1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`find_route`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 //! [`find_route`]: crate::routing::router::find_route
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
24 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
25 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
27 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
30 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
32 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
35 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
38 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
39 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
40 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
41 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
42 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
43 // construct one themselves.
44 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
45 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
46 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
47 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
48 use crate::ln::features::InvoiceFeatures;
49 use crate::routing::router::{InFlightHtlcs, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RoutePath, RouteParameters};
51 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
52 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
53 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
54 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, Recipient};
55 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig};
56 use crate::util::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
57 use crate::util::{byte_utils, events};
58 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
59 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
60 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
61 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
62 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
65 use crate::prelude::*;
67 use core::cell::RefCell;
69 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock};
70 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
71 use core::time::Duration;
74 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
76 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
77 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
78 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
80 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
81 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
82 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
83 // before we forward it.
85 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
86 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
87 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
88 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
89 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
91 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
92 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
94 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
95 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
96 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
97 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
100 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
101 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
102 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
105 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
106 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
110 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
111 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
112 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
113 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
114 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
115 pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
116 pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
117 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
120 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
121 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
122 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
123 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
126 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
127 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
128 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
129 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
130 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
133 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
134 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
136 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
137 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
138 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
141 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
142 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
144 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
145 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
148 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
149 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
152 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
156 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
157 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
158 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
159 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
160 short_channel_id: u64,
162 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
163 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
165 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
166 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
171 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
173 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
174 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
175 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
177 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
178 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
181 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
182 struct ClaimableHTLC {
183 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
185 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
187 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
189 /// The sum total of all MPP parts
193 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
194 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
195 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
196 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
198 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
199 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
204 impl Readable for PaymentId {
205 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
206 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
211 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
212 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
213 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
214 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
216 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
217 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
222 impl Readable for InterceptId {
223 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
224 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
228 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
229 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
230 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
231 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
232 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
235 session_priv: SecretKey,
236 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
237 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
238 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
239 payment_id: PaymentId,
240 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
241 payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters>,
244 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
245 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
246 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
248 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
250 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
252 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_secret, first_hop_htlc_msat, payment_params } => {
255 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
256 payment_id.hash(hasher);
257 payment_secret.hash(hasher);
258 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
259 payment_params.hash(hasher);
264 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
267 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
268 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
270 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
271 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
272 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
273 payment_secret: None,
274 payment_params: None,
279 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
280 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
282 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
290 impl HTLCFailReason {
291 pub(super) fn reason(failure_code: u16, data: Vec<u8>) -> Self {
292 Self::Reason { failure_code, data }
295 pub(super) fn from_failure_code(failure_code: u16) -> Self {
296 Self::Reason { failure_code, data: Vec::new() }
300 struct ReceiveError {
306 /// Return value for claim_funds_from_hop
307 enum ClaimFundsFromHop {
309 MonitorUpdateFail(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal, Option<u64>),
314 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>);
316 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
317 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
318 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
319 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
320 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
322 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
323 err: msgs::LightningError,
324 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
325 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
327 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
329 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
331 err: LightningError {
333 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
334 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
341 shutdown_finish: None,
345 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
347 err: LightningError {
349 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
352 shutdown_finish: None,
356 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
357 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
360 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
362 err: LightningError {
364 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
365 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
371 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
372 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
376 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
379 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
381 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
382 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
386 log_level: Level::Warn,
389 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
391 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
393 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
395 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
396 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
404 shutdown_finish: None,
409 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
410 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
411 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
412 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
413 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
415 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
416 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
417 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
418 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
419 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
420 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
421 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
423 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
427 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
428 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<Signer: Sign> {
429 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
430 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
431 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
432 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
435 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
436 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
437 /// quite some time lag.
438 enum BackgroundEvent {
439 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
440 /// commitment transaction.
441 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
444 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
445 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
447 latest_features: InitFeatures,
450 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
451 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
453 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
456 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
457 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
458 struct PendingInboundPayment {
459 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
460 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
461 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
462 /// this payment being removed.
464 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
465 user_payment_id: u64,
466 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
467 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
468 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
471 /// Stores the session_priv for each part of a payment that is still pending. For versions 0.0.102
472 /// and later, also stores information for retrying the payment.
473 pub(crate) enum PendingOutboundPayment {
475 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
478 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
479 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
480 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
481 pending_amt_msat: u64,
482 /// Used to track the fee paid. Only present if the payment was serialized on 0.0.103+.
483 pending_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
484 /// The total payment amount across all paths, used to verify that a retry is not overpaying.
486 /// Our best known block height at the time this payment was initiated.
487 starting_block_height: u32,
489 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
490 /// been resolved. This ensures we don't look up pending payments in ChannelMonitors on restart
491 /// and add a pending payment that was already fulfilled.
493 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
494 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
495 timer_ticks_without_htlcs: u8,
497 /// When a payer gives up trying to retry a payment, they inform us, letting us generate a
498 /// `PaymentFailed` event when all HTLCs have irrevocably failed. This avoids a number of race
499 /// conditions in MPP-aware payment retriers (1), where the possibility of multiple
500 /// `PaymentPathFailed` events with `all_paths_failed` can be pending at once, confusing a
501 /// downstream event handler as to when a payment has actually failed.
503 /// (1) https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1164
505 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
506 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
510 impl PendingOutboundPayment {
511 fn is_fulfilled(&self) -> bool {
513 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => true,
517 fn abandoned(&self) -> bool {
519 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => true,
523 fn get_pending_fee_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
525 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { pending_fee_msat, .. } => pending_fee_msat.clone(),
530 fn payment_hash(&self) -> Option<PaymentHash> {
532 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None,
533 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
534 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => *payment_hash,
535 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
539 fn mark_fulfilled(&mut self) {
540 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
541 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
542 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
543 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
544 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
545 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. }
548 let payment_hash = self.payment_hash();
549 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, payment_hash, timer_ticks_without_htlcs: 0 };
552 fn mark_abandoned(&mut self) -> Result<(), ()> {
553 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
554 let our_payment_hash;
555 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
556 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } |
557 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } =>
559 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } |
560 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } => {
561 our_payment_hash = *payment_hash;
565 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash: our_payment_hash };
569 /// panics if path is None and !self.is_fulfilled
570 fn remove(&mut self, session_priv: &[u8; 32], path: Option<&Vec<RouteHop>>) -> bool {
571 let remove_res = match self {
572 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
573 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
574 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
575 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => {
576 session_privs.remove(session_priv)
580 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
581 let path = path.expect("Fulfilling a payment should always come with a path");
582 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
583 *pending_amt_msat -= path_last_hop.fee_msat;
584 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
585 *fee_msat -= path.get_path_fees();
592 fn insert(&mut self, session_priv: [u8; 32], path: &Vec<RouteHop>) -> bool {
593 let insert_res = match self {
594 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
595 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
596 session_privs.insert(session_priv)
598 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => false,
599 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => false,
602 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
603 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
604 *pending_amt_msat += path_last_hop.fee_msat;
605 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
606 *fee_msat += path.get_path_fees();
613 fn remaining_parts(&self) -> usize {
615 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
616 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
617 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
618 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => {
625 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
626 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
627 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
628 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
629 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
630 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
631 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
633 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
634 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>;
636 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
637 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
638 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
639 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
640 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
641 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
642 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
643 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
645 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
646 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<&'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
648 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
649 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
651 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
652 /// to individual Channels.
654 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
655 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
656 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
657 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
659 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
660 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
661 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
662 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
663 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
664 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
665 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
667 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
668 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
669 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
670 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
673 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
674 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
675 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
676 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
677 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
679 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
680 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
681 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
682 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
683 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
686 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
687 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
688 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
689 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
690 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
694 // `total_consistency_lock`
696 // |__`forward_htlcs`
698 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
700 // |__`pending_inbound_payments`
702 // | |__`claimable_htlcs`
704 // | |__`pending_outbound_payments`
706 // | |__`channel_state`
710 // | |__`short_to_chan_info`
712 // | |__`per_peer_state`
714 // | |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
718 // | |__`pending_events`
720 // | |__`pending_background_events`
722 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
723 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
724 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
725 K::Target: KeysInterface,
726 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
729 default_configuration: UserConfig,
730 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
731 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
735 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
737 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
739 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
740 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
742 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
743 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
744 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>>,
745 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
746 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>>,
748 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
749 /// expose them to users via a PaymentReceived event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
750 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
751 /// after we generate a PaymentReceived upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
753 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
754 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
756 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
757 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
758 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
759 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
760 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
761 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
762 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
763 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
765 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
767 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
768 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment>>,
770 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
772 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
773 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
774 /// and via the classic SCID.
776 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
777 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
779 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
781 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
783 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
784 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
785 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
787 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
788 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
790 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
791 /// failed/claimed by the user.
793 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
794 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
796 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
797 claimable_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, (events::PaymentPurpose, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>)>>,
799 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
800 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
801 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
802 /// active channel list on load.
804 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
805 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
807 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
809 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
810 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
811 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
813 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
814 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
815 /// the handling of the events.
818 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
819 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
820 /// would break backwards compatability.
821 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
822 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
823 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
825 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
826 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<[u8; 32], PublicKey>>,
828 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
830 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
831 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
832 /// confirmation depth.
834 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
835 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
836 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
838 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
840 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
842 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
844 our_network_key: SecretKey,
845 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
847 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
849 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
850 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
851 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
853 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
854 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
856 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
857 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
858 /// keeping additional state.
859 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
861 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
862 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
863 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
864 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
866 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
867 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
868 /// are currently open with that peer.
869 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
870 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
873 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
874 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
876 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
877 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
878 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
879 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
880 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
881 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
882 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
883 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
884 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
885 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
886 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
888 persistence_notifier: Notifier,
895 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
897 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
898 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
899 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
900 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
901 pub struct ChainParameters {
902 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
903 pub network: Network,
905 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
907 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
908 pub best_block: BestBlock,
911 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
917 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
918 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
919 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
920 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
921 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
922 /// updates are ready for persistence).
924 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
925 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
926 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
927 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
928 persistence_notifier: &'a Notifier,
930 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
931 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
934 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
935 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
936 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
939 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
940 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
942 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
943 persistence_notifier: notifier,
944 should_persist: persist_check,
945 _read_guard: read_guard,
950 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
952 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
953 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
958 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
959 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
961 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
963 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
964 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
965 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
966 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
967 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
969 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
970 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
972 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
974 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
975 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
976 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
977 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
978 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
979 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
980 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
981 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
982 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
983 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
984 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
985 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
986 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
988 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
989 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry` field to at least
991 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
992 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
993 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
994 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 3;
996 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
997 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
998 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
999 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1000 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1001 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1004 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1006 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1007 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1010 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1012 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1013 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1015 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until we time-out the
1016 /// idempotency of payments by [`PaymentId`]. See
1017 /// [`ChannelManager::remove_stale_resolved_payments`].
1018 pub(crate) const IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 7;
1020 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1021 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1022 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1023 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1024 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1025 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1026 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1027 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1028 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1029 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1030 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1033 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1034 /// to better separate parameters.
1035 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1036 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1037 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1038 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1039 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1040 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1041 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1042 pub features: InitFeatures,
1043 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1044 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1045 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1047 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1049 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1050 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1051 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1052 /// payments to us through this channel.
1053 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1054 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1055 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1056 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1057 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1058 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1059 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1062 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
1063 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1064 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1065 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1066 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1067 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1068 /// lifetime of the channel.
1069 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
1070 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1071 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1072 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1073 /// our counterparty already.
1075 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1076 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1077 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1078 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1080 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1081 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1082 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1083 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1085 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1086 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1088 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1089 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1091 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1092 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1093 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1094 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1095 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1096 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1097 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1098 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1099 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1102 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1104 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1105 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1106 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1107 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1108 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1109 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1110 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1112 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1113 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1115 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1116 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1117 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1118 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1119 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1120 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1121 /// this value on chain.
1123 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1125 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1127 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1128 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1129 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or a random value if the channel was
1130 /// inbound. This may be zero for inbound channels serialized with LDK versions prior to
1132 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1133 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1134 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1135 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1137 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1138 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1139 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1140 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1142 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1143 pub balance_msat: u64,
1144 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1145 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1146 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1147 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1149 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1151 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1152 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1153 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1154 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1155 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1156 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1157 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1158 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1160 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`] and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1161 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1162 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1163 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1164 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1165 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1166 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1168 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1169 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1170 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1171 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1172 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1173 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1174 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1175 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1176 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1178 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1180 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1181 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1182 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1183 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1184 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1186 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1187 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1188 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1189 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1190 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1191 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1192 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1194 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1195 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1196 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1197 pub is_outbound: bool,
1198 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1199 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1200 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1201 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1202 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1204 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1205 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1206 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1207 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1209 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1210 pub is_usable: bool,
1211 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1212 pub is_public: bool,
1213 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1214 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1215 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1216 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1217 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1218 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1220 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1221 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1224 impl ChannelDetails {
1225 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1226 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1227 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1229 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1230 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1231 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1232 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1235 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1236 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1237 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1239 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1240 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1241 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1242 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1246 /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
1247 /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
1248 /// states for more.
