1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see routing::router::get_route for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
27 use bitcoin::hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
30 use bitcoin::hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
31 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
35 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
36 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
41 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator};
42 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
43 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
44 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
45 // construct one themselves.
46 pub use ln::channel::CounterpartyForwardingInfo;
47 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
48 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
49 use routing::router::{Route, RouteHop};
51 use ln::msgs::NetAddress;
53 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, OptionalField};
54 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
55 use util::config::UserConfig;
56 use util::events::{Event, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
57 use util::{byte_utils, events};
58 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer};
59 use util::chacha20::{ChaCha20, ChaChaReader};
60 use util::logger::Logger;
61 use util::errors::APIError;
64 use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map, HashSet};
65 use std::io::{Cursor, Read};
66 use std::sync::{Arc, Condvar, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
67 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
68 use std::time::Duration;
69 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
70 use std::time::Instant;
72 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
74 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
76 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
77 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
78 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
80 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
81 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
82 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
83 // before we forward it.
85 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
86 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
87 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
88 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
89 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
91 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
92 enum PendingHTLCRouting {
94 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
95 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
98 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
99 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
103 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
104 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
105 routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
106 incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
107 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
108 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
109 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
112 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
113 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
114 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
115 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
118 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
119 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
120 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
121 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
122 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
125 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
127 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
129 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
130 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
131 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
133 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
135 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
139 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
143 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
144 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
145 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
146 short_channel_id: u64,
148 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
150 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
151 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
155 struct ClaimableHTLC {
156 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
158 /// Contains a total_msat (which may differ from value if this is a Multi-Path Payment) and a
159 /// payment_secret which prevents path-probing attacks and can associate different HTLCs which
160 /// are part of the same payment.
161 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
165 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
166 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
167 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
168 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
171 session_priv: SecretKey,
172 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
173 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
174 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
179 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
180 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
182 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
183 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
188 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
189 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
191 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
199 /// payment_hash type, use to cross-lock hop
200 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
201 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
202 pub struct PaymentHash(pub [u8;32]);
203 /// payment_preimage type, use to route payment between hop
204 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
205 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
206 pub struct PaymentPreimage(pub [u8;32]);
207 /// payment_secret type, use to authenticate sender to the receiver and tie MPP HTLCs together
208 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
209 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
210 pub struct PaymentSecret(pub [u8;32]);
212 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
214 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
215 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
216 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
217 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
218 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
220 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
221 err: msgs::LightningError,
222 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
224 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
226 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
228 err: LightningError {
230 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
231 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
237 shutdown_finish: None,
241 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
243 err: LightningError {
245 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
247 shutdown_finish: None,
251 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
252 Self { err, shutdown_finish: None }
255 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
257 err: LightningError {
259 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
260 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
266 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
270 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
273 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
275 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
277 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
279 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
280 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
286 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => LightningError {
288 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
289 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
296 shutdown_finish: None,
301 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
302 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
303 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
304 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
305 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
307 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
308 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
309 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
310 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
311 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
312 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
313 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
315 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
319 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
320 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<Signer: Sign> {
321 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
322 pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
323 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
324 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
325 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
326 /// ids in the PendingHTLCInfo!
327 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
328 /// Map from payment hash to any HTLCs which are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user.
329 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
330 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
332 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>>,
333 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
334 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
335 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
338 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
339 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
340 /// quite some time lag.
341 enum BackgroundEvent {
342 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
343 /// commitment transaction.
344 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
347 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
348 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
350 latest_features: InitFeatures,
353 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
354 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
356 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
358 struct PendingInboundPayment {
359 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
360 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
361 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
362 /// this payment being removed.
364 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
365 user_payment_id: u64,
366 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
367 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
368 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
371 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
372 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
373 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
374 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
375 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
376 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
377 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
378 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>;
380 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
381 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
382 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
383 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
384 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
385 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
386 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
387 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
388 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, &'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
390 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
391 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
393 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
394 /// to individual Channels.
396 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
397 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
398 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
399 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
401 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
402 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
403 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
404 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
405 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
406 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
407 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
409 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
410 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
411 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
412 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
415 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
416 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
417 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
418 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
419 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
421 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
422 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
423 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
424 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
425 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
426 pub struct ChannelManager<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
427 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
428 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
429 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
430 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
433 default_configuration: UserConfig,
434 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
440 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
442 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
443 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
445 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
446 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
447 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
448 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
450 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
451 /// expose them to users via a PaymentReceived event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
452 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
453 /// after we generate a PaymentReceived upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
454 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
455 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
457 our_network_key: SecretKey,
458 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
460 /// Used to track the last value sent in a node_announcement "timestamp" field. We ensure this
461 /// value increases strictly since we don't assume access to a time source.
462 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize,
464 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
465 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
466 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
467 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
469 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
470 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
471 /// are currently open with that peer.
472 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
473 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
475 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
477 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
478 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
479 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
480 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
481 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
482 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
483 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the PersistenceNotifier
484 /// the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
485 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
487 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier,
494 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
496 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
497 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
498 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
499 pub struct ChainParameters {
500 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
501 pub network: Network,
503 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
505 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
506 pub best_block: BestBlock,
509 /// The best known block as identified by its hash and height.
510 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
511 pub struct BestBlock {
512 block_hash: BlockHash,
517 /// Returns the best block from the genesis of the given network.
518 pub fn from_genesis(network: Network) -> Self {
520 block_hash: genesis_block(network).header.block_hash(),
525 /// Returns the best block as identified by the given block hash and height.
526 pub fn new(block_hash: BlockHash, height: u32) -> Self {
527 BestBlock { block_hash, height }
530 /// Returns the best block hash.
531 pub fn block_hash(&self) -> BlockHash { self.block_hash }
533 /// Returns the best block height.
534 pub fn height(&self) -> u32 { self.height }
537 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
538 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
539 /// `await_persistable_update` that new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
540 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
541 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
542 /// updates are ready for persistence).
543 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a> {
544 persistence_notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier,
545 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
546 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
549 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a> {
550 fn new(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier) -> Self {
551 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
554 persistence_notifier: notifier,
555 _read_guard: read_guard,
560 impl<'a> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a> {
562 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
566 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
567 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
569 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
571 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
572 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
573 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
574 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
575 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
577 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
578 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly six hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
580 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
582 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
583 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
584 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
585 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
586 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
587 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 6;
588 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
590 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
591 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry` field to at least
593 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER;
595 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
596 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
597 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
598 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
599 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
600 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
603 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
605 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying inbound claim. See
606 // ChannelMontior::would_broadcast_at_height for a description of why this is needed.
609 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
611 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
613 pub struct ChannelDetails {
614 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
615 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
616 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
617 /// lifetime of the channel.
618 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
619 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
620 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
621 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
622 /// The node_id of our counterparty
623 pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
624 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
625 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
626 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
627 pub counterparty_features: InitFeatures,
628 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
629 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
630 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
632 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
633 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
634 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
635 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
636 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
637 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
638 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
639 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
640 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
641 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
642 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
643 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b)
644 /// the peer is connected, and (c) no monitor update failure is pending resolution.
647 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
648 /// payments to us through this channel.
649 pub counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
652 /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
653 /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
655 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
656 pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
657 /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
658 /// send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages sent to peers, and
659 /// once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the payment in full.
660 ParameterError(APIError),
661 /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us
662 /// from attempting to send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages
663 /// sent to peers, and once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the
666 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
668 PathParameterError(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
669 /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
670 /// You can freely retry the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
671 /// paths than the ones selected).
672 AllFailedRetrySafe(Vec<APIError>),
673 /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
674 /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
675 /// in over-/re-payment.
677 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
678 /// send_payment, and any Errs which are not APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed can be safely
679 /// retried (though there is currently no API with which to do so).
681 /// Any entries which contain Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) or Ok(()) MUST NOT be retried
682 /// as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent (in the
683 /// case of Ok(())) or will send once channel_monitor_updated is called on the next-hop channel
684 /// with the latest update_id.
