1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see routing::router::get_route for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
23 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
25 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
26 use bitcoin::hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
27 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
30 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
32 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
35 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
39 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator};
40 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
41 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
42 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
43 // construct one themselves.
44 pub use ln::channel::CounterpartyForwardingInfo;
45 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
46 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
47 use routing::router::{Route, RouteHop};
49 use ln::msgs::NetAddress;
51 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, OptionalField};
52 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
53 use util::config::UserConfig;
54 use util::events::{Event, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
55 use util::{byte_utils, events};
56 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer};
57 use util::chacha20::{ChaCha20, ChaChaReader};
58 use util::logger::Logger;
59 use util::errors::APIError;
62 use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map, HashSet};
63 use std::io::{Cursor, Read};
64 use std::sync::{Arc, Condvar, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
65 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
66 use std::time::Duration;
67 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
68 use std::time::Instant;
69 use std::marker::{Sync, Send};
71 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
73 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
75 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
76 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
77 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
79 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
80 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
81 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
82 // before we forward it.
84 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
85 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
86 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
87 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
88 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
90 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
91 enum PendingHTLCRouting {
93 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
94 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
97 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
98 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
102 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
103 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
104 routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
105 incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
106 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
107 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
108 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
111 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
112 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
113 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
114 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
117 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
118 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
119 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
120 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
121 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
124 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
126 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
128 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
129 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
130 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
132 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
134 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
138 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
142 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
143 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
144 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
145 short_channel_id: u64,
147 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
149 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
150 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
154 struct ClaimableHTLC {
155 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
157 /// Filled in when the HTLC was received with a payment_secret packet, which contains a
158 /// total_msat (which may differ from value if this is a Multi-Path Payment) and a
159 /// payment_secret which prevents path-probing attacks and can associate different HTLCs which
160 /// are part of the same payment.
161 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
165 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
166 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
167 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
168 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
171 session_priv: SecretKey,
172 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
173 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
174 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
179 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
180 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
182 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
183 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
188 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
189 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
191 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
199 /// payment_hash type, use to cross-lock hop
200 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
201 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
202 pub struct PaymentHash(pub [u8;32]);
203 /// payment_preimage type, use to route payment between hop
204 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
205 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
206 pub struct PaymentPreimage(pub [u8;32]);
207 /// payment_secret type, use to authenticate sender to the receiver and tie MPP HTLCs together
208 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
209 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
210 pub struct PaymentSecret(pub [u8;32]);
212 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
214 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
215 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
216 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
217 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
218 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
220 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
221 err: msgs::LightningError,
222 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
224 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
226 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
228 err: LightningError {
230 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
231 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
237 shutdown_finish: None,
241 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
243 err: LightningError {
245 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
247 shutdown_finish: None,
251 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
252 Self { err, shutdown_finish: None }
255 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
257 err: LightningError {
259 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
260 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
266 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
270 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
273 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
275 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
277 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
279 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
280 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
286 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => LightningError {
288 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
289 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
296 shutdown_finish: None,
301 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
302 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
303 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
304 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
305 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
307 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
308 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
309 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
310 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
311 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
312 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
313 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
315 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
319 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
320 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<Signer: Sign> {
321 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
322 pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
323 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
324 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
325 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
326 /// ids in the PendingHTLCInfo!
327 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
328 /// (payment_hash, payment_secret) -> Vec<HTLCs> for tracking HTLCs that
329 /// were to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
330 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
331 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
333 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<(PaymentHash, Option<PaymentSecret>), Vec<ClaimableHTLC>>,
334 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
335 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
336 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
339 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
340 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_chan_freshness_every_min, so may be processed with
341 /// quite some time lag.
342 enum BackgroundEvent {
343 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
344 /// commitment transaction.
345 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
348 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
349 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
351 latest_features: InitFeatures,
354 #[cfg(not(any(target_pointer_width = "32", target_pointer_width = "64")))]
355 const ERR: () = "You need at least 32 bit pointers (well, usize, but we'll assume they're the same) for ChannelManager::latest_block_height";
357 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
358 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
359 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
360 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
361 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
362 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
363 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
364 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>;
366 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
367 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
368 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
369 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
370 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
371 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
372 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
373 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
374 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, &'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
376 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
377 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
379 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
380 /// to individual Channels.
382 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
383 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
384 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
385 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
387 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
388 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
389 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
390 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
391 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
392 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
393 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
395 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
396 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
397 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
398 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
401 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
402 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
403 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
404 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
405 /// timer_chan_freshness_every_min roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
407 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
408 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
409 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
410 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
411 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
412 pub struct ChannelManager<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
413 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
414 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
415 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
416 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
419 default_configuration: UserConfig,
420 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
426 pub(super) latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
428 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
429 last_block_hash: RwLock<BlockHash>,
430 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
432 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
433 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
434 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
435 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
436 our_network_key: SecretKey,
438 /// Used to track the last value sent in a node_announcement "timestamp" field. We ensure this
439 /// value increases strictly since we don't assume access to a time source.
440 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize,
442 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
443 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
444 /// are currently open with that peer.
445 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
446 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
448 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
450 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
451 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
452 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
453 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
454 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
455 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
456 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the PersistenceNotifier
457 /// the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
458 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
460 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier,
467 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
469 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
470 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
471 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
472 pub struct ChainParameters {
473 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
474 pub network: Network,
476 /// The hash of the latest block successfully connected.
477 pub latest_hash: BlockHash,
479 /// The height of the latest block successfully connected.
481 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
482 pub latest_height: usize,
485 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
486 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
487 /// `await_persistable_update` that new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
488 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
489 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
490 /// updates are ready for persistence).
491 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a> {
492 persistence_notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier,
493 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
494 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
497 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a> {
498 fn new(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier) -> Self {
499 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
502 persistence_notifier: notifier,
503 _read_guard: read_guard,
508 impl<'a> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a> {
510 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
514 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
515 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
516 pub(crate) const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
517 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
518 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
519 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
521 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
522 /// HTLC's CLTV. This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
523 /// ie the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
524 /// the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
525 /// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
526 const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 12; //TODO?
527 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
529 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
530 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
531 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
532 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
533 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
534 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
537 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
539 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying inbound claim. See
540 // ChannelMontior::would_broadcast_at_height for a description of why this is needed.
543 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
545 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
547 pub struct ChannelDetails {
548 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
549 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
550 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
551 /// lifetime of the channel.
552 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
553 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
554 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
555 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
556 /// The node_id of our counterparty
557 pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
558 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
559 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
560 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
561 pub counterparty_features: InitFeatures,
562 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
563 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
564 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
566 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
567 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
568 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
569 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
570 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
571 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
572 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
573 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
574 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
575 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
576 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
577 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b)
578 /// the peer is connected, and (c) no monitor update failure is pending resolution.
581 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
582 /// payments to us through this channel.
583 pub counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
586 /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
587 /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
589 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
590 pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
591 /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
592 /// send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages sent to peers, and
593 /// once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the payment in full.
594 ParameterError(APIError),
595 /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us
596 /// from attempting to send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages
597 /// sent to peers, and once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the
600 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
602 PathParameterError(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
603 /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
604 /// You can freely retry the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
605 /// paths than the ones selected).
606 AllFailedRetrySafe(Vec<APIError>),
607 /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
608 /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
609 /// in over-/re-payment.
611 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
612 /// send_payment, and any Errs which are not APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed can be safely
613 /// retried (though there is currently no API with which to do so).
615 /// Any entries which contain Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) or Ok(()) MUST NOT be retried
616 /// as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent (in the
617 /// case of Ok(())) or will send once channel_monitor_updated is called on the next-hop channel
618 /// with the latest update_id.
