1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see routing::router::get_route for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
27 use bitcoin::hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
30 use bitcoin::hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
31 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
35 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
36 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
39 use chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, Watch, BestBlock};
40 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator};
41 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
42 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
43 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
44 // construct one themselves.
45 use ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
46 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
47 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
48 use routing::router::{Payee, Route, RouteHop, RoutePath, RouteParameters};
50 use ln::msgs::NetAddress;
52 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, OptionalField};
53 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
54 use util::config::UserConfig;
55 use util::events::{EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
56 use util::{byte_utils, events};
57 use util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer};
58 use util::chacha20::{ChaCha20, ChaChaReader};
59 use util::logger::{Logger, Level};
60 use util::errors::APIError;
65 use core::cell::RefCell;
66 use io::{Cursor, Read};
67 use sync::{Arc, Condvar, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
68 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
69 use core::time::Duration;
70 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
71 use std::time::Instant;
74 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
76 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
77 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
78 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
80 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
81 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
82 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
83 // before we forward it.
85 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
86 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
87 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
88 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
89 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
91 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
92 enum PendingHTLCRouting {
94 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
95 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
98 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
99 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
102 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
103 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
107 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
108 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
109 routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
110 incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
111 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
112 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
113 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
116 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
117 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
118 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
119 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
122 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
123 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
124 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
125 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
126 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
129 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
131 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
133 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
134 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
135 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
137 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
139 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
143 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
147 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
148 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
149 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
150 short_channel_id: u64,
152 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
154 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
155 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
160 /// Contains a total_msat (which may differ from value if this is a Multi-Path Payment) and a
161 /// payment_secret which prevents path-probing attacks and can associate different HTLCs which
162 /// are part of the same payment.
163 Invoice(msgs::FinalOnionHopData),
164 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
165 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
168 struct ClaimableHTLC {
169 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
172 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
175 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
176 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
177 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
179 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
180 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
185 impl Readable for PaymentId {
186 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
187 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
191 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
192 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
193 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
194 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
195 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
198 session_priv: SecretKey,
199 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
200 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
201 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
202 payment_id: PaymentId,
203 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
204 payee: Option<Payee>,
207 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
208 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
209 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
211 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
213 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
215 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_secret, first_hop_htlc_msat, payee } => {
218 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
219 payment_id.hash(hasher);
220 payment_secret.hash(hasher);
221 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
229 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
230 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
232 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
233 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
234 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
235 payment_secret: None,
241 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
242 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
244 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
252 /// Return value for claim_funds_from_hop
253 enum ClaimFundsFromHop {
255 MonitorUpdateFail(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal, Option<u64>),
260 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
262 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
263 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
264 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
265 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
266 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
268 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
269 err: msgs::LightningError,
270 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u64)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
271 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
273 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
275 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
277 err: LightningError {
279 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
280 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
287 shutdown_finish: None,
291 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
293 err: LightningError {
295 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
298 shutdown_finish: None,
302 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
303 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
306 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u64, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
308 err: LightningError {
310 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
311 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
317 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
318 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
322 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
325 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
327 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
329 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
331 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
333 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
335 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
336 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
342 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => LightningError {
344 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
345 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
353 shutdown_finish: None,
358 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
359 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
360 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
361 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
362 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
364 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
365 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
366 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
367 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
368 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
369 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
370 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
372 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
376 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
377 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<Signer: Sign> {
378 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
379 pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
380 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
381 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
382 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
383 /// ids in the PendingHTLCInfo!
384 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
385 /// Map from payment hash to any HTLCs which are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user.
386 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
387 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
389 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>>,
390 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
391 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
392 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
395 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
396 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
397 /// quite some time lag.
398 enum BackgroundEvent {
399 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
400 /// commitment transaction.
401 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
404 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
405 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
407 latest_features: InitFeatures,
410 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
411 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
413 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
415 struct PendingInboundPayment {
416 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
417 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
418 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
419 /// this payment being removed.
421 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
422 user_payment_id: u64,
423 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
424 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
425 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
428 /// Stores the session_priv for each part of a payment that is still pending. For versions 0.0.102
429 /// and later, also stores information for retrying the payment.
430 pub(crate) enum PendingOutboundPayment {
432 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
435 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
436 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
437 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
438 pending_amt_msat: u64,
439 /// Used to track the fee paid. Only present if the payment was serialized on 0.0.103+.
440 pending_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
441 /// The total payment amount across all paths, used to verify that a retry is not overpaying.
443 /// Our best known block height at the time this payment was initiated.
444 starting_block_height: u32,
446 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
447 /// been resolved. This ensures we don't look up pending payments in ChannelMonitors on restart
448 /// and add a pending payment that was already fulfilled.
450 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
454 impl PendingOutboundPayment {
455 fn is_retryable(&self) -> bool {
457 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { .. } => true,
461 fn is_fulfilled(&self) -> bool {
463 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => true,
467 fn get_pending_fee_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
469 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { pending_fee_msat, .. } => pending_fee_msat.clone(),
474 fn mark_fulfilled(&mut self) {
475 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
476 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
477 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
478 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
479 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs }
482 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs };
485 /// panics if path is None and !self.is_fulfilled
486 fn remove(&mut self, session_priv: &[u8; 32], path: Option<&Vec<RouteHop>>) -> bool {
487 let remove_res = match self {
488 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
489 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
490 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs } => {
491 session_privs.remove(session_priv)
495 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
496 let path = path.expect("Fulfilling a payment should always come with a path");
497 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
498 *pending_amt_msat -= path_last_hop.fee_msat;
499 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
500 *fee_msat -= path.get_path_fees();
507 fn insert(&mut self, session_priv: [u8; 32], path: &Vec<RouteHop>) -> bool {
508 let insert_res = match self {
509 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
510 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
511 session_privs.insert(session_priv)
513 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => false
516 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
517 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
518 *pending_amt_msat += path_last_hop.fee_msat;
519 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
520 *fee_msat += path.get_path_fees();
527 fn remaining_parts(&self) -> usize {
529 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
530 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
531 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs } => {
538 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
539 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
540 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
541 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
542 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
543 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
544 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
545 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>;
547 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
548 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
549 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
550 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
551 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
552 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
553 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
554 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
555 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, &'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
557 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
558 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
560 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
561 /// to individual Channels.
563 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
564 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
565 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
566 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
568 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
569 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
570 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
571 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
572 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
573 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
574 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
576 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
577 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
578 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
579 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
582 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
583 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
584 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
585 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
586 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
588 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
589 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
590 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
591 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
592 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
593 pub struct ChannelManager<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
594 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
595 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
596 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
597 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
600 default_configuration: UserConfig,
601 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
607 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
609 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
610 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
612 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
613 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
614 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
615 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
617 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
618 /// expose them to users via a PaymentReceived event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
619 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
620 /// after we generate a PaymentReceived upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
621 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
622 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
624 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
625 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
626 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
627 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
628 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
629 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
630 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
631 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
633 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
635 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
636 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment>>,
638 our_network_key: SecretKey,
639 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
641 /// Used to track the last value sent in a node_announcement "timestamp" field. We ensure this
642 /// value increases strictly since we don't assume access to a time source.
643 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize,
645 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
646 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
647 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
648 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
650 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
651 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
652 /// are currently open with that peer.
653 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
654 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
657 /// If also holding `channel_state` lock, must lock `channel_state` prior to `per_peer_state`.
658 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
660 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
661 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
662 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
663 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
664 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
665 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
666 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
667 /// PersistenceNotifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
668 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
670 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier,
677 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
679 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
680 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
681 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
682 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
683 pub struct ChainParameters {
684 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
685 pub network: Network,
687 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
689 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
690 pub best_block: BestBlock,
693 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
699 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
700 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
701 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
702 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
703 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
704 /// updates are ready for persistence).
706 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
707 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
708 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
709 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
710 persistence_notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier,
712 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
713 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
716 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
717 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
718 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
721 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
722 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
724 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
725 persistence_notifier: notifier,
726 should_persist: persist_check,
727 _read_guard: read_guard,
732 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
734 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
735 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
740 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
741 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
743 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
745 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
746 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
747 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
748 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
749 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
751 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
752 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
754 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
756 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
757 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
758 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
759 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
760 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
761 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
762 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
764 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
765 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry` field to at least
767 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
768 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
769 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
770 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 3;
772 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
773 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
774 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
775 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
776 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
777 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
780 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
782 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
783 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
786 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
788 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
789 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
790 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
791 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
792 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
793 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
794 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
795 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
796 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
797 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
798 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
801 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
802 /// to better separate parameters.
803 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
804 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
805 /// The node_id of our counterparty
806 pub node_id: PublicKey,
807 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
808 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
809 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
810 pub features: InitFeatures,
811 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
812 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
813 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
815 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
817 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
818 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
819 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
820 /// payments to us through this channel.
821 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
824 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
825 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
826 pub struct ChannelDetails {
827 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
828 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
829 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
830 /// lifetime of the channel.
831 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
832 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
833 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
834 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
835 /// our counterparty already.
837 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
838 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
839 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
840 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
841 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
842 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
843 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
844 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
845 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
846 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
847 /// this value on chain.
849 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
851 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
853 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
854 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
855 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
856 pub user_channel_id: u64,
857 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
858 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
859 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
860 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
862 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
863 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
864 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
865 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
866 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
867 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
868 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
869 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
870 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
872 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
873 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
874 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
875 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
876 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
877 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
878 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
879 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
880 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
882 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
884 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
885 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
886 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
887 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
888 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
889 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
890 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
891 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
892 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
894 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
895 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
896 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
897 pub is_outbound: bool,
898 /// True if the channel is confirmed, funding_locked messages have been exchanged, and the
899 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `funding_locked` message exchange implies the
900 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
901 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
902 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
904 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
905 pub is_funding_locked: bool,
906 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b)
907 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
909 /// This is a strict superset of `is_funding_locked`.
911 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
915 /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
916 /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
918 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
919 pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
920 /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
921 /// send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages sent to peers, and
922 /// once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the payment in full.
923 ParameterError(APIError),
924 /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us
925 /// from attempting to send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages
926 /// sent to peers, and once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the
929 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
931 PathParameterError(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
932 /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
933 /// You can freely retry the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
934 /// paths than the ones selected).
935 AllFailedRetrySafe(Vec<APIError>),
936 /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
937 /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
938 /// in over-/re-payment.
940 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
941 /// send_payment, and any Errs which are not APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed can be safely
942 /// retried (though there is currently no API with which to do so).
944 /// Any entries which contain Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) or Ok(()) MUST NOT be retried
945 /// as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent (in the
946 /// case of Ok(())) or will send once channel_monitor_updated is called on the next-hop channel
947 /// with the latest update_id.
948 PartialFailure(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
951 macro_rules! handle_error {
952 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
955 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
956 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
958 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
959 // entering the macro.