685 PartialFailure(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
688 macro_rules! handle_error {
689 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
692 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish }) => {
693 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
695 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
696 // entering the macro.
697 assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
700 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
702 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
703 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
704 if let Some(update) = update_option {
705 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
711 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
712 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
714 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
715 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
716 action: err.action.clone()
720 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
721 $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
724 // Return error in case higher-API need one
731 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
732 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
735 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
736 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
738 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
739 log_trace!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
740 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
741 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
742 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
744 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
746 Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_)) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
751 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
752 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
755 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
756 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
758 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
759 log_trace!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
760 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
761 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
762 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
764 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
766 Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg)) => {
767 log_error!($self.logger, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
768 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
769 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
770 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
772 let shutdown_res = chan.force_shutdown(false);
773 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
779 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
780 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
781 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
783 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
785 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
786 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]));
787 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
788 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
789 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
791 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
792 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
793 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
794 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
795 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
796 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
797 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
798 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
799 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
800 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()));
803 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
804 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards and {} fails",
805 log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]),
806 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
808 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
809 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
811 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
812 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
814 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
815 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len());
816 if !$resend_commitment {
817 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
820 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
822 $entry.get_mut().monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
823 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$entry.key()))
829 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
830 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
831 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
833 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
834 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
838 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
839 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
840 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
841 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
842 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
845 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
850 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
851 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
852 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
853 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
854 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
857 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
859 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
860 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
862 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
864 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
866 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
867 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
868 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
869 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
870 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
871 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
874 default_configuration: config.clone(),
875 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
876 fee_estimator: fee_est,
880 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
882 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
883 by_id: HashMap::new(),
884 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
885 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
886 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
887 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
889 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
891 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
892 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
895 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(0),
896 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
898 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
900 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
901 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
902 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
903 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
911 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels, as
912 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
913 &self.default_configuration
916 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
918 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady events to allow
919 /// tracking of which events correspond with which create_channel call. Note that the
920 /// user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you may wish to avoid using 0 for
921 /// user_id here. user_id has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply copied to events and
922 /// otherwise ignored.
924 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel message event, so you should probably poll
925 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
927 /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat is
928 /// greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k or channel_value_satoshis is < 1000.
929 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
930 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
931 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
934 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
935 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_id, config)?;
936 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
938 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
939 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
940 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
942 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
943 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
944 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
945 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
946 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
948 panic!("RNG is bad???");
951 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
953 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
954 node_id: their_network_key,
960 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<Signer>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
961 let mut res = Vec::new();
963 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
964 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
965 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
966 let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
967 res.push(ChannelDetails {
968 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
969 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
970 remote_network_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
971 counterparty_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
972 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
973 inbound_capacity_msat,
974 outbound_capacity_msat,
975 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
976 is_live: channel.is_live(),
977 counterparty_forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
981 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
982 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
983 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.remote_network_id) {
984 chan.counterparty_features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
990 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
991 /// more information.
992 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
993 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
996 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
997 /// get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
999 /// These are guaranteed to have their is_live value set to true, see the documentation for
1000 /// ChannelDetails::is_live for more info on exactly what the criteria are.
1001 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1002 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1003 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1004 // really wanted anyway.
1005 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1008 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1009 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1010 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1012 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1013 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1014 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1016 let (mut failed_htlcs, chan_option) = {
1017 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1018 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1019 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1020 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1021 let (shutdown_msg, failed_htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
1022 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1023 node_id: chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
1026 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1027 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1028 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1030 (failed_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1031 } else { (failed_htlcs, None) }
1033 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()})
1036 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1037 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1039 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1040 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1045 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
1046 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1047 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1056 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1057 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1058 log_trace!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1059 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1060 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1062 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
1063 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
1064 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
1065 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
1066 // ignore the result here.
1067 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
1071 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
1073 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1074 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1075 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1076 if let Some(node_id) = peer_node_id {
1077 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *node_id {
1078 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1081 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1082 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1084 chan.remove_entry().1
1086 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1089 log_trace!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
1090 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(true));
1091 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1092 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1093 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1098 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
1101 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
1102 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if channel_id is unknown to the manager.
1103 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1104 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1105 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, None) {
1106 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
1107 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1108 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1109 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1110 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
1111 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
1121 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
1122 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
1123 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
1124 for chan in self.list_channels() {
1125 let _ = self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
1129 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>) {
1130 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
1131 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
1133 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1134 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
1135 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1136 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1137 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
1138 failure_code: $err_code,
1139 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1144 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
1145 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
1148 let shared_secret = {
1149 let mut arr = [0; 32];
1150 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
1153 let (rho, mu) = onion_utils::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1155 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
1156 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
1157 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
1158 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
1159 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
1160 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
1161 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
1162 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
1165 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&mu);
1166 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
1167 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash.0[..]);
1168 if !fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
1169 return_malformed_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5);
1172 let mut channel_state = None;
1173 macro_rules! return_err {
1174 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
1176 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1177 if channel_state.is_none() {
1178 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1180 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1181 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1182 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1183 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
1184 })), channel_state.unwrap());
1189 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
1190 let mut chacha_stream = ChaChaReader { chacha: &mut chacha, read: Cursor::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..]) };
1191 let (next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac) = {
1192 match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut chacha_stream) {
1194 let error_code = match err {
1195 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
1196 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature|
1197 msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue|
1198 msgs::DecodeError::ShortRead => 0x4000 | 22, // invalid_onion_payload
1199 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
1201 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
1204 let mut hmac = [0; 32];
1205 if let Err(_) = chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut hmac[..]) {
1206 return_err!("Unable to decode hop data", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1213 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_hmac == [0; 32] {
1216 // In tests, make sure that the initial onion pcket data is, at least, non-0.
1217 // We could do some fancy randomness test here, but, ehh, whatever.
1218 // This checks for the issue where you can calculate the path length given the
1219 // onion data as all the path entries that the originator sent will be here
1220 // as-is (and were originally 0s).
1221 // Of course reverse path calculation is still pretty easy given naive routing
1222 // algorithms, but this fixes the most-obvious case.
1223 let mut next_bytes = [0; 32];
1224 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1225 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1226 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1227 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1231 // final_expiry_too_soon
1232 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure we have at least
1233 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
1234 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown payment hash, our payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward
1235 // before our onchain logic triggers a channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rational).
1236 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) <= self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
1237 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
1239 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
1240 if next_hop_data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
1241 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1243 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
1244 if next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
1245 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1248 let payment_data = match next_hop_data.format {
1249 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { .. } => None,
1250 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => return_err!("Got non final data with an HMAC of 0", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]),
1251 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data } => payment_data,
1254 if payment_data.is_none() {
1255 return_err!("We require payment_secrets", 0x4000|0x2000|3, &[0;0]);
1258 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
1259 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
1260 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
1261 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
1263 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1264 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
1265 payment_data: payment_data.unwrap(),
1266 incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
1268 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1269 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1270 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1271 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1274 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
1275 let read_pos = chacha_stream.read(&mut new_packet_data).unwrap();
1276 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1278 // Check two things:
1279 // a) that the behavior of our stream here will return Ok(0) even if the TLV
1280 // read above emptied out our buffer and the unwrap() wont needlessly panic
1281 // b) that we didn't somehow magically end up with extra data.
1283 debug_assert!(chacha_stream.read(&mut t).unwrap() == 0);
1285 // Once we've emptied the set of bytes our peer gave us, encrypt 0 bytes until we
1286 // fill the onion hop data we'll forward to our next-hop peer.