619 PartialFailure(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
622 macro_rules! handle_error {
623 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
626 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish }) => {
627 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
629 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
630 // entering the macro.
631 assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
634 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
636 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
637 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
638 if let Some(update) = update_option {
639 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
645 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
646 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
648 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
649 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
650 action: err.action.clone()
654 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
655 $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
658 // Return error in case higher-API need one
665 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
666 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
669 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
670 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
672 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
673 log_trace!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
674 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
675 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
676 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
678 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
680 Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_)) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
685 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
686 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
689 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
690 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
692 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
693 log_trace!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
694 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
695 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
696 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
698 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
700 Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg)) => {
701 log_error!($self.logger, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
702 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
703 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
704 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
706 let shutdown_res = chan.force_shutdown(false);
707 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
713 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
714 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
715 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
717 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
719 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
720 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]));
721 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
722 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
723 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
725 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
726 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
727 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
728 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
729 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
730 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
731 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
732 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
733 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
734 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()));
737 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
738 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards and {} fails",
739 log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]),
740 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
742 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
743 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
745 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
746 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
748 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
749 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len());
750 if !$resend_commitment {
751 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
754 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
756 $entry.get_mut().monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
757 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$entry.key()))
763 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
764 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
765 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
767 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
768 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
772 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
773 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
774 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
775 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
776 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
779 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
784 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
785 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
786 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
787 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
788 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
791 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
793 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
794 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
796 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
798 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
800 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
801 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
802 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
803 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
804 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
805 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
808 default_configuration: config.clone(),
809 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
810 fee_estimator: fee_est,
814 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(params.latest_height),
815 last_block_hash: RwLock::new(params.latest_hash),
818 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
819 by_id: HashMap::new(),
820 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
821 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
822 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
823 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
825 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
827 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(0),
829 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
831 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
832 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
833 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
834 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
842 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
844 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady and
845 /// FundingBroadcastSafe events to allow tracking of which events correspond with which
846 /// create_channel call. Note that user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you
847 /// may wish to avoid using 0 for user_id here.
849 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel message event, so you should probably poll
850 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
852 /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat is
853 /// greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k or channel_value_satoshis is < 1000.
854 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
855 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
856 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
859 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
860 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_id, config)?;
861 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
863 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
864 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
865 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
867 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
868 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
869 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
870 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
871 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
873 panic!("RNG is bad???");
876 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
878 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
879 node_id: their_network_key,
885 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<Signer>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
886 let mut res = Vec::new();
888 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
889 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
890 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
891 let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
892 res.push(ChannelDetails {
893 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
894 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
895 remote_network_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
896 counterparty_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
897 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
898 inbound_capacity_msat,
899 outbound_capacity_msat,
900 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
901 is_live: channel.is_live(),
902 counterparty_forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
906 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
907 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
908 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.remote_network_id) {
909 chan.counterparty_features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
915 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
916 /// more information.
917 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
918 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
921 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
922 /// get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
924 /// These are guaranteed to have their is_live value set to true, see the documentation for
925 /// ChannelDetails::is_live for more info on exactly what the criteria are.
926 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
927 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
928 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
929 // really wanted anyway.
930 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
933 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
934 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
935 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
937 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
938 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
939 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
941 let (mut failed_htlcs, chan_option) = {
942 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
943 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
944 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
945 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
946 let (shutdown_msg, failed_htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
947 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
948 node_id: chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
951 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
952 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
953 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
955 (failed_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
956 } else { (failed_htlcs, None) }
958 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()})
961 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
962 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
964 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
965 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
970 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
971 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
972 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
981 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
982 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
983 log_trace!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
984 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
985 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
987 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
988 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
989 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
990 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
991 // ignore the result here.
992 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
996 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
998 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
999 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1000 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1001 if let Some(node_id) = peer_node_id {
1002 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *node_id {
1003 // Error or Ok here doesn't matter - the result is only exposed publicly
1004 // when peer_node_id is None anyway.
1008 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1009 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1011 chan.remove_entry().1
1013 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1016 log_trace!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
1017 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(true));
1018 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1019 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1020 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1028 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
1029 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if channel_id is unknown to the manager.
1030 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1031 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1032 self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, None)
1035 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
1036 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
1037 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
1038 for chan in self.list_channels() {
1039 let _ = self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
1043 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>) {
1044 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
1045 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
1047 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1048 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
1049 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1050 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1051 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
1052 failure_code: $err_code,
1053 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1058 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
1059 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
1062 let shared_secret = {
1063 let mut arr = [0; 32];
1064 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
1067 let (rho, mu) = onion_utils::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1069 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
1070 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
1071 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
1072 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
1073 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
1074 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
1075 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
1076 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
1079 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&mu);
1080 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
1081 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash.0[..]);
1082 if !fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
1083 return_malformed_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5);
1086 let mut channel_state = None;
1087 macro_rules! return_err {
1088 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
1090 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1091 if channel_state.is_none() {
1092 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1094 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1095 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1096 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1097 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
1098 })), channel_state.unwrap());
1103 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
1104 let mut chacha_stream = ChaChaReader { chacha: &mut chacha, read: Cursor::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..]) };
1105 let (next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac) = {
1106 match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut chacha_stream) {
1108 let error_code = match err {
1109 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
1110 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature|
1111 msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue|
1112 msgs::DecodeError::ShortRead => 0x4000 | 22, // invalid_onion_payload
1113 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
1115 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
1118 let mut hmac = [0; 32];
1119 if let Err(_) = chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut hmac[..]) {
1120 return_err!("Unable to decode hop data", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1127 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_hmac == [0; 32] {
1130 // In tests, make sure that the initial onion pcket data is, at least, non-0.
1131 // We could do some fancy randomness test here, but, ehh, whatever.
1132 // This checks for the issue where you can calculate the path length given the
1133 // onion data as all the path entries that the originator sent will be here
1134 // as-is (and were originally 0s).
1135 // Of course reverse path calculation is still pretty easy given naive routing
1136 // algorithms, but this fixes the most-obvious case.
1137 let mut next_bytes = [0; 32];
1138 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1139 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1140 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1141 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1145 // final_expiry_too_soon
1146 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure we have at least
1147 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
1148 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown payment hash, our payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward
1149 // before our onchain logic triggers a channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rational).
1150 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) <= self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
1151 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
1153 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
1154 if next_hop_data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
1155 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1157 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
1158 if next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
1159 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1162 let payment_data = match next_hop_data.format {
1163 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { .. } => None,
1164 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => return_err!("Got non final data with an HMAC of 0", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]),
1165 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data } => payment_data,
1168 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
1169 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
1170 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
1171 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
1173 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1174 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
1176 incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
1178 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1179 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1180 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1181 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1184 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
1185 let read_pos = chacha_stream.read(&mut new_packet_data).unwrap();
1186 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1188 // Check two things:
1189 // a) that the behavior of our stream here will return Ok(0) even if the TLV
1190 // read above emptied out our buffer and the unwrap() wont needlessly panic
1191 // b) that we didn't somehow magically end up with extra data.
1193 debug_assert!(chacha_stream.read(&mut t).unwrap() == 0);
1195 // Once we've emptied the set of bytes our peer gave us, encrypt 0 bytes until we
1196 // fill the onion hop data we'll forward to our next-hop peer.