1249 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
1250 pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
1251 /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
1252 /// send the payment at all.
1254 /// You can freely resend the payment in full (with the parameter error fixed).
1256 /// Because the payment failed outright, no payment tracking is done, you do not need to call
1257 /// [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] and [`ChannelManager::retry_payment`] will *not* work
1258 /// for this payment.
1259 ParameterError(APIError),
1260 /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us
1261 /// from attempting to send the payment at all.
1263 /// You can freely resend the payment in full (with the parameter error fixed).
1265 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
1268 /// Because the payment failed outright, no payment tracking is done, you do not need to call
1269 /// [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] and [`ChannelManager::retry_payment`] will *not* work
1270 /// for this payment.
1271 PathParameterError(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
1272 /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
1273 /// You can freely resend the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
1274 /// paths than the ones selected).
1276 /// Because the payment failed outright, no payment tracking is done, you do not need to call
1277 /// [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] and [`ChannelManager::retry_payment`] will *not* work
1278 /// for this payment.
1279 AllFailedResendSafe(Vec<APIError>),
1280 /// Indicates that a payment for the provided [`PaymentId`] is already in-flight and has not
1281 /// yet completed (i.e. generated an [`Event::PaymentSent`]) or been abandoned (via
1282 /// [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`]).
1284 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
1286 /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
1287 /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
1288 /// in over-/re-payment.
1290 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
1291 /// send_payment, and any `Err`s which are not [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] can be
1292 /// safely retried via [`ChannelManager::retry_payment`].
1294 /// Any entries which contain `Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInprogress)` or `Ok(())` MUST NOT be
1295 /// retried as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent
1296 /// (in the case of `Ok(())`) or will send once a [`MonitorEvent::Completed`] is provided for
1297 /// the next-hop channel with the latest update_id.
1299 /// The errors themselves, in the same order as the route hops.
1300 results: Vec<Result<(), APIError>>,
1301 /// If some paths failed without irrevocably committing to the new HTLC(s), this will
1302 /// contain a [`RouteParameters`] object which can be used to calculate a new route that
1303 /// will pay all remaining unpaid balance.
1304 failed_paths_retry: Option<RouteParameters>,
1305 /// The payment id for the payment, which is now at least partially pending.
1306 payment_id: PaymentId,
1310 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1312 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
1314 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1315 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1316 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1317 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1319 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1320 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1321 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1324 macro_rules! handle_error {
1325 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
1328 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1329 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1331 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1332 // entering the macro.
1333 assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
1334 assert!($self.pending_events.try_lock().is_ok());
1337 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1339 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1340 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1341 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1342 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1346 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1347 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1348 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1349 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1354 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1355 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1357 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1358 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1359 action: err.action.clone()
1363 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1364 $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1367 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1374 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1375 ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {{
1376 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.channel_id());
1377 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1378 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1379 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1381 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1382 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1383 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1384 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1385 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1387 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1388 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1390 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1394 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1395 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1396 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1398 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1399 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1401 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1402 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1404 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1405 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1406 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel);
1407 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1408 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1409 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1415 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1416 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1420 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1422 $entry.remove_entry();
1430 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1431 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1435 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1437 $entry.remove_entry();
1445 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1446 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1448 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1449 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, channel);
1455 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_res {
1456 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_channel_ready: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
1458 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
1459 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..]));
1460 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $chan);
1461 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
1462 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
1463 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
1464 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
1465 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
1466 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
1467 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
1468 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
1469 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
1470 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id, $chan.get_user_id(),
1471 $chan.force_shutdown(false), $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok() ));
1474 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
1475 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update in progress. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards, {} fails, and {} fulfill finalizations",
1476 log_bytes!($chan_id[..]),
1477 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
1478 match $action_type {
1479 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
1480 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
1482 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
1483 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
1485 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
1486 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len(),
1487 (&$failed_finalized_fulfills as &Vec<HTLCSource>).len());
1488 if !$resend_commitment {
1489 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
1492 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
1494 $chan.monitor_updating_paused($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $resend_channel_ready, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills);
1495 (Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$chan_id)), false)
1497 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
1502 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_channel_ready: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr) => { {
1503 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $resend_channel_ready, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills, $entry.key());
1505 $entry.remove_entry();
1509 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY) => { {
1510 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
1511 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
1513 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, NO_UPDATE) => {
1514 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
1516 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_channel_ready: expr, OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED) => {
1517 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, false, false, $resend_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1519 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1520 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1522 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1523 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, Vec::new())
1527 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1528 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
1529 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1530 node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1531 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1533 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1534 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1535 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1536 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1537 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1538 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1539 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1540 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1541 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1542 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1547 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
1548 ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1549 if $channel.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
1551 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1552 pending_events.push(events::Event::ChannelReady {
1553 channel_id: $channel.channel_id(),
1554 user_channel_id: $channel.get_user_id(),
1555 counterparty_node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1556 channel_type: $channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
1559 $channel.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
1564 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
1565 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
1566 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1567 K::Target: KeysInterface,
1568 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1571 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
1573 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1574 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
1576 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1578 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
1579 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
1580 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
1581 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1582 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1583 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
1584 let inbound_pmt_key_material = keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
1585 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
1587 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1588 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1589 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
1593 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1595 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
1596 by_id: HashMap::new(),
1597 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
1599 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
1600 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1601 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1602 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1603 claimable_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1604 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1605 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1606 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1608 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
1609 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap()),
1612 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
1613 fake_scid_rand_bytes: keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1615 probing_cookie_secret: keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1617 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1619 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1621 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1622 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1623 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1624 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
1632 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
1633 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1634 &self.default_configuration
1637 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1638 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1639 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
1642 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
1643 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
1645 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager);
1647 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
1651 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
1656 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1658 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1659 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1660 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
1661 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
1662 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
1664 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1665 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1667 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1668 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1669 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1671 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1672 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1673 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1674 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1675 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1676 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1678 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1679 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1680 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1681 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1682 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1683 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1687 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1688 match per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key) {
1689 Some(peer_state) => {
1690 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
1691 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1692 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1693 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1694 match Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key,
1695 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
1696 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
1700 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
1705 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) }),
1708 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1710 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1711 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1712 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1714 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1715 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1716 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1717 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1719 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1721 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1724 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1726 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1727 node_id: their_network_key,
1730 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1733 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1734 let mut res = Vec::new();
1736 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1737 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1738 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
1739 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1740 let balance = channel.get_available_balances();
1741 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1742 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1743 res.push(ChannelDetails {
1744 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
1745 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1746 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1747 features: InitFeatures::empty(),
1748 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1749 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1750 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1751 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1752 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1753 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1754 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1755 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if channel.have_received_message() {
1756 Some(channel.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1757 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1759 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1760 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1761 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1762 channel_type: if channel.have_received_message() { Some(channel.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1763 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1764 outbound_scid_alias: if channel.is_usable() { Some(channel.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1765 inbound_scid_alias: channel.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1766 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1767 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1768 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1769 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1770 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1771 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1772 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1773 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1774 confirmations: Some(channel.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1775 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1776 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1777 is_channel_ready: channel.is_usable(),
1778 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1779 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1780 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1781 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1782 config: Some(channel.config()),
1786 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1787 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
1788 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.counterparty.node_id) {
1789 chan.counterparty.features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
1795 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
1796 /// more information.
1797 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1798 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1801 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to [`find_route`]
1802 /// to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1804 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1805 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1808 /// [`find_route`]: crate::routing::router::find_route
1809 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1810 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1811 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1812 // really wanted anyway.
1813 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1816 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
1817 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
1818 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1819 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
1820 Some(transaction) => {
1821 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::DiscardFunding { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction })
1825 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1826 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1827 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1828 reason: closure_reason
1832 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1833 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1835 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
1836 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
1837 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1838 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1839 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1840 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1841 if *counterparty_node_id != chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id(){
1842 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The passed counterparty_node_id doesn't match the channel's counterparty node_id".to_owned() });
1844 let (shutdown_msg, monitor_update, htlcs) = {
1845 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1846 match per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
1847 Some(peer_state) => {
1848 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1849 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1850 chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown(&self.keys_manager, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?
1852 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", counterparty_node_id) }),
1855 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
1857 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
1858 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
1859 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
1860 let (result, is_permanent) =
1861 handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
1863 remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
1868 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1869 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
1873 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1874 let channel = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
1875 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
1876 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1880 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1884 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()})
1888 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1889 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
1890 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8), receiver);
1893 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
1897 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1898 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1899 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1901 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
1902 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1904 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
1905 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
1906 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
1907 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
1909 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1911 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1912 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1913 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1914 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1915 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None)
1918 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1919 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1920 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1922 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
1923 /// the channel being closed or not:
1924 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
1925 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
1926 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1927 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
1928 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
1929 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
1930 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
1932 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1934 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1935 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1936 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1937 pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1938 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
1942 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1943 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1944 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1945 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1946 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
1947 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
1948 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8), receiver);
1950 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
1951 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
1952 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
1953 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
1954 // ignore the result here.
1955 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
1959 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
1960 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
1961 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
1962 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
1964 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1965 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1966 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1967 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *peer_node_id {
1968 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1970 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
1971 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: peer_msg.to_string() });
1973 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1975 remove_channel!(self, chan)
1977 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1980 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
1981 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(broadcast));
1982 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
1983 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1984 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1989 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
1992 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1993 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1994 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
1995 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
1996 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1997 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1998 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1999 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
2000 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
2010 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2011 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2012 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2014 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2015 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2016 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2019 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2020 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2021 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2023 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2024 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2025 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2026 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2027 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2030 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2031 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2032 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2033 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2034 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2038 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2039 /// local transaction(s).
2040 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2041 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2042 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2046 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(&self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
2047 payment_hash: PaymentHash, amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError>
2049 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2050 if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != cltv_expiry {
2051 return Err(ReceiveError {
2052 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value",
2054 err_data: byte_utils::be32_to_array(cltv_expiry).to_vec()
2057 // final_expiry_too_soon
2058 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2059 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2060 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2061 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2062 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2063 if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2064 return Err(ReceiveError {
2066 err_data: Vec::new(),
2067 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2070 if hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat {
2071 return Err(ReceiveError {
2073 err_data: byte_utils::be64_to_array(amt_msat).to_vec(),
2074 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2078 let routing = match hop_data.format {
2079 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => {
2080 return Err(ReceiveError {
2081 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2082 err_data: Vec::new(),
2083 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2086 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
2087 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
2088 return Err(ReceiveError {
2089 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2090 err_data: Vec::new(),
2091 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2093 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2094 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2096 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2097 phantom_shared_secret,
2099 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2100 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2101 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2102 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2103 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2104 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2105 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2106 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2107 return Err(ReceiveError {
2108 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2109 err_data: Vec::new(),
2110 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2114 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2116 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2119 return Err(ReceiveError {
2120 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2121 err_data: Vec::new(),
2122 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2127 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2130 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2131 incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
2132 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_msat,
2133 outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2137 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
2138 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2139 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2141 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2142 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2143 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2144 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2145 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2146 failure_code: $err_code,
2152 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2153 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2156 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key).secret_bytes();
2158 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2159 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2160 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2161 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2162 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2163 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2164 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2165 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2167 macro_rules! return_err {
2168 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2170 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2171 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2172 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2173 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2174 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
2180 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2182 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2183 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2185 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2186 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2190 let pending_forward_info = match next_hop {
2191 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
2193 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None) {
2195 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
2196 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
2197 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
2198 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
2199 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
2201 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
2204 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
2205 let new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
2206 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2208 public_key: onion_utils::next_hop_packet_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx, new_pubkey, &shared_secret),
2209 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2210 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
2213 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
2214 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2215 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
2216 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2220 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2221 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2222 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2225 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2226 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2227 incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
2228 outgoing_amt_msat: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2229 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2234 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref outgoing_amt_msat, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
2235 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
2236 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
2237 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
2238 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
2239 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
2240 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
2241 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2242 let forwarding_id_opt = match id_option {
2243 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2244 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2245 // phantom or an intercept.
2246 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
2247 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)) ||
2248 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)
2252 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2255 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => Some(chan_id.clone()),
2257 let chan_update_opt = if let Some(forwarding_id) = forwarding_id_opt {
2258 let chan = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id) {
2260 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and by_id maps have
2261 // no consistency guarantees.
2262 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2266 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2267 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2268 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2269 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2270 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2272 if chan.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && *short_channel_id != chan.outbound_scid_alias() {
2273 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
2274 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
2275 // we don't have the channel here.