1287 chacha_stream.chacha.process_in_place(&mut new_packet_data[read_pos..]);
1289 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
1291 let blinding_factor = {
1292 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
1293 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
1294 sha.input(&shared_secret);
1295 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
1298 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
1300 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
1302 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
1305 hop_data: new_packet_data,
1306 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
1309 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
1310 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1311 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1312 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
1313 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1317 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1318 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
1319 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
1322 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1323 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1324 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1325 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1329 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1330 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
1331 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
1332 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
1333 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
1334 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
1335 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
1336 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
1337 None => { // unknown_next_peer
1338 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
1340 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1342 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
1343 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
1345 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
1346 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
1347 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
1348 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
1349 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
1350 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
1351 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1353 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
1354 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1356 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_holder_fee_base_msat(&self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
1357 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
1358 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1360 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta() as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
1361 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1363 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1364 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now, but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty
1365 // packet sanitization (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rational)
1366 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
1367 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1369 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
1370 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
1372 // In theory, we would be safe against unitentional channel-closure, if we only required a margin of LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1373 // But, to be safe against policy reception, we use a longuer delay.
1374 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER) as u64 {
1375 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1381 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
1382 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
1383 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
1384 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1386 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
1387 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1389 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
1390 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
1391 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
1393 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1395 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
1400 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
1403 /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
1404 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1405 fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
1406 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1407 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
1411 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
1413 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1414 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
1416 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
1417 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
1418 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
1419 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
1420 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Present(chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat()),
1421 fee_base_msat: chan.get_holder_fee_base_msat(&self.fee_estimator),
1422 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
1423 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1426 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
1427 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
1429 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
1435 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
1436 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1437 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
1438 let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
1439 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
1441 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
1442 .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
1443 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height)?;
1444 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
1445 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
1447 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
1449 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1451 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
1452 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1453 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1454 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
1455 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1458 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
1459 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
1461 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1462 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1464 if !chan.get().is_live() {
1465 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
1467 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1469 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1470 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
1471 }, onion_packet, &self.logger), channel_state, chan)
1473 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
1474 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1475 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
1476 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
1477 // that we will resend the commitment update once monitor updating
1478 // is restored. Therefore, we must return an error indicating that
1479 // it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale, which we do in the
1480 // send_payment check for MonitorUpdateFailed, below.
1481 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1484 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1485 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1486 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1487 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1488 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1489 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1490 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1498 } else { unreachable!(); }
1502 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
1503 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
1505 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
1510 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
1512 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
1513 /// fields for more info.
1515 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
1516 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
1517 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
1518 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
1519 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
1520 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
1522 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed.
1524 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
1525 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
1526 /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
1528 /// In general, a path may raise:
1529 /// * APIError::RouteError when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
1530 /// node public key) is specified.
1531 /// * APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
1532 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
1534 /// * APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
1535 /// relevant updates.
1537 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
1538 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
1539 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
1541 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
1542 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
1543 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
1544 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
1546 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
1547 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
1548 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
1549 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
1550 if route.paths.len() < 1 {
1551 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
1553 if route.paths.len() > 10 {
1554 // This limit is completely arbitrary - there aren't any real fundamental path-count
1555 // limits. After we support retrying individual paths we should likely bump this, but
1556 // for now more than 10 paths likely carries too much one-path failure.
1557 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "Sending over more than 10 paths is not currently supported"}));
1559 let mut total_value = 0;
1560 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1561 let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
1562 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
1563 if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
1564 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
1565 continue 'path_check;
1567 for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
1568 if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
1569 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
1570 continue 'path_check;
1573 total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
1574 path_errs.push(Ok(()));
1576 if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
1577 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
1580 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1581 let mut results = Vec::new();
1582 for path in route.paths.iter() {
1583 results.push(self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height));
1585 let mut has_ok = false;
1586 let mut has_err = false;
1587 for res in results.iter() {
1588 if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
1589 if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
1590 if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = res {
1591 // MonitorUpdateFailed is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
1598 if has_err && has_ok {
1599 Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure(results))
1601 Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
1607 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
1608 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
1609 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>
1610 (&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1612 let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
1614 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
1616 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
1617 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
1618 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
1619 } else { unreachable!(); })
1622 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "No such channel".to_owned() }) },
1624 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
1625 Ok(funding_msg) => {
1628 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
1629 err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
1634 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1635 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
1636 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1639 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
1640 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1641 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
1643 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1651 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1652 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
1653 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
1657 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
1659 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
1660 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
1662 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
1664 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
1665 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
1666 /// keys per-channel).
1668 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
1669 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
1670 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
1672 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
1673 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
1674 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
1675 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1676 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1678 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
1679 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
1680 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
1681 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
1685 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
1686 let mut output_index = None;
1687 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
1688 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1689 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
1690 if output_index.is_some() {
1691 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
1692 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
1695 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
1696 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
1697 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
1700 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
1703 if output_index.is_none() {
1704 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
1705 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
1708 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
1712 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
1713 if !chan.should_announce() {
1714 log_trace!(self.logger, "Can't send announcement_signatures for private channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
1718 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
1720 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
1722 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1723 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1725 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
1726 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
1727 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
1728 node_signature: our_node_sig,
1729 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
1734 // Messages of up to 64KB should never end up more than half full with addresses, as that would
1735 // be absurd. We ensure this by checking that at least 500 (our stated public contract on when
1736 // broadcast_node_announcement panics) of the maximum-length addresses would fit in a 64KB
1738 const HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS: u32 = ::std::u16::MAX as u32 / (NetAddress::MAX_LEN as u32 + 1) / 2;
1741 // ...by failing to compile if the number of addresses that would be half of a message is
1742 // smaller than 500:
1743 const STATIC_ASSERT: u32 = Self::HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS - 500;
1745 /// Generates a signed node_announcement from the given arguments and creates a
1746 /// BroadcastNodeAnnouncement event. Note that such messages will be ignored unless peers have
1747 /// seen a channel_announcement from us (ie unless we have public channels open).
1749 /// RGB is a node "color" and alias is a printable human-readable string to describe this node
1750 /// to humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning.
1752 /// addresses represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node accepts
1753 /// incoming connections. These will be broadcast to the network, publicly tying these
1754 /// addresses together. If you wish to preserve user privacy, addresses should likely contain
1755 /// only Tor Onion addresses.
1757 /// Panics if addresses is absurdly large (more than 500).
1758 pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], addresses: Vec<NetAddress>) {
1759 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1761 if addresses.len() > 500 {
1762 panic!("More than half the message size was taken up by public addresses!");
1765 let announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
1766 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
1767 timestamp: self.last_node_announcement_serial.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32,
1768 node_id: self.get_our_node_id(),
1769 rgb, alias, addresses,
1770 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
1771 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1773 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1775 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1776 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement {
1777 msg: msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
1778 signature: self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key),
1779 contents: announcement
1784 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
1786 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
1787 /// Will likely generate further events.
1788 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
1789 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1791 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1792 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
1793 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
1795 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1796 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1798 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
1799 if short_chan_id != 0 {
1800 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
1801 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1803 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
1804 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1805 match forward_info {
1806 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info,
1807 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
1808 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1809 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1810 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
1811 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1812 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1814 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
1815 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() }
1818 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
1819 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
1820 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
1821 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
1822 // problem, not ours.
1829 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
1830 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1831 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1832 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1833 match forward_info {
1834 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
1835 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
1837 }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
1838 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
1839 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), prev_short_channel_id, short_chan_id);
1840 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1841 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1842 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
1843 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1844 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
1846 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet) {
1848 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
1849 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
1851 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
1853 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap();
1854 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
1855 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }
1861 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1863 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1864 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
1865 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
1866 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
1867 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
1868 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
1869 // this channel currently :/.
1875 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
1876 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
1878 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
1879 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} after delay", short_chan_id);
1880 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet) {
1882 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
1883 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail backwards to short_id {}: {}", short_chan_id, msg);
1885 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
1887 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
1888 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
1889 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
1892 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1894 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1895 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
1896 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
1897 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
1898 // messages when we can.