1197 chacha_stream.chacha.process_in_place(&mut new_packet_data[read_pos..]);
1199 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
1201 let blinding_factor = {
1202 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
1203 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
1204 sha.input(&shared_secret);
1205 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
1208 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
1210 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
1212 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
1215 hop_data: new_packet_data,
1216 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
1219 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
1220 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1221 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1222 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
1223 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1227 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1228 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
1229 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
1232 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1233 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1234 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1235 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1239 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1240 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
1241 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
1242 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
1243 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
1244 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
1245 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
1246 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
1247 None => { // unknown_next_peer
1248 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
1250 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1252 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
1253 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
1255 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
1256 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
1257 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
1258 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
1259 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
1260 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
1261 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1263 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
1264 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1266 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_holder_fee_base_msat(&self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
1267 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
1268 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1270 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
1271 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1273 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1274 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now, but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty
1275 // packet sanitization (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rational)
1276 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
1277 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1279 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
1280 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
1282 // In theory, we would be safe against unitentional channel-closure, if we only required a margin of LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1283 // But, to be safe against policy reception, we use a longuer delay.
1284 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER) as u64 {
1285 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1291 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
1292 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
1293 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
1294 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1296 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
1297 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1299 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
1300 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
1301 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
1303 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1305 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
1310 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
1313 /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
1314 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1315 fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
1316 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1317 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
1321 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
1323 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1324 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
1326 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
1327 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
1328 cltv_expiry_delta: CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
1329 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
1330 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Present(chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat()),
1331 fee_base_msat: chan.get_holder_fee_base_msat(&self.fee_estimator),
1332 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
1333 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1336 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
1337 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
1339 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
1345 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
1346 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1347 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
1348 let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
1349 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
1351 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
1352 .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
1353 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height)?;
1354 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
1355 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
1357 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
1359 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1361 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
1362 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1363 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1364 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
1365 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1368 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
1369 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
1371 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1372 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1374 if !chan.get().is_live() {
1375 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
1377 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1379 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1380 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
1381 }, onion_packet, &self.logger), channel_state, chan)
1383 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
1384 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1385 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
1386 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
1387 // that we will resend the commitment update once monitor updating
1388 // is restored. Therefore, we must return an error indicating that
1389 // it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale, which we do in the
1390 // send_payment check for MonitorUpdateFailed, below.
1391 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1394 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1395 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1396 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1397 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1398 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1399 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1400 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1408 } else { unreachable!(); }
1412 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
1413 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
1415 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
1420 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
1422 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
1423 /// fields for more info.
1425 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
1426 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
1427 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
1428 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
1429 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
1430 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
1432 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed.
1434 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
1435 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
1436 /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
1438 /// In general, a path may raise:
1439 /// * APIError::RouteError when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
1440 /// node public key) is specified.
1441 /// * APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
1442 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
1444 /// * APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
1445 /// relevant updates.
1447 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
1448 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
1449 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
1451 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
1452 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
1453 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
1454 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
1456 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
1457 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
1458 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
1459 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
1460 if route.paths.len() < 1 {
1461 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
1463 if route.paths.len() > 10 {
1464 // This limit is completely arbitrary - there aren't any real fundamental path-count
1465 // limits. After we support retrying individual paths we should likely bump this, but
1466 // for now more than 10 paths likely carries too much one-path failure.
1467 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "Sending over more than 10 paths is not currently supported"}));
1469 let mut total_value = 0;
1470 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1471 let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
1472 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
1473 if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
1474 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
1475 continue 'path_check;
1477 for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
1478 if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
1479 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
1480 continue 'path_check;
1483 total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
1484 path_errs.push(Ok(()));
1486 if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
1487 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
1490 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1491 let mut results = Vec::new();
1492 for path in route.paths.iter() {
1493 results.push(self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height));
1495 let mut has_ok = false;
1496 let mut has_err = false;
1497 for res in results.iter() {
1498 if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
1499 if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
1500 if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = res {
1501 // MonitorUpdateFailed is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
1508 if has_err && has_ok {
1509 Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure(results))
1511 Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
1517 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
1519 /// Note that ALL inputs in the transaction pointed to by funding_txo MUST spend SegWit outputs
1520 /// or your counterparty can steal your funds!
1522 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
1524 /// May panic if the funding_txo is duplicative with some other channel (note that this should
1525 /// be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction keys per-channel).
1526 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_txo: OutPoint) {
1527 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1530 let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
1532 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo, &self.logger)
1533 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
1534 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
1535 } else { unreachable!(); })
1540 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
1541 Ok(funding_msg) => {
1544 Err(_) => { return; }
1548 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1549 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
1550 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1553 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
1554 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1555 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
1557 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1563 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
1564 if !chan.should_announce() {
1565 log_trace!(self.logger, "Can't send announcement_signatures for private channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
1569 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
1571 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
1573 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1574 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1576 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
1577 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
1578 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
1579 node_signature: our_node_sig,
1580 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
1585 // Messages of up to 64KB should never end up more than half full with addresses, as that would
1586 // be absurd. We ensure this by checking that at least 500 (our stated public contract on when
1587 // broadcast_node_announcement panics) of the maximum-length addresses would fit in a 64KB
1589 const HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS: u32 = ::std::u16::MAX as u32 / (NetAddress::MAX_LEN as u32 + 1) / 2;
1592 // ...by failing to compile if the number of addresses that would be half of a message is
1593 // smaller than 500:
1594 const STATIC_ASSERT: u32 = Self::HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS - 500;
1596 /// Generates a signed node_announcement from the given arguments and creates a
1597 /// BroadcastNodeAnnouncement event. Note that such messages will be ignored unless peers have
1598 /// seen a channel_announcement from us (ie unless we have public channels open).
1600 /// RGB is a node "color" and alias is a printable human-readable string to describe this node
1601 /// to humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning.
1603 /// addresses represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node accepts
1604 /// incoming connections. These will be broadcast to the network, publicly tying these
1605 /// addresses together. If you wish to preserve user privacy, addresses should likely contain
1606 /// only Tor Onion addresses.
1608 /// Panics if addresses is absurdly large (more than 500).
1609 pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], addresses: Vec<NetAddress>) {
1610 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1612 if addresses.len() > 500 {
1613 panic!("More than half the message size was taken up by public addresses!");
1616 let announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
1617 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
1618 timestamp: self.last_node_announcement_serial.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32,
1619 node_id: self.get_our_node_id(),
1620 rgb, alias, addresses,
1621 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
1622 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1624 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1626 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1627 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement {
1628 msg: msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
1629 signature: self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key),
1630 contents: announcement
1635 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
1637 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
1638 /// Will likely generate further events.
1639 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
1640 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1642 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1643 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
1644 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
1646 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1647 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1649 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
1650 if short_chan_id != 0 {
1651 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
1652 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1654 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
1655 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1656 match forward_info {
1657 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info,
1658 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
1659 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1660 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1661 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
1662 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1663 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1665 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
1666 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() }
1669 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
1670 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
1671 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
1672 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
1673 // problem, not ours.
1680 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
1681 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1682 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1683 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1684 match forward_info {
1685 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
1686 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
1688 }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
1689 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
1690 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), prev_short_channel_id, short_chan_id);
1691 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1692 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1693 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
1694 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1695 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
1697 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet) {
1699 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
1700 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
1702 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
1704 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap();
1705 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
1706 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }
1712 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1714 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1715 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
1716 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
1717 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
1718 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
1719 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
1720 // this channel currently :/.
1726 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
1727 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
1729 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
1730 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} after delay", short_chan_id);
1731 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet) {
1733 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
1734 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail backwards to short_id {}: {}", short_chan_id, msg);
1736 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
1738 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
1739 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
1740 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
1743 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1745 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1746 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
1747 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
1748 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
1749 // messages when we can.
