node_id,
7272                                                 msg,
7273                                         });
7274                                 }
7275                                 if let Some(msg) = msgs.channel_ready {
7276                                         send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, chan, msg);
7277                                 }
7278                         }
7279                 };
7280
7281                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7282                 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, channel_id)) = channel_opt {
7283                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7284                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7285                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7286                                 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
7287                                         unblock_chan(chan, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
7288                                 }
7289                         }
7290                 } else {
7291                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7292                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7293                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7294                                 for (_, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
7295                                         unblock_chan(chan, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
7296                                 }
7297                         }
7298                 }
7299         }
7300
7301         /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
7302         /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
7303         /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
7304         fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
7305                 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
7306                 let mut has_update = false;
7307                 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
7308                 {
7309                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7310
7311                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7312                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7313                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7314                                 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7315                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, phase| {
7316                                         match phase {
7317                                                 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
7318                                                         match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
7319                                                                 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt, shutdown_result_opt)) => {
7320                                                                         if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
7321                                                                                 has_update = true;
7322                                                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
7323                                                                                         node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
7324                                                                                 });
7325                                                                         }
7326                                                                         debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result_opt.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
7327                                                                         if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result_opt {
7328                                                                                 shutdown_results.push(shutdown_result);
7329                                                                         }
7330                                                                         if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
7331                                                                                 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
7332                                                                                 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
7333                                                                                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7334                                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7335                                                                                                 msg: update
7336                                                                                         });
7337                                                                                 }
7338
7339                                                                                 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
7340
7341                                                                                 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
7342                                                                                 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
7343                                                                                 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
7344                                                                                 false
7345                                                                         } else { true }
7346                                                                 },
7347                                                                 Err(e) => {
7348                                                                         has_update = true;
7349                                                                         let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
7350                                                                         handle_errors.push((chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
7351                                                                         !close_channel
7352                                                                 }
7353                                                         }
7354                                                 },
7355                                                 _ => true, // Retain unfunded channels if present.
7356                                         }
7357                                 });
7358                         }
7359                 }
7360
7361                 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
7362                         let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
7363                 }
7364
7365                 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
7366                         self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
7367                 }
7368
7369                 has_update
7370         }
7371
7372         /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
7373         /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
7374         /// Channel object.
7375         fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
7376                 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7377                         // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
7378                         // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
7379                         // reorganized out of the main chain.
7380                         // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
7381                         // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
7382                         // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
7383                         // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
7384                         if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = failure.monitor_update.take() {
7385                                 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
7386                                 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
7387                                         assert!(should_broadcast);
7388                                 } else { unreachable!(); }
7389                                 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
7390                                         BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
7391                                                 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
7392                                         });
7393                         }
7394                         self.finish_close_channel(failure);
7395                 }
7396         }
7397
7398         /// Creates an [`OfferBuilder`] such that the [`Offer`] it builds is recognized by the
7399         /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`InvoiceRequest`] messages for the offer. The offer will
7400         /// not have an expiration unless otherwise set on the builder.
7401         ///
7402         /// # Privacy
7403         ///
7404         /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the offer with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the
7405         /// introduction node and a derived signing pubkey for recipient privacy. As such, currently,
7406         /// the node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction
7407         /// node in order to send the [`InvoiceRequest`].
7408         ///
7409         /// # Limitations
7410         ///
7411         /// Requires a direct connection to the introduction node in the responding [`InvoiceRequest`]'s
7412         /// reply path.
7413         ///
7414         /// This is not exported to bindings users as builder patterns don't map outside of move semantics.
7415         ///
7416         /// [`Offer`]: crate::offers::offer::Offer
7417         /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
7418         pub fn create_offer_builder(
7419                 &self, description: String
7420         ) -> OfferBuilder<DerivedMetadata, secp256k1::All> {
7421                 let node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
7422                 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7423                 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7424                 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7425                 let path = self.create_one_hop_blinded_path();
7426
7427                 OfferBuilder::deriving_signing_pubkey(description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx)
7428                         .chain_hash(self.chain_hash)
7429                         .path(path)
7430         }
7431
7432         /// Creates a [`RefundBuilder`] such that the [`Refund`] it builds is recognized by the
7433         /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`Bolt12Invoice`] messages for the refund.
7434         ///
7435         /// # Payment
7436         ///
7437         /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the refund.
7438         /// See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has been sent.
7439         ///
7440         /// The builder will have the provided expiration set. Any changes to the expiration on the
7441         /// returned builder will not be honored by [`ChannelManager`]. For `no-std`, the highest seen
7442         /// block time minus two hours is used for the current time when determining if the refund has
7443         /// expired.
7444         ///
7445         /// To revoke the refund, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
7446         /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received before expiration, the payment will fail
7447         /// with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
7448         ///
7449         /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
7450         /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
7451         ///
7452         /// # Privacy
7453         ///
7454         /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the refund with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as
7455         /// the introduction node and a derived payer id for payer privacy. As such, currently, the
7456         /// node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction node
7457         /// in order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
7458         ///
7459         /// # Limitations
7460         ///
7461         /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in the responding
7462         /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
7463         ///
7464         /// # Errors
7465         ///
7466         /// Errors if a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link
7467         /// or if `amount_msats` is invalid.
7468         ///
7469         /// This is not exported to bindings users as builder patterns don't map outside of move semantics.
7470         ///
7471         /// [`Refund`]: crate::offers::refund::Refund
7472         /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7473         /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
7474         pub fn create_refund_builder(
7475                 &self, description: String, amount_msats: u64, absolute_expiry: Duration,
7476                 payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry, max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
7477         ) -> Result<RefundBuilder<secp256k1::All>, Bolt12SemanticError> {
7478                 let node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
7479                 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7480                 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7481                 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7482                 let path = self.create_one_hop_blinded_path();
7483
7484                 let builder = RefundBuilder::deriving_payer_id(
7485                         description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, amount_msats, payment_id
7486                 )?
7487                         .chain_hash(self.chain_hash)
7488                         .absolute_expiry(absolute_expiry)
7489                         .path(path);
7490
7491                 let expiration = StaleExpiration::AbsoluteTimeout(absolute_expiry);
7492                 self.pending_outbound_payments
7493                         .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
7494                                 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat,
7495                         )
7496                         .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
7497
7498                 Ok(builder)
7499         }
7500
7501         /// Pays for an [`Offer`] using the given parameters by creating an [`InvoiceRequest`] and
7502         /// enqueuing it to be sent via an onion message. [`ChannelManager`] will pay the actual
7503         /// [`Bolt12Invoice`] once it is received.
7504         ///
7505         /// Uses [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`] such that the [`InvoiceRequest`] it builds is recognized by
7506         /// the [`ChannelManager`] when handling a [`Bolt12Invoice`] message in response to the request.
7507         /// The optional parameters are used in the builder, if `Some`:
7508         /// - `quantity` for [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`] which must be set if
7509         ///   [`Offer::expects_quantity`] is `true`.
7510         /// - `amount_msats` if overpaying what is required for the given `quantity` is desired, and
7511         /// - `payer_note` for [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`].
7512         ///
7513         /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
7514         /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
7515         ///
7516         /// # Payment
7517         ///
7518         /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the request
7519         /// when received. See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has
7520         /// been sent.
7521         ///
7522         /// To revoke the request, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
7523         /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received in a reasonable amount of time, the
7524         /// payment will fail with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
7525         ///
7526         /// # Privacy
7527         ///
7528         /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the reply path with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`]
7529         /// as the introduction node and a derived payer id for payer privacy. As such, currently, the
7530         /// node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction node
7531         /// in order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
7532         ///
7533         /// # Limitations
7534         ///
7535         /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Offer::paths`] or to
7536         /// [`Offer::signing_pubkey`], if empty. A similar restriction applies to the responding
7537         /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
7538         ///
7539         /// # Errors
7540         ///
7541         /// Errors if a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link
7542         /// or if the provided parameters are invalid for the offer.
7543         ///
7544         /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
7545         /// [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::quantity
7546         /// [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::payer_note
7547         /// [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequestBuilder
7548         /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7549         /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
7550         /// [Avoiding Duplicate Payments]: #avoiding-duplicate-payments
7551         pub fn pay_for_offer(
7552                 &self, offer: &Offer, quantity: Option<u64>, amount_msats: Option<u64>,
7553                 payer_note: Option<String>, payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry,
7554                 max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
7555         ) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
7556                 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7557                 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7558                 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7559
7560                 let builder = offer
7561                         .request_invoice_deriving_payer_id(expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, payment_id)?
7562                         .chain_hash(self.chain_hash)?;
7563                 let builder = match quantity {
7564                         None => builder,
7565                         Some(quantity) => builder.quantity(quantity)?,
7566                 };
7567                 let builder = match amount_msats {
7568                         None => builder,
7569                         Some(amount_msats) => builder.amount_msats(amount_msats)?,
7570                 };
7571                 let builder = match payer_note {
7572                         None => builder,
7573                         Some(payer_note) => builder.payer_note(payer_note),
7574                 };
7575
7576                 let invoice_request = builder.build_and_sign()?;
7577                 let reply_path = self.create_one_hop_blinded_path();
7578
7579                 let expiration = StaleExpiration::TimerTicks(1);
7580                 self.pending_outbound_payments
7581                         .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
7582                                 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat
7583                         )
7584                         .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
7585
7586                 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
7587                 if offer.paths().is_empty() {
7588                         let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7589                                 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request),
7590                                 Destination::Node(offer.signing_pubkey()),
7591                                 Some(reply_path),
7592                         );
7593                         pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7594                 } else {
7595                         // Send as many invoice requests as there are paths in the offer (with an upper bound).
7596                         // Using only one path could result in a failure if the path no longer exists. But only
7597                         // one invoice for a given payment id will be paid, even if more than one is received.
7598                         const REQUEST_LIMIT: usize = 10;
7599                         for path in offer.paths().into_iter().take(REQUEST_LIMIT) {
7600                                 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7601                                         OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request.clone()),
7602                                         Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
7603                                         Some(reply_path.clone()),
7604                                 );
7605                                 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7606                         }
7607                 }
7608
7609                 Ok(())
7610         }
7611
7612         /// Creates a [`Bolt12Invoice`] for a [`Refund`] and enqueues it to be sent via an onion
7613         /// message.
7614         ///
7615         /// The resulting invoice uses a [`PaymentHash`] recognized by the [`ChannelManager`] and a
7616         /// [`BlindedPath`] containing the [`PaymentSecret`] needed to reconstruct the corresponding
7617         /// [`PaymentPreimage`].
7618         ///
7619         /// # Limitations
7620         ///
7621         /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Refund::paths`] or to
7622         /// [`Refund::payer_id`], if empty. This request is best effort; an invoice will be sent to each
7623         /// node meeting the aforementioned criteria, but there's no guarantee that they will be
7624         /// received and no retries will be made.
7625         ///
7626         /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7627         pub fn request_refund_payment(&self, refund: &Refund) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
7628                 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7629                 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7630                 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7631
7632                 let amount_msats = refund.amount_msats();
7633                 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
7634
7635                 match self.create_inbound_payment(Some(amount_msats), relative_expiry, None) {
7636                         Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => {
7637                                 let payment_paths = vec![
7638                                         self.create_one_hop_blinded_payment_path(payment_secret),
7639                                 ];
7640                                 #[cfg(not(feature = "no-std"))]
7641                                 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys(
7642                                         payment_paths, payment_hash, expanded_key, entropy
7643                                 )?;
7644                                 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
7645                                 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
7646                                         self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
7647                                 );
7648                                 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
7649                                 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
7650                                         payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at, expanded_key, entropy
7651                                 )?;
7652                                 let invoice = builder.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)?;
7653                                 let reply_path = self.create_one_hop_blinded_path();
7654
7655                                 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
7656                                 if refund.paths().is_empty() {
7657                                         let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7658                                                 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice),
7659                                                 Destination::Node(refund.payer_id()),
7660                                                 Some(reply_path),
7661                                         );
7662                                         pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7663                                 } else {
7664                                         for path in refund.paths() {
7665                                                 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7666                                                         OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice.clone()),
7667                                                         Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
7668                                                         Some(reply_path.clone()),
7669                                                 );
7670                                                 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7671                                         }
7672                                 }
7673
7674                                 Ok(())
7675                         },
7676                         Err(()) => Err(Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount),
7677                 }
7678         }
7679
7680         /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
7681         /// to pay us.
7682         ///
7683         /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
7684         /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
7685         ///
7686         /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
7687         /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
7688         /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
7689         /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
7690         ///
7691         /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
7692         ///
7693         /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
7694         /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
7695         ///
7696         /// # Note
7697         ///
7698         /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
7699         /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
7700         ///
7701         /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
7702         ///
7703         /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
7704         /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
7705         ///
7706         /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
7707         /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
7708         /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
7709         /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
7710         /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
7711         /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
7712         pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
7713                 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
7714                 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
7715                         &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
7716                         min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
7717         }
7718
7719         /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
7720         /// stored external to LDK.
7721         ///
7722         /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
7723         /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
7724         /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
7725         ///
7726         /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
7727         /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
7728         /// payments.
7729         ///
7730         /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
7731         /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
7732         /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
7733         /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
7734         ///
7735         /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
7736         /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
7737         /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
7738         /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
7739         /// invoices when no timeout is set.
7740         ///
7741         /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
7742         /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
7743         /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
7744         /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
7745         /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
7746         ///
7747         /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
7748         /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
7749         ///
7750         /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
7751         /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
7752         ///
7753         /// # Note
7754         ///
7755         /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
7756         /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
7757         ///
7758         /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
7759         ///
7760         /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
7761         /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
7762         ///
7763         /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
7764         /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
7765         pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
7766                 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
7767                 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
7768                         invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
7769                         min_final_cltv_expiry)
7770         }
7771
7772         /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
7773         /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
7774         ///
7775         /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
7776         pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
7777                 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
7778         }
7779
7780         /// Creates a one-hop blinded path with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction
7781         /// node.
