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[rust-lightning] / lightning / src / ln / channelmanager.rs
1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
2 // history.
3 //
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
8 // licenses.
9
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
11 //!
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
15 //!
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
19
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::Header;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
23 use bitcoin::key::constants::SECRET_KEY_SIZE;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
25
26 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
27 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
28 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
29
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
31 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
32 use bitcoin::{secp256k1, Sequence};
33
34 use crate::blinded_path::BlindedPath;
35 use crate::blinded_path::payment::{PaymentConstraints, ReceiveTlvs};
36 use crate::chain;
37 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
38 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
39 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
40 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
41 use crate::events;
42 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
43 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
44 // construct one themselves.
45 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, ChannelId, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
46 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelPhase, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UnfundedChannelContext, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel};
47 use crate::ln::features::{Bolt12InvoiceFeatures, ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
48 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
49 use crate::ln::features::Bolt11InvoiceFeatures;
50 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
51 use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteParameters, Router};
52 use crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters};
53 use crate::ln::msgs;
54 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
55 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
56 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
57 #[cfg(test)]
58 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
59 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{Bolt12PaymentError, OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment, SendAlongPathArgs, StaleExpiration};
60 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
61 use crate::offers::invoice::{BlindedPayInfo, Bolt12Invoice, DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY, DerivedSigningPubkey, InvoiceBuilder};
62 use crate::offers::invoice_error::InvoiceError;
63 use crate::offers::merkle::SignError;
64 use crate::offers::offer::{DerivedMetadata, Offer, OfferBuilder};
65 use crate::offers::parse::Bolt12SemanticError;
66 use crate::offers::refund::{Refund, RefundBuilder};
67 use crate::onion_message::{Destination, OffersMessage, OffersMessageHandler, PendingOnionMessage, new_pending_onion_message};
68 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
69 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
70 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
71 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
72 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
73 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
74 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
75 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
76
77 use alloc::collections::{btree_map, BTreeMap};
78
79 use crate::io;
80 use crate::prelude::*;
81 use core::{cmp, mem};
82 use core::cell::RefCell;
83 use crate::io::Read;
84 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
85 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, AtomicBool, Ordering};
86 use core::time::Duration;
87 use core::ops::Deref;
88
89 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
90 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, ProbeSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
91 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
92
93 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
94 //
95 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
96 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
97 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
98 //
99 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
100 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
101 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
102 // before we forward it.
103 //
104 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
105 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
106 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
107 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
108 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
109
110 /// Routing info for an inbound HTLC onion.
111 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
112 pub enum PendingHTLCRouting {
113         /// A forwarded HTLC.
114         Forward {
115                 /// BOLT 4 onion packet.
116                 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
117                 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
118                 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
119                 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
120         },
121         /// An HTLC paid to an invoice we generated.
122         Receive {
123                 /// Payment secret and total msat received.
124                 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
125                 /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`] for more info.
126                 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
127                 /// Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed.
128                 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32,
129                 /// Optional shared secret for phantom node.
130                 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
131                 /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`] for more info.
132                 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
133         },
134         /// Incoming keysend (sender provided the preimage in a TLV).
135         ReceiveKeysend {
136                 /// This was added in 0.0.116 and will break deserialization on downgrades.
137                 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
138                 /// Preimage for this onion payment.
139                 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
140                 /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`] for more info.
141                 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
142                 /// CLTV expiry of the incoming HTLC.
143                 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
144                 /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`] for more info.
145                 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
146         },
147 }
148
149 /// Full details of an incoming HTLC, including routing info.
150 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
151 pub struct PendingHTLCInfo {
152         /// Further routing details based on whether the HTLC is being forwarded or received.
153         pub routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
154         /// Shared secret from the previous hop.
155         pub incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
156         payment_hash: PaymentHash,
157         /// Amount received
158         pub incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
159         /// Sender intended amount to forward or receive (actual amount received
160         /// may overshoot this in either case)
161         pub outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
162         /// Outgoing CLTV height.
163         pub outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
164         /// The fee being skimmed off the top of this HTLC. If this is a forward, it'll be the fee we are
165         /// skimming. If we're receiving this HTLC, it's the fee that our counterparty skimmed.
166         pub skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
167 }
168
169 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
170 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
171         Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
172         Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
173 }
174
175 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
176 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
177 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
178         Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
179         Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
180 }
181
182 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
183         pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
184
185         // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
186         // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
187         // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
188         // HTLCs.
189         //
190         // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
191         prev_short_channel_id: u64,
192         prev_htlc_id: u64,
193         prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
194         prev_user_channel_id: u128,
195 }
196
197 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
198         AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
199         FailHTLC {
200                 htlc_id: u64,
201                 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
202         },
203 }
204
205 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
206 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
207 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
208         // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
209         short_channel_id: u64,
210         user_channel_id: Option<u128>,
211         htlc_id: u64,
212         incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
213         phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
214
215         // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
216         // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
217         outpoint: OutPoint,
218 }
219
220 enum OnionPayload {
221         /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
222         Invoice {
223                 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
224                 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
225                 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
226         },
227         /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
228         Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
229 }
230
231 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
232 struct ClaimableHTLC {
233         prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
234         cltv_expiry: u32,
235         /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
236         value: u64,
237         /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
238         /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
239         sender_intended_value: u64,
240         onion_payload: OnionPayload,
241         timer_ticks: u8,
242         /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
243         /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
244         total_value_received: Option<u64>,
245         /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
246         total_msat: u64,
247         /// The extra fee our counterparty skimmed off the top of this HTLC.
248         counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
249 }
250
251 impl From<&ClaimableHTLC> for events::ClaimedHTLC {
252         fn from(val: &ClaimableHTLC) -> Self {
253                 events::ClaimedHTLC {
254                         channel_id: val.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
255                         user_channel_id: val.prev_hop.user_channel_id.unwrap_or(0),
256                         cltv_expiry: val.cltv_expiry,
257                         value_msat: val.value,
258                         counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: val.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0),
259                 }
260         }
261 }
262
263 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
264 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
265 ///
266 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
267 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
268 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; Self::LENGTH]);
269
270 impl PaymentId {
271         /// Number of bytes in the id.
272         pub const LENGTH: usize = 32;
273 }
274
275 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
276         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
277                 self.0.write(w)
278         }
279 }
280
281 impl Readable for PaymentId {
282         fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
283                 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
284                 Ok(PaymentId(buf))
285         }
286 }
287
288 impl core::fmt::Display for PaymentId {
289         fn fmt(&self, f: &mut core::fmt::Formatter) -> core::fmt::Result {
290                 crate::util::logger::DebugBytes(&self.0).fmt(f)
291         }
292 }
293
294 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
295 ///
296 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
297 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
298 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
299
300 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
301         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
302                 self.0.write(w)
303         }
304 }
305
306 impl Readable for InterceptId {
307         fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
308                 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
309                 Ok(InterceptId(buf))
310         }
311 }
312
313 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
314 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
315 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
316         PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
317         OutboundRoute { session_priv: [u8; SECRET_KEY_SIZE] },
318 }
319 impl SentHTLCId {
320         pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
321                 match source {
322                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
323                                 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
324                                 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
325                         },
326                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
327                                 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: session_priv.secret_bytes() },
328                 }
329         }
330 }
331 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
332         (0, PreviousHopData) => {
333                 (0, short_channel_id, required),
334                 (2, htlc_id, required),
335         },
336         (2, OutboundRoute) => {
337                 (0, session_priv, required),
338         };
339 );
340
341
342 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
343 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
344 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
345 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
346         PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
347         OutboundRoute {
348                 path: Path,
349                 session_priv: SecretKey,
350                 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
351                 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
352                 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
353                 payment_id: PaymentId,
354         },
355 }
356 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
357 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
358         fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
359                 match self {
360                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
361                                 0u8.hash(hasher);
362                                 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
363                         },
364                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
365                                 1u8.hash(hasher);
366                                 path.hash(hasher);
367                                 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
368                                 payment_id.hash(hasher);
369                                 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
370                         },
371                 }
372         }
373 }
374 impl HTLCSource {
375         #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
376         #[cfg(test)]
377         pub fn dummy() -> Self {
378                 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
379                         path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
380                         session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
381                         first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
382                         payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
383                 }
384         }
385
386         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
387         /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
388         /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
389         pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
390                 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
391                         *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
392                 } else {
393                         // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
394                         true
395                 }
396         }
397 }
398
399 /// Invalid inbound onion payment.
400 pub struct InboundOnionErr {
401         /// BOLT 4 error code.
402         pub err_code: u16,
403         /// Data attached to this error.
404         pub err_data: Vec<u8>,
405         /// Error message text.
406         pub msg: &'static str,
407 }
408
409 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
410 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
411 ///
412 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
413 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
414 pub enum FailureCode {
415         /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
416         /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
417         TemporaryNodeFailure,
418         /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
419         /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
420         RequiredNodeFeatureMissing,
421         /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
422         /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
423         /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
424         /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
425         IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails,
426         /// We failed to process the payload after the onion was decrypted. You may wish to
427         /// use this when receiving custom HTLC TLVs with even type numbers that you don't recognize.
428         ///
429         /// If available, the tuple data may include the type number and byte offset in the
430         /// decrypted byte stream where the failure occurred.
431         InvalidOnionPayload(Option<(u64, u16)>),
432 }
433
434 impl Into<u16> for FailureCode {
435     fn into(self) -> u16 {
436                 match self {
437                         FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => 0x2000 | 2,
438                         FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
439                         FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => 0x4000 | 15,
440                         FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(_) => 0x4000 | 22,
441                 }
442         }
443 }
444
445 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
446 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
447 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
448 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
449 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
450
451 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
452         err: msgs::LightningError,
453         chan_id: Option<(ChannelId, u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
454         shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
455         channel_capacity: Option<u64>,
456 }
457 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
458         #[inline]
459         fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
460                 Self {
461                         err: LightningError {
462                                 err: err.clone(),
463                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
464                                         msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
465                                                 channel_id,
466                                                 data: err
467                                         },
468                                 },
469                         },
470                         chan_id: None,
471                         shutdown_finish: None,
472                         channel_capacity: None,
473                 }
474         }
475         #[inline]
476         fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
477                 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None, channel_capacity: None }
478         }
479         #[inline]
480         fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId, user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>, channel_capacity: u64) -> Self {
481                 let err_msg = msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: err.clone() };
482                 let action = if shutdown_res.monitor_update.is_some() {
483                         // We have a closing `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, which means the channel was funded and we
484                         // should disconnect our peer such that we force them to broadcast their latest
485                         // commitment upon reconnecting.
486                         msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(err_msg) }
487                 } else {
488                         msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: err_msg }
489                 };
490                 Self {
491                         err: LightningError { err, action },
492                         chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
493                         shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
494                         channel_capacity: Some(channel_capacity)
495                 }
496         }
497         #[inline]
498         fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
499                 Self {
500                         err: match err {
501                                 ChannelError::Warn(msg) =>  LightningError {
502                                         err: msg.clone(),
503                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
504                                                 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
505                                                         channel_id,
506                                                         data: msg
507                                                 },
508                                                 log_level: Level::Warn,
509                                         },
510                                 },
511                                 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
512                                         err: msg,
513                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
514                                 },
515                                 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
516                                         err: msg.clone(),
517                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
518                                                 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
519                                                         channel_id,
520                                                         data: msg
521                                                 },
522                                         },
523                                 },
524                         },
525                         chan_id: None,
526                         shutdown_finish: None,
527                         channel_capacity: None,
528                 }
529         }
530
531         fn closes_channel(&self) -> bool {
532                 self.chan_id.is_some()
533         }
534 }
535
536 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
537 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
538 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
539 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
540 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
541
542 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
543 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
544 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
545 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
546 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
547 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
548         /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
549         CommitmentFirst,
550         /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
551         RevokeAndACKFirst,
552 }
553
554 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
555 struct ClaimingPayment {
556         amount_msat: u64,
557         payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
558         receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
559         htlcs: Vec<events::ClaimedHTLC>,
560         sender_intended_value: Option<u64>,
561 }
562 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
563         (0, amount_msat, required),
564         (2, payment_purpose, required),
565         (4, receiver_node_id, required),
566         (5, htlcs, optional_vec),
567         (7, sender_intended_value, option),
568 });
569
570 struct ClaimablePayment {
571         purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
572         onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
573         htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
574 }
575
576 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
577 struct ClaimablePayments {
578         /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
579         /// failed/claimed by the user.
580         ///
581         /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
582         /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
583         ///
584         /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
585         /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
586         claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
587
588         /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
589         /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
590         /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
591         pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
592 }
593
594 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be processed immediately at the generation site
595 /// usually because we're running pre-full-init. They are handled immediately once we detect we are
596 /// running normally, and specifically must be processed before any other non-background
597 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are applied.
598 #[derive(Debug)]
599 enum BackgroundEvent {
600         /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which closes the channel or for an already-closed channel.
601         /// This is only separated from [`Self::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`] as the
602         /// maybe-non-closing variant needs a public key to handle channel resumption, whereas if the
603         /// channel has been force-closed we do not need the counterparty node_id.
604         ///
605         /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
606         /// are regenerated on startup.
607         ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
608         /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which may or may not close the channel and may unblock the
609         /// channel to continue normal operation.
610         ///
611         /// In general this should be used rather than
612         /// [`Self::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`], however in cases where the
613         /// `counterparty_node_id` is not available as the channel has closed from a [`ChannelMonitor`]
614         /// error the other variant is acceptable.
615         ///
616         /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
617         /// are regenerated on startup.
618         MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
619                 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
620                 funding_txo: OutPoint,
621                 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate
622         },
623         /// Some [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (s) completed before we were serialized but we still have
624         /// them marked pending, thus we need to run any [`MonitorUpdateCompletionAction`] (s) pending
625         /// on a channel.
626         MonitorUpdatesComplete {
627                 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
628                 channel_id: ChannelId,
629         },
630 }
631
632 #[derive(Debug)]
633 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
634         /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
635         /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
636         /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
637         /// event can be generated.
638         PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
639         /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user and possibly resume the
640         /// operation of another channel.
641         ///
642         /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
643         /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
644         /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. In that case, after the inbound
645         /// edge completes, we will surface an [`Event::PaymentForwarded`] as well as unblock the
646         /// outbound edge.
647         EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
648                 event: events::Event,
649                 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction)>,
650         },
651         /// Indicates we should immediately resume the operation of another channel, unless there is
652         /// some other reason why the channel is blocked. In practice this simply means immediately
653         /// removing the [`RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction`] provided from the blocking set.
654         ///
655         /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
656         /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
657         /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. However, we use this variant
658         /// instead of [`Self::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel`] when we discover that the claim was in
659         /// fact duplicative and we simply want to resume the outbound edge channel immediately.
660         ///
661         /// This variant should thus never be written to disk, as it is processed inline rather than
662         /// stored for later processing.
663         FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
664                 downstream_counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
665                 downstream_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
666                 blocking_action: RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
667         },
668 }
669
670 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
671         (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
672         // Note that FreeOtherChannelImmediately should never be written - we were supposed to free
673         // *immediately*. However, for simplicity we implement read/write here.
674         (1, FreeOtherChannelImmediately) => {
675                 (0, downstream_counterparty_node_id, required),
676                 (2, downstream_funding_outpoint, required),
677                 (4, blocking_action, required),
678         },
679         (2, EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel) => {
680                 (0, event, upgradable_required),
681                 // LDK prior to 0.0.116 did not have this field as the monitor update application order was
682                 // required by clients. If we downgrade to something prior to 0.0.116 this may result in
683                 // monitor updates which aren't properly blocked or resumed, however that's fine - we don't
684                 // support async monitor updates even in LDK 0.0.116 and once we do we'll require no
685                 // downgrades to prior versions.
686                 (1, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint, option),
687         },
688 );
689
690 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
691 pub(crate) enum EventCompletionAction {
692         ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
693                 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
694                 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
695         },
696 }
697 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(EventCompletionAction,
698         (0, ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate) => {
699                 (0, channel_funding_outpoint, required),
700                 (2, counterparty_node_id, required),
701         };
702 );
703
704 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
705 /// If something is blocked on the completion of an RAA-generated [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] we track
706 /// the blocked action here. See enum variants for more info.
707 pub(crate) enum RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
708         /// A forwarded payment was claimed. We block the downstream channel completing its monitor
709         /// update which removes the HTLC preimage until the upstream channel has gotten the preimage
710         /// durably to disk.
711         ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
712                 /// The upstream channel ID (i.e. the inbound edge).
713                 channel_id: ChannelId,
714                 /// The HTLC ID on the inbound edge.
715                 htlc_id: u64,
716         },
717 }
718
719 impl RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
720         fn from_prev_hop_data(prev_hop: &HTLCPreviousHopData) -> Self {
721                 Self::ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
722                         channel_id: prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
723                         htlc_id: prev_hop.htlc_id,
724                 }
725         }
726 }
727
728 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
729         (0, ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim) => { (0, channel_id, required), (2, htlc_id, required) }
730 ;);
731
732
733 /// State we hold per-peer.
734 pub(super) struct PeerState<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
735         /// `channel_id` -> `ChannelPhase`
736         ///
737         /// Holds all channels within corresponding `ChannelPhase`s where the peer is the counterparty.
738         pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>,
739         /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `InboundChannelRequest`.
740         ///
741         /// When manual channel acceptance is enabled, this holds all unaccepted inbound channels where
742         /// the peer is the counterparty. If the channel is accepted, then the entry in this table is
743         /// removed, and an InboundV1Channel is created and placed in the `inbound_v1_channel_by_id` table. If
744         /// the channel is rejected, then the entry is simply removed.
745         pub(super) inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, InboundChannelRequest>,
746         /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
747         latest_features: InitFeatures,
748         /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
749         /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
750         pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
751         /// Map from Channel IDs to pending [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s which have been passed to the
752         /// user but which have not yet completed.
753         ///
754         /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example if the channel was closed but we
755         /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
756         /// for a missing channel.
757         in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<OutPoint, Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>,
758         /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
759         /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
760         ///
761         /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
762         /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
763         /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
764         /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
765         ///
766         /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
767         /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
768         /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
769         /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
770         /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
771         /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
772         monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
773         /// If another channel's [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] needs to complete before a channel we have
774         /// with this peer can complete an RAA [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (e.g. because the RAA update
775         /// will remove a preimage that needs to be durably in an upstream channel first), we put an
776         /// entry here to note that the channel with the key's ID is blocked on a set of actions.
777         actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
778         /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
779         /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
780         /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
781         is_connected: bool,
782 }
783
784 impl <SP: Deref> PeerState<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
785         /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
786         /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
787         /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
788         fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
789                 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
790                         return false
791                 }
792                 self.channel_by_id.iter().filter(|(_, phase)| matches!(phase, ChannelPhase::Funded(_))).count() == 0
793                         && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
794                         && self.in_flight_monitor_updates.is_empty()
795         }
796
797         // Returns a count of all channels we have with this peer, including unfunded channels.
798         fn total_channel_count(&self) -> usize {
799                 self.channel_by_id.len() + self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
800         }
801
802         // Returns a bool indicating if the given `channel_id` matches a channel we have with this peer.
803         fn has_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId) -> bool {
804                 self.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
805                         self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.contains_key(channel_id)
806         }
807 }
808
809 /// A not-yet-accepted inbound (from counterparty) channel. Once
810 /// accepted, the parameters will be used to construct a channel.
811 pub(super) struct InboundChannelRequest {
812         /// The original OpenChannel message.
813         pub open_channel_msg: msgs::OpenChannel,
814         /// The number of ticks remaining before the request expires.
815         pub ticks_remaining: i32,
816 }
817
818 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unaccepted inbound channel to be
819 /// accepted. An unaccepted channel that exceeds this limit will be abandoned.
820 const UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: i32 = 2;
821
822 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
823 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
824 ///
825 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
826 /// here.
827 ///
828 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
829 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
830 struct PendingInboundPayment {
831         /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
832         payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
833         /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
834         /// this payment being removed.
835         expiry_time: u64,
836         /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
837         user_payment_id: u64,
838         // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
839         payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
840         min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
841 }
842
843 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
844 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
845 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
846 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
847 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
848 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
849 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
850 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
851 ///
852 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
853 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
854 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
855         Arc<M>,
856         Arc<T>,
857         Arc<KeysManager>,
858         Arc<KeysManager>,
859         Arc<KeysManager>,
860         Arc<F>,
861         Arc<DefaultRouter<
862                 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
863                 Arc<L>,
864                 Arc<RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>,
865                 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
866                 ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>,
867         >>,
868         Arc<L>
869 >;
870
871 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
872 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
873 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
874 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
875 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
876 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
877 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
878 /// or, respectively, [`Router`]  for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
879 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
880 ///
881 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
882 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
883 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> =
884         ChannelManager<
885                 &'a M,
886                 &'b T,
887                 &'c KeysManager,
888                 &'c KeysManager,
889                 &'c KeysManager,
890                 &'d F,
891                 &'e DefaultRouter<
892                         &'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>,
893                         &'g L,
894                         &'h RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>,
895                         ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
896                         ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>
897                 >,
898                 &'g L
899         >;
900
901 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`].
902 ///
903 /// This is not exported to bindings users as general cover traits aren't useful in other
904 /// languages.
905 pub trait AChannelManager {
906         /// A type implementing [`chain::Watch`].
907         type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
908         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Watch`].
909         type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
910         /// A type implementing [`BroadcasterInterface`].
911         type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface + ?Sized;
912         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Broadcaster`].
913         type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
914         /// A type implementing [`EntropySource`].
915         type EntropySource: EntropySource + ?Sized;
916         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::EntropySource`].
917         type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
918         /// A type implementing [`NodeSigner`].
919         type NodeSigner: NodeSigner + ?Sized;
920         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::NodeSigner`].
921         type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
922         /// A type implementing [`WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner`].
923         type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner + Sized;
924         /// A type implementing [`SignerProvider`] for [`Self::Signer`].
925         type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<Signer = Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
926         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::SignerProvider`].
927         type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
928         /// A type implementing [`FeeEstimator`].
929         type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator + ?Sized;
930         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::FeeEstimator`].
931         type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
932         /// A type implementing [`Router`].
933         type Router: Router + ?Sized;
934         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Router`].
935         type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
936         /// A type implementing [`Logger`].
937         type Logger: Logger + ?Sized;
938         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Logger`].
939         type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
940         /// Returns a reference to the actual [`ChannelManager`] object.
941         fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
942 }
943
944 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
945 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
946 where
947         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
948         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
949         ES::Target: EntropySource,
950         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
951         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
952         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
953         R::Target: Router,
954         L::Target: Logger,
955 {
956         type Watch = M::Target;
957         type M = M;
958         type Broadcaster = T::Target;
959         type T = T;
960         type EntropySource = ES::Target;
961         type ES = ES;
962         type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
963         type NS = NS;
964         type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer;
965         type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
966         type SP = SP;
967         type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
968         type F = F;
969         type Router = R::Target;
970         type R = R;
971         type Logger = L::Target;
972         type L = L;
973         fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
974 }
975
976 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
977 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
978 ///
979 /// Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
980 /// to individual Channels.
981 ///
982 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
983 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
984 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
985 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
986 ///
987 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
988 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST durably write each
989 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] before returning from
990 /// [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`] or before completing async writes. With
991 /// `ChannelManager`s, writing updates happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other
992 /// `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during the serialization process). If the
993 /// deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to
994 /// [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds
995 /// will be lost (modulo on-chain transaction fees).
996 ///
997 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
998 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
999 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
1000 ///
1001 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
1002 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
1003 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
1004 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
1005 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
1006 ///
1007 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
1008 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
1009 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
1010 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
1011 ///
1012 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
1013 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
1014 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
1015 ///
1016 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
1017 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
1018 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
1019 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
1020 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
1021 ///
1022 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
1023 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
1024 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
1025 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
1026 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
1027 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
1028 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
1029 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
1030 //
1031 // Lock order:
1032 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
1033 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
1034 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
1035 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
1036 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
1037 //
1038 // Lock order tree:
1039 //
1040 // `pending_offers_messages`
1041 //
1042 // `total_consistency_lock`
1043 //  |
1044 //  |__`forward_htlcs`
1045 //  |   |
1046 //  |   |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
1047 //  |
1048 //  |__`per_peer_state`
1049 //      |
1050 //      |__`pending_inbound_payments`
1051 //          |
1052 //          |__`claimable_payments`
1053 //          |
1054 //          |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
1055 //              |
1056 //              |__`peer_state`
1057 //                  |
1058 //                  |__`id_to_peer`
1059 //                  |
1060 //                  |__`short_to_chan_info`
1061 //                  |
1062 //                  |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
1063 //                  |
1064 //                  |__`best_block`
1065 //                  |
1066 //                  |__`pending_events`
1067 //                      |
1068 //                      |__`pending_background_events`
1069 //
1070 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
1071 where
1072         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
1073         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1074         ES::Target: EntropySource,
1075         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1076         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1077         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1078         R::Target: Router,
1079         L::Target: Logger,
1080 {
1081         default_configuration: UserConfig,
1082         chain_hash: ChainHash,
1083         fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1084         chain_monitor: M,
1085         tx_broadcaster: T,
1086         #[allow(unused)]
1087         router: R,
1088
1089         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1090         #[cfg(test)]
1091         pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1092         #[cfg(not(test))]
1093         best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1094         secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
1095
1096         /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
1097         /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
1098         /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
1099         /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
1100         ///
1101         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1102         pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
1103
1104         /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
1105         /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
1106         /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
1107         /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
1108         /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
1109         /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
1110         /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
1111         /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
1112         ///
1113         /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
1114         ///
1115         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1116         pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
1117
1118         /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
1119         ///
1120         /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
1121         /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
1122         /// and via the classic SCID.
1123         ///
1124         /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
1125         /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
1126         ///
1127         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1128         #[cfg(test)]
1129         pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1130         #[cfg(not(test))]
1131         forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1132         /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
1133         /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
1134         ///
1135         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1136         pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
1137
1138         /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
1139         /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
1140         ///
1141         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1142         claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
1143
1144         /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
1145         /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
1146         /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
1147         /// active channel list on load.
1148         ///
1149         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1150         outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
1151
1152         /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
1153         ///
1154         /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
1155         /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
1156         /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
1157         ///
1158         /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
1159         /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
1160         /// the handling of the events.
1161         ///
1162         /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
1163         /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
1164         ///
1165         /// TODO:
1166         /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
1167         /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
1168         /// would break backwards compatability.
1169         /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
1170         /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
1171         /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
1172         ///
1173         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1174         id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<ChannelId, PublicKey>>,
1175
1176         /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
1177         ///
1178         /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
1179         /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
1180         /// confirmation depth.
1181         ///
1182         /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
1183         /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
1184         /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
1185         ///
1186         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1187         #[cfg(test)]
1188         pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1189         #[cfg(not(test))]
1190         short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1191
1192         our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
1193
1194         inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
1195
1196         /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
1197         /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
1198         /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
1199         ///
1200         /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
1201         fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
1202
1203         /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
1204         /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
1205         /// keeping additional state.
1206         probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
1207
1208         /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
1209         /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
1210         /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
1211         highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
1212
1213         /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
1214         /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
1215         ///
1216         /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
1217         /// are currently open with that peer.
1218         ///
1219         /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
1220         /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
1221         /// channels.
1222         ///
1223         /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
1224         ///
1225         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1226         #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1227         per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1228         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1229         pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1230
1231         /// The set of events which we need to give to the user to handle. In some cases an event may
1232         /// require some further action after the user handles it (currently only blocking a monitor
1233         /// update from being handed to the user to ensure the included changes to the channel state
1234         /// are handled by the user before they're persisted durably to disk). In that case, the second
1235         /// element in the tuple is set to `Some` with further details of the action.
1236         ///
1237         /// Note that events MUST NOT be removed from pending_events after deserialization, as they
1238         /// could be in the middle of being processed without the direct mutex held.
1239         ///
1240         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1241         #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1242         pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1243         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1244         pub(crate) pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1245
1246         /// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
1247         pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
1248
1249         /// If we are running during init (either directly during the deserialization method or in
1250         /// block connection methods which run after deserialization but before normal operation) we
1251         /// cannot provide the user with [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s through the normal update flow -
1252         /// prior to normal operation the user may not have loaded the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into their
1253         /// [`ChainMonitor`] and thus attempting to update it will fail or panic.
1254         ///
1255         /// Thus, we place them here to be handled as soon as possible once we are running normally.
1256         ///
1257         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1258         ///
1259         /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
1260         pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
1261         /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
1262         /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
1263         /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
1264         /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
1265         /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
1266         /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
1267         total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
1268         /// Tracks the progress of channels going through batch funding by whether funding_signed was
1269         /// received and the monitor has been persisted.
1270         ///
1271         /// This information does not need to be persisted as funding nodes can forget
1272         /// unfunded channels upon disconnection.
1273         funding_batch_states: Mutex<BTreeMap<Txid, Vec<(ChannelId, PublicKey, bool)>>>,
1274
1275         background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool,
1276
1277         event_persist_notifier: Notifier,
1278         needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool,
1279
1280         pending_offers_messages: Mutex<Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>>>,
1281
1282         entropy_source: ES,
1283         node_signer: NS,
1284         signer_provider: SP,
1285
1286         logger: L,
1287 }
1288
1289 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
1290 ///
1291 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
1292 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
1293 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
1294 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
1295 pub struct ChainParameters {
1296         /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
1297         pub network: Network,
1298
1299         /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
1300         ///
1301         /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
1302         pub best_block: BestBlock,
1303 }
1304
1305 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
1306 #[must_use]
1307 enum NotifyOption {
1308         DoPersist,
1309         SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1310         SkipPersistNoEvents,
1311 }
1312
1313 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
1314 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
1315 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
1316 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
1317 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
1318 /// updates are ready for persistence).
1319 ///
1320 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
1321 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
1322 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
1323 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1324         event_persist_notifier: &'a Notifier,
1325         needs_persist_flag: &'a AtomicBool,
1326         should_persist: F,
1327         // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
1328         _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
1329 }
1330
1331 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
1332         /// Notifies any waiters and indicates that we need to persist, in addition to possibly having
1333         /// events to handle.
1334         ///
1335         /// This must always be called if the changes included a `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, as well as in
1336         /// other cases where losing the changes on restart may result in a force-close or otherwise
1337         /// isn't ideal.
1338         fn notify_on_drop<C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1339                 Self::optionally_notify(cm, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
1340         }
1341
1342         fn optionally_notify<F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C, mut persist_check: F)
1343         -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1344                 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1345                 let force_notify = cm.get_cm().process_background_events();
1346
1347                 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1348                         event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1349                         needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1350                         should_persist: move || {
1351                                 // Pick the "most" action between `persist_check` and the background events
1352                                 // processing and return that.
1353                                 let notify = persist_check();
1354                                 match (notify, force_notify) {
1355                                         (NotifyOption::DoPersist, _) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1356                                         (_, NotifyOption::DoPersist) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1357                                         (NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents, _) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1358                                         (_, NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1359                                         _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
1360                                 }
1361                         },
1362                         _read_guard: read_guard,
1363                 }
1364         }
1365
1366         /// Note that if any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are possibly generated,
1367         /// [`ChannelManager::process_background_events`] MUST be called first (or
1368         /// [`Self::optionally_notify`] used).
1369         fn optionally_notify_skipping_background_events<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>
1370         (cm: &'a C, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1371                 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1372
1373                 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1374                         event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1375                         needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1376                         should_persist: persist_check,
1377                         _read_guard: read_guard,
1378                 }
1379         }
1380 }
1381
1382 impl<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1383         fn drop(&mut self) {
1384                 match (self.should_persist)() {
1385                         NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
1386                                 self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
1387                                 self.event_persist_notifier.notify()
1388                         },
1389                         NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
1390                                 self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
1391                         NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
1392                 }
1393         }
1394 }
1395
1396 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1397 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1398 ///
1399 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1400 ///
1401 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1402 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1403 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1404 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1405 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1406
1407 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1408 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1409 ///
1410 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1411 ///
1412 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1413 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1414 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1415 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1416 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1417 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1418 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
1419 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
1420 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
1421 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
1422 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
1423 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
1424 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
1425
1426 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1427 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
1428 /// this value.
1429 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1430 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1431 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1432 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
1433
1434 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1435 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1436 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1437 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1438 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1439 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1440 #[deny(const_err)]
1441 #[allow(dead_code)]
1442 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1443
1444 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1445 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1446 #[deny(const_err)]
1447 #[allow(dead_code)]
1448 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1449
1450 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1451 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1452
1453 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
1454 /// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
1455 pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
1456
1457 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is connected until
1458 /// we mark the channel enabled and gossip the update.
1459 pub(crate) const ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 5;
1460
1461 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
1462 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
1463 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
1464 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1465
1466 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1467 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1468 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1469
1470 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1471 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1472 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1473
1474 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1475 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1476 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1477         /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1478         pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1479         /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1480         pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1481         /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1482         /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1483         /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1484         pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1485 }
1486
1487 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1488 /// to better separate parameters.
1489 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1490 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1491         /// The node_id of our counterparty
1492         pub node_id: PublicKey,
1493         /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1494         /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1495         /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1496         pub features: InitFeatures,
1497         /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1498         /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1499         /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1500         ///
1501         /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1502         ///
1503         /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1504         pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1505         /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1506         /// payments to us through this channel.
1507         pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1508         /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1509         /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1510         /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1511         pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1512         /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1513         pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1514 }
1515
1516 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
1517 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1518 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1519         /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1520         /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1521         /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1522         /// lifetime of the channel.
1523         pub channel_id: ChannelId,
1524         /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1525         pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1526         /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1527         /// our counterparty already.
1528         ///
1529         /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1530         /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1531         pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1532         /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1533         ///
1534         /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1535         pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1536         /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1537         /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1538         ///
1539         /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1540         /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1541         ///
1542         /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1543         /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1544         ///
1545         /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1546         /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1547         /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1548         /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1549         /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1550         pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1551         /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1552         /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1553         /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1554         /// `Some(0)`).
1555         ///
1556         /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1557         ///
1558         /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1559         /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1560         pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1561         /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1562         /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1563         /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1564         /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1565         ///
1566         /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1567         /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1568         ///
1569         /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1570         pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1571         /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1572         pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1573         /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1574         /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1575         /// this value on chain.
1576         ///
1577         /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1578         ///
1579         /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1580         ///
1581         /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1582         pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1583         /// The `user_channel_id` value passed in to [`ChannelManager::create_channel`] for outbound
1584         /// channels, or to [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`] for inbound channels if
1585         /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] config flag is set to true. Otherwise
1586         /// `user_channel_id` will be randomized for an inbound channel.  This may be zero for objects
1587         /// serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1588         ///
1589         /// [`ChannelManager::create_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_channel
1590         /// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel
1591         /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels
1592         pub user_channel_id: u128,
1593         /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
1594         /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
1595         ///
1596         /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
1597         pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
1598         /// Our total balance.  This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1599         /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1600         /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1601         ///
1602         /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1603         /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1604         /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1605         /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1606         ///
1607         /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1608         pub balance_msat: u64,
1609         /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1610         /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1611         /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1612         /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1613         ///
1614         /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1615         ///
1616         /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1617         /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1618         /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1619         pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1620         /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1621         /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1622         /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1623         /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1624         ///
1625         /// See also [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat`],
1626         /// [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`], and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1627         pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1628         /// The minimum value for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is the equivalent of
1629         /// [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat`] but represents a lower-bound, rather than
1630         /// an upper-bound. This is intended for use when routing, allowing us to ensure we pick a
1631         /// route which is valid.
1632         pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1633         /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1634         /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1635         /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1636         /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1637         /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1638         ///
1639         /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1640         /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1641         /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1642         pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1643         /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1644         /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1645         /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1646         /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1647         /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1648         ///
1649         /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1650         ///
1651         /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1652         /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1653         /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1654         pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1655         /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1656         ///
1657         /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1658         pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1659         /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1660         /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1661         /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1662         /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1663         /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1664         ///
1665         /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1666         pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1667         /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1668         pub is_outbound: bool,
1669         /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1670         /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1671         /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1672         /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1673         /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1674         ///
1675         /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1676         pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1677         /// The stage of the channel's shutdown.
1678         /// `None` for `ChannelDetails` serialized on LDK versions prior to 0.0.116.