1750 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
1751 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
1752 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
1759 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
1760 let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) {
1763 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
1764 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
1765 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1766 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
1767 ChannelError::Ignore(_) => {
1768 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
1770 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1771 log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
1772 let (channel_id, mut channel) = chan.remove_entry();
1773 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1774 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1776 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update(&channel).ok()))
1778 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
1780 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, err));
1784 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1785 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
1788 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1789 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
1790 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1791 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
1792 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1793 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
1794 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1796 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1804 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1805 match forward_info {
1806 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
1807 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry },
1808 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. },
1809 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
1810 let prev_hop = HTLCPreviousHopData {
1811 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1812 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
1813 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1814 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
1817 let mut total_value = 0;
1818 let payment_secret_opt =
1819 if let &Some(ref data) = &payment_data { Some(data.payment_secret.clone()) } else { None };
1820 let htlcs = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry((payment_hash, payment_secret_opt))
1821 .or_insert(Vec::new());
1822 htlcs.push(ClaimableHTLC {
1824 value: amt_to_forward,
1825 payment_data: payment_data.clone(),
1826 cltv_expiry: incoming_cltv_expiry,
1828 if let &Some(ref data) = &payment_data {
1829 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
1830 total_value += htlc.value;
1831 if htlc.payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat != data.total_msat {
1832 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
1834 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
1836 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > data.total_msat {
1837 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
1838 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
1839 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
1840 &byte_utils::be32_to_array(
1841 self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire)
1845 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1846 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
1847 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
1848 htlc_id: htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
1849 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
1851 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data }
1854 } else if total_value == data.total_msat {
1855 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1857 payment_secret: Some(data.payment_secret),
1862 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1864 payment_secret: None,
1865 amt: amt_to_forward,
1869 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
1870 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
1872 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
1873 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
1881 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
1882 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason);
1885 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
1886 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
1889 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
1890 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1891 events.append(&mut new_events);
1894 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_chan_freshness_every_min.
1896 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
1897 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_chan_freshness_every_min.
1899 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
1900 fn process_background_events(&self) {
1901 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
1902 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
1903 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
1905 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
1906 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
1907 // monitor updating completing.
1908 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update);
1914 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1915 pub(crate) fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
1916 self.process_background_events();
1919 /// If a peer is disconnected we mark any channels with that peer as 'disabled'.
1920 /// After some time, if channels are still disabled we need to broadcast a ChannelUpdate
1921 /// to inform the network about the uselessness of these channels.
1923 /// This method handles all the details, and must be called roughly once per minute.
1925 /// Note that in some rare cases this may generate a `chain::Watch::update_channel` call.
1926 pub fn timer_chan_freshness_every_min(&self) {
1927 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1928 self.process_background_events();
1930 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1931 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1932 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter_mut() {
1933 if chan.is_disabled_staged() && !chan.is_live() {
1934 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1935 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1940 } else if chan.is_disabled_staged() && chan.is_live() {
1942 } else if chan.is_disabled_marked() {
1943 chan.to_disabled_staged();
1948 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
1949 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
1950 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
1951 /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
1952 /// HTLC backwards has been started.
1953 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> bool {
1954 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1956 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1957 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&(*payment_hash, *payment_secret));
1958 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1959 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
1960 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1961 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
1962 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
1963 self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32,
1965 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
1966 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_hash,
1967 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
1973 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
1974 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
1975 // be surfaced to the user.
1976 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(&self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
1977 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
1979 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { .. }) => {
1980 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
1981 match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
1982 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
1983 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update(&chan_entry.get()) {
1984 (0x1000|7, upd.encode_with_len())
1986 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
1989 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
1991 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1992 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state,
1993 htlc_src, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: onion_failure_data});
1995 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1996 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
1997 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1999 rejected_by_dest: false,
2011 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
2012 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
2013 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
2014 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
2015 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
2016 /// still-available channels.
2017 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
2018 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
2019 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
2020 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
2023 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
2024 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
2025 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
2027 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, .. } => {
2028 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2029 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2030 match &onion_error {
2031 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
2033 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
2035 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
2036 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
2037 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
2038 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
2039 if let Some(update) = channel_update {
2040 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
2041 events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate {
2046 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
2047 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2048 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
2049 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
2051 error_code: onion_error_code,
2053 error_data: onion_error_data
2057 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
2063 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
2064 // TODO: We'd like to generate a PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate for temporary
2065 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as get_route
2066 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
2068 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
2069 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
2070 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
2071 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2072 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
2073 rejected_by_dest: path.len() == 1,
2075 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
2077 error_data: Some(data.clone()),
2083 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, .. }) => {
2084 let err_packet = match onion_error {
2085 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
2086 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
2087 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
2088 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
2090 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
2091 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2092 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
2096 let mut forward_event = None;
2097 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
2098 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
2100 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
2101 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2102 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
2104 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2105 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
2108 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2109 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
2110 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2111 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
2112 time_forwardable: time
2119 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
2120 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
2121 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
2123 /// You must specify the expected amounts for this HTLC, and we will only claim HTLCs
2124 /// available within a few percent of the expected amount. This is critical for several
2125 /// reasons : a) it avoids providing senders with `proof-of-payment` (in the form of the
2126 /// payment_preimage without having provided the full value and b) it avoids certain
2127 /// privacy-breaking recipient-probing attacks which may reveal payment activity to
2128 /// motivated attackers.
2130 /// Note that the privacy concerns in (b) are not relevant in payments with a payment_secret
2131 /// set. Thus, for such payments we will claim any payments which do not under-pay.
2133 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
2134 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, expected_amount: u64) -> bool {
2135 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2137 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2139 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2140 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&(payment_hash, *payment_secret));
2141 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
2142 assert!(!sources.is_empty());
2144 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we have to take special care to ensure that each
2145 // channel exists before claiming all of the payments (inside one lock).
2146 // Note that channel existance is sufficient as we should always get a monitor update
2147 // which will take care of the real HTLC claim enforcement.
2149 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
2150 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
2151 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
2152 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
2153 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
2156 let (is_mpp, mut valid_mpp) = if let &Some(ref data) = &sources[0].payment_data {
2157 assert!(payment_secret.is_some());
2158 (true, data.total_msat >= expected_amount)
2160 assert!(payment_secret.is_none());
2164 for htlc in sources.iter() {
2165 if !is_mpp || !valid_mpp { break; }
2166 if let None = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
2171 let mut errs = Vec::new();
2172 let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
2173 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
2174 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
2175 if (is_mpp && !valid_mpp) || (!is_mpp && (htlc.value < expected_amount || htlc.value > expected_amount * 2)) {
2176 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
2177 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
2178 self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32,
2180 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
2181 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash,
2182 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
2184 match self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state.as_mut().unwrap(), htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
2186 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = e.1.err.action {
2187 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
2188 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
2189 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", e.1.err.err);
2190 claimed_any_htlcs = true;
2191 } else { errs.push(e); }
2193 Err(None) if is_mpp => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"),
2195 log_warn!(self.logger, "Channel we expected to claim an HTLC from was closed.");
2197 Ok(()) => claimed_any_htlcs = true,
2202 // Now that we've done the entire above loop in one lock, we can handle any errors
2203 // which were generated.
2204 channel_state.take();
2206 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
2207 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
2208 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
2215 fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> Result<(), Option<(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)>> {
2216 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
2217 let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock;
2218 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
2219 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
2225 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
2226 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
2227 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
2228 Ok((msgs, monitor_option)) => {
2229 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_option {
2230 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2231 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
2232 assert!(msgs.is_none());
2234 return Err(Some((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err())));
2238 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
2239 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2240 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
2241 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2242 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2243 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
2244 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2245 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2254 // TODO: Do something with e?