960 assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
961 assert!($self.pending_events.try_lock().is_ok());
964 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
966 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
967 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
968 if let Some(update) = update_option {
969 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
973 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
974 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
975 channel_id, user_channel_id,
976 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
981 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
982 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
984 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
985 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
986 action: err.action.clone()
990 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
991 $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
994 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1001 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1002 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1003 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1005 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1006 //TODO: Once warning messages are merged, we should send a `warning` message to our
1008 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1010 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1011 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1013 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1014 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1015 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1016 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1018 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1019 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1020 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1022 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => {
1023 log_error!($self.logger, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1024 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1025 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1027 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(false);
1028 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1029 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1035 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1036 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1040 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1042 $entry.remove_entry();
1050 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1051 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1055 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1057 $entry.remove_entry();
1065 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1066 ($channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1068 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1069 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1070 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1077 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
1078 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1079 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1081 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
1083 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1084 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..]));
1085 if let Some(short_id) = $chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1086 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1088 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
1089 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
1090 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
1091 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
1092 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
1093 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
1094 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
1095 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
1096 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
1097 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id, $chan.get_user_id(),
1098 $chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok() ));
1101 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
1102 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards, {} fails, and {} fulfill finalizations",
1103 log_bytes!($chan_id[..]),
1104 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
1105 match $action_type {
1106 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
1107 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
1109 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
1110 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
1112 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
1113 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len(),
1114 (&$failed_finalized_fulfills as &Vec<HTLCSource>).len());
1115 if !$resend_commitment {
1116 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
1119 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
1121 $chan.monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills);
1122 (Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$chan_id)), false)
1126 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr) => { {
1127 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills, $entry.key());
1129 $entry.remove_entry();
1133 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1134 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, Vec::new());
1138 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
1139 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1140 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
1142 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1143 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
1147 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
1148 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
1149 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1150 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
1151 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
1154 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
1159 macro_rules! handle_chan_restoration_locked {
1160 ($self: ident, $channel_lock: expr, $channel_state: expr, $channel_entry: expr,
1161 $raa: expr, $commitment_update: expr, $order: expr, $chanmon_update: expr,
1162 $pending_forwards: expr, $funding_broadcastable: expr, $funding_locked: expr) => { {
1163 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
1164 let counterparty_node_id = $channel_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1166 let chanmon_update: Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> = $chanmon_update; // Force type-checking to resolve
1167 let chanmon_update_is_none = chanmon_update.is_none();
1169 let forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)> = $pending_forwards; // Force type-checking to resolve
1170 if !forwards.is_empty() {
1171 htlc_forwards = Some(($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"),
1172 $channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), forwards));
1175 if chanmon_update.is_some() {
1176 // On reconnect, we, by definition, only resend a funding_locked if there have been
1177 // no commitment updates, so the only channel monitor update which could also be
1178 // associated with a funding_locked would be the funding_created/funding_signed
1179 // monitor update. That monitor update failing implies that we won't send
1180 // funding_locked until it's been updated, so we can't have a funding_locked and a
1181 // monitor update here (so we don't bother to handle it correctly below).
1182 assert!($funding_locked.is_none());
1183 // A channel monitor update makes no sense without either a funding_locked or a
1184 // commitment update to process after it. Since we can't have a funding_locked, we
1185 // only bother to handle the monitor-update + commitment_update case below.
1186 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1189 if let Some(msg) = $funding_locked {
1190 // Similar to the above, this implies that we're letting the funding_locked fly
1191 // before it should be allowed to.
1192 assert!(chanmon_update.is_none());
1193 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
1194 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1197 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = $self.get_announcement_sigs($channel_entry.get()) {
1198 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1199 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1200 msg: announcement_sigs,
1203 $channel_state.short_to_id.insert($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), $channel_entry.get().channel_id());
1206 let funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction> = $funding_broadcastable; // Force type-checking to resolve
1207 if let Some(monitor_update) = chanmon_update {
1208 // We only ever broadcast a funding transaction in response to a funding_signed
1209 // message and the resulting monitor update. Thus, on channel_reestablish
1210 // message handling we can't have a funding transaction to broadcast. When
1211 // processing a monitor update finishing resulting in a funding broadcast, we
1212 // cannot have a second monitor update, thus this case would indicate a bug.
1213 assert!(funding_broadcastable.is_none());
1214 // Given we were just reconnected or finished updating a channel monitor, the
1215 // only case where we can get a new ChannelMonitorUpdate would be if we also
1216 // have some commitment updates to send as well.
1217 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1218 if let Err(e) = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1219 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
1220 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
1221 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
1222 let mut order = $order;
1224 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
1226 break handle_monitor_err!($self, e, $channel_state, $channel_entry, order, $raa.is_some(), true);
1230 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1231 if let Some(update) = $commitment_update {
1232 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1233 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1238 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1239 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = $raa {
1240 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1241 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1242 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1247 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1251 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1256 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
1257 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
1258 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1263 if chanmon_update_is_none {
1264 // If there was no ChannelMonitorUpdate, we should never generate an Err in the res loop
1265 // above. Doing so would imply calling handle_err!() from channel_monitor_updated() which
1266 // should *never* end up calling back to `chain_monitor.update_channel()`.
1267 assert!(res.is_ok());
1270 (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id)
1274 macro_rules! post_handle_chan_restoration {
1275 ($self: ident, $locked_res: expr) => { {
1276 let (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id) = $locked_res;
1278 let _ = handle_error!($self, res, counterparty_node_id);
1280 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1281 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1286 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
1287 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
1288 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1289 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
1290 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1293 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
1295 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1296 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
1298 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1300 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
1302 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
1303 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
1304 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
1305 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1306 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1307 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
1310 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1311 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1312 fee_estimator: fee_est,
1316 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1318 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
1319 by_id: HashMap::new(),
1320 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
1321 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1322 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1323 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
1325 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1326 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1328 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
1329 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
1332 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1333 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1335 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1337 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1338 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1339 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1340 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
1348 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels, as
1349 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1350 &self.default_configuration
1353 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1355 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1356 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1357 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to 0
1358 /// for inbound channels, so you may wish to avoid using 0 for `user_channel_id` here.
1359 /// `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply copied to events and otherwise
1362 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1363 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1365 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1366 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1367 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1369 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1370 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1371 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1372 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1373 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1374 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1376 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1377 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1378 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1379 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u64, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1380 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1381 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1385 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1386 match per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key) {
1387 Some(peer_state) => {
1388 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1389 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1390 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1391 Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config)?
1393 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) }),
1396 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1398 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1399 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1400 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1402 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1403 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1404 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1405 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1406 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
1407 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1409 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1412 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1414 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1415 node_id: their_network_key,
1418 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1421 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<Signer>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1422 let mut res = Vec::new();
1424 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1425 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
1426 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1427 let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
1428 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1429 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1430 res.push(ChannelDetails {
1431 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
1432 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1433 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1434 features: InitFeatures::empty(),
1435 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1436 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1438 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1439 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1440 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1441 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1442 inbound_capacity_msat,
1443 outbound_capacity_msat,
1444 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1445 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1446 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1447 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1448 is_funding_locked: channel.is_usable(),
1449 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1450 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1454 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1455 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
1456 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.counterparty.node_id) {
1457 chan.counterparty.features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
1463 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
1464 /// more information.
1465 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1466 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1469 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
1470 /// get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1472 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1473 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1475 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1476 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1477 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1478 // really wanted anyway.
1479 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1482 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
1483 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
1484 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1485 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
1486 Some(transaction) => {
1487 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::DiscardFunding { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction })
1491 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1492 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1493 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1494 reason: closure_reason
1498 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1499 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1501 let counterparty_node_id;
1502 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
1503 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
1504 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1505 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1506 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1507 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1508 counterparty_node_id = chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1509 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1510 let (shutdown_msg, monitor_update, htlcs) = match per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
1511 Some(peer_state) => {
1512 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1513 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1514 chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown(&self.keys_manager, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?
1516 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", counterparty_node_id) }),
1518 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
1520 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
1521 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
1522 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1523 let (result, is_permanent) =
1524 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_entry.key());
1526 remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
1532 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1533 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1537 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1538 let channel = remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
1539 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
1540 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1544 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1548 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()})
1552 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1553 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1556 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, counterparty_node_id);
1560 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1561 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1562 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1564 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
1565 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1567 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
1568 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
1569 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
1570 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
1572 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1574 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1575 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1576 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1577 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1578 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, None)
1581 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1582 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1583 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1585 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
1586 /// the channel being closed or not:
1587 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
1588 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
1589 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1590 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
1591 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
1592 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
1593 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
1595 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1597 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1598 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1599 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1600 pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1601 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
1605 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1606 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1607 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1608 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1609 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1611 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
1612 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
1613 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
1614 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
1615 // ignore the result here.
1616 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
1620 /// `peer_node_id` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
1621 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
1622 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>, peer_msg: Option<&String>) -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
1624 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1625 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1626 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1627 if let Some(node_id) = peer_node_id {
1628 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *node_id {
1629 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1632 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1633 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1635 if peer_node_id.is_some() {
1636 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
1637 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: peer_msg.to_string() });
1640 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1642 chan.remove_entry().1
1644 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1647 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
1648 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(true));
1649 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
1650 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1651 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1656 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
1659 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
1660 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if channel_id is unknown to the manager.
1661 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1662 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1663 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, None, None) {
1664 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
1665 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1666 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1667 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1668 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
1669 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
1679 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
1680 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
1681 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
1682 for chan in self.list_channels() {
1683 let _ = self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
1687 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>) {
1688 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
1689 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
1691 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1692 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
1693 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1694 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1695 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
1696 failure_code: $err_code,
1697 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1702 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
1703 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
1706 let shared_secret = {
1707 let mut arr = [0; 32];
1708 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
1711 let (rho, mu) = onion_utils::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1713 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
1714 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
1715 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
1716 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
1717 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
1718 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
1719 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
1720 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
1723 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&mu);
1724 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
1725 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash.0[..]);
1726 if !fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
1727 return_malformed_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5);
1730 let mut channel_state = None;
1731 macro_rules! return_err {
1732 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
1734 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1735 if channel_state.is_none() {
1736 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1738 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1739 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1740 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1741 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
1742 })), channel_state.unwrap());
1747 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
1748 let mut chacha_stream = ChaChaReader { chacha: &mut chacha, read: Cursor::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..]) };
1749 let (next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac): (msgs::OnionHopData, _) = {
1750 match <msgs::OnionHopData as Readable>::read(&mut chacha_stream) {
1752 let error_code = match err {
1753 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
1754 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature|
1755 msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue|
1756 msgs::DecodeError::ShortRead => 0x4000 | 22, // invalid_onion_payload
1757 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
1759 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
1762 let mut hmac = [0; 32];
1763 if let Err(_) = chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut hmac[..]) {
1764 return_err!("Unable to decode hop data", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1771 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_hmac == [0; 32] {
1774 // In tests, make sure that the initial onion pcket data is, at least, non-0.