2276 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2278 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(*short_channel_id, chan).ok();
2280 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2281 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2282 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2283 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2284 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2285 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2286 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2288 if *outgoing_amt_msat < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2289 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
2291 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, *outgoing_amt_msat, *outgoing_cltv_value) {
2292 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
2296 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
2298 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
2305 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2306 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2307 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2308 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2309 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2310 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2312 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2313 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2315 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2316 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2317 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2318 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2319 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2320 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2321 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2322 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2323 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2324 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2330 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
2331 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2332 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2333 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2335 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2336 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2338 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2339 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
2340 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2342 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2343 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2344 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2346 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
2351 pending_forward_info
2354 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2355 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2356 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2358 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2359 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2360 if !chan.should_announce() {
2361 return Err(LightningError {
2362 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2363 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2366 if chan.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
2367 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
2369 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2370 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2373 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2374 /// is public (only returning an Err if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id),
2375 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2376 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2377 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2378 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2379 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2380 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
2381 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2385 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
2387 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2388 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2389 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2391 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2392 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2394 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2395 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
2396 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2397 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2398 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
2399 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2400 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2401 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2404 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
2405 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
2407 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2413 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
2414 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_params: &Option<PaymentParameters>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2415 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2416 let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2417 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2419 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2420 .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
2421 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2422 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
2423 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
2425 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
2427 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2429 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2430 let id = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2431 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2432 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
2435 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2436 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2437 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
2439 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
2440 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
2442 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2443 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
2445 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(
2446 htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2448 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2449 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2451 payment_secret: payment_secret.clone(),
2452 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2453 }, onion_packet, &self.logger),
2456 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
2457 let update_err = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
2458 let chan_id = chan.get().channel_id();
2460 handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_err, chan,
2461 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true))
2463 (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure, Err(e)) => break Err(e),
2464 (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed, Ok(())) => {},
2465 (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress, Err(_)) => {
2466 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
2467 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
2468 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
2469 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
2470 // which we do in the send_payment check for
2471 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
2472 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
2474 _ => unreachable!(),
2477 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan_id));
2478 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2479 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
2480 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2481 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
2482 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2483 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2484 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2493 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
2494 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the `by_id` map.
2495 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
2496 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
2501 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2502 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2504 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2509 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2511 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
2512 /// fields for more info.
2514 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
2515 /// method will error with an [`APIError::RouteError`]. Note, however, that once a payment
2516 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
2517 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a second payment with the same
2520 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
2521 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
2522 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
2523 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
2524 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
2526 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
2527 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
2529 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
2530 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2531 /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
2533 /// In general, a path may raise:
2534 /// * [`APIError::RouteError`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2535 /// node public key) is specified.
2536 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2537 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2539 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2540 /// relevant updates.
2542 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
2543 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2544 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2546 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
2547 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
2548 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
2549 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
2552 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
2553 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
2554 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
2556 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2557 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
2558 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2559 let onion_session_privs = self.add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, *payment_secret, payment_id, route)?;
2560 self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, None, payment_id, None, onion_session_privs)
2564 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
2565 self.add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, route)
2568 fn add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
2569 let mut onion_session_privs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
2570 for _ in 0..route.paths.len() {
2571 onion_session_privs.push(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
2574 let mut pending_outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2575 match pending_outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
2576 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => Err(PaymentSendFailure::DuplicatePayment),
2577 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2578 let payment = entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2579 session_privs: HashSet::new(),
2580 pending_amt_msat: 0,
2581 pending_fee_msat: Some(0),
2584 starting_block_height: self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
2585 total_msat: route.get_total_amount(),
2588 for (path, session_priv_bytes) in route.paths.iter().zip(onion_session_privs.iter()) {
2589 assert!(payment.insert(*session_priv_bytes, path));
2592 Ok(onion_session_privs)
2597 fn send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2598 if route.paths.len() < 1 {
2599 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
2601 if payment_secret.is_none() && route.paths.len() > 1 {
2602 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Payment secret is required for multi-path payments".to_string()}));
2604 let mut total_value = 0;
2605 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2606 let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
2607 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
2608 if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
2609 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
2610 continue 'path_check;
2612 for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
2613 if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
2614 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
2615 continue 'path_check;
2618 total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2619 path_errs.push(Ok(()));
2621 if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
2622 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
2624 if let Some(amt_msat) = recv_value_msat {
2625 debug_assert!(amt_msat >= total_value);
2626 total_value = amt_msat;
2629 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2630 let mut results = Vec::new();
2631 debug_assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), onion_session_privs.len());
2632 for (path, session_priv) in route.paths.iter().zip(onion_session_privs.into_iter()) {
2633 let mut path_res = self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &route.payment_params, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, &keysend_preimage, session_priv);
2636 Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress) => {
2637 // While a MonitorUpdateInProgress is an Err(_), the payment is still
2638 // considered "in flight" and we shouldn't remove it from the
2639 // PendingOutboundPayment set.
2642 let mut pending_outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2643 if let Some(payment) = pending_outbounds.get_mut(&payment_id) {
2644 let removed = payment.remove(&session_priv, Some(path));
2645 debug_assert!(removed, "This can't happen as the payment has an entry for this path added by callers");
2647 debug_assert!(false, "This can't happen as the payment was added by callers");
2648 path_res = Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Internal error: payment disappeared during processing. Please report this bug!".to_owned() });
2652 results.push(path_res);
2654 let mut has_ok = false;
2655 let mut has_err = false;
2656 let mut pending_amt_unsent = 0;
2657 let mut max_unsent_cltv_delta = 0;
2658 for (res, path) in results.iter().zip(route.paths.iter()) {
2659 if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
2660 if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
2661 if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress) = res {
2662 // MonitorUpdateInProgress is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
2666 } else if res.is_err() {
2667 pending_amt_unsent += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2668 max_unsent_cltv_delta = cmp::max(max_unsent_cltv_delta, path.last().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta);
2671 if has_err && has_ok {
2672 Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure {
2675 failed_paths_retry: if pending_amt_unsent != 0 {
2676 if let Some(payment_params) = &route.payment_params {
2677 Some(RouteParameters {
2678 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2679 final_value_msat: pending_amt_unsent,
2680 final_cltv_expiry_delta: max_unsent_cltv_delta,
2686 // If we failed to send any paths, we should remove the new PaymentId from the
2687 // `pending_outbound_payments` map, as the user isn't expected to `abandon_payment`.
2688 let removed = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().remove(&payment_id).is_some();
2689 debug_assert!(removed, "We should always have a pending payment to remove here");
2690 Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedResendSafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
2696 /// Retries a payment along the given [`Route`].
2698 /// Errors returned are a superset of those returned from [`send_payment`], so see
2699 /// [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on errors. This method will also error if the
2700 /// retry amount puts the payment more than 10% over the payment's total amount, if the payment
2701 /// for the given `payment_id` cannot be found (likely due to timeout or success), or if
2702 /// further retries have been disabled with [`abandon_payment`].
2704 /// [`send_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::send_payment`]
2705 /// [`abandon_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`]
2706 pub fn retry_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2707 const RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE: u64 = 10;
2708 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2709 if path.len() == 0 {
2710 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2711 err: "length-0 path in route".to_string()
2716 let mut onion_session_privs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
2717 for _ in 0..route.paths.len() {
2718 onion_session_privs.push(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
2721 let (total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret) = {
2722 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2723 match outbounds.get_mut(&payment_id) {
2725 let res = match payment {
2726 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2727 total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret, pending_amt_msat, ..
2729 let retry_amt_msat: u64 = route.paths.iter().map(|path| path.last().unwrap().fee_msat).sum();
2730 if retry_amt_msat + *pending_amt_msat > *total_msat * (100 + RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE) / 100 {
2731 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2732 err: format!("retry_amt_msat of {} will put pending_amt_msat (currently: {}) more than 10% over total_payment_amt_msat of {}", retry_amt_msat, pending_amt_msat, total_msat).to_string()
2735 (*total_msat, *payment_hash, *payment_secret)
2737 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => {
2738 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2739 err: "Unable to retry payments that were initially sent on LDK versions prior to 0.0.102".to_string()
2742 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {
2743 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2744 err: "Payment already completed".to_owned()
2747 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {
2748 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2749 err: "Payment already abandoned (with some HTLCs still pending)".to_owned()
2753 for (path, session_priv_bytes) in route.paths.iter().zip(onion_session_privs.iter()) {
2754 assert!(payment.insert(*session_priv_bytes, path));
2759 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2760 err: format!("Payment with ID {} not found", log_bytes!(payment_id.0)),
2764 self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &payment_secret, None, payment_id, Some(total_msat), onion_session_privs)
2767 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment will occur.
2769 /// After this method returns, any future calls to [`retry_payment`] for the given `payment_id`
2770 /// will fail with [`PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError`]. If no such event has been generated,
2771 /// an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event will be generated as soon as there are no remaining
2772 /// pending HTLCs for this payment.
2774 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
2775 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
2776 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
2778 /// [`retry_payment`]: Self::retry_payment
2779 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2780 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2781 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
2782 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2784 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2785 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
2786 if let Ok(()) = payment.get_mut().mark_abandoned() {
2787 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
2788 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2790 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
2798 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2799 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2800 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2801 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2802 /// never reach the recipient.
2804 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
2805 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
2807 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2808 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2810 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2812 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2813 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
2814 let preimage = match payment_preimage {
2816 None => PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()),
2818 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0).into_inner());
2819 let onion_session_privs = self.add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, None, payment_id, &route)?;
2821 match self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &None, Some(preimage), payment_id, None, onion_session_privs) {
2822 Ok(()) => Ok(payment_hash),
2827 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
2828 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
2829 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
2830 pub fn send_probe(&self, hops: Vec<RouteHop>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2831 let payment_id = PaymentId(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
2833 let payment_hash = self.probing_cookie_from_id(&payment_id);
2836 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2837 err: "No need probing a path with less than two hops".to_string()
2841 let route = Route { paths: vec![hops], payment_params: None };
2842 let onion_session_privs = self.add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, None, payment_id, &route)?;
2844 match self.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &None, None, payment_id, None, onion_session_privs) {
2845 Ok(()) => Ok((payment_hash, payment_id)),
2850 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
2852 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
2853 let target_payment_hash = self.probing_cookie_from_id(payment_id);
2854 target_payment_hash == *payment_hash
2857 /// Returns the 'probing cookie' for the given [`PaymentId`].
2858 fn probing_cookie_from_id(&self, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> PaymentHash {
2859 let mut preimage = [0u8; 64];
2860 preimage[..32].copy_from_slice(&self.probing_cookie_secret);
2861 preimage[32..].copy_from_slice(&payment_id.0);
2862 PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage).into_inner())
2865 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2866 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2867 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
2868 &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], _counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
2869 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2871 let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2873 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2875 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2876 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2877 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2878 } else { unreachable!(); })
2881 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "No such channel".to_owned() }) },
2883 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
2884 Ok(funding_msg) => {
2887 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2888 err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
2893 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2894 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2895 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2898 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2899 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2900 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2902 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2903 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
2904 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.channel_id(), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
2905 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
2914 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2915 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2916 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2920 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2922 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2923 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2925 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
2926 /// across the p2p network.
2928 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
2929 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
2931 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2932 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
2933 /// keys per-channel).
2935 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
2936 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
2937 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
2939 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
2940 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
2941 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2943 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
2944 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
2945 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
2946 /// for more details.
2948 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2949 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::util::events::Event::ChannelClosed
2950 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2951 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2953 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
2954 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
2955 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2956 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
2961 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2962 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools at the next block. However, the modules
2963 // constituting our Lightning node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if
2964 // the wallet module is in advance on the LDK view, allow one more block of headroom.
2965 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 2 {
2966 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2967 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
2971 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
2972 let mut output_index = None;
2973 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
2974 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2975 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
2976 if output_index.is_some() {
2977 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2978 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
2981 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
2982 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2983 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
2986 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
2989 if output_index.is_none() {
2990 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2991 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
2994 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
2998 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
3000 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3001 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3002 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3003 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3005 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3006 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3008 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3009 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3011 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3013 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3014 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3015 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3016 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3017 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3018 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3019 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3020 pub fn update_channel_config(
3021 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config: &ChannelConfig,
3022 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3023 if config.cltv_expiry_delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA {
3024 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3025 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
3029 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(
3030 &self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier,
3033 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3034 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3035 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3036 let channel_counterparty_node_id = channel_state.by_id.get(channel_id)
3037 .ok_or(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3038 err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found", log_bytes!(*channel_id)),
3040 .get_counterparty_node_id();
3041 if channel_counterparty_node_id != *counterparty_node_id {
3042 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3043 err: "counterparty node id mismatch".to_owned(),
3047 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3048 let channel = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(channel_id).unwrap();
3049 if !channel.update_config(config) {
3052 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
3053 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
3054 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
3055 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3056 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3065 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
3066 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
3068 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
3069 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
3071 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
3072 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
3073 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
3074 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
3075 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
3077 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
3078 /// you from forwarding more than you received.