7782         fn create_one_hop_blinded_path(&self) -> BlindedPath {
7783                 let entropy_source = self.entropy_source.deref();
7784                 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7785                 BlindedPath::one_hop_for_message(self.get_our_node_id(), entropy_source, secp_ctx).unwrap()
7786         }
7787
7788         /// Creates a one-hop blinded path with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction
7789         /// node.
7790         fn create_one_hop_blinded_payment_path(
7791                 &self, payment_secret: PaymentSecret
7792         ) -> (BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath) {
7793                 let entropy_source = self.entropy_source.deref();
7794                 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7795
7796                 let payee_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
7797                 let max_cltv_expiry = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
7798                 let payee_tlvs = ReceiveTlvs {
7799                         payment_secret,
7800                         payment_constraints: PaymentConstraints {
7801                                 max_cltv_expiry,
7802                                 htlc_minimum_msat: 1,
7803                         },
7804                 };
7805                 // TODO: Err for overflow?
7806                 BlindedPath::one_hop_for_payment(
7807                         payee_node_id, payee_tlvs, entropy_source, secp_ctx
7808                 ).unwrap()
7809         }
7810
7811         /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
7812         /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
7813         ///
7814         /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
7815         pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
7816                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7817                 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
7818                 loop {
7819                         let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
7820                         // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
7821                         match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
7822                                 Some(_) => continue,
7823                                 None => return scid_candidate
7824                         }
7825                 }
7826         }
7827
7828         /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
7829         ///
7830         /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
7831         pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
7832                 PhantomRouteHints {
7833                         channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
7834                         phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
7835                         real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
7836                 }
7837         }
7838
7839         /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
7840         /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
7841         /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
7842         ///
7843         /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
7844         /// times to get a unique scid.
7845         pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
7846                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7847                 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
7848                 loop {
7849                         let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
7850                         // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
7851                         if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
7852                         return scid_candidate
7853                 }
7854         }
7855
7856         /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
7857         /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
7858         pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
7859                 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
7860
7861                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7862                 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7863                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7864                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7865                         for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(
7866                                 |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
7867                         ) {
7868                                 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
7869                                         if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
7870                                                 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
7871                                         }
7872                                 }
7873                         }
7874                 }
7875
7876                 inflight_htlcs
7877         }
7878
7879         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
7880         pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
7881                 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
7882                 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
7883                 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
7884                 events.into_inner()
7885         }
7886
7887         #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
7888         pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
7889                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7890                 events.push_back((event, None));
7891         }
7892
7893         #[cfg(test)]
7894         pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
7895                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7896                 events.pop_front().map(|(e, _)| e)
7897         }
7898
7899         #[cfg(test)]
7900         pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
7901                 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
7902         }
7903
7904         #[cfg(test)]
7905         pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
7906                 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
7907         }
7908
7909         /// When something which was blocking a channel from updating its [`ChannelMonitor`] (e.g. an
7910         /// [`Event`] being handled) completes, this should be called to restore the channel to normal
7911         /// operation. It will double-check that nothing *else* is also blocking the same channel from
7912         /// making progress and then let any blocked [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s fly.
7913         fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, mut completed_blocker: Option<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>) {
7914                 loop {
7915                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7916                         if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7917                                 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
7918                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
7919
7920                                 if let Some(blocker) = completed_blocker.take() {
7921                                         // Only do this on the first iteration of the loop.
7922                                         if let Some(blockers) = peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
7923                                                 .get_mut(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
7924                                         {
7925                                                 blockers.retain(|iter| iter != &blocker);
7926                                         }
7927                                 }
7928
7929                                 if self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
7930                                         channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id) {
7931                                         // Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have anything else
7932                                         // blocking monitor updates for this channel. If we do, release the monitor
7933                                         // update(s) when those blockers complete.
7934                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another channel's mon update needs to complete first",
7935                                                 &channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
7936                                         break;
7937                                 }
7938
7939                                 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
7940                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7941                                                 debug_assert_eq!(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
7942                                                 if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
7943                                                         log_debug!(self.logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
7944                                                                 channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
7945                                                         handle_new_monitor_update!(self, channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update,
7946                                                                 peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7947                                                         if further_update_exists {
7948                                                                 // If there are more `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to process, restart at the
7949                                                                 // top of the loop.
7950                                                                 continue;
7951                                                         }
7952                                                 } else {
7953                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
7954                                                                 channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
7955                                                 }
7956                                         }
7957                                 }
7958                         } else {
7959                                 log_debug!(self.logger,
7960                                         "Got a release post-RAA monitor update for peer {} but the channel is gone",
7961                                         log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
7962                         }
7963                         break;
7964                 }
7965         }
7966
7967         fn handle_post_event_actions(&self, actions: Vec<EventCompletionAction>) {
7968                 for action in actions {
7969                         match action {
7970                                 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
7971                                         channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id
7972                                 } => {
7973                                         self.handle_monitor_update_release(counterparty_node_id, channel_funding_outpoint, None);
7974                                 }
7975                         }
7976                 }
7977         }
7978
7979         /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
7980         /// using the given event handler.
7981         ///
7982         /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
7983         pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
7984                 &self, handler: H
7985         ) {
7986                 let mut ev;
7987                 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
7988         }
7989 }
7990
7991 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7992 where
7993         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7994         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7995         ES::Target: EntropySource,
7996         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7997         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7998         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7999         R::Target: Router,
8000         L::Target: Logger,
8001 {
8002         /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
8003         /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
8004         /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
8005         /// is always placed next to each other.
8006         ///
8007         /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
8008         /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
8009         /// `MessageSendEvent`s  for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
8010         /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
8011         ///
8012         /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
8013         /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
8014         /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
8015         fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
8016                 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
8017                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8018                         let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
8019
8020                         // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
8021                         // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
8022                         if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
8023                                 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8024                         }
8025
8026                         if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
8027                                 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8028                         }
8029                         if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
8030                                 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8031                         }
8032
8033                         let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
8034                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8035                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8036                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8037                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8038                                 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
8039                                         pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
8040                                 }
8041                         }
8042
8043                         if !pending_events.is_empty() {
8044                                 events.replace(pending_events);
8045                         }
8046
8047                         result
8048                 });
8049                 events.into_inner()
8050         }
8051 }
8052
8053 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8054 where
8055         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8056         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8057         ES::Target: EntropySource,
8058         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8059         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8060         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8061         R::Target: Router,
8062         L::Target: Logger,
8063 {
8064         /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
8065         ///
8066         /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
8067         /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
8068         fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
8069                 let mut ev;
8070                 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
8071         }
8072 }
8073
8074 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8075 where
8076         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8077         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8078         ES::Target: EntropySource,
8079         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8080         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8081         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8082         R::Target: Router,
8083         L::Target: Logger,
8084 {
8085         fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
8086                 {
8087                         let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
8088                         assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
8089                                 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
8090                         assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
8091                                 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
8092                 }
8093
8094                 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
8095                 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
8096         }
8097
8098         fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
8099                 let _persistence_guard =
8100                         PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8101                                 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8102                 let new_height = height - 1;
8103                 {
8104                         let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
8105                         assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
8106                                 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
8107                         assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
8108                                 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
8109                         *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
8110                 }
8111
8112                 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
8113         }
8114 }
8115
8116 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8117 where
8118         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8119         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8120         ES::Target: EntropySource,
8121         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8122         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8123         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8124         R::Target: Router,
8125         L::Target: Logger,
8126 {
8127         fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
8128                 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8129                 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8130                 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8131
8132                 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
8133                 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
8134
8135                 let _persistence_guard =
8136                         PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8137                                 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8138                 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)
8139                         .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
8140
8141                 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
8142                 if height < last_best_block_height {
8143                         let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
8144                         self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
8145                 }
8146         }
8147
8148         fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
8149                 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8150                 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8151                 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8152
8153                 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
8154                 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
8155
8156                 let _persistence_guard =
8157                         PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8158                                 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8159                 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
8160
8161                 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
8162
8163                 macro_rules! max_time {
8164                         ($timestamp: expr) => {
8165                                 loop {
8166                                         // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
8167                                         // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
8168                                         // having an explicit local time source.
8169                                         // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
8170                                         // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
8171                                         let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
8172                                         if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
8173                                         if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
8174                                                 break;
8175                                         }
8176                                 }
8177                         }
8178                 }
8179                 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
8180                 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
8181                 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
8182                         inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
8183                 });
8184         }
8185
8186         fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
8187                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
8188                 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
8189                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8190                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8191                         for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(|phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }) {
8192                                 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(block_hash)) = (chan.context.get_funding_txo(), chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
8193                                         res.push((funding_txo.txid, Some(block_hash)));
8194                                 }
8195                         }
8196                 }
8197                 res
8198         }
8199
8200         fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
8201                 let _persistence_guard =
8202                         PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8203                                 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8204                 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
8205                         if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
8206                                 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
8207                                         channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
8208                                 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
8209                         } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
8210                 });
8211         }
8212 }
8213
8214 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8215 where
8216         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8217         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8218         ES::Target: EntropySource,
8219         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8220         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8221         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8222         R::Target: Router,
8223         L::Target: Logger,
8224 {
8225         /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
8226         /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
8227         /// the function.
8228         fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<SP>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
8229                         (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
8230                 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8231                 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8232                 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8233
8234                 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
8235                 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
8236                 {
8237                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8238                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8239                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8240                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8241                                 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8242                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
8243                                         match phase {
8244                                                 // Retain unfunded channels.
8245                                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => true,
8246                                                 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
8247                                                         let res = f(channel);
8248                                                         if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
8249                                                                 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
8250                                                                         let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
8251                                                                         timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
8252                                                                                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.context.channel_id() }));
8253                                                                 }
8254                                                                 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
8255                                                                         send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
8256                                                                         if channel.context.is_usable() {
8257                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8258                                                                                 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
8259                                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
8260                                                                                                 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8261                                                                                                 msg,
8262                                                                                         });
8263                                                                                 }
8264                                                                         } else {
8265                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8266                                                                         }
8267                                                                 }
8268
8269                                                                 {
8270                                                                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8271                                                                         emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
8272                                                                 }
8273
8274                                                                 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
8275                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8276                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
8277                                                                                 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8278                                                                                 msg: announcement_sigs,
8279                                                                         });
8280                                                                         if let Some(height) = height_opt {
8281                                                                                 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
8282                                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
8283                                                                                                 msg: announcement,
8284                                                                                                 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
8285                                                                                                 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
8286                                                                                                 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
8287                                                                                         });
8288                                                                                 }
8289                                                                         }
8290                                                                 }
8291                                                                 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
8292                                                                         if let Some(real_scid) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
8293                                                                                 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
8294                                                                                 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
8295                                                                                 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
8296                                                                                 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
8297                                                                                 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
8298                                                                                 // is always consistent.
8299                                                                                 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
8300                                                                                 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
8301                                                                                 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()),
8302                                                                                         "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
8303                                                                                         fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
8304                                                                         }
8305                                                                 }
8306                                                         } else if let Err(reason) = res {
8307                                                                 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &channel.context);
8308                                                                 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
8309                                                                 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
8310                                                                 failed_channels.push(channel.context.force_shutdown(true));
8311                                                                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
8312                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
8313                                                                                 msg: update
8314                                                                         });
8315                                                                 }
8316                                                                 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
8317                                                                 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel.context, reason);
8318                                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
8319                                                                         node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8320                                                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
8321                                                                                 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage {
8322                                                                                         channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
8323                                                                                         data: reason_message,
8324                                                                                 })
8325                                                                         },
8326                                                                 });
8327                                                                 return false;
8328                                                         }
8329                                                         true
8330                                                 }
8331                                         }
8332                                 });
8333                         }
8334                 }
8335
8336                 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
8337                         self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
8338                                 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
8339                                         // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
8340                                         // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
8341                                         // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
8342                                         // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
8343                                         if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
8344                                                 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
8345                                                 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
8346
8347                                                 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
8348                                                         HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
8349                                                         HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
8350                                                 false
8351                                         } else { true }
8352                                 });
8353                                 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
8354                         });
8355
8356                         let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
8357                         intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
8358                                 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
8359                                         let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
8360                                                 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
8361                                                 user_channel_id: Some(htlc.prev_user_channel_id),
8362                                                 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
8363                                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
8364                                                 phantom_shared_secret: None,
8365                                                 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
8366                                         });
8367
8368                                         let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
8369                                                 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
8370                                                 _ => unreachable!(),
8371                                         };
8372                                         timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
8373                                                         HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
8374                                                         HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
8375                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
8376                                         false
8377                                 } else { true }
8378                         });
8379                 }
8380
8381                 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
8382
8383                 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
8384                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
8385                 }
8386         }
8387
8388         /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] may need to be persisted or
8389         /// may have events that need processing.
8390         ///
8391         /// In order to check if this [`ChannelManager`] needs persisting, call
8392         /// [`Self::get_and_clear_needs_persistence`].
8393         ///
8394         /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
8395         /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
8396         pub fn get_event_or_persistence_needed_future(&self) -> Future {
8397                 self.event_persist_notifier.get_future()
8398         }
8399
8400         /// Returns true if this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
8401         pub fn get_and_clear_needs_persistence(&self) -> bool {
8402                 self.needs_persist_flag.swap(false, Ordering::AcqRel)
8403         }
8404
8405         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
8406         pub fn get_event_or_persist_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
8407                 self.event_persist_notifier.notify_pending()
8408         }
8409
8410         /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
8411         /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
8412         pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
8413                 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
8414         }
8415
8416         /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8417         /// [`ChannelManager`].
8418         pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
8419                 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
8420         }
8421
8422         /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8423         /// [`ChannelManager`].
8424         ///
8425         /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
8426         /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
8427         #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
8428         pub fn bolt11_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
8429                 provided_bolt11_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
8430         }
8431
8432         /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8433         /// [`ChannelManager`].
8434         fn bolt12_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
8435                 provided_bolt12_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
8436         }
8437
8438         /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8439         /// [`ChannelManager`].