1899 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
1900 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
1901 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
1908 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
1909 let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) {
1912 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
1913 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
1914 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1915 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
1916 ChannelError::Ignore(_) => {
1917 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
1919 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1920 log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
1921 let (channel_id, mut channel) = chan.remove_entry();
1922 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1923 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1925 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update(&channel).ok()))
1927 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
1929 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, err));
1933 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1934 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
1937 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1938 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
1939 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1940 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
1941 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1942 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
1943 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1945 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1953 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1954 match forward_info {
1955 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
1956 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry },
1957 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. },
1958 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
1959 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
1960 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
1961 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1962 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
1963 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1964 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
1966 value: amt_to_forward,
1967 payment_data: payment_data.clone(),
1968 cltv_expiry: incoming_cltv_expiry,
1971 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
1973 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc.value).to_vec();
1974 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
1975 &byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()),
1977 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1978 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
1979 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
1980 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
1981 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
1983 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data }
1988 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
1989 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
1990 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
1991 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
1992 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
1993 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
1994 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
1995 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
1996 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
1997 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we didn't have a corresponding inbound payment.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
1998 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2000 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
2001 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
2002 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2003 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2004 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
2005 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
2006 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
2007 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2009 let mut total_value = 0;
2010 let htlcs = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
2011 .or_insert(Vec::new());
2012 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
2013 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
2014 total_value += htlc.value;
2015 if htlc.payment_data.total_msat != payment_data.total_msat {
2016 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
2017 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, htlc.payment_data.total_msat);
2018 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
2020 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
2022 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > payment_data.total_msat {
2023 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
2024 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, payment_data.total_msat);
2025 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
2028 } else if total_value == payment_data.total_msat {
2029 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
2031 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
2032 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
2034 user_payment_id: inbound_payment.get().user_payment_id,
2036 // Only ever generate at most one PaymentReceived
2037 // per registered payment_hash, even if it isn't
2039 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
2041 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
2042 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
2049 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
2050 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
2052 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
2053 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
2061 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
2062 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason);
2065 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
2066 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
2069 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
2070 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2071 events.append(&mut new_events);
2074 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
2076 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
2077 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
2079 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
2080 fn process_background_events(&self) {
2081 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
2082 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
2083 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
2085 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
2086 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
2087 // monitor updating completing.
2088 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update);
2094 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
2095 pub(crate) fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
2096 self.process_background_events();
2099 /// If a peer is disconnected we mark any channels with that peer as 'disabled'.
2100 /// After some time, if channels are still disabled we need to broadcast a ChannelUpdate
2101 /// to inform the network about the uselessness of these channels.
2103 /// This method handles all the details, and must be called roughly once per minute.
2105 /// Note that in some rare cases this may generate a `chain::Watch::update_channel` call.
2106 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
2107 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2108 self.process_background_events();
2110 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2111 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2112 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter_mut() {
2113 if chan.is_disabled_staged() && !chan.is_live() {
2114 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2115 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2120 } else if chan.is_disabled_staged() && chan.is_live() {
2122 } else if chan.is_disabled_marked() {
2123 chan.to_disabled_staged();
2128 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
2129 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
2130 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
2131 /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
2132 /// HTLC backwards has been started.
2133 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) -> bool {
2134 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2136 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2137 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
2138 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
2139 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
2140 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
2141 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
2142 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
2143 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
2144 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
2145 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_hash,
2146 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
2152 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
2153 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
2154 // be surfaced to the user.
2155 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(&self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
2156 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
2158 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { .. }) => {
2159 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
2160 match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
2161 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
2162 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update(&chan_entry.get()) {
2163 (0x1000|7, upd.encode_with_len())
2165 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
2168 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
2170 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2171 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state,
2172 htlc_src, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: onion_failure_data});
2174 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
2175 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
2176 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2178 rejected_by_dest: false,
2190 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
2191 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
2192 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
2193 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
2194 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
2195 /// still-available channels.
2196 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
2197 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
2198 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
2199 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
2202 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
2203 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
2204 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
2206 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, .. } => {
2207 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2208 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2209 match &onion_error {
2210 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
2212 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
2214 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
2215 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
2216 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
2217 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
2218 if let Some(update) = channel_update {
2219 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
2220 events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate {
2225 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
2226 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2227 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
2228 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
2230 error_code: onion_error_code,
2232 error_data: onion_error_data
2236 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
2242 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
2243 // TODO: We'd like to generate a PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate for temporary
2244 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as get_route
2245 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
2247 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
2248 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
2249 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
2250 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2251 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
2252 rejected_by_dest: path.len() == 1,
2254 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
2256 error_data: Some(data.clone()),
2262 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, .. }) => {
2263 let err_packet = match onion_error {
2264 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
2265 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
2266 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
2267 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
2269 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
2270 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2271 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
2275 let mut forward_event = None;
2276 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
2277 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
2279 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
2280 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2281 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
2283 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2284 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
2287 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2288 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
2289 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2290 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
2291 time_forwardable: time
2298 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
2299 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
2300 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
2302 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
2303 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentReceived`
2304 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
2305 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
2307 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
2309 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
2310 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
2311 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> bool {
2312 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2314 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2316 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2317 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
2318 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
2319 assert!(!sources.is_empty());
2321 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we have to take special care to ensure that each
2322 // channel exists before claiming all of the payments (inside one lock).
2323 // Note that channel existance is sufficient as we should always get a monitor update
2324 // which will take care of the real HTLC claim enforcement.
2326 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
2327 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
2328 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
2329 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
2330 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
2332 let mut valid_mpp = true;
2333 for htlc in sources.iter() {
2334 if let None = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
2340 let mut errs = Vec::new();
2341 let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
2342 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
2344 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
2345 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
2346 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
2347 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
2348 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
2349 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash,
2350 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
2352 match self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state.as_mut().unwrap(), htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
2354 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = e.1.err.action {
2355 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
2356 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
2357 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", e.1.err.err);
2358 claimed_any_htlcs = true;
2359 } else { errs.push(e); }
2361 Err(None) => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"),
2362 Ok(()) => claimed_any_htlcs = true,
2367 // Now that we've done the entire above loop in one lock, we can handle any errors
2368 // which were generated.
2369 channel_state.take();
2371 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
2372 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
2373 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
2380 fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> Result<(), Option<(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)>> {
2381 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
2382 let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock;
2383 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
2384 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
2390 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
2391 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
2392 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
2393 Ok((msgs, monitor_option)) => {
2394 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_option {
2395 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2396 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
2397 assert!(msgs.is_none());
2399 return Err(Some((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err())));
2403 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
2404 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2405 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
2406 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2407 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2408 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
2409 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2410 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2419 // TODO: Do something with e?
2420 // This should only occur if we are claiming an HTLC at the same time as the
2421 // HTLC is being failed (eg because a block is being connected and this caused
2422 // an HTLC to time out). This should, of course, only occur if the user is the
2423 // one doing the claiming (as it being a part of a peer claim would imply we're
2424 // about to lose funds) and only if the lock in claim_funds was dropped as a
2425 // previous HTLC was failed (thus not for an MPP payment).
2426 debug_assert!(false, "This shouldn't be reachable except in absurdly rare cases between monitor updates and HTLC timeouts: {:?}", e);
2430 } else { unreachable!(); }
2433 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
2435 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
2436 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2437 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2438 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
2442 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
2443 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
2444 if let Err((counterparty_node_id, err)) = match self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage) {
2447 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2448 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
2449 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
2450 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
2453 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
2454 // receiving an offchain preimage event from the forward link (the
2455 // event being update_fulfill_htlc).
2456 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_outpoint, preimage_update) {
2457 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
2458 payment_preimage, e);
2462 Err(Some(res)) => Err(res),
2464 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2465 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
2466 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
2472 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
2473 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
2474 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
2477 /// Restores a single, given channel to normal operation after a
2478 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
2481 /// All ChannelMonitor updates up to and including highest_applied_update_id must have been
2482 /// fully committed in every copy of the given channels' ChannelMonitors.
2484 /// Note that there is no effect to calling with a highest_applied_update_id other than the
2485 /// current latest ChannelMonitorUpdate and one call to this function after multiple
2486 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures is fine. The highest_applied_update_id field
2487 /// exists largely only to prevent races between this and concurrent update_monitor calls.