1679         pub channel_shutdown_state: Option<ChannelShutdownState>,
1680         /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1681         /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1682         ///
1683         /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1684         pub is_usable: bool,
1685         /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1686         pub is_public: bool,
1687         /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1688         /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1689         pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1690         /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1691         pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1692         /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1693         ///
1694         /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1695         pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1696 }
1697
1698 impl ChannelDetails {
1699         /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1700         /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1701         /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1702         ///
1703         /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1704         /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1705         pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1706                 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1707         }
1708
1709         /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1710         /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1711         /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1712         ///
1713         /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1714         /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1715         pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1716                 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1717         }
1718
1719         fn from_channel_context<SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
1720                 context: &ChannelContext<SP>, best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures,
1721                 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
1722         ) -> Self
1723         where
1724                 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1725                 F::Target: FeeEstimator
1726         {
1727                 let balance = context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
1728                 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1729                         context.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1730                 ChannelDetails {
1731                         channel_id: context.channel_id(),
1732                         counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1733                                 node_id: context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1734                                 features: latest_features,
1735                                 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1736                                 forwarding_info: context.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1737                                 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1738                                 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1739                                 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1740                                 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1741                                 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1742                                 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if context.have_received_message() {
1743                                         Some(context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1744                                 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1745                         },
1746                         funding_txo: context.get_funding_txo(),
1747                         // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1748                         // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1749                         channel_type: if context.have_received_message() { Some(context.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1750                         short_channel_id: context.get_short_channel_id(),
1751                         outbound_scid_alias: if context.is_usable() { Some(context.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1752                         inbound_scid_alias: context.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1753                         channel_value_satoshis: context.get_value_satoshis(),
1754                         feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
1755                         unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1756                         balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1757                         inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1758                         outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1759                         next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1760                         next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1761                         user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
1762                         confirmations_required: context.minimum_depth(),
1763                         confirmations: Some(context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1764                         force_close_spend_delay: context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1765                         is_outbound: context.is_outbound(),
1766                         is_channel_ready: context.is_usable(),
1767                         is_usable: context.is_live(),
1768                         is_public: context.should_announce(),
1769                         inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(context.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1770                         inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1771                         config: Some(context.config()),
1772                         channel_shutdown_state: Some(context.shutdown_state()),
1773                 }
1774         }
1775 }
1776
1777 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1778 /// Further information on the details of the channel shutdown.
1779 /// Upon channels being forced closed (i.e. commitment transaction confirmation detected
1780 /// by `ChainMonitor`), ChannelShutdownState will be set to `ShutdownComplete` or
1781 /// the channel will be removed shortly.
1782 /// Also note, that in normal operation, peers could disconnect at any of these states
1783 /// and require peer re-connection before making progress onto other states
1784 pub enum ChannelShutdownState {
1785         /// Channel has not sent or received a shutdown message.
1786         NotShuttingDown,
1787         /// Local node has sent a shutdown message for this channel.
1788         ShutdownInitiated,
1789         /// Shutdown message exchanges have concluded and the channels are in the midst of
1790         /// resolving all existing open HTLCs before closing can continue.
1791         ResolvingHTLCs,
1792         /// All HTLCs have been resolved, nodes are currently negotiating channel close onchain fee rates.
1793         NegotiatingClosingFee,
1794         /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point `ChannelManager` is about
1795         /// to drop the channel.
1796         ShutdownComplete,
1797 }
1798
1799 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1800 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1801 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1802 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1803         /// When an invoice was requested and thus a payment has not yet been sent.
1804         AwaitingInvoice {
1805                 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1806                 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1807                 payment_id: PaymentId,
1808         },
1809         /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1810         Pending {
1811                 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1812                 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1813                 payment_id: PaymentId,
1814                 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1815                 /// abandoned.
1816                 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1817                 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1818                 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1819                 total_msat: u64,
1820         },
1821         /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1822         /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1823         /// payment is removed from tracking.
1824         Fulfilled {
1825                 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1826                 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1827                 payment_id: PaymentId,
1828                 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1829                 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1830                 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1831         },
1832         /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1833         /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1834         /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1835         Abandoned {
1836                 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1837                 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1838                 payment_id: PaymentId,
1839                 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1840                 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1841         },
1842 }
1843
1844 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1845 ///
1846 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
1847 #[derive(Clone)]
1848 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1849         /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1850         pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1851         /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1852         /// route hints.
1853         pub phantom_scid: u64,
1854         /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1855         pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1856 }
1857
1858 macro_rules! handle_error {
1859         ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
1860                 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1861                 // entering the macro.
1862                 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1863                 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1864
1865                 match $internal {
1866                         Ok(msg) => Ok(msg),
1867                         Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish, channel_capacity }) => {
1868                                 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1869
1870                                 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1871                                         $self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1872                                         if let Some(update) = update_option {
1873                                                 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1874                                                         msg: update
1875                                                 });
1876                                         }
1877                                         if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1878                                                 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1879                                                         channel_id, user_channel_id,
1880                                                         reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() },
1881                                                         counterparty_node_id: Some($counterparty_node_id),
1882                                                         channel_capacity_sats: channel_capacity,
1883                                                 }, None));
1884                                         }
1885                                 }
1886
1887                                 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1888                                 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1889                                 } else {
1890                                         msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1891                                                 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1892                                                 action: err.action.clone()
1893                                         });
1894                                 }
1895
1896                                 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1897                                         let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1898                                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1899                                                 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1900                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1901                                         }
1902                                 }
1903
1904                                 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1905                                 Err(err)
1906                         },
1907                 }
1908         } };
1909         ($self: ident, $internal: expr) => {
1910                 match $internal {
1911                         Ok(res) => Ok(res),
1912                         Err((chan, msg_handle_err)) => {
1913                                 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
1914                                 handle_error!($self, Err(msg_handle_err), counterparty_node_id).map_err(|err| (chan, err))
1915                         },
1916                 }
1917         };
1918 }
1919
1920 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1921         ($self: expr, $channel_context: expr) => {{
1922                 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.channel_id());
1923                 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1924                 if let Some(short_id) = $channel_context.get_short_channel_id() {
1925                         short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1926                 } else {
1927                         // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1928                         // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1929                         // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1930                         // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1931                         // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1932                         // stage.
1933                         let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
1934                         debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1935                 }
1936                 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
1937         }}
1938 }
1939
1940 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1941 macro_rules! convert_chan_phase_err {
1942         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, $channel_update: expr) => {
1943                 match $err {
1944                         ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1945                                 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), *$channel_id))
1946                         },
1947                         ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1948                                 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), *$channel_id))
1949                         },
1950                         ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1951                                 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", $channel_id, msg);
1952                                 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel.context);
1953                                 let shutdown_res = $channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
1954                                 let user_id = $channel.context.get_user_id();
1955                                 let channel_capacity_satoshis = $channel.context.get_value_satoshis();
1956
1957                                 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, user_id,
1958                                         shutdown_res, $channel_update, channel_capacity_satoshis))
1959                         },
1960                 }
1961         };
1962         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, FUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
1963                 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, { $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast($channel).ok() })
1964         };
1965         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
1966                 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, None)
1967         };
1968         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_phase: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1969                 match $channel_phase {
1970                         ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
1971                                 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL)
1972                         },
1973                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel) => {
1974                                 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
1975                         },
1976                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel) => {
1977                                 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
1978                         },
1979                 }
1980         };
1981 }
1982
1983 macro_rules! break_chan_phase_entry {
1984         ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1985                 match $res {
1986                         Ok(res) => res,
1987                         Err(e) => {
1988                                 let key = *$entry.key();
1989                                 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
1990                                 if drop {
1991                                         $entry.remove_entry();
1992                                 }
1993                                 break Err(res);
1994                         }
1995                 }
1996         }
1997 }
1998
1999 macro_rules! try_chan_phase_entry {
2000         ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2001                 match $res {
2002                         Ok(res) => res,
2003                         Err(e) => {
2004                                 let key = *$entry.key();
2005                                 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
2006                                 if drop {
2007                                         $entry.remove_entry();
2008                                 }
2009                                 return Err(res);
2010                         }
2011                 }
2012         }
2013 }
2014
2015 macro_rules! remove_channel_phase {
2016         ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2017                 {
2018                         let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
2019                         update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &channel.context());
2020                         channel
2021                 }
2022         }
2023 }
2024
2025 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
2026         ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
2027                 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
2028                         node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2029                         msg: $channel_ready_msg,
2030                 });
2031                 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
2032                 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
2033                 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
2034                 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.context.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2035                 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2036                         "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2037                 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
2038                         let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2039                         assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2040                                 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2041                 }
2042         }}
2043 }
2044
2045 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
2046         ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2047                 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
2048                         $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelPending {
2049                                 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2050                                 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.context.temporary_channel_id(),
2051                                 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2052                                 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2053                                 funding_txo: $channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
2054                         }, None));
2055                         $channel.context.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
2056                 }
2057         }
2058 }
2059
2060 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
2061         ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2062                 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
2063                         debug_assert!($channel.context.channel_pending_event_emitted());
2064                         $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelReady {
2065                                 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2066                                 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2067                                 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2068                                 channel_type: $channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
2069                         }, None));
2070                         $channel.context.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
2071                 }
2072         }
2073 }
2074
2075 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
2076         ($self: ident, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2077                 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&$self.logger,
2078                         &$self.node_signer, $self.chain_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
2079                         $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
2080                 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
2081                 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.context.is_usable() {
2082                         // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
2083                         // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
2084                         // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
2085                         // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
2086                         // now.
2087                         if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
2088                                 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2089                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2090                                         msg,
2091                                 })
2092                         } else { None }
2093                 } else { None };
2094
2095                 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
2096                         .remove(&$chan.context.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
2097
2098                 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
2099                         &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
2100                         updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
2101                         updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
2102                         updates.announcement_sigs);
2103                 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
2104                         $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
2105                 }
2106
2107                 let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id();
2108                 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = $chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2109                 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
2110                 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
2111
2112                 // If the channel belongs to a batch funding transaction, the progress of the batch
2113                 // should be updated as we have received funding_signed and persisted the monitor.
2114                 if let Some(txid) = unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2115                         let mut funding_batch_states = $self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2116                         let mut batch_completed = false;
2117                         if let Some(batch_state) = funding_batch_states.get_mut(&txid) {
2118                                 let channel_state = batch_state.iter_mut().find(|(chan_id, pubkey, _)| (
2119                                         *chan_id == channel_id &&
2120                                         *pubkey == counterparty_node_id
2121                                 ));
2122                                 if let Some(channel_state) = channel_state {
2123                                         channel_state.2 = true;
2124                                 } else {
2125                                         debug_assert!(false, "Missing channel batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2126                                 }
2127                                 batch_completed = batch_state.iter().all(|(_, _, completed)| *completed);
2128                         } else {
2129                                 debug_assert!(false, "Missing batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2130                         }
2131
2132                         // When all channels in a batched funding transaction have become ready, it is not necessary
2133                         // to track the progress of the batch anymore and the state of the channels can be updated.
2134                         if batch_completed {
2135                                 let removed_batch_state = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2136                                 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2137                                 let mut batch_funding_tx = None;
2138                                 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, _) in removed_batch_state {
2139                                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2140                                                 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2141                                                 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
2142                                                         batch_funding_tx = batch_funding_tx.or_else(|| chan.context.unbroadcasted_funding());
2143                                                         chan.set_batch_ready();
2144                                                         let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2145                                                         emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, chan);
2146                                                 }
2147                                         }
2148                                 }
2149                                 if let Some(tx) = batch_funding_tx {
2150                                         log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting batch funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
2151                                         $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
2152                                 }
2153                         }
2154                 }
2155
2156                 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
2157
2158                 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
2159                         $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
2160                 }
2161                 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
2162                 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2163                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2164                         $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
2165                 }
2166         } }
2167 }
2168
2169 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
2170         ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $chan: expr, _internal, $completed: expr) => { {
2171                 debug_assert!($self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire));
2172                 match $update_res {
2173                         ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::UnrecoverableError => {
2174                                 let err_str = "ChannelMonitor[Update] persistence failed unrecoverably. This indicates we cannot continue normal operation and must shut down.";
2175                                 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err_str);
2176                                 panic!("{}", err_str);
2177                         },
2178                         ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
2179                                 log_debug!($self.logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
2180                                         &$chan.context.channel_id());
2181                                 false
2182                         },
2183                         ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
2184                                 $completed;
2185                                 true
2186                         },
2187                 }
2188         } };
2189         ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, INITIAL_MONITOR) => {
2190                 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $chan, _internal,
2191                         handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan))
2192         };
2193         ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2194                 let in_flight_updates = $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.entry($funding_txo)
2195                         .or_insert_with(Vec::new);
2196                 // During startup, we push monitor updates as background events through to here in
2197                 // order to replay updates that were in-flight when we shut down. Thus, we have to
2198                 // filter for uniqueness here.
2199                 let idx = in_flight_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd == &$update)
2200                         .unwrap_or_else(|| {
2201                                 in_flight_updates.push($update);
2202                                 in_flight_updates.len() - 1
2203                         });
2204                 let update_res = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($funding_txo, &in_flight_updates[idx]);
2205                 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, update_res, $chan, _internal,
2206                         {
2207                                 let _ = in_flight_updates.remove(idx);
2208                                 if in_flight_updates.is_empty() && $chan.blocked_monitor_updates_pending() == 0 {
2209                                         handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
2210                                 }
2211                         })
2212         } };
2213 }
2214
2215 macro_rules! process_events_body {
2216         ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
2217                 let mut processed_all_events = false;
2218                 while !processed_all_events {
2219                         if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
2220                                 return;
2221                         }
2222
2223                         let mut result;
2224
2225                         {
2226                                 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
2227                                 // persists happen while processing monitor events.
2228                                 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2229
2230                                 // Because `handle_post_event_actions` may send `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to the user we must
2231                                 // ensure any startup-generated background events are handled first.
2232                                 result = $self.process_background_events();
2233
2234                                 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
2235                                 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
2236                                 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
2237                                         result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2238                                 }
2239                         }
2240
2241                         let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
2242                         let num_events = pending_events.len();
2243                         if !pending_events.is_empty() {
2244                                 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2245                         }
2246
2247                         let mut post_event_actions = Vec::new();
2248
2249                         for (event, action_opt) in pending_events {
2250                                 $event_to_handle = event;
2251                                 $handle_event;
2252                                 if let Some(action) = action_opt {
2253                                         post_event_actions.push(action);
2254                                 }
2255                         }
2256
2257                         {
2258                                 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2259                                 pending_events.drain(..num_events);
2260                                 processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
2261                                 // Note that `push_pending_forwards_ev` relies on `pending_events_processor` being
2262                                 // updated here with the `pending_events` lock acquired.
2263                                 $self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
2264                         }
2265
2266                         if !post_event_actions.is_empty() {
2267                                 $self.handle_post_event_actions(post_event_actions);
2268                                 // If we had some actions, go around again as we may have more events now
2269                                 processed_all_events = false;
2270                         }
2271
2272                         match result {
2273                                 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
2274                                         $self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
2275                                         $self.event_persist_notifier.notify();
2276                                 },
2277                                 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
2278                                         $self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
2279                                 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
2280                         }
2281                 }
2282         }
2283 }
2284
2285 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
2286 where
2287         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
2288         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2289         ES::Target: EntropySource,
2290         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2291         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2292         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2293         R::Target: Router,
2294         L::Target: Logger,
2295 {
2296         /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
2297         ///
2298         /// The current time or latest block header time can be provided as the `current_timestamp`.
2299         ///
2300         /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
2301         /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
2302         ///
2303         /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
2304         ///
2305         /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
2306         /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
2307         /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
2308         /// more details.
2309         ///
2310         /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
2311         /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
2312         /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
2313         pub fn new(
2314                 fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES,
2315                 node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters,
2316                 current_timestamp: u32,
2317         ) -> Self {
2318                 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2319                 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
2320                 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
2321                 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
2322                 ChannelManager {
2323                         default_configuration: config.clone(),
2324                         chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(params.network),
2325                         fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
2326                         chain_monitor,
2327                         tx_broadcaster,
2328                         router,
2329
2330                         best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
2331
2332                         outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
2333                         pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2334                         pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
2335                         forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2336                         claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
2337                         pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2338                         id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2339                         short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2340
2341                         our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
2342                         secp_ctx,
2343
2344                         inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
2345                         fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2346
2347                         probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2348
2349                         highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(current_timestamp as usize),
2350
2351                         per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2352
2353                         pending_events: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
2354                         pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
2355                         pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2356                         total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
2357                         background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
2358                         event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
2359                         needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
2360                         funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
2361
2362                         pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2363
2364                         entropy_source,
2365                         node_signer,
2366                         signer_provider,
2367
2368                         logger,
2369                 }
2370         }
2371
2372         /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
2373         pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
2374                 &self.default_configuration
2375         }
2376
2377         fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
2378                 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2379                 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
2380                 let mut i = 0;
2381                 loop {
2382                         if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
2383                                 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
2384                         } else {
2385                                 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
2386                         }
2387                         if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
2388                                 break;
2389                         }
2390                         i += 1;
2391                         if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
2392                 }
2393                 outbound_scid_alias
2394         }
2395
2396         /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
2397         ///
2398         /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
2399         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
2400         /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
2401         /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
2402         /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
2403         ///
2404         /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
2405         /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
2406         ///
2407         /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to
2408         /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2409         /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`].
2410         ///
2411         /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
2412         /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
2413         /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
2414         ///
2415         /// If `temporary_channel_id` is specified, it will be used as the temporary channel ID of the
2416         /// channel. Otherwise, a random one will be generated for you.
2417         ///
2418         /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
2419         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
2420         /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
2421         /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
2422         /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
2423         /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
2424         ///
2425         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
2426         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
2427         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
2428         pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<ChannelId, APIError> {
2429                 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
2430                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
2431                 }
2432
2433                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2434                 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
2435                 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2436
2437                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2438
2439                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
2440                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
2441
2442                 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2443
2444                 if let Some(temporary_channel_id) = temporary_channel_id {
2445                         if peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(&temporary_channel_id) {
2446                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Channel with temporary channel ID {} already exists!", temporary_channel_id)});
2447                         }
2448                 }
2449
2450                 let channel = {
2451                         let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
2452                         let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2453                         let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
2454                         match OutboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
2455                                 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
2456                                 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias, temporary_channel_id)
2457                         {
2458                                 Ok(res) => res,
2459                                 Err(e) => {
2460                                         self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
2461                                         return Err(e);
2462                                 },
2463                         }
2464                 };
2465                 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.chain_hash);
2466
2467                 let temporary_channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
2468                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
2469                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2470                                 if cfg!(fuzzing) {
2471                                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
2472                                 } else {
2473                                         panic!("RNG is bad???");
2474                                 }
2475                         },
2476                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel)); }
2477                 }
2478
2479                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
2480                         node_id: their_network_key,
2481                         msg: res,
2482                 });
2483                 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
2484         }
2485
2486         fn list_funded_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&ChannelId, &Channel<SP>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2487                 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2488                 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2489                 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2490                 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2491                 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2492                 // the same channel.
2493                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2494                 {
2495                         let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2496                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2497                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2498                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2499                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2500                                 res.extend(peer_state.channel_by_id.iter()
2501                                         .filter_map(|(chan_id, phase)| match phase {
2502                                                 // Only `Channels` in the `ChannelPhase::Funded` phase can be considered funded.
2503                                                 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => Some((chan_id, chan)),
2504                                                 _ => None,
2505                                         })
2506                                         .filter(f)
2507                                         .map(|(_channel_id, channel)| {
2508                                                 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2509                                                         peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2510                                         })
2511                                 );
2512                         }
2513                 }
2514                 res
2515         }
2516
2517         /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
2518         /// more information.
2519         pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2520                 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2521                 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2522                 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2523                 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2524                 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2525                 // the same channel.
2526                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2527                 {
2528                         let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2529                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2530                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2531                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2532                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2533                                 for context in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().map(|(_, phase)| phase.context()) {
2534                                         let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height,
2535                                                 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2536                                         res.push(details);
2537                                 }
2538                         }
2539                 }
2540                 res
2541         }
2542
2543         /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
2544         /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
2545         ///
2546         /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
2547         /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
2548         /// are.
2549         pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2550                 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
2551                 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
2552                 // really wanted anyway.
2553                 self.list_funded_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.context.is_live())
2554         }
2555
2556         /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
2557         pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2558                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2559                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2560
2561                 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
2562                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2563                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2564                         let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2565                         let context_to_details = |context| {
2566                                 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height, features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2567                         };
2568                         return peer_state.channel_by_id
2569                                 .iter()
2570                                 .map(|(_, phase)| phase.context())
2571                                 .map(context_to_details)
2572                                 .collect();
2573                 }
2574                 vec![]
2575         }
2576
2577         /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
2578         /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
2579         ///
2580         /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
2581         /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
2582         /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
2583         ///
2584         /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2585         pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
2586                 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
2587                         .filter_map(|(payment_id, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
2588                                 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {
2589                                         Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2590                                 },
2591                                 // InvoiceReceived is an intermediate state and doesn't need to be exposed
2592                                 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {
2593                                         Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2594                                 },
2595                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
2596                                         Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
2597                                                 payment_id: *payment_id,
2598                                                 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2599                                                 total_msat: *total_msat,
2600                                         })
2601                                 },
2602                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
2603                                         Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2604                                 },
2605                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
2606                                         Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2607                                 },
2608                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
2609                         })
2610                         .collect()
2611         }
2612
2613         /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
2614         fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, context: &ChannelContext<SP>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
2615                 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2616                 match context.unbroadcasted_funding() {
2617                         Some(transaction) => {
2618                                 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::DiscardFunding {
2619                                         channel_id: context.channel_id(), transaction
2620                                 }, None));
2621                         },
2622                         None => {},
2623                 }
2624                 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
2625                         channel_id: context.channel_id(),
2626                         user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
2627                         reason: closure_reason,
2628                         counterparty_node_id: Some(context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
2629                         channel_capacity_sats: Some(context.get_value_satoshis()),
2630                 }, None));
2631         }
2632
2633         fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2634                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2635
2636                 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
2637                 let shutdown_result;
2638                 loop {
2639                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2640
2641                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2642                                 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2643
2644                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2645                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2646
2647                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2648                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
2649                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
2650                                                 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
2651                                                 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2652                                                 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs, local_shutdown_result) =
2653                                                         chan.get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
2654                                                 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
2655                                                 shutdown_result = local_shutdown_result;
2656                                                 debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
2657
2658                                                 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
2659                                                 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
2660                                                 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
2661                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2662                                                         node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
2663                                                         msg: shutdown_msg,
2664                                                 });
2665
2666                                                 debug_assert!(monitor_update_opt.is_none() || !chan.is_shutdown(),
2667                                                         "We can't both complete shutdown and generate a monitor update");
2668
2669                                                 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
2670                                                 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
2671                                                         handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
2672                                                                 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
2673                                                         break;
2674                                                 }
2675
2676                                                 if chan.is_shutdown() {
2677                                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
2678                                                                 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2679                                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2680                                                                                 msg: channel_update
2681                                                                         });
2682                                                                 }
2683                                                                 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2684                                                         }
2685                                                 }
2686                                                 break;
2687                                         }
2688                                 },
2689                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
2690                                         // If we reach this point, it means that the channel_id either refers to an unfunded channel or
2691                                         // it does not exist for this peer. Either way, we can attempt to force-close it.
2692                                         //
2693                                         // An appropriate error will be returned for non-existence of the channel if that's the case.
2694                                         mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
2695                                         mem::drop(per_peer_state);
2696                                         return self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, false).map(|_| ())
2697                                 },
2698                         }
2699                 }
2700
2701                 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2702                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2703                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
2704                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
2705                 }
2706
2707                 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
2708                         self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
2709                 }
2710
2711                 Ok(())
2712         }
2713
2714         /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2715         /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2716         /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2717         ///
2718         ///  * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] and
2719         ///    [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
2720         ///    fee estimate.
2721         ///  * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
2722         ///    transaction feerate of at least our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] feerate or the feerate which
2723         ///    would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
2724         ///    counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
2725         ///
2726         /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2727         ///
2728         /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2729         /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2730         /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2731         /// channel.
2732         ///
2733         /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2734         /// [`ChannelCloseMinimum`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum
2735         /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
2736         /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2737         pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2738                 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None)
2739         }
2740
2741         /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2742         /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2743         /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2744         ///
2745         /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
2746         /// the channel being closed or not:
2747         ///  * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
2748         ///    transaction. The upper-bound is set by
2749         ///    [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
2750         ///    fee estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
2751         ///  * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
2752         ///    transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
2753         ///    will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
2754         ///
2755         /// The `shutdown_script` provided  will be used as the `scriptPubKey` for the closing transaction.
2756         /// Will fail if a shutdown script has already been set for this channel by
2757         /// ['ChannelHandshakeConfig::commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey`]. The given shutdown script must
2758         /// also be compatible with our and the counterparty's features.
2759         ///
2760         /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2761         ///
2762         /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2763         /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2764         /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2765         /// channel.
2766         ///
2767         /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2768         /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
2769         /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2770         pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2771                 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script)
2772         }
2773
2774         fn finish_close_channel(&self, mut shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
2775                 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2776                 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2777                 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
2778                         debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2779                 }
2780
2781                 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.len());
2782                 for htlc_source in shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.drain(..) {
2783                         let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
2784                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2785                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2786                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
2787                 }
2788                 if let Some((_, funding_txo, monitor_update)) = shutdown_res.monitor_update {
2789                         // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2790                         // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2791                         // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2792                         // ignore the result here.
2793                         let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
2794                 }
2795                 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
2796                 if let Some(txid) = shutdown_res.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2797                         let mut funding_batch_states = self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2798                         let affected_channels = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2799                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2800                         let mut has_uncompleted_channel = None;
2801                         for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, state) in affected_channels {
2802                                 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2803                                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2804                                         if let Some(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id) {
2805                                                 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
2806                                                 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context(), ClosureReason::FundingBatchClosure);
2807                                                 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
2808                                         }
2809                                 }
2810                                 has_uncompleted_channel = Some(has_uncompleted_channel.map_or(!state, |v| v || !state));
2811                         }
2812                         debug_assert!(
2813                                 has_uncompleted_channel.unwrap_or(true),
2814                                 "Closing a batch where all channels have completed initial monitor update",
2815                         );
2816                 }
2817                 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
2818                         self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
2819                 }
2820         }
2821
2822         /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2823         /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2824         fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
2825         -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2826                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2827                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2828                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
2829                 let (update_opt, counterparty_node_id) = {
2830                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2831                         let closure_reason = if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2832                                 ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) }
2833                         } else {
2834                                 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
2835                         };
2836                         if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2837                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", channel_id);
2838                                 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan_phase_entry.get().context(), closure_reason);
2839                                 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
2840                                 mem::drop(peer_state);
2841                                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
2842                                 match chan_phase {
2843                                         ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) => {
2844                                                 self.finish_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(broadcast));
2845                                                 (self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan).ok(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2846                                         },
2847                                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {
2848                                                 self.finish_close_channel(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
2849                                                 // Unfunded channel has no update
2850                                                 (None, chan_phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id())
2851                                         },
2852                                 }
2853                         } else if peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(channel_id).is_some() {
2854                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", &channel_id);
2855                                 // N.B. that we don't send any channel close event here: we
2856                                 // don't have a user_channel_id, and we never sent any opening
2857                                 // events anyway.
2858                                 (None, *peer_node_id)
2859                         } else {
2860                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, peer_node_id) });
2861                         }
2862                 };
2863                 if let Some(update) = update_opt {
2864                         // Try to send the `BroadcastChannelUpdate` to the peer we just force-closed on, but if
2865                         // not try to broadcast it via whatever peer we have.
2866                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2867                         let a_peer_state_opt = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2868                                 .ok_or(per_peer_state.values().next());
2869                         if let Ok(a_peer_state_mutex) = a_peer_state_opt {
2870                                 let mut a_peer_state = a_peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2871                                 a_peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2872                                         msg: update
2873                                 });
2874                         }
2875                 }
2876
2877                 Ok(counterparty_node_id)
2878         }
2879
2880         fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2881                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2882                 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2883                         Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2884                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2885                                 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2886                                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2887                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
2888                                                 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2889                                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2890                                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
2891                                                                 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() })
2892                                                         },
2893                                                 }
2894                                         );
2895                                 }
2896                                 Ok(())
2897                         },
2898                         Err(e) => Err(e)
2899                 }
2900         }
2901
2902         /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2903         /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2904         /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2905         /// channel.
2906         pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2907         -> Result<(), APIError> {
2908                 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2909         }
2910
2911         /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2912         /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2913         /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2914         ///
2915         /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2916         /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2917         pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2918         -> Result<(), APIError> {
2919                 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2920         }
2921
2922         /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2923         /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2924         pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2925                 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2926                         let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2927                 }
2928         }
2929
2930         /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2931         /// local transaction(s).
2932         pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2933                 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2934                         let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2935                 }
2936         }
2937
2938         fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(
2939                 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC
2940         ) -> Result<
2941                 (onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>), HTLCFailureMsg
2942         > {
2943                 let (next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_details_opt) = decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion(
2944                         msg, &self.node_signer, &self.logger, &self.secp_ctx
2945                 )?;
2946
2947                 macro_rules! return_err {
2948                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2949                                 {
2950                                         log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2951                                         return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2952                                                 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2953                                                 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2954                                                 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
2955                                                         .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
2956                                         }));
2957                                 }
2958                         }
2959                 }
2960
2961                 let NextPacketDetails {
2962                         next_packet_pubkey, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_scid, outgoing_cltv_value
2963                 } = match next_packet_details_opt {
2964                         Some(next_packet_details) => next_packet_details,
2965                         // it is a receive, so no need for outbound checks
2966                         None => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)),
2967                 };
2968
2969                 // Perform outbound checks here instead of in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] because we
2970                 // can't hold the outbound peer state lock at the same time as the inbound peer state lock.
2971                 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
2972                         let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&outgoing_scid).cloned();
2973                         let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
2974                                 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2975                                         // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2976                                         // phantom or an intercept.
2977                                         if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
2978                                                 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)) ||
2979                                                 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)
2980                                         {
2981                                                 None
2982                                         } else {
2983                                                 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2984                                         }
2985                                 },
2986                                 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
2987                         };
2988                         let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
2989                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2990                                 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
2991                                 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
2992                                         break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2993                                 }
2994                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
2995                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2996                                 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).map(
2997                                         |chan_phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
2998                                 ).flatten() {
2999                                         None => {
3000                                                 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
3001                                                 // have no consistency guarantees.
3002                                                 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3003                                         },
3004                                         Some(chan) => chan
3005                                 };
3006                                 if !chan.context.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
3007                                         // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
3008                                         // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
3009                                         // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
3010                                         break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3011                                 }
3012                                 if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && outgoing_scid != chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() {
3013                                         // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
3014                                         // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
3015                                         // we don't have the channel here.
3016                                         break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3017                                 }
3018                                 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
3019
3020                                 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
3021                                 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
3022                                 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
3023                                 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
3024                                 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
3025                                 if !chan.context.is_live() { // channel_disabled
3026                                         // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
3027                                         // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
3028                                         // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
3029                                         if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
3030                                                 break Some(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
3031                                         } else {
3032                                                 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
3033                                         }
3034                                 }
3035                                 if outgoing_amt_msat < chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
3036                                         break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
3037                                 }
3038                                 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value) {
3039                                         break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
3040                                 }
3041                                 chan_update_opt
3042                         } else {
3043                                 None
3044                         };
3045
3046                         let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3047
3048                         if let Err((err_msg, code)) = check_incoming_htlc_cltv(
3049                                 cur_height, outgoing_cltv_value, msg.cltv_expiry
3050                         ) {
3051                                 if code & 0x1000 != 0 && chan_update_opt.is_none() {
3052                                         // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
3053                                         // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
3054                                         // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
3055                                         break Some((err_msg, 0x2000 | 2, None))
3056                                 }
3057                                 let chan_update_opt = if code & 0x1000 != 0 { chan_update_opt } else { None };
3058                                 break Some((err_msg, code, chan_update_opt));
3059                         }
3060
3061                         break None;
3062                 }
3063                 {
3064                         let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
3065                         if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
3066                                 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
3067                                         msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3068                                 }
3069                                 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
3070                                         msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3071                                 }
3072                                 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3073                                         // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
3074                                         0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3075                                 }
3076                                 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3077                                 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3078                                 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3079                         } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
3080                                 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
3081                                 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
3082                                 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
3083                                 // instead.
3084                                 code = 0x2000 | 2;
3085                         }
3086                         return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
3087                 }
3088                 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, Some(next_packet_pubkey)))
3089         }
3090
3091         fn construct_pending_htlc_status<'a>(
3092                 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, shared_secret: [u8; 32], decoded_hop: onion_utils::Hop,
3093                 allow_underpay: bool, next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>
3094         ) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
3095                 macro_rules! return_err {
3096                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3097                                 {
3098                                         log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3099                                         return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3100                                                 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3101                                                 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3102                                                 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
3103                                                         .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3104                                         }));
3105                                 }
3106                         }
3107                 }
3108                 match decoded_hop {
3109                         onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
3110                                 // OUR PAYMENT!
3111                                 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3112                                 match create_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash,
3113                                         msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None, allow_underpay, msg.skimmed_fee_msat,
3114                                         current_height, self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
3115                                 {
3116                                         Ok(info) => {
3117                                                 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
3118                                                 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
3119                                                 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
3120                                                 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
3121                                                 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
3122                                         },
3123                                         Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3124                                 }
3125                         },
3126                         onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
3127                                 match create_fwd_pending_htlc_info(msg, next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac,
3128                                         new_packet_bytes, shared_secret, next_packet_pubkey_opt) {
3129                                         Ok(info) => PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info),
3130                                         Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3131                                 }
3132                         }
3133                 }
3134         }
3135
3136         /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
3137         /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
3138         /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
3139         ///
3140         /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
3141         /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
3142         /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3143         ///
3144         /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3145         /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3146         fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3147                 if !chan.context.should_announce() {
3148                         return Err(LightningError {
3149                                 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
3150                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
3151                         });
3152                 }
3153                 if chan.context.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
3154                         return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
3155                 }
3156                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3157                 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
3158         }
3159
3160         /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
3161         /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
3162         /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
3163         /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
3164         ///
3165         /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
3166         /// `peer_state`  corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
3167         /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3168         ///
3169         /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3170         /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3171         fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3172                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3173                 let short_channel_id = match chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
3174                         None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
3175                         Some(id) => id,
3176                 };
3177
3178                 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
3179         }
3180
3181         fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3182                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3183                 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
3184
3185                 let enabled = chan.context.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
3186                         ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
3187                         ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
3188                         ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
3189                         ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => false,
3190                 };
3191
3192                 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
3193                         chain_hash: self.chain_hash,
3194                         short_channel_id,
3195                         timestamp: chan.context.get_update_time_counter(),
3196                         flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
3197                         cltv_expiry_delta: chan.context.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
3198                         htlc_minimum_msat: chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
3199                         htlc_maximum_msat: chan.context.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
3200                         fee_base_msat: chan.context.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
3201                         fee_proportional_millionths: chan.context.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
3202                         excess_data: Vec::new(),
3203                 };
3204                 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
3205                 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
3206                 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
3207                 // channel.
3208                 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
3209
3210                 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
3211                         signature: sig,
3212                         contents: unsigned
3213                 })
3214         }
3215
3216         #[cfg(test)]
3217         pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3218                 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3219                 self.send_payment_along_path(SendAlongPathArgs {
3220                         path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3221                         session_priv_bytes
3222                 })
3223         }
3224
3225         fn send_payment_along_path(&self, args: SendAlongPathArgs) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3226                 let SendAlongPathArgs {
3227                         path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3228                         session_priv_bytes
3229                 } = args;
3230                 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
3231                 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
3232
3233                 log_trace!(self.logger,
3234                         "Attempting to send payment with payment hash {} along path with next hop {}",
3235                         payment_hash, path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
3236                 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
3237                 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
3238
3239                 let (onion_packet, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::create_payment_onion(
3240                         &self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height,
3241                         payment_hash, keysend_preimage, prng_seed
3242                 )?;
3243
3244                 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
3245                         let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
3246                                 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
3247                                 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3248                         };
3249
3250                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3251                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3252                                 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
3253                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3254                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3255                         if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
3256                                 match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
3257                                         ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
3258                                                 if !chan.context.is_live() {
3259                                                         return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
3260                                                 }
3261                                                 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
3262                                                 let send_res = chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
3263                                                         htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3264                                                                 path: path.clone(),
3265                                                                 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
3266                                                                 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
3267                                                                 payment_id,
3268                                                         }, onion_packet, None, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
3269                                                 match break_chan_phase_entry!(self, send_res, chan_phase_entry) {
3270                                                         Some(monitor_update) => {
3271                                                                 match handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
3272                                                                         false => {
3273                                                                                 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
3274                                                                                 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
3275                                                                                 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
3276                                                                                 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
3277                                                                                 // which we do in the send_payment check for
3278                                                                                 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
3279                                                                                 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
3280                                                                         },
3281                                                                         true => {},
3282                                                                 }
3283                                                         },
3284                                                         None => {},
3285                                                 }
3286                                         },
3287                                         _ => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel to first hop is unfunded".to_owned()}),
3288                                 };
3289                         } else {
3290                                 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
3291                                 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
3292                                 // `channel_by_id` map.