8440         pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
8441                 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
8442         }
8443
8444         /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8445         /// [`ChannelManager`].
8446         pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
8447                 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
8448         }
8449
8450         /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8451         /// [`ChannelManager`].
8452         pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
8453                 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
8454         }
8455 }
8456
8457 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8458         ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8459 where
8460         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8461         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8462         ES::Target: EntropySource,
8463         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8464         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8465         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8466         R::Target: Router,
8467         L::Target: Logger,
8468 {
8469         fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
8470                 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8471                 // open_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
8472                 // change to the contents.
8473                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8474                         let res = self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8475                         let persist = match &res {
8476                                 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => {
8477                                         debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't close a new channel");
8478                                         NotifyOption::DoPersist
8479                                 },
8480                                 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8481                         };
8482                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8483                         persist
8484                 });
8485         }
8486
8487         fn handle_open_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2) {
8488                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8489                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8490                          msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8491         }
8492
8493         fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
8494                 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8495                 // accept_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
8496                 // change to the contents.
8497                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8498                         let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8499                         NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents
8500                 });
8501         }
8502
8503         fn handle_accept_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannelV2) {
8504                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8505                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8506                          msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8507         }
8508
8509         fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
8510                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8511                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8512         }
8513
8514         fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
8515                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8516                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8517         }
8518
8519         fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
8520                 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8521                 // channel_ready message - while the channel's state will change, any channel_ready message
8522                 // will ultimately be re-sent on startup and the `ChannelMonitor` won't be updated so we
8523                 // will not force-close the channel on startup.
8524                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8525                         let res = self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8526                         let persist = match &res {
8527                                 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8528                                 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8529                         };
8530                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8531                         persist
8532                 });
8533         }
8534
8535         fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
8536                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8537                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8538         }
8539
8540         fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
8541                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8542                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8543         }
8544
8545         fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
8546                 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8547                 // update_add_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8548                 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8549                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8550                         let res = self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8551                         let persist = match &res {
8552                                 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8553                                 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8554                                 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8555                         };
8556                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8557                         persist
8558                 });
8559         }
8560
8561         fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
8562                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8563                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8564         }
8565
8566         fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
8567                 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8568                 // update_fail_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8569                 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8570                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8571                         let res = self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8572                         let persist = match &res {
8573                                 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8574                                 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8575                                 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8576                         };
8577                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8578                         persist
8579                 });
8580         }
8581
8582         fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
8583                 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8584                 // update_fail_malformed_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state
8585                 // only the `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8586                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8587                         let res = self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8588                         let persist = match &res {
8589                                 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8590                                 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8591                                 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8592                         };
8593                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8594                         persist
8595                 });
8596         }
8597
8598         fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
8599                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8600                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8601         }
8602
8603         fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
8604                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8605                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8606         }
8607
8608         fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
8609                 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8610                 // update_fee message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8611                 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8612                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8613                         let res = self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8614                         let persist = match &res {
8615                                 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8616                                 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8617                                 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8618                         };
8619                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8620                         persist
8621                 });
8622         }
8623
8624         fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
8625                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8626                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8627         }
8628
8629         fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
8630                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8631                         if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
8632                                 persist
8633                         } else {
8634                                 NotifyOption::DoPersist
8635                         }
8636                 });
8637         }
8638
8639         fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
8640                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8641                         let res = self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8642                         let persist = match &res {
8643                                 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8644                                 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8645                                 Ok(persist) => *persist,
8646                         };
8647                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8648                         persist
8649                 });
8650         }
8651
8652         fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
8653                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(
8654                         self, || NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents);
8655                 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
8656                 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
8657                 let remove_peer = {
8658                         log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
8659                                 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8660                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
8661                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8662                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8663                                 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8664                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
8665                                         let context = match phase {
8666                                                 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
8667                                                         if chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger).is_ok() {
8668                                                                 // We only retain funded channels that are not shutdown.
8669                                                                 return true;
8670                                                         }
8671                                                         &mut chan.context
8672                                                 },
8673                                                 // Unfunded channels will always be removed.
8674                                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
8675                                                         &mut chan.context
8676                                                 },
8677                                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
8678                                                         &mut chan.context
8679                                                 },
8680                                         };
8681                                         // Clean up for removal.
8682                                         update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
8683                                         self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
8684                                         failed_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false));
8685                                         false
8686                                 });
8687                                 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
8688                                 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
8689                                 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
8690                                 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
8691                                         match msg {
8692                                                 // V1 Channel Establishment
8693                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
8694                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
8695                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
8696                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
8697                                                 // V2 Channel Establishment
8698                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannelV2 { .. } => false,
8699                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 { .. } => false,
8700                                                 // Common Channel Establishment
8701                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
8702                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
8703                                                 // Interactive Transaction Construction
8704                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddInput { .. } => false,
8705                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddOutput { .. } => false,
8706                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveInput { .. } => false,
8707                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveOutput { .. } => false,
8708                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxComplete { .. } => false,
8709                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxSignatures { .. } => false,
8710                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxInitRbf { .. } => false,
8711                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAckRbf { .. } => false,
8712                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAbort { .. } => false,
8713                                                 // Channel Operations
8714                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
8715                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
8716                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
8717                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
8718                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
8719                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
8720                                                 // Gossip
8721                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
8722                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
8723                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
8724                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
8725                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
8726                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
8727                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
8728                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
8729                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
8730                                         }
8731                                 });
8732                                 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
8733                                 peer_state.is_connected = false;
8734                                 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
8735                         } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
8736                 };
8737                 if remove_peer {
8738                         per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
8739                 }
8740                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
8741
8742                 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
8743                         self.finish_close_channel(failure);
8744                 }
8745         }
8746
8747         fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
8748                 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
8749                         log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8750                         return Err(());
8751                 }
8752
8753                 let mut res = Ok(());
8754
8755                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8756                         // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
8757                         // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
8758                         // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
8759                         // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
8760                         let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
8761                         let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
8762
8763                         {
8764                                 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
8765                                 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
8766                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
8767                                                 if inbound_peer_limited {
8768                                                         res = Err(());
8769                                                         return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
8770                                                 }
8771                                                 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
8772                                                         channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8773                                                         inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8774                                                         latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
8775                                                         pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
8776                                                         in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8777                                                         monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
8778                                                         actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8779                                                         is_connected: true,
8780                                                 }));
8781                                         },
8782                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
8783                                                 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
8784                                                 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
8785
8786                                                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
8787                                                 if inbound_peer_limited &&
8788                                                         Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
8789                                                         peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
8790                                                 {
8791                                                         res = Err(());
8792                                                         return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
8793                                                 }
8794
8795                                                 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
8796                                                 peer_state.is_connected = true;
8797                                         },
8798                                 }
8799                         }
8800
8801                         log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8802
8803                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8804                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
8805                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8806                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8807                                 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8808
8809                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(|(_, phase)|
8810                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else {
8811                                                 // Since unfunded channel maps are cleared upon disconnecting a peer, and they're not persisted
8812                                                 // (so won't be recovered after a crash), they shouldn't exist here and we would never need to
8813                                                 // worry about closing and removing them.
8814                                                 debug_assert!(false);
8815                                                 None
8816                                         }
8817                                 ).for_each(|chan| {
8818                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
8819                                                 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8820                                                 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
8821                                         });
8822                                 });
8823                         }
8824
8825                         return NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
8826                         //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
8827                 });
8828                 res
8829         }
8830
8831         fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
8832                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8833
8834                 match &msg.data as &str {
8835                         "cannot co-op close channel w/ active htlcs"|
8836                         "link failed to shutdown" =>
8837                         {
8838                                 // LND hasn't properly handled shutdown messages ever, and force-closes any time we
8839                                 // send one while HTLCs are still present. The issue is tracked at
8840                                 // https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/6039 and has had multiple patches
8841                                 // to fix it but none so far have managed to land upstream. The issue appears to be
8842                                 // very low priority for the LND team despite being marked "P1".
8843                                 // We're not going to bother handling this in a sensible way, instead simply
8844                                 // repeating the Shutdown message on repeat until morale improves.
8845                                 if !msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
8846                                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8847                                         let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
8848                                         if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
8849                                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
8850                                         if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&msg.channel_id) {
8851                                                 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_outbound_shutdown() {
8852                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
8853                                                                 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
8854                                                                 msg,
8855                                                         });
8856                                                 }
8857                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
8858                                                         node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
8859                                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
8860                                                                 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
8861                                                                         channel_id: msg.channel_id,
8862                                                                         data: "You appear to be exhibiting LND bug 6039, we'll keep sending you shutdown messages until you handle them correctly".to_owned()
8863                                                                 },
8864                                                                 log_level: Level::Trace,
8865                                                         }
8866                                                 });
8867                                         }
8868                                 }
8869                                 return;
8870                         }
8871                         _ => {}
8872                 }
8873
8874                 if msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
8875                         let channel_ids: Vec<ChannelId> = {
8876                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8877                                 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
8878                                 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
8879                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
8880                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8881                                 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
8882                                 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
8883                                 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
8884                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
8885                         };
8886                         for channel_id in channel_ids {
8887                                 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
8888                                 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
8889                         }
8890                 } else {
8891                         {
8892                                 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
8893                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8894                                 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
8895                                 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
8896                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
8897                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8898                                 if let Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
8899                                         if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.chain_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
8900                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
8901                                                         node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
8902                                                         msg,
8903                                                 });
8904                                                 return;
8905                                         }
8906                                 }
8907                         }
8908
8909                         // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
8910                         let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
8911                 }
8912         }
8913
8914         fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
8915                 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
8916         }
8917
8918         fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
8919                 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
8920         }
8921
8922         fn get_chain_hashes(&self) -> Option<Vec<ChainHash>> {
8923                 Some(vec![self.chain_hash])
8924         }
8925
8926         fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddInput) {
8927                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8928                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8929                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8930         }
8931
8932         fn handle_tx_add_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddOutput) {
8933                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8934                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8935                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8936         }
8937
8938         fn handle_tx_remove_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveInput) {
8939                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8940                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8941                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8942         }
8943
8944         fn handle_tx_remove_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveOutput) {
8945                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8946                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8947                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8948         }
8949
8950         fn handle_tx_complete(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxComplete) {
8951                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8952                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8953                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8954         }
8955
8956         fn handle_tx_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxSignatures) {
8957                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8958                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8959                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8960         }
8961
8962         fn handle_tx_init_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxInitRbf) {
8963                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8964                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8965                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8966         }
8967
8968         fn handle_tx_ack_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAckRbf) {
8969                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8970                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8971                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8972         }
8973
8974         fn handle_tx_abort(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAbort) {
8975                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8976                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8977                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8978         }
8979 }
8980
8981 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8982 OffersMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8983 where
8984         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8985         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8986         ES::Target: EntropySource,
8987         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8988         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8989         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8990         R::Target: Router,
8991         L::Target: Logger,
8992 {
8993         fn handle_message(&self, message: OffersMessage) -> Option<OffersMessage> {
8994                 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
8995                 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
8996
8997                 match message {
8998                         OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request) => {
8999                                 let amount_msats = match InvoiceBuilder::<DerivedSigningPubkey>::amount_msats(
9000                                         &invoice_request
9001                                 ) {
9002                                         Ok(amount_msats) => Some(amount_msats),
9003                                         Err(error) => return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
9004                                 };
9005                                 let invoice_request = match invoice_request.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
9006                                         Ok(invoice_request) => invoice_request,
9007                                         Err(()) => {
9008                                                 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidMetadata;
9009                                                 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
9010                                         },
9011                                 };
9012                                 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
9013
9014                                 match self.create_inbound_payment(amount_msats, relative_expiry, None) {
9015                                         Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) if invoice_request.keys.is_some() => {
9016                                                 let payment_paths = vec![
9017                                                         self.create_one_hop_blinded_payment_path(payment_secret),
9018                                                 ];
9019                                                 #[cfg(not(feature = "no-std"))]
9020                                                 let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys(
9021                                                         payment_paths, payment_hash
9022                                                 );
9023                                                 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
9024                                                 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
9025                                                         self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
9026                                                 );
9027                                                 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
9028                                                 let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
9029                                                         payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
9030                                                 );
9031                                                 match builder.and_then(|b| b.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)) {
9032                                                         Ok(invoice) => Some(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
9033                                                         Err(error) => Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
9034                                                 }
9035                                         },
9036                                         Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => {
9037                                                 let payment_paths = vec![
9038                                                         self.create_one_hop_blinded_payment_path(payment_secret),
9039                                                 ];
9040                                                 #[cfg(not(feature = "no-std"))]
9041                                                 let builder = invoice_request.respond_with(payment_paths, payment_hash);
9042                                                 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
9043                                                 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