1775 // We could do some fancy randomness test here, but, ehh, whatever.
1776 // This checks for the issue where you can calculate the path length given the
1777 // onion data as all the path entries that the originator sent will be here
1778 // as-is (and were originally 0s).
1779 // Of course reverse path calculation is still pretty easy given naive routing
1780 // algorithms, but this fixes the most-obvious case.
1781 let mut next_bytes = [0; 32];
1782 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1783 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1784 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1785 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1789 // final_expiry_too_soon
1790 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
1791 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
1792 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
1793 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
1794 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
1795 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) <= self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
1796 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
1798 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
1799 if next_hop_data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
1800 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1802 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
1803 if next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
1804 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1807 let routing = match next_hop_data.format {
1808 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { .. } => return_err!("We require payment_secrets", 0x4000|0x2000|3, &[0;0]),
1809 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => return_err!("Got non final data with an HMAC of 0", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]),
1810 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
1811 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
1812 return_err!("We don't support MPP keysend payments", 0x4000|22, &[0;0]);
1813 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
1814 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
1816 incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
1818 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
1819 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
1820 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
1821 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
1822 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
1823 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
1824 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
1825 if hashed_preimage != msg.payment_hash {
1826 return_err!("Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 0x4000|22, &[0;0]);
1829 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
1831 incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
1834 return_err!("We require payment_secrets", 0x4000|0x2000|3, &[0;0]);
1839 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
1840 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
1841 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
1842 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
1844 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1846 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1847 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1848 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1849 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1852 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
1853 let read_pos = chacha_stream.read(&mut new_packet_data).unwrap();
1854 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1856 // Check two things:
1857 // a) that the behavior of our stream here will return Ok(0) even if the TLV
1858 // read above emptied out our buffer and the unwrap() wont needlessly panic
1859 // b) that we didn't somehow magically end up with extra data.
1861 debug_assert!(chacha_stream.read(&mut t).unwrap() == 0);
1863 // Once we've emptied the set of bytes our peer gave us, encrypt 0 bytes until we
1864 // fill the onion hop data we'll forward to our next-hop peer.
1865 chacha_stream.chacha.process_in_place(&mut new_packet_data[read_pos..]);
1867 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
1869 let blinding_factor = {
1870 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
1871 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
1872 sha.input(&shared_secret);
1873 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
1876 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
1878 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
1880 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
1883 hop_data: new_packet_data,
1884 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
1887 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
1888 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1889 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1890 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
1891 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1895 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1896 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
1897 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
1900 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1901 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1902 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1903 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1907 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1908 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
1909 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
1910 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
1911 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
1912 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
1913 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
1914 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
1915 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
1916 None => { // unknown_next_peer
1917 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
1919 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1922 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
1924 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
1925 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
1926 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
1927 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
1928 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
1931 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
1932 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
1933 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
1934 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
1935 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
1936 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
1937 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1939 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
1940 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1942 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64)
1943 .and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000)
1944 .checked_add(chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat() as u64) });
1945 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
1946 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1948 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta() as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
1949 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1951 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1952 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now, but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty
1953 // packet sanitization (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rational)
1954 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
1955 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1957 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
1958 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
1960 // In theory, we would be safe against unintentional channel-closure, if we only required a margin of LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1961 // But, to be safe against policy reception, we use a longer delay.
1962 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER) as u64 {
1963 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1969 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
1970 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
1971 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
1972 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1974 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
1975 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1977 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
1978 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
1979 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
1981 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1983 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
1988 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
1991 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
1992 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
1993 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
1995 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1996 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
1997 if !chan.should_announce() {
1998 return Err(LightningError {
1999 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2000 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2003 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2004 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2007 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2008 /// is public (only returning an Err if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id),
2009 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2010 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2011 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2012 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2013 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2014 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2015 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2019 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2021 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2022 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2024 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2025 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
2026 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2027 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2028 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Present(chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat()),
2029 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2030 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2031 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2034 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
2035 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
2037 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2043 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
2044 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payee: &Option<Payee>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2045 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2046 let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2047 let session_priv_bytes = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2048 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2050 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2051 .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
2052 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2053 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
2054 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
2056 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
2058 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2060 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2061 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2063 let mut pending_outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2064 let payment_entry = pending_outbounds.entry(payment_id);
2065 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(payment) = &payment_entry {
2066 if !payment.get().is_retryable() {
2067 return Err(APIError::RouteError {
2068 err: "Payment already completed"
2073 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2074 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2075 Some(id) => id.clone(),
2078 macro_rules! insert_outbound_payment {
2080 let payment = payment_entry.or_insert_with(|| PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2081 session_privs: HashSet::new(),
2082 pending_amt_msat: 0,
2083 pending_fee_msat: Some(0),
2084 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2085 payment_secret: *payment_secret,
2086 starting_block_height: self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
2087 total_msat: total_value,
2089 assert!(payment.insert(session_priv_bytes, path));
2093 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2094 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
2096 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
2097 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
2099 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2100 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
2102 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(
2103 htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2105 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2106 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2108 payment_secret: payment_secret.clone(),
2109 payee: payee.clone(),
2110 }, onion_packet, &self.logger),
2111 channel_state, chan)
2113 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
2114 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2115 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
2116 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
2117 // that we will resend the commitment update once monitor updating
2118 // is restored. Therefore, we must return an error indicating that
2119 // it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale, which we do in the
2120 // send_payment check for MonitorUpdateFailed, below.
2121 insert_outbound_payment!(); // Only do this after possibly break'ing on Perm failure above.
2122 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2124 insert_outbound_payment!();
2126 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2127 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2128 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
2129 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2130 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
2131 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2132 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2133 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2139 None => { insert_outbound_payment!(); },
2141 } else { unreachable!(); }
2145 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2146 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2148 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2153 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2155 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
2156 /// fields for more info.
2158 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
2159 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
2160 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
2161 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
2162 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
2163 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
2165 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed.
2167 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
2168 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2169 /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
2171 /// In general, a path may raise:
2172 /// * APIError::RouteError when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2173 /// node public key) is specified.
2174 /// * APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2175 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2177 /// * APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2178 /// relevant updates.
2180 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
2181 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2182 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2184 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
2185 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
2186 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
2187 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
2189 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
2190 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
2191 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
2192 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> Result<PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure> {
2193 self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, None, None, None)
2196 fn send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: Option<PaymentId>, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>) -> Result<PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure> {
2197 if route.paths.len() < 1 {
2198 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
2200 if route.paths.len() > 10 {
2201 // This limit is completely arbitrary - there aren't any real fundamental path-count
2202 // limits. After we support retrying individual paths we should likely bump this, but
2203 // for now more than 10 paths likely carries too much one-path failure.
2204 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "Sending over more than 10 paths is not currently supported"}));
2206 if payment_secret.is_none() && route.paths.len() > 1 {
2207 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Payment secret is required for multi-path payments".to_string()}));
2209 let mut total_value = 0;
2210 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2211 let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
2212 let payment_id = if let Some(id) = payment_id { id } else { PaymentId(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()) };
2213 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
2214 if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
2215 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
2216 continue 'path_check;
2218 for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
2219 if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
2220 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
2221 continue 'path_check;
2224 total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2225 path_errs.push(Ok(()));
2227 if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
2228 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
2230 if let Some(amt_msat) = recv_value_msat {
2231 debug_assert!(amt_msat >= total_value);
2232 total_value = amt_msat;
2235 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2236 let mut results = Vec::new();
2237 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2238 results.push(self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &route.payee, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, &keysend_preimage));
2240 let mut has_ok = false;
2241 let mut has_err = false;
2242 for res in results.iter() {
2243 if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
2244 if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
2245 if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = res {
2246 // MonitorUpdateFailed is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
2253 if has_err && has_ok {
2254 Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure(results))
2256 // If we failed to send any paths, we shouldn't have inserted the new PaymentId into
2257 // our `pending_outbound_payments` map at all.
2258 debug_assert!(self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().get(&payment_id).is_none());
2259 Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
2265 /// Retries a payment along the given [`Route`].
2267 /// Errors returned are a superset of those returned from [`send_payment`], so see
2268 /// [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on errors. This method will also error if the
2269 /// retry amount puts the payment more than 10% over the payment's total amount, or if the payment
2270 /// for the given `payment_id` cannot be found (likely due to timeout or success).
2272 /// [`send_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::send_payment`]
2273 pub fn retry_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2274 const RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE: u64 = 10;
2275 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2276 if path.len() == 0 {
2277 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2278 err: "length-0 path in route".to_string()
2283 let (total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret) = {
2284 let outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2285 if let Some(payment) = outbounds.get(&payment_id) {
2287 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2288 total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret, pending_amt_msat, ..
2290 let retry_amt_msat: u64 = route.paths.iter().map(|path| path.last().unwrap().fee_msat).sum();
2291 if retry_amt_msat + *pending_amt_msat > *total_msat * (100 + RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE) / 100 {
2292 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2293 err: format!("retry_amt_msat of {} will put pending_amt_msat (currently: {}) more than 10% over total_payment_amt_msat of {}", retry_amt_msat, pending_amt_msat, total_msat).to_string()
2296 (*total_msat, *payment_hash, *payment_secret)
2298 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => {
2299 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2300 err: "Unable to retry payments that were initially sent on LDK versions prior to 0.0.102".to_string()
2303 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {
2304 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError {
2305 err: "Payment already completed"
2310 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2311 err: format!("Payment with ID {} not found", log_bytes!(payment_id.0)),
2315 return self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &payment_secret, None, Some(payment_id), Some(total_msat)).map(|_| ())
2318 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2319 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2320 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2321 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2322 /// never reach the recipient.
2324 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function.
2326 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2327 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2329 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2331 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2332 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2333 let preimage = match payment_preimage {
2335 None => PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()),
2337 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0).into_inner());
2338 match self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &None, Some(preimage), None, None) {
2339 Ok(payment_id) => Ok((payment_hash, payment_id)),
2344 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2345 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2346 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>
2347 (&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2349 let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2351 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2353 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2354 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2355 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2356 } else { unreachable!(); })
2359 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "No such channel".to_owned() }) },
2361 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
2362 Ok(funding_msg) => {
2365 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2366 err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
2371 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2372 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2373 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2376 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2377 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2378 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2380 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2388 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2389 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2390 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2394 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2396 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2397 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2399 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
2401 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2402 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
2403 /// keys per-channel).