2255 // This should only occur if we are claiming an HTLC at the same time as the
2256 // HTLC is being failed (eg because a block is being connected and this caused
2257 // an HTLC to time out). This should, of course, only occur if the user is the
2258 // one doing the claiming (as it being a part of a peer claim would imply we're
2259 // about to lose funds) and only if the lock in claim_funds was dropped as a
2260 // previous HTLC was failed (thus not for an MPP payment).
2261 debug_assert!(false, "This shouldn't be reachable except in absurdly rare cases between monitor updates and HTLC timeouts: {:?}", e);
2265 } else { unreachable!(); }
2268 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
2270 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
2271 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2272 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2273 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
2277 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
2278 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
2279 if let Err((counterparty_node_id, err)) = match self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage) {
2282 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2283 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
2284 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
2285 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
2288 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
2289 // receiving an offchain preimage event from the forward link (the
2290 // event being update_fulfill_htlc).
2291 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_outpoint, preimage_update) {
2292 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
2293 payment_preimage, e);
2297 Err(Some(res)) => Err(res),
2299 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2300 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
2301 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
2307 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
2308 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
2309 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key)
2312 /// Restores a single, given channel to normal operation after a
2313 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
2316 /// All ChannelMonitor updates up to and including highest_applied_update_id must have been
2317 /// fully committed in every copy of the given channels' ChannelMonitors.
2319 /// Note that there is no effect to calling with a highest_applied_update_id other than the
2320 /// current latest ChannelMonitorUpdate and one call to this function after multiple
2321 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures is fine. The highest_applied_update_id field
2322 /// exists largely only to prevent races between this and concurrent update_monitor calls.
2324 /// Thus, the anticipated use is, at a high level:
2325 /// 1) You register a chain::Watch with this ChannelManager,
2326 /// 2) it stores each update to disk, and begins updating any remote (eg watchtower) copies of
2327 /// said ChannelMonitors as it can, returning ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures
2328 /// any time it cannot do so instantly,
2329 /// 3) update(s) are applied to each remote copy of a ChannelMonitor,
2330 /// 4) once all remote copies are updated, you call this function with the update_id that
2331 /// completed, and once it is the latest the Channel will be re-enabled.
2332 pub fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
2333 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2335 let mut close_results = Vec::new();
2336 let mut htlc_forwards = Vec::new();
2337 let mut htlc_failures = Vec::new();
2338 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
2341 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2342 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2343 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
2344 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2345 let channel = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
2349 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
2353 let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, needs_broadcast_safe, funding_locked) = channel.monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger);
2354 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
2355 htlc_forwards.push((channel.get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"), funding_txo.clone(), pending_forwards));
2357 htlc_failures.append(&mut pending_failures);
2359 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
2360 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
2361 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2362 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2367 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
2368 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
2369 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2370 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2371 msg: revoke_and_ack,
2376 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
2380 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
2385 if needs_broadcast_safe {
2386 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
2387 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap(),
2388 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
2391 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
2392 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2393 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2396 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
2397 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2398 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2399 msg: announcement_sigs,
2402 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
2406 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().append(&mut pending_events);
2408 for failure in htlc_failures.drain(..) {
2409 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
2411 self.forward_htlcs(&mut htlc_forwards[..]);
2413 for res in close_results.drain(..) {
2414 self.finish_force_close_channel(res);
2418 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2419 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
2420 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
2423 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, counterparty_node_id.clone(), their_features, msg, 0, &self.default_configuration)
2424 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
2425 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2426 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2427 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
2428 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
2429 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2430 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
2431 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2432 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
2434 entry.insert(channel);
2440 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2441 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
2442 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2443 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2444 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
2445 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2446 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2447 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
2449 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration, their_features), channel_state, chan);
2450 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
2452 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
2455 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2456 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
2457 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
2458 channel_value_satoshis: value,
2460 user_channel_id: user_id,
2465 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2466 let ((funding_msg, monitor), mut chan) = {
2467 let last_block_hash = *self.last_block_hash.read().unwrap();
2468 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2469 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2470 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
2471 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2472 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2473 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
2475 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, last_block_hash, &self.logger), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
2477 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
2480 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
2481 // lock before watch_channel
2482 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
2484 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
2485 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
2486 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
2487 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
2488 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
2489 // We do not do a force-close here as that would generate a monitor update for
2490 // a monitor that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we
2491 // don't respond with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
2492 let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(true);
2493 assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
2494 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
2496 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
2497 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
2498 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
2499 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our funding_locked
2500 // until we have persisted our monitor.
2501 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2505 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2506 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2507 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
2508 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2509 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
2511 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2512 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
2513 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2522 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2523 let (funding_txo, user_id) = {
2524 let last_block_hash = *self.last_block_hash.read().unwrap();
2525 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2526 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2527 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2528 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2529 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2530 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2532 let monitor = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, last_block_hash, &self.logger) {
2533 Ok(update) => update,
2534 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
2536 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
2537 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, false, false);
2539 (chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get().get_user_id())
2541 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2544 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2545 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
2547 user_channel_id: user_id,
2552 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2553 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2554 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2555 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2556 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2557 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2558 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2560 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg), channel_state, chan);
2561 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
2562 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for {} in response to funding_locked", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2563 // If we see locking block before receiving remote funding_locked, we broadcast our
2564 // announcement_sigs at remote funding_locked reception. If we receive remote
2565 // funding_locked before seeing locking block, we broadcast our announcement_sigs at locking
2566 // block connection. We should guanrantee to broadcast announcement_sigs to our peer whatever
2567 // the order of the events but our peer may not receive it due to disconnection. The specs
2568 // lacking an acknowledgement for announcement_sigs we may have to re-send them at peer
2569 // connection in the future if simultaneous misses by both peers due to network/hardware
2570 // failures is an issue. Note, to achieve its goal, only one of the announcement_sigs needs
2571 // to be received, from then sigs are going to be flood to the whole network.
2572 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2573 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2574 msg: announcement_sigs,
2579 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2583 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2584 let (mut dropped_htlcs, chan_option) = {
2585 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2586 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2588 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
2589 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2590 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2591 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2593 let (shutdown, closing_signed, dropped_htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.fee_estimator, &their_features, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
2594 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
2595 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2596 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2600 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2601 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2602 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2606 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
2607 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
2608 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2610 (dropped_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
2611 } else { (dropped_htlcs, None) }
2613 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2616 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
2617 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2619 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
2620 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2621 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2622 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2630 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2631 let (tx, chan_option) = {
2632 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2633 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2634 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
2635 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2636 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2637 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2639 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
2640 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2641 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2642 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2647 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
2648 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
2649 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
2650 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
2651 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
2652 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
2653 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2655 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
2656 } else { (tx, None) }
2658 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2661 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
2662 log_trace!(self.logger, "Broadcast onchain {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
2663 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
2665 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
2666 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2667 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2668 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2676 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2677 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
2678 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
2679 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
2681 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
2682 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
2683 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
2684 //but we should prevent it anyway.
2686 let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
2687 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2689 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2690 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2691 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2692 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2695 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
2696 // Ensure error_code has the UPDATE flag set, since by default we send a
2697 // channel update along as part of failing the HTLC.