9044                                                         self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
9045                                                 );
9046                                                 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
9047                                                 let builder = invoice_request.respond_with_no_std(
9048                                                         payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
9049                                                 );
9050                                                 let response = builder.and_then(|builder| builder.allow_mpp().build())
9051                                                         .map_err(|e| OffersMessage::InvoiceError(e.into()))
9052                                                         .and_then(|invoice|
9053                                                                 match invoice.sign(|invoice| self.node_signer.sign_bolt12_invoice(invoice)) {
9054                                                                         Ok(invoice) => Ok(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
9055                                                                         Err(SignError::Signing(())) => Err(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(
9056                                                                                         InvoiceError::from_string("Failed signing invoice".to_string())
9057                                                                         )),
9058                                                                         Err(SignError::Verification(_)) => Err(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(
9059                                                                                         InvoiceError::from_string("Failed invoice signature verification".to_string())
9060                                                                         )),
9061                                                                 });
9062                                                 match response {
9063                                                         Ok(invoice) => Some(invoice),
9064                                                         Err(error) => Some(error),
9065                                                 }
9066                                         },
9067                                         Err(()) => {
9068                                                 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount.into()))
9069                                         },
9070                                 }
9071                         },
9072                         OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice) => {
9073                                 match invoice.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
9074                                         Err(()) => {
9075                                                 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(InvoiceError::from_string("Unrecognized invoice".to_owned())))
9076                                         },
9077                                         Ok(_) if invoice.invoice_features().requires_unknown_bits_from(&self.bolt12_invoice_features()) => {
9078                                                 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(Bolt12SemanticError::UnknownRequiredFeatures.into()))
9079                                         },
9080                                         Ok(payment_id) => {
9081                                                 if let Err(e) = self.send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&invoice, payment_id) {
9082                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed paying invoice: {:?}", e);
9083                                                         Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(InvoiceError::from_string(format!("{:?}", e))))
9084                                                 } else {
9085                                                         None
9086                                                 }
9087                                         },
9088                                 }
9089                         },
9090                         OffersMessage::InvoiceError(invoice_error) => {
9091                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received invoice_error: {}", invoice_error);
9092                                 None
9093                         },
9094                 }
9095         }
9096
9097         fn release_pending_messages(&self) -> Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>> {
9098                 core::mem::take(&mut self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap())
9099         }
9100 }
9101
9102 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9103 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9104 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
9105         let mut node_features = provided_init_features(config).to_context();
9106         node_features.set_keysend_optional();
9107         node_features
9108 }
9109
9110 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9111 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9112 ///
9113 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
9114 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
9115 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
9116 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt11_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
9117         provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9118 }
9119
9120 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9121 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9122 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt12_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
9123         provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9124 }
9125
9126 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9127 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9128 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
9129         provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9130 }
9131
9132 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9133 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9134 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
9135         ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
9136 }
9137
9138 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9139 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9140 pub fn provided_init_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
9141         // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
9142         // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
9143         // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
9144         let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
9145         features.set_data_loss_protect_required();
9146         features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
9147         features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
9148         features.set_static_remote_key_required();
9149         features.set_payment_secret_required();
9150         features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
9151         features.set_wumbo_optional();
9152         features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
9153         features.set_channel_type_optional();
9154         features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
9155         features.set_zero_conf_optional();
9156         if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
9157                 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
9158         }
9159         features
9160 }
9161
9162 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
9163 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
9164
9165 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
9166         (2, fee_base_msat, required),
9167         (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
9168         (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
9169 });
9170
9171 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
9172         (2, node_id, required),
9173         (4, features, required),
9174         (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
9175         (8, forwarding_info, option),
9176         (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9177         (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9178 });
9179
9180 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
9181         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9182                 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
9183                 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
9184                 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
9185                 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
9186                 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9187                         (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
9188                         (2, self.channel_id, required),
9189                         (3, self.channel_type, option),
9190                         (4, self.counterparty, required),
9191                         (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
9192                         (6, self.funding_txo, option),
9193                         (7, self.config, option),
9194                         (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
9195                         (9, self.confirmations, option),
9196                         (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
9197                         (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
9198                         (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
9199                         (16, self.balance_msat, required),
9200                         (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
9201                         (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required),
9202                         (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
9203                         (21, self.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, required),
9204                         (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
9205                         (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
9206                         (26, self.is_outbound, required),
9207                         (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
9208                         (30, self.is_usable, required),
9209                         (32, self.is_public, required),
9210                         (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9211                         (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9212                         (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
9213                         (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
9214                         (41, self.channel_shutdown_state, option),
9215                 });
9216                 Ok(())
9217         }
9218 }
9219
9220 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
9221         fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9222                 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9223                         (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
9224                         (2, channel_id, required),
9225                         (3, channel_type, option),
9226                         (4, counterparty, required),
9227                         (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
9228                         (6, funding_txo, option),
9229                         (7, config, option),
9230                         (8, short_channel_id, option),
9231                         (9, confirmations, option),
9232                         (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
9233                         (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
9234                         (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
9235                         (16, balance_msat, required),
9236                         (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
9237                         // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
9238                         // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
9239                         (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
9240                         (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
9241                         (21, next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, (default_value, 0)),
9242                         (22, confirmations_required, option),
9243                         (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
9244                         (26, is_outbound, required),
9245                         (28, is_channel_ready, required),
9246                         (30, is_usable, required),
9247                         (32, is_public, required),
9248                         (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9249                         (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9250                         (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
9251                         (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
9252                         (41, channel_shutdown_state, option),
9253                 });
9254
9255                 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
9256                 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
9257                 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
9258                 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
9259                         ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
9260
9261                 Ok(Self {
9262                         inbound_scid_alias,
9263                         channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
9264                         channel_type,
9265                         counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
9266                         outbound_scid_alias,
9267                         funding_txo,
9268                         config,
9269                         short_channel_id,
9270                         channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
9271                         unspendable_punishment_reserve,
9272                         user_channel_id,
9273                         balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
9274                         outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
9275                         next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
9276                         next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat.0.unwrap(),
9277                         inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
9278                         confirmations_required,
9279                         confirmations,
9280                         force_close_spend_delay,
9281                         is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
9282                         is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
9283                         is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
9284                         is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
9285                         inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
9286                         inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
9287                         feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
9288                         channel_shutdown_state,
9289                 })
9290         }
9291 }
9292
9293 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
9294         (2, channels, required_vec),
9295         (4, phantom_scid, required),
9296         (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
9297 });
9298
9299 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
9300         (0, Forward) => {
9301                 (0, onion_packet, required),
9302                 (2, short_channel_id, required),
9303         },
9304         (1, Receive) => {
9305                 (0, payment_data, required),
9306                 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
9307                 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
9308                 (3, payment_metadata, option),
9309                 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
9310         },
9311         (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
9312                 (0, payment_preimage, required),
9313                 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
9314                 (3, payment_metadata, option),
9315                 (4, payment_data, option), // Added in 0.0.116
9316                 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
9317         },
9318 ;);
9319
9320 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
9321         (0, routing, required),
9322         (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
9323         (4, payment_hash, required),
9324         (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
9325         (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
9326         (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
9327         (10, skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9328 });
9329
9330
9331 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
9332         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9333                 match self {
9334                         HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
9335                                 0u8.write(writer)?;
9336                                 channel_id.write(writer)?;
9337                                 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
9338                                 reason.write(writer)?;
9339                         },
9340                         HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
9341                                 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
9342                         }) => {
9343                                 1u8.write(writer)?;
9344                                 channel_id.write(writer)?;
9345                                 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
9346                                 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
9347                                 failure_code.write(writer)?;
9348                         },
9349                 }
9350                 Ok(())
9351         }
9352 }
9353
9354 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
9355         fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9356                 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9357                 match id {
9358                         0 => {
9359                                 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
9360                                         channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9361                                         htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9362                                         reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
9363                                 }))
9364                         },
9365                         1 => {
9366                                 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
9367                                         channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9368                                         htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9369                                         sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
9370                                         failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
9371                                 }))
9372                         },
9373                         // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
9374                         // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
9375                         // messages contained in the variants.
9376                         // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
9377                         // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
9378                         // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
9379                         2 => {
9380                                 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
9381                                 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
9382                                 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
9383                                 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
9384                                 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
9385                         },
9386                         3 => {
9387                                 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
9388                                 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
9389                                 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
9390                                 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
9391                                 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
9392                         },
9393                         _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
9394                 }
9395         }
9396 }
9397
9398 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
9399         (0, Forward),
9400         (1, Fail),
9401 );
9402
9403 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
9404         (0, short_channel_id, required),
9405         (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
9406         (2, outpoint, required),
9407         (4, htlc_id, required),
9408         (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required),
9409         (7, user_channel_id, option),
9410 });
9411
9412 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
9413         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9414                 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
9415                         OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
9416                         OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
9417                 };
9418                 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9419                         (0, self.prev_hop, required),
9420                         (1, self.total_msat, required),
9421                         (2, self.value, required),
9422                         (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
9423                         (4, payment_data, option),
9424                         (5, self.total_value_received, option),
9425                         (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
9426                         (8, keysend_preimage, option),
9427                         (10, self.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9428                 });
9429                 Ok(())
9430         }
9431 }
9432
9433 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
9434         fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9435                 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9436                         (0, prev_hop, required),
9437                         (1, total_msat, option),
9438                         (2, value_ser, required),
9439                         (3, sender_intended_value, option),
9440                         (4, payment_data_opt, option),
9441                         (5, total_value_received, option),
9442                         (6, cltv_expiry, required),
9443                         (8, keysend_preimage, option),
9444                         (10, counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9445                 });
9446                 let payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = payment_data_opt;
9447                 let value = value_ser.0.unwrap();
9448                 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
9449                         Some(p) => {
9450                                 if payment_data.is_some() {
9451                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9452                                 }
9453                                 if total_msat.is_none() {
9454                                         total_msat = Some(value);
9455                                 }
9456                                 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
9457                         },
9458                         None => {
9459                                 if total_msat.is_none() {
9460                                         if payment_data.is_none() {
9461                                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9462                                         }
9463                                         total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
9464                                 }
9465                                 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
9466                         },
9467                 };
9468                 Ok(Self {
9469                         prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
9470                         timer_ticks: 0,
9471                         value,
9472                         sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
9473                         total_value_received,
9474                         total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
9475                         onion_payload,
9476                         cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry.0.unwrap(),
9477                         counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
9478                 })
9479         }
9480 }
9481
9482 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
9483         fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9484                 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9485                 match id {
9486                         0 => {
9487                                 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
9488                                 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
9489                                 let mut path_hops = Vec::new();
9490                                 let mut payment_id = None;
9491                                 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
9492                                 let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
9493                                 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9494                                         (0, session_priv, required),
9495                                         (1, payment_id, option),
9496                                         (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
9497                                         (4, path_hops, required_vec),
9498                                         (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
9499                                         (6, blinded_tail, option),
9500                                 });
9501                                 if payment_id.is_none() {
9502                                         // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
9503                                         // instead.
9504                                         payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
9505                                 }
9506                                 let path = Path { hops: path_hops, blinded_tail };
9507                                 if path.hops.len() == 0 {
9508                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9509                                 }
9510                                 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
9511                                         if let Payee::Clear { ref mut final_cltv_expiry_delta, .. } = params.payee {
9512                                                 if final_cltv_expiry_delta == &0 {
9513                                                         *final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.final_cltv_expiry_delta().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9514                                                 }
9515                                         }
9516                                 }
9517                                 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
9518                                         session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
9519                                         first_hop_htlc_msat,
9520                                         path,
9521                                         payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
9522                                 })
9523                         }
9524                         1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
9525                         _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
9526                 }
9527         }
9528 }
9529
9530 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
9531         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
9532                 match self {
9533                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
9534                                 0u8.write(writer)?;
9535                                 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
9536                                 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9537                                         (0, session_priv, required),
9538                                         (1, payment_id_opt, option),
9539                                         (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
9540                                         // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
9541                                         (4, path.hops, required_vec),
9542                                         (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
9543                                         (6, path.blinded_tail, option),
9544                                  });
9545                         }
9546                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
9547                                 1u8.write(writer)?;
9548                                 field.write(writer)?;
9549                         }
9550                 }
9551                 Ok(())
9552         }
9553 }
9554
9555 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
9556         (0, forward_info, required),
9557         (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
9558         (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
9559         (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
9560         (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
9561 });
9562
9563 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
9564         (1, FailHTLC) => {
9565                 (0, htlc_id, required),
9566                 (2, err_packet, required),
9567         };
9568         (0, AddHTLC)
9569 );
9570
9571 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
9572         (0, payment_secret, required),
9573         (2, expiry_time, required),
9574         (4, user_payment_id, required),
9575         (6, payment_preimage, required),
9576         (8, min_value_msat, required),
9577 });
9578
9579 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9580 where
9581         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
9582         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9583         ES::Target: EntropySource,
9584         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9585         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9586         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9587         R::Target: Router,
9588         L::Target: Logger,
9589 {
9590         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9591                 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
9592
9593                 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
9594
9595                 self.chain_hash.write(writer)?;
9596                 {
9597                         let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
9598                         best_block.height().write(writer)?;
9599                         best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
9600                 }
9601
9602                 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
9603                 {
9604                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9605                         let mut number_of_funded_channels = 0;
9606                         for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9607                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9608                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9609                                 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
9610                                         serializable_peer_count += 1;
9611                                 }
9612
9613                                 number_of_funded_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(
9614                                         |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { chan.context.is_funding_broadcast() } else { false }
9615                                 ).count();
9616                         }
9617
9618                         (number_of_funded_channels as u64).write(writer)?;
9619
9620                         for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9621                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9622                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9623                                 for channel in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter_map(
9624                                         |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = phase {
9625                                                 if channel.context.is_funding_broadcast() { Some(channel) } else { None }
9626                                         } else { None }
9627                                 ) {
9628                                         channel.write(writer)?;
9629                                 }
9630                         }
9631                 }
9632
9633                 {
9634                         let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
9635                         (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9636                         for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
9637                                 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
9638                                 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9639                                 for forward in pending_forwards {
9640                                         forward.write(writer)?;
9641                                 }
9642                         }
9643                 }
9644
9645                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
9646
9647                 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
9648                 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
9649                 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
9650
9651                 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
9652                 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
9653                 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9654                 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
9655                         payment_hash.write(writer)?;
9656                         (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9657                         for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
9658                                 htlc.write(writer)?;
9659                         }
9660                         htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
9661                         htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
9662                 }
9663
9664                 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
9665                 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
9666                 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9667                         // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
9668                         // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
9669                         // per_peer_state lock at all.
9670                         peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
9671                 }
9672
9673                 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
9674                 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
9675                         // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
9676                         // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
9677                         // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
9678                         // no channels.
9679                         if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
9680                                 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
9681                                 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
9682                                 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
9683                                         monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
9684                                                 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
9685                                                 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
9686                                 }
9687                         }
9688                 }
9689
9690                 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
9691                 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.115 don't support post-event actions, thus if there's no
9692                 // actions at all, skip writing the required TLV. Otherwise, pre-0.0.115 versions will
9693                 // refuse to read the new ChannelManager.