3080 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3083 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
3084 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3085 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
3086 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
3087 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &[u8; 32], _next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3088 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3090 let next_hop_scid = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
3092 if !chan.is_usable() {
3093 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3094 err: format!("Channel with id {:?} not fully established", next_hop_channel_id)
3097 chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.outbound_scid_alias())
3099 None => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3100 err: format!("Channel with id {:?} not found", next_hop_channel_id)
3104 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3105 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3106 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {:?} not found", intercept_id.0)
3109 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
3110 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => {
3111 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid }
3113 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3115 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
3116 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
3119 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
3120 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3121 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3122 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
3123 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
3125 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
3129 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
3130 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
3132 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3135 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3136 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3137 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3139 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3140 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3141 err: format!("Payment with InterceptId {:?} not found", intercept_id)
3144 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
3145 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3146 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3147 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3148 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
3149 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
3150 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3153 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
3154 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
3155 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, failure_reason, destination);
3156 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3161 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
3163 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
3164 /// Will likely generate further events.
3165 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
3166 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3168 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
3169 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
3170 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
3171 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3173 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
3174 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
3176 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
3177 if short_chan_id != 0 {
3178 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
3180 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3181 match forward_info {
3182 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3183 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3184 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3185 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
3186 outgoing_cltv_value, incoming_amt_msat: _
3189 macro_rules! failure_handler {
3190 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
3191 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3193 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3194 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3195 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3196 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3197 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3198 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
3201 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
3202 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
3204 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
3207 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3208 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
3214 macro_rules! fail_forward {
3215 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3217 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
3221 macro_rules! failed_payment {
3222 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3224 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
3228 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
3229 let phantom_secret_res = self.keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::PhantomNode);
3230 if phantom_secret_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.genesis_hash) {
3231 let phantom_shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &phantom_secret_res.unwrap()).secret_bytes();
3232 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
3234 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3235 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
3236 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
3237 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
3238 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
3240 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
3242 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3243 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
3247 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
3248 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) {
3249 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
3250 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
3256 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3259 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3262 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3263 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
3264 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
3265 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
3266 // problem, not ours.
3272 let forward_chan_id = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id) {
3273 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
3275 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3279 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3280 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3281 match channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
3282 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3283 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3286 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3287 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
3288 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
3289 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3290 match forward_info {
3291 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3292 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id: _,
3293 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3294 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
3295 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, incoming_amt_msat: _,
3298 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
3299 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3300 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3301 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3302 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3303 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3304 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
3305 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3307 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet, &self.logger) {
3309 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3310 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
3312 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3314 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
3315 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3316 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
3317 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
3323 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
3325 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
3326 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
3327 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
3328 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
3329 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
3330 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
3331 // this channel currently :/.
3337 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3338 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3340 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3341 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3342 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger) {
3344 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3345 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3347 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
3349 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3350 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3351 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3354 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
3356 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
3357 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
3358 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
3359 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
3360 // messages when we can.
3361 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
3362 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
3363 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
3370 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
3371 let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) {
3374 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
3375 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
3376 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3377 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
3378 ChannelError::Ignore(_) | ChannelError::Warn(_) => {
3379 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
3381 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
3382 log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
3383 let mut channel = remove_channel!(self, chan);
3384 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us.
3385 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel.channel_id(), channel.get_user_id(), channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel).ok()))
3388 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, err));
3392 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3393 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
3395 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
3399 log_debug!(self.logger, "Forwarding HTLCs resulted in a commitment update with {} HTLCs added and {} HTLCs failed for channel {}",
3400 add_htlc_msgs.len(), fail_htlc_msgs.len(), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3401 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3402 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3403 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3404 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
3405 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3406 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
3407 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3409 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
3416 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3417 match forward_info {
3418 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3419 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3420 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3421 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, ..
3424 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret) = match routing {
3425 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } => {
3426 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
3427 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data }, Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret)
3429 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
3430 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage), None, None),
3432 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3435 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3436 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3437 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3438 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3439 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3440 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3441 phantom_shared_secret,
3443 value: outgoing_amt_msat,
3445 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
3450 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3451 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
3452 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc.value).to_vec();
3453 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3454 &byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()),
3456 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3457 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
3458 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3459 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3460 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3461 phantom_shared_secret,
3463 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
3464 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
3468 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
3469 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
3470 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
3471 receiver_node_id = self.keys_manager.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
3472 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
3475 macro_rules! check_total_value {
3476 ($payment_data: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{
3477 let mut payment_received_generated = false;
3479 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
3480 payment_preimage: $payment_preimage,
3481 payment_secret: $payment_data.payment_secret,
3484 let mut claimable_htlcs = self.claimable_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
3485 let (_, htlcs) = claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
3486 .or_insert_with(|| (purpose(), Vec::new()));
3487 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
3488 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3489 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3490 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3494 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.value;
3495 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3496 total_value += htlc.value;
3497 match &htlc.onion_payload {
3498 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3499 if htlc.total_msat != $payment_data.total_msat {
3500 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
3501 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $payment_data.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
3502 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
3504 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
3506 _ => unreachable!(),
3509 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > $payment_data.total_msat {
3510 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
3511 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, $payment_data.total_msat);
3512 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3513 } else if total_value == $payment_data.total_msat {
3514 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3515 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3516 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
3517 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3520 amount_msat: total_value,
3521 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3522 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3524 payment_received_generated = true;
3526 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
3527 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
3529 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3531 payment_received_generated
3535 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
3536 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
3537 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
3538 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
3539 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
3540 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
3541 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3542 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3543 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3544 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3545 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3546 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3547 let payment_preimage = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
3548 Ok(payment_preimage) => payment_preimage,
3550 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3554 check_total_value!(payment_data, payment_preimage);
3556 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
3557 match self.claimable_htlcs.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_hash) {
3558 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3559 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
3560 e.insert((purpose.clone(), vec![claimable_htlc]));
3561 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3562 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
3563 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3565 amount_msat: outgoing_amt_msat,
3567 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3568 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3571 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3572 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3573 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3579 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
3580 if payment_data.is_none() {
3581 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3582 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3585 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3586 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
3587 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3588 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3589 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
3590 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
3591 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
3592 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3594 let payment_received_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage);
3595 if payment_received_generated {
3596 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
3602 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3603 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
3611 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
3612 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason, destination);
3614 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
3616 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3617 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3620 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
3621 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3622 events.append(&mut new_events);
3625 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
3627 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
3628 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
3630 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
3631 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
3632 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
3633 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
3634 if background_events.is_empty() {
3638 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
3640 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
3641 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
3642 // monitor updating completing.
3643 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update);
3650 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3651 /// Process background events, for functional testing
3652 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
3653 self.process_background_events();
3656 fn update_channel_fee(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> (bool, NotifyOption, Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal>) {
3657 if !chan.is_outbound() { return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(())); }
3658 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
3659 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate() {
3660 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3661 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3662 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
3664 if !chan.is_live() {
3665 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
3666 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3667 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
3669 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3670 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3672 let mut retain_channel = true;
3673 let res = match chan.send_update_fee_and_commit(new_feerate, &self.logger) {
3676 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id);
3677 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
3681 let ret_err = match res {
3682 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update))) => {
3683 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3684 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
3685 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3686 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3687 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3688 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3689 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3690 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3691 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3692 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
3699 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY);
3700 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
3708 (retain_channel, NotifyOption::DoPersist, ret_err)
3712 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
3713 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
3714 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
3715 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
3716 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
3717 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3718 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3720 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3722 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3724 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3725 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3726 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3727 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3728 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3729 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3731 handle_errors.push(err);
3741 fn remove_stale_resolved_payments(&self) {
3742 // If an outbound payment was completed, and no pending HTLCs remain, we should remove it
3743 // from the map. However, if we did that immediately when the last payment HTLC is claimed,
3744 // this could race the user making a duplicate send_payment call and our idempotency
3745 // guarantees would be violated. Instead, we wait a few timer ticks to do the actual
3746 // removal. This should be more than sufficient to ensure the idempotency of any
3747 // `send_payment` calls that were made at the same time the `PaymentSent` event was being
3749 let mut pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3750 let pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3751 pending_outbound_payments.retain(|payment_id, payment| {
3752 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, timer_ticks_without_htlcs, .. } = payment {
3753 let mut no_remaining_entries = session_privs.is_empty();
3754 if no_remaining_entries {
3755 for ev in pending_events.iter() {
3757 events::Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: Some(ev_payment_id), .. } |
3758 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ev_payment_id, .. } |
3759 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_id: Some(ev_payment_id), .. } => {
3760 if payment_id == ev_payment_id {
3761 no_remaining_entries = false;
3769 if no_remaining_entries {
3770 *timer_ticks_without_htlcs += 1;
3771 *timer_ticks_without_htlcs <= IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS
3773 *timer_ticks_without_htlcs = 0;
3780 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
3782 /// This currently includes:
3783 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
3784 /// * Broadcasting `ChannelUpdate` messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
3785 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
3787 /// * Expiring a channel's previous `ChannelConfig` if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
3788 /// with the current `ChannelConfig`.
3790 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through `chain::Watch::update_channel` calls or feerate
3791 /// estimate fetches.
3792 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
3793 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3794 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3795 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3797 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3799 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3800 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
3802 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3803 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3804 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3805 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3806 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
3807 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3808 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3810 handle_errors.push((err, counterparty_node_id));
3812 if !retain_channel { return false; }
3814 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
3815 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id);
3816 handle_errors.push((Err(err), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()));
3817 if needs_close { return false; }
3820 match chan.channel_update_status() {
3821 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
3822 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
3823 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3824 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3825 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
3826 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3827 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3831 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3832 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3834 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
3835 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3836 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3840 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3841 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3846 chan.maybe_expire_prev_config();
3852 self.claimable_htlcs.lock().unwrap().retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
3853 if htlcs.is_empty() {
3854 // This should be unreachable
3855 debug_assert!(false);
3858 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3859 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
3860 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
3861 if htlcs[0].total_msat == htlcs.iter().fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.value) {
3863 } else if htlcs.into_iter().any(|htlc| {
3864 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
3865 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
3867 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(htlcs.drain(..).map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
3874 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
3875 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
3876 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone()), &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23), receiver);
3879 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3880 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3883 self.remove_stale_resolved_payments();
3889 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
3890 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
3891 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
3893 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
3894 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
3895 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentReceived`] event. Alternatively, the payment
3896 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
3898 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
3899 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
3900 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
3901 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
3902 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
3903 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3905 let removed_source = self.claimable_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(payment_hash);
3906 if let Some((_, mut sources)) = removed_source {
3907 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3908 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3909 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
3910 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
3911 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(
3912 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_hash,
3913 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
3914 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash });
3919 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3920 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3922 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
3924 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3925 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
3926 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
3927 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
3928 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
3929 let scid_pref = if chan.should_announce() {
3930 chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
3932 chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.get_short_channel_id())
3934 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
3935 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
3937 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3942 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3943 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3944 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3945 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
3946 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
3947 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
3948 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3949 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
3950 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
3951 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3953 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3954 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3955 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3956 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
3958 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
3959 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
3960 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
3961 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
3962 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3966 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
3967 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
3968 // be surfaced to the user.
3969 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
3970 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32],
3971 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
3973 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
3974 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
3975 match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3976 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
3977 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
3979 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3982 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
3983 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(htlc_src, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data), receiver);
3987 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
3988 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
3989 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason,destination: HTLCDestination) {
3990 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
3992 // Ensure that the `channel_state` lock is not held when calling this function.
3993 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock_order requirement for
3994 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `channel_state` lock, which calling this
3995 // function with the `channel_state` locked would.
3996 assert!(self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
3999 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
4000 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
4001 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
4004 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4005 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
4006 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4008 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, session_priv, payment_id, ref payment_params, .. } => {
4009 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
4010 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
4011 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4012 let mut all_paths_failed = false;
4013 let mut full_failure_ev = None;
4014 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
4015 if !payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
4016 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4019 if payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
4020 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received failure of HTLC with payment_hash {} after payment completion", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4023 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
4024 all_paths_failed = true;
4025 if payment.get().abandoned() {
4026 full_failure_ev = Some(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
4028 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
4034 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4037 let mut retry = if let Some(payment_params_data) = payment_params {
4038 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
4039 Some(RouteParameters {
4040 payment_params: payment_params_data.clone(),
4041 final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat,
4042 final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta,
4045 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4047 let path_failure = match &onion_error {
4048 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
4050 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
4052 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
4054 if self.payment_is_probe(payment_hash, &payment_id) {
4055 if !payment_retryable {
4056 events::Event::ProbeSuccessful {
4058 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
4062 events::Event::ProbeFailed {
4064 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
4070 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
4071 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
4072 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
4073 if let Some(scid) = short_channel_id {
4074 retry.as_mut().map(|r| r.payment_params.previously_failed_channels.push(scid));
4076 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
4077 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
4078 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
4079 payment_failed_permanently: !payment_retryable,
4086 error_code: onion_error_code,
4088 error_data: onion_error_data
4092 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
4098 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
4099 // TODO: We'd like to generate a NetworkUpdate for temporary
4100 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as find_route
4101 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
4103 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
4104 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
4105 let scid = path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id;
4106 retry.as_mut().map(|r| r.payment_params.previously_failed_channels.push(scid));
4108 if self.payment_is_probe(payment_hash, &payment_id) {
4109 events::Event::ProbeFailed {
4111 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
4113 short_channel_id: Some(scid),
4116 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
4117 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
4118 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
4119 payment_failed_permanently: false,
4120 network_update: None,
4123 short_channel_id: Some(scid),
4126 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
4128 error_data: Some(data.clone()),
4133 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4134 pending_events.push(path_failure);
4135 if let Some(ev) = full_failure_ev { pending_events.push(ev); }
4137 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret, outpoint }) => {
4138 let err_packet = match onion_error {
4139 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
4140 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
4141 if let Some(phantom_ss) = phantom_shared_secret {
4142 let phantom_packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&phantom_ss, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
4143 let encrypted_phantom_packet = onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&phantom_ss, &phantom_packet);
4144 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &encrypted_phantom_packet.data[..])