2489 /// Thus, the anticipated use is, at a high level:
2490 /// 1) You register a chain::Watch with this ChannelManager,
2491 /// 2) it stores each update to disk, and begins updating any remote (eg watchtower) copies of
2492 /// said ChannelMonitors as it can, returning ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures
2493 /// any time it cannot do so instantly,
2494 /// 3) update(s) are applied to each remote copy of a ChannelMonitor,
2495 /// 4) once all remote copies are updated, you call this function with the update_id that
2496 /// completed, and once it is the latest the Channel will be re-enabled.
2497 pub fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
2498 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2500 let mut close_results = Vec::new();
2501 let mut htlc_forwards = Vec::new();
2502 let mut htlc_failures = Vec::new();
2503 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
2506 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2507 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2508 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
2509 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2510 let channel = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
2514 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
2518 let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, funding_broadcastable, funding_locked) = channel.monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger);
2519 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
2520 htlc_forwards.push((channel.get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"), funding_txo.clone(), pending_forwards));
2522 htlc_failures.append(&mut pending_failures);
2524 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
2525 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
2526 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2527 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2532 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
2533 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
2534 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2535 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2536 msg: revoke_and_ack,
2541 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
2545 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
2550 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
2551 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
2553 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
2554 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2555 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2558 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
2559 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2560 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2561 msg: announcement_sigs,
2564 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
2568 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().append(&mut pending_events);
2570 for failure in htlc_failures.drain(..) {
2571 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
2573 self.forward_htlcs(&mut htlc_forwards[..]);
2575 for res in close_results.drain(..) {
2576 self.finish_force_close_channel(res);
2580 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2581 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
2582 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
2585 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, counterparty_node_id.clone(), their_features, msg, 0, &self.default_configuration)
2586 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
2587 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2588 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2589 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
2590 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
2591 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2592 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
2593 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2594 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
2596 entry.insert(channel);
2602 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2603 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
2604 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2605 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2606 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
2607 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2608 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2609 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
2611 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration, their_features), channel_state, chan);
2612 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
2614 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
2617 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2618 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
2619 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
2620 channel_value_satoshis: value,
2622 user_channel_id: user_id,
2627 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2628 let ((funding_msg, monitor), mut chan) = {
2629 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
2630 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2631 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2632 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
2633 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2634 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2635 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
2637 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.logger), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
2639 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
2642 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
2643 // lock before watch_channel
2644 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
2646 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
2647 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
2648 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
2649 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
2650 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
2651 // We do not do a force-close here as that would generate a monitor update for
2652 // a monitor that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we
2653 // don't respond with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
2654 let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(true);
2655 assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
2656 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
2658 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
2659 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
2660 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
2661 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our funding_locked
2662 // until we have persisted our monitor.
2663 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2667 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2668 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2669 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
2670 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2671 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
2673 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2674 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
2675 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2684 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2686 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
2687 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2688 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2689 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2690 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2691 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2692 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2694 let (monitor, funding_tx) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.logger) {
2695 Ok(update) => update,
2696 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
2698 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
2699 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, false, false);
2703 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2706 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
2710 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2711 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2712 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2713 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2714 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2715 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2716 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2718 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg), channel_state, chan);
2719 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
2720 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for {} in response to funding_locked", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2721 // If we see locking block before receiving remote funding_locked, we broadcast our
2722 // announcement_sigs at remote funding_locked reception. If we receive remote
2723 // funding_locked before seeing locking block, we broadcast our announcement_sigs at locking
2724 // block connection. We should guanrantee to broadcast announcement_sigs to our peer whatever
2725 // the order of the events but our peer may not receive it due to disconnection. The specs
2726 // lacking an acknowledgement for announcement_sigs we may have to re-send them at peer
2727 // connection in the future if simultaneous misses by both peers due to network/hardware
2728 // failures is an issue. Note, to achieve its goal, only one of the announcement_sigs needs
2729 // to be received, from then sigs are going to be flood to the whole network.
2730 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2731 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2732 msg: announcement_sigs,
2737 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2741 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2742 let (mut dropped_htlcs, chan_option) = {
2743 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2744 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2746 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
2747 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2748 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2749 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2751 let (shutdown, closing_signed, dropped_htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.fee_estimator, &their_features, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
2752 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
2753 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2754 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2758 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2759 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2760 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2764 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
2765 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
2766 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2768 (dropped_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
2769 } else { (dropped_htlcs, None) }
2771 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2774 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
2775 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2777 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
2778 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2779 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2780 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2788 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2789 let (tx, chan_option) = {
2790 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2791 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2792 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
2793 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2794 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2795 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2797 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
2798 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2799 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2800 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2805 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
2806 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
2807 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
2808 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
2809 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
2810 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
2811 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2813 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
2814 } else { (tx, None) }
2816 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2819 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
2820 log_trace!(self.logger, "Broadcast onchain {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
2821 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
2823 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
2824 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2825 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2826 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2834 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2835 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
2836 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
2837 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
2839 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
2840 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
2841 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
2842 //but we should prevent it anyway.
2844 let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
2845 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2847 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2848 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2849 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2850 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2853 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
2854 // Ensure error_code has the UPDATE flag set, since by default we send a
2855 // channel update along as part of failing the HTLC.
2856 assert!((error_code & 0x1000) != 0);
2857 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
2858 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
2859 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
2860 match pending_forward_info {
2861 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
2862 let reason = if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update(chan) {
2863 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &{
2864 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
2865 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
2866 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
2867 res.extend_from_slice(&upd.encode_with_len()[..]);
2871 // The only case where we'd be unable to
2872 // successfully get a channel update is if the
2873 // channel isn't in the fully-funded state yet,
2874 // implying our counterparty is trying to route
2875 // payments over the channel back to themselves
2876 // (cause no one else should know the short_id
2877 // is a lightning channel yet). We should have
2878 // no problem just calling this
2879 // unknown_next_peer (0x4000|10).
2880 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
2882 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2883 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2884 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2887 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
2889 _ => pending_forward_info
2892 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
2894 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2899 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2900 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2902 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2903 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2904 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2905 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2906 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2908 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
2910 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2913 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone());
2917 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2918 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2919 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2920 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2921 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2922 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2923 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2925 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
2927 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2932 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2933 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2934 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2935 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2936 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2937 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2938 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2940 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
2941 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
2942 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
2944 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
2947 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2951 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2952 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2953 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2954 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2955 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2956 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2957 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2959 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, closing_signed, monitor_update) =
2960 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
2961 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
2962 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
2963 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
2964 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
2965 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan);
2970 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2971 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
2972 //TODO: Rebroadcast closing_signed if present on monitor update restoration
2974 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2975 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2976 msg: revoke_and_ack,
2978 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
2979 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2980 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2981 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2982 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2983 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2984 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2985 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2987 commitment_signed: msg,
2991 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2992 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2993 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2999 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3004 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
3005 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
3006 let mut forward_event = None;
3007 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
3008 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3009 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3010 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
3012 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3013 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.routing {
3014 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
3015 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
3017 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3018 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
3019 prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
3021 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3022 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
3023 prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
3028 match forward_event {
3030 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3031 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
3032 time_forwardable: time
3040 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3041 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3043 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3044 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3045 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3046 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3047 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3048 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3050 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
3051 let (commitment_update, pending_forwards, pending_failures, closing_signed, monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail_in) =
3052 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3053 htlcs_to_fail = htlcs_to_fail_in;
3054 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3055 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
3056 assert!(commitment_update.is_none() && closing_signed.is_none() && pending_forwards.is_empty() && pending_failures.is_empty());
3057 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
3059 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, commitment_update.is_some(), pending_forwards, pending_failures) {
3061 } else { unreachable!(); }
3064 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
3065 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3066 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3070 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
3071 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
3072 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3076 break Ok((pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"), chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap()))
3078 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3081 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id);
3083 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, short_channel_id, channel_outpoint)) => {
3084 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
3085 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
3087 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, pending_forwards)]);
3094 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3095 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3096 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3097 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3098 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3099 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3100 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3102 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
3104 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3109 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3110 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3111 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3113 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3114 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3115 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3116 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3118 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
3119 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
3122 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
3123 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) =
3124 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone()), channel_state, chan);
3126 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
3127 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
3129 let their_node_key = if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 };
3130 let their_bitcoin_key = if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 };
3131 match (self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, their_node_key),
3132 self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, their_bitcoin_key)) {
3134 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close(format!("Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature: {:?}. Maybe using different node_secret for transport and routing msg? UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}", e, &announcement, their_node_key));
3135 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
3138 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close(format!("Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature: {:?}. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})", e, &announcement, their_bitcoin_key));
3139 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
3145 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
3147 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
3148 msg: msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
3149 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
3150 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
3151 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
3152 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
3153 contents: announcement,
3155 update_msg: self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap(), // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
3158 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3163 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3164 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3165 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3166 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
3167 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
3169 // It's not a local channel
3173 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
3174 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3175 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3176 // TODO: see issue #153, need a consistent behavior on obnoxious behavior from random node
3177 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), chan_id));
3179 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), channel_state, chan);
3181 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => unreachable!()
3186 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3187 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3188 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3190 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3191 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3192 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3193 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3195 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
3196 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
3197 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
3198 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
3199 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, monitor_update_opt, mut order, shutdown) =
3200 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3201 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
3202 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3203 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
3204 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
3205 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
3206 if revoke_and_ack.is_none() {
3207 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
3209 if commitment_update.is_none() {
3210 order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
3212 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, order, revoke_and_ack.is_some(), commitment_update.is_some());
3213 //TODO: Resend the funding_locked if needed once we get the monitor running again
3216 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
3217 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
3218 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3222 macro_rules! send_raa { () => {
3223 if let Some(msg) = revoke_and_ack {
3224 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
3225 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3230 macro_rules! send_cu { () => {
3231 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
3232 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3233 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3239 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
3243 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
3248 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
3249 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
3250 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3256 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3260 /// Begin Update fee process. Allowed only on an outbound channel.