3293                                 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
3294                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
3295                         }
3296                         return Ok(());
3297                 };
3298
3299                 match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
3300                         Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3301                         Err(e) => {
3302                                 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
3303                         },
3304                 }
3305         }
3306
3307         /// Sends a payment along a given route.
3308         ///
3309         /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
3310         /// fields for more info.
3311         ///
3312         /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
3313         /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
3314         ///
3315         /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
3316         ///
3317         /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
3318         /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
3319         /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
3320         /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
3321         /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
3322         ///
3323         /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
3324         /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
3325         /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
3326         /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
3327         /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
3328         ///
3329         /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
3330         /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
3331         /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
3332         /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
3333         ///
3334         /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
3335         ///
3336         /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
3337         /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
3338         /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
3339         ///
3340         /// In general, a path may raise:
3341         ///  * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
3342         ///    node public key) is specified.
3343         ///  * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available as it has been
3344         ///    closed, doesn't exist, or the peer is currently disconnected.
3345         ///  * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
3346         ///    relevant updates.
3347         ///
3348         /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
3349         /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
3350         /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
3351         ///
3352         /// [`RouteHop`]: crate::routing::router::RouteHop
3353         /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3354         /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
3355         /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
3356         /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
3357         /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3358         pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3359                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3360                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3361                 self.pending_outbound_payments
3362                         .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id,
3363                                 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3364                                 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3365         }
3366
3367         /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route`], but will automatically find a route based on
3368         /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3369         pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
3370                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3371                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3372                 self.pending_outbound_payments
3373                         .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
3374                                 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
3375                                 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
3376                                 &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3377         }
3378
3379         #[cfg(test)]
3380         pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3381                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3382                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3383                 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion,
3384                         keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer,
3385                         best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3386         }
3387
3388         #[cfg(test)]
3389         pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
3390                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3391                 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
3392         }
3393
3394         #[cfg(test)]
3395         pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
3396                 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
3397         }
3398
3399         pub(super) fn send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&self, invoice: &Bolt12Invoice, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), Bolt12PaymentError> {
3400                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3401                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3402                 self.pending_outbound_payments
3403                         .send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(
3404                                 invoice, payment_id, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3405                                 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer,
3406                                 best_block_height, &self.logger, &self.pending_events,
3407                                 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args)
3408                         )
3409         }
3410
3411         /// Signals that no further attempts for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
3412         /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
3413         /// retries are exhausted.
3414         ///
3415         /// # Event Generation
3416         ///
3417         /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
3418         /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
3419         ///
3420         /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
3421         /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
3422         /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
3423         ///
3424         /// # Requested Invoices
3425         ///
3426         /// In the case of paying a [`Bolt12Invoice`] via [`ChannelManager::pay_for_offer`], abandoning
3427         /// the payment prior to receiving the invoice will result in an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`]
3428         /// and prevent any attempts at paying it once received. The other events may only be generated
3429         /// once the invoice has been received.
3430         ///
3431         /// # Restart Behavior
3432         ///
3433         /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated and we restart without first persisting the
3434         /// [`ChannelManager`], another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated; likewise for
3435         /// [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
3436         ///
3437         /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
3438         pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
3439                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3440                 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
3441         }
3442
3443         /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
3444         /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
3445         /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
3446         /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
3447         /// never reach the recipient.
3448         ///
3449         /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
3450         /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
3451         ///
3452         /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
3453         /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
3454         ///
3455         /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
3456         pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
3457                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3458                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3459                 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
3460                         route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
3461                         &self.node_signer, best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3462         }
3463
3464         /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
3465         /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3466         ///
3467         /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
3468         /// payments.
3469         ///
3470         /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
3471         pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
3472                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3473                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3474                 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
3475                         payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3476                         || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),  &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3477                         &self.logger, &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3478         }
3479
3480         /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
3481         /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
3482         /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
3483         pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
3484                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3485                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3486                 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret,
3487                         &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3488                         |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3489         }
3490
3491         /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
3492         /// payment probe.
3493         #[cfg(test)]
3494         pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
3495                 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
3496         }
3497
3498         /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay the given
3499         /// amount to the given `node_id`.
3500         ///
3501         /// See [`ChannelManager::send_preflight_probes`] for more information.
3502         pub fn send_spontaneous_preflight_probes(
3503                 &self, node_id: PublicKey, amount_msat: u64, final_cltv_expiry_delta: u32,
3504                 liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
3505         ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
3506                 let payment_params =
3507                         PaymentParameters::from_node_id(node_id, final_cltv_expiry_delta);
3508
3509                 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, amount_msat);
3510
3511                 self.send_preflight_probes(route_params, liquidity_limit_multiplier)
3512         }
3513
3514         /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay a route found
3515         /// according to the given [`RouteParameters`].
3516         ///
3517         /// This may be used to send "pre-flight" probes, i.e., to train our scorer before conducting
3518         /// the actual payment. Note this is only useful if there likely is sufficient time for the
3519         /// probe to settle before sending out the actual payment, e.g., when waiting for user
3520         /// confirmation in a wallet UI.
3521         ///
3522         /// Otherwise, there is a chance the probe could take up some liquidity needed to complete the
3523         /// actual payment. Users should therefore be cautious and might avoid sending probes if
3524         /// liquidity is scarce and/or they don't expect the probe to return before they send the
3525         /// payment. To mitigate this issue, channels with available liquidity less than the required
3526         /// amount times the given `liquidity_limit_multiplier` won't be used to send pre-flight
3527         /// probes. If `None` is given as `liquidity_limit_multiplier`, it defaults to `3`.
3528         pub fn send_preflight_probes(
3529                 &self, route_params: RouteParameters, liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
3530         ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
3531                 let liquidity_limit_multiplier = liquidity_limit_multiplier.unwrap_or(3);
3532
3533                 let payer = self.get_our_node_id();
3534                 let usable_channels = self.list_usable_channels();
3535                 let first_hops = usable_channels.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>();
3536                 let inflight_htlcs = self.compute_inflight_htlcs();
3537
3538                 let route = self
3539                         .router
3540                         .find_route(&payer, &route_params, Some(&first_hops), inflight_htlcs)
3541                         .map_err(|e| {
3542                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to find path for payment probe: {:?}", e);
3543                                 ProbeSendFailure::RouteNotFound
3544                         })?;
3545
3546                 let mut used_liquidity_map = HashMap::with_capacity(first_hops.len());
3547
3548                 let mut res = Vec::new();
3549
3550                 for mut path in route.paths {
3551                         // If the last hop is probably an unannounced channel we refrain from probing all the
3552                         // way through to the end and instead probe up to the second-to-last channel.
3553                         while let Some(last_path_hop) = path.hops.last() {
3554                                 if last_path_hop.maybe_announced_channel {
3555                                         // We found a potentially announced last hop.
3556                                         break;
3557                                 } else {
3558                                         // Drop the last hop, as it's likely unannounced.
3559                                         log_debug!(
3560                                                 self.logger,
3561                                                 "Avoided sending payment probe all the way to last hop {} as it is likely unannounced.",
3562                                                 last_path_hop.short_channel_id
3563                                         );
3564                                         let final_value_msat = path.final_value_msat();
3565                                         path.hops.pop();
3566                                         if let Some(new_last) = path.hops.last_mut() {
3567                                                 new_last.fee_msat += final_value_msat;
3568                                         }
3569                                 }
3570                         }
3571
3572                         if path.hops.len() < 2 {
3573                                 log_debug!(
3574                                         self.logger,
3575                                         "Skipped sending payment probe over path with less than two hops."
3576                                 );
3577                                 continue;
3578                         }
3579
3580                         if let Some(first_path_hop) = path.hops.first() {
3581                                 if let Some(first_hop) = first_hops.iter().find(|h| {
3582                                         h.get_outbound_payment_scid() == Some(first_path_hop.short_channel_id)
3583                                 }) {
3584                                         let path_value = path.final_value_msat() + path.fee_msat();
3585                                         let used_liquidity =
3586                                                 used_liquidity_map.entry(first_path_hop.short_channel_id).or_insert(0);
3587
3588                                         if first_hop.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat
3589                                                 < (*used_liquidity + path_value) * liquidity_limit_multiplier
3590                                         {
3591                                                 log_debug!(self.logger, "Skipped sending payment probe to avoid putting channel {} under the liquidity limit.", first_path_hop.short_channel_id);
3592                                                 continue;
3593                                         } else {
3594                                                 *used_liquidity += path_value;
3595                                         }
3596                                 }
3597                         }
3598
3599                         res.push(self.send_probe(path).map_err(|e| {
3600                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to send pre-flight probe: {:?}", e);
3601                                 ProbeSendFailure::SendingFailed(e)
3602                         })?);
3603                 }
3604
3605                 Ok(res)
3606         }
3607
3608         /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
3609         /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
3610         fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: FnMut(&OutboundV1Channel<SP>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
3611                 &self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, is_batch_funding: bool,
3612                 mut find_funding_output: FundingOutput,
3613         ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3614                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3615                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3616                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3617
3618                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3619                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3620                 let (chan, msg_opt) = match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
3621                         Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan)) => {
3622                                 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
3623
3624                                 let funding_res = chan.get_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, is_batch_funding, &self.logger)
3625                                         .map_err(|(mut chan, e)| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
3626                                                 let channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
3627                                                 let user_id = chan.context.get_user_id();
3628                                                 let shutdown_res = chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
3629                                                 let channel_capacity = chan.context.get_value_satoshis();
3630                                                 (chan, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None, channel_capacity))
3631                                         } else { unreachable!(); });
3632                                 match funding_res {
3633                                         Ok((chan, funding_msg)) => (chan, funding_msg),
3634                                         Err((chan, err)) => {
3635                                                 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
3636                                                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3637
3638                                                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(err), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
3639                                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3640                                                         err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
3641                                                 });
3642                                         },
3643                                 }
3644                         },
3645                         Some(phase) => {
3646                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(*temporary_channel_id, phase);
3647                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3648                                         err: format!(
3649                                                 "Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is not an unfunded, outbound V1 channel",
3650                                                 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3651                                 })
3652                         },
3653                         None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {err: format!(
3654                                 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
3655                                 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3656                                 }),
3657                 };
3658
3659                 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
3660                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
3661                                 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3662                                 msg,
3663                         });
3664                 }
3665                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
3666                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3667                                 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
3668                         },
3669                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3670                                 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
3671                                 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.context.channel_id(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
3672                                         panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
3673                                 }
3674                                 e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan));
3675                         }
3676                 }
3677                 Ok(())
3678         }
3679
3680         #[cfg(test)]
3681         pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3682                 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, false, |_, tx| {
3683                         Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
3684                 })
3685         }
3686
3687         /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
3688         ///
3689         /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
3690         /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
3691         ///
3692         /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
3693         /// across the p2p network.
3694         ///
3695         /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
3696         /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
3697         ///
3698         /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
3699         /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
3700         /// keys per-channel).
3701         ///
3702         /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
3703         /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
3704         /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
3705         ///
3706         /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
3707         /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
3708         /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
3709         ///
3710         /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
3711         /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
3712         /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
3713         /// for more details.
3714         ///
3715         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
3716         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
3717         pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3718                 self.batch_funding_transaction_generated(&[(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id)], funding_transaction)
3719         }
3720
3721         /// Call this upon creation of a batch funding transaction for the given channels.
3722         ///
3723         /// Return values are identical to [`Self::funding_transaction_generated`], respective to
3724         /// each individual channel and transaction output.
3725         ///
3726         /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. This batch funding transaction
3727         /// will only be broadcast when we have safely received and persisted the counterparty's
3728         /// signature for each channel.
3729         ///
3730         /// If there is an error, all channels in the batch are to be considered closed.
3731         pub fn batch_funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channels: &[(&ChannelId, &PublicKey)], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3732                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3733                 let mut result = Ok(());
3734
3735                 if !funding_transaction.is_coin_base() {
3736                         for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
3737                                 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
3738                                         result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3739                                                 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
3740                                         }));
3741                                 }
3742                         }
3743                 }
3744                 if funding_transaction.output.len() > u16::max_value() as usize {
3745                         result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3746                                 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
3747                         }));
3748                 }
3749                 {
3750                         let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3751                         // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools if their locktime is strictly
3752                         // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
3753                         // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
3754                         // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
3755                         if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) &&
3756                                 funding_transaction.lock_time.is_block_height() &&
3757                                 funding_transaction.lock_time.to_consensus_u32() > height + 1
3758                         {
3759                                 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3760                                         err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
3761                                 }));
3762                         }
3763                 }
3764
3765                 let txid = funding_transaction.txid();
3766                 let is_batch_funding = temporary_channels.len() > 1;
3767                 let mut funding_batch_states = if is_batch_funding {
3768                         Some(self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap())
3769                 } else {
3770                         None
3771                 };
3772                 let mut funding_batch_state = funding_batch_states.as_mut().and_then(|states| {
3773                         match states.entry(txid) {
3774                                 btree_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3775                                         result = result.clone().and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3776                                                 err: "Batch funding transaction with the same txid already exists".to_owned()
3777                                         }));
3778                                         None
3779                                 },
3780                                 btree_map::Entry::Vacant(vacant) => Some(vacant.insert(Vec::new())),
3781                         }
3782                 });
3783                 for &(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in temporary_channels {
3784                         result = result.and_then(|_| self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(
3785                                 temporary_channel_id,
3786                                 counterparty_node_id,
3787                                 funding_transaction.clone(),
3788                                 is_batch_funding,
3789                                 |chan, tx| {
3790                                         let mut output_index = None;
3791                                         let expected_spk = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
3792                                         for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3793                                                 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.context.get_value_satoshis() {
3794                                                         if output_index.is_some() {
3795                                                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3796                                                                         err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
3797                                                                 });
3798                                                         }
3799                                                         output_index = Some(idx as u16);
3800                                                 }
3801                                         }
3802                                         if output_index.is_none() {
3803                                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3804                                                         err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
3805                                                 });
3806                                         }
3807                                         let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() };
3808                                         if let Some(funding_batch_state) = funding_batch_state.as_mut() {
3809                                                 funding_batch_state.push((outpoint.to_channel_id(), *counterparty_node_id, false));
3810                                         }
3811                                         Ok(outpoint)
3812                                 })
3813                         );
3814                 }
3815                 if let Err(ref e) = result {
3816                         // Remaining channels need to be removed on any error.
3817                         let e = format!("Error in transaction funding: {:?}", e);
3818                         let mut channels_to_remove = Vec::new();
3819                         channels_to_remove.extend(funding_batch_states.as_mut()
3820                                 .and_then(|states| states.remove(&txid))
3821                                 .into_iter().flatten()
3822                                 .map(|(chan_id, node_id, _state)| (chan_id, node_id))
3823                         );
3824                         channels_to_remove.extend(temporary_channels.iter()
3825                                 .map(|(&chan_id, &node_id)| (chan_id, node_id))
3826                         );
3827                         let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
3828                         {
3829                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3830                                 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in channels_to_remove {
3831                                         per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3832                                                 .map(|peer_state_mutex| peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap())
3833                                                 .and_then(|mut peer_state| peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id))
3834                                                 .map(|mut chan| {
3835                                                         update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
3836                                                         self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context(), ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: e.clone() });
3837                                                         shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
3838                                                 });
3839                                 }
3840                         }
3841                         for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
3842                                 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
3843                         }
3844                 }
3845                 result
3846         }
3847
3848         /// Atomically applies partial updates to the [`ChannelConfig`] of the given channels.
3849         ///
3850         /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3851         /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3852         /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3853         /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3854         ///
3855         /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3856         /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3857         ///
3858         /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3859         /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3860         ///
3861         /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3862         ///
3863         /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3864         /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3865         /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3866         /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3867         /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3868         /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3869         /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3870         pub fn update_partial_channel_config(
3871                 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config_update: &ChannelConfigUpdate,
3872         ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3873                 if config_update.cltv_expiry_delta.map(|delta| delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA).unwrap_or(false) {
3874                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3875                                 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
3876                         });
3877                 }
3878
3879                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3880                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3881                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3882                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3883                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3884                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3885                 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3886                         if !peer_state.has_channel(channel_id) {
3887                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3888                                         err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3889                                 });
3890                         };
3891                 }
3892                 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3893                         if let Some(channel_phase) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
3894                                 let mut config = channel_phase.context().config();
3895                                 config.apply(config_update);
3896                                 if !channel_phase.context_mut().update_config(&config) {
3897                                         continue;
3898                                 }
3899                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = channel_phase {
3900                                         if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
3901                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
3902                                         } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
3903                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3904                                                         node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3905                                                         msg,
3906                                                 });
3907                                         }
3908                                 }
3909                                 continue;
3910                         } else {
3911                                 // This should not be reachable as we've already checked for non-existence in the previous channel_id loop.
3912                                 debug_assert!(false);
3913                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3914                                         err: format!(
3915                                                 "Channel with ID {} for passed counterparty_node_id {} disappeared after we confirmed its existence - this should not be reachable!",
3916                                                 channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3917                                 });
3918                         };
3919                 }
3920                 Ok(())
3921         }
3922
3923         /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
3924         ///
3925         /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3926         /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3927         /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3928         /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3929         ///
3930         /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3931         /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3932         ///
3933         /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3934         /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3935         ///
3936         /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3937         ///
3938         /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3939         /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3940         /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3941         /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3942         /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3943         /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3944         /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3945         pub fn update_channel_config(
3946                 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config: &ChannelConfig,
3947         ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3948                 return self.update_partial_channel_config(counterparty_node_id, channel_ids, &(*config).into());
3949         }
3950
3951         /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
3952         /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
3953         ///
3954         /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
3955         /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
3956         ///
3957         /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
3958         /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
3959         /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
3960         /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
3961         /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
3962         ///
3963         /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
3964         /// you from forwarding more than you received. See
3965         /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`] for more on forwarding a different amount
3966         /// than expected.
3967         ///
3968         /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3969         /// backwards.
3970         ///
3971         /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
3972         /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3973         /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
3974         // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
3975         // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
3976         pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &ChannelId, next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3977                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3978
3979                 let next_hop_scid = {
3980                         let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3981                         let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
3982                                 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
3983                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3984                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3985                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
3986                                 Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) => {
3987                                         if !chan.context.is_usable() {
3988                                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3989                                                         err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", next_hop_channel_id)
3990                                                 })
3991                                         }
3992                                         chan.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias())
3993                                 },
3994                                 Some(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3995                                         err: format!("Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is still opening.",
3996                                                 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id)
3997                                 }),
3998                                 None => {
3999                                         let error = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
4000                                                 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id);
4001                                         log_error!(self.logger, "{} when attempting to forward intercepted HTLC", error);
4002                                         return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4003                                                 err: error
4004                                         })
4005                                 }
4006                         }
4007                 };
4008
4009                 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4010                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4011                                 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4012                         })?;
4013
4014                 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
4015                         PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => {
4016                                 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid }
4017                         },
4018                         _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4019                 };
4020                 let skimmed_fee_msat =
4021                         payment.forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat.saturating_sub(amt_to_forward_msat);
4022                 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
4023                         skimmed_fee_msat: if skimmed_fee_msat == 0 { None } else { Some(skimmed_fee_msat) },
4024                         outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
4025                 };
4026
4027                 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
4028                         payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4029                         payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4030                         payment.prev_user_channel_id,
4031                         vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
4032                 )];
4033                 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
4034                 Ok(())
4035         }
4036
4037         /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
4038         /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
4039         ///
4040         /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4041         /// backwards.
4042         ///
4043         /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4044         pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4045                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4046
4047                 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4048                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4049                                 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4050                         })?;
4051
4052                 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
4053                         let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4054                                 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4055                                 user_channel_id: Some(payment.prev_user_channel_id),
4056                                 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4057                                 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
4058                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
4059                                 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4060                         });
4061
4062                         let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
4063                         let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
4064                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4065                 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4066
4067                 Ok(())
4068         }
4069
4070         /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
4071         ///
4072         /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
4073         /// Will likely generate further events.
4074         pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
4075                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4076
4077                 let mut new_events = VecDeque::new();
4078                 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
4079                 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
4080                 {
4081                         let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
4082                         mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
4083
4084                         for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
4085                                 if short_chan_id != 0 {
4086                                         macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
4087                                                 () => {
4088                                                         for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4089                                                                 match forward_info {
4090                                                                         HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4091                                                                                 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4092                                                                                 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4093                                                                                         routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4094                                                                                         outgoing_cltv_value, ..
4095                                                                                 }
4096                                                                         }) => {
4097                                                                                 macro_rules! failure_handler {
4098                                                                                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
4099                                                                                                 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
4100
4101                                                                                                 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4102                                                                                                         short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4103                                                                                                         user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4104                                                                                                         outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4105                                                                                                         htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4106                                                                                                         incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4107                                                                                                         phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
4108                                                                                                 });
4109
4110                                                                                                 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
4111                                                                                                         HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
4112                                                                                                 } else {
4113                                                                                                         HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
4114                                                                                                 };
4115
4116                                                                                                 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4117                                                                                                         HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
4118                                                                                                         reason
4119                                                                                                 ));
4120                                                                                                 continue;
4121                                                                                         }
4122                                                                                 }
4123                                                                                 macro_rules! fail_forward {
4124                                                                                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4125                                                                                                 {
4126                                                                                                         failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
4127                                                                                                 }
4128                                                                                         }
4129                                                                                 }
4130                                                                                 macro_rules! failed_payment {
4131                                                                                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4132                                                                                                 {
4133                                                                                                         failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
4134                                                                                                 }
4135                                                                                         }
4136                                                                                 }
4137                                                                                 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
4138                                                                                         let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
4139                                                                                         if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.chain_hash) {
4140                                                                                                 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
4141                                                                                                 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(
4142                                                                                                         phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac,
4143                                                                                                         payment_hash, &self.node_signer
4144                                                                                                 ) {
4145                                                                                                         Ok(res) => res,
4146                                                                                                         Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4147                                                                                                                 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).to_byte_array();
4148                                                                                                                 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
4149                                                                                                                 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
4150                                                                                                                 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
4151                                                                                                                 // of the onion.
4152                                                                                                                 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
4153                                                                                                         },
4154                                                                                                         Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4155                                                                                                                 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
4156                                                                                                         },
4157                                                                                                 };
4158                                                                                                 match next_hop {
4159                                                                                                         onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
4160                                                                                                                 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4161                                                                                                                 match create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data,
4162                                                                                                                         incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4163                                                                                                                         outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret), false, None,
4164                                                                                                                         current_height, self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
4165                                                                                                                 {
4166                                                                                                                         Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
4167                                                                                                                         Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
4168                                                                                                                 }
4169                                                                                                         },
4170                                                                                                         _ => panic!(),
4171                                                                                                 }
4172                                                                                         } else {
4173                                                                                                 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4174                                                                                         }
4175                                                                                 } else {
4176                                                                                         fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4177                                                                                 }
4178                                                                         },
4179                                                                         HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
4180                                                                                 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
4181                                                                                 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
4182                                                                                 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
4183                                                                                 // problem, not ours.
4184                                                                         }
4185                                                                 }
4186                                                         }
4187                                                 }
4188                                         }
4189                                         let chan_info_opt = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id).cloned();
4190                                         let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match chan_info_opt {
4191                                                 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id, chan_id),
4192                                                 None => {
4193                                                         forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4194                                                         continue;
4195                                                 }
4196                                         };
4197                                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4198                                         let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4199                                         if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
4200                                                 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4201                                                 continue;
4202                                         }
4203                                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4204                                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4205                                         if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id) {
4206                                                 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4207                                                         match forward_info {
4208                                                                 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4209                                                                         prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4210                                                                         forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4211                                                                                 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
4212                                                                                 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4213                                                                         },
4214                                                                 }) => {
4215                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, &payment_hash, short_chan_id);
4216                                                                         let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4217                                                                                 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4218                                                                                 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4219                                                                                 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4220                                                                                 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4221                                                                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4222                                                                                 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
4223                                                                                 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4224                                                                         });
4225                                                                         if let Err(e) = chan.queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
4226                                                                                 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
4227                                                                                 onion_packet, skimmed_fee_msat, &self.fee_estimator,
4228                                                                                 &self.logger)
4229                                                                         {
4230                                                                                 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4231                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", &payment_hash, msg);
4232                                                                                 } else {
4233                                                                                         panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
4234                                                                                 }
4235                                                                                 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan);
4236                                                                                 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4237                                                                                         HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
4238                                                                                         HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
4239                                                                                 ));
4240                                                                                 continue;
4241                                                                         }
4242                                                                 },
4243                                                                 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
4244                                                                         panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
4245                                                                 },
4246                                                                 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
4247                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
4248                                                                         if let Err(e) = chan.queue_fail_htlc(
4249                                                                                 htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger
4250                                                                         ) {
4251                                                                                 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4252                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
4253                                                                                 } else {
4254                                                                                         panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
4255                                                                                 }
4256                                                                                 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
4257                                                                                 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
4258                                                                                 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
4259                                                                                 continue;
4260                                                                         }
4261                                                                 },
4262                                                         }
4263                                                 }
4264                                         } else {
4265                                                 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4266                                                 continue;
4267                                         }
4268                                 } else {
4269                                         'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4270                                                 match forward_info {
4271                                                         HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4272                                                                 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4273                                                                 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4274                                                                         routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat,
4275                                                                         skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4276                                                                 }
4277                                                         }) => {
4278                                                                 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
4279                                                                         PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret, custom_tlvs } => {
4280                                                                                 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
4281                                                                                 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret),
4282                                                                                                 payment_metadata, custom_tlvs };
4283                                                                                 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
4284                                                                                         Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
4285                                                                         },
4286                                                                         PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_data, payment_preimage, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, custom_tlvs } => {
4287                                                                                 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields {
4288                                                                                         payment_secret: payment_data.as_ref().map(|data| data.payment_secret),
4289                                                                                         payment_metadata,
4290                                                                                         custom_tlvs,
4291                                                                                 };
4292                                                                                 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
4293                                                                                         payment_data, None, onion_fields)
4294                                                                         },
4295                                                                         _ => {
4296                                                                                 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
4297                                                                         }
4298                                                                 };
4299                                                                 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
4300                                                                         prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
4301                                                                                 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4302                                                                                 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4303                                                                                 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4304                                                                                 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4305                                                                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4306                                                                                 phantom_shared_secret,
4307                                                                         },
4308                                                                         // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
4309                                                                         // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
4310                                                                         // if routing nodes overpay
4311                                                                         value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
4312                                                                         sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
4313                                                                         timer_ticks: 0,
4314                                                                         total_value_received: None,
4315                                                                         total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
4316                                                                         cltv_expiry,
4317                                                                         onion_payload,
4318                                                                         counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
4319                                                                 };
4320
4321                                                                 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
4322
4323                                                                 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
4324                                                                         ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
4325                                                                                 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
4326                                                                                 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4327                                                                                 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
4328                                                                                         &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
4329                                                                                 );
4330                                                                                 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4331                                                                                                 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
4332                                                                                                 user_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.user_channel_id,
4333                                                                                                 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4334                                                                                                 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
4335                                                                                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
4336                                                                                                 phantom_shared_secret,
4337                                                                                         }), payment_hash,
4338                                                                                         HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
4339                                                                                         HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
4340                                                                                 ));
4341                                                                                 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
4342                                                                         }
4343                                                                 }
4344                                                                 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
4345                                                                 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4346                                                                 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4347                                                                         receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4348                                                                                 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4349                                                                 }
4350
4351                                                                 macro_rules! check_total_value {
4352                                                                         ($purpose: expr) => {{
4353                                                                                 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
4354                                                                                 let is_keysend = match $purpose {
4355                                                                                         events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(_) => true,
4356                                                                                         events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { .. } => false,
4357                                                                                 };
4358                                                                                 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4359                                                                                 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
4360                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4361                                                                                 }
4362                                                                                 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
4363                                                                                         .entry(payment_hash)
4364                                                                                         // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
4365                                                                                         .or_insert_with(|| {
4366                                                                                                 committed_to_claimable = true;
4367                                                                                                 ClaimablePayment {
4368                                                                                                         purpose: $purpose.clone(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
4369                                                                                                 }
4370                                                                                         });
4371                                                                                 if $purpose != claimable_payment.purpose {
4372                                                                                         let log_keysend = |keysend| if keysend { "keysend" } else { "non-keysend" };
4373                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new {} HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing {} HTLC with the same payment hash", log_keysend(is_keysend), &payment_hash, log_keysend(!is_keysend));
4374                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4375                                                                                 }
4376                                                                                 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && is_keysend && !claimable_payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4377                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash and our config states we don't accept MPP keysend", &payment_hash);
4378                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4379                                                                                 }
4380                                                                                 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
4381                                                                                         if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
4382                                                                                                 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4383                                                                                         }
4384                                                                                 } else {
4385                                                                                         claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
4386                                                                                 }
4387                                                                                 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
4388                                                                                 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
4389                                                                                 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
4390                                                                                 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
4391                                                                                         total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
4392                                                                                         earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
4393                                                                                         if htlc.total_msat != claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4394                                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
4395                                                                                                         &payment_hash, claimable_htlc.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
4396                                                                                                 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
4397                                                                                         }
4398                                                                                         if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
4399                                                                                 }
4400                                                                                 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
4401                                                                                 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
4402                                                                                 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
4403                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4404                                                                                 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4405                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
4406                                                                                                 &payment_hash);
4407                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4408                                                                                 } else if total_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4409                                                                                         #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4410                                                                                                 committed_to_claimable = true;
4411                                                                                         }
4412                                                                                         let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
4413                                                                                         htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4414                                                                                         let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
4415                                                                                         htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
4416                                                                                         let counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat = htlcs.iter()
4417                                                                                                 .map(|htlc| htlc.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)).sum();
4418                                                                                         debug_assert!(total_value.saturating_sub(amount_msat) <=
4419                                                                                                 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat);
4420                                                                                         new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
4421                                                                                                 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4422                                                                                                 payment_hash,
4423                                                                                                 purpose: $purpose,
4424                                                                                                 amount_msat,
4425                                                                                                 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
4426                                                                                                 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
4427                                                                                                 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4428                                                                                                 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
4429                                                                                                 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
4430                                                                                         }, None));
4431                                                                                         payment_claimable_generated = true;
4432                                                                                 } else {
4433                                                                                         // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
4434                                                                                         // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
4435                                                                                         // MPP parts.
4436                                                                                         htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4437                                                                                         #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4438                                                                                                 committed_to_claimable = true;
4439                                                                                         }
4440                                                                                 }
4441                                                                                 payment_claimable_generated
4442                                                                         }}
4443                                                                 }
4444
4445                                                                 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
4446                                                                 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
4447                                                                 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
4448                                                                 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
4449                                                                 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
4450                                                                 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
4451                                                                 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4452                                                                 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
4453                                                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4454                                                                                 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4455                                                                                         OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
4456                                                                                                 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4457                                                                                                 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
4458                                                                                                         Ok(result) => result,
4459                                                                                                         Err(()) => {
4460                                                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", &payment_hash);
4461                                                                                                                 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4462                                                                                                         }
4463                                                                                                 };
4464                                                                                                 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
4465                                                                                                         let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
4466                                                                                                         if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
4467                                                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
4468                                                                                                                         &payment_hash, cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
4469                                                                                                                 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4470                                                                                                         }
4471                                                                                                 }
4472                                                                                                 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4473                                                                                                         payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4474                                                                                                         payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4475                                                                                                 };
4476                                                                                                 check_total_value!(purpose);
4477                                                                                         },
4478                                                                                         OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
4479                                                                                                 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
4480                                                                                                 check_total_value!(purpose);
4481                                                                                         }
4482                                                                                 }
4483                                                                         },
4484                                                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
4485                                                                                 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4486                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", &payment_hash);
4487                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4488                                                                                 }
4489                                                                                 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4490                                                                                 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
4491                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", &payment_hash);
4492                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4493                                                                                 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
4494                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
4495                                                                                                 &payment_hash, payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
4496                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4497                                                                                 } else {
4498                                                                                         let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4499                                                                                                 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
4500                                                                                                 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4501                                                                                         };
4502                                                                                         let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(purpose);
4503                                                                                         if payment_claimable_generated {
4504                                                                                                 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
4505                                                                                         }
4506                                                                                 }
4507                                                                         },
4508                                                                 };
4509                                                         },
4510                                                         HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
4511                                                                 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
4512                                                         }
4513                                                 }
4514                                         }
4515                                 }
4516                         }
4517                 }
4518
4519                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4520                 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
4521                         || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4522                         &self.pending_events, &self.logger, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args));
4523
4524                 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
4525                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4526                 }
4527                 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
4528
4529                 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
4530                 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
4531                 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
4532                 // network stack.
4533                 self.check_free_holding_cells();
4534
4535                 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
4536                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4537                 events.append(&mut new_events);
4538         }
4539
4540         /// Free the background events, generally called from [`PersistenceNotifierGuard`] constructors.
4541         ///
4542         /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
4543         fn process_background_events(&self) -> NotifyOption {
4544                 debug_assert_ne!(self.total_consistency_lock.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::NotHeldByThread);
4545
4546                 self.background_events_processed_since_startup.store(true, Ordering::Release);
4547
4548                 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
4549                 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
4550                 if background_events.is_empty() {
4551                         return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4552                 }
4553
4554                 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
4555                         match event {
4556                                 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, update)) => {
4557                                         // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
4558                                         // monitor updating completing.
4559                                         let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4560                                 },
4561                                 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup { counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update } => {
4562                                         let mut updated_chan = false;
4563                                         {
4564                                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4565                                                 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4566                                                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4567                                                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4568                                                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4569                                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase) => {
4570                                                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase.get_mut() {
4571                                                                                 updated_chan = true;
4572                                                                                 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, update.clone(),
4573                                                                                         peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4574                                                                         } else {
4575                                                                                 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't have an update for a non-funded channel");
4576                                                                         }
4577                                                                 },
4578                                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {},
4579                                                         }
4580                                                 }
4581                                         }
4582                                         if !updated_chan {
4583                                                 // TODO: Track this as in-flight even though the channel is closed.
4584                                                 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4585                                         }
4586                                 },
4587                                 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete { counterparty_node_id, channel_id } => {
4588                                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4589                                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4590                                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4591                                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4592                                                 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
4593                                                         handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4594                                                 } else {
4595                                                         let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
4596                                                                 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
4597                                                         mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
4598                                                         mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4599                                                         self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
4600                                                 }
4601                                         }
4602                                 },
4603                         }
4604                 }
4605                 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4606         }
4607
4608         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
4609         /// Process background events, for functional testing
4610         pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
4611                 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
4612                 let _ = self.process_background_events();
4613         }
4614
4615         fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &ChannelId, chan: &mut Channel<SP>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
4616                 if !chan.context.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents; }
4617                 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
4618                 if new_feerate <= chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4619                         if new_feerate != chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4620                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4621                                 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4622                         }
4623                         return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4624                 }
4625                 if !chan.context.is_live() {
4626                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
4627                                 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4628                         return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4629                 }
4630                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4631                         &chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4632
4633                 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
4634                 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4635         }
4636
4637         #[cfg(fuzzing)]
4638         /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
4639         /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
4640         /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
4641         /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
4642         pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
4643                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
4644                         let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4645
4646                         let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
4647                         let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
4648
4649                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4650                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4651                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4652                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4653                                 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
4654                                         |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
4655                                 ) {
4656                                         let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4657                                                 anchor_feerate
4658                                         } else {
4659                                                 non_anchor_feerate
4660                                         };
4661                                         let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4662                                         if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4663                                 }
4664                         }
4665
4666                         should_persist
4667                 });
4668         }
4669
4670         /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
4671         ///
4672         /// This currently includes:
4673         ///  * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
4674         ///  * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
4675         ///    than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
4676         ///    the channel.
4677         ///  * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
4678         ///    with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
4679         ///  * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
4680         ///  * Force-closing and removing channels which have not completed establishment in a timely manner.
4681         ///  * Forgetting about stale outbound payments, either those that have already been fulfilled
4682         ///    or those awaiting an invoice that hasn't been delivered in the necessary amount of time.
4683         ///    The latter is determined using the system clock in `std` and the highest seen block time
4684         ///    minus two hours in `no-std`.
4685         ///
4686         /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
4687         /// estimate fetches.