4146 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
4147 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
4150 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
4151 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4152 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
4156 let mut forward_event = None;
4157 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4158 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
4159 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
4161 match forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
4162 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4163 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
4165 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4166 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
4169 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
4170 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4171 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
4172 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
4173 time_forwardable: time
4176 pending_events.push(events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
4177 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
4178 failed_next_destination: destination
4184 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentReceived`], generating any
4185 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
4187 /// Note that calling this method does *not* guarantee that the payment has been claimed. You
4188 /// *must* wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] event which upon a successful claim will be
4189 /// provided to your [`EventHandler`] when [`process_pending_events`] is next called.
4191 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
4192 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentReceived`
4193 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
4194 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
4196 /// [`Event::PaymentReceived`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentReceived
4197 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
4198 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
4199 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
4200 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
4201 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
4202 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
4203 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4205 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4207 let removed_source = self.claimable_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&payment_hash);
4208 if let Some((payment_purpose, mut sources)) = removed_source {
4209 assert!(!sources.is_empty());
4211 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we have to take special care to ensure that each
4212 // channel exists before claiming all of the payments (inside one lock).
4213 // Note that channel existance is sufficient as we should always get a monitor update
4214 // which will take care of the real HTLC claim enforcement.
4216 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
4217 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
4218 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
4219 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
4220 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
4222 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
4223 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
4224 let mut valid_mpp = true;
4225 let mut errs = Vec::new();
4226 let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
4227 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4228 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4229 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(self.our_network_pubkey);
4230 for htlc in sources.iter() {
4231 let chan_id = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
4232 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
4239 if let None = channel_state.by_id.get(&chan_id) {
4244 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
4245 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4246 debug_assert!(false);
4250 expected_amt_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
4251 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = &htlc.onion_payload {
4252 // We don't currently support MPP for spontaneous payments, so just check
4253 // that there's one payment here and move on.
4254 if sources.len() != 1 {
4255 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP spontaneous payment - this should not be reachable!");
4256 debug_assert!(false);
4261 let phantom_shared_secret = htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
4262 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4263 let phantom_pubkey = self.keys_manager.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4264 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4265 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
4268 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
4270 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
4271 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
4274 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
4275 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
4276 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
4280 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4281 match self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
4282 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) => {
4283 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
4284 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
4285 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
4286 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
4287 claimed_any_htlcs = true;
4288 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
4290 ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"),
4291 ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim => {
4292 // While we should never get here in most cases, if we do, it likely
4293 // indicates that the HTLC was timed out some time ago and is no longer
4294 // available to be claimed. Thus, it does not make sense to set
4295 // `claimed_any_htlcs`.
4297 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(_) => claimed_any_htlcs = true,
4301 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4303 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4304 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
4305 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
4306 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
4307 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(
4308 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash,
4309 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
4310 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash } );
4314 if claimed_any_htlcs {
4315 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
4318 purpose: payment_purpose,
4319 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
4323 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
4324 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
4325 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4326 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
4331 fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> ClaimFundsFromHop {
4332 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
4334 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
4335 let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock;
4336 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4337 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
4338 Ok(msgs_monitor_option) => {
4339 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { msgs, htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = msgs_monitor_option {
4340 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4341 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
4343 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Debug },
4344 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4345 payment_preimage, e);
4346 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(
4347 chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4348 handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err(),
4349 Some(htlc_value_msat)
4353 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
4354 log_debug!(self.logger, "Claiming funds for HTLC with preimage {} resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}",
4355 log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4356 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4357 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4358 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4359 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4360 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
4361 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4362 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4368 return ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(htlc_value_msat);
4370 return ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim;
4373 Err((e, monitor_update)) => {
4374 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4375 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
4377 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Info },
4378 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?} immediately prior to force-close: {:?}",
4379 payment_preimage, e);
4382 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
4383 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan.get_mut(), &chan_id);
4385 chan.remove_entry();
4387 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(counterparty_node_id, res, None);
4390 } else { return ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed }
4393 fn finalize_claims(&self, mut sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
4394 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4395 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4396 for source in sources.drain(..) {
4397 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } = source {
4398 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
4399 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
4400 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
4401 assert!(payment.get().is_fulfilled());
4402 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, None) {
4403 pending_events.push(
4404 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
4406 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash(),
4416 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
4418 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
4419 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4420 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
4421 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
4422 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4423 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
4424 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4425 if !payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
4426 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4427 let fee_paid_msat = payment.get().get_pending_fee_msat();
4428 pending_events.push(
4429 events::Event::PaymentSent {
4430 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
4436 payment.get_mut().mark_fulfilled();
4440 // We currently immediately remove HTLCs which were fulfilled on-chain.
4441 // This could potentially lead to removing a pending payment too early,
4442 // with a reorg of one block causing us to re-add the fulfilled payment on
4444 // TODO: We should have a second monitor event that informs us of payments
4445 // irrevocably fulfilled.
4446 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
4447 let payment_hash = Some(PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner()));
4448 pending_events.push(
4449 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
4458 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fulfill for HTLC with payment_preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0));
4461 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
4462 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
4463 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage);
4464 let claimed_htlc = if let ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim = res { false } else { true };
4465 let htlc_claim_value_msat = match res {
4466 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(_, _, amt_opt) => amt_opt,
4467 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(amt) => Some(amt),
4470 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed = res {
4471 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4472 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
4473 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
4474 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4477 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
4478 // receiving an offchain preimage event from the forward link (the
4479 // event being update_fulfill_htlc).
4480 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_outpoint, preimage_update);
4481 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
4482 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
4483 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
4484 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
4485 // again on restart.
4486 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4487 payment_preimage, update_res);
4489 // Note that we do *not* set `claimed_htlc` to false here. In fact, this
4490 // totally could be a duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing
4491 // without interrogating the `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above
4492 // update to. Instead, we simply document in `PaymentForwarded` that this
4495 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4496 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) = res {
4497 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4498 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
4502 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
4503 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
4504 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
4507 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4508 let prev_channel_id = Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id());
4509 let next_channel_id = Some(next_channel_id);
4511 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
4513 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
4523 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
4524 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4525 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
4528 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
4529 /// update completion.
4530 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4531 channel: &mut Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
4532 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
4533 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
4534 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
4535 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
4536 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
4538 let counterparty_node_id = channel.get_counterparty_node_id();
4539 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4540 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.outbound_scid_alias()),
4541 channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
4544 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4545 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
4547 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
4548 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4549 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4554 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, channel);
4556 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
4557 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
4558 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4559 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4564 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
4565 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
4566 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4567 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4568 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4573 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
4577 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
4583 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
4584 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
4585 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
4591 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
4592 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4595 let (mut pending_failures, finalized_claims, counterparty_node_id) = {
4596 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4597 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4598 let mut channel = match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4599 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
4600 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
4602 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
4606 let counterparty_node_id = channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
4607 let updates = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
4608 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && channel.get().is_usable() {
4609 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
4610 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
4611 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
4612 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
4614 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel.get()) {
4615 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4616 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4621 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(&mut channel_state.pending_msg_events, channel.get_mut(), updates.raa, updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs, updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready, updates.announcement_sigs);
4622 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
4623 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
4626 (updates.failed_htlcs, updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs, counterparty_node_id)
4628 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
4629 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
4631 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claims);
4632 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4633 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id: funding_txo.to_channel_id() };
4634 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2, receiver);
4638 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
4640 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
4641 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
4644 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4645 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4646 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4648 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
4649 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
4650 /// used to accept such channels.
4652 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4653 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4654 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4655 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
4658 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
4659 /// it as confirmed immediately.
4661 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4662 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4663 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4665 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
4666 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
4668 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
4669 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
4671 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
4672 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
4674 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4675 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4676 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4677 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
4680 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4681 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4683 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4684 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4685 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4686 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
4687 if !channel.get().inbound_is_awaiting_accept() {
4688 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
4690 if *counterparty_node_id != channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id() {
4691 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The passed counterparty_node_id doesn't match the channel's counterparty node_id".to_owned() });
4694 channel.get_mut().set_0conf();
4695 } else if channel.get().get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4696 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4697 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4698 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4699 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
4702 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4703 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4704 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
4707 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4708 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4709 msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4712 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4713 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Can't accept a channel that doesn't exist".to_owned() });
4719 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4720 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
4721 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4724 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
4725 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4728 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
4729 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
4730 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
4732 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
4733 let mut channel = match Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager,
4734 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &their_features, msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration,
4735 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias)
4738 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4739 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
4743 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4744 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4745 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
4746 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4747 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4748 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
4750 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4751 if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
4752 if channel.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4753 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4755 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4756 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4757 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4760 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4761 pending_events.push(
4762 events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
4763 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
4764 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4765 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
4766 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
4767 channel_type: channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
4772 entry.insert(channel);
4778 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4779 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
4780 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4781 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4782 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4783 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4784 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4785 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
4787 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &their_features), chan);
4788 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
4790 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4793 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4794 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
4795 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
4796 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4797 channel_value_satoshis: value,
4799 user_channel_id: user_id,
4804 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4805 let ((funding_msg, monitor, mut channel_ready), mut chan) = {
4806 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4807 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4808 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4809 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4810 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4811 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4812 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
4814 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.logger), chan), chan.remove())
4816 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4819 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
4820 // lock before watch_channel
4821 match self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
4822 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
4823 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
4824 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
4825 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
4826 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
4827 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
4828 // We do not propagate the monitor update to the user as it would be for a monitor
4829 // that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we don't respond
4830 // with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
4831 let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(false);
4832 assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4833 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
4835 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
4836 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
4837 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
4838 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
4839 // until we have persisted our monitor.
4840 chan.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, channel_ready.is_some(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4841 channel_ready = None; // Don't send the channel_ready now
4844 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4845 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4846 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
4847 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4848 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
4850 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4851 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4852 match id_to_peer.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
4853 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4854 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4855 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
4856 funding_msg.channel_id))
4858 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
4859 i_e.insert(chan.get_counterparty_node_id());
4862 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
4863 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4866 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4867 send_channel_ready!(self, channel_state.pending_msg_events, chan, msg);
4875 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4877 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4878 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4879 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4880 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4881 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4882 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4883 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4885 let (monitor, funding_tx, channel_ready) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.logger) {
4886 Ok(update) => update,
4887 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan),
4889 match self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
4890 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
4892 let mut res = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, channel_ready.is_some(), OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED);
4893 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
4894 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
4895 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
4896 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
4897 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
4898 shutdown_finish.0.take();
4904 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4905 send_channel_ready!(self, channel_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get(), msg);
4909 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4912 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid());
4913 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
4917 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4918 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4919 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4920 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4921 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4922 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4923 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4925 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, self.get_our_node_id(),
4926 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan);
4927 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
4928 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4929 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4930 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4931 msg: announcement_sigs,
4933 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4934 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
4935 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
4936 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
4937 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
4938 // announcement_signatures.
4939 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4940 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
4941 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4942 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4948 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, chan.get_mut());
4952 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4956 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4957 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
4958 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
4959 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4960 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4962 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4963 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4964 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4965 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4968 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
4969 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
4970 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
4971 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
4974 let (shutdown, monitor_update, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.keys_manager, &their_features, &msg), chan_entry);
4975 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
4977 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
4978 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
4979 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
4980 let (result, is_permanent) =
4981 handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
4983 remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
4988 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4989 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4990 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4997 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5000 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
5001 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
5002 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8), receiver);
5005 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
5009 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5010 let (tx, chan_option) = {
5011 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5012 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5013 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
5014 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
5015 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5016 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5018 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_entry);
5019 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
5020 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5021 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5026 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
5027 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
5028 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
5029 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
5030 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
5031 (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, chan_entry)))
5032 } else { (tx, None) }
5034 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5037 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
5038 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
5039 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
5041 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
5042 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5043 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5044 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5048 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5053 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5054 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
5055 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
5056 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
5058 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
5059 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
5060 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
5061 //but we should prevent it anyway.