2405 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
2406 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
2407 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
2409 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
2410 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
2411 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2413 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2414 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2415 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2417 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
2418 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
2419 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2420 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
2424 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
2425 let mut output_index = None;
2426 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
2427 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2428 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
2429 if output_index.is_some() {
2430 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2431 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
2434 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
2435 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2436 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
2439 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
2442 if output_index.is_none() {
2443 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2444 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
2447 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
2451 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
2452 if !chan.should_announce() {
2453 log_trace!(self.logger, "Can't send announcement_signatures for private channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2457 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
2459 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
2461 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2462 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2464 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
2465 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
2466 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
2467 node_signature: our_node_sig,
2468 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
2473 // Messages of up to 64KB should never end up more than half full with addresses, as that would
2474 // be absurd. We ensure this by checking that at least 500 (our stated public contract on when
2475 // broadcast_node_announcement panics) of the maximum-length addresses would fit in a 64KB
2477 const HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS: u32 = ::core::u16::MAX as u32 / (NetAddress::MAX_LEN as u32 + 1) / 2;
2480 // ...by failing to compile if the number of addresses that would be half of a message is
2481 // smaller than 500:
2482 const STATIC_ASSERT: u32 = Self::HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS - 500;
2484 /// Regenerates channel_announcements and generates a signed node_announcement from the given
2485 /// arguments, providing them in corresponding events via
2486 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`], if at least one public channel has been confirmed
2487 /// on-chain. This effectively re-broadcasts all channel announcements and sends our node
2488 /// announcement to ensure that the lightning P2P network is aware of the channels we have and
2489 /// our network addresses.
2491 /// `rgb` is a node "color" and `alias` is a printable human-readable string to describe this
2492 /// node to humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning.
2494 /// `addresses` represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node
2495 /// accepts incoming connections. These will be included in the node_announcement, publicly
2496 /// tying these addresses together and to this node. If you wish to preserve user privacy,
2497 /// addresses should likely contain only Tor Onion addresses.
2499 /// Panics if `addresses` is absurdly large (more than 500).
2501 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
2502 pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], mut addresses: Vec<NetAddress>) {
2503 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2505 if addresses.len() > 500 {
2506 panic!("More than half the message size was taken up by public addresses!");
2509 // While all existing nodes handle unsorted addresses just fine, the spec requires that
2510 // addresses be sorted for future compatibility.
2511 addresses.sort_by_key(|addr| addr.get_id());
2513 let announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
2514 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
2515 timestamp: self.last_node_announcement_serial.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32,
2516 node_id: self.get_our_node_id(),
2517 rgb, alias, addresses,
2518 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
2519 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2521 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2522 let node_announce_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2524 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2525 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2527 let mut announced_chans = false;
2528 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
2529 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.our_network_key, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
2530 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2532 update_msg: match self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
2537 announced_chans = true;
2539 // If the channel is not public or has not yet reached funding_locked, check the
2540 // next channel. If we don't yet have any public channels, we'll skip the broadcast
2541 // below as peers may not accept it without channels on chain first.
2545 if announced_chans {
2546 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement {
2547 msg: msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
2548 signature: node_announce_sig,
2549 contents: announcement
2555 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
2557 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
2558 /// Will likely generate further events.
2559 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
2560 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2562 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2563 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
2564 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
2566 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2567 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2569 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
2570 if short_chan_id != 0 {
2571 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
2572 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
2574 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
2575 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2576 match forward_info {
2577 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info,
2578 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2579 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2580 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2581 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2582 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2583 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
2585 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
2586 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() }
2589 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
2590 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
2591 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
2592 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
2593 // problem, not ours.
2600 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
2601 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
2602 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
2603 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2604 match forward_info {
2605 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
2606 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2608 }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
2609 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2610 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
2611 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2612 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2613 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2614 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2615 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
2617 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet) {
2619 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
2620 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
2622 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
2624 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap();
2625 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
2626 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }
2632 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
2634 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
2635 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
2636 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
2637 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
2638 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
2639 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
2640 // this channel currently :/.
2646 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
2647 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
2649 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
2650 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
2651 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger) {
2653 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
2654 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
2656 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
2658 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
2659 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
2660 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
2663 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
2665 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
2666 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
2667 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
2668 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
2669 // messages when we can.
2670 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
2671 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
2672 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
2679 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
2680 let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) {
2683 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
2684 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
2685 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
2686 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
2687 ChannelError::Ignore(_) | ChannelError::Warn(_) => {
2688 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
2690 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
2691 log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
2692 let (channel_id, mut channel) = chan.remove_entry();
2693 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2694 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2696 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us.
2697 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, channel.get_user_id(), channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel).ok()))
2699 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
2701 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, err));
2705 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2706 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
2709 log_debug!(self.logger, "Forwarding HTLCs resulted in a commitment update with {} HTLCs added and {} HTLCs failed for channel {}",
2710 add_htlc_msgs.len(), fail_htlc_msgs.len(), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2711 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2712 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
2713 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2714 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
2715 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2716 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
2717 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2719 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
2727 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2728 match forward_info {
2729 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
2730 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. },
2731 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2732 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload) = match routing {
2733 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
2734 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice(payment_data)),
2735 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
2736 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage)),
2738 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
2741 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
2742 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
2743 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2744 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2745 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2746 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
2748 value: amt_to_forward,
2753 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
2755 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc.value).to_vec();
2756 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
2757 &byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()),
2759 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2760 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
2761 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2762 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
2763 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
2765 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data }
2770 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
2771 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
2772 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
2773 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
2774 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
2775 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
2776 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2777 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
2778 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
2779 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
2780 OnionPayload::Invoice(_) => {
2781 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we didn't have a corresponding inbound payment.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2782 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2784 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
2785 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
2786 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2787 e.insert(vec![claimable_htlc]);
2788 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
2790 amt: amt_to_forward,
2791 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage),
2794 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2795 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2796 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2802 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
2804 if let OnionPayload::Invoice(ref data) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
2807 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2808 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2811 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
2812 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2813 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2814 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
2815 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
2816 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
2817 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2819 let mut total_value = 0;
2820 let htlcs = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
2821 .or_insert(Vec::new());
2822 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
2823 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
2824 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2825 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2829 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
2830 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
2831 total_value += htlc.value;
2832 match &htlc.onion_payload {
2833 OnionPayload::Invoice(htlc_payment_data) => {
2834 if htlc_payment_data.total_msat != payment_data.total_msat {
2835 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
2836 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, htlc_payment_data.total_msat);
2837 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
2839 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
2841 _ => unreachable!(),
2844 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > payment_data.total_msat {
2845 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
2846 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, payment_data.total_msat);
2847 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
2850 } else if total_value == payment_data.total_msat {
2851 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
2853 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
2854 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
2855 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
2856 user_payment_id: inbound_payment.get().user_payment_id,
2860 // Only ever generate at most one PaymentReceived
2861 // per registered payment_hash, even if it isn't
2863 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
2865 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
2866 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
2873 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
2874 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
2882 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
2883 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason);
2886 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
2887 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
2890 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
2891 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2892 events.append(&mut new_events);
2895 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
2897 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
2898 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
2900 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
2901 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
2902 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
2903 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
2904 if background_events.is_empty() {
2908 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
2910 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
2911 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
2912 // monitor updating completing.
2913 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update);
2920 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
2921 /// Process background events, for functional testing
2922 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
2923 self.process_background_events();
2926 fn update_channel_fee(&self, short_to_id: &mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> (bool, NotifyOption, Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal>) {
2927 if !chan.is_outbound() { return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(())); }
2928 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
2929 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate() {
2930 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
2931 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
2932 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
2934 if !chan.is_live() {
2935 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
2936 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
2937 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
2939 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
2940 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
2942 let mut retain_channel = true;
2943 let res = match chan.send_update_fee_and_commit(new_feerate, &self.logger) {
2946 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, chan_id);
2947 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
2951 let ret_err = match res {
2952 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update))) => {
2953 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2954 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_id);
2955 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
2958 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2959 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2960 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2961 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2962 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2963 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2964 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2965 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
2975 (retain_channel, NotifyOption::DoPersist, ret_err)
2979 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
2980 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
2981 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
2982 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
2983 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
2984 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
2985 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
2987 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
2989 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
2991 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2992 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2993 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2994 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
2995 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
2996 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
2997 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
2999 handle_errors.push(err);
3009 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
3011 /// This currently includes:
3012 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
3013 /// * Broadcasting `ChannelUpdate` messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
3014 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
3017 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through `chain::Watch::update_channel` calls or feerate
3018 /// estimate fetches.
3019 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
3020 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3021 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3022 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3024 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3026 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3028 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3029 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3030 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3031 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3032 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3033 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
3034 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3035 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3037 handle_errors.push((err, counterparty_node_id));
3039 if !retain_channel { return false; }
3041 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
3042 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, chan_id);
3043 handle_errors.push((Err(err), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()));
3044 if needs_close { return false; }
3047 match chan.channel_update_status() {
3048 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
3049 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
3050 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3051 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3052 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
3053 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3054 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3058 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3059 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3061 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
3062 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3063 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3067 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3068 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3077 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3078 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3084 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
3085 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
3086 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
3087 /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
3088 /// HTLC backwards has been started.
3089 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) -> bool {
3090 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3092 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
3093 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
3094 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
3095 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3096 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
3097 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3098 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
3099 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
3100 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
3101 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_hash,
3102 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
3108 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
3109 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
3110 // be surfaced to the user.
3111 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(&self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
3112 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
3114 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { .. }) => {
3115 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
3116 match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3117 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
3118 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(&chan_entry.get()) {
3119 (0x1000|7, upd.encode_with_len())
3121 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3124 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3126 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3127 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state,
3128 htlc_src, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: onion_failure_data});
3130 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, payee, .. } => {
3131 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3132 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3133 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3134 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3135 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) && !payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3136 let retry = if let Some(payee_data) = payee {
3137 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
3138 Some(RouteParameters {
3140 final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat,
3141 final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta,
3144 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
3145 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3146 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3148 rejected_by_dest: false,
3149 network_update: None,
3150 all_paths_failed: payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0,
3152 short_channel_id: None,
3162 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3169 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
3170 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
3171 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
3172 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
3173 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
3174 /// still-available channels.