4688         ///
4689         /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4690         /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
4691         pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
4692                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
4693                         let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4694
4695                         let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
4696                         let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
4697
4698                         let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
4699                         let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
4700                         let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
4701                         let mut shutdown_channels = Vec::new();
4702
4703                         let mut process_unfunded_channel_tick = |
4704                                 chan_id: &ChannelId,
4705                                 context: &mut ChannelContext<SP>,
4706                                 unfunded_context: &mut UnfundedChannelContext,
4707                                 pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4708                                 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
4709                         | {
4710                                 context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4711                                 if unfunded_context.should_expire_unfunded_channel() {
4712                                         log_error!(self.logger,
4713                                                 "Force-closing pending channel with ID {} for not establishing in a timely manner", chan_id);
4714                                         update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
4715                                         self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4716                                         shutdown_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false));
4717                                         pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4718                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4719                                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4720                                                         msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
4721                                                                 channel_id: *chan_id,
4722                                                                 data: "Force-closing pending channel due to timeout awaiting establishment handshake".to_owned(),
4723                                                         },
4724                                                 },
4725                                         });
4726                                         false
4727                                 } else {
4728                                         true
4729                                 }
4730                         };
4731
4732                         {
4733                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4734                                 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4735                                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4736                                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4737                                         let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
4738                                         let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
4739                                         peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, phase| {
4740                                                 match phase {
4741                                                         ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
4742                                                                 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4743                                                                         anchor_feerate
4744                                                                 } else {
4745                                                                         non_anchor_feerate
4746                                                                 };
4747                                                                 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4748                                                                 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4749
4750                                                                 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
4751                                                                         let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
4752                                                                         handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
4753                                                                         if needs_close { return false; }
4754                                                                 }
4755
4756                                                                 match chan.channel_update_status() {
4757                                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
4758                                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
4759                                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.context.is_live()
4760                                                                                 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
4761                                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.context.is_live()
4762                                                                                 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
4763                                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.context.is_live() => {
4764                                                                                 n += 1;
4765                                                                                 if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4766                                                                                         chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
4767                                                                                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4768                                                                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4769                                                                                                         msg: update
4770                                                                                                 });
4771                                                                                         }
4772                                                                                         should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4773                                                                                 } else {
4774                                                                                         chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
4775                                                                                 }
4776                                                                         },
4777                                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.context.is_live() => {
4778                                                                                 n += 1;
4779                                                                                 if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4780                                                                                         chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
4781                                                                                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4782                                                                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4783                                                                                                         msg: update
4784                                                                                                 });
4785                                                                                         }
4786                                                                                         should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4787                                                                                 } else {
4788                                                                                         chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
4789                                                                                 }
4790                                                                         },
4791                                                                         _ => {},
4792                                                                 }
4793
4794                                                                 chan.context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4795
4796                                                                 if chan.should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response() {
4797                                                                         log_debug!(self.logger, "Disconnecting peer {} due to not making any progress on channel {}",
4798                                                                                         counterparty_node_id, chan_id);
4799                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4800                                                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4801                                                                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning {
4802                                                                                         msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
4803                                                                                                 channel_id: *chan_id,
4804                                                                                                 data: "Disconnecting due to timeout awaiting response".to_owned(),
4805                                                                                         },
4806                                                                                 },
4807                                                                         });
4808                                                                 }
4809
4810                                                                 true
4811                                                         },
4812                                                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
4813                                                                 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
4814                                                                         pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
4815                                                         },
4816                                                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
4817                                                                 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
4818                                                                         pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
4819                                                         },
4820                                                 }
4821                                         });
4822
4823                                         for (chan_id, req) in peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.iter_mut() {
4824                                                 if { req.ticks_remaining -= 1 ; req.ticks_remaining } <= 0 {
4825                                                         log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing unaccepted inbound channel {} for not accepting in a timely manner", &chan_id);
4826                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
4827                                                                 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4828                                                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4829                                                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4830                                                                                 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_id.clone(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
4831                                                                         },
4832                                                                 }
4833                                                         );
4834                                                 }
4835                                         }
4836                                         peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.retain(|_, req| req.ticks_remaining > 0);
4837
4838                                         if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
4839                                                 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
4840                                         }
4841                                 }
4842                         }
4843
4844                         // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
4845                         // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
4846                         // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
4847                         // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
4848                         // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
4849                         // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
4850                         // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
4851                         if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
4852                                 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
4853                                 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
4854                                         match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
4855                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
4856                                                         // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
4857                                                         // have no channels to the peer.
4858                                                         let remove_entry = {
4859                                                                 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
4860                                                                 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
4861                                                         };
4862                                                         if remove_entry {
4863                                                                 entry.remove_entry();
4864                                                         }
4865                                                 },
4866                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
4867                                         }
4868                                 }
4869                         }
4870
4871                         self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
4872                                 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4873                                         // This should be unreachable
4874                                         debug_assert!(false);
4875                                         return false;
4876                                 }
4877                                 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
4878                                         // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
4879                                         // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
4880                                         // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
4881                                         // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
4882                                         if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
4883                                                 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
4884                                         {
4885                                                 return true;
4886                                         } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
4887                                                 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
4888                                                 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
4889                                         }) {
4890                                                 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
4891                                                         .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
4892                                                 return false;
4893                                         }
4894                                 }
4895                                 true
4896                         });
4897
4898                         for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
4899                                 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
4900                                 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
4901                                 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
4902                                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
4903                         }
4904
4905                         for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4906                                 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4907                         }
4908
4909                         for shutdown_res in shutdown_channels {
4910                                 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
4911                         }
4912
4913                         #[cfg(feature = "std")]
4914                         let duration_since_epoch = std::time::SystemTime::now()
4915                                 .duration_since(std::time::SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH)
4916                                 .expect("SystemTime::now() should come after SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH");
4917                         #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
4918                         let duration_since_epoch = Duration::from_secs(
4919                                 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire).saturating_sub(7200) as u64
4920                         );
4921
4922                         self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_payments(
4923                                 duration_since_epoch, &self.pending_events
4924                         );
4925
4926                         // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
4927                         // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
4928                         // than block the message queueing pipeline.
4929                         if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
4930                                 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4931                         }
4932
4933                         should_persist
4934                 });
4935         }
4936
4937         /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
4938         /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
4939         /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
4940         ///
4941         /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
4942         /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
4943         /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
4944         /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
4945         ///
4946         /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
4947         /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
4948         /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
4949         /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
4950         pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
4951                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
4952         }
4953
4954         /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
4955         /// reason for the failure.
4956         ///
4957         /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
4958         pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
4959                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4960
4961                 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
4962                 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
4963                         for htlc in payment.htlcs {
4964                                 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
4965                                 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4966                                 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
4967                                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4968                         }
4969                 }
4970         }
4971
4972         /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
4973         fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
4974                 match failure_code {
4975                         FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
4976                         FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
4977                         FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
4978                                 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4979                                 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
4980                                 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), htlc_msat_height_data)
4981                         },
4982                         FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(data) => {
4983                                 let fail_data = match data {
4984                                         Some((typ, offset)) => [BigSize(typ).encode(), offset.encode()].concat(),
4985                                         None => Vec::new(),
4986                                 };
4987                                 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), fail_data)
4988                         }
4989                 }
4990         }
4991
4992         /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
4993         /// that we want to return and a channel.
4994         ///
4995         /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
4996         /// forwarding
4997         fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
4998                 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
4999                 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
5000                 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
5001                 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
5002                 let scid_pref = if chan.context.should_announce() {
5003                         chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
5004                 } else {
5005                         chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.context.get_short_channel_id())
5006                 };
5007                 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
5008                         self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
5009                 } else {
5010                         (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5011                 }
5012         }
5013
5014
5015         /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5016         /// that we want to return and a channel.
5017         fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5018                 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
5019                 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
5020                         let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
5021                         if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
5022                                 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
5023                                 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
5024                                 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5025                         }
5026                         (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5027                         msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5028                         upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5029                         (desired_err_code, enc.0)
5030                 } else {
5031                         // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
5032                         // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
5033                         // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
5034                         // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
5035                         (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5036                 }
5037         }
5038
5039         // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
5040         // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
5041         // be surfaced to the user.
5042         fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
5043                 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: ChannelId,
5044                 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
5045         ) {
5046                 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
5047                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5048                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
5049                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5050                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5051                                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
5052                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
5053                                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get() {
5054                                                         self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan)
5055                                                 } else {
5056                                                         // We shouldn't be trying to fail holding cell HTLCs on an unfunded channel.
5057                                                         debug_assert!(false);
5058                                                         (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5059                                                 }
5060                                         },
5061                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5062                                 }
5063                         } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
5064                 };
5065
5066                 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
5067                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
5068                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
5069                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5070                 }
5071         }
5072
5073         /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
5074         /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
5075         fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
5076                 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
5077                 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
5078                 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
5079                 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
5080                 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5081                 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
5082                         debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5083                 }
5084
5085                 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
5086                 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
5087                 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
5088                 //timer handling.
5089
5090                 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5091                 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
5092                 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5093                 match source {
5094                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
5095                                 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
5096                                         session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
5097                                         &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
5098                                 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5099                         },
5100                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint, .. }) => {
5101                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", &payment_hash, onion_error);
5102                                 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
5103
5104                                 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
5105                                 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5106                                 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
5107                                         push_forward_ev = true;
5108                                 }
5109                                 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
5110                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5111                                                 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
5112                                         },
5113                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5114                                                 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
5115                                         }
5116                                 }
5117                                 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
5118                                 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5119                                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5120                                 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
5121                                         prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
5122                                         failed_next_destination: destination,
5123                                 }, None));
5124                         },
5125                 }
5126         }
5127
5128         /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
5129         /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
5130         ///
5131         /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
5132         /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
5133         /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
5134         /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
5135         ///
5136         /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
5137         /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
5138         /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
5139         /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
5140         ///
5141         /// This function will fail the payment if it has custom TLVs with even type numbers, as we
5142         /// will assume they are unknown. If you intend to accept even custom TLVs, you should use
5143         /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`].
5144         ///
5145         /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5146         /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
5147         /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
5148         /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
5149         /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5150         /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5151         /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`]: Self::claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs
5152         pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5153                 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, false);
5154         }
5155
5156         /// This is a variant of [`claim_funds`] that allows accepting a payment with custom TLVs with
5157         /// even type numbers.
5158         ///
5159         /// # Note
5160         ///
5161         /// You MUST check you've understood all even TLVs before using this to
5162         /// claim, otherwise you may unintentionally agree to some protocol you do not understand.
5163         ///
5164         /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5165         pub fn claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5166                 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, true);
5167         }
5168
5169         fn claim_payment_internal(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, custom_tlvs_known: bool) {
5170                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).to_byte_array());
5171
5172                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5173
5174                 let mut sources = {
5175                         let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
5176                         if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
5177                                 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
5178                                 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
5179                                         if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
5180                                                 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
5181                                                         .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
5182                                                 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
5183                                                 break;
5184                                         }
5185                                 }
5186
5187                                 let htlcs = payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect();
5188                                 let sender_intended_value = payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat);
5189                                 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
5190                                         ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
5191                                         payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id, htlcs, sender_intended_value
5192                                 });
5193                                 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
5194                                         debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
5195                                         log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
5196                                                 &payment_hash);
5197                                 }
5198
5199                                 if let Some(RecipientOnionFields { ref custom_tlvs, .. }) = payment.onion_fields {
5200                                         if !custom_tlvs_known && custom_tlvs.iter().any(|(typ, _)| typ % 2 == 0) {
5201                                                 log_info!(self.logger, "Rejecting payment with payment hash {} as we cannot accept payment with unknown even TLVs: {}",
5202                                                         &payment_hash, log_iter!(custom_tlvs.iter().map(|(typ, _)| typ).filter(|typ| *typ % 2 == 0)));
5203                                                 claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5204                                                 mem::drop(claimable_payments);
5205                                                 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5206                                                         let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(None), &htlc);
5207                                                         let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5208                                                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5209                                                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5210                                                 }
5211                                                 return;
5212                                         }
5213                                 }
5214
5215                                 payment.htlcs
5216                         } else { return; }
5217                 };
5218                 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
5219
5220                 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
5221                 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
5222                 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
5223                 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
5224                 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
5225                 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
5226                 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
5227                 let mut valid_mpp = true;
5228                 let mut errs = Vec::new();
5229                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5230                 for htlc in sources.iter() {
5231                         if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
5232                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5233                                 debug_assert!(false);
5234                                 valid_mpp = false;
5235                                 break;
5236                         }
5237                         prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
5238
5239                         if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
5240                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5241                                 debug_assert!(false);
5242                                 valid_mpp = false;
5243                                 break;
5244                         }
5245                         expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
5246                         claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
5247                 }
5248                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5249                 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
5250                         self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5251                         log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
5252                         return;
5253                 }
5254                 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
5255                         self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5256                         log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
5257                                 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
5258                         return;
5259                 }
5260                 if valid_mpp {
5261                         for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5262                                 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
5263                                         htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
5264                                         |_, definitely_duplicate| {
5265                                                 debug_assert!(!definitely_duplicate, "We shouldn't claim duplicatively from a payment");
5266                                                 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash })
5267                                         }
5268                                 ) {
5269                                         if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
5270                                                 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
5271                                                 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
5272                                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
5273                                         } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
5274                                 }
5275                         }
5276                 }
5277                 if !valid_mpp {
5278                         for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5279                                 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5280                                 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
5281                                 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5282                                 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
5283                                 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5284                                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5285                         }
5286                         self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5287                 }
5288
5289                 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
5290                 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
5291                         let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5292                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
5293                 }
5294         }
5295
5296         fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>, bool) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
5297                 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
5298         -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
5299                 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
5300
5301                 // If we haven't yet run background events assume we're still deserializing and shouldn't
5302                 // actually pass `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to users yet. Instead, queue them up as
5303                 // `BackgroundEvent`s.
5304                 let during_init = !self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5305
5306                 // As we may call handle_monitor_update_completion_actions in rather rare cases, check that
5307                 // the required mutexes are not held before we start.
5308                 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5309                 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5310
5311                 {
5312                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5313                         let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
5314                         let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
5315                                 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
5316                                 None => None
5317                         };
5318
5319                         let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
5320                                 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5321                                         .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
5322                         ).unwrap_or(None);
5323
5324                         if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
5325                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
5326                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5327                                 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5328                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
5329                                                 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5330                                                 let fulfill_res = chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger);
5331
5332                                                 match fulfill_res {
5333                                                         UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } => {
5334                                                                 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat), false) {
5335                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
5336                                                                                 chan_id, action);
5337                                                                         peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
5338                                                                 }
5339                                                                 if !during_init {
5340                                                                         handle_new_monitor_update!(self, prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
5341                                                                                 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5342                                                                 } else {
5343                                                                         // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly -
5344                                                                         // they probably haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the
5345                                                                         // monitor update as a background event.
5346                                                                         self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5347                                                                                 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5348                                                                                         counterparty_node_id,
5349                                                                                         funding_txo: prev_hop.outpoint,
5350                                                                                         update: monitor_update.clone(),
5351                                                                                 });
5352                                                                 }
5353                                                         }
5354                                                         UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => {
5355                                                                 let action = if let Some(action) = completion_action(None, true) {
5356                                                                         action
5357                                                                 } else {
5358                                                                         return Ok(());
5359                                                                 };
5360                                                                 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5361
5362                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Completing monitor update completion action for channel {} as claim was redundant: {:?}",
5363                                                                         chan_id, action);
5364                                                                 let (node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker) =
5365                                                                 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5366                                                                         downstream_counterparty_node_id: node_id,
5367                                                                         downstream_funding_outpoint: funding_outpoint,
5368                                                                         blocking_action: blocker,
5369                                                                 } = action {
5370                                                                         (node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker)
5371                                                                 } else {
5372                                                                         debug_assert!(false,
5373                                                                                 "Duplicate claims should always free another channel immediately");
5374                                                                         return Ok(());
5375                                                                 };
5376                                                                 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
5377                                                                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5378                                                                         if let Some(blockers) = peer_state
5379                                                                                 .actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
5380                                                                                 .get_mut(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
5381                                                                         {
5382                                                                                 let mut found_blocker = false;
5383                                                                                 blockers.retain(|iter| {
5384                                                                                         // Note that we could actually be blocked, in
5385                                                                                         // which case we need to only remove the one
5386                                                                                         // blocker which was added duplicatively.
5387                                                                                         let first_blocker = !found_blocker;
5388                                                                                         if *iter == blocker { found_blocker = true; }
5389                                                                                         *iter != blocker || !first_blocker
5390                                                                                 });
5391                                                                                 debug_assert!(found_blocker);
5392                                                                         }
5393                                                                 } else {
5394                                                                         debug_assert!(false);
5395                                                                 }
5396                                                         }
5397                                                 }
5398                                         }
5399                                         return Ok(());
5400                                 }
5401                         }
5402                 }
5403                 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5404                         update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
5405                         updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5406                                 payment_preimage,
5407                         }],
5408                 };
5409
5410                 if !during_init {
5411                         // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
5412                         // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
5413                         let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
5414                         if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
5415                                 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
5416                                 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
5417                                 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
5418                                 // again on restart.
5419                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
5420                                         payment_preimage, update_res);
5421                         }
5422                 } else {
5423                         // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly - they probably
5424                         // haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the monitor update as a background
5425                         // event.
5426                         // Note that while it's safe to use `ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup` here (the
5427                         // channel is already closed) we need to ultimately handle the monitor update
5428                         // completion action only after we've completed the monitor update. This is the only
5429                         // way to guarantee this update *will* be regenerated on startup (otherwise if this was
5430                         // from a forwarded HTLC the downstream preimage may be deleted before we claim
5431                         // upstream). Thus, we need to transition to some new `BackgroundEvent` type which will
5432                         // complete the monitor update completion action from `completion_action`.
5433                         self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5434                                 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((
5435                                         prev_hop.outpoint, preimage_update,
5436                                 )));
5437                 }
5438                 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
5439                 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
5440                 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
5441                 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
5442                 // `PaymentForwarded`).
5443                 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None, false));
5444                 Ok(())
5445         }
5446
5447         fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
5448                 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
5449         }
5450
5451         fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
5452                 forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, startup_replay: bool,
5453                 next_channel_counterparty_node_id: Option<PublicKey>, next_channel_outpoint: OutPoint
5454         ) {
5455                 match source {
5456                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
5457                                 debug_assert!(self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire),
5458                                         "We don't support claim_htlc claims during startup - monitors may not be available yet");
5459                                 if let Some(pubkey) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
5460                                         debug_assert_eq!(pubkey, path.hops[0].pubkey);
5461                                 }
5462                                 let ev_completion_action = EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
5463                                         channel_funding_outpoint: next_channel_outpoint,
5464                                         counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
5465                                 };
5466                                 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage,
5467                                         session_priv, path, from_onchain, ev_completion_action, &self.pending_events,
5468                                         &self.logger);
5469                         },
5470                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
5471                                 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
5472                                 let completed_blocker = RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&hop_data);
5473                                 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5474                                 let claiming_chan_funding_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
5475                                 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
5476                                         |htlc_claim_value_msat, definitely_duplicate| {
5477                                                 let chan_to_release =
5478                                                         if let Some(node_id) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
5479                                                                 Some((node_id, next_channel_outpoint, completed_blocker))
5480                                                         } else {
5481                                                                 // We can only get `None` here if we are processing a
5482                                                                 // `ChannelMonitor`-originated event, in which case we
5483                                                                 // don't care about ensuring we wake the downstream
5484                                                                 // channel's monitor updating - the channel is already
5485                                                                 // closed.
5486                                                                 None
5487                                                         };
5488
5489                                                 if definitely_duplicate && startup_replay {
5490                                                         // On startup we may get redundant claims which are related to
5491                                                         // monitor updates still in flight. In that case, we shouldn't
5492                                                         // immediately free, but instead let that monitor update complete
5493                                                         // in the background.
5494                                                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
5495                                                                 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
5496                                                                 // There should be a `BackgroundEvent` pending...
5497                                                                 assert!(background_events.iter().any(|ev| {
5498                                                                         match ev {
5499                                                                                 // to apply a monitor update that blocked the claiming channel,
5500                                                                                 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5501                                                                                         funding_txo, update, ..
5502                                                                                 } => {
5503                                                                                         if *funding_txo == claiming_chan_funding_outpoint {
5504                                                                                                 assert!(update.updates.iter().any(|upd|
5505                                                                                                         if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5506                                                                                                                 payment_preimage: update_preimage
5507                                                                                                         } = upd {
5508                                                                                                                 payment_preimage == *update_preimage
5509                                                                                                         } else { false }
5510                                                                                                 ), "{:?}", update);
5511                                                                                                 true
5512                                                                                         } else { false }
5513                                                                                 },
5514                                                                                 // or the channel we'd unblock is already closed,
5515                                                                                 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup(
5516                                                                                         (funding_txo, monitor_update)
5517                                                                                 ) => {
5518                                                                                         if *funding_txo == next_channel_outpoint {
5519                                                                                                 assert_eq!(monitor_update.updates.len(), 1);
5520                                                                                                 assert!(matches!(
5521                                                                                                         monitor_update.updates[0],
5522                                                                                                         ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { .. }
5523                                                                                                 ));
5524                                                                                                 true
5525                                                                                         } else { false }
5526                                                                                 },
5527                                                                                 // or the monitor update has completed and will unblock
5528                                                                                 // immediately once we get going.
5529                                                                                 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
5530                                                                                         channel_id, ..
5531                                                                                 } =>
5532                                                                                         *channel_id == claiming_chan_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(),
5533                                                                         }
5534                                                                 }), "{:?}", *background_events);
5535                                                         }
5536                                                         None
5537                                                 } else if definitely_duplicate {
5538                                                         if let Some(other_chan) = chan_to_release {
5539                                                                 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5540                                                                         downstream_counterparty_node_id: other_chan.0,
5541                                                                         downstream_funding_outpoint: other_chan.1,
5542                                                                         blocking_action: other_chan.2,
5543                                                                 })
5544                                                         } else { None }
5545                                                 } else {
5546                                                         let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
5547                                                                 if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
5548                                                                         Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
5549                                                                 } else { None }
5550                                                         } else { None };
5551                                                         Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5552                                                                 event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
5553                                                                         fee_earned_msat,
5554                                                                         claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
5555                                                                         prev_channel_id: Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
5556                                                                         next_channel_id: Some(next_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
5557                                                                         outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
5558                                                                 },
5559                                                                 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: chan_to_release,
5560                                                         })
5561                                                 }
5562                                         });
5563                                 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
5564                                         let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5565                                         let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
5566                                 }
5567                         },
5568                 }
5569         }
5570
5571         /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
5572         pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
5573                 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
5574         }
5575
5576         fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
5577                 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5578                 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5579                 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5580
5581                 for action in actions.into_iter() {
5582                         match action {
5583                                 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
5584                                         let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5585                                         if let Some(ClaimingPayment {
5586                                                 amount_msat,
5587                                                 payment_purpose: purpose,
5588                                                 receiver_node_id,
5589                                                 htlcs,
5590                                                 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_total_msat,
5591                                         }) = payment {
5592                                                 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
5593                                                         payment_hash,
5594                                                         purpose,
5595                                                         amount_msat,
5596                                                         receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
5597                                                         htlcs,
5598                                                         sender_intended_total_msat,
5599                                                 }, None));
5600                                         }
5601                                 },
5602                                 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5603                                         event, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint
5604                                 } => {
5605                                         self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
5606                                         if let Some((node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker)) = downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint {
5607                                                 self.handle_monitor_update_release(node_id, funding_outpoint, Some(blocker));
5608                                         }
5609                                 },
5610                                 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5611                                         downstream_counterparty_node_id, downstream_funding_outpoint, blocking_action,
5612                                 } => {
5613                                         self.handle_monitor_update_release(
5614                                                 downstream_counterparty_node_id,
5615                                                 downstream_funding_outpoint,
5616                                                 Some(blocking_action),
5617                                         );
5618                                 },
5619                         }
5620                 }
5621         }
5622
5623         /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
5624         /// update completion.
5625         fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
5626                 channel: &mut Channel<SP>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
5627                 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
5628                 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
5629                 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
5630         -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
5631                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
5632                         &channel.context.channel_id(),
5633                         if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
5634                         if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
5635                         if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
5636                         if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
5637                         if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
5638
5639                 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
5640
5641                 let counterparty_node_id = channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5642                 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5643                         htlc_forwards = Some((channel.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.context.outbound_scid_alias()),
5644                                 channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.context.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
5645                 }
5646
5647                 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
5648                         send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
5649                 }
5650                 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
5651                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5652                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5653                                 msg,
5654                         });
5655                 }
5656
5657                 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
5658                         if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
5659                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5660                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5661                                         updates: update,
5662                                 });
5663                         }
5664                 } }
5665                 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
5666                         if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
5667                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
5668                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5669                                         msg: revoke_and_ack,
5670                                 });
5671                         }
5672                 } }
5673                 match order {
5674                         RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
5675                                 handle_cs!();
5676                                 handle_raa!();
5677                         },
5678                         RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
5679                                 handle_raa!();
5680                                 handle_cs!();
5681                         },
5682                 }
5683
5684                 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
5685                         log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
5686                         self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
5687                 }
5688
5689                 {
5690                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5691                         emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
5692                         emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
5693                 }
5694
5695                 htlc_forwards
5696         }
5697
5698         fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
5699                 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
5700
5701                 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
5702                         Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5703                         None => {
5704                                 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5705                                 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
5706                                 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5707                                 match id_to_peer.get(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
5708                                         Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5709                                         None => return,
5710                                 }
5711                         }
5712                 };
5713                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5714                 let mut peer_state_lock;
5715                 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
5716                 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
5717                 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5718                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5719                 let channel =
5720                         if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
5721                                 chan
5722                         } else {
5723                                 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
5724                                         .remove(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
5725                                 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5726                                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5727                                 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
5728                                 return;
5729                         };
5730                 let remaining_in_flight =
5731                         if let Some(pending) = peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.get_mut(funding_txo) {
5732                                 pending.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > highest_applied_update_id);
5733                                 pending.len()
5734                         } else { 0 };
5735                 log_trace!(self.logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}. {} pending in-flight updates.",
5736                         highest_applied_update_id, channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
5737                         remaining_in_flight);
5738                 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
5739                         return;
5740                 }
5741                 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel);
5742         }
5743
5744         /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
5745         ///
5746         /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
5747         /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
5748         /// the channel.
5749         ///
5750         /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5751         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5752         /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5753         ///
5754         /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
5755         /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
5756         /// used to accept such channels.
5757         ///
5758         /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5759         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5760         pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5761                 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
5762         }
5763
5764         /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
5765         /// it as confirmed immediately.
5766         ///
5767         /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5768         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5769         /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5770         ///
5771         /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
5772         /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
5773         ///
5774         /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
5775         /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
5776         ///
5777         /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
5778         /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
5779         ///
5780         /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5781         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5782         pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5783                 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
5784         }
5785
5786         fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5787                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5788
5789                 let peers_without_funded_channels =
5790                         self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| { peer.total_channel_count() > 0 });
5791                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5792                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5793                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
5794                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5795                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5796                 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.total_channel_count() == 1;
5797
5798                 // Find (and remove) the channel in the unaccepted table. If it's not there, something weird is
5799                 // happening and return an error. N.B. that we create channel with an outbound SCID of zero so
5800                 // that we can delay allocating the SCID until after we're sure that the checks below will
5801                 // succeed.
5802                 let mut channel = match peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
5803                         Some(unaccepted_channel) => {
5804                                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5805                                 InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
5806                                         counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features,
5807                                         &unaccepted_channel.open_channel_msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration, best_block_height,
5808                                         &self.logger, accept_0conf).map_err(|e| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.to_string() })
5809                         }
5810                         _ => Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() })
5811                 }?;
5812
5813                 if accept_0conf {
5814                         // This should have been correctly configured by the call to InboundV1Channel::new.
5815                         debug_assert!(channel.context.minimum_depth().unwrap() == 0);
5816                 } else if channel.context.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
5817                         let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5818                                 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5819                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
5820                                         msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
5821                                 }
5822                         };
5823                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
5824                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
5825                 } else {
5826                         // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
5827                         // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
5828                         // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
5829                         if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
5830                                 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5831                                         node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5832                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
5833                                                 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
5834                                         }
5835                                 };
5836                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
5837                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned() });
5838                         }
5839                 }
5840
5841                 // Now that we know we have a channel, assign an outbound SCID alias.
5842                 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
5843                 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
5844
5845                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
5846                         node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5847                         msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
5848                 });
5849
5850                 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(temporary_channel_id.clone(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
5851
5852                 Ok(())
5853         }
5854
5855         /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
5856         /// or 0-conf channels.
5857         ///
5858         /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
5859         /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
5860         fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
5861         where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<SP>) -> bool {
5862                 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
5863                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5864                 {
5865                         let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5866                         for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
5867                                 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5868                                 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
5869                                 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
5870                                 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.total_channel_count() {
5871                                         peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
5872                                 }
5873                         }
5874                 }
5875                 return peers_without_funded_channels;
5876         }
5877
5878         fn unfunded_channel_count(
5879                 peer: &PeerState<SP>, best_block_height: u32
5880         ) -> usize {
5881                 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
5882                 for (_, phase) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
5883                         match phase {
5884                                 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
5885                                         // This covers non-zero-conf inbound `Channel`s that we are currently monitoring, but those
5886                                         // which have not yet had any confirmations on-chain.
5887                                         if !chan.context.is_outbound() && chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
5888                                                 chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
5889                                         {
5890                                                 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
5891                                         }
5892                                 },
5893                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
5894                                         if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 {
5895                                                 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
5896                                         }
5897                                 },
5898                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
5899                                         // Outbound channels don't contribute to the unfunded count in the DoS context.
5900                                         continue;
5901                                 }
5902                         }
5903                 }
5904                 num_unfunded_channels + peer.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
5905         }
5906
5907         fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5908                 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
5909                 // likely to be lost on restart!
5910                 if msg.chain_hash != self.chain_hash {
5911                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5912                 }
5913
5914                 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
5915                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5916                 }
5917
5918                 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
5919                 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
5920                 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
5921                 let channeled_peers_without_funding =
5922                         self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.total_channel_count() > 0);
5923
5924                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5925                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5926                     .ok_or_else(|| {
5927                                 debug_assert!(false);
5928                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())
5929                         })?;
5930                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5931                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5932
5933                 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
5934                 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
5935                 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
5936                 if peer_state.total_channel_count() == 0 &&
5937                         channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
5938                         !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
5939                 {
5940                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
5941                                 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
5942                                 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5943                 }
5944
5945                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5946                 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
5947                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
5948                                 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
5949                                 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5950                 }
5951
5952                 let channel_id = msg.temporary_channel_id;
5953                 let channel_exists = peer_state.has_channel(&channel_id);
5954                 if channel_exists {
5955                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5956                 }
5957
5958                 // If we're doing manual acceptance checks on the channel, then defer creation until we're sure we want to accept.
5959                 if self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
5960                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5961                         pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
5962                                 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
5963                                 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5964                                 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
5965                                 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
5966                                 channel_type: msg.channel_type.clone().unwrap(),
5967                         }, None));
5968                         peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.insert(channel_id, InboundChannelRequest {
5969                                 open_channel_msg: msg.clone(),
5970                                 ticks_remaining: UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS,
5971                         });
5972                         return Ok(());
5973                 }
5974
5975                 // Otherwise create the channel right now.
5976                 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
5977                 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
5978                 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
5979                 let mut channel = match InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
5980                         counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
5981                         &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, /*is_0conf=*/false)
5982                 {
5983                         Err(e) => {
5984                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
5985                         },
5986                         Ok(res) => res
5987                 };
5988
5989                 let channel_type = channel.context.get_channel_type();
5990                 if channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
5991                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5992                 }
5993                 if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5994                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5995                 }
5996
5997                 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
5998                 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
5999
6000                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
6001                         node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6002                         msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
6003                 });
6004                 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(channel_id, ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
6005                 Ok(())
6006         }
6007
6008         fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6009                 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
6010                 // likely to be lost on restart!
6011                 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
6012                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6013                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6014                                 .ok_or_else(|| {
6015                                         debug_assert!(false);
6016                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
6017                                 })?;
6018                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6019                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6020                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
6021                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut phase) => {
6022                                         match phase.get_mut() {
6023                                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
6024                                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), phase);
6025                                                         (chan.context.get_value_satoshis(), chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.context.get_user_id())
6026                                                 },
6027                                                 _ => {
6028                                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected accept_channel message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id));
6029                                                 }
6030                                         }
6031                                 },
6032                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
6033                         }
6034                 };
6035                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6036                 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
6037                         temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
6038                         counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6039                         channel_value_satoshis: value,
6040                         output_script,
6041                         user_channel_id: user_id,
6042                 }, None));
6043                 Ok(())
6044         }
6045
6046         fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6047                 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6048
6049                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6050                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6051                         .ok_or_else(|| {
6052                                 debug_assert!(false);
6053                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
6054                         })?;
6055
6056                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6057                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6058                 let (chan, funding_msg_opt, monitor) =
6059                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
6060                                 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan)) => {
6061                                         match inbound_chan.funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger) {
6062                                                 Ok(res) => res,
6063                                                 Err((mut inbound_chan, err)) => {
6064                                                         // We've already removed this inbound channel from the map in `PeerState`
6065                                                         // above so at this point we just need to clean up any lingering entries
6066                                                         // concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
6067                                                         update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &inbound_chan.context);
6068                                                         let user_id = inbound_chan.context.get_user_id();
6069                                                         let shutdown_res = inbound_chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
6070                                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(format!("{}", err),
6071                                                                 msg.temporary_channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None, inbound_chan.context.get_value_satoshis()));
6072                                                 },
6073                                         }
6074                                 },
6075                                 Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(_)) | Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_)) => {
6076                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected funding_created message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id));
6077                                 },
6078                                 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
6079                         };
6080
6081                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
6082                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6083                                 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6084                                         "Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(),
6085                                         chan.context.channel_id()
6086                                 ))
6087                         },
6088                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6089                                 let mut id_to_peer_lock = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6090                                 match id_to_peer_lock.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
6091                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6092                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6093                                                         "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
6094                                                         chan.context.channel_id()))
6095                                         },
6096                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
6097                                                 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
6098                                                 if let Ok(persist_state) = monitor_res {
6099                                                         i_e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
6100                                                         mem::drop(id_to_peer_lock);
6101
6102                                                         // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
6103                                                         // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
6104                                                         // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
6105                                                         // until we have persisted our monitor.
6106                                                         if let Some(msg) = funding_msg_opt {
6107                                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
6108                                                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6109                                                                         msg,
6110                                                                 });
6111                                                         }
6112
6113                                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) {
6114                                                                 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_state, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
6115                                                                         per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
6116                                                         } else {
6117                                                                 unreachable!("This must be a funded channel as we just inserted it.");
6118                                                         }
6119                                                         Ok(())
6120                                                 } else {
6121                                                         log_error!(self.logger, "Persisting initial ChannelMonitor failed, implying the funding outpoint was duplicated");
6122                                                         let channel_id = match funding_msg_opt {
6123                                                                 Some(msg) => msg.channel_id,
6124                                                                 None => chan.context.channel_id(),
6125                                                         };
6126                                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6127                                                                 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
6128                                                                 channel_id));
6129                                                 }
6130                                         }
6131                                 }
6132                         }
6133                 }
6134         }
6135
6136         fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6137                 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6138                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6139                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6140                         .ok_or_else(|| {
6141                                 debug_assert!(false);
6142                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6143                         })?;
6144
6145                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6146                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6147                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6148                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6149                                 match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6150                                         ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) => {
6151                                                 let monitor = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6152                                                         chan.funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6153                                                 if let Ok(persist_status) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
6154                                                         handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_status, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
6155                                                         Ok(())
6156                                                 } else {
6157                                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel funding outpoint was a duplicate".to_owned())), chan_phase_entry)
6158                                                 }
6159                                         },
6160                                         _ => {
6161                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
6162                                         },
6163                                 }
6164                         },
6165                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
6166                 }
6167         }
6168
6169         fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6170                 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6171                 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6172                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6173                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6174                         .ok_or_else(|| {
6175                                 debug_assert!(false);
6176                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6177                         })?;
6178                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6179                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6180                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6181                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6182                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6183                                         let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
6184                                                 self.chain_hash, &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6185                                         if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
6186                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
6187                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6188                                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6189                                                         msg: announcement_sigs,
6190                                                 });
6191                                         } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
6192                                                 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
6193                                                 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
6194                                                 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
6195                                                 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
6196                                                 // announcement_signatures.