5063 let pending_forward_info = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
5064 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5065 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5067 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5068 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5069 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5070 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5073 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
5074 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
5075 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
5076 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
5077 match pending_forward_info {
5078 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
5079 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
5080 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
5081 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, real_code, &error_data)
5083 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &[])
5085 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
5086 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
5087 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
5090 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
5092 _ => pending_forward_info
5095 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), chan);
5097 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5102 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5103 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5104 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
5105 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5106 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5107 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5108 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5109 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5111 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan)
5113 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5116 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, msg.channel_id);
5120 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5121 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5122 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5123 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5124 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5125 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5126 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5128 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), chan);
5130 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5135 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5136 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5137 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5138 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5139 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5140 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5141 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5143 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
5144 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
5145 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan);
5147 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(msg.failure_code)), chan);
5150 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5154 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5155 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5156 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5157 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5158 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5159 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5160 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5162 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, monitor_update) =
5163 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger) {
5164 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan),
5165 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
5166 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
5167 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
5168 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan);
5173 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
5174 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some()) {
5178 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
5179 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5180 msg: revoke_and_ack,
5182 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
5183 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5184 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5185 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
5186 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5187 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5188 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5189 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5191 commitment_signed: msg,
5197 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5202 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
5203 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
5204 let mut forward_event = None;
5205 let mut new_intercept_events = Vec::new();
5206 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
5207 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5208 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
5209 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
5210 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
5211 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
5212 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
5214 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
5215 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
5217 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5218 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
5219 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
5220 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5221 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5222 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
5224 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5225 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
5226 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.genesis_hash)
5228 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).into_inner());
5229 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5230 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
5231 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5232 new_intercept_events.push(events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
5233 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
5234 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
5235 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
5236 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
5239 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5240 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
5242 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
5243 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
5244 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5245 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
5246 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
5247 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
5248 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
5249 phantom_shared_secret: None,
5252 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
5253 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
5254 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
5259 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
5260 // payments are being processed.
5261 if forward_htlcs_empty {
5262 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
5264 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5265 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
5272 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
5273 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason, destination);
5276 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
5277 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5278 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
5281 match forward_event {
5283 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5284 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
5285 time_forwardable: time
5293 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5294 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
5296 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5297 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5298 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5299 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5300 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5301 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5303 let was_paused_for_mon_update = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
5304 let raa_updates = break_chan_entry!(self,
5305 chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
5306 htlcs_to_fail = raa_updates.holding_cell_failed_htlcs;
5307 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), raa_updates.monitor_update);
5308 if was_paused_for_mon_update {
5309 assert!(update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
5310 assert!(raa_updates.commitment_update.is_none());
5311 assert!(raa_updates.accepted_htlcs.is_empty());
5312 assert!(raa_updates.failed_htlcs.is_empty());
5313 assert!(raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs.is_empty());
5314 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Existing pending monitor update prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
5316 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
5317 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan,
5318 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false,
5319 raa_updates.commitment_update.is_some(), false,
5320 raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
5321 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs) {
5323 } else { unreachable!(); }
5325 if let Some(updates) = raa_updates.commitment_update {
5326 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5327 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5331 break Ok((raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
5332 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs,
5333 chan.get().get_short_channel_id()
5334 .unwrap_or(chan.get().outbound_scid_alias()),
5335 chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(),
5336 chan.get().get_user_id()))
5338 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5341 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
5343 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, finalized_claim_htlcs,
5344 short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, user_channel_id)) =>
5346 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
5347 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: channel_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
5348 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2, receiver);
5350 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, user_channel_id, pending_forwards)]);
5351 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claim_htlcs);
5358 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5359 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5360 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5361 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5362 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5363 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5364 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5366 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan);
5368 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5373 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5374 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5375 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5377 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5378 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5379 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5380 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5382 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
5383 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
5386 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5387 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
5388 self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), msg), chan),
5389 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5390 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5391 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
5394 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5399 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
5400 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5401 let chan_id = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
5402 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
5404 // It's not a local channel
5405 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5408 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5409 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5410 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5411 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5412 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5413 if chan.get().should_announce() {
5414 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
5415 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
5416 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
5417 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5419 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
5421 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
5422 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
5423 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
5424 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5426 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", log_bytes!(chan_id));
5427 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), chan);
5430 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5432 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
5435 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5437 let need_lnd_workaround = {
5438 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5439 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5441 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5442 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5443 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5444 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5446 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
5447 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
5448 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
5449 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
5450 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
5451 msg, &self.logger, self.our_network_pubkey.clone(), self.genesis_hash,
5452 &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan);
5453 let mut channel_update = None;
5454 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
5455 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5456 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5459 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
5460 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
5461 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
5462 // they have the latest channel parameters.
5463 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
5464 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5465 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
5470 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
5471 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
5472 &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get_mut(), responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
5473 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
5474 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
5475 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
5479 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5483 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
5484 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
5487 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
5488 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
5493 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed.
5494 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
5495 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5496 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
5497 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
5498 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
5499 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
5500 match monitor_event {
5501 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
5502 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
5503 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
5504 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
5506 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
5507 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
5508 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8), receiver);
5511 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
5512 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
5513 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5514 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5515 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
5516 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5517 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
5518 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
5519 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
5520 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5521 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5525 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
5526 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
5528 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
5530 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
5531 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5532 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5533 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5534 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5539 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
5540 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id);
5546 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5547 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5550 has_pending_monitor_events
5553 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
5554 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
5555 /// update events as a separate process method here.
5557 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
5558 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
5561 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
5562 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
5563 /// update was applied.
5565 /// This should only apply to HTLCs which were added to the holding cell because we were
5566 /// waiting on a monitor update to finish. In that case, we don't want to free the holding cell
5567 /// directly in `channel_monitor_updated` as it may introduce deadlocks calling back into user
5568 /// code to inform them of a channel monitor update.
5569 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
5570 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
5571 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5572 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
5574 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5575 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5576 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
5577 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5579 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5580 match chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger) {
5581 Ok((commitment_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
5582 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
5584 holding_cell_failed_htlcs,
5586 chan.get_counterparty_node_id()
5589 if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt {
5590 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
5591 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
5592 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5593 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5594 updates: commitment_update,
5598 has_monitor_update = true;
5599 let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, channel_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY);
5600 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res));
5601 if close_channel { return false; }
5608 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
5609 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5610 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us
5617 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
5618 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
5619 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
5622 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5623 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5629 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
5630 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
5631 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
5632 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
5633 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
5634 let mut has_update = false;
5636 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5637 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5638 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
5639 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5641 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5642 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
5643 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
5644 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
5646 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5647 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
5650 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
5651 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
5652 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
5653 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5654 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5659 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5661 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
5662 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
5663 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
5669 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
5670 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5677 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5678 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5684 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
5685 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
5687 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
5688 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5689 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
5690 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
5691 // reorganized out of the main chain.
5692 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
5693 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
5694 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
5695 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
5696 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
5697 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
5698 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
5699 assert!(should_broadcast);
5700 } else { unreachable!(); }
5701 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
5703 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5707 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5708 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
5710 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
5711 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("min_value_msat of {} greater than total 21 million bitcoin supply", min_value_msat.unwrap()) });
5714 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5716 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5717 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5718 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5719 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5720 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
5721 payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
5722 user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
5723 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
5724 // it's updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
5725 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
5726 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
5727 // never fail a payment too early.
5728 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
5730 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
5733 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
5738 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
5741 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
5742 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
5744 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentReceived`], which
5745 /// will have the [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
5746 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
5748 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
5750 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5751 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5755 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5756 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5758 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5760 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5761 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
5762 /// [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::payment_preimage
5763 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5764 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
5765 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, &self.keys_manager, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5768 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5769 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5771 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5774 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5776 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5778 pub fn create_inbound_payment_legacy(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), APIError> {
5779 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5780 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5781 let payment_secret = self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)?;
5782 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret))
5785 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
5786 /// stored external to LDK.
5788 /// A [`PaymentReceived`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
5789 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
5790 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
5792 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
5793 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
5796 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
5797 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
5798 /// before a [`PaymentReceived`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
5799 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
5801 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
5802 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
5803 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
5804 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
5805 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
5807 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
5808 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
5809 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentReceived`] event for some time after the expiry.
5810 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
5811 /// [`PaymentReceived`].
5813 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry`
5814 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY`].
5816 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5817 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5821 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5822 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5824 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5826 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5827 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
5828 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
5829 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5832 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5833 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5835 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5838 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5840 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5842 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5843 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
5846 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
5847 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
5849 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5850 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
5851 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
5854 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
5855 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
5857 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5858 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5859 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5860 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5862 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager);
5863 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5864 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
5865 Some(_) => continue,
5866 None => return scid_candidate
5871 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
5873 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5874 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
5876 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
5877 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
5878 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
5882 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
5883 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
5884 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
5886 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
5887 /// times to get a unique scid.
5888 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5889 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5890 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5892 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager);
5893 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5894 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
5895 return scid_candidate
5899 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
5900 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
5901 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
5902 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
5904 for chan in self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.values() {
5905 for htlc_source in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
5906 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
5907 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
5915 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5916 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
5917 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5918 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
5919 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
5924 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
5925 !self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().is_empty()
5929 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
5930 self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().clear()
5933 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
5934 /// using the given event handler.
5936 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
5937 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
5940 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock until the returned future completes so that
5941 // we can be sure no other persists happen while processing events.
5942 let _read_guard = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
5944 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5946 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5947 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5948 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5949 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5952 let pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5953 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5954 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5957 for event in pending_events {
5958 handler(event).await;
5961 if result == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
5962 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
5967 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
5968 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
5969 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5970 K::Target: KeysInterface,
5971 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5974 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
5975 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5976 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5977 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5979 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5980 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5981 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5982 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5985 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5986 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5988 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
5989 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5992 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
5993 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5994 mem::swap(&mut pending_events, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
5996 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5997 events.replace(pending_events);
6006 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
6008 M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
6009 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6010 K::Target: KeysInterface,
6011 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6014 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
6016 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
6017 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
6018 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
6019 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6020 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
6022 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
6023 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
6024 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
6025 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6028 let pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
6029 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
6030 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6033 for event in pending_events {
6034 handler.handle_event(event);
6042 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
6044 M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
6045 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6046 K::Target: KeysInterface,
6047 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6050 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
6052 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6053 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
6054 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
6055 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
6056 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
6059 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
6060 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
6063 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
6064 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6065 let new_height = height - 1;
6067 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
6068 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
6069 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
6070 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
6071 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
6072 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
6075 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
6079 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
6081 M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
6082 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6083 K::Target: KeysInterface,
6084 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6087 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
6088 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6089 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6090 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6092 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
6093 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
6095 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6096 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger)
6097 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
6099 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6100 if height < last_best_block_height {
6101 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6102 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
6106 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
6107 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6108 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6109 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6111 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
6112 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
6114 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6116 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
6118 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
6120 macro_rules! max_time {
6121 ($timestamp: expr) => {
6123 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
6124 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
6125 // having an explicit local time source.
6126 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
6127 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
6128 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6129 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
6130 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
6136 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
6137 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6138 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
6139 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
6143 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
6144 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6145 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
6146 for chan in channel_state.by_id.values() {
6147 if let (Some(funding_txo), block_hash) = (chan.get_funding_txo(), chan.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
6148 res.push((funding_txo.txid, block_hash));
6154 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
6155 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6156 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
6157 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
6158 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
6159 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
6160 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
6161 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
6166 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
6168 M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
6169 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6170 K::Target: KeysInterface,
6171 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6174 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
6175 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
6177 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
6178 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
6179 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6180 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6181 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6183 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6184 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
6186 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6187 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
6188 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
6189 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
6190 let res = f(channel);
6191 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
6192 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
6193 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
6194 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
6195 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.channel_id() }));
6197 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
6198 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
6199 if channel.is_usable() {
6200 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6201 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
6202 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6203 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6208 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6212 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, channel);
6214 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
6215 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6216 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6217 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6218 msg: announcement_sigs,
6220 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6221 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, height) {
6222 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
6224 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
6225 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
6226 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap(),
6231 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
6232 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
6233 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
6234 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
6235 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
6236 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
6237 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
6238 // is always consistent.
6239 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
6240 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
6241 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()),
6242 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
6243 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
6246 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
6247 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, channel);
6248 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
6249 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
6250 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
6251 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
6252 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6256 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
6257 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
6258 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6259 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6260 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
6261 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
6262 data: reason_message,
6271 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6272 self.claimable_htlcs.lock().unwrap().retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
6273 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
6274 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
6275 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
6276 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
6277 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
6278 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6279 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
6280 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(height));
6282 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
6283 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
6284 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
6288 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
6291 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6292 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
6293 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6294 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6295 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
6296 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
6297 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6298 phantom_shared_secret: None,
6299 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
6302 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
6303 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6304 _ => unreachable!(),
6306 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
6307 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
6308 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
6309 log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
6315 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
6317 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
6318 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(source, &payment_hash, reason, destination);
6322 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
6323 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
6324 /// [`await_persistable_update`], [`await_persistable_update_timeout`], or a future returned by
6325 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`] is guaranteed to be woken up.