3175 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
3176 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
3177 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
3178 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
3181 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3182 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
3183 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3185 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, session_priv, payment_id, ref payee, .. } => {
3186 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3187 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3188 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3189 let mut all_paths_failed = false;
3190 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3191 if !payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
3192 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3195 if payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3196 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received failure of HTLC with payment_hash {} after payment completion", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3199 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3200 all_paths_failed = true;
3203 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3206 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3207 let retry = if let Some(payee_data) = payee {
3208 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
3209 Some(RouteParameters {
3210 payee: payee_data.clone(),
3211 final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat,
3212 final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta,
3215 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3216 match &onion_error {
3217 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
3219 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
3221 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
3222 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
3223 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
3224 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
3225 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
3226 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3227 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3228 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3229 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
3236 error_code: onion_error_code,
3238 error_data: onion_error_data
3242 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3248 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
3249 // TODO: We'd like to generate a NetworkUpdate for temporary
3250 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as get_route
3251 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
3253 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
3254 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
3255 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
3256 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3257 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3258 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3259 rejected_by_dest: path.len() == 1,
3260 network_update: None,
3263 short_channel_id: Some(path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id),
3266 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
3268 error_data: Some(data.clone()),
3274 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, .. }) => {
3275 let err_packet = match onion_error {
3276 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
3277 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
3278 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
3279 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
3281 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
3282 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3283 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
3287 let mut forward_event = None;
3288 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3289 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
3291 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
3292 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3293 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
3295 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3296 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
3299 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3300 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
3301 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3302 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
3303 time_forwardable: time
3310 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
3311 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
3312 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
3314 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
3315 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentReceived`
3316 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
3317 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
3319 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
3321 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
3322 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
3323 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> bool {
3324 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3326 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3328 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
3329 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
3330 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
3331 assert!(!sources.is_empty());
3333 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we have to take special care to ensure that each
3334 // channel exists before claiming all of the payments (inside one lock).
3335 // Note that channel existance is sufficient as we should always get a monitor update
3336 // which will take care of the real HTLC claim enforcement.
3338 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
3339 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
3340 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
3341 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
3342 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
3344 let mut valid_mpp = true;
3345 for htlc in sources.iter() {
3346 if let None = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3352 let mut errs = Vec::new();
3353 let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
3354 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3356 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
3357 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3358 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
3359 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
3360 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
3361 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash,
3362 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
3364 match self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state.as_mut().unwrap(), htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
3365 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) => {
3366 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
3367 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
3368 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
3369 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
3370 claimed_any_htlcs = true;
3371 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
3373 ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"),
3374 ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim => {
3375 // While we should never get here in most cases, if we do, it likely
3376 // indicates that the HTLC was timed out some time ago and is no longer
3377 // available to be claimed. Thus, it does not make sense to set
3378 // `claimed_any_htlcs`.
3380 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(_) => claimed_any_htlcs = true,
3385 // Now that we've done the entire above loop in one lock, we can handle any errors
3386 // which were generated.
3387 channel_state.take();
3389 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
3390 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
3391 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
3398 fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> ClaimFundsFromHop {
3399 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
3400 let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock;
3401 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3402 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
3404 return ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed
3408 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
3409 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
3410 Ok(msgs_monitor_option) => {
3411 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { msgs, htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = msgs_monitor_option {
3412 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3413 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Debug },
3414 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
3415 payment_preimage, e);
3416 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(
3417 chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3418 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err(),
3419 Some(htlc_value_msat)
3422 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
3423 log_debug!(self.logger, "Claiming funds for HTLC with preimage {} resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}",
3424 log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3425 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3426 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3427 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3428 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3429 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
3430 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3431 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3437 return ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(htlc_value_msat);
3439 return ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim;
3442 Err((e, monitor_update)) => {
3443 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3444 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Info },
3445 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?} immediately prior to force-close: {:?}",
3446 payment_preimage, e);
3448 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3449 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan.get_mut(), &chan_id);
3451 chan.remove_entry();
3453 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(counterparty_node_id, res, None);
3456 } else { unreachable!(); }
3459 fn finalize_claims(&self, mut sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
3460 for source in sources.drain(..) {
3461 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, .. } = source {
3462 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3463 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3464 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3465 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3466 assert!(payment.get().is_fulfilled());
3467 payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, None);
3468 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3476 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool) {
3478 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
3479 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3480 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3481 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3482 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3483 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3484 let found_payment = !payment.get().is_fulfilled();
3485 let fee_paid_msat = payment.get().get_pending_fee_msat();
3486 payment.get_mut().mark_fulfilled();
3488 // We currently immediately remove HTLCs which were fulfilled on-chain.
3489 // This could potentially lead to removing a pending payment too early,
3490 // with a reorg of one block causing us to re-add the fulfilled payment on
3492 // TODO: We should have a second monitor event that informs us of payments
3493 // irrevocably fulfilled.
3494 payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path));
3495 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3500 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3501 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
3502 events::Event::PaymentSent {
3503 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3505 payment_hash: payment_hash,
3511 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fulfill for HTLC with payment_preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0));
3514 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
3515 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
3516 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage);
3517 let claimed_htlc = if let ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim = res { false } else { true };
3518 let htlc_claim_value_msat = match res {
3519 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(_, _, amt_opt) => amt_opt,
3520 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(amt) => Some(amt),
3523 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed = res {
3524 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3525 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
3526 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
3527 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
3530 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
3531 // receiving an offchain preimage event from the forward link (the
3532 // event being update_fulfill_htlc).
3533 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_outpoint, preimage_update) {
3534 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
3535 payment_preimage, e);
3537 // Note that we do *not* set `claimed_htlc` to false here. In fact, this
3538 // totally could be a duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing
3539 // without interrogating the `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above
3540 // update to. Instead, we simply document in `PaymentForwarded` that this
3543 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3544 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) = res {
3545 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
3546 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
3550 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
3551 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
3552 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
3555 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3556 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
3558 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
3566 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
3567 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
3568 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
3571 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
3572 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3574 let chan_restoration_res;
3575 let (mut pending_failures, finalized_claims) = {
3576 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3577 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3578 let mut channel = match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
3579 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
3580 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
3582 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
3586 let updates = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger);
3587 let channel_update = if updates.funding_locked.is_some() && channel.get().is_usable() && !channel.get().should_announce() {
3588 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
3589 // funding_locked and the channel is in a usable state. Further, we rely on the
3590 // normal announcement_signatures process to send a channel_update for public
3591 // channels, only generating a unicast channel_update if this is a private channel.
3592 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3593 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3594 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel.get()).unwrap(),
3597 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_lock, channel_state, channel, updates.raa, updates.commitment_update, updates.order, None, updates.accepted_htlcs, updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.funding_locked);
3598 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
3599 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
3601 (updates.failed_htlcs, updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs)
3603 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
3604 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claims);
3605 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
3606 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
3610 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3611 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
3612 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
3615 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, counterparty_node_id.clone(), &their_features, msg, 0, &self.default_configuration)
3616 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
3617 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3618 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3619 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
3620 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
3621 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3622 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
3623 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3624 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
3626 entry.insert(channel);
3632 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3633 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
3634 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3635 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3636 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
3637 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3638 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3639 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
3641 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration, &their_features), channel_state, chan);
3642 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
3644 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
3647 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3648 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
3649 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
3650 channel_value_satoshis: value,
3652 user_channel_id: user_id,
3657 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3658 let ((funding_msg, monitor), mut chan) = {
3659 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
3660 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3661 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3662 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
3663 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3664 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3665 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
3667 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.logger), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
3669 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
3672 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
3673 // lock before watch_channel
3674 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
3676 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
3677 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
3678 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
3679 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
3680 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
3681 // We do not do a force-close here as that would generate a monitor update for
3682 // a monitor that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we
3683 // don't respond with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
3684 let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(true);
3685 assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
3686 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
3688 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
3689 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
3690 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
3691 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our funding_locked
3692 // until we have persisted our monitor.
3693 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3697 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3698 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3699 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
3700 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3701 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
3703 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3704 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
3705 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3714 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3716 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
3717 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3718 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3719 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3720 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3721 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3722 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3724 let (monitor, funding_tx) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.logger) {
3725 Ok(update) => update,
3726 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
3728 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
3729 let mut res = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, false, false);
3730 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
3731 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
3732 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
3733 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
3734 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
3735 shutdown_finish.0.take();
3742 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3745 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid());
3746 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
3750 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3751 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3752 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3753 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3754 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3755 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3756 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3758 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3759 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
3760 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for {} in response to funding_locked", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3761 // If we see locking block before receiving remote funding_locked, we broadcast our
3762 // announcement_sigs at remote funding_locked reception. If we receive remote
3763 // funding_locked before seeing locking block, we broadcast our announcement_sigs at locking
3764 // block connection. We should guanrantee to broadcast announcement_sigs to our peer whatever
3765 // the order of the events but our peer may not receive it due to disconnection. The specs
3766 // lacking an acknowledgement for announcement_sigs we may have to re-send them at peer
3767 // connection in the future if simultaneous misses by both peers due to network/hardware
3768 // failures is an issue. Note, to achieve its goal, only one of the announcement_sigs needs
3769 // to be received, from then sigs are going to be flood to the whole network.
3770 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
3771 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3772 msg: announcement_sigs,
3774 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
3775 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3776 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3777 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
3782 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3786 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3787 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
3788 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
3789 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3790 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3792 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
3793 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
3794 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3795 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3798 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
3799 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
3800 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
3801 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
3804 let (shutdown, monitor_update, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.keys_manager, &their_features, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
3805 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
3807 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
3808 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
3809 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3810 let (result, is_permanent) =
3811 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_entry.key());
3813 remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
3819 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
3820 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
3821 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
3828 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3831 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
3832 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
3835 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
3839 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3840 let (tx, chan_option) = {
3841 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3842 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3843 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
3844 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
3845 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3846 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3848 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
3849 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
3850 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
3851 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3856 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
3857 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
3858 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
3859 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
3860 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
3861 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
3862 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3864 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
3865 } else { (tx, None) }
3867 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3870 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
3871 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
3872 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
3874 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
3875 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3876 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3877 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3881 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
3886 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3887 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
3888 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
3889 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
3891 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
3892 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
3893 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
3894 //but we should prevent it anyway.
3896 let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
3897 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3899 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3900 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3901 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3902 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3905 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
3906 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
3907 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
3908 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
3909 match pending_forward_info {
3910 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
3911 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
3912 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
3913 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &{
3914 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
3915 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
3916 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
3917 res.extend_from_slice(&upd.encode_with_len()[..]);
3921 // The only case where we'd be unable to
3922 // successfully get a channel update is if the
3923 // channel isn't in the fully-funded state yet,
3924 // implying our counterparty is trying to route
3925 // payments over the channel back to themselves
3926 // (because no one else should know the short_id
3927 // is a lightning channel yet). We should have
3928 // no problem just calling this
3929 // unknown_next_peer (0x4000|10).