9694                 let events_not_backwards_compatible = events.iter().any(|(_, action)| action.is_some());
9695                 if events_not_backwards_compatible {
9696                         // If we're gonna write a even TLV that will overwrite our events anyway we might as
9697                         // well save the space and not write any events here.
9698                         0u64.write(writer)?;
9699                 } else {
9700                         (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9701                         for (event, _) in events.iter() {
9702                                 event.write(writer)?;
9703                         }
9704                 }
9705
9706                 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote the `pending_background_events`
9707                 // `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here, however there was never a reason to do so -
9708                 // the closing monitor updates were always effectively replayed on startup (either directly
9709                 // by calling `broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn` on a `ChannelMonitor` during
9710                 // deserialization or, in 0.0.115, by regenerating the monitor update itself).
9711                 0u64.write(writer)?;
9712
9713                 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
9714                 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
9715                 // likely to be identical.
9716                 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
9717                 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
9718
9719                 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9720                 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
9721                         hash.write(writer)?;
9722                         pending_payment.write(writer)?;
9723                 }
9724
9725                 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
9726                 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
9727                 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
9728                         if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
9729                                 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
9730                         }
9731                 }
9732                 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
9733                 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
9734                         match outbound {
9735                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
9736                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
9737                                         for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
9738                                                 session_priv.write(writer)?;
9739                                         }
9740                                 }
9741                                 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {},
9742                                 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {},
9743                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
9744                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
9745                         }
9746                 }
9747
9748                 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
9749                 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
9750                 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
9751                         match outbound {
9752                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
9753                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
9754                                         pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
9755                                 },
9756                                 _ => {},
9757                         }
9758                 }
9759
9760                 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
9761                 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
9762                 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
9763                         pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
9764                 }
9765
9766                 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
9767                 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
9768                         // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
9769                         // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
9770                         pending_claiming_payments = None;
9771                 }
9772
9773                 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(&PublicKey, &OutPoint), &Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
9774                 for ((counterparty_id, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
9775                         for (funding_outpoint, updates) in peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.iter() {
9776                                 if !updates.is_empty() {
9777                                         if in_flight_monitor_updates.is_none() { in_flight_monitor_updates = Some(HashMap::new()); }
9778                                         in_flight_monitor_updates.as_mut().unwrap().insert((counterparty_id, funding_outpoint), updates);
9779                                 }
9780                         }
9781                 }
9782
9783                 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9784                         (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
9785                         (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
9786                         (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
9787                         (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
9788                         (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
9789                         (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
9790                         (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
9791                         (8, if events_not_backwards_compatible { Some(&*events) } else { None }, option),
9792                         (9, htlc_purposes, required_vec),
9793                         (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
9794                         (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
9795                         (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
9796                 });
9797
9798                 Ok(())
9799         }
9800 }
9801
9802 impl Writeable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
9803         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9804                 (self.len() as u64).write(w)?;
9805                 for (event, action) in self.iter() {
9806                         event.write(w)?;
9807                         action.write(w)?;
9808                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
9809                                 // Events are MaybeReadable, in some cases indicating that they shouldn't actually
9810                                 // be persisted and are regenerated on restart. However, if such an event has a
9811                                 // post-event-handling action we'll write nothing for the event and would have to
9812                                 // either forget the action or fail on deserialization (which we do below). Thus,
9813                                 // check that the event is sane here.
9814                                 let event_encoded = event.encode();
9815                                 let event_read: Option<Event> =
9816                                         MaybeReadable::read(&mut &event_encoded[..]).unwrap();
9817                                 if action.is_some() { assert!(event_read.is_some()); }
9818                         }
9819                 }
9820                 Ok(())
9821         }
9822 }
9823 impl Readable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
9824         fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9825                 let len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9826                 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 1024 * 16;
9827                 let mut events: Self = VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(
9828                         MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>() as u64,
9829                         len) as usize);
9830                 for _ in 0..len {
9831                         let ev_opt = MaybeReadable::read(reader)?;
9832                         let action = Readable::read(reader)?;
9833                         if let Some(ev) = ev_opt {
9834                                 events.push_back((ev, action));
9835                         } else if action.is_some() {
9836                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9837                         }
9838                 }
9839                 Ok(events)
9840         }
9841 }
9842
9843 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(ChannelShutdownState,
9844         (0, NotShuttingDown) => {},
9845         (2, ShutdownInitiated) => {},
9846         (4, ResolvingHTLCs) => {},
9847         (6, NegotiatingClosingFee) => {},
9848         (8, ShutdownComplete) => {}, ;
9849 );
9850
9851 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
9852 ///
9853 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
9854 /// is:
9855 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
9856 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
9857 ///    `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
9858 ///    This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
9859 ///    [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
9860 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
9861 ///    same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
9862 ///    [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
9863 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
9864 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
9865 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
9866 ///    Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
9867 ///    will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
9868 ///    the next step.
9869 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
9870 ///    [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
9871 ///
9872 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
9873 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
9874 ///
9875 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
9876 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
9877 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
9878 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
9879 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
9880 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
9881 ///
9882 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
9883 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9884 where
9885         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
9886         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9887         ES::Target: EntropySource,
9888         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9889         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9890         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9891         R::Target: Router,
9892         L::Target: Logger,
9893 {
9894         /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
9895         pub entropy_source: ES,
9896
9897         /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
9898         pub node_signer: NS,
9899
9900         /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
9901         /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
9902         /// signing data.
9903         pub signer_provider: SP,
9904
9905         /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
9906         ///
9907         /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
9908         pub fee_estimator: F,
9909         /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
9910         ///
9911         /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
9912         /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
9913         /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
9914         pub chain_monitor: M,
9915
9916         /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
9917         /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
9918         /// force-closed during deserialization.
9919         pub tx_broadcaster: T,
9920         /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
9921         /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
9922         ///
9923         /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
9924         pub router: R,
9925         /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
9926         /// deserialization.
9927         pub logger: L,
9928         /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
9929         /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
9930         pub default_config: UserConfig,
9931
9932         /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
9933         /// value.context.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
9934         ///
9935         /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
9936         /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
9937         /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
9938         /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
9939         ///
9940         /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
9941         /// this struct.
9942         ///
9943         /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
9944         pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>,
9945 }
9946
9947 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9948                 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9949 where
9950         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
9951         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9952         ES::Target: EntropySource,
9953         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9954         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9955         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9956         R::Target: Router,
9957         L::Target: Logger,
9958 {
9959         /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
9960         /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
9961         /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
9962         pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
9963                         mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>) -> Self {
9964                 Self {
9965                         entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
9966                         channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
9967                 }
9968         }
9969 }
9970
9971 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
9972 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
9973 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9974         ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
9975 where
9976         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
9977         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9978         ES::Target: EntropySource,
9979         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9980         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9981         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9982         R::Target: Router,
9983         L::Target: Logger,
9984 {
9985         fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9986                 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
9987                 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
9988         }
9989 }
9990
9991 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9992         ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
9993 where
9994         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
9995         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9996         ES::Target: EntropySource,
9997         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9998         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9999         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10000         R::Target: Router,
10001         L::Target: Logger,
10002 {
10003         fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10004                 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
10005
10006                 let chain_hash: ChainHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10007                 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10008                 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10009
10010                 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
10011
10012                 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10013                 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10014                 let mut funded_peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10015                 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10016                 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10017                 let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
10018                 let mut close_background_events = Vec::new();
10019                 for _ in 0..channel_count {
10020                         let mut channel: Channel<SP> = Channel::read(reader, (
10021                                 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
10022                         ))?;
10023                         let funding_txo = channel.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
10024                         funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
10025                         if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
10026                                 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
10027                                                 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
10028                                                 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
10029                                                 channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
10030                                         // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
10031                                         log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
10032                                         log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
10033                                         if channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
10034                                                 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
10035                                                         &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
10036                                         }
10037                                         if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() {
10038                                                 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at holder commitment number {} but the ChannelManager is at holder commitment number {}.",
10039                                                         &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number());
10040                                         }
10041                                         if channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() {
10042                                                 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at revoked counterparty transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at revoked counterparty transaction number {}.",
10043                                                         &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
10044                                         }
10045                                         if channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() {
10046                                                 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at counterparty commitment transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at counterparty commitment transaction number {}.",
10047                                                         &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
10048                                         }
10049                                         let mut shutdown_result = channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
10050                                         if shutdown_result.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid.is_some() {
10051                                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10052                                         }
10053                                         if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = shutdown_result.monitor_update {
10054                                                 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
10055                                                         counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
10056                                                 });
10057                                         }
10058                                         failed_htlcs.append(&mut shutdown_result.dropped_outbound_htlcs);
10059                                         channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
10060                                                 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
10061                                                 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
10062                                                 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager,
10063                                                 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
10064                                                 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
10065                                         }, None));
10066                                         for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
10067                                                 let mut found_htlc = false;
10068                                                 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
10069                                                         if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
10070                                                 }
10071                                                 if !found_htlc {
10072                                                         // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
10073                                                         // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
10074                                                         // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
10075                                                         // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
10076                                                         // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
10077                                                         // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
10078                                                         // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
10079                                                         log_info!(args.logger,
10080                                                                 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
10081                                                                 &channel.context.channel_id(), &payment_hash);
10082                                                         failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
10083                                                 }
10084                                         }
10085                                 } else {
10086                                         log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {} at update_id {} against monitor at update id {}",
10087                                                 &channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
10088                                                 monitor.get_latest_update_id());
10089                                         if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
10090                                                 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
10091                                         }
10092                                         if channel.context.is_funding_broadcast() {
10093                                                 id_to_peer.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
10094                                         }
10095                                         match funded_peer_channels.entry(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
10096                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
10097                                                         let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
10098                                                         by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
10099                                                 },
10100                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
10101                                                         let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
10102                                                         by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
10103                                                         entry.insert(by_id_map);
10104                                                 }
10105                                         }
10106                                 }
10107                         } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
10108                                 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
10109                                 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
10110                                 // safely discard the channel.
10111                                 let _ = channel.context.force_shutdown(false);
10112                                 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
10113                                         channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
10114                                         user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
10115                                         reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
10116                                         counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
10117                                         channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
10118                                 }, None));
10119                         } else {
10120                                 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", &channel.context.channel_id());
10121                                 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10122                                 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10123                                 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10124                                 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10125                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10126                         }
10127                 }
10128
10129                 for (funding_txo, _) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
10130                         if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
10131                                 log_info!(args.logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
10132                                         &funding_txo.to_channel_id());
10133                                 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
10134                                         update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
10135                                         updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
10136                                 };
10137                                 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, monitor_update)));
10138                         }
10139                 }
10140
10141                 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
10142                 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10143                 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
10144                 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
10145                         let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
10146                         let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10147                         let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
10148                         for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
10149                                 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
10150                         }
10151                         forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
10152                 }
10153
10154                 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10155                 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
10156                 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
10157                         let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10158                         let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10159                         let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
10160                         for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
10161                                 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
10162                         }
10163                         claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
10164                 }
10165
10166                 let peer_state_from_chans = |channel_by_id| {
10167                         PeerState {
10168                                 channel_by_id,
10169                                 inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
10170                                 latest_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
10171                                 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
10172                                 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
10173                                 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
10174                                 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
10175                                 is_connected: false,
10176                         }
10177                 };
10178
10179                 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10180                 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>)>()));
10181                 for _ in 0..peer_count {
10182                         let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
10183                         let peer_chans = funded_peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new());
10184                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_from_chans(peer_chans);
10185                         peer_state.latest_features = Readable::read(reader)?;
10186                         per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
10187                 }
10188
10189                 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10190                 let mut pending_events_read: VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> =
10191                         VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>()));
10192                 for _ in 0..event_count {
10193                         match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
10194                                 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push_back((event, None)),
10195                                 None => continue,
10196                         }
10197                 }
10198
10199                 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10200                 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
10201                         match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
10202                                 0 => {
10203                                         // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote pending `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here,
10204                                         // however we really don't (and never did) need them - we regenerate all
10205                                         // on-startup monitor updates.
10206                                         let _: OutPoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
10207                                         let _: ChannelMonitorUpdate = Readable::read(reader)?;
10208                                 }
10209                                 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
10210                         }
10211                 }
10212
10213                 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
10214                 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10215
10216                 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10217                 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
10218                 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
10219                         if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
10220                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10221                         }
10222                 }
10223
10224                 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10225                 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
10226                         HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
10227                 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
10228                         let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
10229                         let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
10230                                 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
10231                         };
10232                         if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
10233                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10234                         };
10235                 }
10236
10237                 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
10238                 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
10239                 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
10240                 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
10241                 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
10242                 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
10243                 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
10244                 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
10245                 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
10246                 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
10247                 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer: Option<Vec<(_, BTreeMap<_, Vec<_>>)>> = Some(Vec::new());
10248                 let mut events_override = None;
10249                 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(PublicKey, OutPoint), Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
10250                 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
10251                         (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
10252                         (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
10253                         (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
10254                         (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
10255                         (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
10256                         (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
10257                         (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
10258                         (8, events_override, option),
10259                         (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, optional_vec),
10260                         (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
10261                         (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
10262                         (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
10263                 });
10264                 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
10265                         fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10266                 }
10267
10268                 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
10269                         probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10270                 }
10271
10272                 if let Some(events) = events_override {
10273                         pending_events_read = events;
10274                 }
10275
10276                 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
10277                         pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
10278                 }
10279
10280                 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
10281                         pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
10282                 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
10283                         let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
10284                         for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
10285                                 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
10286                         }
10287                         pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
10288                 }
10289                 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
10290                         pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
10291                         retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
10292                 };
10293
10294                 // We have to replay (or skip, if they were completed after we wrote the `ChannelManager`)
10295                 // each `ChannelMonitorUpdate` in `in_flight_monitor_updates`. After doing so, we have to
10296                 // check that each channel we have isn't newer than the latest `ChannelMonitorUpdate`(s) we
10297                 // replayed, and for each monitor update we have to replay we have to ensure there's a
10298                 // `ChannelMonitor` for it.