2698 assert!((error_code & 0x1000) != 0);
2699 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
2700 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
2701 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
2702 match pending_forward_info {
2703 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
2704 let reason = if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update(chan) {
2705 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &{
2706 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
2707 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
2708 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
2709 res.extend_from_slice(&upd.encode_with_len()[..]);
2713 // The only case where we'd be unable to
2714 // successfully get a channel update is if the
2715 // channel isn't in the fully-funded state yet,
2716 // implying our counterparty is trying to route
2717 // payments over the channel back to themselves
2718 // (cause no one else should know the short_id
2719 // is a lightning channel yet). We should have
2720 // no problem just calling this
2721 // unknown_next_peer (0x4000|10).
2722 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
2724 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2725 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2726 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2729 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
2731 _ => pending_forward_info
2734 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
2736 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2741 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2742 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2744 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2745 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2746 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2747 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2748 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2750 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
2752 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2755 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone());
2759 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2760 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2761 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2762 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2763 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2764 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2765 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2767 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
2769 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2774 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2775 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2776 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2777 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2778 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2779 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2780 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2782 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
2783 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
2784 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
2786 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
2789 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2793 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2794 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2795 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2796 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2797 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2798 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2799 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2801 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, closing_signed, monitor_update) =
2802 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
2803 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
2804 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
2805 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
2806 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
2807 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan);
2812 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2813 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
2814 //TODO: Rebroadcast closing_signed if present on monitor update restoration
2816 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2817 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2818 msg: revoke_and_ack,
2820 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
2821 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2822 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2823 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2824 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2825 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2826 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2827 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2829 commitment_signed: msg,
2833 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2834 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2835 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2841 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2846 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
2847 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
2848 let mut forward_event = None;
2849 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
2850 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2851 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
2852 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
2854 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2855 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.routing {
2856 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
2857 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
2859 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2860 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
2861 prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
2863 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2864 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
2865 prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
2870 match forward_event {
2872 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2873 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
2874 time_forwardable: time
2882 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2883 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
2885 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2886 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2887 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2888 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2889 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2890 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2892 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
2893 let (commitment_update, pending_forwards, pending_failures, closing_signed, monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail_in) =
2894 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
2895 htlcs_to_fail = htlcs_to_fail_in;
2896 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2897 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
2898 assert!(commitment_update.is_none() && closing_signed.is_none() && pending_forwards.is_empty() && pending_failures.is_empty());
2899 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
2901 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, commitment_update.is_some(), pending_forwards, pending_failures) {
2903 } else { unreachable!(); }
2906 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2907 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2908 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2912 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2913 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2914 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2918 break Ok((pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"), chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap()))
2920 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2923 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id);
2925 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, short_channel_id, channel_outpoint)) => {
2926 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
2927 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
2929 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, pending_forwards)]);
2936 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2937 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2938 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2939 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2940 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2941 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2942 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2944 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
2946 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2951 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2952 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2953 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2955 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2956 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2957 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2958 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2960 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
2961 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
2964 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2965 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) =
2966 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone()), channel_state, chan);
2968 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
2969 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2971 let their_node_key = if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 };
2972 let their_bitcoin_key = if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 };
2973 match (self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, their_node_key),
2974 self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, their_bitcoin_key)) {
2976 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close(format!("Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature: {:?}. Maybe using different node_secret for transport and routing msg? UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}", e, &announcement, their_node_key));
2977 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
2980 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close(format!("Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature: {:?}. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})", e, &announcement, their_bitcoin_key));
2981 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
2987 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2989 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2990 msg: msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
2991 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
2992 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
2993 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
2994 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
2995 contents: announcement,
2997 update_msg: self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap(), // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
3000 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3005 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3006 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3007 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3008 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
3009 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
3011 // It's not a local channel
3015 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
3016 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3017 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3018 // TODO: see issue #153, need a consistent behavior on obnoxious behavior from random node
3019 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), chan_id));
3021 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), channel_state, chan);
3023 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => unreachable!()
3028 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3029 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3030 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3032 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3033 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3034 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3035 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3037 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
3038 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
3039 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
3040 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
3041 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, monitor_update_opt, mut order, shutdown) =
3042 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3043 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
3044 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3045 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
3046 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
3047 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
3048 if revoke_and_ack.is_none() {
3049 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
3051 if commitment_update.is_none() {
3052 order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
3054 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, order, revoke_and_ack.is_some(), commitment_update.is_some());
3055 //TODO: Resend the funding_locked if needed once we get the monitor running again
3058 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
3059 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
3060 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3064 macro_rules! send_raa { () => {
3065 if let Some(msg) = revoke_and_ack {
3066 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
3067 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3072 macro_rules! send_cu { () => {
3073 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
3074 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3075 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3081 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
3085 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
3090 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
3091 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
3092 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3098 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3102 /// Begin Update fee process. Allowed only on an outbound channel.
3103 /// If successful, will generate a UpdateHTLCs event, so you should probably poll
3104 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
3105 /// Note: This API is likely to change!
3106 /// (C-not exported) Cause its doc(hidden) anyway
3108 pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3109 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3110 let counterparty_node_id;
3111 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
3112 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3113 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3115 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3116 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("Failed to find corresponding channel for id {}", channel_id.to_hex())}),
3117 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3118 if !chan.get().is_outbound() {
3119 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "update_fee cannot be sent for an inbound channel".to_owned()});
3121 if chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
3122 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
3124 if !chan.get().is_live() {
3125 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel is either not yet fully established or peer is currently disconnected".to_owned()});
3127 counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3128 if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) =
3129 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw, &self.logger), channel_state, chan)
3131 if let Err(_e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3134 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3135 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3136 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3137 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3138 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3139 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3140 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3141 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
3151 match handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id) {
3152 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3153 Err(e) => { Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: e.err })}
3157 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`.
3158 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) {
3159 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
3161 for monitor_event in self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events() {
3162 match monitor_event {
3163 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
3164 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
3165 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
3166 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
3168 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
3169 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
3172 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(funding_outpoint) => {
3173 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3174 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3175 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
3176 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3177 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3178 if let Some(mut chan) = by_id.remove(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
3179 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
3180 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3182 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
3183 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
3184 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3194 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
3195 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
3199 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
3200 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
3202 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
3203 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
3204 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
3205 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
3206 // reorganized out of the main chain.
3207 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
3208 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
3209 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
3210 // timer_chan_freshness_every_min, guaranteeing we're running normally.
3211 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
3212 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
3213 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
3214 assert!(should_broadcast);
3215 } else { unreachable!(); }
3216 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
3218 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
3223 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3224 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3225 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3226 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3227 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3230 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
3231 //TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's non-intuitive that we query
3232 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
3233 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
3235 let mut ret = Vec::new();
3236 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3237 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
3242 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3243 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3244 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3245 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3246 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3249 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<Event> {
3250 //TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's non-intuitive that we query
3251 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
3252 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
3254 let mut ret = Vec::new();
3255 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3256 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
3261 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3263 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3264 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3265 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3266 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3269 fn block_connected(&self, block: &Block, height: u32) {
3270 let txdata: Vec<_> = block.txdata.iter().enumerate().collect();
3271 ChannelManager::block_connected(self, &block.header, &txdata, height);
3274 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, _height: u32) {
3275 ChannelManager::block_disconnected(self, header);
3279 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3280 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3281 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3282 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3283 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3286 /// Updates channel state based on transactions seen in a connected block.