6197                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
6198                                                 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
6199                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6200                                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6201                                                                 msg,
6202                                                         });
6203                                                 }
6204                                         }
6205
6206                                         {
6207                                                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6208                                                 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan);
6209                                         }
6210
6211                                         Ok(())
6212                                 } else {
6213                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6214                                                 "Got a channel_ready message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry)
6215                                 }
6216                         },
6217                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
6218                                 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6219                         }
6220                 }
6221         }
6222
6223         fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6224                 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
6225                 let mut finish_shutdown = None;
6226                 {
6227                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6228                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6229                                 .ok_or_else(|| {
6230                                         debug_assert!(false);
6231                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6232                                 })?;
6233                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6234                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6235                         if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
6236                                 let phase = chan_phase_entry.get_mut();
6237                                 match phase {
6238                                         ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
6239                                                 if !chan.received_shutdown() {
6240                                                         log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
6241                                                                 msg.channel_id,
6242                                                                 if chan.sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
6243                                                 }
6244
6245                                                 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6246                                                 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6247                                                         chan.shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
6248                                                 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
6249
6250                                                 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
6251                                                         // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
6252                                                         // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
6253                                                         // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
6254                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
6255                                                                 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6256                                                                 msg,
6257                                                         });
6258                                                 }
6259                                                 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
6260                                                 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6261                                                         handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
6262                                                                 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6263                                                 }
6264                                         },
6265                                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
6266                                                 let context = phase.context_mut();
6267                                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
6268                                                 self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel);
6269                                                 let mut chan = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
6270                                                 finish_shutdown = Some(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
6271                                         },
6272                                 }
6273                         } else {
6274                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6275                         }
6276                 }
6277                 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
6278                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
6279                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
6280                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
6281                 }
6282                 if let Some(shutdown_res) = finish_shutdown {
6283                         self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
6284                 }
6285
6286                 Ok(())
6287         }
6288
6289         fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6290                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6291                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6292                         .ok_or_else(|| {
6293                                 debug_assert!(false);
6294                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6295                         })?;
6296                 let (tx, chan_option, shutdown_result) = {
6297                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6298                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6299                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
6300                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6301                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6302                                                 let (closing_signed, tx, shutdown_result) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
6303                                                 debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
6304                                                 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
6305                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
6306                                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6307                                                                 msg,
6308                                                         });
6309                                                 }
6310                                                 if tx.is_some() {
6311                                                         // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
6312                                                         // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
6313                                                         // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
6314                                                         // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
6315                                                         // watch for old state broadcasts)!
6316                                                         (tx, Some(remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry)), shutdown_result)
6317                                                 } else { (tx, None, shutdown_result) }
6318                                         } else {
6319                                                 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6320                                                         "Got a closing_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6321                                         }
6322                                 },
6323                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6324                         }
6325                 };
6326                 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
6327                         log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
6328                         self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&broadcast_tx]);
6329                 }
6330                 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = chan_option {
6331                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6332                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6333                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6334                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6335                                         msg: update
6336                                 });
6337                         }
6338                         self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
6339                 }
6340                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6341                 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
6342                         self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
6343                 }
6344                 Ok(())
6345         }
6346
6347         fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6348                 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
6349                 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
6350                 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
6351                 //
6352                 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
6353                 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
6354                 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
6355                 //but we should prevent it anyway.
6356
6357                 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6358                 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6359
6360                 let decoded_hop_res = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
6361                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6362                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6363                         .ok_or_else(|| {
6364                                 debug_assert!(false);
6365                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6366                         })?;
6367                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6368                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6369                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6370                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6371                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6372                                         let pending_forward_info = match decoded_hop_res {
6373                                                 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt)) =>
6374                                                         self.construct_pending_htlc_status(msg, shared_secret, next_hop,
6375                                                                 chan.context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_pk_opt),
6376                                                 Err(e) => PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(e)
6377                                         };
6378                                         let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<SP>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
6379                                                 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
6380                                                 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
6381                                                 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
6382                                                 match pending_forward_info {
6383                                                         PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
6384                                                                 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
6385                                                                         let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
6386                                                                         HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
6387                                                                 } else {
6388                                                                         HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
6389                                                                 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
6390                                                                 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6391                                                                         channel_id: msg.channel_id,
6392                                                                         htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
6393                                                                         reason
6394                                                                 };
6395                                                                 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
6396                                                         },
6397                                                         _ => pending_forward_info
6398                                                 }
6399                                         };
6400                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6401                                 } else {
6402                                         return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6403                                                 "Got an update_add_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6404                                 }
6405                         },
6406                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6407                 }
6408                 Ok(())
6409         }
6410
6411         fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6412                 let funding_txo;
6413                 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
6414                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6415                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6416                                 .ok_or_else(|| {
6417                                         debug_assert!(false);
6418                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6419                                 })?;
6420                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6421                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6422                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6423                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6424                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6425                                                 let res = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
6426                                                 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop) = &res.0 {
6427                                                         log_trace!(self.logger,
6428                                                                 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
6429                                                                 msg.channel_id);
6430                                                         peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates.entry(msg.channel_id)
6431                                                                 .or_insert_with(Vec::new)
6432                                                                 .push(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&prev_hop));
6433                                                 }
6434                                                 // Note that we do not need to push an `actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates`
6435                                                 // entry here, even though we *do* need to block the next RAA monitor update.
6436                                                 // We do this instead in the `claim_funds_internal` by attaching a
6437                                                 // `ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate` action to the event generated when the
6438                                                 // outbound HTLC is claimed. This is guaranteed to all complete before we
6439                                                 // process the RAA as messages are processed from single peers serially.
6440                                                 funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().expect("We won't accept a fulfill until funded");
6441                                                 res
6442                                         } else {
6443                                                 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6444                                                         "Got an update_fulfill_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6445                                         }
6446                                 },
6447                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6448                         }
6449                 };
6450                 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, false, Some(*counterparty_node_id), funding_txo);
6451                 Ok(())
6452         }
6453
6454         fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6455                 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6456                 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6457                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6458                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6459                         .ok_or_else(|| {
6460                                 debug_assert!(false);
6461                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6462                         })?;
6463                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6464                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6465                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6466                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6467                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6468                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan_phase_entry);
6469                                 } else {
6470                                         return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6471                                                 "Got an update_fail_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6472                                 }
6473                         },
6474                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6475                 }
6476                 Ok(())
6477         }
6478
6479         fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6480                 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6481                 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6482                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6483                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6484                         .ok_or_else(|| {
6485                                 debug_assert!(false);
6486                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6487                         })?;
6488                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6489                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6490                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6491                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6492                                 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
6493                                         let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
6494                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan_phase_entry);
6495                                 }
6496                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6497                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan_phase_entry);
6498                                 } else {
6499                                         return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6500                                                 "Got an update_fail_malformed_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6501                                 }
6502                                 Ok(())
6503                         },
6504                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6505                 }
6506         }
6507
6508         fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6509                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6510                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6511                         .ok_or_else(|| {
6512                                 debug_assert!(false);
6513                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6514                         })?;
6515                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6516                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6517                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6518                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6519                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6520                                         let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6521                                         let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6522                                         if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6523                                                 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
6524                                                         peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6525                                         }
6526                                         Ok(())
6527                                 } else {
6528                                         return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6529                                                 "Got a commitment_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6530                                 }
6531                         },
6532                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6533                 }
6534         }
6535
6536         #[inline]
6537         fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
6538                 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
6539                         let mut push_forward_event = false;
6540                         let mut new_intercept_events = VecDeque::new();
6541                         let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
6542                         if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
6543                                 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
6544                                         let scid = match forward_info.routing {
6545                                                 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6546                                                 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
6547                                                 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
6548                                         };
6549                                         // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
6550                                         let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
6551
6552                                         let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6553                                         let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
6554                                         match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
6555                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
6556                                                         entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6557                                                                 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
6558                                                 },
6559                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6560                                                         if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
6561                                                            fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.chain_hash)
6562                                                         {
6563                                                                 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).to_byte_array());
6564                                                                 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6565                                                                 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
6566                                                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6567                                                                                 new_intercept_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
6568                                                                                         requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
6569                                                                                         payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
6570                                                                                         inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
6571                                                                                         expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
6572                                                                                         intercept_id
6573                                                                                 }, None));
6574                                                                                 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6575                                                                                         prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
6576                                                                         },
6577                                                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6578                                                                                 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
6579                                                                                 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6580                                                                                         short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
6581                                                                                         user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
6582                                                                                         outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
6583                                                                                         htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
6584                                                                                         incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6585                                                                                         phantom_shared_secret: None,
6586                                                                                 });
6587
6588                                                                                 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
6589                                                                                                 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
6590                                                                                                 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
6591                                                                                 ));
6592                                                                         }
6593                                                                 }
6594                                                         } else {
6595                                                                 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
6596                                                                 // payments are being processed.
6597                                                                 if forward_htlcs_empty {
6598                                                                         push_forward_event = true;
6599                                                                 }
6600                                                                 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6601                                                                         prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
6602                                                         }
6603                                                 }
6604                                         }
6605                                 }
6606                         }
6607
6608                         for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
6609                                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
6610                         }
6611
6612                         if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
6613                                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6614                                 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
6615                         }
6616                         if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
6617                 }
6618         }
6619
6620         fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
6621                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6622                 let is_processing_events = self.pending_events_processor.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6623                 let num_forward_events = pending_events.iter().filter(|(ev, _)|
6624                         if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false }
6625                 ).count();
6626                 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued. Processing
6627                 // events is done in batches and they are not removed until we're done processing each
6628                 // batch. Since handling a `PendingHTLCsForwardable` event will call back into the
6629                 // `ChannelManager`, we'll still see the original forwarding event not removed. Phantom
6630                 // payments will need an additional forwarding event before being claimed to make them look
6631                 // real by taking more time.
6632                 if (is_processing_events && num_forward_events <= 1) || num_forward_events < 1 {
6633                         pending_events.push_back((Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
6634                                 time_forwardable: Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
6635                         }, None));
6636                 }
6637         }
6638
6639         /// Checks whether [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s generated by the receipt of a remote
6640         /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] should be held for the given channel until some other action
6641         /// completes. Note that this needs to happen in the same [`PeerState`] mutex as any release of
6642         /// the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in question.
6643         fn raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
6644                 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: &BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
6645                 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
6646         ) -> bool {
6647                 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
6648                         .get(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).map(|v| !v.is_empty()).unwrap_or(false)
6649                 || self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().iter().any(|(_, action)| {
6650                         action == &Some(EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
6651                                 channel_funding_outpoint,
6652                                 counterparty_node_id,
6653                         })
6654                 })
6655         }
6656
6657         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6658         pub(crate) fn test_raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
6659                 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_id: ChannelId
6660         ) -> bool {
6661                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6662                 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
6663                         let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6664                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
6665
6666                         if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&channel_id) {
6667                                 return self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
6668                                         chan.context().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), counterparty_node_id);
6669                         }
6670                 }
6671                 false
6672         }
6673
6674         fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6675                 let htlcs_to_fail = {
6676                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6677                         let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6678                                 .ok_or_else(|| {
6679                                         debug_assert!(false);
6680                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6681                                 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
6682                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6683                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6684                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6685                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6686                                                 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6687                                                 let mon_update_blocked = if let Some(funding_txo) = funding_txo_opt {
6688                                                         self.raa_monitor_updates_held(
6689                                                                 &peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates, funding_txo,
6690                                                                 *counterparty_node_id)
6691                                                 } else { false };
6692                                                 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6693                                                         chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger, mon_update_blocked), chan_phase_entry);
6694                                                 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6695                                                         let funding_txo = funding_txo_opt
6696                                                                 .expect("Funding outpoint must have been set for RAA handling to succeed");
6697                                                         handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update,
6698                                                                 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6699                                                 }
6700                                                 htlcs_to_fail
6701                                         } else {
6702                                                 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6703                                                         "Got a revoke_and_ack message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6704                                         }
6705                                 },
6706                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6707                         }
6708                 };
6709                 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
6710                 Ok(())
6711         }
6712
6713         fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6714                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6715                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6716                         .ok_or_else(|| {
6717                                 debug_assert!(false);
6718                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6719                         })?;
6720                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6721                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6722                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6723                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6724                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6725                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6726                                 } else {
6727                                         return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6728                                                 "Got an update_fee message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6729                                 }
6730                         },
6731                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6732                 }
6733                 Ok(())
6734         }
6735
6736         fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6737                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6738                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6739                         .ok_or_else(|| {
6740                                 debug_assert!(false);
6741                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6742                         })?;
6743                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6744                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6745                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6746                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6747                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6748                                         if !chan.context.is_usable() {
6749                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
6750                                         }
6751
6752                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
6753                                                 msg: try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.announcement_signatures(
6754                                                         &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
6755                                                         msg, &self.default_configuration
6756                                                 ), chan_phase_entry),
6757                                                 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
6758                                                 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
6759                                                 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan).unwrap()),
6760                                         });
6761                                 } else {
6762                                         return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6763                                                 "Got an announcement_signatures message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6764                                 }
6765                         },
6766                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6767                 }
6768                 Ok(())
6769         }
6770
6771         /// Returns DoPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersistNoEvents or an Err.
6772         fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6773                 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
6774                         Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
6775                         None => {
6776                                 // It's not a local channel
6777                                 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
6778                         }
6779                 };
6780                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6781                 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
6782                 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
6783                         return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
6784                 }
6785                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6786                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6787                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
6788                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6789                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6790                                         if chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6791                                                 if chan.context.should_announce() {
6792                                                         // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
6793                                                         // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
6794                                                         // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
6795                                                         return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
6796                                                 }
6797                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
6798                                         }
6799                                         let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
6800                                         let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
6801                                         if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
6802                                                 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
6803                                         } else {
6804                                                 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update {:?} for channel {}.", msg, chan_id);
6805                                                 let did_change = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_update(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
6806                                                 // If nothing changed after applying their update, we don't need to bother
6807                                                 // persisting.
6808                                                 if !did_change {
6809                                                         return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
6810                                                 }
6811                                         }
6812                                 } else {
6813                                         return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6814                                                 "Got a channel_update for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6815                                 }
6816                         },
6817                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
6818                 }
6819                 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
6820         }
6821
6822         fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6823                 let htlc_forwards;
6824                 let need_lnd_workaround = {
6825                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6826
6827                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6828                                 .ok_or_else(|| {
6829                                         debug_assert!(false);
6830                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6831                                                 format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id),
6832                                                 msg.channel_id
6833                                         )
6834                                 })?;
6835                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6836                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6837                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6838                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6839                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6840                                                 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
6841                                                 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
6842                                                 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
6843                                                 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
6844                                                 let responses = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_reestablish(
6845                                                         msg, &self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash,
6846                                                         &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan_phase_entry);
6847                                                 let mut channel_update = None;
6848                                                 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
6849                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
6850                                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6851                                                                 msg,
6852                                                         });
6853                                                 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
6854                                                         // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
6855                                                         // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
6856                                                         // they have the latest channel parameters.
6857                                                         if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
6858                                                                 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6859                                                                         node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6860                                                                         msg,
6861                                                                 });
6862                                                         }
6863                                                 }
6864                                                 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
6865                                                 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
6866                                                         &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
6867                                                         Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
6868                                                 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
6869                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
6870                                                 }
6871                                                 need_lnd_workaround
6872                                         } else {
6873                                                 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6874                                                         "Got a channel_reestablish message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6875                                         }
6876                                 },
6877                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
6878                                         log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending bogus ChannelReestablish for unknown channel {} to force channel closure",
6879                                                 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id.0));
6880                                         // Unfortunately, lnd doesn't force close on errors
6881                                         // (https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/blob/abb1e3463f3a83bbb843d5c399869dbe930ad94f/htlcswitch/link.go#L2119).
6882                                         // One of the few ways to get an lnd counterparty to force close is by
6883                                         // replicating what they do when restoring static channel backups (SCBs). They
6884                                         // send an invalid `ChannelReestablish` with `0` commitment numbers and an
6885                                         // invalid `your_last_per_commitment_secret`.
6886                                         //
6887                                         // Since we received a `ChannelReestablish` for a channel that doesn't exist, we
6888                                         // can assume it's likely the channel closed from our point of view, but it
6889                                         // remains open on the counterparty's side. By sending this bogus
6890                                         // `ChannelReestablish` message now as a response to theirs, we trigger them to
6891                                         // force close broadcasting their latest state. If the closing transaction from
6892                                         // our point of view remains unconfirmed, it'll enter a race with the
6893                                         // counterparty's to-be-broadcast latest commitment transaction.
6894                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
6895                                                 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6896                                                 msg: msgs::ChannelReestablish {
6897                                                         channel_id: msg.channel_id,
6898                                                         next_local_commitment_number: 0,
6899                                                         next_remote_commitment_number: 0,
6900                                                         your_last_per_commitment_secret: [1u8; 32],
6901                                                         my_current_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_slice(&[2u8; 33]).unwrap(),
6902                                                         next_funding_txid: None,
6903                                                 },
6904                                         });
6905                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6906                                                 format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}",
6907                                                         counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6908                                         )
6909                                 }
6910                         }
6911                 };
6912
6913                 let mut persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
6914                 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
6915                         self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
6916                         persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6917                 }
6918
6919                 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
6920                         self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
6921                 }
6922                 Ok(persist)
6923         }
6924
6925         /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
6926         fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
6927                 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
6928
6929                 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6930                 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
6931                 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
6932                 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
6933                         for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
6934                                 match monitor_event {
6935                                         MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
6936                                                 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
6937                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", preimage);
6938                                                         self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, false, counterparty_node_id, funding_outpoint);
6939                                                 } else {
6940                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", &htlc_update.payment_hash);
6941                                                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
6942                                                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
6943                                                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
6944                                                 }
6945                                         },
6946                                         MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(funding_outpoint) => {
6947                                                 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
6948                                                         Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
6949                                                         None => {
6950                                                                 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
6951                                                                 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
6952                                                                 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6953                                                                 id_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).cloned()
6954                                                         }
6955                                                 };
6956                                                 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
6957                                                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6958                                                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
6959                                                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6960                                                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6961                                                                 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6962                                                                 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
6963                                                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
6964                                                                                 failed_channels.push(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
6965                                                                                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6966                                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6967                                                                                                 msg: update
6968                                                                                         });
6969                                                                                 }
6970                                                                                 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
6971                                                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6972                                                                                         node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6973                                                                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
6974                                                                                                 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.context.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() })
6975                                                                                         },
6976                                                                                 });
6977                                                                         }
6978                                                                 }
6979                                                         }
6980                                                 }
6981                                         },
6982                                         MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
6983                                                 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
6984                                         },
6985                                 }
6986                         }
6987                 }
6988
6989                 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6990                         self.finish_close_channel(failure);
6991                 }
6992
6993                 has_pending_monitor_events
6994         }
6995
6996         /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
6997         /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
6998         /// update events as a separate process method here.
6999         #[cfg(fuzzing)]
7000         pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
7001                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7002                 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
7003         }
7004
7005         /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
7006         /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
7007         /// update was applied.
7008         fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
7009                 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
7010                 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
7011
7012                 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
7013                 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
7014                 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
7015                 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
7016                 'peer_loop: loop {
7017                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7018                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7019                                 'chan_loop: loop {
7020                                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7021                                         let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7022                                         for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
7023                                                 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
7024                                         ) {
7025                                                 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
7026                                                 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
7027                                                 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
7028                                                         chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
7029                                                 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
7030                                                         failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
7031                                                 }
7032                                                 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
7033                                                         has_monitor_update = true;
7034
7035                                                         handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update,
7036                                                                 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7037                                                         continue 'peer_loop;
7038                                                 }
7039                                         }
7040                                         break 'chan_loop;
7041                                 }
7042                         }
7043                         break 'peer_loop;
7044                 }
7045
7046                 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty();
7047                 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7048                         self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
7049                 }
7050
7051                 has_update
7052         }
7053
7054         /// When a call to a [`ChannelSigner`] method returns an error, this indicates that the signer
7055         /// is (temporarily) unavailable, and the operation should be retried later.
7056         ///
7057         /// This method allows for that retry - either checking for any signer-pending messages to be
7058         /// attempted in every channel, or in the specifically provided channel.
7059         ///
7060         /// [`ChannelSigner`]: crate::sign::ChannelSigner
7061         #[cfg(test)] // This is only implemented for one signer method, and should be private until we
7062                      // actually finish implementing it fully.
7063         pub fn signer_unblocked(&self, channel_opt: Option<(PublicKey, ChannelId)>) {
7064                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7065
7066                 let unblock_chan = |phase: &mut ChannelPhase<SP>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>| {
7067                         let node_id = phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id();
7068                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
7069                                 let msgs = chan.signer_maybe_unblocked(&self.logger);
7070                                 if let Some(updates) = msgs.commitment_update {
7071                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
7072                                                 node_id,
7073                                                 updates,
7074                                         });
7075                                 }
7076                                 if let Some(msg) = msgs.funding_signed {
7077                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
7078                                                 node_id,
7079                                                 msg,
7080                                         });
7081                                 }
7082                                 if let Some(msg) = msgs.funding_created {
7083                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
7084                                                 node_id,
7085                                                 msg,
7086                                         });
7087                                 }
7088                                 if let Some(msg) = msgs.channel_ready {
7089                                         send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, chan, msg);
7090                                 }
7091                         }
7092                 };
7093
7094                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7095                 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, channel_id)) = channel_opt {
7096                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7097                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7098                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7099                                 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
7100                                         unblock_chan(chan, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
7101                                 }
7102                         }
7103                 } else {
7104                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7105                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7106                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7107                                 for (_, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
7108                                         unblock_chan(chan, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
7109                                 }
7110                         }
7111                 }
7112         }
7113
7114         /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
7115         /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
7116         /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
7117         fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
7118                 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
7119                 let mut has_update = false;
7120                 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
7121                 {
7122                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7123
7124                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7125                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7126                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7127                                 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7128                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, phase| {
7129                                         match phase {
7130                                                 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
7131                                                         match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
7132                                                                 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt, shutdown_result_opt)) => {
7133                                                                         if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
7134                                                                                 has_update = true;
7135                                                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
7136                                                                                         node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
7137                                                                                 });
7138                                                                         }
7139                                                                         debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result_opt.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
7140                                                                         if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result_opt {
7141                                                                                 shutdown_results.push(shutdown_result);
7142                                                                         }
7143                                                                         if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
7144                                                                                 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
7145                                                                                 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
7146                                                                                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7147                                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7148                                                                                                 msg: update
7149                                                                                         });
7150                                                                                 }
7151
7152                                                                                 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
7153
7154                                                                                 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
7155                                                                                 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
7156                                                                                 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
7157                                                                                 false
7158                                                                         } else { true }
7159                                                                 },
7160                                                                 Err(e) => {
7161                                                                         has_update = true;
7162                                                                         let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
7163                                                                         handle_errors.push((chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
7164                                                                         !close_channel
7165                                                                 }
7166                                                         }
7167                                                 },
7168                                                 _ => true, // Retain unfunded channels if present.
7169                                         }
7170                                 });
7171                         }
7172                 }
7173
7174                 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
7175                         let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
7176                 }
7177
7178                 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
7179                         self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
7180                 }
7181
7182                 has_update
7183         }
7184
7185         /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
7186         /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
7187         /// Channel object.
7188         fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
7189                 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7190                         // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
7191                         // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
7192                         // reorganized out of the main chain.
7193                         // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
7194                         // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
7195                         // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
7196                         // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
7197                         if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = failure.monitor_update.take() {
7198                                 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
7199                                 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
7200                                         assert!(should_broadcast);
7201                                 } else { unreachable!(); }
7202                                 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
7203                                         BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
7204                                                 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
7205                                         });
7206                         }
7207                         self.finish_close_channel(failure);
7208                 }
7209         }
7210
7211         /// Creates an [`OfferBuilder`] such that the [`Offer`] it builds is recognized by the
7212         /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`InvoiceRequest`] messages for the offer. The offer will
7213         /// not have an expiration unless otherwise set on the builder.
7214         ///
7215         /// # Privacy
7216         ///
7217         /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the offer with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the
7218         /// introduction node and a derived signing pubkey for recipient privacy. As such, currently,
7219         /// the node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction
7220         /// node in order to send the [`InvoiceRequest`].
7221         ///
7222         /// # Limitations
7223         ///
7224         /// Requires a direct connection to the introduction node in the responding [`InvoiceRequest`]'s
7225         /// reply path.
7226         ///
7227         /// This is not exported to bindings users as builder patterns don't map outside of move semantics.
7228         ///
7229         /// [`Offer`]: crate::offers::offer::Offer
7230         /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
7231         pub fn create_offer_builder(
7232                 &self, description: String
7233         ) -> OfferBuilder<DerivedMetadata, secp256k1::All> {
7234                 let node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
7235                 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7236                 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7237                 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7238                 let path = self.create_one_hop_blinded_path();
7239
7240                 OfferBuilder::deriving_signing_pubkey(description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx)
7241                         .chain_hash(self.chain_hash)
7242                         .path(path)
7243         }
7244
7245         /// Creates a [`RefundBuilder`] such that the [`Refund`] it builds is recognized by the
7246         /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`Bolt12Invoice`] messages for the refund.
7247         ///
7248         /// # Payment
7249         ///
7250         /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the refund.
7251         /// See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has been sent.
7252         ///
7253         /// The builder will have the provided expiration set. Any changes to the expiration on the
7254         /// returned builder will not be honored by [`ChannelManager`]. For `no-std`, the highest seen
7255         /// block time minus two hours is used for the current time when determining if the refund has
7256         /// expired.
7257         ///
7258         /// To revoke the refund, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
7259         /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received before expiration, the payment will fail
7260         /// with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
7261         ///
7262         /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
7263         /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
7264         ///
7265         /// # Privacy
7266         ///
7267         /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the refund with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as
7268         /// the introduction node and a derived payer id for payer privacy. As such, currently, the
7269         /// node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction node
7270         /// in order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
7271         ///
7272         /// # Limitations
7273         ///
7274         /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in the responding
7275         /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
7276         ///
7277         /// # Errors
7278         ///
7279         /// Errors if a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link
7280         /// or if `amount_msats` is invalid.
7281         ///
7282         /// This is not exported to bindings users as builder patterns don't map outside of move semantics.
7283         ///
7284         /// [`Refund`]: crate::offers::refund::Refund
7285         /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7286         /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
7287         pub fn create_refund_builder(
7288                 &self, description: String, amount_msats: u64, absolute_expiry: Duration,
7289                 payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry, max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
7290         ) -> Result<RefundBuilder<secp256k1::All>, Bolt12SemanticError> {
7291                 let node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
7292                 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7293                 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7294                 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7295                 let path = self.create_one_hop_blinded_path();
7296
7297                 let builder = RefundBuilder::deriving_payer_id(
7298                         description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, amount_msats, payment_id
7299                 )?
7300                         .chain_hash(self.chain_hash)
7301                         .absolute_expiry(absolute_expiry)
7302                         .path(path);
7303
7304                 let expiration = StaleExpiration::AbsoluteTimeout(absolute_expiry);
7305                 self.pending_outbound_payments
7306                         .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
7307                                 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat,
7308                         )
7309                         .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
7310
7311                 Ok(builder)
7312         }
7313
7314         /// Pays for an [`Offer`] using the given parameters by creating an [`InvoiceRequest`] and
7315         /// enqueuing it to be sent via an onion message. [`ChannelManager`] will pay the actual
7316         /// [`Bolt12Invoice`] once it is received.
7317         ///
7318         /// Uses [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`] such that the [`InvoiceRequest`] it builds is recognized by
7319         /// the [`ChannelManager`] when handling a [`Bolt12Invoice`] message in response to the request.
7320         /// The optional parameters are used in the builder, if `Some`:
7321         /// - `quantity` for [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`] which must be set if
7322         ///   [`Offer::expects_quantity`] is `true`.
7323         /// - `amount_msats` if overpaying what is required for the given `quantity` is desired, and
7324         /// - `payer_note` for [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`].
7325         ///
7326         /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
7327         /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
7328         ///
7329         /// # Payment
7330         ///
7331         /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the request
7332         /// when received. See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has
7333         /// been sent.
7334         ///
7335         /// To revoke the request, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
7336         /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received in a reasonable amount of time, the
7337         /// payment will fail with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
7338         ///
7339         /// # Privacy
7340         ///
7341         /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the reply path with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`]
7342         /// as the introduction node and a derived payer id for payer privacy. As such, currently, the
7343         /// node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction node
7344         /// in order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
7345         ///
7346         /// # Limitations
7347         ///
7348         /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Offer::paths`] or to
7349         /// [`Offer::signing_pubkey`], if empty. A similar restriction applies to the responding
7350         /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
7351         ///
7352         /// # Errors
7353         ///
7354         /// Errors if a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link
7355         /// or if the provided parameters are invalid for the offer.
7356         ///
7357         /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
7358         /// [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::quantity
7359         /// [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::payer_note
7360         /// [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequestBuilder
7361         /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7362         /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
7363         /// [Avoiding Duplicate Payments]: #avoiding-duplicate-payments
7364         pub fn pay_for_offer(
7365                 &self, offer: &Offer, quantity: Option<u64>, amount_msats: Option<u64>,
7366                 payer_note: Option<String>, payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry,
7367                 max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
7368         ) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
7369                 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7370                 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7371                 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7372
7373                 let builder = offer
7374                         .request_invoice_deriving_payer_id(expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, payment_id)?
7375                         .chain_hash(self.chain_hash)?;
7376                 let builder = match quantity {
7377                         None => builder,
7378                         Some(quantity) => builder.quantity(quantity)?,
7379                 };
7380                 let builder = match amount_msats {
7381                         None => builder,
7382                         Some(amount_msats) => builder.amount_msats(amount_msats)?,
7383                 };
7384                 let builder = match payer_note {
7385                         None => builder,
7386                         Some(payer_note) => builder.payer_note(payer_note),
7387                 };
7388
7389                 let invoice_request = builder.build_and_sign()?;
7390                 let reply_path = self.create_one_hop_blinded_path();
7391
7392                 let expiration = StaleExpiration::TimerTicks(1);
7393                 self.pending_outbound_payments
7394                         .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
7395                                 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat
7396                         )
7397                         .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
7398
7399                 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
7400                 if offer.paths().is_empty() {
7401                         let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7402                                 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request),
7403                                 Destination::Node(offer.signing_pubkey()),
7404                                 Some(reply_path),
7405                         );
7406                         pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7407                 } else {
7408                         // Send as many invoice requests as there are paths in the offer (with an upper bound).
7409                         // Using only one path could result in a failure if the path no longer exists. But only
7410                         // one invoice for a given payment id will be paid, even if more than one is received.
7411                         const REQUEST_LIMIT: usize = 10;
7412                         for path in offer.paths().into_iter().take(REQUEST_LIMIT) {
7413                                 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7414                                         OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request.clone()),
7415                                         Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
7416                                         Some(reply_path.clone()),
7417                                 );
7418                                 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7419                         }
7420                 }
7421
7422                 Ok(())
7423         }
7424
7425         /// Creates a [`Bolt12Invoice`] for a [`Refund`] and enqueues it to be sent via an onion
7426         /// message.
7427         ///
7428         /// The resulting invoice uses a [`PaymentHash`] recognized by the [`ChannelManager`] and a
7429         /// [`BlindedPath`] containing the [`PaymentSecret`] needed to reconstruct the corresponding
7430         /// [`PaymentPreimage`].
7431         ///
7432         /// # Limitations
7433         ///
7434         /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Refund::paths`] or to
7435         /// [`Refund::payer_id`], if empty. This request is best effort; an invoice will be sent to each
7436         /// node meeting the aforementioned criteria, but there's no guarantee that they will be
7437         /// received and no retries will be made.
7438         ///
7439         /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7440         pub fn request_refund_payment(&self, refund: &Refund) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
7441                 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7442                 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7443                 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7444
7445                 let amount_msats = refund.amount_msats();
7446                 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
7447
7448                 match self.create_inbound_payment(Some(amount_msats), relative_expiry, None) {
7449                         Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => {
7450                                 let payment_paths = vec![
7451                                         self.create_one_hop_blinded_payment_path(payment_secret),
7452                                 ];
7453                                 #[cfg(not(feature = "no-std"))]
7454                                 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys(
7455                                         payment_paths, payment_hash, expanded_key, entropy
7456                                 )?;
7457                                 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
7458                                 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
7459                                         self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
7460                                 );
7461                                 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
7462                                 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
7463                                         payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at, expanded_key, entropy
7464                                 )?;
7465                                 let invoice = builder.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)?;
7466                                 let reply_path = self.create_one_hop_blinded_path();
7467
7468                                 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
7469                                 if refund.paths().is_empty() {
7470                                         let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7471                                                 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice),
7472                                                 Destination::Node(refund.payer_id()),
7473                                                 Some(reply_path),
7474                                         );
7475                                         pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7476                                 } else {
7477                                         for path in refund.paths() {
7478                                                 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7479                                                         OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice.clone()),
7480                                                         Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
7481                                                         Some(reply_path.clone()),
7482                                                 );
7483                                                 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7484                                         }
7485                                 }
7486
7487                                 Ok(())
7488                         },
7489                         Err(()) => Err(Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount),
7490                 }
7491         }
7492
7493         /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
7494         /// to pay us.
7495         ///
7496         /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
7497         /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
7498         ///
7499         /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
7500         /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
7501         /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
7502         /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
7503         ///
7504         /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
7505         ///
7506         /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
7507         /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
7508         ///
7509         /// # Note
7510         ///
7511         /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
7512         /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
7513         ///
7514         /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
7515         ///
7516         /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
7517         /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
7518         ///
7519         /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
7520         /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
7521         /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
7522         /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
7523         /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
7524         /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
7525         pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
7526                 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
7527                 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
7528                         &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
7529                         min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
7530         }
7531
7532         /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
7533         /// stored external to LDK.
7534         ///
7535         /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
7536         /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
7537         /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
7538         ///
7539         /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
7540         /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
7541         /// payments.
7542         ///
7543         /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
7544         /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
7545         /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
7546         /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
7547         ///
7548         /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
7549         /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
7550         /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
7551         /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
7552         /// invoices when no timeout is set.
7553         ///
7554         /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
7555         /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
7556         /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
7557         /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
7558         /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
7559         ///
7560         /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
7561         /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
7562         ///
7563         /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
7564         /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
7565         ///
7566         /// # Note
7567         ///
7568         /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
7569         /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
7570         ///
7571         /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
7572         ///
7573         /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
7574         /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
7575         ///
7576         /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
7577         /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
7578         pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
7579                 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
7580                 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
7581                         invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
7582                         min_final_cltv_expiry)
7583         }
7584
7585         /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
7586         /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
7587         ///
7588         /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
7589         pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
7590                 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
7591         }
7592
7593         /// Creates a one-hop blinded path with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction
7594         /// node.
7595         fn create_one_hop_blinded_path(&self) -> BlindedPath {
7596                 let entropy_source = self.entropy_source.deref();
7597                 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7598                 BlindedPath::one_hop_for_message(self.get_our_node_id(), entropy_source, secp_ctx).unwrap()
7599         }
7600
7601         /// Creates a one-hop blinded path with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction
7602         /// node.
7603         fn create_one_hop_blinded_payment_path(
7604                 &self, payment_secret: PaymentSecret
7605         ) -> (BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath) {
7606                 let entropy_source = self.entropy_source.deref();
7607                 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7608
7609                 let payee_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
7610                 let max_cltv_expiry = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
7611                 let payee_tlvs = ReceiveTlvs {
7612                         payment_secret,
7613                         payment_constraints: PaymentConstraints {
7614                                 max_cltv_expiry,
7615                                 htlc_minimum_msat: 1,
7616                         },
7617                 };
7618                 // TODO: Err for overflow?
7619                 BlindedPath::one_hop_for_payment(
7620                         payee_node_id, payee_tlvs, entropy_source, secp_ctx
7621                 ).unwrap()
7622         }
7623
7624         /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
7625         /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
7626         ///
7627         /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
7628         pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
7629                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7630                 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
7631                 loop {
7632                         let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
7633                         // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
7634                         match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
7635                                 Some(_) => continue,
7636                                 None => return scid_candidate
7637                         }
7638                 }
7639         }
7640
7641         /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
7642         ///
7643         /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
7644         pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
7645                 PhantomRouteHints {
7646                         channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
7647                         phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
7648                         real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
7649                 }
7650         }
7651
7652         /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
7653         /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
7654         /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
7655         ///
7656         /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
7657         /// times to get a unique scid.
7658         pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
7659                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7660                 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
7661                 loop {
7662                         let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
7663                         // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
7664                         if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
7665                         return scid_candidate
7666                 }
7667         }
7668
7669         /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
7670         /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
7671         pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
7672                 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
7673
7674                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7675                 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7676                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7677                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7678                         for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(
7679                                 |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
7680                         ) {
7681                                 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
7682                                         if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
7683                                                 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
7684                                         }
7685                                 }
7686                         }
7687                 }
7688
7689                 inflight_htlcs
7690         }
7691
7692         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
7693         pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
7694                 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
7695                 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
7696                 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
7697                 events.into_inner()
7698         }
7699
7700         #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
7701         pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
7702                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7703                 events.push_back((event, None));
7704         }
7705
7706         #[cfg(test)]
7707         pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
7708                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7709                 events.pop_front().map(|(e, _)| e)
7710         }
7711
7712         #[cfg(test)]
7713         pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
7714                 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
7715         }
7716
7717         #[cfg(test)]
7718         pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
7719                 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
7720         }
7721
7722         /// When something which was blocking a channel from updating its [`ChannelMonitor`] (e.g. an
7723         /// [`Event`] being handled) completes, this should be called to restore the channel to normal
7724         /// operation. It will double-check that nothing *else* is also blocking the same channel from
7725         /// making progress and then let any blocked [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s fly.