10299                 //
10300                 // In order to do so we first walk all of our live channels (so that we can check their
10301                 // state immediately after doing the update replays, when we have the `update_id`s
10302                 // available) and then walk any remaining in-flight updates.
10303                 //
10304                 // Because the actual handling of the in-flight updates is the same, it's macro'ized here:
10305                 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
10306                 macro_rules! handle_in_flight_updates {
10307                         ($counterparty_node_id: expr, $chan_in_flight_upds: expr, $funding_txo: expr,
10308                          $monitor: expr, $peer_state: expr, $channel_info_log: expr
10309                         ) => { {
10310                                 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = 0;
10311                                 $chan_in_flight_upds.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > $monitor.get_latest_update_id());
10312                                 for update in $chan_in_flight_upds.iter() {
10313                                         log_trace!(args.logger, "Replaying ChannelMonitorUpdate {} for {}channel {}",
10314                                                 update.update_id, $channel_info_log, &$funding_txo.to_channel_id());
10315                                         max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id, update.update_id);
10316                                         pending_background_events.push(
10317                                                 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
10318                                                         counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
10319                                                         funding_txo: $funding_txo,
10320                                                         update: update.clone(),
10321                                                 });
10322                                 }
10323                                 if $chan_in_flight_upds.is_empty() {
10324                                         // We had some updates to apply, but it turns out they had completed before we
10325                                         // were serialized, we just weren't notified of that. Thus, we may have to run
10326                                         // the completion actions for any monitor updates, but otherwise are done.
10327                                         pending_background_events.push(
10328                                                 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
10329                                                         counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
10330                                                         channel_id: $funding_txo.to_channel_id(),
10331                                                 });
10332                                 }
10333                                 if $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.insert($funding_txo, $chan_in_flight_upds).is_some() {
10334                                         log_error!(args.logger, "Duplicate in-flight monitor update set for the same channel!");
10335                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10336                                 }
10337                                 max_in_flight_update_id
10338                         } }
10339                 }
10340
10341                 for (counterparty_id, peer_state_mtx) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
10342                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
10343                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10344                         for phase in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
10345                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
10346                                         // Channels that were persisted have to be funded, otherwise they should have been
10347                                         // discarded.
10348                                         let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
10349                                         let monitor = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo)
10350                                                 .expect("We already checked for monitor presence when loading channels");
10351                                         let mut max_in_flight_update_id = monitor.get_latest_update_id();
10352                                         if let Some(in_flight_upds) = &mut in_flight_monitor_updates {
10353                                                 if let Some(mut chan_in_flight_upds) = in_flight_upds.remove(&(*counterparty_id, funding_txo)) {
10354                                                         max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id,
10355                                                                 handle_in_flight_updates!(*counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_upds,
10356                                                                         funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, ""));
10357                                                 }
10358                                         }
10359                                         if chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id() > max_in_flight_update_id {
10360                                                 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
10361                                                 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
10362                                                 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} with update_id through {} in-flight",
10363                                                         chan.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), max_in_flight_update_id);
10364                                                 log_error!(args.logger, " but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.", chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id());
10365                                                 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10366                                                 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10367                                                 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10368                                                 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10369                                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10370                                         }
10371                                 } else {
10372                                         // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
10373                                         // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
10374                                         debug_assert!(false);
10375                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10376                                 }
10377                         }
10378                 }
10379
10380                 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = in_flight_monitor_updates {
10381                         for ((counterparty_id, funding_txo), mut chan_in_flight_updates) in in_flight_upds {
10382                                 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
10383                                         // Now that we've removed all the in-flight monitor updates for channels that are
10384                                         // still open, we need to replay any monitor updates that are for closed channels,
10385                                         // creating the neccessary peer_state entries as we go.
10386                                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_id).or_insert_with(|| {
10387                                                 Mutex::new(peer_state_from_chans(HashMap::new()))
10388                                         });
10389                                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10390                                         handle_in_flight_updates!(counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_updates,
10391                                                 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, "closed ");
10392                                 } else {
10393                                         log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is missing even though we have in-flight updates for it! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
10394                                         log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is missing.",
10395                                                 &funding_txo.to_channel_id());
10396                                         log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10397                                         log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10398                                         log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10399                                         log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10400                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10401                                 }
10402                         }
10403                 }
10404
10405                 // Note that we have to do the above replays before we push new monitor updates.
10406                 pending_background_events.append(&mut close_background_events);
10407
10408                 // If there's any preimages for forwarded HTLCs hanging around in ChannelMonitors we
10409                 // should ensure we try them again on the inbound edge. We put them here and do so after we
10410                 // have a fully-constructed `ChannelManager` at the end.
10411                 let mut pending_claims_to_replay = Vec::new();
10412
10413                 {
10414                         // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
10415                         // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
10416                         // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
10417                         // corresponding `Channel` at all).
10418                         // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
10419                         // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
10420                         // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
10421                         // 0.0.102+
10422                         for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
10423                                 let counterparty_opt = id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
10424                                 if counterparty_opt.is_none() {
10425                                         for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
10426                                                 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
10427                                                         if path.hops.is_empty() {
10428                                                                 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
10429                                                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10430                                                         }
10431
10432                                                         let path_amt = path.final_value_msat();
10433                                                         let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
10434                                                         session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
10435                                                         match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
10436                                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
10437                                                                         let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
10438                                                                         log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
10439                                                                                 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), &htlc.payment_hash);
10440                                                                 },
10441                                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
10442                                                                         let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
10443                                                                         entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
10444                                                                                 retry_strategy: None,
10445                                                                                 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
10446                                                                                 payment_params: None,
10447                                                                                 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
10448                                                                                 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
10449                                                                                 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10450                                                                                 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10451                                                                                 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10452                                                                                 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(), // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10453                                                                                 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
10454                                                                                 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
10455                                                                                 total_msat: path_amt,
10456                                                                                 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
10457                                                                                 remaining_max_total_routing_fee_msat: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10458                                                                         });
10459                                                                         log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
10460                                                                                 path_amt, &htlc.payment_hash,  log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
10461                                                                 }
10462                                                         }
10463                                                 }
10464                                         }
10465                                         for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
10466                                                 match htlc_source {
10467                                                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
10468                                                                 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
10469                                                                         info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
10470                                                                                 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
10471                                                                 };
10472                                                                 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
10473                                                                 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
10474                                                                 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
10475                                                                 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
10476                                                                 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
10477                                                                 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
10478                                                                         forwards.retain(|forward| {
10479                                                                                 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
10480                                                                                         if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
10481                                                                                                 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
10482                                                                                                         &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
10483                                                                                                 false
10484                                                                                         } else { true }
10485                                                                                 } else { true }
10486                                                                         });
10487                                                                         !forwards.is_empty()
10488                                                                 });
10489                                                                 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
10490                                                                         if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
10491                                                                                 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
10492                                                                                         &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
10493                                                                                 pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
10494                                                                                         if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
10495                                                                                                 intercepted_id != ev_id
10496                                                                                         } else { true }
10497                                                                                 });
10498                                                                                 false
10499                                                                         } else { true }
10500                                                                 });
10501                                                         },
10502                                                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
10503                                                                 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
10504                                                                         let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
10505                                                                         // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
10506                                                                         // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
10507                                                                         // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
10508                                                                         // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
10509                                                                         // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
10510                                                                         // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
10511                                                                         // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
10512                                                                         // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
10513                                                                         let compl_action =
10514                                                                                 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
10515                                                                                         channel_funding_outpoint: monitor.get_funding_txo().0,
10516                                                                                         counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
10517                                                                                 };
10518                                                                         pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv,
10519                                                                                 path, false, compl_action, &pending_events, &args.logger);
10520                                                                         pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
10521                                                                 }
10522                                                         },
10523                                                 }
10524                                         }
10525                                 }
10526
10527                                 // Whether the downstream channel was closed or not, try to re-apply any payment
10528                                 // preimages from it which may be needed in upstream channels for forwarded
10529                                 // payments.
10530                                 let outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter = monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs()
10531                                         .into_iter()
10532                                         .filter_map(|(htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt))| {
10533                                                 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(_) = htlc_source {
10534                                                         if let Some(payment_preimage) = preimage_opt {
10535                                                                 Some((htlc_source, payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat,
10536                                                                         // Check if `counterparty_opt.is_none()` to see if the
10537                                                                         // downstream chan is closed (because we don't have a
10538                                                                         // channel_id -> peer map entry).
10539                                                                         counterparty_opt.is_none(),
10540                                                                         counterparty_opt.cloned().or(monitor.get_counterparty_node_id()),
10541                                                                         monitor.get_funding_txo().0))
10542                                                         } else { None }
10543                                                 } else {
10544                                                         // If it was an outbound payment, we've handled it above - if a preimage
10545                                                         // came in and we persisted the `ChannelManager` we either handled it and
10546                                                         // are good to go or the channel force-closed - we don't have to handle the
10547                                                         // channel still live case here.
10548                                                         None
10549                                                 }
10550                                         });
10551                                 for tuple in outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter {
10552                                         pending_claims_to_replay.push(tuple);
10553                                 }
10554                         }
10555                 }
10556
10557                 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
10558                         // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
10559                         // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
10560                         // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
10561                         // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
10562                         // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
10563                         pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
10564                                 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
10565                         }, None));
10566                 }
10567
10568                 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
10569                 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
10570
10571                 let mut claimable_payments = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
10572                 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
10573                         if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
10574                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10575                         }
10576                         if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
10577                                 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
10578                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10579                                 }
10580                                 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
10581                                         purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
10582                                 {
10583                                         let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
10584                                                 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
10585                                         });
10586                                         if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
10587                                 }
10588                         } else {
10589                                 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
10590                                         let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
10591                                                 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
10592                                         });
10593                                         if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
10594                                 }
10595                         }
10596                 } else {
10597                         // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
10598                         // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
10599                         for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
10600                                 if htlcs.is_empty() {
10601                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10602                                 }
10603                                 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
10604                                         OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
10605                                                 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
10606                                                         events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
10607                                                                 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
10608                                                                         Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
10609                                                                         None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
10610                                                                                 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
10611                                                                                 Err(()) => {
10612                                                                                         log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", &payment_hash);
10613                                                                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10614                                                                                 }
10615                                                                         }
10616                                                                 },
10617                                                                 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
10618                                                         }
10619                                                 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
10620                                         },
10621                                         OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
10622                                                 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
10623                                 };
10624                                 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
10625                                         purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
10626                                 });
10627                         }
10628                 }
10629
10630                 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10631                 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10632
10633                 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
10634                         Ok(key) => key,
10635                         Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10636                 };
10637                 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
10638                         if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
10639                                 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
10640                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10641                         }
10642                 }
10643
10644                 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
10645                 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
10646                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10647                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10648                         for (chan_id, phase) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
10649                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
10650                                         if chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
10651                                                 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
10652                                                 loop {
10653                                                         outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
10654                                                                 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &chain_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
10655                                                         if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
10656                                                 }
10657                                                 chan.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
10658                                         } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias()) {
10659                                                 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
10660                                                 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
10661                                                 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
10662                                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10663                                         }
10664                                         if chan.context.is_usable() {
10665                                                 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
10666                                                         // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
10667                                                         // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
10668                                                         log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
10669                                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10670                                                 }
10671                                         }
10672                                 } else {
10673                                         // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
10674                                         // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
10675                                         debug_assert!(false);
10676                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10677                                 }
10678                         }
10679                 }
10680
10681                 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
10682
10683                 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
10684                         for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
10685                                 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
10686                                         log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", &payment_hash);
10687                                         let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
10688                                         let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
10689                                         let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
10690                                         if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
10691                                                 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
10692                                                         .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
10693                                                 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
10694                                         }
10695                                         for claimable_htlc in &payment.htlcs {
10696                                                 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
10697
10698                                                 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
10699                                                 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
10700                                                 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
10701                                                 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
10702                                                 //
10703                                                 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
10704                                                 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
10705                                                 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
10706                                                 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
10707                                                 // reason to.
10708                                                 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
10709                                                 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
10710                                                 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
10711                                                 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
10712                                                 // restart.
10713                                                 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
10714                                                 if let Some(peer_node_id) = id_to_peer.get(&previous_channel_id){
10715                                                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
10716                                                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10717                                                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10718                                                         if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(channel)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
10719                                                                 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
10720                                                         }
10721                                                 }
10722                                                 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
10723                                                         previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
10724                                                 }
10725                                         }
10726                                         pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
10727                                                 receiver_node_id,
10728                                                 payment_hash,
10729                                                 purpose: payment.purpose,
10730                                                 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
10731                                                 htlcs: payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect(),
10732                                                 sender_intended_total_msat: payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat),
10733                                         }, None));
10734                                 }
10735                         }
10736                 }
10737
10738                 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
10739                         if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
10740                                 for (_, actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions.iter() {
10741                                         for action in actions.iter() {
10742                                                 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
10743                                                         downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
10744                                                                 Some((blocked_node_id, blocked_channel_outpoint, blocking_action)), ..
10745                                                 } = action {
10746                                                         if let Some(blocked_peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&blocked_node_id) {
10747                                                                 log_trace!(args.logger,
10748                                                                         "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
10749                                                                         blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id());
10750                                                                 blocked_peer_state.lock().unwrap().actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
10751                                                                         .entry(blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id())
10752                                                                         .or_insert_with(Vec::new).push(blocking_action.clone());
10753                                                         } else {
10754                                                                 // If the channel we were blocking has closed, we don't need to
10755                                                                 // worry about it - the blocked monitor update should never have
10756                                                                 // been released from the `Channel` object so it can't have
10757                                                                 // completed, and if the channel closed there's no reason to bother
10758                                                                 // anymore.