6327 /// Note that this method is not available with the `no-std` feature.
6329 /// [`await_persistable_update`]: Self::await_persistable_update
6330 /// [`await_persistable_update_timeout`]: Self::await_persistable_update_timeout
6331 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`]: Self::get_persistable_update_future
6332 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
6333 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
6334 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
6337 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
6338 /// [`await_persistable_update`], `await_persistable_update_timeout`, or a future returned by
6339 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`] is guaranteed to be woken up.
6341 /// [`await_persistable_update`]: Self::await_persistable_update
6342 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`]: Self::get_persistable_update_future
6343 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
6344 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
6347 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when a persistable update is available. Note that
6348 /// callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this [`ChannelManager`] and
6349 /// should instead register actions to be taken later.
6350 pub fn get_persistable_update_future(&self) -> Future {
6351 self.persistence_notifier.get_future()
6354 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6355 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
6356 self.persistence_notifier.notify_pending()
6359 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
6360 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
6361 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
6362 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
6366 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref >
6367 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
6368 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
6369 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6370 K::Target: KeysInterface,
6371 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6374 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
6375 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6376 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6379 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
6380 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6381 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6384 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
6385 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6386 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6389 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
6390 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6391 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6394 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
6395 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6396 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6399 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
6400 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6401 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6404 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
6405 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6406 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6409 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
6410 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6411 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6414 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
6415 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6416 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6419 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
6420 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6421 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6424 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
6425 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6426 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6429 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
6430 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6431 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6434 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
6435 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6436 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6439 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
6440 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6441 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6444 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
6445 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6446 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6449 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
6450 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6451 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
6454 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
6459 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
6460 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6461 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6464 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
6465 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6466 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6467 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
6469 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6470 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
6471 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
6472 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates. We believe we {} make future connections to this peer.",
6473 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id), if no_connection_possible { "cannot" } else { "can" });
6474 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6475 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
6476 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
6477 if chan.is_shutdown() {
6478 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
6479 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
6482 no_channels_remain = false;
6487 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
6489 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6490 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6491 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6492 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6493 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6494 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6495 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6496 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6497 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6498 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6499 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6500 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6501 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6502 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
6503 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6504 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6505 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
6506 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
6507 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
6508 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
6512 if no_channels_remain {
6513 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id);
6516 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6517 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6521 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) -> Result<(), ()> {
6522 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
6523 log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting with no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6527 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6529 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6532 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6533 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
6534 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6535 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
6536 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
6539 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
6540 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
6545 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6546 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
6547 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
6548 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6549 let retain = if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
6550 if !chan.have_received_message() {
6551 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
6552 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
6553 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
6557 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
6558 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6559 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
6564 if retain && chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6565 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()) {
6566 if let Ok(update_msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
6567 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement {
6568 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6576 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
6580 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
6581 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6583 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
6584 for chan in self.list_channels() {
6585 if chan.counterparty.node_id == *counterparty_node_id {
6586 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6587 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6592 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
6593 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6594 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
6595 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6598 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash) {
6599 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
6600 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6608 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6609 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6613 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6614 provided_node_features()
6617 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
6618 provided_init_features()
6622 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6623 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6624 pub fn provided_node_features() -> NodeFeatures {
6625 provided_init_features().to_context()
6628 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6629 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6631 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6632 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6633 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6634 pub fn provided_invoice_features() -> InvoiceFeatures {
6635 provided_init_features().to_context()
6638 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6639 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6640 pub fn provided_channel_features() -> ChannelFeatures {
6641 provided_init_features().to_context()
6644 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6645 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6646 pub fn provided_init_features() -> InitFeatures {
6647 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
6648 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the ChannelMessageHandler impl for
6649 // ErroringMessageHandler.
6650 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
6651 features.set_data_loss_protect_optional();
6652 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
6653 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
6654 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
6655 features.set_payment_secret_required();
6656 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
6657 features.set_wumbo_optional();
6658 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
6659 features.set_channel_type_optional();
6660 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
6661 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
6665 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6666 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6668 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
6669 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
6670 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
6671 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
6674 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
6675 (2, node_id, required),
6676 (4, features, required),
6677 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
6678 (8, forwarding_info, option),
6679 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6680 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6683 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
6684 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6685 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6686 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6687 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
6688 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
6689 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6690 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
6691 (2, self.channel_id, required),
6692 (3, self.channel_type, option),
6693 (4, self.counterparty, required),
6694 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
6695 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
6696 (7, self.config, option),
6697 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
6698 (9, self.confirmations, option),
6699 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
6700 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6701 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6702 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
6703 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6704 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6705 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6706 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6707 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6708 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
6709 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
6710 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
6711 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
6712 (30, self.is_usable, required),
6713 (32, self.is_public, required),
6714 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6715 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6716 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6722 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
6723 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6724 init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6725 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
6726 (2, channel_id, required),
6727 (3, channel_type, option),
6728 (4, counterparty, required),
6729 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6730 (6, funding_txo, option),
6731 (7, config, option),
6732 (8, short_channel_id, option),
6733 (9, confirmations, option),
6734 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
6735 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6736 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6737 (16, balance_msat, required),
6738 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6739 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6740 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6741 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6742 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6743 (22, confirmations_required, option),
6744 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
6745 (26, is_outbound, required),
6746 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
6747 (30, is_usable, required),
6748 (32, is_public, required),
6749 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6750 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6751 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6754 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6755 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6756 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
6757 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
6758 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
6762 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
6764 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
6765 outbound_scid_alias,
6769 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
6770 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
6772 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
6773 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
6774 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
6775 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
6776 confirmations_required,
6778 force_close_spend_delay,
6779 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
6780 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
6781 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
6782 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
6783 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
6784 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
6789 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
6790 (2, channels, vec_type),
6791 (4, phantom_scid, required),
6792 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
6795 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
6797 (0, onion_packet, required),
6798 (2, short_channel_id, required),
6801 (0, payment_data, required),
6802 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6803 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6805 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
6806 (0, payment_preimage, required),
6807 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6811 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
6812 (0, routing, required),
6813 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
6814 (4, payment_hash, required),
6815 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
6816 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
6817 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
6821 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6822 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6824 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
6826 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6827 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6828 reason.write(writer)?;
6830 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6831 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
6834 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6835 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6836 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
6837 failure_code.write(writer)?;
6844 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6845 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6846 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6849 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6850 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6851 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6852 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
6856 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6857 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6858 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6859 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
6860 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
6863 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
6864 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
6865 // messages contained in the variants.
6866 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
6867 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
6868 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
6870 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6871 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6872 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6873 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6874 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
6877 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6878 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6879 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6880 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6881 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
6883 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6888 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
6893 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
6894 (0, short_channel_id, required),
6895 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6896 (2, outpoint, required),
6897 (4, htlc_id, required),
6898 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
6901 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
6902 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6903 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
6904 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
6905 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
6907 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6908 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
6909 (1, self.total_msat, required),
6910 (2, self.value, required),
6911 (4, payment_data, option),
6912 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
6913 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
6919 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
6920 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6921 let mut prev_hop = crate::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6923 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
6924 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
6925 let mut total_msat = None;
6926 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
6927 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6928 (0, prev_hop, required),
6929 (1, total_msat, option),
6930 (2, value, required),
6931 (4, payment_data, option),
6932 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
6933 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
6935 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
6937 if payment_data.is_some() {
6938 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6940 if total_msat.is_none() {
6941 total_msat = Some(value);
6943 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
6946 if total_msat.is_none() {
6947 if payment_data.is_none() {
6948 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6950 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
6952 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
6956 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
6959 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
6966 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
6967 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6968 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6971 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6972 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
6973 let mut path = Some(Vec::new());
6974 let mut payment_id = None;
6975 let mut payment_secret = None;
6976 let mut payment_params = None;
6977 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6978 (0, session_priv, required),
6979 (1, payment_id, option),
6980 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6981 (3, payment_secret, option),
6982 (4, path, vec_type),
6983 (5, payment_params, option),
6985 if payment_id.is_none() {
6986 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
6988 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
6990 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
6991 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
6992 first_hop_htlc_msat,
6993 path: path.unwrap(),
6994 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
6999 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
7000 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
7005 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
7006 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
7008 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id, payment_secret, payment_params } => {
7010 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
7011 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7012 (0, session_priv, required),
7013 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
7014 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
7015 (3, payment_secret, option),
7016 (4, *path, vec_type),
7017 (5, payment_params, option),
7020 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
7022 field.write(writer)?;
7029 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCFailReason,
7030 (0, LightningError) => {
7034 (0, failure_code, required),
7035 (2, data, vec_type),
7039 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
7040 (0, forward_info, required),
7041 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
7042 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
7043 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
7044 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
7047 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
7049 (0, htlc_id, required),
7050 (2, err_packet, required),
7055 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
7056 (0, payment_secret, required),
7057 (2, expiry_time, required),
7058 (4, user_payment_id, required),
7059 (6, payment_preimage, required),
7060 (8, min_value_msat, required),
7063 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(PendingOutboundPayment,
7065 (0, session_privs, required),
7068 (0, session_privs, required),
7069 (1, payment_hash, option),
7070 (3, timer_ticks_without_htlcs, (default_value, 0)),
7073 (0, session_privs, required),
7074 (1, pending_fee_msat, option),
7075 (2, payment_hash, required),
7076 (4, payment_secret, option),
7077 (6, total_msat, required),
7078 (8, pending_amt_msat, required),
7079 (10, starting_block_height, required),
7082 (0, session_privs, required),
7083 (2, payment_hash, required),
7087 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
7088 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
7089 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7090 K::Target: KeysInterface,
7091 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7094 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7095 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
7097 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7099 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
7101 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
7102 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
7103 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
7107 // Take `channel_state` lock temporarily to avoid creating a lock order that requires
7108 // that the `forward_htlcs` lock is taken after `channel_state`
7109 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
7110 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
7111 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
7112 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7113 unfunded_channels += 1;
7116 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
7117 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
7118 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7119 channel.write(writer)?;
7125 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7126 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7127 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
7128 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
7129 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7130 for forward in pending_forwards {
7131 forward.write(writer)?;
7136 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7137 let claimable_htlcs = self.claimable_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7138 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7140 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
7141 (claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7142 for (payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops)) in claimable_htlcs.iter() {
7143 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7144 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7145 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
7146 htlc.write(writer)?;
7148 htlc_purposes.push(purpose);
7151 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
7152 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7153 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7154 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
7155 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7156 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
7159 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7160 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7161 for event in events.iter() {
7162 event.write(writer)?;
7165 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
7166 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7167 for event in background_events.iter() {
7169 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
7171 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
7172 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
7177 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
7178 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
7179 // likely to be identical.
7180 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
7181 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
7183 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7184 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
7185 hash.write(writer)?;
7186 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
7189 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
7190 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
7191 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7192 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
7193 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
7196 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
7197 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7199 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7200 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7201 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
7202 session_priv.write(writer)?;
7205 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
7206 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
7210 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
7211 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
7212 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7214 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7215 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7216 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
7222 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
7223 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7224 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
7225 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
7227 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7228 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
7229 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7230 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
7231 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
7232 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
7233 (9, htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7234 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
7241 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
7243 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
7245 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7246 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
7247 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
7248 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
7249 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
7250 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
7251 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
7252 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
7253 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7254 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
7255 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
7256 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
7257 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
7259 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
7260 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
7262 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
7263 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
7265 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
7266 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
7267 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
7268 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
7269 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
7270 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
7272 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
7273 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
7274 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
7275 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7276 K::Target: KeysInterface,
7277 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7280 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
7281 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
7283 pub keys_manager: K,
7285 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7287 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
7288 pub fee_estimator: F,
7289 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7291 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
7292 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
7293 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
7294 pub chain_monitor: M,
7296 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
7297 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
7298 /// force-closed during deserialization.
7299 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
7300 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
7301 /// deserialization.