3261 /// If successful, will generate a UpdateHTLCs event, so you should probably poll
3262 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
3263 /// Note: This API is likely to change!
3264 /// (C-not exported) Cause its doc(hidden) anyway
3266 pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3267 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3268 let counterparty_node_id;
3269 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
3270 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3271 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3273 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3274 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("Failed to find corresponding channel for id {}", channel_id.to_hex())}),
3275 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3276 if !chan.get().is_outbound() {
3277 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "update_fee cannot be sent for an inbound channel".to_owned()});
3279 if chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
3280 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
3282 if !chan.get().is_live() {
3283 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel is either not yet fully established or peer is currently disconnected".to_owned()});
3285 counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3286 if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) =
3287 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw, &self.logger), channel_state, chan)
3289 if let Err(_e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3292 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3293 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3294 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3295 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3296 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3297 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3298 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3299 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
3309 match handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id) {
3310 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3311 Err(e) => { Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: e.err })}
3315 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`.
3316 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) {
3317 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
3319 for monitor_event in self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events() {
3320 match monitor_event {
3321 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
3322 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
3323 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
3324 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
3326 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
3327 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
3330 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(funding_outpoint) => {
3331 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3332 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3333 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
3334 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3335 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3336 if let Some(mut chan) = by_id.remove(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
3337 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
3338 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3340 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
3341 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
3342 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3346 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
3347 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3348 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
3349 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
3358 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
3359 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
3363 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
3364 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
3366 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
3367 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
3368 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
3369 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
3370 // reorganized out of the main chain.
3371 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
3372 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
3373 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
3374 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
3375 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
3376 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
3377 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
3378 assert!(should_broadcast);
3379 } else { unreachable!(); }
3380 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
3382 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
3386 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
3387 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
3389 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
3391 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3392 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3393 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3394 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3395 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
3396 payment_secret, min_value_msat, user_payment_id, payment_preimage,
3397 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
3398 // its updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
3399 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
3400 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
3401 // never fail a payment too early.
3402 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
3404 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
3407 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
3412 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
3415 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
3416 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you, returning the first and storing the second.
3418 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentReceived`], which
3419 /// will have the [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
3420 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
3422 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
3424 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
3425 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
3426 /// [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::payment_preimage
3427 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
3428 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> (PaymentHash, PaymentSecret) {
3429 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
3430 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3433 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, user_payment_id)
3434 .expect("RNG Generated Duplicate PaymentHash"))
3437 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
3438 /// stored external to LDK.
3440 /// A [`PaymentReceived`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
3441 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
3442 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
3444 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) must be globally unique. This
3445 /// method may return an Err if another payment with the same payment_hash is still pending.
3447 /// `user_payment_id` will be provided back in [`PaymentReceived::user_payment_id`] events to
3448 /// allow tracking of which events correspond with which calls to this and
3449 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]. `user_payment_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply
3450 /// copied to events and otherwise ignored. It may be used to correlate PaymentReceived events
3451 /// with invoice metadata stored elsewhere.
3453 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
3454 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
3455 /// before a [`PaymentReceived`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
3456 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
3458 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
3459 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
3460 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
3461 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 7,200 secs as a default validity time for
3462 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
3464 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
3465 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
3466 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentReceived`] event for some time after the expiry.
3467 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
3468 /// [`PaymentReceived`].
3470 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
3472 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry`
3473 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY`].
3475 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
3476 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
3477 /// [`PaymentReceived::user_payment_id`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::user_payment_id
3478 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
3479 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, user_payment_id)
3483 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3484 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3485 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3486 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3487 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3490 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
3491 //TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's non-intuitive that we query
3492 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
3493 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
3495 let mut ret = Vec::new();
3496 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3497 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
3502 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3503 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3504 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3505 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3506 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3509 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<Event> {
3510 //TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's non-intuitive that we query
3511 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
3512 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
3514 let mut ret = Vec::new();
3515 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3516 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
3521 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3523 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3524 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3525 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3526 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3529 fn block_connected(&self, block: &Block, height: u32) {
3531 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
3532 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), block.header.prev_blockhash,
3533 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
3534 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
3535 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
3538 let txdata: Vec<_> = block.txdata.iter().enumerate().collect();
3539 self.transactions_confirmed(&block.header, &txdata, height);
3540 self.best_block_updated(&block.header, height);
3543 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
3544 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3545 let new_height = height - 1;
3547 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
3548 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
3549 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
3550 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
3551 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
3552 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
3555 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time));
3559 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3561 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3562 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3563 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3564 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3567 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
3568 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3569 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
3570 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3572 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
3573 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
3575 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3576 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, &self.logger).map(|a| (a, Vec::new())));
3579 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
3580 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3581 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
3582 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3584 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
3585 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
3587 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3589 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
3591 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time));
3593 macro_rules! max_time {
3594 ($timestamp: expr) => {
3596 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
3597 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
3598 // having an explicit local time source.
3599 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
3600 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
3601 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
3602 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
3603 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
3609 max_time!(self.last_node_announcement_serial);
3610 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
3611 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3612 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
3613 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
3617 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
3618 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3619 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.short_to_id.len());
3620 for chan in channel_state.by_id.values() {
3621 if let Some(funding_txo) = chan.get_funding_txo() {
3622 res.push(funding_txo.txid);
3628 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
3629 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3630 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
3631 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
3632 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
3633 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed().map(|_| (None, Vec::new()))
3634 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
3635 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
3640 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3642 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3643 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3644 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3645 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3648 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
3649 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
3651 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), msgs::ErrorMessage>>
3652 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
3653 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3654 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
3655 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3657 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
3658 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
3660 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3661 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3662 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3663 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3664 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
3665 let res = f(channel);
3666 if let Ok((chan_res, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs)) = res {
3667 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
3668 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&channel).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
3669 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3670 failure_code: 0x1000 | 14, // expiry_too_soon, or at least it is now
3674 if let Some(funding_locked) = chan_res {
3675 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
3676 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3677 msg: funding_locked,
3679 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
3680 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked and announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
3681 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
3682 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3683 msg: announcement_sigs,
3686 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
3688 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
3690 } else if let Err(e) = res {
3691 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
3692 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3694 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
3695 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
3696 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
3697 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
3698 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3702 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
3703 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3704 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: e },
3711 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
3712 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, htlcs| {
3713 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3714 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
3715 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
3716 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
3717 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
3718 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
3719 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3720 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(height));
3721 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(), HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3722 failure_code: 0x4000 | 15,
3723 data: htlc_msat_height_data
3728 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
3733 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
3735 for (source, payment_hash, reason) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
3736 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, reason);
3740 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
3741 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
3742 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
3744 /// Note that the feature `allow_wallclock_use` must be enabled to use this function.