10759                                                         }
10760                                                 }
10761                                                 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately { .. } = action {
10762                                                         debug_assert!(false, "Non-event-generating channel freeing should not appear in our queue");
10763                                                 }
10764                                         }
10765                                 }
10766                                 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
10767                         } else {
10768                                 log_error!(args.logger, "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
10769                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10770                         }
10771                 }
10772
10773                 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
10774                         chain_hash,
10775                         fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
10776                         chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
10777                         tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
10778                         router: args.router,
10779
10780                         best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
10781
10782                         inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
10783                         pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
10784                         pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
10785                         pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
10786
10787                         forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
10788                         claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
10789                         outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
10790                         id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
10791                         short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
10792                         fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
10793
10794                         probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
10795
10796                         our_network_pubkey,
10797                         secp_ctx,
10798
10799                         highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
10800
10801                         per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
10802
10803                         pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
10804                         pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
10805                         pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
10806                         total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
10807                         background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
10808
10809                         event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
10810                         needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
10811
10812                         funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
10813
10814                         pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
10815
10816                         entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
10817                         node_signer: args.node_signer,
10818                         signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
10819
10820                         logger: args.logger,
10821                         default_configuration: args.default_config,
10822                 };
10823
10824                 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
10825                         let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
10826                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
10827                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
10828                         channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
10829                 }
10830
10831                 for (source, preimage, downstream_value, downstream_closed, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding) in pending_claims_to_replay {
10832                         // We use `downstream_closed` in place of `from_onchain` here just as a guess - we
10833                         // don't remember in the `ChannelMonitor` where we got a preimage from, but if the
10834                         // channel is closed we just assume that it probably came from an on-chain claim.
10835                         channel_manager.claim_funds_internal(source, preimage, Some(downstream_value),
10836                                 downstream_closed, true, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding);
10837                 }
10838
10839                 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
10840                 //connection or two.
10841
10842                 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
10843         }
10844 }
10845
10846 #[cfg(test)]
10847 mod tests {
10848         use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
10849         use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
10850         use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
10851         use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
10852         use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
10853         use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
10854         use crate::ln::ChannelId;
10855         use crate::ln::channelmanager::{inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
10856         use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
10857         use crate::ln::msgs::{self, ErrorAction};
10858         use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
10859         use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
10860         use crate::util::errors::APIError;
10861         use crate::util::test_utils;
10862         use crate::util::config::{ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
10863         use crate::sign::EntropySource;
10864
10865         #[test]
10866         fn test_notify_limits() {
10867                 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
10868                 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
10869                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
10870                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
10871                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
10872                 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10873
10874                 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
10875                 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
10876                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10877                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10878                 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10879
10880                 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
10881
10882                 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
10883                 // to connect messages with new values
10884                 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
10885                 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
10886                 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
10887                         &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
10888                 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
10889                         &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
10890
10891                 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
10892                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10893                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10894                 // ... but the last node should not.
10895                 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10896                 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
10897                 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10898                 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10899
10900                 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
10901                 // about the channel.
10902                 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
10903                 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
10904                 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10905
10906                 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
10907                 // parties.
10908                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
10909                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
10910                 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
10911                 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
10912                 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10913                 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10914
10915                 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
10916                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
10917                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
10918
10919                 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
10920                 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
10921                 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
10922                 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
10923                 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
10924                 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
10925
10926                 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
10927                 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
10928                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
10929                 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
10930                 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10931                 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10932                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
10933                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
10934
10935                 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
10936                 // the channel info has updated.
10937                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
10938                 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
10939                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10940                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10941                 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
10942                 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
10943         }
10944
10945         #[test]
10946         fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
10947                 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
10948                 // expected.
10949                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10950                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10951                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10952                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10953                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
10954
10955                 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
10956                 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
10957                 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
10958                 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
10959
10960                 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
10961                 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
10962                 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
10963                 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
10964                 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
10965                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
10966                 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
10967                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
10968                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10969                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10970                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10971                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
10972
10973                 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
10974                 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
10975                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
10976                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10977                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10978                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10979                 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
10980                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
10981                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10982                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
10983                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
10984                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
10985                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
10986                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10987                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10988                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
10989                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
10990                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
10991                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
10992                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
10993                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
10994                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
10995                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
10996
10997                 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
10998                 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
10999                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
11000                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11001                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11002                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11003                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
11004
11005                 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
11006                 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
11007                 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
11008                 // lightning messages manually.
11009                 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
11010                 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
11011                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
11012
11013                 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11014                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
11015                 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
11016                 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
11017                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11018                 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11019                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
11020                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11021                 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11022                 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
11023                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11024                 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11025                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
11026                 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
11027                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11028                 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11029                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
11030                 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11031                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11032                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
11033                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11034                 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
11035                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11036                 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11037                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
11038                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11039
11040                 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
11041                 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
11042                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11043                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
11044                 match events[0] {
11045                         Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
11046                                 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
11047                                 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
11048                                 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
11049                         },
11050                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11051                 }
11052                 match events[1] {
11053                         Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
11054                                 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
11055                                 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
11056                                 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
11057                         },
11058                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11059                 }
11060         }
11061
11062         #[test]
11063         fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
11064                 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(false);
11065                 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(true);
11066         }
11067
11068         fn do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(accept_mpp_keysend: bool) {
11069                 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
11070                 //      outbound regular payment fails as expected.
11071                 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
11072                 //      fails as expected.
11073                 // (3): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend
11074                 //      payment fails as expected. When `accept_mpp_keysend` is false, this tests that we
11075                 //      reject MPP keysend payments, since in this case where the payment has no payment
11076                 //      secret, a keysend payment with a duplicate hash is basically an MPP keysend. If
11077                 //      `accept_mpp_keysend` is true, this tests that we only accept MPP keysends with
11078                 //      payment secrets and reject otherwise.
11079                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11080                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11081                 let mut mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
11082                 mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = accept_mpp_keysend;
11083                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
11084                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11085                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11086                 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11087                 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11088
11089                 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
11090                 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
11091                 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
11092
11093                 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
11094                 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11095                         PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(),
11096                         TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false), 100_000);
11097                 let route = find_route(
11098                         &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11099                         None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11100                 ).unwrap();
11101                 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11102                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11103                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11104                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11105                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11106                 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11107                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11108                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11109                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11110                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11111                 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
11112                 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
11113                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11114                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11115                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11116                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11117                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11118                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11119                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11120                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11121                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11122                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11123                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11124                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11125
11126                 // Finally, claim the original payment.
11127                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11128
11129                 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
11130                 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11131                 let route = find_route(
11132                         &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11133                         None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11134                 ).unwrap();
11135                 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11136                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11137                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11138                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11139                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11140                 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
11141                 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
11142                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
11143
11144                 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
11145                 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
11146                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
11147                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
11148                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11149                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11150                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11151                 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11152                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11153                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11154                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11155                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11156                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11157                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11158                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11159                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11160                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11161                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11162                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11163                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11164                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11165                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11166                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11167                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11168
11169                 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
11170                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11171
11172                 // To start (3), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
11173                 let payment_id_1 = PaymentId([44; 32]);
11174                 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11175                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_1).unwrap();
11176                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11177                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11178                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11179                 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
11180                 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
11181                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
11182
11183                 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
11184                 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11185                         PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
11186                         100_000
11187                 );
11188                 let route = find_route(
11189                         &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11190                         None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11191                 ).unwrap();
11192                 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId([45; 32]);
11193                 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11194                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_2).unwrap();
11195                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11196                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11197                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11198                 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11199                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11200                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11201                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11202                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11203                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11204                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11205                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11206                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11207                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11208                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11209                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11210                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11211                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11212                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11213                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11214                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11215
11216                 // Finally, claim the original payment.
11217                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11218         }
11219
11220         #[test]
11221         fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
11222                 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
11223                 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
11224                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11225                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11226                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11227                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11228
11229                 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
11230                 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11231
11232                 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
11233                 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11234                         PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
11235                 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
11236                 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
11237                 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11238                 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11239                 let route = find_route(
11240                         &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
11241                         nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11242                 ).unwrap();
11243
11244                 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11245                 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
11246                 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
11247                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
11248                 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
11249                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
11250                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11251
11252                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11253                 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
11254                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11255                 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
11256                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11257                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11258                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
11259
11260                 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
11261         }
11262
11263         #[test]
11264         fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
11265                 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment
11266                 // secret when we don't support MPP keysend.
11267                 let mut reject_mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
11268                 reject_mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = false;
11269                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11270                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11271                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(reject_mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
11272                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11273
11274                 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
11275                 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11276
11277                 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
11278                 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11279                         PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
11280                 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
11281                 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
11282                 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11283                 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11284                 let route = find_route(
11285                         &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
11286                         nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11287                 ).unwrap();
11288
11289                 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11290                 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
11291                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
11292                 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
11293                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
11294                 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
11295                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
11296                         PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
11297                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11298
11299                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11300                 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
11301                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11302                 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
11303                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11304                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11305                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
11306
11307                 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
11308         }
11309
11310         #[test]
11311         fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
11312                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
11313                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
11314                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
11315                 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11316
11317                 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11318                 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11319                 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11320                 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11321
11322                 // Marshall an MPP route.
11323                 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
11324                 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
11325                 route.paths.push(path);
11326                 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11327                 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
11328                 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
11329                 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
11330                 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
11331                 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
11332
11333                 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
11334                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
11335                 .unwrap_err() {
11336                         PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
11337                                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
11338                         },
11339                         _ => panic!("unexpected error")
11340                 }
11341         }
11342
11343         #[test]
11344         fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
11345                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11346                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11347                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11348                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11349
11350                 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11351
11352                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11353                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11354
11355                 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
11356                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
11357                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11358                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
11359
11360                 {
11361                         // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
11362                         // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
11363                         let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
11364                         // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
11365                         assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
11366                         assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
11367                 }
11368
11369                 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
11370
11371                 {
11372                         // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
11373                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
11374                 }
11375         }
11376
11377         #[test]
11378         fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
11379                 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
11380                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11381                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11382                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11383                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11384
11385                 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
11386                 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
11387                         payment_secret,
11388                         total_msat: 100_000,
11389                 };
11390
11391                 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
11392                 // payment verification fails as expected.
11393                 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
11394                 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
11395                 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
11396                         Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
11397                         Err(()) => {
11398                                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
11399                         }
11400                 }
11401
11402                 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
11403                 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
11404         }
11405
11406         #[test]
11407         fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
11408                 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
11409                 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
11410                 // the channel is successfully closed.
11411                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11412                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11413                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11414                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11415
11416                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11417                 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11418                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
11419                 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11420                 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
11421
11422                 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
11423                 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes(tx.txid().into_inner());
11424                 {
11425                         // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
11426                         // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
11427                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11428                         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11429                 }
11430
11431                 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
11432                 {
11433                         // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
11434                         // as it has the funding transaction.
11435                         let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11436                         assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
11437                         assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11438                 }
11439
11440                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11441
11442                 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11443
11444                 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
11445                 {
11446                         let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11447                         assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
11448                         assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11449                 }
11450                 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11451
11452                 {
11453                         // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
11454                         // as it has the funding transaction.
11455                         let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11456                         assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
11457                         assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11458                 }
11459                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11460                 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11461                 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
11462                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11463                 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11464                 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
11465                 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
11466                 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
11467
11468                 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
11469                 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
11470                 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11471                 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
11472
11473                 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11474                 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
11475                 {
11476                         // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
11477                         // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
11478                         // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
11479                         // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
11480                         let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11481                         assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
11482                         assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11483                 }
11484
11485                 {
11486                         // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
11487                         // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
11488                         // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
11489                         // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
11490                         let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11491                         assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
11492                         assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11493                 }
11494
11495                 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
11496                 {
11497                         // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
11498                         // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
11499                         // closing transaction).
11500                         // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
11501                         // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
11502                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11503
11504                         // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s  `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
11505                         // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
11506                         let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11507                         assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
11508                         assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11509                 }
11510
11511                 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11512
11513                 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
11514                 {
11515                         // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
11516                         // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
11517                         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11518                 }
11519                 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11520
11521                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
11522                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
11523         }
11524
11525         fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
11526                 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
11527                 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11528         }
11529
11530         fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
11531                 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
11532                 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11533         }
11534
11535         fn check_channel_unavailable_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_channel_id: ChannelId, peer_node_id: PublicKey) {
11536                 let expected_message = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_channel_id, peer_node_id);
11537                 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11538         }
11539
11540         fn check_api_misuse_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
11541                 let expected_message = "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_string();
11542                 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11543         }
11544
11545         fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
11546                 match res_err {
11547                         Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
11548                                 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
11549                         },
11550                         Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
11551                                 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
11552                         },
11553                         Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
11554                         Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
11555                 }
11556         }
11557
11558         #[test]
11559         fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
11560                 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
11561                 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
11562                 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
11563                 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11564                 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
11565                 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
11566                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11567
11568                 // Dummy values
11569                 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
11570                 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
11571                 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
11572
11573                 // Test the API functions.
11574                 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None), unkown_public_key);
11575
11576                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
11577
11578                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
11579
11580                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
11581
11582                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
11583
11584                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
11585
11586                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
11587         }
11588
11589         #[test]
11590         fn test_api_calls_with_unavailable_channel() {
11591                 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` and a `channel_id`
11592                 // as input, behaves as expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is a known peer in the
11593                 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map, but the peer state doesn't contain a channel with
11594                 // the given `channel_id`.
11595                 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11596                 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
11597                 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
11598                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11599
11600                 let counterparty_node_id = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11601
11602                 // Dummy values
11603                 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
11604
11605                 // Test the API functions.