3930 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
3933 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &[])
3935 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3936 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3937 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3940 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
3942 _ => pending_forward_info
3945 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3947 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3952 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3953 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3954 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
3955 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3956 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3957 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3958 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3959 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3961 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
3963 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3966 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false);
3970 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3971 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3972 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3973 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3974 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3975 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3976 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3978 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
3980 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3985 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3986 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3987 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3988 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3989 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3990 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3991 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3993 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
3994 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
3995 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
3997 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
4000 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4004 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4005 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4006 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4007 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4008 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4009 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4010 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4012 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, monitor_update) =
4013 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger) {
4014 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
4015 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
4016 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
4017 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
4018 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan);
4023 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4024 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
4026 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4027 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4028 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4030 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
4031 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4032 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4033 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4034 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4035 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4036 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4037 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4039 commitment_signed: msg,
4045 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4050 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
4051 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
4052 let mut forward_event = None;
4053 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4054 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4055 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
4056 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
4058 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4059 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.routing {
4060 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
4061 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
4062 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
4064 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4065 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4066 prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
4068 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4069 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4070 prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
4075 match forward_event {
4077 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4078 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
4079 time_forwardable: time
4087 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4088 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
4090 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4091 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4092 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4093 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4094 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4095 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4097 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
4098 let raa_updates = break_chan_entry!(self,
4099 chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4100 htlcs_to_fail = raa_updates.holding_cell_failed_htlcs;
4101 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), raa_updates.monitor_update) {
4102 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
4103 assert!(raa_updates.commitment_update.is_none());
4104 assert!(raa_updates.accepted_htlcs.is_empty());
4105 assert!(raa_updates.failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4106 assert!(raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs.is_empty());
4107 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
4109 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan,
4110 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false,
4111 raa_updates.commitment_update.is_some(),
4112 raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4113 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs) {
4115 } else { unreachable!(); }
4118 if let Some(updates) = raa_updates.commitment_update {
4119 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4120 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4124 break Ok((raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4125 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs,
4126 chan.get().get_short_channel_id()
4127 .expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"),
4128 chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap()))
4130 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4133 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id);
4135 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, finalized_claim_htlcs,
4136 short_channel_id, channel_outpoint)) =>
4138 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4139 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
4141 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, pending_forwards)]);
4142 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claim_htlcs);
4149 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4150 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4151 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4152 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4153 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4154 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4155 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4157 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
4159 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4164 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4165 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4166 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4168 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4169 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4170 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4171 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4173 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
4174 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
4177 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
4178 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(&self.our_network_key, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), msg), channel_state, chan),
4179 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
4180 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
4181 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
4184 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4189 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
4190 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4191 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4192 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4193 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
4194 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
4196 // It's not a local channel
4197 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
4200 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4201 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4202 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4203 if chan.get().should_announce() {
4204 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
4205 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
4206 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
4207 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
4209 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
4211 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
4212 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
4213 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
4214 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
4216 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), channel_state, chan);
4219 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => unreachable!()
4221 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
4224 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4225 let chan_restoration_res;
4226 let (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround) = {
4227 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4228 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4230 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4231 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4232 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4233 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4235 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
4236 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
4237 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
4238 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
4239 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, monitor_update_opt, order, htlcs_failed_forward, shutdown) =
4240 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4241 let mut channel_update = None;
4242 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4243 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4244 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4247 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4248 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
4249 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
4250 // they have the latest channel parameters.
4251 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4252 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4253 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
4256 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
4257 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_state_lock, channel_state, chan, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, order, monitor_update_opt, Vec::new(), None, funding_locked);
4258 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
4259 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
4261 (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround)
4263 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4266 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
4267 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_failed_forward, msg.channel_id);
4269 if let Some(funding_locked_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
4270 self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, &funding_locked_msg)?;
4275 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed.
4276 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
4277 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
4278 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
4279 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
4280 for monitor_event in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
4281 match monitor_event {
4282 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
4283 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
4284 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
4285 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.onchain_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true);
4287 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
4288 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
4291 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
4292 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
4293 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4294 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4295 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4296 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4297 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4298 if let Some(mut chan) = by_id.remove(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
4299 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
4300 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4302 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
4303 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4304 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4308 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
4309 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
4311 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
4313 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
4314 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4315 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4316 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4317 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
4322 MonitorEvent::UpdateCompleted { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
4323 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id);
4328 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
4329 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
4332 has_pending_monitor_events
4335 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
4336 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
4337 /// update events as a separate process method here.
4338 #[cfg(feature = "fuzztarget")]
4339 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
4340 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
4343 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
4344 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
4345 /// update was applied.
4347 /// This should only apply to HTLCs which were added to the holding cell because we were
4348 /// waiting on a monitor update to finish. In that case, we don't want to free the holding cell
4349 /// directly in `channel_monitor_updated` as it may introduce deadlocks calling back into user
4350 /// code to inform them of a channel monitor update.
4351 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
4352 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
4353 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4354 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
4356 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4357 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4358 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4359 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4360 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4362 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
4363 match chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger) {
4364 Ok((commitment_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
4365 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
4366 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id));
4368 if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt {
4369 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4370 has_monitor_update = true;
4371 let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), channel_id);
4372 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res));
4373 if close_channel { return false; }
4375 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4376 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4377 updates: commitment_update,
4384 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
4385 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
4386 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us
4393 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
4394 for (failures, channel_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
4395 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id);
4398 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4399 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4405 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
4406 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
4407 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
4408 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
4409 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
4410 let mut has_update = false;
4412 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4413 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4414 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4415 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4416 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4418 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
4419 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
4420 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
4421 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
4423 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4424 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
4427 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
4428 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
4429 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
4430 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
4431 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4434 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4435 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4440 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4442 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
4443 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
4449 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
4450 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
4457 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4458 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4464 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
4465 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
4467 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
4468 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
4469 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
4470 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
4471 // reorganized out of the main chain.
4472 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
4473 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
4474 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
4475 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
4476 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
4477 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
4478 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
4479 assert!(should_broadcast);
4480 } else { unreachable!(); }
4481 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
4483 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
4487 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
4488 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
4490 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
4492 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4493 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4494 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
4495 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4496 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
4497 payment_secret, min_value_msat, user_payment_id, payment_preimage,
4498 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
4499 // its updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
4500 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
4501 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
4502 // never fail a payment too early.
4503 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
4505 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
4508 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
4513 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
4516 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
4517 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you, returning the first and storing the second.
4519 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentReceived`], which
4520 /// will have the [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
4521 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
4523 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
4525 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
4526 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
4527 /// [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::payment_preimage
4528 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
4529 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> (PaymentHash, PaymentSecret) {
4530 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
4531 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4534 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, user_payment_id)
4535 .expect("RNG Generated Duplicate PaymentHash"))
4538 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
4539 /// stored external to LDK.
4541 /// A [`PaymentReceived`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
4542 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
4543 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
4545 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) must be globally unique. This
4546 /// method may return an Err if another payment with the same payment_hash is still pending.
4548 /// `user_payment_id` will be provided back in [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::user_payment_id`] events to
4549 /// allow tracking of which events correspond with which calls to this and
4550 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]. `user_payment_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply
4551 /// copied to events and otherwise ignored. It may be used to correlate PaymentReceived events
4552 /// with invoice metadata stored elsewhere.
4554 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
4555 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
4556 /// before a [`PaymentReceived`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
4557 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
4559 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
4560 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
4561 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
4562 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
4563 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
4565 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
4566 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
4567 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentReceived`] event for some time after the expiry.
4568 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
4569 /// [`PaymentReceived`].
4571 /// Pending inbound payments are stored in memory and in serialized versions of this
4572 /// [`ChannelManager`]. If potentially unbounded numbers of inbound payments may exist and
4573 /// space is limited, you may wish to rate-limit inbound payment creation.
4575 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
4577 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry`
4578 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY`].
4580 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
4581 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
4582 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::user_payment_id`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::user_payment_id
4583 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
4584 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, user_payment_id)
4587 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget", feature = "_test_utils"))]
4588 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
4589 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
4590 let event_handler = |event: &events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event.clone());
4591 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
4596 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
4597 !self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().is_empty()
4601 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4602 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4603 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4604 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4605 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4608 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
4609 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
4610 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4611 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4613 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
4614 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
4615 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
4616 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4619 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
4620 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4622 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
4623 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4626 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
4627 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4628 mem::swap(&mut pending_events, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
4630 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
4631 events.replace(pending_events);
4640 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4642 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4643 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4644 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4645 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4648 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
4650 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
4651 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
4653 /// Pending events are persisted as part of [`ChannelManager`]. While these events are cleared
4654 /// when processed, an [`EventHandler`] must be able to handle previously seen events when
4655 /// restarting from an old state.
4656 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
4657 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4658 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4660 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
4661 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
4662 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
4663 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4666 let mut pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
4667 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
4668 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4671 for event in pending_events.drain(..) {
4672 handler.handle_event(&event);
4680 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4682 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4683 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4684 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4685 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4688 fn block_connected(&self, block: &Block, height: u32) {
4690 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4691 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), block.header.prev_blockhash,
4692 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
4693 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
4694 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
4697 let txdata: Vec<_> = block.txdata.iter().enumerate().collect();
4698 self.transactions_confirmed(&block.header, &txdata, height);
4699 self.best_block_updated(&block.header, height);
4702 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
4703 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4704 let new_height = height - 1;
4706 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
4707 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
4708 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
4709 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
4710 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
4711 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
4714 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, &self.logger));
4718 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4720 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4721 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4722 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4723 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4726 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
4727 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4728 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
4729 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4731 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
4732 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
4734 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4735 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, &self.logger).map(|a| (a, Vec::new())));
4738 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
4739 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4740 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
4741 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4743 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
4744 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
4746 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4748 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
4750 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, &self.logger));
4752 macro_rules! max_time {
4753 ($timestamp: expr) => {
4755 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
4756 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
4757 // having an explicit local time source.
4758 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
4759 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
4760 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
4761 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
4762 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
4768 max_time!(self.last_node_announcement_serial);
4769 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
4770 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4771 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
4772 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
4775 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4776 outbounds.retain(|_, payment| {
4777 const PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
4778 if payment.remaining_parts() != 0 { return true }
4779 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { starting_block_height, .. } = payment {
4780 return *starting_block_height + PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS > height
4786 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
4787 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4788 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.short_to_id.len());
4789 for chan in channel_state.by_id.values() {
4790 if let Some(funding_txo) = chan.get_funding_txo() {
4791 res.push(funding_txo.txid);
4797 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
4798 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4799 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
4800 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
4801 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
4802 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|_| (None, Vec::new()))
4803 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
4804 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
4809 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4811 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4812 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4813 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4814 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4817 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
4818 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
4820 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), msgs::ErrorMessage>>
4821 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
4822 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4823 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
4824 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4826 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
4827 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
4829 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4830 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4831 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4832 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4833 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
4834 let res = f(channel);
4835 if let Ok((chan_res, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs)) = res {
4836 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
4837 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(&channel).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
4838 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason {
4839 failure_code: 0x1000 | 14, // expiry_too_soon, or at least it is now
4843 if let Some(funding_locked) = chan_res {
4844 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
4845 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4846 msg: funding_locked,
4848 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
4849 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked and announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
4850 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4851 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4852 msg: announcement_sigs,
4854 } else if channel.is_usable() {
4855 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures but with private channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
4856 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4857 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4858 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel).unwrap(),
4861 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
4863 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
4865 } else if let Err(e) = res {
4866 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
4867 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4869 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
4870 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
4871 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
4872 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
4873 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4877 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4878 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4879 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4880 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: e },
4887 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
4888 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, htlcs| {
4889 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
4890 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
4891 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
4892 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
4893 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
4894 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
4895 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
4896 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(height));
4897 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(), HTLCFailReason::Reason {
4898 failure_code: 0x4000 | 15,
4899 data: htlc_msat_height_data
4904 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
4909 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
4911 for (source, payment_hash, reason) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
4912 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, reason);
4916 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
4917 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
4918 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
4920 /// Note that the feature `allow_wallclock_use` must be enabled to use this function.