3745 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
3746 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
3747 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
3750 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
3751 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
3753 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
3754 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
3757 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3758 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
3759 let mutcond = &self.persistence_notifier.persistence_lock;
3760 let &(ref mtx, _) = mutcond;
3761 let guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
3766 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref , T: Deref , K: Deref , F: Deref , L: Deref >
3767 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3768 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3769 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3770 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3771 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3774 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
3775 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3776 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3779 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
3780 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3781 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3784 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
3785 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3786 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3789 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
3790 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3791 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3794 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) {
3795 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3796 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3799 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
3800 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3801 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3804 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
3805 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3806 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3809 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
3810 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3811 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3814 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
3815 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3816 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3819 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
3820 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3821 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3824 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
3825 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3826 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3829 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
3830 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3831 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3834 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
3835 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3836 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3839 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
3840 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3841 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3844 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
3845 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3846 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3849 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
3850 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3851 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3854 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
3855 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3856 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3859 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
3860 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3861 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
3862 let mut failed_payments = Vec::new();
3863 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
3865 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3866 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3867 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3868 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3869 if no_connection_possible {
3870 log_debug!(self.logger, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
3871 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
3872 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
3873 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
3874 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3876 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(true));
3877 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
3878 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3888 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
3889 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
3890 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
3891 // Note that currently on channel reestablish we assert that there are no
3892 // holding cell add-HTLCs, so if in the future we stop removing uncommitted HTLCs
3893 // on peer disconnect here, there will need to be corresponding changes in
3894 // reestablish logic.
3895 let failed_adds = chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
3896 chan.to_disabled_marked();
3897 if !failed_adds.is_empty() {
3898 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&chan).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
3899 failed_payments.push((chan_update, failed_adds));
3901 if chan.is_shutdown() {
3902 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
3903 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3907 no_channels_remain = false;
3913 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
3915 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3916 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3917 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3918 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3919 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3920 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3921 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3922 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3923 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3924 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3925 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3926 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
3927 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
3928 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
3929 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3930 &events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => true,
3931 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
3932 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
3933 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
3937 if no_channels_remain {
3938 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id);
3941 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
3942 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
3944 for (chan_update, mut htlc_sources) in failed_payments {
3945 for (htlc_source, payment_hash) in htlc_sources.drain(..) {
3946 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.clone() });
3951 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) {
3952 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
3954 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3957 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
3958 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
3959 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3960 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
3961 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
3964 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
3965 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
3970 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3971 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3972 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3973 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
3974 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
3975 if !chan.have_received_message() {
3976 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
3977 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
3978 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
3982 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
3983 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3984 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
3990 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
3993 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
3994 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3996 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
3997 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3998 if chan.remote_network_id == *counterparty_node_id {
3999 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
4000 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id));
4004 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
4005 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id));
4010 /// Used to signal to the ChannelManager persister that the manager needs to be re-persisted to
4011 /// disk/backups, through `await_persistable_update_timeout` and `await_persistable_update`.
4012 struct PersistenceNotifier {
4013 /// Users won't access the persistence_lock directly, but rather wait on its bool using
4014 /// `wait_timeout` and `wait`.
4015 persistence_lock: (Mutex<bool>, Condvar),
4018 impl PersistenceNotifier {
4021 persistence_lock: (Mutex::new(false), Condvar::new()),
4027 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
4028 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
4029 guard = cvar.wait(guard).unwrap();
4030 let result = *guard;
4038 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
4039 fn wait_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
4040 let current_time = Instant::now();
4042 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
4043 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
4044 guard = cvar.wait_timeout(guard, max_wait).unwrap().0;
4045 // Due to spurious wakeups that can happen on `wait_timeout`, here we need to check if the
4046 // desired wait time has actually passed, and if not then restart the loop with a reduced wait
4047 // time. Note that this logic can be highly simplified through the use of
4048 // `Condvar::wait_while` and `Condvar::wait_timeout_while`, if and when our MSRV is raised to
4050 let elapsed = current_time.elapsed();
4051 let result = *guard;
4052 if result || elapsed >= max_wait {
4056 match max_wait.checked_sub(elapsed) {
4057 None => return result,
4063 // Signal to the ChannelManager persister that there are updates necessitating persisting to disk.
4065 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &self.persistence_lock;
4066 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
4067 *persistence_lock = true;
4068 mem::drop(persistence_lock);
4073 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
4074 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
4076 impl Writeable for PendingHTLCInfo {
4077 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
4078 match &self.routing {
4079 &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref onion_packet, ref short_channel_id } => {
4081 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
4082 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
4084 &PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { ref payment_data, ref incoming_cltv_expiry } => {
4086 payment_data.payment_secret.write(writer)?;
4087 payment_data.total_msat.write(writer)?;
4088 incoming_cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
4091 self.incoming_shared_secret.write(writer)?;
4092 self.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4093 self.amt_to_forward.write(writer)?;
4094 self.outgoing_cltv_value.write(writer)?;
4099 impl Readable for PendingHTLCInfo {
4100 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, DecodeError> {
4101 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
4102 routing: match Readable::read(reader)? {
4103 0u8 => PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
4104 onion_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
4105 short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4107 1u8 => PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
4108 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
4109 payment_secret: Readable::read(reader)?,
4110 total_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
4112 incoming_cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
4114 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4116 incoming_shared_secret: Readable::read(reader)?,
4117 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
4118 amt_to_forward: Readable::read(reader)?,
4119 outgoing_cltv_value: Readable::read(reader)?,
4124 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
4125 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
4127 &HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(ref fail_msg) => {
4129 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
4131 &HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(ref fail_msg) => {
4133 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
4140 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
4141 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailureMsg, DecodeError> {
4142 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4143 0 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(Readable::read(reader)?)),
4144 1 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(Readable::read(reader)?)),
4145 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4150 impl Writeable for PendingHTLCStatus {
4151 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
4153 &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(ref forward_info) => {
4155 forward_info.write(writer)?;
4157 &PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(ref fail_msg) => {
4159 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
4166 impl Readable for PendingHTLCStatus {
4167 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingHTLCStatus, DecodeError> {
4168 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4169 0 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(Readable::read(reader)?)),
4170 1 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(Readable::read(reader)?)),
4171 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4176 impl_writeable!(HTLCPreviousHopData, 0, {
4180 incoming_packet_shared_secret
4183 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
4184 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
4185 self.prev_hop.write(writer)?;
4186 self.value.write(writer)?;
4187 self.payment_data.payment_secret.write(writer)?;
4188 self.payment_data.total_msat.write(writer)?;
4189 self.cltv_expiry.write(writer)
4193 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
4194 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4196 prev_hop: Readable::read(reader)?,
4197 value: Readable::read(reader)?,
4198 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
4199 payment_secret: Readable::read(reader)?,
4200 total_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
4202 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
4207 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
4208 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
4210 &HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref hop_data) => {
4212 hop_data.write(writer)?;
4214 &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
4216 path.write(writer)?;
4217 session_priv.write(writer)?;
4218 first_hop_htlc_msat.write(writer)?;
4225 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
4226 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCSource, DecodeError> {
4227 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4228 0 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
4229 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
4230 path: Readable::read(reader)?,
4231 session_priv: Readable::read(reader)?,
4232 first_hop_htlc_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
4234 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4239 impl Writeable for HTLCFailReason {
4240 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
4242 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
4246 &HTLCFailReason::Reason { ref failure_code, ref data } => {
4248 failure_code.write(writer)?;
4249 data.write(writer)?;
4256 impl Readable for HTLCFailReason {
4257 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailReason, DecodeError> {
4258 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4259 0 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: Readable::read(reader)? }),
4260 1 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::Reason {
4261 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
4262 data: Readable::read(reader)?,
4264 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4269 impl Writeable for HTLCForwardInfo {
4270 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
4272 &HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { ref prev_short_channel_id, ref prev_funding_outpoint, ref prev_htlc_id, ref forward_info } => {
4274 prev_short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
4275 prev_funding_outpoint.write(writer)?;
4276 prev_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4277 forward_info.write(writer)?;
4279 &HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
4281 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4282 err_packet.write(writer)?;
4289 impl Readable for HTLCForwardInfo {
4290 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCForwardInfo, DecodeError> {
4291 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4292 0 => Ok(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC {
4293 prev_short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4294 prev_funding_outpoint: Readable::read(reader)?,
4295 prev_htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4296 forward_info: Readable::read(reader)?,
4298 1 => Ok(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC {
4299 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4300 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
4302 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4307 impl_writeable!(PendingInboundPayment, 0, {
4315 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4316 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4317 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4318 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4319 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4322 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
4323 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
4325 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
4326 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
4328 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
4330 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4331 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
4332 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
4335 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4336 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
4337 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
4338 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
4339 unfunded_channels += 1;
4342 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
4343 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
4344 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
4345 channel.write(writer)?;
4349 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4350 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
4351 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
4352 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4353 for forward in pending_forwards {
4354 forward.write(writer)?;
4358 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4359 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
4360 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4361 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4362 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
4363 htlc.write(writer)?;
4367 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
4368 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4369 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4370 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
4371 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4372 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
4375 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4376 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4377 for event in events.iter() {
4378 event.write(writer)?;
4381 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
4382 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4383 for event in background_events.iter() {
4385 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
4387 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
4388 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
4393 (self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
4394 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
4396 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4397 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4398 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
4399 hash.write(writer)?;
4400 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
4407 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
4409 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
4411 /// 1) Deserialize all stored ChannelMonitors.