7726         fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, mut completed_blocker: Option<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>) {
7727                 loop {
7728                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7729                         if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7730                                 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
7731                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
7732
7733                                 if let Some(blocker) = completed_blocker.take() {
7734                                         // Only do this on the first iteration of the loop.
7735                                         if let Some(blockers) = peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
7736                                                 .get_mut(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
7737                                         {
7738                                                 blockers.retain(|iter| iter != &blocker);
7739                                         }
7740                                 }
7741
7742                                 if self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
7743                                         channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id) {
7744                                         // Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have anything else
7745                                         // blocking monitor updates for this channel. If we do, release the monitor
7746                                         // update(s) when those blockers complete.
7747                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another channel's mon update needs to complete first",
7748                                                 &channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
7749                                         break;
7750                                 }
7751
7752                                 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
7753                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7754                                                 debug_assert_eq!(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
7755                                                 if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
7756                                                         log_debug!(self.logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
7757                                                                 channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
7758                                                         handle_new_monitor_update!(self, channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update,
7759                                                                 peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7760                                                         if further_update_exists {
7761                                                                 // If there are more `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to process, restart at the
7762                                                                 // top of the loop.
7763                                                                 continue;
7764                                                         }
7765                                                 } else {
7766                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
7767                                                                 channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
7768                                                 }
7769                                         }
7770                                 }
7771                         } else {
7772                                 log_debug!(self.logger,
7773                                         "Got a release post-RAA monitor update for peer {} but the channel is gone",
7774                                         log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
7775                         }
7776                         break;
7777                 }
7778         }
7779
7780         fn handle_post_event_actions(&self, actions: Vec<EventCompletionAction>) {
7781                 for action in actions {
7782                         match action {
7783                                 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
7784                                         channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id
7785                                 } => {
7786                                         self.handle_monitor_update_release(counterparty_node_id, channel_funding_outpoint, None);
7787                                 }
7788                         }
7789                 }
7790         }
7791
7792         /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
7793         /// using the given event handler.
7794         ///
7795         /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
7796         pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
7797                 &self, handler: H
7798         ) {
7799                 let mut ev;
7800                 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
7801         }
7802 }
7803
7804 fn create_fwd_pending_htlc_info(
7805         msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload, hop_hmac: [u8; 32],
7806         new_packet_bytes: [u8; onion_utils::ONION_DATA_LEN], shared_secret: [u8; 32],
7807         next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>
7808 ) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, InboundOnionErr> {
7809         debug_assert!(next_packet_pubkey_opt.is_some());
7810         let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
7811                 version: 0,
7812                 public_key: next_packet_pubkey_opt.unwrap_or(Err(secp256k1::Error::InvalidPublicKey)),
7813                 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
7814                 hmac: hop_hmac,
7815         };
7816
7817         let (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value) = match hop_data {
7818                 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward { short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value } =>
7819                         (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value),
7820                 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { .. } | msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedReceive { .. } =>
7821                         return Err(InboundOnionErr {
7822                                 msg: "Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node",
7823                                 err_code: 0x4000 | 22,
7824                                 err_data: Vec::new(),
7825                         }),
7826         };
7827
7828         Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
7829                 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
7830                         onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
7831                         short_channel_id,
7832                 },
7833                 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
7834                 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
7835                 incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
7836                 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward,
7837                 outgoing_cltv_value,
7838                 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7839         })
7840 }
7841
7842 fn create_recv_pending_htlc_info(
7843         hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload, shared_secret: [u8; 32], payment_hash: PaymentHash,
7844         amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>, allow_underpay: bool,
7845         counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, current_height: u32, accept_mpp_keysend: bool,
7846 ) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, InboundOnionErr> {
7847         let (payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, onion_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata) = match hop_data {
7848                 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
7849                         payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata, ..
7850                 } =>
7851                         (payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata),
7852                 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedReceive {
7853                         amt_msat, total_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_secret, ..
7854                 } => {
7855                         let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData { payment_secret, total_msat };
7856                         (Some(payment_data), None, Vec::new(), amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, None)
7857                 }
7858                 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward { .. } => {
7859                         return Err(InboundOnionErr {
7860                                 err_code: 0x4000|22,
7861                                 err_data: Vec::new(),
7862                                 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
7863                         })
7864                 },
7865         };
7866         // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
7867         if outgoing_cltv_value > cltv_expiry {
7868                 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
7869                         msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to less than the CLTV set by the sender",
7870                         err_code: 18,
7871                         err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
7872                 })
7873         }
7874         // final_expiry_too_soon
7875         // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
7876         // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
7877         //
7878         // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
7879         // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
7880         // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
7881         if cltv_expiry <= current_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 {
7882                 let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12);
7883                 err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes());
7884                 err_data.extend_from_slice(&current_height.to_be_bytes());
7885                 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
7886                         err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data,
7887                         msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
7888                 });
7889         }
7890         if (!allow_underpay && onion_amt_msat > amt_msat) ||
7891                 (allow_underpay && onion_amt_msat >
7892                  amt_msat.saturating_add(counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)))
7893         {
7894                 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
7895                         err_code: 19,
7896                         err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
7897                         msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
7898                 });
7899         }
7900
7901         let routing = if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
7902                 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
7903                 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
7904                 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
7905                 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
7906                 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
7907                 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).to_byte_array());
7908                 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
7909                         return Err(InboundOnionErr {
7910                                 err_code: 0x4000|22,
7911                                 err_data: Vec::new(),
7912                                 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
7913                         });
7914                 }
7915                 if !accept_mpp_keysend && payment_data.is_some() {
7916                         return Err(InboundOnionErr {
7917                                 err_code: 0x4000|22,
7918                                 err_data: Vec::new(),
7919                                 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
7920                         });
7921                 }
7922                 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
7923                         payment_data,
7924                         payment_preimage,
7925                         payment_metadata,
7926                         incoming_cltv_expiry: outgoing_cltv_value,
7927                         custom_tlvs,
7928                 }
7929         } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
7930                 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
7931                         payment_data: data,
7932                         payment_metadata,
7933                         incoming_cltv_expiry: outgoing_cltv_value,
7934                         phantom_shared_secret,
7935                         custom_tlvs,
7936                 }
7937         } else {
7938                 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
7939                         err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
7940                         err_data: Vec::new(),
7941                         msg: "We require payment_secrets",
7942                 });
7943         };
7944         Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
7945                 routing,
7946                 payment_hash,
7947                 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
7948                 incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
7949                 outgoing_amt_msat: onion_amt_msat,
7950                 outgoing_cltv_value,
7951                 skimmed_fee_msat: counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
7952         })
7953 }
7954
7955 /// Peel one layer off an incoming onion, returning [`PendingHTLCInfo`] (either Forward or Receive).
7956 /// This does all the relevant context-free checks that LDK requires for payment relay or
7957 /// acceptance. If the payment is to be received, and the amount matches the expected amount for
7958 /// a given invoice, this indicates the [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC`], once fully committed in the
7959 /// channel, will generate an [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
7960 pub fn peel_payment_onion<NS: Deref, L: Deref, T: secp256k1::Verification>(
7961         msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, node_signer: &NS, logger: &L, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>,
7962         cur_height: u32, accept_mpp_keysend: bool,
7963 ) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, InboundOnionErr>
7964 where
7965         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7966         L::Target: Logger,
7967 {
7968         let (hop, shared_secret, next_packet_details_opt) =
7969                 decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion(msg, node_signer, logger, secp_ctx
7970         ).map_err(|e| {
7971                 let (err_code, err_data) = match e {
7972                         HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(m) => (m.failure_code, Vec::new()),
7973                         HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(r) => (0x4000 | 22, r.reason.data),
7974                 };
7975                 let msg = "Failed to decode update add htlc onion";
7976                 InboundOnionErr { msg, err_code, err_data }
7977         })?;
7978         Ok(match hop {
7979                 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
7980                         let NextPacketDetails {
7981                                 next_packet_pubkey, outgoing_amt_msat: _, outgoing_scid: _, outgoing_cltv_value
7982                         } = match next_packet_details_opt {
7983                                 Some(next_packet_details) => next_packet_details,
7984                                 // Forward should always include the next hop details
7985                                 None => return Err(InboundOnionErr {
7986                                         msg: "Failed to decode update add htlc onion",
7987                                         err_code: 0x4000 | 22,
7988                                         err_data: Vec::new(),
7989                                 }),
7990                         };
7991
7992                         if let Err((err_msg, code)) = check_incoming_htlc_cltv(
7993                                 cur_height, outgoing_cltv_value, msg.cltv_expiry
7994                         ) {
7995                                 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
7996                                         msg: err_msg,
7997                                         err_code: code,
7998                                         err_data: Vec::new(),
7999                                 });
8000                         }
8001                         create_fwd_pending_htlc_info(
8002                                 msg, next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes, shared_secret,
8003                                 Some(next_packet_pubkey)
8004                         )?
8005                 },
8006                 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(received_data) => {
8007                         create_recv_pending_htlc_info(
8008                                 received_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry,
8009                                 None, false, msg.skimmed_fee_msat, cur_height, accept_mpp_keysend,
8010                         )?
8011                 }
8012         })
8013 }
8014
8015 struct NextPacketDetails {
8016         next_packet_pubkey: Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>,
8017         outgoing_scid: u64,
8018         outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
8019         outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
8020 }
8021
8022 fn decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion<NS: Deref, L: Deref, T: secp256k1::Verification>(
8023         msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, node_signer: &NS, logger: &L, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>,
8024 ) -> Result<(onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option<NextPacketDetails>), HTLCFailureMsg>
8025 where
8026         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8027         L::Target: Logger,
8028 {
8029         macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
8030                 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
8031                         {
8032                                 log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
8033                                 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
8034                                         channel_id: msg.channel_id,
8035                                         htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
8036                                         sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).to_byte_array(),
8037                                         failure_code: $err_code,
8038                                 }));
8039                         }
8040                 }
8041         }
8042
8043         if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
8044                 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
8045         }
8046
8047         let shared_secret = node_signer.ecdh(
8048                 Recipient::Node, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None
8049         ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
8050
8051         if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
8052                 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
8053                 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
8054                 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
8055                 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
8056                 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
8057                 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
8058                 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
8059         }
8060         macro_rules! return_err {
8061                 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
8062                         {
8063                                 log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
8064                                 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
8065                                         channel_id: msg.channel_id,
8066                                         htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
8067                                         reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
8068                                                 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
8069                                 }));
8070                         }
8071                 }
8072         }
8073
8074         let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(
8075                 shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac,
8076                 msg.payment_hash, node_signer
8077         ) {
8078                 Ok(res) => res,
8079                 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
8080                         return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
8081                 },
8082                 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
8083                         return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
8084                 },
8085         };
8086
8087         let next_packet_details = match next_hop {
8088                 onion_utils::Hop::Forward {
8089                         next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward {
8090                                 short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value
8091                         }, ..
8092                 } => {
8093                         let next_packet_pubkey = onion_utils::next_hop_pubkey(secp_ctx,
8094                                 msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &shared_secret);
8095                         NextPacketDetails {
8096                                 next_packet_pubkey, outgoing_scid: short_channel_id,
8097                                 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value
8098                         }
8099                 },
8100                 onion_utils::Hop::Receive { .. } => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)),
8101                 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { .. }, .. } |
8102                         onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedReceive { .. }, .. } =>
8103                 {
8104                         return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0; 0]);
8105                 }
8106         };
8107
8108         Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, Some(next_packet_details)))
8109 }
8110
8111 fn check_incoming_htlc_cltv(
8112         cur_height: u32, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, cltv_expiry: u32
8113 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
8114         if (cltv_expiry as u64) < (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
8115                 return Err((
8116                         "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
8117                         0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
8118                 ));
8119         }
8120         // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
8121         // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
8122         // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
8123         if cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
8124                 return Err(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14));
8125         }
8126         if cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
8127                 return Err(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21));
8128         }
8129         // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
8130         // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
8131         // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
8132         // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
8133         // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
8134         // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
8135         // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
8136         // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
8137         if (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
8138                 return Err(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14));
8139         }
8140
8141         Ok(())
8142 }
8143
8144 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8145 where
8146         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8147         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8148         ES::Target: EntropySource,
8149         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8150         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8151         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8152         R::Target: Router,
8153         L::Target: Logger,
8154 {
8155         /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
8156         /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
8157         /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
8158         /// is always placed next to each other.
8159         ///
8160         /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
8161         /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
8162         /// `MessageSendEvent`s  for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
8163         /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
8164         ///
8165         /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
8166         /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
8167         /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
8168         fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
8169                 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
8170                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8171                         let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
8172
8173                         // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
8174                         // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
8175                         if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
8176                                 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8177                         }
8178
8179                         if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
8180                                 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8181                         }
8182                         if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
8183                                 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8184                         }
8185
8186                         let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
8187                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8188                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8189                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8190                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8191                                 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
8192                                         pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
8193                                 }
8194                         }
8195
8196                         if !pending_events.is_empty() {
8197                                 events.replace(pending_events);
8198                         }
8199
8200                         result
8201                 });
8202                 events.into_inner()
8203         }
8204 }
8205
8206 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8207 where
8208         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8209         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8210         ES::Target: EntropySource,
8211         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8212         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8213         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8214         R::Target: Router,
8215         L::Target: Logger,
8216 {
8217         /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
8218         ///
8219         /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
8220         /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
8221         fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
8222                 let mut ev;
8223                 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
8224         }
8225 }
8226
8227 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8228 where
8229         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8230         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8231         ES::Target: EntropySource,
8232         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8233         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8234         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8235         R::Target: Router,
8236         L::Target: Logger,
8237 {
8238         fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
8239                 {
8240                         let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
8241                         assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
8242                                 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
8243                         assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
8244                                 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
8245                 }
8246
8247                 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
8248                 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
8249         }
8250
8251         fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
8252                 let _persistence_guard =
8253                         PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8254                                 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8255                 let new_height = height - 1;
8256                 {
8257                         let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
8258                         assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
8259                                 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
8260                         assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
8261                                 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
8262                         *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
8263                 }
8264
8265                 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
8266         }
8267 }
8268
8269 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8270 where
8271         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8272         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8273         ES::Target: EntropySource,
8274         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8275         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8276         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8277         R::Target: Router,
8278         L::Target: Logger,
8279 {
8280         fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
8281                 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8282                 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8283                 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8284
8285                 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
8286                 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
8287
8288                 let _persistence_guard =
8289                         PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8290                                 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8291                 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)
8292                         .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
8293
8294                 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
8295                 if height < last_best_block_height {
8296                         let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
8297                         self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
8298                 }
8299         }
8300
8301         fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
8302                 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8303                 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8304                 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8305
8306                 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
8307                 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
8308
8309                 let _persistence_guard =
8310                         PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8311                                 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8312                 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
8313
8314                 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
8315
8316                 macro_rules! max_time {
8317                         ($timestamp: expr) => {
8318                                 loop {
8319                                         // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
8320                                         // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
8321                                         // having an explicit local time source.
8322                                         // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
8323                                         // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
8324                                         let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
8325                                         if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
8326                                         if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
8327                                                 break;
8328                                         }
8329                                 }
8330                         }
8331                 }
8332                 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
8333                 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
8334                 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
8335                         inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
8336                 });
8337         }
8338
8339         fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, u32, Option<BlockHash>)> {
8340                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
8341                 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
8342                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8343                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8344                         for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(|phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }) {
8345                                 let txid_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
8346                                 let height_opt = chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmation_height();
8347                                 let hash_opt = chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in();
8348                                 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(conf_height), Some(block_hash)) = (txid_opt, height_opt, hash_opt) {
8349                                         res.push((funding_txo.txid, conf_height, Some(block_hash)));
8350                                 }
8351                         }
8352                 }
8353                 res
8354         }
8355
8356         fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
8357                 let _persistence_guard =
8358                         PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8359                                 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8360                 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
8361                         if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
8362                                 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
8363                                         channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
8364                                 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
8365                         } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
8366                 });
8367         }
8368 }
8369
8370 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8371 where
8372         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8373         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8374         ES::Target: EntropySource,
8375         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8376         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8377         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8378         R::Target: Router,
8379         L::Target: Logger,
8380 {
8381         /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
8382         /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
8383         /// the function.
8384         fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<SP>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
8385                         (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
8386                 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8387                 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8388                 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8389
8390                 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
8391                 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
8392                 {
8393                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8394                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8395                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8396                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8397                                 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8398                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
8399                                         match phase {
8400                                                 // Retain unfunded channels.
8401                                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => true,
8402                                                 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
8403                                                         let res = f(channel);
8404                                                         if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
8405                                                                 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
8406                                                                         let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
8407                                                                         timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
8408                                                                                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.context.channel_id() }));
8409                                                                 }
8410                                                                 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
8411                                                                         send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
8412                                                                         if channel.context.is_usable() {
8413                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8414                                                                                 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
8415                                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
8416                                                                                                 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8417                                                                                                 msg,
8418                                                                                         });
8419                                                                                 }
8420                                                                         } else {
8421                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8422                                                                         }
8423                                                                 }
8424
8425                                                                 {
8426                                                                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8427                                                                         emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
8428                                                                 }
8429
8430                                                                 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
8431                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8432                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
8433                                                                                 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8434                                                                                 msg: announcement_sigs,
8435                                                                         });
8436                                                                         if let Some(height) = height_opt {
8437                                                                                 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
8438                                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
8439                                                                                                 msg: announcement,
8440                                                                                                 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
8441                                                                                                 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
8442                                                                                                 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
8443                                                                                         });
8444                                                                                 }
8445                                                                         }
8446                                                                 }
8447                                                                 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
8448                                                                         if let Some(real_scid) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
8449                                                                                 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
8450                                                                                 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
8451                                                                                 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
8452                                                                                 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
8453                                                                                 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
8454                                                                                 // is always consistent.
8455                                                                                 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
8456                                                                                 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
8457                                                                                 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()),
8458                                                                                         "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
8459                                                                                         fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
8460                                                                         }
8461                                                                 }
8462                                                         } else if let Err(reason) = res {
8463                                                                 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &channel.context);
8464                                                                 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
8465                                                                 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
8466                                                                 failed_channels.push(channel.context.force_shutdown(true));
8467                                                                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
8468                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
8469                                                                                 msg: update
8470                                                                         });
8471                                                                 }
8472                                                                 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
8473                                                                 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel.context, reason);
8474                                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
8475                                                                         node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8476                                                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
8477                                                                                 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage {
8478                                                                                         channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
8479                                                                                         data: reason_message,
8480                                                                                 })
8481                                                                         },
8482                                                                 });
8483                                                                 return false;
8484                                                         }
8485                                                         true
8486                                                 }
8487                                         }
8488                                 });
8489                         }
8490                 }
8491
8492                 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
8493                         self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
8494                                 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
8495                                         // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
8496                                         // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
8497                                         // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
8498                                         // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
8499                                         if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
8500                                                 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
8501                                                 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
8502
8503                                                 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
8504                                                         HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
8505                                                         HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
8506                                                 false
8507                                         } else { true }
8508                                 });
8509                                 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
8510                         });
8511
8512                         let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
8513                         intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
8514                                 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
8515                                         let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
8516                                                 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
8517                                                 user_channel_id: Some(htlc.prev_user_channel_id),
8518                                                 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
8519                                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
8520                                                 phantom_shared_secret: None,
8521                                                 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
8522                                         });
8523
8524                                         let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
8525                                                 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
8526                                                 _ => unreachable!(),
8527                                         };
8528                                         timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
8529                                                         HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
8530                                                         HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
8531                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
8532                                         false
8533                                 } else { true }
8534                         });
8535                 }
8536
8537                 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
8538
8539                 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
8540                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
8541                 }
8542         }
8543
8544         /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] may need to be persisted or
8545         /// may have events that need processing.
8546         ///
8547         /// In order to check if this [`ChannelManager`] needs persisting, call
8548         /// [`Self::get_and_clear_needs_persistence`].
8549         ///
8550         /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
8551         /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
8552         pub fn get_event_or_persistence_needed_future(&self) -> Future {
8553                 self.event_persist_notifier.get_future()
8554         }
8555
8556         /// Returns true if this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
8557         pub fn get_and_clear_needs_persistence(&self) -> bool {
8558                 self.needs_persist_flag.swap(false, Ordering::AcqRel)
8559         }
8560
8561         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
8562         pub fn get_event_or_persist_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
8563                 self.event_persist_notifier.notify_pending()
8564         }
8565
8566         /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
8567         /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
8568         pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
8569                 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
8570         }
8571
8572         /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8573         /// [`ChannelManager`].
8574         pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
8575                 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
8576         }
8577
8578         /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8579         /// [`ChannelManager`].
8580         ///
8581         /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
8582         /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
8583         #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
8584         pub fn bolt11_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
8585                 provided_bolt11_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
8586         }
8587
8588         /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8589         /// [`ChannelManager`].
8590         fn bolt12_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
8591                 provided_bolt12_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
8592         }
8593
8594         /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8595         /// [`ChannelManager`].
8596         pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
8597                 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
8598         }
8599
8600         /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8601         /// [`ChannelManager`].
8602         pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
8603                 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
8604         }
8605
8606         /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8607         /// [`ChannelManager`].
8608         pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
8609                 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
8610         }
8611 }
8612
8613 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8614         ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8615 where
8616         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8617         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8618         ES::Target: EntropySource,
8619         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8620         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8621         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8622         R::Target: Router,
8623         L::Target: Logger,
8624 {
8625         fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
8626                 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8627                 // open_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
8628                 // change to the contents.
8629                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8630                         let res = self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8631                         let persist = match &res {
8632                                 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => {
8633                                         debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't close a new channel");
8634                                         NotifyOption::DoPersist
8635                                 },
8636                                 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8637                         };
8638                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8639                         persist
8640                 });
8641         }
8642
8643         fn handle_open_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2) {
8644                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8645                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8646                          msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8647         }
8648
8649         fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
8650                 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8651                 // accept_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
8652                 // change to the contents.
8653                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8654                         let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8655                         NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents
8656                 });
8657         }
8658
8659         fn handle_accept_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannelV2) {
8660                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8661                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8662                          msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8663         }
8664
8665         fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
8666                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8667                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8668         }
8669
8670         fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
8671                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8672                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8673         }
8674
8675         fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
8676                 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8677                 // channel_ready message - while the channel's state will change, any channel_ready message
8678                 // will ultimately be re-sent on startup and the `ChannelMonitor` won't be updated so we
8679                 // will not force-close the channel on startup.
8680                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8681                         let res = self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8682                         let persist = match &res {
8683                                 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8684                                 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8685                         };
8686                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8687                         persist
8688                 });
8689         }
8690
8691         fn handle_stfu(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Stfu) {
8692                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8693                         "Quiescence not supported".to_owned(),
8694                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8695         }
8696
8697         fn handle_splice(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Splice) {
8698                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8699                         "Splicing not supported".to_owned(),
8700                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8701         }
8702
8703         fn handle_splice_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::SpliceAck) {
8704                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8705                         "Splicing not supported (splice_ack)".to_owned(),
8706                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8707         }
8708
8709         fn handle_splice_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::SpliceLocked) {
8710                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8711                         "Splicing not supported (splice_locked)".to_owned(),
8712                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8713         }
8714
8715         fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
8716                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8717                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8718         }
8719
8720         fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
8721                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8722                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8723         }
8724
8725         fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
8726                 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8727                 // update_add_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8728                 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8729                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8730                         let res = self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8731                         let persist = match &res {
8732                                 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8733                                 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8734                                 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8735                         };
8736                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8737                         persist
8738                 });
8739         }
8740
8741         fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
8742                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8743                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8744         }
8745
8746         fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
8747                 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8748                 // update_fail_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8749                 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8750                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8751                         let res = self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8752                         let persist = match &res {
8753                                 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8754                                 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8755                                 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8756                         };
8757                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8758                         persist
8759                 });
8760         }
8761
8762         fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
8763                 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8764                 // update_fail_malformed_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state
8765                 // only the `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8766                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8767                         let res = self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8768                         let persist = match &res {
8769                                 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8770                                 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8771                                 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8772                         };
8773                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8774                         persist
8775                 });
8776         }
8777
8778         fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
8779                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8780                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8781         }
8782
8783         fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
8784                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8785                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8786         }
8787
8788         fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
8789                 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8790                 // update_fee message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8791                 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8792                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8793                         let res = self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8794                         let persist = match &res {
8795                                 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8796                                 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8797                                 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8798                         };
8799                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8800                         persist
8801                 });
8802         }
8803
8804         fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
8805                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8806                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8807         }
8808
8809         fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
8810                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8811                         if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
8812                                 persist
8813                         } else {
8814                                 NotifyOption::DoPersist
8815                         }
8816                 });
8817         }
8818
8819         fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
8820                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8821                         let res = self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8822                         let persist = match &res {
8823                                 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8824                                 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8825                                 Ok(persist) => *persist,
8826                         };
8827                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8828                         persist
8829                 });
8830         }
8831
8832         fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
8833                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(
8834                         self, || NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents);
8835                 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
8836                 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
8837                 let remove_peer = {
8838                         log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
8839                                 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8840                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
8841                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8842                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8843                                 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8844                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
8845                                         let context = match phase {
8846                                                 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
8847                                                         if chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger).is_ok() {
8848                                                                 // We only retain funded channels that are not shutdown.
8849                                                                 return true;
8850                                                         }
8851                                                         &mut chan.context
8852                                                 },
8853                                                 // Unfunded channels will always be removed.
8854                                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
8855                                                         &mut chan.context
8856                                                 },
8857                                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
8858                                                         &mut chan.context
8859                                                 },
8860                                         };
8861                                         // Clean up for removal.
8862                                         update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
8863                                         self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
8864                                         failed_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false));
8865                                         false
8866                                 });
8867                                 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
8868                                 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
8869                                 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
8870                                 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
8871                                         match msg {
8872                                                 // V1 Channel Establishment
8873                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
8874                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
8875                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
8876                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
8877                                                 // V2 Channel Establishment
8878                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannelV2 { .. } => false,
8879                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 { .. } => false,
8880                                                 // Common Channel Establishment
8881                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
8882                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
8883                                                 // Quiescence
8884                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendStfu { .. } => false,
8885                                                 // Splicing
8886                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSplice { .. } => false,
8887                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSpliceAck { .. } => false,
8888                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSpliceLocked { .. } => false,
8889                                                 // Interactive Transaction Construction
8890                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddInput { .. } => false,
8891                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddOutput { .. } => false,
8892                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveInput { .. } => false,
8893                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveOutput { .. } => false,
8894                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxComplete { .. } => false,
8895                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxSignatures { .. } => false,
8896                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxInitRbf { .. } => false,
8897                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAckRbf { .. } => false,
8898                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAbort { .. } => false,
8899                                                 // Channel Operations
8900                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
8901                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
8902                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
8903                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
8904                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
8905                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
8906                                                 // Gossip
8907                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
8908                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
8909                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
8910                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
8911                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
8912                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
8913                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
8914                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
8915                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
8916                                         }
8917                                 });
8918                                 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
8919                                 peer_state.is_connected = false;
8920                                 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
8921                         } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
8922                 };
8923                 if remove_peer {
8924                         per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
8925                 }
8926                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
8927
8928                 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
8929                         self.finish_close_channel(failure);
8930                 }
8931         }
8932
8933         fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
8934                 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
8935                         log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8936                         return Err(());
8937                 }
8938
8939                 let mut res = Ok(());
8940
8941                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8942                         // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
8943                         // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
8944                         // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
8945                         // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
8946                         let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
8947                         let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
8948
8949                         {
8950                                 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
8951                                 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
8952                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
8953                                                 if inbound_peer_limited {
8954                                                         res = Err(());
8955                                                         return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
8956                                                 }
8957                                                 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
8958                                                         channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8959                                                         inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8960                                                         latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
8961                                                         pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
8962                                                         in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8963                                                         monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
8964                                                         actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8965                                                         is_connected: true,
8966                                                 }));
8967                                         },
8968                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
8969                                                 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
8970                                                 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
8971
8972                                                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
8973                                                 if inbound_peer_limited &&
8974                                                         Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
8975                                                         peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
8976                                                 {
8977                                                         res = Err(());
8978                                                         return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
8979                                                 }
8980
8981                                                 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
8982                                                 peer_state.is_connected = true;
8983                                         },
8984                                 }
8985                         }
8986
8987                         log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8988
8989                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8990                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
8991                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8992                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8993                                 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8994
8995                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(|(_, phase)|
8996                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else {
8997                                                 // Since unfunded channel maps are cleared upon disconnecting a peer, and they're not persisted
8998                                                 // (so won't be recovered after a crash), they shouldn't exist here and we would never need to
8999                                                 // worry about closing and removing them.
9000                                                 debug_assert!(false);
9001                                                 None
9002                                         }
9003                                 ).for_each(|chan| {
9004                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
9005                                                 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9006                                                 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
9007                                         });
9008                                 });
9009                         }
9010
9011                         return NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
9012                         //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
9013                 });
9014                 res
9015         }
9016
9017         fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
9018                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9019
9020                 match &msg.data as &str {
9021                         "cannot co-op close channel w/ active htlcs"|
9022                         "link failed to shutdown" =>
9023                         {
9024                                 // LND hasn't properly handled shutdown messages ever, and force-closes any time we
9025                                 // send one while HTLCs are still present. The issue is tracked at
9026                                 // https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/6039 and has had multiple patches
9027                                 // to fix it but none so far have managed to land upstream. The issue appears to be
9028                                 // very low priority for the LND team despite being marked "P1".
9029                                 // We're not going to bother handling this in a sensible way, instead simply
9030                                 // repeating the Shutdown message on repeat until morale improves.
9031                                 if !msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
9032                                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9033                                         let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
9034                                         if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
9035                                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9036                                         if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&msg.channel_id) {
9037                                                 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_outbound_shutdown() {
9038                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
9039                                                                 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
9040                                                                 msg,
9041                                                         });
9042                                                 }
9043                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
9044                                                         node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
9045                                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
9046                                                                 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
9047                                                                         channel_id: msg.channel_id,
9048                                                                         data: "You appear to be exhibiting LND bug 6039, we'll keep sending you shutdown messages until you handle them correctly".to_owned()
9049                                                                 },
9050                                                                 log_level: Level::Trace,
9051                                                         }
9052                                                 });
9053                                         }
9054                                 }
9055                                 return;
9056                         }
9057                         _ => {}
9058                 }
9059
9060                 if msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
9061                         let channel_ids: Vec<ChannelId> = {
9062                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9063                                 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
9064                                 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
9065                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9066                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9067                                 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
9068                                 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
9069                                 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
9070                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
9071                         };
9072                         for channel_id in channel_ids {
9073                                 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
9074                                 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
9075                         }
9076                 } else {
9077                         {
9078                                 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
9079                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9080                                 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
9081                                 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
9082                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9083                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9084                                 if let Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
9085                                         if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.chain_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
9086                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
9087                                                         node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
9088                                                         msg,
9089                                                 });
9090                                                 return;
9091                                         }
9092                                 }
9093                         }
9094
9095                         // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
9096                         let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
9097                 }
9098         }
9099
9100         fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
9101                 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
9102         }
9103
9104         fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
9105                 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
9106         }
9107
9108         fn get_chain_hashes(&self) -> Option<Vec<ChainHash>> {
9109                 Some(vec![self.chain_hash])
9110         }
9111
9112         fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddInput) {
9113                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9114                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9115                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9116         }
9117
9118         fn handle_tx_add_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddOutput) {
9119                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9120                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9121                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9122         }
9123
9124         fn handle_tx_remove_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveInput) {
9125                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9126                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9127                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9128         }
9129
9130         fn handle_tx_remove_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveOutput) {
9131                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9132                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9133                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9134         }
9135
9136         fn handle_tx_complete(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxComplete) {
9137                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9138                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9139                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9140         }
9141
9142         fn handle_tx_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxSignatures) {
9143                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9144                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9145                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9146         }
9147
9148         fn handle_tx_init_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxInitRbf) {
9149                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9150                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9151                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9152         }
9153
9154         fn handle_tx_ack_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAckRbf) {
9155                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9156                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9157                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9158         }
9159
9160         fn handle_tx_abort(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAbort) {
9161                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9162                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9163                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9164         }
9165 }
9166
9167 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9168 OffersMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9169 where
9170         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
9171         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9172         ES::Target: EntropySource,
9173         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9174         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9175         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9176         R::Target: Router,
9177         L::Target: Logger,
9178 {
9179         fn handle_message(&self, message: OffersMessage) -> Option<OffersMessage> {
9180                 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
9181                 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
9182
9183                 match message {
9184                         OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request) => {
9185                                 let amount_msats = match InvoiceBuilder::<DerivedSigningPubkey>::amount_msats(
9186                                         &invoice_request
9187                                 ) {
9188                                         Ok(amount_msats) => Some(amount_msats),
9189                                         Err(error) => return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
9190                                 };
9191                                 let invoice_request = match invoice_request.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
9192                                         Ok(invoice_request) => invoice_request,
9193                                         Err(()) => {
9194                                                 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidMetadata;
9195                                                 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
9196                                         },
9197                                 };
9198                                 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
9199
9200                                 match self.create_inbound_payment(amount_msats, relative_expiry, None) {
9201                                         Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) if invoice_request.keys.is_some() => {
9202                                                 let payment_paths = vec![
9203                                                         self.create_one_hop_blinded_payment_path(payment_secret),
9204                                                 ];
9205                                                 #[cfg(not(feature = "no-std"))]
9206                                                 let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys(
9207                                                         payment_paths, payment_hash
9208                                                 );
9209                                                 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
9210                                                 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
9211                                                         self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
9212                                                 );
9213                                                 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
9214                                                 let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
9215                                                         payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
9216                                                 );
9217                                                 match builder.and_then(|b| b.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)) {
9218                                                         Ok(invoice) => Some(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
9219                                                         Err(error) => Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
9220                                                 }
9221                                         },
9222                                         Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => {
9223                                                 let payment_paths = vec![
9224                                                         self.create_one_hop_blinded_payment_path(payment_secret),
9225                                                 ];
9226                                                 #[cfg(not(feature = "no-std"))]
9227                                                 let builder = invoice_request.respond_with(payment_paths, payment_hash);
9228                                                 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
9229                                                 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
9230                                                         self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
9231                                                 );
9232                                                 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
9233                                                 let builder = invoice_request.respond_with_no_std(
9234                                                         payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
9235                                                 );
9236                                                 let response = builder.and_then(|builder| builder.allow_mpp().build())
9237                                                         .map_err(|e| OffersMessage::InvoiceError(e.into()))
9238                                                         .and_then(|invoice|
9239                                                                 match invoice.sign(|invoice| self.node_signer.sign_bolt12_invoice(invoice)) {
9240                                                                         Ok(invoice) => Ok(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
9241                                                                         Err(SignError::Signing(())) => Err(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(
9242                                                                                         InvoiceError::from_string("Failed signing invoice".to_string())
9243                                                                         )),
9244                                                                         Err(SignError::Verification(_)) => Err(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(
9245                                                                                         InvoiceError::from_string("Failed invoice signature verification".to_string())
9246                                                                         )),
9247                                                                 });
9248                                                 match response {
9249                                                         Ok(invoice) => Some(invoice),
9250                                                         Err(error) => Some(error),
9251                                                 }
9252                                         },
9253                                         Err(()) => {
9254                                                 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount.into()))
9255                                         },
9256                                 }
9257                         },
9258                         OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice) => {
9259                                 match invoice.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
9260                                         Err(()) => {
9261                                                 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(InvoiceError::from_string("Unrecognized invoice".to_owned())))
9262                                         },
9263                                         Ok(_) if invoice.invoice_features().requires_unknown_bits_from(&self.bolt12_invoice_features()) => {
9264                                                 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(Bolt12SemanticError::UnknownRequiredFeatures.into()))
9265                                         },
9266                                         Ok(payment_id) => {
9267                                                 if let Err(e) = self.send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&invoice, payment_id) {
9268                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed paying invoice: {:?}", e);
9269                                                         Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(InvoiceError::from_string(format!("{:?}", e))))
9270                                                 } else {
9271                                                         None
9272                                                 }
9273                                         },
9274                                 }
9275                         },
9276                         OffersMessage::InvoiceError(invoice_error) => {
9277                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received invoice_error: {}", invoice_error);
9278                                 None
9279                         },
9280                 }
9281         }
9282
9283         fn release_pending_messages(&self) -> Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>> {
9284                 core::mem::take(&mut self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap())
9285         }
9286 }
9287
9288 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9289 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9290 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
9291         let mut node_features = provided_init_features(config).to_context();
9292         node_features.set_keysend_optional();
9293         node_features
9294 }
9295
9296 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9297 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9298 ///
9299 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
9300 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
9301 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
9302 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt11_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
9303         provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9304 }
9305
9306 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9307 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9308 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt12_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
9309         provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9310 }
9311
9312 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9313 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9314 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
9315         provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9316 }
9317
9318 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9319 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9320 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
9321         ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
9322 }
9323
9324 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9325 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9326 pub fn provided_init_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
9327         // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
9328         // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
9329         // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
9330         let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
9331         features.set_data_loss_protect_required();
9332         features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
9333         features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
9334         features.set_static_remote_key_required();
9335         features.set_payment_secret_required();
9336         features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
9337         features.set_wumbo_optional();
9338         features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
9339         features.set_channel_type_optional();
9340         features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
9341         features.set_zero_conf_optional();
9342         if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
9343                 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
9344         }
9345         features
9346 }
9347
9348 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
9349 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
9350
9351 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
9352         (2, fee_base_msat, required),
9353         (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
9354         (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
9355 });
9356
9357 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
9358         (2, node_id, required),
9359         (4, features, required),
9360         (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
9361         (8, forwarding_info, option),
9362         (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9363         (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9364 });
9365
9366 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
9367         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9368                 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
9369                 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
9370                 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
9371                 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
9372                 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9373                         (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
9374                         (2, self.channel_id, required),
9375                         (3, self.channel_type, option),
9376                         (4, self.counterparty, required),
9377                         (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
9378                         (6, self.funding_txo, option),
9379                         (7, self.config, option),
9380                         (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
9381                         (9, self.confirmations, option),
9382                         (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
9383                         (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
9384                         (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
9385                         (16, self.balance_msat, required),
9386                         (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
9387                         (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required),
9388                         (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
9389                         (21, self.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, required),
9390                         (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
9391                         (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
9392                         (26, self.is_outbound, required),
9393                         (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
9394                         (30, self.is_usable, required),
9395                         (32, self.is_public, required),
9396                         (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9397                         (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9398                         (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
9399                         (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
9400                         (41, self.channel_shutdown_state, option),
9401                 });
9402                 Ok(())
9403         }
9404 }
9405
9406 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
9407         fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9408                 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9409                         (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
9410                         (2, channel_id, required),
9411                         (3, channel_type, option),
9412                         (4, counterparty, required),
9413                         (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
9414                         (6, funding_txo, option),
9415                         (7, config, option),
9416                         (8, short_channel_id, option),
9417                         (9, confirmations, option),
9418                         (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
9419                         (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
9420                         (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
9421                         (16, balance_msat, required),
9422                         (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
9423                         // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
9424                         // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
9425                         (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
9426                         (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
9427                         (21, next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, (default_value, 0)),
9428                         (22, confirmations_required, option),
9429                         (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
9430                         (26, is_outbound, required),
9431                         (28, is_channel_ready, required),
9432                         (30, is_usable, required),
9433                         (32, is_public, required),
9434                         (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9435                         (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9436                         (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
9437                         (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
9438                         (41, channel_shutdown_state, option),
9439                 });
9440
9441                 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
9442                 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
9443                 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
9444                 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
9445                         ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
9446
9447                 Ok(Self {
9448                         inbound_scid_alias,
9449                         channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
9450                         channel_type,
9451                         counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
9452                         outbound_scid_alias,
9453                         funding_txo,
9454                         config,
9455                         short_channel_id,
9456                         channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
9457                         unspendable_punishment_reserve,
9458                         user_channel_id,
9459                         balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
9460                         outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
9461                         next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
9462                         next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat.0.unwrap(),
9463                         inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
9464                         confirmations_required,
9465                         confirmations,
9466                         force_close_spend_delay,
9467                         is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
9468                         is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
9469                         is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
9470                         is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
9471                         inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
9472                         inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
9473                         feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
9474                         channel_shutdown_state,
9475                 })
9476         }
9477 }
9478
9479 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
9480         (2, channels, required_vec),
9481         (4, phantom_scid, required),
9482         (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
9483 });
9484
9485 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
9486         (0, Forward) => {
9487                 (0, onion_packet, required),
9488                 (2, short_channel_id, required),
9489         },
9490         (1, Receive) => {
9491                 (0, payment_data, required),
9492                 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
9493                 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
9494                 (3, payment_metadata, option),
9495                 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
9496         },
9497         (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
9498                 (0, payment_preimage, required),
9499                 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
9500                 (3, payment_metadata, option),
9501                 (4, payment_data, option), // Added in 0.0.116
9502                 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
9503         },
9504 ;);
9505
9506 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
9507         (0, routing, required),
9508         (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
9509         (4, payment_hash, required),
9510         (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
9511         (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
9512         (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
9513         (10, skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9514 });
9515
9516
9517 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
9518         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9519                 match self {
9520                         HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
9521                                 0u8.write(writer)?;
9522                                 channel_id.write(writer)?;
9523                                 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
9524                                 reason.write(writer)?;
9525                         },
9526                         HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
9527                                 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
9528                         }) => {
9529                                 1u8.write(writer)?;
9530                                 channel_id.write(writer)?;
9531                                 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
9532                                 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
9533                                 failure_code.write(writer)?;
9534                         },
9535                 }
9536                 Ok(())
9537         }
9538 }
9539
9540 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
9541         fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9542                 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9543                 match id {
9544                         0 => {
9545                                 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
9546                                         channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9547                                         htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9548                                         reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
9549                                 }))
9550                         },
9551                         1 => {
9552                                 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
9553                                         channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9554                                         htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9555                                         sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
9556                                         failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
9557                                 }))
9558                         },
9559                         // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
9560                         // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
9561                         // messages contained in the variants.