4921 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
4922 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
4923 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
4926 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
4927 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
4929 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
4930 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
4933 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
4934 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
4935 let mutcond = &self.persistence_notifier.persistence_lock;
4936 let &(ref mtx, _) = mutcond;
4937 let guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
4941 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
4942 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
4943 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
4944 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
4948 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref , T: Deref , K: Deref , F: Deref , L: Deref >
4949 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4950 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4951 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4952 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4953 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4956 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
4957 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4958 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4961 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
4962 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4963 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4966 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
4967 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4968 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4971 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
4972 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4973 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4976 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) {
4977 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4978 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4981 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
4982 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4983 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4986 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
4987 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4988 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4991 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
4992 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4993 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4996 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
4997 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4998 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5001 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
5002 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5003 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5006 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
5007 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5008 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5011 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
5012 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5013 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5016 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
5017 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5018 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5021 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
5022 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5023 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5026 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
5027 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5028 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5031 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
5032 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5033 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
5036 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
5041 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
5042 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5043 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5046 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
5047 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5048 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5049 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
5051 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5052 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5053 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
5054 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5055 if no_connection_possible {
5056 log_debug!(self.logger, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
5057 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5058 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5059 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
5060 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
5062 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(true));
5063 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5064 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5068 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
5075 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
5076 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5077 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5078 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
5079 if chan.is_shutdown() {
5080 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
5081 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
5083 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
5086 no_channels_remain = false;
5092 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
5094 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5095 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5096 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5097 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5098 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5099 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5100 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5101 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5102 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5103 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5104 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5105 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
5106 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
5107 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
5108 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5109 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5110 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
5111 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
5112 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
5116 if no_channels_remain {
5117 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id);
5120 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5121 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5125 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) {
5126 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
5128 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5131 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
5132 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
5133 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5134 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
5135 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
5138 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
5139 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
5144 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5145 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5146 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5147 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5148 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5149 if !chan.have_received_message() {
5150 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
5151 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
5152 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
5156 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
5157 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5158 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
5164 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
5167 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
5168 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5170 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
5171 for chan in self.list_channels() {
5172 if chan.counterparty.node_id == *counterparty_node_id {
5173 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
5174 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(&msg.data));
5178 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
5179 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(&msg.data));
5184 /// Used to signal to the ChannelManager persister that the manager needs to be re-persisted to
5185 /// disk/backups, through `await_persistable_update_timeout` and `await_persistable_update`.
5186 struct PersistenceNotifier {
5187 /// Users won't access the persistence_lock directly, but rather wait on its bool using
5188 /// `wait_timeout` and `wait`.
5189 persistence_lock: (Mutex<bool>, Condvar),
5192 impl PersistenceNotifier {
5195 persistence_lock: (Mutex::new(false), Condvar::new()),
5201 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
5202 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
5207 guard = cvar.wait(guard).unwrap();
5208 let result = *guard;
5216 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
5217 fn wait_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
5218 let current_time = Instant::now();
5220 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
5221 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
5226 guard = cvar.wait_timeout(guard, max_wait).unwrap().0;
5227 // Due to spurious wakeups that can happen on `wait_timeout`, here we need to check if the
5228 // desired wait time has actually passed, and if not then restart the loop with a reduced wait
5229 // time. Note that this logic can be highly simplified through the use of
5230 // `Condvar::wait_while` and `Condvar::wait_timeout_while`, if and when our MSRV is raised to
5232 let elapsed = current_time.elapsed();
5233 let result = *guard;
5234 if result || elapsed >= max_wait {
5238 match max_wait.checked_sub(elapsed) {
5239 None => return result,
5245 // Signal to the ChannelManager persister that there are updates necessitating persisting to disk.
5247 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &self.persistence_lock;
5248 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5249 *persistence_lock = true;
5250 mem::drop(persistence_lock);
5255 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
5256 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
5258 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
5260 (0, onion_packet, required),
5261 (2, short_channel_id, required),
5264 (0, payment_data, required),
5265 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
5267 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
5268 (0, payment_preimage, required),
5269 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
5273 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
5274 (0, routing, required),
5275 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
5276 (4, payment_hash, required),
5277 (6, amt_to_forward, required),
5278 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required)
5282 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
5283 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5285 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
5287 channel_id.write(writer)?;
5288 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
5289 reason.write(writer)?;
5291 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
5292 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
5295 channel_id.write(writer)?;
5296 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
5297 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
5298 failure_code.write(writer)?;
5305 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
5306 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5307 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5310 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
5311 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5312 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5313 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
5317 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
5318 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5319 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5320 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
5321 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
5324 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
5325 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
5326 // messages contained in the variants.
5327 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
5328 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
5329 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
5331 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
5332 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
5333 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
5334 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
5335 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
5338 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
5339 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
5340 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
5341 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
5342 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
5344 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
5349 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
5354 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
5355 (0, short_channel_id, required),
5356 (2, outpoint, required),
5357 (4, htlc_id, required),
5358 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
5361 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
5362 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5363 let payment_data = match &self.onion_payload {
5364 OnionPayload::Invoice(data) => Some(data.clone()),
5367 let keysend_preimage = match self.onion_payload {
5368 OnionPayload::Invoice(_) => None,
5369 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => Some(preimage.clone()),
5374 (0, self.prev_hop, required), (2, self.value, required),
5375 (4, payment_data, option), (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
5376 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
5382 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
5383 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5384 let mut prev_hop = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
5386 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
5387 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
5388 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
5392 (0, prev_hop, required), (2, value, required),
5393 (4, payment_data, option), (6, cltv_expiry, required),
5394 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
5396 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
5398 if payment_data.is_some() {
5399 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
5401 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
5404 if payment_data.is_none() {
5405 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
5407 OnionPayload::Invoice(payment_data.unwrap())
5411 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
5419 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
5420 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5421 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5424 let mut session_priv: ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper<SecretKey> = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
5425 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
5426 let mut path = Some(Vec::new());
5427 let mut payment_id = None;
5428 let mut payment_secret = None;
5429 let mut payee = None;
5430 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
5431 (0, session_priv, required),
5432 (1, payment_id, option),
5433 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
5434 (3, payment_secret, option),
5435 (4, path, vec_type),
5438 if payment_id.is_none() {
5439 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
5441 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
5443 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
5444 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
5445 first_hop_htlc_msat: first_hop_htlc_msat,
5446 path: path.unwrap(),
5447 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
5452 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
5453 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
5458 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
5459 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::io::Error> {
5461 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id, payment_secret, payee } => {
5463 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
5464 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
5465 (0, session_priv, required),
5466 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
5467 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
5468 (3, payment_secret, option),
5469 (4, path, vec_type),
5473 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
5475 field.write(writer)?;
5482 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCFailReason,
5483 (0, LightningError) => {
5487 (0, failure_code, required),
5488 (2, data, vec_type),
5492 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
5494 (0, forward_info, required),
5495 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
5496 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
5497 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
5500 (0, htlc_id, required),
5501 (2, err_packet, required),
5505 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
5506 (0, payment_secret, required),
5507 (2, expiry_time, required),
5508 (4, user_payment_id, required),
5509 (6, payment_preimage, required),
5510 (8, min_value_msat, required),
5513 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(PendingOutboundPayment,
5515 (0, session_privs, required),
5518 (0, session_privs, required),
5521 (0, session_privs, required),
5522 (1, pending_fee_msat, option),
5523 (2, payment_hash, required),
5524 (4, payment_secret, option),
5525 (6, total_msat, required),
5526 (8, pending_amt_msat, required),
5527 (10, starting_block_height, required),
5531 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5532 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5533 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5534 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5535 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5538 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5539 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
5541 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
5543 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
5545 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5546 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
5547 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
5550 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5551 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
5552 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
5553 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
5554 unfunded_channels += 1;
5557 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
5558 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
5559 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
5560 channel.write(writer)?;
5564 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5565 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
5566 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
5567 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5568 for forward in pending_forwards {
5569 forward.write(writer)?;
5573 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5574 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
5575 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
5576 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5577 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
5578 htlc.write(writer)?;
5582 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
5583 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5584 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5585 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
5586 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5587 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
5590 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5591 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5592 for event in events.iter() {
5593 event.write(writer)?;
5596 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
5597 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5598 for event in background_events.iter() {
5600 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
5602 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
5603 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
5608 (self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
5609 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
5611 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5612 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5613 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
5614 hash.write(writer)?;
5615 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
5618 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5619 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
5620 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
5621 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
5622 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() {
5623 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
5626 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
5627 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
5629 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
5630 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
5631 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
5632 session_priv.write(writer)?;
5635 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
5639 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
5640 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
5641 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
5643 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
5644 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
5645 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
5650 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
5651 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
5652 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
5659 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
5661 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
5663 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
5664 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
5665 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
5666 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
5667 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
5668 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
5669 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
5670 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
5671 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
5672 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
5673 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
5674 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
5675 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
5677 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
5678 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
5680 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
5681 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
5683 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
5684 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
5685 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
5686 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
5687 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
5688 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
5690 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
5691 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
5692 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5693 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5694 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5695 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5698 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
5699 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
5701 pub keys_manager: K,
5703 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
5705 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
5706 pub fee_estimator: F,
5707 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
5709 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
5710 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
5711 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
5712 pub chain_monitor: M,
5714 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
5715 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
5716 /// force-closed during deserialization.
5717 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
5718 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
5719 /// deserialization.