7303 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
7304 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
7305 pub default_config: UserConfig,
7307 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
7308 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
7310 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
7311 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
7312 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
7313 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
7315 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
7318 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
7319 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>>,
7322 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
7323 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, K, F, L>
7324 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
7325 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7326 K::Target: KeysInterface,
7327 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7330 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
7331 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
7332 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
7333 pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
7334 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>>) -> Self {
7336 keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config,
7337 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
7342 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
7343 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
7344 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
7345 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>>)
7346 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
7347 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7348 K::Target: KeysInterface,
7349 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7352 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7353 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
7354 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
7358 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
7359 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>)
7360 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
7361 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7362 K::Target: KeysInterface,
7363 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7366 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7367 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7369 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7370 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7371 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7373 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
7375 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7376 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7377 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7378 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7379 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7380 let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
7381 for _ in 0..channel_count {
7382 let mut channel: Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (&args.keys_manager, best_block_height))?;
7383 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7384 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
7385 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
7386 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7387 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7388 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7389 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7390 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
7391 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
7392 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7393 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7394 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7395 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7396 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7397 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7398 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7399 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7400 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7401 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7402 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7403 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
7404 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
7405 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
7406 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7407 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7408 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
7409 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
7410 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
7411 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7412 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7413 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7414 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
7417 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7418 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
7419 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7421 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7422 id_to_peer.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel.get_counterparty_node_id());
7424 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
7426 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
7427 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
7428 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
7429 // safely discard the channel.
7430 let _ = channel.force_shutdown(false);
7431 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7432 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7433 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7434 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
7437 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7438 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7439 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7440 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7441 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7442 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7446 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
7447 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
7448 log_info!(args.logger, "Broadcasting latest holder commitment transaction for closed channel {}", log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
7449 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
7453 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
7454 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7455 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7456 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
7457 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7458 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7459 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
7460 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
7461 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
7463 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
7466 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7467 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7468 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
7469 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7470 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7471 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
7472 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
7473 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
7475 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
7478 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7479 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>)>()));
7480 for _ in 0..peer_count {
7481 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7482 let peer_state = PeerState {
7483 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
7485 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
7488 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7489 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
7490 for _ in 0..event_count {
7491 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
7492 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
7496 if forward_htlcs_count > 0 {
7497 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
7498 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
7499 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
7500 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
7501 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
7502 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
7503 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
7507 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7508 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
7509 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
7510 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7511 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
7512 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7516 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
7517 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7519 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7520 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
7521 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
7522 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
7523 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7527 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7528 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
7529 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
7530 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
7531 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
7532 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
7533 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
7535 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
7536 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7540 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
7541 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
7542 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
7543 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
7544 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
7545 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7546 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7547 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
7548 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7549 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
7550 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7551 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
7552 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
7553 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
7554 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7555 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
7557 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
7558 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
7561 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
7562 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
7565 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
7566 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
7567 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
7568 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
7569 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
7570 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
7572 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
7574 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
7575 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
7576 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
7577 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
7578 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
7579 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
7580 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
7582 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7583 if by_id.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
7584 for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_pending_outbound_htlcs() {
7585 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, payment_secret, .. } = htlc_source {
7586 if path.is_empty() {
7587 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
7588 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7590 let path_amt = path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
7591 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
7592 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
7593 match pending_outbound_payments.as_mut().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
7594 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7595 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
7596 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
7597 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
7599 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7600 let path_fee = path.get_path_fees();
7601 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
7602 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
7603 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
7605 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
7606 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
7607 total_msat: path_amt,
7608 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
7610 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
7611 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
7620 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
7621 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
7623 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
7624 if let Some(mut purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
7625 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
7626 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7628 for (purpose, (payment_hash, previous_hops)) in purposes.drain(..).zip(claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..)) {
7629 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7632 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
7633 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
7634 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
7635 if previous_hops.is_empty() {
7636 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7638 let purpose = match &previous_hops[0].onion_payload {
7639 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
7640 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
7641 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
7642 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
7643 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
7644 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
7645 Ok(payment_preimage) => payment_preimage,
7647 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7648 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7652 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
7654 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
7656 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
7657 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
7659 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7663 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7664 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
7666 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
7667 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
7670 let our_network_key = match args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node) {
7672 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7674 let our_network_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &our_network_key);
7675 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
7676 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
7677 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
7678 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7682 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
7683 for (chan_id, chan) in by_id.iter_mut() {
7684 if chan.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
7685 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
7687 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
7688 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.keys_manager);
7689 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
7691 chan.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
7692 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias()) {
7693 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7694 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7695 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7696 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7698 if chan.is_usable() {
7699 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
7700 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7701 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7702 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7703 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7708 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
7710 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7711 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
7712 if let Some((payment_purpose, claimable_htlcs)) = claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
7713 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7714 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
7715 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
7716 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
7717 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
7718 let phantom_pubkey = args.keys_manager.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
7719 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
7720 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
7722 for claimable_htlc in claimable_htlcs {
7723 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
7725 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
7726 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
7727 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
7728 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
7730 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
7731 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
7732 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
7733 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
7735 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
7736 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
7737 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
7738 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
7740 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
7741 if let Some(channel) = by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
7742 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
7744 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
7745 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
7748 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
7751 purpose: payment_purpose,
7752 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
7758 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
7760 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
7761 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
7762 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
7764 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
7766 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
7768 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
7770 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
7771 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
7772 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
7773 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
7775 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
7776 claimable_htlcs: Mutex::new(claimable_htlcs),
7777 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
7778 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
7779 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
7780 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
7782 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
7788 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
7790 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
7792 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
7793 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
7794 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
7795 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
7797 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
7798 logger: args.logger,
7799 default_configuration: args.default_config,
7802 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7803 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
7804 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
7805 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8), receiver);
7808 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
7809 //connection or two.
7811 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
7817 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7818 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7819 use core::time::Duration;
7820 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
7821 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
7822 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure};
7823 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
7824 use crate::ln::msgs;
7825 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
7826 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
7827 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7828 use crate::util::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
7829 use crate::util::test_utils;
7830 use crate::chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
7833 fn test_notify_limits() {
7834 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
7835 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
7836 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7837 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7838 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7839 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7841 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
7842 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
7843 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7844 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7845 assert!(nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7847 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7849 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
7850 // to connect messages with new values
7851 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7852 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7853 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
7854 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
7856 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
7857 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7858 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7859 // ... but the last node should not.
7860 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7861 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
7862 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7863 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7865 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
7866 // about the channel.
7867 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7868 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7869 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7871 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
7873 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7874 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7875 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7876 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7877 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7878 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7880 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
7881 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7882 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7884 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
7885 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
7886 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
7887 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
7888 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
7889 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
7891 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
7892 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
7893 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7894 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7895 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7896 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7897 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7898 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7900 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
7901 // the channel info has updated.
7902 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7903 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7904 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7905 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7906 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7907 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7911 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
7912 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
7914 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7915 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7916 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7917 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7918 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7920 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
7921 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
7922 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
7923 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
7925 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
7926 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
7927 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
7928 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
7929 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
7930 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
7931 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7932 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7933 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7934 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
7936 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
7937 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
7938 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7939 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7940 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7941 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7942 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7943 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7944 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7945 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7946 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7947 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
7948 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7949 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7950 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7951 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7952 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7953 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7954 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7955 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7956 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7957 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
7959 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
7960 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
7961 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7962 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7963 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7964 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
7966 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
7967 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
7968 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
7969 // lightning messages manually.
7970 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7971 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
7972 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7974 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7975 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7976 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
7977 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7978 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7979 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
7980 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7981 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7982 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
7983 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7984 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7985 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7986 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
7987 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7988 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7989 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
7990 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7991 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7992 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
7993 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7994 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
7995 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7996 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7997 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
7998 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8000 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
8001 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
8002 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8003 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
8005 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
8006 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
8007 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
8008 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
8010 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8013 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
8014 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
8015 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
8016 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
8018 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8021 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
8022 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
8023 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
8024 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
8026 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8031 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
8032 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
8033 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
8034 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
8035 // fails as expected.
8036 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8037 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8038 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8039 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8040 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8041 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
8042 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8044 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
8045 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
8046 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
8048 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
8049 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8050 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id()),
8051 final_value_msat: 100_000,
8052 final_cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
8054 let route = find_route(
8055 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
8056 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8058 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8059 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8060 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8061 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8062 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8063 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8064 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8065 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8066 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8067 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
8068 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
8069 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8070 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
8071 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8072 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8073 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8074 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8075 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8076 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8077 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8078 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8079 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8080 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
8082 // Finally, claim the original payment.
8083 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
8085 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
8086 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8087 let route = find_route(
8088 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
8089 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8091 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8092 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8093 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8094 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8095 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
8096 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
8097 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
8099 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
8100 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8101 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8102 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8103 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8104 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8105 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8106 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8107 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8108 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8109 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8110 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8111 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
8112 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8113 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8114 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8115 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8116 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8117 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8118 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8119 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8120 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8121 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
8123 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
8124 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
8128 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
8129 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
8130 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
8131 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8132 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8133 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8134 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8136 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8137 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8138 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
8139 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
8141 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8142 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8143 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
8144 final_value_msat: 10_000,
8145 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
8147 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
8148 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
8149 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
8150 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8151 let route = find_route(
8152 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
8153 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8156 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8157 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
8158 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash, None, PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
8159 nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
8160 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8162 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8163 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8164 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8165 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8166 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8167 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8168 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8170 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash".to_string(), 1);
8174 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
8175 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
8176 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8177 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8178 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8179 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8181 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8182 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8183 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
8184 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
8186 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8187 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8188 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
8189 final_value_msat: 10_000,
8190 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
8192 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
8193 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
8194 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
8195 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8196 let route = find_route(
8197 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
8198 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8201 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8202 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8203 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
8204 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, Some(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
8205 nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
8206 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8208 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8209 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8210 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8211 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8212 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8213 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8214 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8216 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "We don't support MPP keysend payments".to_string(), 1);
8220 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
8221 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8222 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8223 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8224 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8226 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8227 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8228 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8229 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8231 // Marshall an MPP route.
8232 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8233 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8234 route.paths.push(path);
8235 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8236 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8237 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8238 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8239 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8240 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8242 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None, PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap_err() {
8243 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
8244 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err)) },
8245 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
8250 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
8251 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
8252 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8253 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8254 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8255 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8257 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
8258 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
8260 total_msat: 100_000,
8263 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
8264 // payment verification fails as expected.
8265 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
8266 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
8267 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
8268 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
8270 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment".to_string(), "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash".to_string(), 1);
8274 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
8275 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
8279 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
8280 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
8281 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
8282 // the channel is successfully closed.
8283 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8284 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8285 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8286 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8288 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8289 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8290 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel);
8291 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8292 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_channel);
8294 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
8295 let channel_id = &tx.txid().into_inner();
8297 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
8298 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
8299 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8300 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8303 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8305 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8306 // as it has the funding transaction.
8307 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8308 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8309 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8311 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8314 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8316 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8318 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8319 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8320 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8322 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8323 // as it has the funding transaction.
8324 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8325 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8326 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8328 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8329 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8330 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
8331 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8332 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
8333 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
8334 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
8336 nodes[0].node.close_channel(channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8337 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8338 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8339 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
8341 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8342 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
8344 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
8345 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
8346 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
8347 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
8348 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8349 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8350 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8352 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
8353 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
8354 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
8355 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
8356 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8357 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8358 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8361 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8363 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
8364 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
8365 // closing transaction).
8366 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
8367 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
8368 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8370 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
8371 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
8372 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8373 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8374 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8377 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8379 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
8381 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
8382 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
8383 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8385 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8387 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8388 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8392 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
8394 use crate::chain::Listen;
8395 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
8396 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, KeysInterface, InMemorySigner};
8397 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId};
8398 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
8399 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
8400 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
8401 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, get_route};
8402 use crate::util::test_utils;
8403 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
8404 use crate::util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
8406 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
8407 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
8408 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
8410 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
8414 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
8415 node: &'a ChannelManager<
8416 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
8417 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
8418 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
8419 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager,
8420 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestLogger>,
8425 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
8426 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
8429 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
8430 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
8431 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
8433 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
8434 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
8436 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
8437 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
8439 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
8440 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
8442 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
8443 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
8444 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
8445 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
8446 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
8448 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
8450 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
8452 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
8453 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
8454 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
8455 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
8456 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
8458 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
8460 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
8462 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
8463 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
8464 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8465 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8466 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8469 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
8470 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8471 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
8473 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8474 } else { panic!(); }
8476 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8477 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8479 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
8482 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
8485 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
8486 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
8488 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8489 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8490 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
8491 match msg_events[0] {
8492 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
8493 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
8494 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
8498 match msg_events[1] {
8499 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8503 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8504 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
8506 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8507 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
8509 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8512 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8513 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
8515 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8516 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
8518 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8521 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger_a);
8523 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
8524 macro_rules! send_payment {
8525 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
8526 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
8527 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id())
8528 .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
8529 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
8530 let seed = [3u8; 32];
8531 let keys_manager = KeysManager::new(&seed, 42, 42);
8532 let random_seed_bytes = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8533 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &dummy_graph.read_only(),
8534 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
8536 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
8537 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
8539 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
8540 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
8542 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8543 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
8544 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8545 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
8546 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
8547 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
8548 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
8549 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8551 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
8552 expect_payment_received!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
8553 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8554 expect_payment_claimed!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
8556 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
8557 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
8558 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
8559 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8560 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
8562 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
8565 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
8566 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
8567 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
8568 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8570 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
8575 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
8576 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);