9562                         // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
9563                         // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
9564                         // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
9565                         2 => {
9566                                 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
9567                                 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
9568                                 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
9569                                 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
9570                                 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
9571                         },
9572                         3 => {
9573                                 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
9574                                 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
9575                                 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
9576                                 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
9577                                 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
9578                         },
9579                         _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
9580                 }
9581         }
9582 }
9583
9584 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
9585         (0, Forward),
9586         (1, Fail),
9587 );
9588
9589 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
9590         (0, short_channel_id, required),
9591         (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
9592         (2, outpoint, required),
9593         (4, htlc_id, required),
9594         (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required),
9595         (7, user_channel_id, option),
9596 });
9597
9598 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
9599         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9600                 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
9601                         OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
9602                         OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
9603                 };
9604                 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9605                         (0, self.prev_hop, required),
9606                         (1, self.total_msat, required),
9607                         (2, self.value, required),
9608                         (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
9609                         (4, payment_data, option),
9610                         (5, self.total_value_received, option),
9611                         (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
9612                         (8, keysend_preimage, option),
9613                         (10, self.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9614                 });
9615                 Ok(())
9616         }
9617 }
9618
9619 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
9620         fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9621                 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9622                         (0, prev_hop, required),
9623                         (1, total_msat, option),
9624                         (2, value_ser, required),
9625                         (3, sender_intended_value, option),
9626                         (4, payment_data_opt, option),
9627                         (5, total_value_received, option),
9628                         (6, cltv_expiry, required),
9629                         (8, keysend_preimage, option),
9630                         (10, counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9631                 });
9632                 let payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = payment_data_opt;
9633                 let value = value_ser.0.unwrap();
9634                 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
9635                         Some(p) => {
9636                                 if payment_data.is_some() {
9637                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9638                                 }
9639                                 if total_msat.is_none() {
9640                                         total_msat = Some(value);
9641                                 }
9642                                 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
9643                         },
9644                         None => {
9645                                 if total_msat.is_none() {
9646                                         if payment_data.is_none() {
9647                                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9648                                         }
9649                                         total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
9650                                 }
9651                                 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
9652                         },
9653                 };
9654                 Ok(Self {
9655                         prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
9656                         timer_ticks: 0,
9657                         value,
9658                         sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
9659                         total_value_received,
9660                         total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
9661                         onion_payload,
9662                         cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry.0.unwrap(),
9663                         counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
9664                 })
9665         }
9666 }
9667
9668 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
9669         fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9670                 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9671                 match id {
9672                         0 => {
9673                                 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
9674                                 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
9675                                 let mut path_hops = Vec::new();
9676                                 let mut payment_id = None;
9677                                 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
9678                                 let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
9679                                 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9680                                         (0, session_priv, required),
9681                                         (1, payment_id, option),
9682                                         (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
9683                                         (4, path_hops, required_vec),
9684                                         (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
9685                                         (6, blinded_tail, option),
9686                                 });
9687                                 if payment_id.is_none() {
9688                                         // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
9689                                         // instead.
9690                                         payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
9691                                 }
9692                                 let path = Path { hops: path_hops, blinded_tail };
9693                                 if path.hops.len() == 0 {
9694                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9695                                 }
9696                                 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
9697                                         if let Payee::Clear { ref mut final_cltv_expiry_delta, .. } = params.payee {
9698                                                 if final_cltv_expiry_delta == &0 {
9699                                                         *final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.final_cltv_expiry_delta().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9700                                                 }
9701                                         }
9702                                 }
9703                                 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
9704                                         session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
9705                                         first_hop_htlc_msat,
9706                                         path,
9707                                         payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
9708                                 })
9709                         }
9710                         1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
9711                         _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
9712                 }
9713         }
9714 }
9715
9716 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
9717         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
9718                 match self {
9719                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
9720                                 0u8.write(writer)?;
9721                                 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
9722                                 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9723                                         (0, session_priv, required),
9724                                         (1, payment_id_opt, option),
9725                                         (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
9726                                         // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
9727                                         (4, path.hops, required_vec),
9728                                         (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
9729                                         (6, path.blinded_tail, option),
9730                                  });
9731                         }
9732                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
9733                                 1u8.write(writer)?;
9734                                 field.write(writer)?;
9735                         }
9736                 }
9737                 Ok(())
9738         }
9739 }
9740
9741 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
9742         (0, forward_info, required),
9743         (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
9744         (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
9745         (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
9746         (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
9747 });
9748
9749 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
9750         (1, FailHTLC) => {
9751                 (0, htlc_id, required),
9752                 (2, err_packet, required),
9753         };
9754         (0, AddHTLC)
9755 );
9756
9757 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
9758         (0, payment_secret, required),
9759         (2, expiry_time, required),
9760         (4, user_payment_id, required),
9761         (6, payment_preimage, required),
9762         (8, min_value_msat, required),
9763 });
9764
9765 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9766 where
9767         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
9768         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9769         ES::Target: EntropySource,
9770         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9771         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9772         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9773         R::Target: Router,
9774         L::Target: Logger,
9775 {
9776         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9777                 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
9778
9779                 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
9780
9781                 self.chain_hash.write(writer)?;
9782                 {
9783                         let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
9784                         best_block.height().write(writer)?;
9785                         best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
9786                 }
9787
9788                 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
9789                 {
9790                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9791                         let mut number_of_funded_channels = 0;
9792                         for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9793                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9794                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9795                                 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
9796                                         serializable_peer_count += 1;
9797                                 }
9798
9799                                 number_of_funded_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(
9800                                         |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { chan.context.is_funding_broadcast() } else { false }
9801                                 ).count();
9802                         }
9803
9804                         (number_of_funded_channels as u64).write(writer)?;
9805
9806                         for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9807                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9808                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9809                                 for channel in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter_map(
9810                                         |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = phase {
9811                                                 if channel.context.is_funding_broadcast() { Some(channel) } else { None }
9812                                         } else { None }
9813                                 ) {
9814                                         channel.write(writer)?;
9815                                 }
9816                         }
9817                 }
9818
9819                 {
9820                         let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
9821                         (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9822                         for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
9823                                 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
9824                                 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9825                                 for forward in pending_forwards {
9826                                         forward.write(writer)?;
9827                                 }
9828                         }
9829                 }
9830
9831                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
9832
9833                 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
9834                 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
9835                 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
9836
9837                 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
9838                 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
9839                 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9840                 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
9841                         payment_hash.write(writer)?;
9842                         (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9843                         for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
9844                                 htlc.write(writer)?;
9845                         }
9846                         htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
9847                         htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
9848                 }
9849
9850                 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
9851                 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
9852                 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9853                         // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
9854                         // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
9855                         // per_peer_state lock at all.
9856                         peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
9857                 }
9858
9859                 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
9860                 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
9861                         // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
9862                         // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
9863                         // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
9864                         // no channels.
9865                         if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
9866                                 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
9867                                 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
9868                                 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
9869                                         monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
9870                                                 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
9871                                                 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
9872                                 }
9873                         }
9874                 }
9875
9876                 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
9877                 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.115 don't support post-event actions, thus if there's no
9878                 // actions at all, skip writing the required TLV. Otherwise, pre-0.0.115 versions will
9879                 // refuse to read the new ChannelManager.
9880                 let events_not_backwards_compatible = events.iter().any(|(_, action)| action.is_some());
9881                 if events_not_backwards_compatible {
9882                         // If we're gonna write a even TLV that will overwrite our events anyway we might as
9883                         // well save the space and not write any events here.
9884                         0u64.write(writer)?;
9885                 } else {
9886                         (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9887                         for (event, _) in events.iter() {
9888                                 event.write(writer)?;
9889                         }
9890                 }
9891
9892                 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote the `pending_background_events`
9893                 // `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here, however there was never a reason to do so -
9894                 // the closing monitor updates were always effectively replayed on startup (either directly
9895                 // by calling `broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn` on a `ChannelMonitor` during
9896                 // deserialization or, in 0.0.115, by regenerating the monitor update itself).
9897                 0u64.write(writer)?;
9898
9899                 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
9900                 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
9901                 // likely to be identical.
9902                 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
9903                 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
9904
9905                 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9906                 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
9907                         hash.write(writer)?;
9908                         pending_payment.write(writer)?;
9909                 }
9910
9911                 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
9912                 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
9913                 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
9914                         if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
9915                                 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
9916                         }
9917                 }
9918                 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
9919                 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
9920                         match outbound {
9921                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
9922                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
9923                                         for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
9924                                                 session_priv.write(writer)?;
9925                                         }
9926                                 }
9927                                 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {},
9928                                 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {},
9929                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
9930                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
9931                         }
9932                 }
9933
9934                 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
9935                 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
9936                 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
9937                         match outbound {
9938                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
9939                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
9940                                         pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
9941                                 },
9942                                 _ => {},
9943                         }
9944                 }
9945
9946                 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
9947                 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
9948                 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
9949                         pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
9950                 }
9951
9952                 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
9953                 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
9954                         // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
9955                         // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
9956                         pending_claiming_payments = None;
9957                 }
9958
9959                 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(&PublicKey, &OutPoint), &Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
9960                 for ((counterparty_id, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
9961                         for (funding_outpoint, updates) in peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.iter() {
9962                                 if !updates.is_empty() {
9963                                         if in_flight_monitor_updates.is_none() { in_flight_monitor_updates = Some(HashMap::new()); }
9964                                         in_flight_monitor_updates.as_mut().unwrap().insert((counterparty_id, funding_outpoint), updates);
9965                                 }
9966                         }
9967                 }
9968
9969                 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9970                         (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
9971                         (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
9972                         (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
9973                         (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
9974                         (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
9975                         (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
9976                         (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
9977                         (8, if events_not_backwards_compatible { Some(&*events) } else { None }, option),
9978                         (9, htlc_purposes, required_vec),
9979                         (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
9980                         (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
9981                         (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
9982                 });
9983
9984                 Ok(())
9985         }
9986 }
9987
9988 impl Writeable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
9989         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9990                 (self.len() as u64).write(w)?;
9991                 for (event, action) in self.iter() {
9992                         event.write(w)?;
9993                         action.write(w)?;
9994                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
9995                                 // Events are MaybeReadable, in some cases indicating that they shouldn't actually
9996                                 // be persisted and are regenerated on restart. However, if such an event has a
9997                                 // post-event-handling action we'll write nothing for the event and would have to
9998                                 // either forget the action or fail on deserialization (which we do below). Thus,
9999                                 // check that the event is sane here.
10000                                 let event_encoded = event.encode();
10001                                 let event_read: Option<Event> =
10002                                         MaybeReadable::read(&mut &event_encoded[..]).unwrap();
10003                                 if action.is_some() { assert!(event_read.is_some()); }
10004                         }
10005                 }
10006                 Ok(())
10007         }
10008 }
10009 impl Readable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
10010         fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10011                 let len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10012                 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 1024 * 16;
10013                 let mut events: Self = VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(
10014                         MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>() as u64,
10015                         len) as usize);
10016                 for _ in 0..len {
10017                         let ev_opt = MaybeReadable::read(reader)?;
10018                         let action = Readable::read(reader)?;
10019                         if let Some(ev) = ev_opt {
10020                                 events.push_back((ev, action));
10021                         } else if action.is_some() {
10022                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10023                         }
10024                 }
10025                 Ok(events)
10026         }
10027 }
10028
10029 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(ChannelShutdownState,
10030         (0, NotShuttingDown) => {},
10031         (2, ShutdownInitiated) => {},
10032         (4, ResolvingHTLCs) => {},
10033         (6, NegotiatingClosingFee) => {},
10034         (8, ShutdownComplete) => {}, ;
10035 );
10036
10037 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
10038 ///
10039 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
10040 /// is:
10041 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
10042 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
10043 ///    `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
10044 ///    This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
10045 ///    [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
10046 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
10047 ///    same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
10048 ///    [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
10049 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
10050 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
10051 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
10052 ///    Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
10053 ///    will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
10054 ///    the next step.
10055 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
10056 ///    [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
10057 ///
10058 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
10059 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
10060 ///
10061 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
10062 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
10063 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
10064 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
10065 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
10066 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
10067 ///
10068 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
10069 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10070 where
10071         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
10072         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10073         ES::Target: EntropySource,
10074         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10075         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10076         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10077         R::Target: Router,
10078         L::Target: Logger,
10079 {
10080         /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
10081         pub entropy_source: ES,
10082
10083         /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
10084         pub node_signer: NS,
10085
10086         /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
10087         /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
10088         /// signing data.
10089         pub signer_provider: SP,
10090
10091         /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
10092         ///
10093         /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
10094         pub fee_estimator: F,
10095         /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
10096         ///
10097         /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
10098         /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
10099         /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
10100         pub chain_monitor: M,
10101
10102         /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
10103         /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
10104         /// force-closed during deserialization.
10105         pub tx_broadcaster: T,
10106         /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
10107         /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
10108         ///
10109         /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
10110         pub router: R,
10111         /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
10112         /// deserialization.
10113         pub logger: L,
10114         /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
10115         /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
10116         pub default_config: UserConfig,
10117
10118         /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
10119         /// value.context.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
10120         ///
10121         /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
10122         /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
10123         /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
10124         /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
10125         ///
10126         /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
10127         /// this struct.
10128         ///
10129         /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
10130         pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>,
10131 }
10132
10133 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10134                 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
10135 where
10136         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
10137         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10138         ES::Target: EntropySource,
10139         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10140         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10141         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10142         R::Target: Router,
10143         L::Target: Logger,
10144 {
10145         /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
10146         /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
10147         /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
10148         pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
10149                         mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>) -> Self {
10150                 Self {
10151                         entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
10152                         channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
10153                 }
10154         }
10155 }
10156
10157 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
10158 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
10159 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10160         ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
10161 where
10162         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
10163         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10164         ES::Target: EntropySource,
10165         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10166         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10167         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10168         R::Target: Router,
10169         L::Target: Logger,
10170 {
10171         fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10172                 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
10173                 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
10174         }
10175 }
10176
10177 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10178         ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
10179 where
10180         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
10181         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10182         ES::Target: EntropySource,
10183         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10184         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10185         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10186         R::Target: Router,
10187         L::Target: Logger,
10188 {
10189         fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10190                 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
10191
10192                 let chain_hash: ChainHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10193                 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10194                 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10195
10196                 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
10197
10198                 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10199                 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10200                 let mut funded_peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10201                 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10202                 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10203                 let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
10204                 let mut close_background_events = Vec::new();
10205                 for _ in 0..channel_count {
10206                         let mut channel: Channel<SP> = Channel::read(reader, (
10207                                 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
10208                         ))?;
10209                         let funding_txo = channel.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
10210                         funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
10211                         if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
10212                                 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
10213                                                 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
10214                                                 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
10215                                                 channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
10216                                         // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
10217                                         log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
10218                                         log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
10219                                         if channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
10220                                                 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
10221                                                         &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
10222                                         }
10223                                         if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() {
10224                                                 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at holder commitment number {} but the ChannelManager is at holder commitment number {}.",
10225                                                         &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number());
10226                                         }
10227                                         if channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() {
10228                                                 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at revoked counterparty transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at revoked counterparty transaction number {}.",
10229                                                         &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
10230                                         }
10231                                         if channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() {
10232                                                 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at counterparty commitment transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at counterparty commitment transaction number {}.",
10233                                                         &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
10234                                         }
10235                                         let mut shutdown_result = channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
10236                                         if shutdown_result.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid.is_some() {
10237                                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10238                                         }
10239                                         if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = shutdown_result.monitor_update {
10240                                                 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
10241                                                         counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
10242                                                 });
10243                                         }
10244                                         failed_htlcs.append(&mut shutdown_result.dropped_outbound_htlcs);
10245                                         channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
10246                                                 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
10247                                                 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
10248                                                 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager,
10249                                                 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
10250                                                 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
10251                                         }, None));
10252                                         for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
10253                                                 let mut found_htlc = false;
10254                                                 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
10255                                                         if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
10256                                                 }
10257                                                 if !found_htlc {
10258                                                         // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
10259                                                         // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
10260                                                         // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
10261                                                         // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
10262                                                         // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
10263                                                         // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
10264                                                         // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
10265                                                         log_info!(args.logger,
10266                                                                 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
10267                                                                 &channel.context.channel_id(), &payment_hash);
10268                                                         failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
10269                                                 }
10270                                         }
10271                                 } else {
10272                                         log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {} at update_id {} against monitor at update id {}",
10273                                                 &channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
10274                                                 monitor.get_latest_update_id());
10275                                         if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
10276                                                 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
10277                                         }
10278                                         if channel.context.is_funding_broadcast() {
10279                                                 id_to_peer.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
10280                                         }
10281                                         match funded_peer_channels.entry(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
10282                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
10283                                                         let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
10284                                                         by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
10285                                                 },
10286                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
10287                                                         let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
10288                                                         by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
10289                                                         entry.insert(by_id_map);
10290                                                 }
10291                                         }
10292                                 }
10293                         } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
10294                                 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
10295                                 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
10296                                 // safely discard the channel.
10297                                 let _ = channel.context.force_shutdown(false);
10298                                 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
10299                                         channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
10300                                         user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
10301                                         reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
10302                                         counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
10303                                         channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
10304                                 }, None));
10305                         } else {
10306                                 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", &channel.context.channel_id());
10307                                 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10308                                 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10309                                 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10310                                 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10311                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10312                         }
10313                 }
10314
10315                 for (funding_txo, _) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
10316                         if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
10317                                 log_info!(args.logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
10318                                         &funding_txo.to_channel_id());
10319                                 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
10320                                         update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
10321                                         updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
10322                                 };
10323                                 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, monitor_update)));
10324                         }
10325                 }
10326
10327                 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
10328                 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10329                 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
10330                 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
10331                         let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
10332                         let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10333                         let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
10334                         for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
10335                                 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
10336                         }
10337                         forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
10338                 }
10339
10340                 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10341                 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
10342                 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
10343                         let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10344                         let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10345                         let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
10346                         for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
10347                                 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
10348                         }
10349                         claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
10350                 }
10351
10352                 let peer_state_from_chans = |channel_by_id| {
10353                         PeerState {
10354                                 channel_by_id,
10355                                 inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
10356                                 latest_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
10357                                 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
10358                                 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
10359                                 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
10360                                 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
10361                                 is_connected: false,
10362                         }
10363                 };
10364
10365                 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10366                 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>)>()));
10367                 for _ in 0..peer_count {
10368                         let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
10369                         let peer_chans = funded_peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new());
10370                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_from_chans(peer_chans);
10371                         peer_state.latest_features = Readable::read(reader)?;
10372                         per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
10373                 }
10374
10375                 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10376                 let mut pending_events_read: VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> =
10377                         VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>()));
10378                 for _ in 0..event_count {
10379                         match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
10380                                 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push_back((event, None)),
10381                                 None => continue,
10382                         }
10383                 }
10384
10385                 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10386                 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
10387                         match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
10388                                 0 => {
10389                                         // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote pending `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here,
10390                                         // however we really don't (and never did) need them - we regenerate all
10391                                         // on-startup monitor updates.
10392                                         let _: OutPoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
10393                                         let _: ChannelMonitorUpdate = Readable::read(reader)?;
10394                                 }
10395                                 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
10396                         }
10397                 }
10398
10399                 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
10400                 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10401
10402                 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10403                 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
10404                 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
10405                         if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
10406                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10407                         }
10408                 }
10409
10410                 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10411                 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
10412                         HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
10413                 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
10414                         let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
10415                         let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
10416                                 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
10417                         };
10418                         if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
10419                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10420                         };
10421                 }
10422
10423                 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
10424                 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
10425                 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
10426                 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
10427                 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
10428                 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
10429                 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
10430                 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
10431                 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
10432                 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
10433                 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer: Option<Vec<(_, BTreeMap<_, Vec<_>>)>> = Some(Vec::new());
10434                 let mut events_override = None;
10435                 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(PublicKey, OutPoint), Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
10436                 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
10437                         (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
10438                         (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
10439                         (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
10440                         (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
10441                         (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
10442                         (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
10443                         (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
10444                         (8, events_override, option),
10445                         (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, optional_vec),
10446                         (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
10447                         (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
10448                         (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
10449                 });
10450                 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
10451                         fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10452                 }
10453
10454                 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
10455                         probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10456                 }
10457
10458                 if let Some(events) = events_override {
10459                         pending_events_read = events;
10460                 }
10461
10462                 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
10463                         pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
10464                 }
10465
10466                 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
10467                         pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
10468                 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
10469                         let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
10470                         for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
10471                                 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
10472                         }
10473                         pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
10474                 }
10475                 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
10476                         pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
10477                         retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
10478                 };
10479
10480                 // We have to replay (or skip, if they were completed after we wrote the `ChannelManager`)
10481                 // each `ChannelMonitorUpdate` in `in_flight_monitor_updates`. After doing so, we have to
10482                 // check that each channel we have isn't newer than the latest `ChannelMonitorUpdate`(s) we
10483                 // replayed, and for each monitor update we have to replay we have to ensure there's a
10484                 // `ChannelMonitor` for it.
10485                 //
10486                 // In order to do so we first walk all of our live channels (so that we can check their
10487                 // state immediately after doing the update replays, when we have the `update_id`s
10488                 // available) and then walk any remaining in-flight updates.
10489                 //
10490                 // Because the actual handling of the in-flight updates is the same, it's macro'ized here:
10491                 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
10492                 macro_rules! handle_in_flight_updates {
10493                         ($counterparty_node_id: expr, $chan_in_flight_upds: expr, $funding_txo: expr,
10494                          $monitor: expr, $peer_state: expr, $channel_info_log: expr
10495                         ) => { {
10496                                 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = 0;
10497                                 $chan_in_flight_upds.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > $monitor.get_latest_update_id());
10498                                 for update in $chan_in_flight_upds.iter() {
10499                                         log_trace!(args.logger, "Replaying ChannelMonitorUpdate {} for {}channel {}",
10500                                                 update.update_id, $channel_info_log, &$funding_txo.to_channel_id());
10501                                         max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id, update.update_id);
10502                                         pending_background_events.push(
10503                                                 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
10504                                                         counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
10505                                                         funding_txo: $funding_txo,
10506                                                         update: update.clone(),
10507                                                 });
10508                                 }
10509                                 if $chan_in_flight_upds.is_empty() {
10510                                         // We had some updates to apply, but it turns out they had completed before we
10511                                         // were serialized, we just weren't notified of that. Thus, we may have to run
10512                                         // the completion actions for any monitor updates, but otherwise are done.
10513                                         pending_background_events.push(
10514                                                 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
10515                                                         counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
10516                                                         channel_id: $funding_txo.to_channel_id(),
10517                                                 });
10518                                 }
10519                                 if $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.insert($funding_txo, $chan_in_flight_upds).is_some() {
10520                                         log_error!(args.logger, "Duplicate in-flight monitor update set for the same channel!");
10521                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10522                                 }
10523                                 max_in_flight_update_id
10524                         } }
10525                 }
10526
10527                 for (counterparty_id, peer_state_mtx) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
10528                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
10529                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10530                         for phase in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
10531                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
10532                                         // Channels that were persisted have to be funded, otherwise they should have been
10533                                         // discarded.
10534                                         let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
10535                                         let monitor = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo)
10536                                                 .expect("We already checked for monitor presence when loading channels");
10537                                         let mut max_in_flight_update_id = monitor.get_latest_update_id();
10538                                         if let Some(in_flight_upds) = &mut in_flight_monitor_updates {
10539                                                 if let Some(mut chan_in_flight_upds) = in_flight_upds.remove(&(*counterparty_id, funding_txo)) {
10540                                                         max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id,
10541                                                                 handle_in_flight_updates!(*counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_upds,
10542                                                                         funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, ""));
10543                                                 }
10544                                         }
10545                                         if chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id() > max_in_flight_update_id {
10546                                                 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
10547                                                 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
10548                                                 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} with update_id through {} in-flight",
10549                                                         chan.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), max_in_flight_update_id);
10550                                                 log_error!(args.logger, " but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.", chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id());
10551                                                 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10552                                                 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10553                                                 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10554                                                 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10555                                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10556                                         }
10557                                 } else {
10558                                         // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
10559                                         // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
10560                                         debug_assert!(false);
10561                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10562                                 }
10563                         }
10564                 }
10565
10566                 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = in_flight_monitor_updates {
10567                         for ((counterparty_id, funding_txo), mut chan_in_flight_updates) in in_flight_upds {
10568                                 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
10569                                         // Now that we've removed all the in-flight monitor updates for channels that are
10570                                         // still open, we need to replay any monitor updates that are for closed channels,
10571                                         // creating the neccessary peer_state entries as we go.
10572                                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_id).or_insert_with(|| {
10573                                                 Mutex::new(peer_state_from_chans(HashMap::new()))
10574                                         });
10575                                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10576                                         handle_in_flight_updates!(counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_updates,
10577                                                 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, "closed ");
10578                                 } else {
10579                                         log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is missing even though we have in-flight updates for it! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
10580                                         log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is missing.",
10581                                                 &funding_txo.to_channel_id());
10582                                         log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10583                                         log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10584                                         log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10585                                         log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10586                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10587                                 }
10588                         }
10589                 }
10590
10591                 // Note that we have to do the above replays before we push new monitor updates.
10592                 pending_background_events.append(&mut close_background_events);
10593
10594                 // If there's any preimages for forwarded HTLCs hanging around in ChannelMonitors we
10595                 // should ensure we try them again on the inbound edge. We put them here and do so after we
10596                 // have a fully-constructed `ChannelManager` at the end.
10597                 let mut pending_claims_to_replay = Vec::new();
10598
10599                 {
10600                         // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
10601                         // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
10602                         // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
10603                         // corresponding `Channel` at all).
10604                         // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
10605                         // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
10606                         // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
10607                         // 0.0.102+
10608                         for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
10609                                 let counterparty_opt = id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
10610                                 if counterparty_opt.is_none() {
10611                                         for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
10612                                                 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
10613                                                         if path.hops.is_empty() {
10614                                                                 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
10615                                                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10616                                                         }
10617
10618                                                         let path_amt = path.final_value_msat();
10619                                                         let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
10620                                                         session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
10621                                                         match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
10622                                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
10623                                                                         let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
10624                                                                         log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
10625                                                                                 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), &htlc.payment_hash);
10626                                                                 },
10627                                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
10628                                                                         let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
10629                                                                         entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
10630                                                                                 retry_strategy: None,
10631                                                                                 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
10632                                                                                 payment_params: None,
10633                                                                                 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
10634                                                                                 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
10635                                                                                 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10636                                                                                 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10637                                                                                 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10638                                                                                 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(), // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10639                                                                                 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
10640                                                                                 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
10641                                                                                 total_msat: path_amt,
10642                                                                                 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
10643                                                                                 remaining_max_total_routing_fee_msat: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10644                                                                         });
10645                                                                         log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
10646                                                                                 path_amt, &htlc.payment_hash,  log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
10647                                                                 }
10648                                                         }
10649                                                 }
10650                                         }
10651                                         for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
10652                                                 match htlc_source {
10653                                                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
10654                                                                 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
10655                                                                         info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
10656                                                                                 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
10657                                                                 };
10658                                                                 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
10659                                                                 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
10660                                                                 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
10661                                                                 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
10662                                                                 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
10663                                                                 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
10664                                                                         forwards.retain(|forward| {
10665                                                                                 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
10666                                                                                         if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
10667                                                                                                 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
10668                                                                                                         &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
10669                                                                                                 false
10670                                                                                         } else { true }
10671                                                                                 } else { true }
10672                                                                         });
10673                                                                         !forwards.is_empty()
10674                                                                 });
10675                                                                 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
10676                                                                         if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
10677                                                                                 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
10678                                                                                         &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
10679                                                                                 pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
10680                                                                                         if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
10681                                                                                                 intercepted_id != ev_id
10682                                                                                         } else { true }
10683                                                                                 });
10684                                                                                 false
10685                                                                         } else { true }
10686                                                                 });
10687                                                         },
10688                                                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
10689                                                                 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
10690                                                                         let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
10691                                                                         // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
10692                                                                         // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
10693                                                                         // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
10694                                                                         // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
10695                                                                         // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
10696                                                                         // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
10697                                                                         // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
10698                                                                         // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
10699                                                                         let compl_action =
10700                                                                                 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
10701                                                                                         channel_funding_outpoint: monitor.get_funding_txo().0,
10702                                                                                         counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
10703                                                                                 };
10704                                                                         pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv,
10705                                                                                 path, false, compl_action, &pending_events, &args.logger);
10706                                                                         pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
10707                                                                 }
10708                                                         },
10709                                                 }
10710                                         }
10711                                 }
10712
10713                                 // Whether the downstream channel was closed or not, try to re-apply any payment
10714                                 // preimages from it which may be needed in upstream channels for forwarded
10715                                 // payments.
10716                                 let outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter = monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs()
10717                                         .into_iter()
10718                                         .filter_map(|(htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt))| {
10719                                                 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(_) = htlc_source {
10720                                                         if let Some(payment_preimage) = preimage_opt {
10721                                                                 Some((htlc_source, payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat,
10722                                                                         // Check if `counterparty_opt.is_none()` to see if the
10723                                                                         // downstream chan is closed (because we don't have a
10724                                                                         // channel_id -> peer map entry).
10725                                                                         counterparty_opt.is_none(),
10726                                                                         counterparty_opt.cloned().or(monitor.get_counterparty_node_id()),
10727                                                                         monitor.get_funding_txo().0))
10728                                                         } else { None }
10729                                                 } else {
10730                                                         // If it was an outbound payment, we've handled it above - if a preimage
10731                                                         // came in and we persisted the `ChannelManager` we either handled it and
10732                                                         // are good to go or the channel force-closed - we don't have to handle the
10733                                                         // channel still live case here.