11606                 check_api_misuse_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, 42));
11607
11608                 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11609
11610                 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11611
11612                 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11613
11614                 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(InterceptId([0; 32]), &channel_id, counterparty_node_id, 1_000_000), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11615
11616                 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&counterparty_node_id, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11617         }
11618
11619         #[test]
11620         fn test_connection_limiting() {
11621                 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
11622                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11623                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11624                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11625                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11626
11627                 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
11628
11629                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11630                 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11631
11632                 let mut funding_tx = None;
11633                 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
11634                         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11635                         let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11636
11637                         if idx == 0 {
11638                                 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
11639                                 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
11640                                 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
11641                                 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
11642                                 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11643
11644                                 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
11645                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11646                                 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11647
11648                                 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11649
11650                                 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
11651                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11652                                 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11653                         }
11654                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11655                 }
11656
11657                 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
11658                 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11659                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11660                 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
11661                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11662
11663                 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
11664                 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
11665                 // limit.
11666                 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
11667                 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
11668                         let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11669                                 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11670                         peer_pks.push(random_pk);
11671                         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11672                                 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11673                         }, true).unwrap();
11674                 }
11675                 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11676                         &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11677                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11678                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11679                 }, true).unwrap_err();
11680
11681                 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
11682                 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
11683                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11684                 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11685                 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
11686                 for ev in chan_closed_events {
11687                         if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
11688                 }
11689                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11690                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11691                 }, true).unwrap();
11692                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
11693                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11694                 }, true).unwrap_err();
11695
11696                 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
11697                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
11698                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11699                 }, false).unwrap();
11700                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11701
11702                 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
11703                 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
11704                 // open channels.
11705                 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
11706                 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
11707                         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
11708                         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
11709                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11710                 }
11711                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11712                 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
11713                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11714
11715                 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
11716                 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11717                 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
11718
11719                 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
11720                 // "protected" and can connect again.
11721                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
11722                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
11723                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11724                 }, true).unwrap();
11725                 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11726
11727                 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
11728                 // last_random_pk.
11729                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11730                 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
11731         }
11732
11733         #[test]
11734         fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
11735                 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
11736                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11737                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11738                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11739                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11740
11741                 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
11742
11743                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11744                 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11745
11746                 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
11747                         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11748                         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11749                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11750                 }
11751
11752                 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
11753                 // rejected.
11754                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11755                 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
11756                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11757
11758                 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
11759                 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11760                 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11761
11762                 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
11763                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11764                 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
11765                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11766         }
11767
11768         #[test]
11769         fn test_0conf_limiting() {
11770                 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
11771                 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
11772                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11773                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11774                 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
11775                 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
11776                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
11777                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11778
11779                 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
11780
11781                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11782                 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11783
11784                 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
11785                 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
11786                         let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11787                                 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11788                         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11789                                 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11790                         }, true).unwrap();
11791
11792                         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11793                         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11794                         match events[0] {
11795                                 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
11796                                         nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
11797                                 }
11798                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11799                         }
11800                         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
11801                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11802                 }
11803
11804                 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
11805                 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11806                         &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11807                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11808                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11809                 }, true).unwrap();
11810                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11811                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11812                 match events[0] {
11813                         Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
11814                                 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
11815                                         Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
11816                                                 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
11817                                         _ => panic!(),
11818                                 }
11819                         }
11820                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11821                 }
11822                 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
11823                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11824
11825                 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
11826                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11827                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11828                 match events[0] {
11829                         Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
11830                                 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
11831                         }
11832                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11833                 }
11834                 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
11835         }
11836
11837         #[test]
11838         fn reject_excessively_underpaying_htlcs() {
11839                 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
11840                 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
11841                 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
11842                 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11843                 let sender_intended_amt_msat = 100;
11844                 let extra_fee_msat = 10;
11845                 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
11846                         amt_msat: 100,
11847                         outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
11848                         payment_metadata: None,
11849                         keysend_preimage: None,
11850                         payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
11851                                 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
11852                         }),
11853                         custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
11854                 };
11855                 // Check that if the amount we received + the penultimate hop extra fee is less than the sender
11856                 // intended amount, we fail the payment.
11857                 if let Err(crate::ln::channelmanager::InboundOnionErr { err_code, .. }) =
11858                         node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
11859                                 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat - 1, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat))
11860                 {
11861                         assert_eq!(err_code, 19);
11862                 } else { panic!(); }
11863
11864                 // If amt_received + extra_fee is equal to the sender intended amount, we're fine.
11865                 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { // This is the same payload as above, InboundOnionPayload doesn't implement Clone
11866                         amt_msat: 100,
11867                         outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
11868                         payment_metadata: None,
11869                         keysend_preimage: None,
11870                         payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
11871                                 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
11872                         }),
11873                         custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
11874                 };
11875                 assert!(node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
11876                         sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat)).is_ok());
11877         }
11878
11879         #[test]
11880         fn test_final_incorrect_cltv(){
11881                 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
11882                 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
11883                 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
11884                 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11885
11886                 let result = node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
11887                         amt_msat: 100,
11888                         outgoing_cltv_value: 22,
11889                         payment_metadata: None,
11890                         keysend_preimage: None,
11891                         payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
11892                                 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: 100,
11893                         }),
11894                         custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
11895                 }, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]), 100, 23, None, true, None);
11896
11897                 // Should not return an error as this condition:
11898                 // https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/4dcc377209509b13cf89a4b91fde7d478f5b46d8/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L334
11899                 // is not satisfied.
11900                 assert!(result.is_ok());
11901         }
11902
11903         #[test]
11904         fn test_inbound_anchors_manual_acceptance() {
11905                 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
11906                 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
11907                 let mut anchors_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
11908                 anchors_cfg.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
11909
11910                 let mut anchors_manual_accept_cfg = anchors_cfg.clone();
11911                 anchors_manual_accept_cfg.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
11912
11913                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
11914                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
11915                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs,
11916                         &[Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_manual_accept_cfg.clone())]);
11917                 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11918
11919                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11920                 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11921
11922                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11923                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
11924                 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11925                 match &msg_events[0] {
11926                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } => {
11927                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11928                                 match action {
11929                                         ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } =>
11930                                                 assert_eq!(msg.data, "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned()),
11931                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected error action"),
11932                                 }
11933                         }
11934                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11935                 }
11936
11937                 nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11938                 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11939                 match events[0] {
11940                         Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } =>
11941                                 nodes[2].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap(),
11942                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11943                 }
11944                 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11945         }
11946
11947         #[test]
11948         fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
11949                 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
11950                 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
11951                 // the channel without the anchors feature.
11952                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11953                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11954                 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
11955                 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
11956                 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
11957                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
11958                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11959
11960                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None, None).unwrap();
11961                 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11962                 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
11963
11964                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11965                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11966                 match events[0] {
11967                         Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
11968                                 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
11969                         }
11970                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11971                 }
11972
11973                 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11974                 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
11975
11976                 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11977                 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
11978
11979                 // Since nodes[1] should not have accepted the channel, it should
11980                 // not have generated any events.
11981                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
11982         }
11983
11984         #[test]
11985         fn test_update_channel_config() {
11986                 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11987                 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
11988                 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
11989                 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
11990                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11991                 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11992                 let channel = &nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0];
11993
11994                 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
11995                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11996                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
11997
11998                 user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat += 10;
11999                 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
12000                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_base_msat, user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat);
12001                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12002                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12003                 match &events[0] {
12004                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12005                         _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
12006                 }
12007
12008                 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate::default()).unwrap();
12009                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12010                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
12011
12012                 let new_cltv_expiry_delta = user_config.channel_config.cltv_expiry_delta + 6;
12013                 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
12014                         cltv_expiry_delta: Some(new_cltv_expiry_delta),
12015                         ..Default::default()
12016                 }).unwrap();
12017                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
12018                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12019                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12020                 match &events[0] {
12021                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12022                         _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
12023                 }
12024
12025                 let new_fee = user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths + 100;
12026                 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
12027                         forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
12028                         ..Default::default()
12029                 }).unwrap();
12030                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
12031                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, new_fee);
12032                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12033                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12034                 match &events[0] {
12035                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12036                         _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
12037                 }
12038
12039                 // If we provide a channel_id not associated with the peer, we should get an error and no updates
12040                 // should be applied to ensure update atomicity as specified in the API docs.
12041                 let bad_channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_txid(&[10; 32], 10);
12042                 let current_fee = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths;
12043                 let new_fee = current_fee + 100;
12044                 assert!(
12045                         matches!(
12046                                 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id, bad_channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
12047                                         forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
12048                                         ..Default::default()
12049                                 }),
12050                                 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: _ }),
12051                         )
12052                 );
12053                 // Check that the fee hasn't changed for the channel that exists.
12054                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, current_fee);
12055                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12056                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
12057         }
12058
12059         #[test]
12060         fn test_payment_display() {
12061                 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
12062                 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_id), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
12063                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
12064                 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_hash), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
12065                 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
12066                 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_preimage), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
12067         }
12068
12069         #[test]
12070         fn test_trigger_lnd_force_close() {
12071                 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12072                 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
12073                 let user_config = test_default_channel_config();
12074                 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
12075                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12076
12077                 // Open a channel, immediately disconnect each other, and broadcast Alice's latest state.
12078                 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12079                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12080                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12081                 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
12082                 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
12083                 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
12084                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12085                 {
12086                         let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
12087                         assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
12088                         check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
12089                 }
12090
12091                 // Since they're disconnected, Bob won't receive Alice's `Error` message. Reconnect them
12092                 // such that Bob sends a `ChannelReestablish` to Alice since the channel is still open from
12093                 // their side.
12094                 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12095                         features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12096                 }, true).unwrap();
12097                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12098                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12099                 }, false).unwrap();
12100                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
12101                 let channel_reestablish = get_event_msg!(
12102                         nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()
12103                 );
12104                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channel_reestablish);
12105
12106                 // Alice should respond with an error since the channel isn't known, but a bogus
12107                 // `ChannelReestablish` should be sent first, such that we actually trigger Bob to force
12108                 // close even if it was an lnd node.
12109                 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12110                 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
12111                 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { node_id, msg } = &msg_events[0] {
12112                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12113                         assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 0);
12114                         assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0);
12115                         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
12116                 } else { panic!() };
12117                 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[1], 1, true);
12118                 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
12119                 let expected_close_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError {
12120                         err: "Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_string()
12121                 };
12122                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, expected_close_reason, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12123                 {
12124                         let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
12125                         assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
12126                         check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
12127                 }
12128         }
12129 }
12130
12131 #[cfg(ldk_bench)]
12132 pub mod bench {
12133         use crate::chain::Listen;
12134         use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
12135         use crate::sign::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
12136         use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
12137         use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
12138         use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
12139         use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
12140         use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
12141         use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
12142         use crate::util::test_utils;
12143         use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
12144
12145         use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
12146         use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
12147         use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
12148
12149         use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock};
12150
12151         use criterion::Criterion;
12152
12153         type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
12154                 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
12155                         &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
12156                         &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
12157                 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
12158                 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
12159                 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
12160
12161         struct ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
12162                 node: &'node_cfg Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>,
12163         }
12164         impl<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg, P> {
12165                 type CM = Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>;
12166                 #[inline]
12167                 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P> { self.node }
12168                 #[inline]
12169                 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
12170         }
12171
12172         pub fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Criterion) {
12173                 bench_two_sends(bench, "bench_sends", test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
12174         }
12175
12176         pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Criterion, bench_name: &str, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
12177                 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
12178                 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
12179                 // calls per node.
12180                 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
12181                 let genesis_block = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network);
12182
12183                 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
12184                 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
12185                 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
12186                 let scorer = RwLock::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
12187                 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &scorer);
12188
12189                 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
12190                 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(5_000_000 / 253);
12191                 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
12192
12193                 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
12194                 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
12195                 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
12196                 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
12197                         network,
12198                         best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
12199                 }, genesis_block.header.time);
12200                 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
12201
12202                 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
12203                 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
12204                 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
12205                 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
12206                 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
12207                         network,
12208                         best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
12209                 }, genesis_block.header.time);
12210                 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
12211
12212                 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
12213                         features: node_b.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12214                 }, true).unwrap();
12215                 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
12216                         features: node_a.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12217                 }, false).unwrap();
12218                 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12219                 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12220                 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12221
12222                 let tx;
12223                 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
12224                         tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
12225                                 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
12226                         }]};
12227                         node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
12228                 } else { panic!(); }
12229
12230                 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12231                 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12232                 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
12233                 match events_b[0] {
12234                         Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12235                                 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12236                         },
12237                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12238                 }
12239
12240                 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12241                 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12242                 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
12243                 match events_a[0] {
12244                         Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12245                                 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
12246                         },
12247                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12248                 }
12249
12250                 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
12251
12252                 let block = create_dummy_block(BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash(), 42, vec![tx]);
12253                 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
12254                 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
12255
12256                 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12257                 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12258                 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
12259                 match msg_events[0] {
12260                         MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
12261                                 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
12262                                 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12263                         },
12264                         _ => panic!(),
12265                 }
12266                 match msg_events[1] {
12267                         MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12268                         _ => panic!(),
12269                 }
12270
12271                 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12272                 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
12273                 match events_a[0] {
12274                         Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12275                                 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
12276                         },
12277                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12278                 }
12279
12280                 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12281                 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
12282                 match events_b[0] {
12283                         Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12284                                 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12285                         },
12286                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12287                 }
12288
12289                 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
12290                 macro_rules! send_payment {
12291                         ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
12292                                 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
12293                                         .with_bolt11_features($node_b.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
12294                                 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
12295                                 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
12296                                 payment_count += 1;
12297                                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
12298                                 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
12299
12300                                 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
12301                                         PaymentId(payment_hash.0),
12302                                         RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 10_000),
12303                                         Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
12304                                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
12305                                 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
12306                                 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
12307                                 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
12308                                 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
12309                                 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
12310                                 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12311
12312                                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
12313                                 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
12314                                 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
12315                                 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
12316
12317                                 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
12318                                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
12319                                                 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
12320                                                 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
12321                                                 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
12322                                         },
12323                                         _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
12324                                 }
12325
12326                                 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
12327                                 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
12328                                 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
12329                                 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12330
12331                                 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
12332                         }
12333                 }
12334
12335                 bench.bench_function(bench_name, |b| b.iter(|| {
12336                         send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
12337                         send_payment!(node_b, node_a);
12338                 }));
12339         }
12340 }