4412 /// 2) Deserialize the ChannelManager by filling in this struct and calling:
4413 /// <(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)
4414 /// This may result in closing some Channels if the ChannelMonitor is newer than the stored
4415 /// ChannelManager state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
4416 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant ChannelMonitor outpoints the same
4417 /// way you would handle a `chain::Filter` call using ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch() and
4418 /// ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo().
4419 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your ChannelMonitors.
4420 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the ChannelManager.
4421 /// 6) Move the ChannelMonitors into your local chain::Watch.
4423 /// Note that the ordering of #4-6 is not of importance, however all three must occur before you
4424 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized ChannelManager.
4426 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
4427 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
4428 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
4429 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
4430 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
4431 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
4432 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
4433 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4434 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4435 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4436 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4439 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
4440 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
4442 pub keys_manager: K,
4444 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
4446 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
4447 pub fee_estimator: F,
4448 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
4450 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
4451 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
4452 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
4453 pub chain_monitor: M,
4455 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
4456 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
4457 /// force-closed during deserialization.
4458 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
4459 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
4460 /// deserialization.
4462 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
4463 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
4464 pub default_config: UserConfig,
4466 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
4467 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
4469 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
4470 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
4471 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
4472 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
4474 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
4477 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
4478 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>,
4481 impl<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
4482 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4483 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4484 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4485 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4486 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4489 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
4490 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
4491 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
4492 pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
4493 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>) -> Self {
4495 keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config,
4496 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
4501 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
4502 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
4503 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
4504 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>>)
4505 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4506 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4507 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4508 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4511 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4512 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
4513 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
4517 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
4518 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)
4519 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4520 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4521 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4522 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4525 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4526 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4527 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4528 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
4529 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
4532 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
4533 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4534 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
4536 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4538 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4539 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
4540 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
4541 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
4542 for _ in 0..channel_count {
4543 let mut channel: Channel<Signer> = Channel::read(reader, &args.keys_manager)?;
4544 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
4545 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
4546 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
4547 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
4548 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
4549 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
4550 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
4551 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
4552 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4553 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
4554 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
4555 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
4556 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
4557 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
4558 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
4559 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
4560 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
4562 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
4563 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
4565 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
4568 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4572 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
4573 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
4574 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
4578 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
4579 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4580 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
4581 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
4582 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4583 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4584 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
4585 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
4586 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
4588 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
4591 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4592 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
4593 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
4594 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
4595 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4596 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
4597 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
4598 previous_hops.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
4600 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
4603 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4604 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>)>()));
4605 for _ in 0..peer_count {
4606 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
4607 let peer_state = PeerState {
4608 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
4610 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
4613 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4614 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
4615 for _ in 0..event_count {
4616 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
4617 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
4622 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4623 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
4624 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
4625 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4626 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
4627 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4631 let last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4632 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4634 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4635 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
4636 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
4637 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
4638 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4642 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4643 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
4645 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
4647 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
4648 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
4649 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
4651 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
4653 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
4658 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
4660 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
4662 our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
4663 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &args.keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
4666 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(last_node_announcement_serial as usize),
4667 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
4669 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
4671 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
4672 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
4673 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
4674 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
4676 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
4677 logger: args.logger,
4678 default_configuration: args.default_config,
4681 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
4682 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_manager.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
4685 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
4686 //connection or two.
4688 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
4694 use ln::channelmanager::PersistenceNotifier;
4696 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, Ordering};
4698 use std::time::Duration;
4701 fn test_wait_timeout() {
4702 let persistence_notifier = Arc::new(PersistenceNotifier::new());
4703 let thread_notifier = Arc::clone(&persistence_notifier);
4705 let exit_thread = Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false));
4706 let exit_thread_clone = exit_thread.clone();
4707 thread::spawn(move || {
4709 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &thread_notifier.persistence_lock;
4710 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
4711 *persistence_lock = true;
4714 if exit_thread_clone.load(Ordering::SeqCst) {
4720 // Check that we can block indefinitely until updates are available.
4721 let _ = persistence_notifier.wait();
4723 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration if updates are
4726 if persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
4731 exit_thread.store(true, Ordering::SeqCst);
4733 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration even if no updates
4736 if !persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
4743 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "unstable"))]
4746 use chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor;
4747 use chain::channelmonitor::Persist;
4748 use chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
4749 use ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
4750 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures};
4751 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
4752 use ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
4753 use routing::network_graph::NetworkGraph;
4754 use routing::router::get_route;
4755 use util::test_utils;
4756 use util::config::UserConfig;
4757 use util::events::{Event, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
4759 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
4760 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
4761 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, Transaction, TxOut};
4763 use std::sync::Mutex;
4767 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
4768 node: &'a ChannelManager<InMemorySigner,
4769 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
4770 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
4771 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
4772 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager,
4773 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestLogger>
4778 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
4779 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
4782 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
4783 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
4784 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
4786 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
4787 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
4789 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new())};
4790 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 };
4792 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
4793 config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
4795 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
4796 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
4797 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
4798 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
4799 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
4801 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
4803 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
4805 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
4806 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
4807 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
4808 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
4809 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
4811 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
4813 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
4815 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
4816 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
4817 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
4820 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
4821 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
4822 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
4824 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
4825 } else { panic!(); }
4827 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
4828 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
4830 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
4833 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
4836 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
4837 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
4839 node_a.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
4840 node_b.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
4842 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash);
4844 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
4845 macro_rules! send_payment {
4846 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
4847 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
4848 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &dummy_graph, &$node_b.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()),
4849 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), &[], 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a).unwrap();
4851 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
4852 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
4854 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
4855 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, 0).unwrap();
4857 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
4858 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
4859 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
4860 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
4861 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
4862 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
4863 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
4864 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
4866 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
4867 expect_payment_received!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
4868 assert!($node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
4870 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
4871 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
4872 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
4873 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
4874 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
4876 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
4879 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
4880 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
4881 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
4882 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
4884 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
4889 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
4890 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);