3287 pub fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
3288 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3289 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
3290 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3291 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
3292 log_trace!(self.logger, "Block {} at height {} connected", block_hash, height);
3294 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3296 self.latest_block_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release);
3297 *self.last_block_hash.write().unwrap() = block_hash;
3299 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
3300 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
3302 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3303 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3304 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3305 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3306 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
3307 let res = channel.block_connected(header, txdata, height);
3308 if let Ok((chan_res, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs)) = res {
3309 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
3310 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&channel).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
3311 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3312 failure_code: 0x1000 | 14, // expiry_too_soon, or at least it is now
3316 if let Some(funding_locked) = chan_res {
3317 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
3318 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3319 msg: funding_locked,
3321 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
3322 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked and announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
3323 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
3324 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3325 msg: announcement_sigs,
3328 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
3330 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
3332 } else if let Err(e) = res {
3333 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
3334 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3335 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: e },
3339 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
3340 for &(_, tx) in txdata.iter() {
3341 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
3342 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
3343 log_trace!(self.logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
3344 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
3345 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3347 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain. Close the channel.
3348 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
3349 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
3350 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3362 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|&(ref payment_hash, _), htlcs| {
3363 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3364 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
3365 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
3366 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
3367 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
3368 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
3369 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3370 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(height));
3371 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(), HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3372 failure_code: 0x4000 | 15,
3373 data: htlc_msat_height_data
3378 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
3382 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
3384 for (source, payment_hash, reason) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
3385 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, reason);
3389 // Update last_node_announcement_serial to be the max of its current value and the
3390 // block timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
3391 // having an explicit local time source.
3392 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully update
3393 // last_node_announcement_serial or decide we don't need to.
3394 let old_serial = self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire);
3395 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
3396 if self.last_node_announcement_serial.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
3402 /// Updates channel state based on a disconnected block.
3404 /// If necessary, the channel may be force-closed without letting the counterparty participate
3405 /// in the shutdown.
3406 pub fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader) {
3407 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3408 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
3409 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3410 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3412 self.latest_block_height.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
3413 *self.last_block_hash.write().unwrap() = header.prev_blockhash;
3415 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
3417 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3418 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3419 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3420 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3421 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, v| {
3422 if v.block_disconnected(header) {
3423 if let Some(short_id) = v.get_short_channel_id() {
3424 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3426 failed_channels.push(v.force_shutdown(true));
3427 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&v) {
3428 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3439 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
3442 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
3443 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
3444 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
3446 /// Note that the feature `allow_wallclock_use` must be enabled to use this function.
3447 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
3448 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
3449 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
3452 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
3453 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
3455 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
3456 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
3459 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3460 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
3461 let mutcond = &self.persistence_notifier.persistence_lock;
3462 let &(ref mtx, _) = mutcond;
3463 let guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
3468 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref + Sync + Send, T: Deref + Sync + Send, K: Deref + Sync + Send, F: Deref + Sync + Send, L: Deref + Sync + Send>
3469 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3470 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3471 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3472 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3473 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3476 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
3477 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3478 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3481 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
3482 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3483 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3486 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
3487 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3488 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3491 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
3492 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3493 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3496 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) {
3497 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3498 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3501 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
3502 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3503 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3506 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
3507 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3508 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3511 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
3512 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3513 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3516 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
3517 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3518 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3521 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
3522 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3523 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3526 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
3527 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3528 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3531 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
3532 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3533 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3536 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
3537 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3538 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3541 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
3542 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3543 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3546 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
3547 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3548 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3551 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
3552 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3553 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3556 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
3557 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3558 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3561 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
3562 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3563 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
3564 let mut failed_payments = Vec::new();
3565 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
3567 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3568 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3569 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3570 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3571 if no_connection_possible {
3572 log_debug!(self.logger, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
3573 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
3574 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
3575 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
3576 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3578 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(true));
3579 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
3580 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3590 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
3591 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
3592 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
3593 // Note that currently on channel reestablish we assert that there are no
3594 // holding cell add-HTLCs, so if in the future we stop removing uncommitted HTLCs
3595 // on peer disconnect here, there will need to be corresponding changes in
3596 // reestablish logic.
3597 let failed_adds = chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
3598 chan.to_disabled_marked();
3599 if !failed_adds.is_empty() {
3600 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&chan).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
3601 failed_payments.push((chan_update, failed_adds));
3603 if chan.is_shutdown() {
3604 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
3605 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3609 no_channels_remain = false;
3615 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
3617 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3618 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3619 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3620 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3621 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3622 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3623 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3624 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3625 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3626 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3627 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3628 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
3629 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
3630 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
3631 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3632 &events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => true,
3633 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
3634 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
3635 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
3639 if no_channels_remain {
3640 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id);
3643 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
3644 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
3646 for (chan_update, mut htlc_sources) in failed_payments {
3647 for (htlc_source, payment_hash) in htlc_sources.drain(..) {
3648 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.clone() });
3653 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) {
3654 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
3656 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3659 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
3660 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
3661 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3662 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
3663 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
3666 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
3667 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
3672 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3673 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3674 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3675 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
3676 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
3677 if !chan.have_received_message() {
3678 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
3679 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
3680 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
3684 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
3685 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3686 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
3692 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
3695 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
3696 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3698 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
3699 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3700 if chan.remote_network_id == *counterparty_node_id {
3701 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
3702 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id));
3706 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
3707 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id));
3712 /// Used to signal to the ChannelManager persister that the manager needs to be re-persisted to
3713 /// disk/backups, through `await_persistable_update_timeout` and `await_persistable_update`.
3714 struct PersistenceNotifier {
3715 /// Users won't access the persistence_lock directly, but rather wait on its bool using
3716 /// `wait_timeout` and `wait`.
3717 persistence_lock: (Mutex<bool>, Condvar),
3720 impl PersistenceNotifier {
3723 persistence_lock: (Mutex::new(false), Condvar::new()),
3729 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
3730 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
3731 guard = cvar.wait(guard).unwrap();
3732 let result = *guard;
3740 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
3741 fn wait_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
3742 let current_time = Instant::now();
3744 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
3745 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
3746 guard = cvar.wait_timeout(guard, max_wait).unwrap().0;
3747 // Due to spurious wakeups that can happen on `wait_timeout`, here we need to check if the
3748 // desired wait time has actually passed, and if not then restart the loop with a reduced wait
3749 // time. Note that this logic can be highly simplified through the use of
3750 // `Condvar::wait_while` and `Condvar::wait_timeout_while`, if and when our MSRV is raised to
3752 let elapsed = current_time.elapsed();
3753 let result = *guard;
3754 if result || elapsed >= max_wait {
3758 match max_wait.checked_sub(elapsed) {
3759 None => return result,
3765 // Signal to the ChannelManager persister that there are updates necessitating persisting to disk.