5721 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
5722 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
5723 pub default_config: UserConfig,
5725 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
5726 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
5728 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
5729 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
5730 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
5731 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
5733 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
5736 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
5737 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>,
5740 impl<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
5741 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5742 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5743 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5744 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5745 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5748 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
5749 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
5750 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
5751 pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
5752 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>) -> Self {
5754 keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config,
5755 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
5760 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
5761 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
5762 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
5763 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>>)
5764 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5765 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5766 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5767 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5770 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5771 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
5772 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
5776 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
5777 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)
5778 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5779 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5780 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5781 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5784 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5785 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
5787 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
5788 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5789 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
5791 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5793 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5794 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
5795 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
5796 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
5797 let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
5798 for _ in 0..channel_count {
5799 let mut channel: Channel<Signer> = Channel::read(reader, &args.keys_manager)?;
5800 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
5801 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
5802 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
5803 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
5804 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
5805 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
5806 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
5807 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
5808 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
5809 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
5810 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
5811 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
5812 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
5813 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
5814 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/rust-bitcoin/rust-lightning");
5815 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
5816 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
5817 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
5818 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
5819 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
5820 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
5821 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
5822 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
5823 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
5824 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
5825 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
5826 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
5827 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
5828 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
5829 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
5830 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
5831 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
5834 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
5835 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
5837 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
5840 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5841 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
5842 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
5843 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
5844 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/rust-bitcoin/rust-lightning");
5845 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
5849 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
5850 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
5851 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
5855 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
5856 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5857 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
5858 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
5859 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
5860 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5861 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
5862 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
5863 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
5865 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
5868 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5869 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
5870 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
5871 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
5872 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5873 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
5874 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
5875 previous_hops.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
5877 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
5880 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5881 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>)>()));
5882 for _ in 0..peer_count {
5883 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
5884 let peer_state = PeerState {
5885 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
5887 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
5890 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5891 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
5892 for _ in 0..event_count {
5893 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
5894 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
5898 if forward_htlcs_count > 0 {
5899 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
5900 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
5901 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
5902 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
5903 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
5904 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
5905 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
5909 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5910 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
5911 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
5912 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
5913 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
5914 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
5918 let last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5919 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5921 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5922 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
5923 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
5924 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
5925 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
5929 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5930 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
5931 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
5932 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
5933 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
5934 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
5935 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
5937 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
5938 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
5942 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
5943 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
5944 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
5945 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
5946 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
5947 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
5949 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
5950 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
5951 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
5952 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
5953 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
5954 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
5956 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
5958 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
5959 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
5960 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
5961 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
5962 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
5963 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
5964 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
5966 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors {
5967 if by_id.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
5968 for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_pending_outbound_htlcs() {
5969 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, payment_secret, .. } = htlc_source {
5970 if path.is_empty() {
5971 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
5972 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
5974 let path_amt = path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
5975 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
5976 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
5977 match pending_outbound_payments.as_mut().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
5978 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5979 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
5980 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
5981 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5983 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5984 let path_fee = path.get_path_fees();
5985 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
5986 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
5987 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
5989 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
5990 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
5991 total_msat: path_amt,
5992 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
5994 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
5995 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
6004 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6005 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
6007 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
6008 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
6011 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
6013 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
6014 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
6015 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
6017 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
6019 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
6024 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
6026 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
6027 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
6029 our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
6030 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &args.keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
6033 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(last_node_announcement_serial as usize),
6034 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
6036 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
6038 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
6039 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
6040 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
6041 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
6043 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
6044 logger: args.logger,
6045 default_configuration: args.default_config,
6048 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
6049 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_manager.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
6052 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
6053 //connection or two.
6055 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
6061 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
6062 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
6063 use core::time::Duration;
6064 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
6065 use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure};
6066 use ln::features::InitFeatures;
6067 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
6069 use ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
6070 use routing::router::{Payee, RouteParameters, find_route};
6071 use routing::scorer::Scorer;
6072 use util::errors::APIError;
6073 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
6075 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
6077 fn test_wait_timeout() {
6078 use ln::channelmanager::PersistenceNotifier;
6080 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, Ordering};
6083 let persistence_notifier = Arc::new(PersistenceNotifier::new());
6084 let thread_notifier = Arc::clone(&persistence_notifier);
6086 let exit_thread = Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false));
6087 let exit_thread_clone = exit_thread.clone();
6088 thread::spawn(move || {
6090 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &thread_notifier.persistence_lock;
6091 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6092 *persistence_lock = true;
6095 if exit_thread_clone.load(Ordering::SeqCst) {
6101 // Check that we can block indefinitely until updates are available.
6102 let _ = persistence_notifier.wait();
6104 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration if updates are
6107 if persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
6112 exit_thread.store(true, Ordering::SeqCst);
6114 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration even if no updates
6117 if !persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
6124 fn test_notify_limits() {
6125 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
6126 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
6127 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6128 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6129 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6130 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6132 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
6133 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
6134 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6135 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6136 assert!(nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6138 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6140 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
6141 // to connect messages with new values
6142 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
6143 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
6144 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
6145 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
6147 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
6148 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6149 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6150 // ... but the last node should not.
6151 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6152 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
6153 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6154 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6156 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
6157 // about the channel.
6158 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
6159 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
6160 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6162 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
6164 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
6165 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
6166 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
6167 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
6168 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6169 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6171 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
6172 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
6173 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
6175 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
6176 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
6177 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
6178 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
6179 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
6180 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
6182 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
6183 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
6184 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
6185 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
6186 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6187 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6188 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
6189 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
6191 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
6192 // the channel info has updated.
6193 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
6194 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
6195 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6196 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6197 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
6198 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
6202 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
6203 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
6205 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6206 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6207 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6208 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6209 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6211 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
6212 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
6213 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
6214 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
6215 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
6216 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
6217 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payee, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
6218 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6219 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6220 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6221 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
6223 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
6224 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
6225 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6226 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6227 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6228 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
6229 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
6230 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6231 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6232 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6233 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6234 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6235 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6236 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6237 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6238 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6239 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6240 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6241 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6242 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6243 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
6244 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
6246 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
6247 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payee, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
6248 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6249 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6250 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6251 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
6253 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
6254 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
6255 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
6256 // lightning messages manually.
6257 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
6258 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6259 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6260 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6261 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
6262 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6263 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6264 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
6265 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6266 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6267 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
6268 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6269 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6270 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6271 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
6272 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6273 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6274 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
6275 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6276 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6277 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
6278 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6279 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
6280 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6281 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6282 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
6283 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6285 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate 1 event upon the first path's success. No
6286 // further events will be generated for subsequence path successes.
6287 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6289 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
6290 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
6291 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
6292 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
6294 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6299 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
6300 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
6301 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
6302 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
6303 // fails as expected.
6304 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6305 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6306 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6307 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6308 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6309 let scorer = Scorer::new(0);
6311 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
6312 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
6313 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
6315 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
6316 let params = RouteParameters {
6317 payee: Payee::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id()),
6318 final_value_msat: 100_000,
6319 final_cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
6321 let route = find_route(
6322 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), ¶ms,
6323 &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer
6325 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
6326 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6327 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6328 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6329 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
6330 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
6331 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6332 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6333 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6334 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6335 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6336 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6337 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6338 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6339 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6340 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6341 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6342 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6343 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6344 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
6345 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
6347 // Finally, claim the original payment.
6348 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
6350 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
6351 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
6352 let route = find_route(
6353 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), ¶ms,
6354 &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer
6356 let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
6357 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6358 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6359 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6360 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
6361 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
6362 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
6364 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
6365 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
6366 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
6367 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6368 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6369 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6370 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
6371 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
6372 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6373 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6374 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6375 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6376 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6377 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6378 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6379 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6380 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6381 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6382 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6383 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6384 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6385 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
6386 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
6388 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
6389 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
6393 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
6394 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
6395 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
6396 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6397 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6398 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6399 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6401 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
6402 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
6403 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
6404 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
6406 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6407 let params = RouteParameters {
6408 payee: Payee::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
6409 final_value_msat: 10000,
6410 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
6412 let network_graph = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph;
6413 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
6414 let scorer = Scorer::new(0);
6415 let route = find_route(
6416 &payer_pubkey, ¶ms, network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
6417 nodes[0].logger, &scorer
6420 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
6421 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
6422 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage), None, None).unwrap();
6423 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6425 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6426 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
6427 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6428 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6429 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6430 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6431 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6433 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash".to_string(), 1);
6437 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
6438 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
6439 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6440 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6441 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6442 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6444 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
6445 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
6446 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
6447 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
6449 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6450 let params = RouteParameters {
6451 payee: Payee::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
6452 final_value_msat: 10000,
6453 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
6455 let network_graph = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph;
6456 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
6457 let scorer = Scorer::new(0);
6458 let route = find_route(
6459 &payer_pubkey, ¶ms, network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
6460 nodes[0].logger, &scorer
6463 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
6464 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
6465 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
6466 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage), None, None).unwrap();
6467 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6469 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6470 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
6471 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6472 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6473 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6474 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6475 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6477 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "We don't support MPP keysend payments".to_string(), 1);
6481 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
6482 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
6483 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
6484 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
6485 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6487 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
6488 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
6489 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
6490 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
6492 // Marshall an MPP route.
6493 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
6494 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
6495 route.paths.push(path);
6496 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
6497 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
6498 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
6499 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
6500 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
6501 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
6503 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None).unwrap_err() {
6504 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
6505 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err)) },
6506 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
6511 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "unstable"))]
6514 use chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
6515 use chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
6516 use ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
6517 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures};
6518 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
6519 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
6520 use routing::network_graph::NetworkGraph;
6521 use routing::router::{Payee, get_route};
6522 use routing::scorer::Scorer;
6523 use util::test_utils;
6524 use util::config::UserConfig;
6525 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PaymentPurpose};
6527 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
6528 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
6529 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, Transaction, TxOut};
6531 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
6535 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
6536 node: &'a ChannelManager<InMemorySigner,
6537 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
6538 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
6539 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
6540 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager,
6541 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestLogger>
6546 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
6547 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
6550 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
6551 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
6552 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
6554 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
6555 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
6557 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
6558 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
6560 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
6561 config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
6563 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
6564 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
6565 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
6566 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
6567 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
6569 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
6571 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
6573 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
6574 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
6575 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
6576 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
6577 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
6579 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
6581 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
6583 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
6584 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
6585 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
6586 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
6587 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
6590 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
6591 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
6592 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
6594 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
6595 } else { panic!(); }
6597 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
6598 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
6600 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
6603 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
6606 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
6607 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
6609 node_a.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
6610 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6611 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
6612 match msg_events[0] {
6613 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref msg, .. } => {
6614 node_b.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
6615 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
6619 match msg_events[1] {
6620 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
6624 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash);
6626 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
6627 macro_rules! send_payment {
6628 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
6629 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
6630 let payee = Payee::new($node_b.get_our_node_id())
6631 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
6632 let scorer = Scorer::new(0);
6633 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payee, &dummy_graph,
6634 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a, &scorer).unwrap();
6636 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
6637 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
6639 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
6640 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, 0).unwrap();
6642 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
6643 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
6644 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6645 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
6646 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
6647 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6648 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
6649 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
6651 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
6652 expect_payment_received!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
6653 assert!($node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
6655 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
6656 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
6657 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
6658 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6659 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
6661 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
6664 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
6665 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6666 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
6667 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
6669 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
6674 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
6675 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);