10734                                                         None
10735                                                 }
10736                                         });
10737                                 for tuple in outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter {
10738                                         pending_claims_to_replay.push(tuple);
10739                                 }
10740                         }
10741                 }
10742
10743                 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
10744                         // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
10745                         // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
10746                         // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
10747                         // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
10748                         // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
10749                         pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
10750                                 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
10751                         }, None));
10752                 }
10753
10754                 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
10755                 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
10756
10757                 let mut claimable_payments = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
10758                 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
10759                         if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
10760                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10761                         }
10762                         if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
10763                                 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
10764                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10765                                 }
10766                                 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
10767                                         purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
10768                                 {
10769                                         let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
10770                                                 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
10771                                         });
10772                                         if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
10773                                 }
10774                         } else {
10775                                 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
10776                                         let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
10777                                                 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
10778                                         });
10779                                         if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
10780                                 }
10781                         }
10782                 } else {
10783                         // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
10784                         // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
10785                         for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
10786                                 if htlcs.is_empty() {
10787                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10788                                 }
10789                                 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
10790                                         OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
10791                                                 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
10792                                                         events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
10793                                                                 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
10794                                                                         Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
10795                                                                         None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
10796                                                                                 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
10797                                                                                 Err(()) => {
10798                                                                                         log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", &payment_hash);
10799                                                                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10800                                                                                 }
10801                                                                         }
10802                                                                 },
10803                                                                 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
10804                                                         }
10805                                                 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
10806                                         },
10807                                         OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
10808                                                 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
10809                                 };
10810                                 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
10811                                         purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
10812                                 });
10813                         }
10814                 }
10815
10816                 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10817                 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10818
10819                 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
10820                         Ok(key) => key,
10821                         Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10822                 };
10823                 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
10824                         if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
10825                                 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
10826                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10827                         }
10828                 }
10829
10830                 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
10831                 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
10832                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10833                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10834                         for (chan_id, phase) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
10835                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
10836                                         if chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
10837                                                 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
10838                                                 loop {
10839                                                         outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
10840                                                                 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &chain_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
10841                                                         if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
10842                                                 }
10843                                                 chan.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
10844                                         } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias()) {
10845                                                 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
10846                                                 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
10847                                                 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
10848                                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10849                                         }
10850                                         if chan.context.is_usable() {
10851                                                 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
10852                                                         // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
10853                                                         // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
10854                                                         log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
10855                                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10856                                                 }
10857                                         }
10858                                 } else {
10859                                         // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
10860                                         // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
10861                                         debug_assert!(false);
10862                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10863                                 }
10864                         }
10865                 }
10866
10867                 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
10868
10869                 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
10870                         for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
10871                                 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
10872                                         log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", &payment_hash);
10873                                         let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
10874                                         let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
10875                                         let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
10876                                         if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
10877                                                 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
10878                                                         .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
10879                                                 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
10880                                         }
10881                                         for claimable_htlc in &payment.htlcs {
10882                                                 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
10883
10884                                                 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
10885                                                 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
10886                                                 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
10887                                                 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
10888                                                 //
10889                                                 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
10890                                                 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
10891                                                 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
10892                                                 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
10893                                                 // reason to.
10894                                                 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
10895                                                 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
10896                                                 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
10897                                                 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
10898                                                 // restart.
10899                                                 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
10900                                                 if let Some(peer_node_id) = id_to_peer.get(&previous_channel_id){
10901                                                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
10902                                                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10903                                                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10904                                                         if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(channel)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
10905                                                                 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
10906                                                         }
10907                                                 }
10908                                                 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
10909                                                         previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
10910                                                 }
10911                                         }
10912                                         pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
10913                                                 receiver_node_id,
10914                                                 payment_hash,
10915                                                 purpose: payment.purpose,
10916                                                 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
10917                                                 htlcs: payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect(),
10918                                                 sender_intended_total_msat: payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat),
10919                                         }, None));
10920                                 }
10921                         }
10922                 }
10923
10924                 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
10925                         if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
10926                                 for (_, actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions.iter() {
10927                                         for action in actions.iter() {
10928                                                 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
10929                                                         downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
10930                                                                 Some((blocked_node_id, blocked_channel_outpoint, blocking_action)), ..
10931                                                 } = action {
10932                                                         if let Some(blocked_peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&blocked_node_id) {
10933                                                                 log_trace!(args.logger,
10934                                                                         "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
10935                                                                         blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id());
10936                                                                 blocked_peer_state.lock().unwrap().actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
10937                                                                         .entry(blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id())
10938                                                                         .or_insert_with(Vec::new).push(blocking_action.clone());
10939                                                         } else {
10940                                                                 // If the channel we were blocking has closed, we don't need to
10941                                                                 // worry about it - the blocked monitor update should never have
10942                                                                 // been released from the `Channel` object so it can't have
10943                                                                 // completed, and if the channel closed there's no reason to bother
10944                                                                 // anymore.
10945                                                         }
10946                                                 }
10947                                                 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately { .. } = action {
10948                                                         debug_assert!(false, "Non-event-generating channel freeing should not appear in our queue");
10949                                                 }
10950                                         }
10951                                 }
10952                                 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
10953                         } else {
10954                                 log_error!(args.logger, "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
10955                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10956                         }
10957                 }
10958
10959                 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
10960                         chain_hash,
10961                         fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
10962                         chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
10963                         tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
10964                         router: args.router,
10965
10966                         best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
10967
10968                         inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
10969                         pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
10970                         pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
10971                         pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
10972
10973                         forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
10974                         claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
10975                         outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
10976                         id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
10977                         short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
10978                         fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
10979
10980                         probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
10981
10982                         our_network_pubkey,
10983                         secp_ctx,
10984
10985                         highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
10986
10987                         per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
10988
10989                         pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
10990                         pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
10991                         pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
10992                         total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
10993                         background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
10994
10995                         event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
10996                         needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
10997
10998                         funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
10999
11000                         pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
11001
11002                         entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
11003                         node_signer: args.node_signer,
11004                         signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
11005
11006                         logger: args.logger,
11007                         default_configuration: args.default_config,
11008                 };
11009
11010                 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
11011                         let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
11012                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
11013                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
11014                         channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
11015                 }
11016
11017                 for (source, preimage, downstream_value, downstream_closed, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding) in pending_claims_to_replay {
11018                         // We use `downstream_closed` in place of `from_onchain` here just as a guess - we
11019                         // don't remember in the `ChannelMonitor` where we got a preimage from, but if the
11020                         // channel is closed we just assume that it probably came from an on-chain claim.
11021                         channel_manager.claim_funds_internal(source, preimage, Some(downstream_value),
11022                                 downstream_closed, true, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding);
11023                 }
11024
11025                 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
11026                 //connection or two.
11027
11028                 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
11029         }
11030 }
11031
11032 #[cfg(test)]
11033 mod tests {
11034         use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
11035         use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
11036         use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
11037         use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
11038         use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
11039         use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
11040         use crate::ln::ChannelId;
11041         use crate::ln::channelmanager::{create_recv_pending_htlc_info, inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
11042         use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, NodeFeatures};
11043         use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
11044         use crate::ln::msgs::{self, ErrorAction};
11045         use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
11046         use crate::routing::router::{Path, PaymentParameters, RouteHop, RouteParameters, find_route};
11047         use crate::util::errors::APIError;
11048         use crate::util::test_utils;
11049         use crate::util::config::{ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
11050         use crate::sign::EntropySource;
11051
11052         #[test]
11053         fn test_notify_limits() {
11054                 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
11055                 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
11056                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
11057                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
11058                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
11059                 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11060
11061                 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
11062                 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
11063                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11064                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11065                 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11066
11067                 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11068
11069                 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
11070                 // to connect messages with new values
11071                 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
11072                 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
11073                 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
11074                         &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
11075                 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
11076                         &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
11077
11078                 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
11079                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11080                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11081                 // ... but the last node should not.
11082                 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11083                 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
11084                 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11085                 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11086
11087                 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
11088                 // about the channel.
11089                 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
11090                 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
11091                 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11092
11093                 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
11094                 // parties.
11095                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
11096                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
11097                 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
11098                 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
11099                 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11100                 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11101
11102                 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
11103                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
11104                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
11105
11106                 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
11107                 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
11108                 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
11109                 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
11110                 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
11111                 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
11112
11113                 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
11114                 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
11115                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
11116                 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
11117                 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11118                 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11119                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
11120                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
11121
11122                 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
11123                 // the channel info has updated.
11124                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
11125                 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
11126                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11127                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11128                 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
11129                 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
11130         }
11131
11132         #[test]
11133         fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
11134                 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
11135                 // expected.
11136                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11137                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11138                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11139                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11140                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11141
11142                 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
11143                 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
11144                 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
11145                 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
11146
11147                 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
11148                 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
11149                 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
11150                 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
11151                 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
11152                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
11153                 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
11154                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
11155                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11156                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11157                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11158                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
11159
11160                 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
11161                 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11162                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11163                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11164                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11165                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11166                 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11167                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11168                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11169                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11170                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11171                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11172                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
11173                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11174                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11175                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11176                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11177                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11178                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11179                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11180                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11181                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11182                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
11183
11184                 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
11185                 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
11186                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
11187                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11188                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11189                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11190                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
11191
11192                 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
11193                 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
11194                 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
11195                 // lightning messages manually.
11196                 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
11197                 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
11198                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
11199
11200                 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11201                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
11202                 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
11203                 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
11204                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11205                 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11206                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
11207                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11208                 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11209                 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
11210                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11211                 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11212                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
11213                 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
11214                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11215                 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11216                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
11217                 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11218                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11219                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
11220                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11221                 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
11222                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11223                 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11224                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
11225                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11226
11227                 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
11228                 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
11229                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11230                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
11231                 match events[0] {
11232                         Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
11233                                 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
11234                                 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
11235                                 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
11236                         },
11237                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11238                 }
11239                 match events[1] {
11240                         Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
11241                                 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
11242                                 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
11243                                 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
11244                         },
11245                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11246                 }
11247         }
11248
11249         #[test]
11250         fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
11251                 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(false);
11252                 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(true);
11253         }
11254
11255         fn do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(accept_mpp_keysend: bool) {
11256                 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
11257                 //      outbound regular payment fails as expected.
11258                 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
11259                 //      fails as expected.
11260                 // (3): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend
11261                 //      payment fails as expected. When `accept_mpp_keysend` is false, this tests that we
11262                 //      reject MPP keysend payments, since in this case where the payment has no payment
11263                 //      secret, a keysend payment with a duplicate hash is basically an MPP keysend. If
11264                 //      `accept_mpp_keysend` is true, this tests that we only accept MPP keysends with
11265                 //      payment secrets and reject otherwise.
11266                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11267                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11268                 let mut mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
11269                 mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = accept_mpp_keysend;
11270                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
11271                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11272                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11273                 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11274                 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11275
11276                 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
11277                 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
11278                 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
11279
11280                 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
11281                 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11282                         PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(),
11283                         TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false), 100_000);
11284                 let route = find_route(
11285                         &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11286                         None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11287                 ).unwrap();
11288                 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11289                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11290                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11291                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11292                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11293                 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11294                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11295                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11296                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11297                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11298                 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
11299                 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
11300                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11301                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11302                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11303                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11304                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11305                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11306                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11307                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11308                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11309                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11310                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11311                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11312
11313                 // Finally, claim the original payment.
11314                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11315
11316                 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
11317                 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11318                 let route = find_route(
11319                         &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11320                         None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11321                 ).unwrap();
11322                 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11323                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11324                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11325                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11326                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11327                 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
11328                 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
11329                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
11330
11331                 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
11332                 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
11333                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
11334                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
11335                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11336                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11337                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11338                 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11339                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11340                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11341                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11342                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11343                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11344                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11345                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11346                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11347                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11348                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11349                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11350                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11351                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11352                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11353                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11354                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11355
11356                 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
11357                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11358
11359                 // To start (3), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
11360                 let payment_id_1 = PaymentId([44; 32]);
11361                 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11362                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_1).unwrap();
11363                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11364                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11365                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11366                 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
11367                 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
11368                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
11369
11370                 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
11371                 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11372                         PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
11373                         100_000
11374                 );
11375                 let route = find_route(
11376                         &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11377                         None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11378                 ).unwrap();
11379                 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId([45; 32]);
11380                 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11381                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_2).unwrap();
11382                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11383                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11384                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11385                 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11386                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11387                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11388                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11389                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11390                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11391                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11392                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11393                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11394                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11395                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11396                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11397                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11398                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11399                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11400                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11401                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11402
11403                 // Finally, claim the original payment.
11404                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11405         }
11406
11407         #[test]
11408         fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
11409                 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
11410                 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
11411                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11412                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11413                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11414                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11415
11416                 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
11417                 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11418
11419                 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
11420                 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11421                         PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
11422                 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
11423                 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
11424                 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11425                 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11426                 let route = find_route(
11427                         &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
11428                         nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11429                 ).unwrap();
11430
11431                 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11432                 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
11433                 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
11434                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
11435                 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
11436                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
11437                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11438
11439                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11440                 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
11441                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11442                 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
11443                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11444                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11445                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
11446
11447                 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
11448         }
11449
11450         #[test]
11451         fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
11452                 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment
11453                 // secret when we don't support MPP keysend.
11454                 let mut reject_mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
11455                 reject_mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = false;
11456                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11457                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11458                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(reject_mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
11459                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11460
11461                 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
11462                 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11463
11464                 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
11465                 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11466                         PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
11467                 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
11468                 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
11469                 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11470                 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11471                 let route = find_route(
11472                         &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
11473                         nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11474                 ).unwrap();
11475
11476                 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11477                 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
11478                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).to_byte_array());
11479                 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
11480                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
11481                 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
11482                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
11483                         PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
11484                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11485
11486                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11487                 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
11488                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11489                 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
11490                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11491                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11492                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
11493
11494                 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
11495         }
11496
11497         #[test]
11498         fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
11499                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
11500                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
11501                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
11502                 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11503
11504                 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11505                 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11506                 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11507                 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11508
11509                 // Marshall an MPP route.
11510                 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
11511                 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
11512                 route.paths.push(path);
11513                 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11514                 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
11515                 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
11516                 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
11517                 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
11518                 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
11519
11520                 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
11521                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
11522                 .unwrap_err() {
11523                         PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
11524                                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
11525                         },
11526                         _ => panic!("unexpected error")
11527                 }
11528         }
11529
11530         #[test]
11531         fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
11532                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11533                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11534                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11535                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11536
11537                 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11538
11539                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11540                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11541
11542                 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
11543                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
11544                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11545                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
11546
11547                 {
11548                         // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
11549                         // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
11550                         let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
11551                         // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
11552                         assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
11553                         assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
11554                 }
11555
11556                 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
11557
11558                 {
11559                         // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
11560                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
11561                 }
11562         }
11563
11564         #[test]
11565         fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
11566                 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
11567                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11568                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11569                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11570                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11571
11572                 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
11573                 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
11574                         payment_secret,
11575                         total_msat: 100_000,
11576                 };
11577
11578                 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
11579                 // payment verification fails as expected.
11580                 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
11581                 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
11582                 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
11583                         Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
11584                         Err(()) => {
11585                                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
11586                         }
11587                 }
11588
11589                 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
11590                 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
11591         }
11592
11593         #[test]
11594         fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
11595                 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
11596                 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
11597                 // the channel is successfully closed.
11598                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11599                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11600                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11601                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11602
11603                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11604                 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11605                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
11606                 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11607                 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
11608
11609                 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
11610                 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes(tx.txid().to_byte_array());
11611                 {
11612                         // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
11613                         // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
11614                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11615                         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11616                 }
11617
11618                 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
11619                 {
11620                         // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
11621                         // as it has the funding transaction.
11622                         let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11623                         assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
11624                         assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11625                 }
11626
11627                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11628
11629                 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11630
11631                 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
11632                 {
11633                         let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11634                         assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
11635                         assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11636                 }
11637                 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11638
11639                 {
11640                         // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
11641                         // as it has the funding transaction.
11642                         let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11643                         assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
11644                         assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11645                 }
11646                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11647                 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11648                 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
11649                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11650                 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11651                 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
11652                 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
11653                 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
11654
11655                 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
11656                 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
11657                 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11658                 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
11659
11660                 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11661                 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
11662                 {
11663                         // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
11664                         // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
11665                         // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
11666                         // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
11667                         let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11668                         assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
11669                         assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11670                 }
11671
11672                 {
11673                         // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
11674                         // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
11675                         // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
11676                         // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
11677                         let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11678                         assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
11679                         assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11680                 }
11681
11682                 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
11683                 {
11684                         // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
11685                         // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
11686                         // closing transaction).
11687                         // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
11688                         // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
11689                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11690
11691                         // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s  `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
11692                         // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
11693                         let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11694                         assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
11695                         assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11696                 }
11697
11698                 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11699
11700                 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
11701                 {
11702                         // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
11703                         // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
11704                         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11705                 }
11706                 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11707
11708                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
11709                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
11710         }
11711
11712         fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
11713                 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
11714                 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11715         }
11716
11717         fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
11718                 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
11719                 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11720         }
11721
11722         fn check_channel_unavailable_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_channel_id: ChannelId, peer_node_id: PublicKey) {
11723                 let expected_message = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_channel_id, peer_node_id);
11724                 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11725         }
11726
11727         fn check_api_misuse_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
11728                 let expected_message = "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_string();
11729                 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11730         }
11731
11732         fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
11733                 match res_err {
11734                         Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
11735                                 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
11736                         },
11737                         Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
11738                                 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
11739                         },
11740                         Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
11741                         Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
11742                 }
11743         }
11744
11745         #[test]
11746         fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
11747                 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
11748                 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
11749                 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
11750                 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11751                 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
11752                 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
11753                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11754
11755                 // Dummy values
11756                 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
11757                 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
11758                 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
11759
11760                 // Test the API functions.
11761                 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None), unkown_public_key);
11762
11763                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
11764
11765                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
11766
11767                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
11768
11769                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
11770
11771                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
11772
11773                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
11774         }
11775
11776         #[test]
11777         fn test_api_calls_with_unavailable_channel() {
11778                 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` and a `channel_id`
11779                 // as input, behaves as expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is a known peer in the
11780                 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map, but the peer state doesn't contain a channel with
11781                 // the given `channel_id`.
11782                 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11783                 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
11784                 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
11785                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11786
11787                 let counterparty_node_id = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11788
11789                 // Dummy values
11790                 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
11791
11792                 // Test the API functions.
11793                 check_api_misuse_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, 42));
11794
11795                 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11796
11797                 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11798
11799                 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11800
11801                 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(InterceptId([0; 32]), &channel_id, counterparty_node_id, 1_000_000), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11802
11803                 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&counterparty_node_id, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11804         }
11805
11806         #[test]
11807         fn test_connection_limiting() {
11808                 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
11809                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11810                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11811                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11812                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11813
11814                 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
11815
11816                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11817                 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11818
11819                 let mut funding_tx = None;
11820                 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
11821                         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11822                         let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11823
11824                         if idx == 0 {
11825                                 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
11826                                 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
11827                                 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
11828                                 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
11829                                 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11830
11831                                 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
11832                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11833                                 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11834
11835                                 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11836
11837                                 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
11838                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11839                                 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11840                         }
11841                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11842                 }
11843
11844                 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
11845                 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11846                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11847                 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
11848                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11849
11850                 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
11851                 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
11852                 // limit.
11853                 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
11854                 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
11855                         let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11856                                 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11857                         peer_pks.push(random_pk);
11858                         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11859                                 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11860                         }, true).unwrap();
11861                 }
11862                 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11863                         &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11864                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11865                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11866                 }, true).unwrap_err();
11867
11868                 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
11869                 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
11870                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11871                 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11872                 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
11873                 for ev in chan_closed_events {
11874                         if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
11875                 }
11876                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11877                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11878                 }, true).unwrap();
11879                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
11880                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11881                 }, true).unwrap_err();
11882
11883                 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
11884                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
11885                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11886                 }, false).unwrap();
11887                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11888
11889                 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
11890                 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
11891                 // open channels.
11892                 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
11893                 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
11894                         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
11895                         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
11896                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11897                 }
11898                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11899                 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
11900                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11901
11902                 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
11903                 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11904                 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
11905
11906                 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
11907                 // "protected" and can connect again.
11908                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
11909                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
11910                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11911                 }, true).unwrap();
11912                 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11913
11914                 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
11915                 // last_random_pk.
11916                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11917                 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
11918         }
11919
11920         #[test]
11921         fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
11922                 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
11923                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11924                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11925                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11926                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11927
11928                 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
11929
11930                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11931                 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11932
11933                 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
11934                         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11935                         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11936                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11937                 }
11938
11939                 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
11940                 // rejected.
11941                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11942                 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
11943                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11944
11945                 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
11946                 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11947                 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11948
11949                 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
11950                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11951                 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
11952                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11953         }
11954
11955         #[test]
11956         fn test_0conf_limiting() {
11957                 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
11958                 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
11959                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11960                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11961                 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
11962                 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
11963                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
11964                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11965
11966                 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
11967
11968                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11969                 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11970
11971                 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
11972                 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
11973                         let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11974                                 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11975                         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11976                                 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11977                         }, true).unwrap();
11978
11979                         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11980                         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11981                         match events[0] {
11982                                 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
11983                                         nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
11984                                 }
11985                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11986                         }
11987                         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
11988                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11989                 }
11990
11991                 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
11992                 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11993                         &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11994                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11995                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11996                 }, true).unwrap();
11997                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11998                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11999                 match events[0] {
12000                         Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
12001                                 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
12002                                         Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
12003                                                 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
12004                                         _ => panic!(),
12005                                 }
12006                         }
12007                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12008                 }
12009                 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
12010                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
12011
12012                 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
12013                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12014                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12015                 match events[0] {
12016                         Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
12017                                 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
12018                         }
12019                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12020                 }
12021                 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
12022         }
12023
12024         #[test]
12025         fn reject_excessively_underpaying_htlcs() {
12026                 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
12027                 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
12028                 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
12029                 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12030                 let sender_intended_amt_msat = 100;
12031                 let extra_fee_msat = 10;
12032                 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
12033                         amt_msat: 100,
12034                         outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
12035                         payment_metadata: None,
12036                         keysend_preimage: None,
12037                         payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
12038                                 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
12039                         }),
12040                         custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
12041                 };
12042                 // Check that if the amount we received + the penultimate hop extra fee is less than the sender
12043                 // intended amount, we fail the payment.
12044                 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
12045                 if let Err(crate::ln::channelmanager::InboundOnionErr { err_code, .. }) =
12046                         create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
12047                                 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat - 1, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat),
12048                                 current_height, node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
12049                 {
12050                         assert_eq!(err_code, 19);
12051                 } else { panic!(); }
12052
12053                 // If amt_received + extra_fee is equal to the sender intended amount, we're fine.
12054                 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { // This is the same payload as above, InboundOnionPayload doesn't implement Clone
12055                         amt_msat: 100,
12056                         outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
12057                         payment_metadata: None,
12058                         keysend_preimage: None,
12059                         payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
12060                                 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
12061                         }),
12062                         custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
12063                 };
12064                 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
12065                 assert!(create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
12066                         sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat),
12067                         current_height, node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend).is_ok());
12068         }
12069
12070         #[test]
12071         fn test_final_incorrect_cltv(){
12072                 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
12073                 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
12074                 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
12075                 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12076
12077                 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
12078                 let result = create_recv_pending_htlc_info(msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
12079                         amt_msat: 100,
12080                         outgoing_cltv_value: 22,
12081                         payment_metadata: None,
12082                         keysend_preimage: None,
12083                         payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
12084                                 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: 100,
12085                         }),
12086                         custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
12087                 }, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]), 100, 23, None, true, None, current_height,
12088                         node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend);
12089
12090                 // Should not return an error as this condition:
12091                 // https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/4dcc377209509b13cf89a4b91fde7d478f5b46d8/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L334
12092                 // is not satisfied.
12093                 assert!(result.is_ok());
12094         }
12095
12096         #[test]
12097         fn test_inbound_anchors_manual_acceptance() {
12098                 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
12099                 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
12100                 let mut anchors_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
12101                 anchors_cfg.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
12102
12103                 let mut anchors_manual_accept_cfg = anchors_cfg.clone();
12104                 anchors_manual_accept_cfg.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
12105
12106                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
12107                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
12108                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs,
12109                         &[Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_manual_accept_cfg.clone())]);
12110                 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12111
12112                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12113                 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12114
12115                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12116                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
12117                 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12118                 match &msg_events[0] {
12119                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } => {
12120                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12121                                 match action {
12122                                         ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } =>
12123                                                 assert_eq!(msg.data, "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned()),
12124                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected error action"),
12125                                 }
12126                         }
12127                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12128                 }
12129
12130                 nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12131                 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12132                 match events[0] {
12133                         Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } =>
12134                                 nodes[2].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap(),
12135                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12136                 }
12137                 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12138         }
12139
12140         #[test]
12141         fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
12142                 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
12143                 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
12144                 // the channel without the anchors feature.
12145                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12146                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12147                 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
12148                 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
12149                 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
12150                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
12151                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12152
12153                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None, None).unwrap();
12154                 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12155                 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
12156
12157                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12158                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12159                 match events[0] {
12160                         Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
12161                                 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
12162                         }
12163                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12164                 }
12165
12166                 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12167                 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
12168
12169                 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12170                 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
12171
12172                 // Since nodes[1] should not have accepted the channel, it should
12173                 // not have generated any events.
12174                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
12175         }
12176
12177         #[test]
12178         fn test_update_channel_config() {
12179                 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12180                 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
12181                 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
12182                 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
12183                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12184                 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12185                 let channel = &nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0];
12186
12187                 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
12188                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12189                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
12190
12191                 user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat += 10;
12192                 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
12193                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_base_msat, user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat);
12194                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12195                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12196                 match &events[0] {
12197                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12198                         _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
12199                 }
12200
12201                 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate::default()).unwrap();
12202                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12203                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
12204
12205                 let new_cltv_expiry_delta = user_config.channel_config.cltv_expiry_delta + 6;
12206                 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
12207                         cltv_expiry_delta: Some(new_cltv_expiry_delta),
12208                         ..Default::default()
12209                 }).unwrap();
12210                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
12211                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12212                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12213                 match &events[0] {
12214                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12215                         _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
12216                 }
12217
12218                 let new_fee = user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths + 100;
12219                 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
12220                         forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
12221                         ..Default::default()
12222                 }).unwrap();
12223                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
12224                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, new_fee);
12225                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12226                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12227                 match &events[0] {
12228                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12229                         _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
12230                 }
12231
12232                 // If we provide a channel_id not associated with the peer, we should get an error and no updates
12233                 // should be applied to ensure update atomicity as specified in the API docs.
12234                 let bad_channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_txid(&[10; 32], 10);
12235                 let current_fee = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths;
12236                 let new_fee = current_fee + 100;
12237                 assert!(
12238                         matches!(
12239                                 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id, bad_channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
12240                                         forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
12241                                         ..Default::default()
12242                                 }),
12243                                 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: _ }),
12244                         )
12245                 );
12246                 // Check that the fee hasn't changed for the channel that exists.
12247                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, current_fee);
12248                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12249                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
12250         }
12251
12252         #[test]
12253         fn test_payment_display() {
12254                 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
12255                 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_id), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
12256                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
12257                 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_hash), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
12258                 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
12259                 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_preimage), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
12260         }
12261
12262         #[test]
12263         fn test_trigger_lnd_force_close() {
12264                 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12265                 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
12266                 let user_config = test_default_channel_config();
12267                 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
12268                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12269
12270                 // Open a channel, immediately disconnect each other, and broadcast Alice's latest state.
12271                 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12272                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12273                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12274                 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
12275                 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
12276                 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
12277                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12278                 {
12279                         let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
12280                         assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
12281                         check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
12282                 }
12283
12284                 // Since they're disconnected, Bob won't receive Alice's `Error` message. Reconnect them
12285                 // such that Bob sends a `ChannelReestablish` to Alice since the channel is still open from
12286                 // their side.
12287                 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12288                         features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12289                 }, true).unwrap();
12290                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12291                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12292                 }, false).unwrap();
12293                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
12294                 let channel_reestablish = get_event_msg!(
12295                         nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()
12296                 );
12297                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channel_reestablish);
12298
12299                 // Alice should respond with an error since the channel isn't known, but a bogus
12300                 // `ChannelReestablish` should be sent first, such that we actually trigger Bob to force
12301                 // close even if it was an lnd node.
12302                 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12303                 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
12304                 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { node_id, msg } = &msg_events[0] {
12305                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12306                         assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 0);
12307                         assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0);
12308                         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
12309                 } else { panic!() };
12310                 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[1], 1, true);
12311                 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
12312                 let expected_close_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError {
12313                         err: "Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_string()
12314                 };
12315                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, expected_close_reason, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12316                 {
12317                         let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
12318                         assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
12319                         check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
12320                 }
12321         }
12322
12323         #[test]
12324         fn test_peel_payment_onion() {
12325                 use super::*;
12326                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
12327
12328                 let bob = crate::sign::KeysManager::new(&[2; 32], 42, 42);
12329                 let bob_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &bob.get_node_secret_key());
12330                 let charlie = crate::sign::KeysManager::new(&[3; 32], 42, 42);
12331                 let charlie_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &charlie.get_node_secret_key());
12332
12333                 let (session_priv, total_amt_msat, cur_height, recipient_onion, preimage, payment_hash,
12334                         prng_seed, hops, recipient_amount, pay_secret) = payment_onion_args(bob_pk, charlie_pk);
12335
12336                 let path = Path {
12337                         hops: hops,
12338                         blinded_tail: None,
12339                 };
12340
12341                 let (amount_msat, cltv_expiry, onion) = create_payment_onion(
12342                         &secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv, total_amt_msat, recipient_onion, cur_height,
12343                         payment_hash, Some(preimage), prng_seed
12344                 ).unwrap();
12345
12346                 let msg = make_update_add_msg(amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, onion);
12347                 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("bob".to_string());
12348
12349                 let peeled = peel_payment_onion(&msg, &&bob, &&logger, &secp_ctx, cur_height, true)
12350                         .map_err(|e| e.msg).unwrap();
12351
12352                 let next_onion = match peeled.routing {
12353                         PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: _ } => {
12354                                 onion_packet
12355                         },
12356                         _ => panic!("expected a forwarded onion"),
12357                 };
12358
12359                 let msg2 = make_update_add_msg(amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, next_onion);
12360                 let peeled2 = peel_payment_onion(&msg2, &&charlie, &&logger, &secp_ctx, cur_height, true)
12361                         .map_err(|e| e.msg).unwrap();
12362
12363                 match peeled2.routing {
12364                         PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry, .. } => {
12365                                 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, preimage);
12366                                 assert_eq!(peeled2.outgoing_amt_msat, recipient_amount);
12367                                 assert_eq!(incoming_cltv_expiry, peeled2.outgoing_cltv_value);
12368                                 let msgs::FinalOnionHopData{total_msat, payment_secret} = payment_data.unwrap();
12369                                 assert_eq!(total_msat, total_amt_msat);
12370                                 assert_eq!(payment_secret, pay_secret);
12371                         },
12372                         _ => panic!("expected a received keysend"),
12373                 };
12374         }
12375
12376         fn make_update_add_msg(
12377                 amount_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, payment_hash: PaymentHash,
12378                 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket
12379         ) -> msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
12380                 msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
12381                         channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([0; 32]),
12382                         htlc_id: 0,
12383                         amount_msat,
12384                         cltv_expiry,
12385                         payment_hash,
12386                         onion_routing_packet,
12387                         skimmed_fee_msat: None,
12388                 }
12389         }
12390
12391         fn payment_onion_args(hop_pk: PublicKey, recipient_pk: PublicKey) -> (
12392                 SecretKey, u64, u32, RecipientOnionFields, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, [u8; 32],
12393                 Vec<RouteHop>, u64, PaymentSecret,
12394         ) {
12395                 let session_priv_bytes = [42; 32];
12396                 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes).unwrap();
12397                 let total_amt_msat = 1000;
12398                 let cur_height = 1000;
12399                 let pay_secret = PaymentSecret([99; 32]);
12400                 let recipient_onion = RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(pay_secret);
12401                 let preimage_bytes = [43; 32];
12402                 let preimage = PaymentPreimage(preimage_bytes);
12403                 let rhash_bytes = Sha256::hash(&preimage_bytes).to_byte_array();
12404                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(rhash_bytes);
12405                 let prng_seed = [44; 32];
12406
12407                 // make a route alice -> bob -> charlie
12408                 let hop_fee = 1;
12409                 let recipient_amount = total_amt_msat - hop_fee;
12410                 let hops = vec![
12411                         RouteHop {
12412                                 pubkey: hop_pk,
12413                                 fee_msat: hop_fee,
12414                                 cltv_expiry_delta: 42,
12415                                 short_channel_id: 1,
12416                                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
12417                                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
12418                                 maybe_announced_channel: false,
12419                         },
12420                         RouteHop {
12421                                 pubkey: recipient_pk,
12422                                 fee_msat: recipient_amount,
12423                                 cltv_expiry_delta: 42,
12424                                 short_channel_id: 2,
12425                                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
12426                                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
12427                                 maybe_announced_channel: false,
12428                         }
12429                 ];
12430
12431                 (session_priv, total_amt_msat, cur_height, recipient_onion, preimage, payment_hash,
12432                         prng_seed, hops, recipient_amount, pay_secret)
12433         }
12434
12435         pub fn create_payment_onion<T: bitcoin::secp256k1::Signing>(
12436                 secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, path: &Path, session_priv: &SecretKey, total_msat: u64,
12437                 recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, best_block_height: u32, payment_hash: PaymentHash,
12438                 keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, prng_seed: [u8; 32]
12439         ) -> Result<(u64, u32, msgs::OnionPacket), ()> {
12440                 let onion_keys = super::onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv).map_err(|_| ())?;
12441                 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = super::onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(
12442                         &path,
12443                         total_msat,
12444                         recipient_onion,
12445                         best_block_height + 1,
12446                         &keysend_preimage,
12447                 ).map_err(|_| ())?;
12448                 let onion_packet = super::onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(
12449                         onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, &payment_hash
12450                 )?;
12451                 Ok((htlc_msat, htlc_cltv, onion_packet))
12452         }
12453 }
12454
12455 #[cfg(ldk_bench)]
12456 pub mod bench {
12457         use crate::chain::Listen;
12458         use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
12459         use crate::sign::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
12460         use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
12461         use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
12462         use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
12463         use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
12464         use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
12465         use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
12466         use crate::util::test_utils;
12467         use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
12468
12469         use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
12470         use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
12471         use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
12472         use bitcoin::{Block, Transaction, TxOut};
12473
12474         use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock};
12475
12476         use criterion::Criterion;
12477
12478         type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
12479                 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
12480                         &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
12481                         &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
12482                 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
12483                 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
12484                 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
12485
12486         struct ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
12487                 node: &'node_cfg Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>,
12488         }
12489         impl<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg, P> {
12490                 type CM = Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>;
12491                 #[inline]
12492                 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P> { self.node }
12493                 #[inline]
12494                 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
12495         }
12496
12497         pub fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Criterion) {
12498                 bench_two_sends(bench, "bench_sends", test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
12499         }
12500
12501         pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Criterion, bench_name: &str, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
12502                 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
12503                 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
12504                 // calls per node.
12505                 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
12506                 let genesis_block = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network);
12507
12508                 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
12509                 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
12510                 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
12511                 let scorer = RwLock::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
12512                 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &scorer);
12513
12514                 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
12515                 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(5_000_000 / 253);
12516                 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
12517
12518                 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
12519                 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
12520                 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
12521                 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
12522                         network,
12523                         best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
12524                 }, genesis_block.header.time);
12525                 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
12526
12527                 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
12528                 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
12529                 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
12530                 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
12531                 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
12532                         network,
12533                         best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
12534                 }, genesis_block.header.time);
12535                 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
12536
12537                 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
12538                         features: node_b.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12539                 }, true).unwrap();
12540                 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
12541                         features: node_a.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12542                 }, false).unwrap();
12543                 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12544                 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12545                 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12546
12547                 let tx;
12548                 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
12549                         tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
12550                                 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
12551                         }]};
12552                         node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
12553                 } else { panic!(); }
12554
12555                 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12556                 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12557                 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
12558                 match events_b[0] {
12559                         Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12560                                 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12561                         },
12562                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12563                 }
12564
12565                 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12566                 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12567                 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
12568                 match events_a[0] {
12569                         Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12570                                 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
12571                         },
12572                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12573                 }
12574
12575                 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
12576
12577                 let block = create_dummy_block(BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash(), 42, vec![tx]);
12578                 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
12579                 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
12580
12581                 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12582                 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12583                 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
12584                 match msg_events[0] {
12585                         MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
12586                                 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
12587                                 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12588                         },
12589                         _ => panic!(),
12590                 }
12591                 match msg_events[1] {
12592                         MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12593                         _ => panic!(),
12594                 }
12595
12596                 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12597                 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
12598                 match events_a[0] {
12599                         Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12600                                 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
12601                         },
12602                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12603                 }
12604
12605                 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12606                 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
12607                 match events_b[0] {
12608                         Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12609                                 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12610                         },
12611                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12612                 }
12613
12614                 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
12615                 macro_rules! send_payment {
12616                         ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
12617                                 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
12618                                         .with_bolt11_features($node_b.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
12619                                 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
12620                                 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
12621                                 payment_count += 1;
12622                                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array());
12623                                 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
12624
12625                                 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
12626                                         PaymentId(payment_hash.0),
12627                                         RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 10_000),
12628                                         Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
12629                                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
12630                                 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
12631                                 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
12632                                 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
12633                                 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
12634                                 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
12635                                 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12636
12637                                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
12638                                 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
12639                                 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
12640                                 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
12641
12642                                 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
12643                                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
12644                                                 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
12645                                                 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
12646                                                 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
12647                                         },
12648                                         _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
12649                                 }
12650
12651                                 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
12652                                 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
12653                                 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
12654                                 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12655
12656                                 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
12657                         }
12658                 }
12659
12660                 bench.bench_function(bench_name, |b| b.iter(|| {
12661                         send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
12662                         send_payment!(node_b, node_a);
12663                 }));
12664         }
12665 }