3767 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &self.persistence_lock;
3768 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
3769 *persistence_lock = true;
3770 mem::drop(persistence_lock);
3775 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
3776 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
3778 impl Writeable for PendingHTLCInfo {
3779 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3780 match &self.routing {
3781 &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref onion_packet, ref short_channel_id } => {
3783 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
3784 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
3786 &PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { ref payment_data, ref incoming_cltv_expiry } => {
3788 payment_data.write(writer)?;
3789 incoming_cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
3792 self.incoming_shared_secret.write(writer)?;
3793 self.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
3794 self.amt_to_forward.write(writer)?;
3795 self.outgoing_cltv_value.write(writer)?;
3800 impl Readable for PendingHTLCInfo {
3801 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, DecodeError> {
3802 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
3803 routing: match Readable::read(reader)? {
3804 0u8 => PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
3805 onion_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
3806 short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3808 1u8 => PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
3809 payment_data: Readable::read(reader)?,
3810 incoming_cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
3812 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3814 incoming_shared_secret: Readable::read(reader)?,
3815 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
3816 amt_to_forward: Readable::read(reader)?,
3817 outgoing_cltv_value: Readable::read(reader)?,
3822 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
3823 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3825 &HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(ref fail_msg) => {
3827 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3829 &HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(ref fail_msg) => {
3831 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3838 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
3839 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailureMsg, DecodeError> {
3840 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3841 0 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3842 1 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3843 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3848 impl Writeable for PendingHTLCStatus {
3849 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3851 &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(ref forward_info) => {
3853 forward_info.write(writer)?;
3855 &PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(ref fail_msg) => {
3857 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3864 impl Readable for PendingHTLCStatus {
3865 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingHTLCStatus, DecodeError> {
3866 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3867 0 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3868 1 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3869 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3874 impl_writeable!(HTLCPreviousHopData, 0, {
3878 incoming_packet_shared_secret
3881 impl_writeable!(ClaimableHTLC, 0, {
3888 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
3889 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3891 &HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref hop_data) => {
3893 hop_data.write(writer)?;
3895 &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
3897 path.write(writer)?;
3898 session_priv.write(writer)?;
3899 first_hop_htlc_msat.write(writer)?;
3906 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
3907 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCSource, DecodeError> {
3908 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3909 0 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3910 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3911 path: Readable::read(reader)?,
3912 session_priv: Readable::read(reader)?,
3913 first_hop_htlc_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
3915 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3920 impl Writeable for HTLCFailReason {
3921 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3923 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
3927 &HTLCFailReason::Reason { ref failure_code, ref data } => {
3929 failure_code.write(writer)?;
3930 data.write(writer)?;
3937 impl Readable for HTLCFailReason {
3938 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailReason, DecodeError> {
3939 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3940 0 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: Readable::read(reader)? }),
3941 1 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3942 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
3943 data: Readable::read(reader)?,
3945 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3950 impl Writeable for HTLCForwardInfo {
3951 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3953 &HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { ref prev_short_channel_id, ref prev_funding_outpoint, ref prev_htlc_id, ref forward_info } => {
3955 prev_short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
3956 prev_funding_outpoint.write(writer)?;
3957 prev_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3958 forward_info.write(writer)?;
3960 &HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3962 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3963 err_packet.write(writer)?;
3970 impl Readable for HTLCForwardInfo {
3971 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCForwardInfo, DecodeError> {
3972 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3973 0 => Ok(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC {
3974 prev_short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3975 prev_funding_outpoint: Readable::read(reader)?,
3976 prev_htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3977 forward_info: Readable::read(reader)?,
3979 1 => Ok(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC {
3980 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3981 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
3983 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3988 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3989 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3990 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3991 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3992 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3995 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3996 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
3998 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
3999 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
4001 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
4002 (self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
4003 self.last_block_hash.read().unwrap().write(writer)?;
4005 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4006 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
4007 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
4008 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
4009 unfunded_channels += 1;
4012 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
4013 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
4014 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
4015 channel.write(writer)?;
4019 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4020 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
4021 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
4022 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4023 for forward in pending_forwards {
4024 forward.write(writer)?;
4028 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4029 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
4030 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4031 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4032 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
4033 htlc.write(writer)?;
4037 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
4038 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4039 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4040 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
4041 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4042 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
4045 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4046 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4047 for event in events.iter() {
4048 event.write(writer)?;
4051 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
4052 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4053 for event in background_events.iter() {
4055 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
4057 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
4058 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
4063 (self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
4069 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
4071 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
4073 /// 1) Deserialize all stored ChannelMonitors.
4074 /// 2) Deserialize the ChannelManager by filling in this struct and calling:
4075 /// <(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)
4076 /// This may result in closing some Channels if the ChannelMonitor is newer than the stored
4077 /// ChannelManager state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
4078 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant ChannelMonitor outpoints the same
4079 /// way you would handle a `chain::Filter` call using ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch() and
4080 /// ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo().
4081 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your ChannelMonitors.
4082 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the ChannelManager.
4083 /// 6) Move the ChannelMonitors into your local chain::Watch.
4085 /// Note that the ordering of #4-6 is not of importance, however all three must occur before you
4086 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized ChannelManager.
4088 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
4089 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
4090 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
4091 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
4092 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
4093 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
4094 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
4095 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4096 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4097 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4098 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4101 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
4102 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
4104 pub keys_manager: K,
4106 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
4108 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
4109 pub fee_estimator: F,
4110 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
4112 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
4113 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
4114 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
4115 pub chain_monitor: M,
4117 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
4118 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
4119 /// force-closed during deserialization.
4120 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
4121 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
4122 /// deserialization.
4124 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
4125 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
4126 pub default_config: UserConfig,
4128 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
4129 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
4131 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
4132 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
4133 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
4134 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
4136 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
4139 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
4140 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>,
4143 impl<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
4144 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4145 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4146 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4147 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4148 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4151 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
4152 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
4153 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
4154 pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
4155 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>) -> Self {
4157 keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config,
4158 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
4163 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
4164 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
4165 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
4166 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>>)
4167 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4168 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4169 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4170 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4173 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4174 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
4175 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
4179 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
4180 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)
4181 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4182 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4183 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4184 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4187 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4188 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4189 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4190 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
4191 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
4194 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
4195 let latest_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4196 let last_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
4198 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4200 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4201 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
4202 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
4203 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
4204 for _ in 0..channel_count {
4205 let mut channel: Channel<Signer> = Channel::read(reader, &args.keys_manager)?;
4206 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
4207 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
4208 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
4209 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
4210 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
4211 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
4212 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
4213 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
4214 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4215 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
4216 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
4217 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
4218 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
4219 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
4220 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
4221 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
4222 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
4224 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
4225 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
4227 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
4230 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4234 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
4235 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
4236 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
4240 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
4241 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4242 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
4243 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
4244 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4245 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4246 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
4247 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
4248 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
4250 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
4253 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4254 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
4255 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
4256 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
4257 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4258 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
4259 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
4260 previous_hops.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
4262 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
4265 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4266 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>)>()));
4267 for _ in 0..peer_count {
4268 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
4269 let peer_state = PeerState {
4270 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
4272 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
4275 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4276 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
4277 for _ in 0..event_count {
4278 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
4279 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
4284 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4285 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
4286 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
4287 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4288 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
4289 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4293 let last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4295 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4296 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
4298 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
4300 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
4301 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
4302 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
4304 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(latest_block_height as usize),
4305 last_block_hash: RwLock::new(last_block_hash),
4308 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
4313 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
4315 our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
4317 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(last_node_announcement_serial as usize),
4319 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
4321 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
4322 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
4323 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
4324 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
4326 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
4327 logger: args.logger,
4328 default_configuration: args.default_config,
4331 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
4332 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_manager.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
4335 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
4336 //connection or two.
4338 Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
4344 use ln::channelmanager::PersistenceNotifier;
4346 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, Ordering};
4348 use std::time::Duration;
4351 fn test_wait_timeout() {
4352 let persistence_notifier = Arc::new(PersistenceNotifier::new());
4353 let thread_notifier = Arc::clone(&persistence_notifier);
4355 let exit_thread = Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false));
4356 let exit_thread_clone = exit_thread.clone();
4357 thread::spawn(move || {
4359 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &thread_notifier.persistence_lock;
4360 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
4361 *persistence_lock = true;
4364 if exit_thread_clone.load(Ordering::SeqCst) {
4370 // Check that we can block indefinitely until updates are available.
4371 let _ = persistence_notifier.wait();
4373 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration if updates are
4376 if persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
4381 exit_thread.store(true, Ordering::SeqCst);
4383 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration even if no updates
4386 if !persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {