1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
23 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
25 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
27 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
29 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
31 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
34 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
39 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
40 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
41 // construct one themselves.
42 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
43 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
44 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
45 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
46 use crate::ln::features::InvoiceFeatures;
47 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
48 use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, Router};
49 use crate::routing::scoring::ProbabilisticScorer;
51 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
52 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
53 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
55 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
56 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment};
57 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
58 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider, ChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
59 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig};
60 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
61 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
62 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
63 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
64 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
65 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
67 use alloc::collections::BTreeMap;
70 use crate::prelude::*;
72 use core::cell::RefCell;
74 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
75 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, AtomicBool, Ordering};
76 use core::time::Duration;
79 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
80 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
81 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
83 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
85 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
86 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
87 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
89 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
90 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
91 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
92 // before we forward it.
94 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
95 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
96 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
97 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
98 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
100 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
101 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
103 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
104 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
105 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
106 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
109 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
110 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
111 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
112 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
115 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
116 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
117 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
121 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
122 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
123 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
124 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
125 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
127 pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
128 /// Sender intended amount to forward or receive (actual amount received
129 /// may overshoot this in either case)
130 pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
131 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
134 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
135 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
136 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
137 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
140 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
141 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
142 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
143 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
144 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
147 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
148 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
150 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
151 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
152 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
155 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
156 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
158 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
159 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
162 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
163 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
166 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
170 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
171 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
172 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
173 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
174 short_channel_id: u64,
176 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
177 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
179 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
180 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
185 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
187 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
188 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
189 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
191 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
192 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
195 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
196 struct ClaimableHTLC {
197 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
199 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
201 /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
202 /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
203 sender_intended_value: u64,
204 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
206 /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
207 /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
208 total_value_received: Option<u64>,
209 /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
213 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
215 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
216 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
217 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
219 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
220 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
225 impl Readable for PaymentId {
226 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
227 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
232 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
234 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
235 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
236 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
238 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
239 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
244 impl Readable for InterceptId {
245 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
246 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
251 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
252 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
253 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
254 PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
255 OutboundRoute { session_priv: SecretKey },
258 pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
260 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
261 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
262 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
264 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
265 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: *session_priv },
269 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
270 (0, PreviousHopData) => {
271 (0, short_channel_id, required),
272 (2, htlc_id, required),
274 (2, OutboundRoute) => {
275 (0, session_priv, required),
280 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
281 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
282 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
283 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
284 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
287 session_priv: SecretKey,
288 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
289 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
290 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
291 payment_id: PaymentId,
294 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
295 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
296 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
298 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
300 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
302 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
305 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
306 payment_id.hash(hasher);
307 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
313 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
315 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
316 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
317 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
318 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
319 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
320 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
324 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
325 /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
326 /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
327 pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
328 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
329 *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
331 // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
337 struct ReceiveError {
343 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
344 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
346 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
347 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
348 pub enum FailureCode {
349 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
350 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
351 TemporaryNodeFailure = 0x2000 | 2,
352 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
353 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
354 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing = 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
355 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
356 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
357 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
358 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
359 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails = 0x4000 | 15,
362 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>);
364 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
365 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
366 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
367 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
368 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
370 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
371 err: msgs::LightningError,
372 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
373 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
375 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
377 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
379 err: LightningError {
381 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
382 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
389 shutdown_finish: None,
393 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
394 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
397 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
399 err: LightningError {
401 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
402 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
408 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
409 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
413 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
416 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
418 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
419 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
423 log_level: Level::Warn,
426 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
428 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
430 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
432 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
433 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
441 shutdown_finish: None,
446 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
447 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
448 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
449 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
450 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
452 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
453 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
454 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
455 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
456 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
457 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
458 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
460 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
464 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
465 struct ClaimingPayment {
467 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
468 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
470 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
471 (0, amount_msat, required),
472 (2, payment_purpose, required),
473 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
476 struct ClaimablePayment {
477 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
478 onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
479 htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
482 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
483 struct ClaimablePayments {
484 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
485 /// failed/claimed by the user.
487 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
488 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
490 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
491 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
492 claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
494 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
495 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
496 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
497 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
500 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
501 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
502 /// quite some time lag.
503 enum BackgroundEvent {
504 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate
506 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
507 /// are regenerated on startup.
508 MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
512 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
513 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
514 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
515 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
516 /// event can be generated.
517 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
518 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user.
519 EmitEvent { event: events::Event },
522 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
523 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
524 (2, EmitEvent) => { (0, event, upgradable_required) },
527 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
528 pub(crate) enum EventCompletionAction {
529 ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
530 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
531 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
534 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(EventCompletionAction,
535 (0, ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate) => {
536 (0, channel_funding_outpoint, required),
537 (2, counterparty_node_id, required),
541 /// State we hold per-peer.
542 pub(super) struct PeerState<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
543 /// `temporary_channel_id` or `channel_id` -> `channel`.
545 /// Holds all channels where the peer is the counterparty. Once a channel has been assigned a
546 /// `channel_id`, the `temporary_channel_id` key in the map is updated and is replaced by the
548 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
549 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
550 latest_features: InitFeatures,
551 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
552 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
553 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
554 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
555 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
557 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
558 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
559 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
560 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
562 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
563 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
564 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
565 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
566 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
567 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
568 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
569 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
570 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
571 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
575 impl <Signer: ChannelSigner> PeerState<Signer> {
576 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
577 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
578 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
579 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
580 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
583 self.channel_by_id.is_empty() && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
587 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
588 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
590 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
593 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
594 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
595 struct PendingInboundPayment {
596 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
597 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
598 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
599 /// this payment being removed.
601 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
602 user_payment_id: u64,
603 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
604 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
605 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
608 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
609 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
610 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
611 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
612 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
613 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
614 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
615 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
617 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
618 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
626 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
628 Arc<Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>
633 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
634 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
635 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
636 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
637 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
638 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
639 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
640 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
641 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
643 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
644 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<&'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e DefaultRouter<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L, &'h Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>>, &'g L>;
646 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`] used in testing.
647 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
648 pub trait AChannelManager {
649 type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer>;
650 type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
651 type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface;
652 type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
653 type EntropySource: EntropySource;
654 type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
655 type NodeSigner: NodeSigner;
656 type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
657 type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner;
658 type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<Signer = Self::Signer>;
659 type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
660 type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator;
661 type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
663 type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
665 type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
666 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
668 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
669 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
670 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
672 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> + Sized,
673 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface + Sized,
674 ES::Target: EntropySource + Sized,
675 NS::Target: NodeSigner + Sized,
676 SP::Target: SignerProvider + Sized,
677 F::Target: FeeEstimator + Sized,
678 R::Target: Router + Sized,
679 L::Target: Logger + Sized,
681 type Watch = M::Target;
683 type Broadcaster = T::Target;
685 type EntropySource = ES::Target;
687 type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
689 type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer;
690 type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
692 type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
694 type Router = R::Target;
696 type Logger = L::Target;
698 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
701 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
702 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
704 /// Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
705 /// to individual Channels.
707 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
708 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
709 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
710 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
712 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
713 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
714 /// returning from [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`], with ChannelManagers, writing updates
715 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during
716 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
717 /// [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the
718 /// `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
720 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
721 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
722 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
724 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
725 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
726 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
727 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
728 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
730 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
731 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
732 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
733 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
735 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
736 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
737 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
739 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
740 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
741 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
742 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
743 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
745 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
746 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
747 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
748 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
749 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
750 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
751 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
752 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
755 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
756 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
757 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
758 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
759 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
763 // `total_consistency_lock`
765 // |__`forward_htlcs`
767 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
769 // |__`per_peer_state`
771 // | |__`pending_inbound_payments`
773 // | |__`claimable_payments`
775 // | |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
781 // | |__`short_to_chan_info`
783 // | |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
787 // | |__`pending_events`
789 // | |__`pending_background_events`
791 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
793 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
794 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
795 ES::Target: EntropySource,
796 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
797 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
798 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
802 default_configuration: UserConfig,
803 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
804 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
810 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
812 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
814 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
815 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
817 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
818 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
819 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
820 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
822 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
823 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
825 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
826 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
827 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
828 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
829 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
830 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
831 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
832 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
834 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
836 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
837 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
839 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
841 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
842 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
843 /// and via the classic SCID.
845 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
846 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
848 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
850 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
852 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
853 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
854 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
856 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
857 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
859 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
860 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
862 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
863 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
865 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
866 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
867 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
868 /// active channel list on load.
870 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
871 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
873 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
875 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
876 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
877 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
879 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
880 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
881 /// the handling of the events.
883 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
884 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
887 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
888 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
889 /// would break backwards compatability.
890 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
891 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
892 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
894 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
895 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<[u8; 32], PublicKey>>,
897 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
899 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
900 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
901 /// confirmation depth.
903 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
904 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
905 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
907 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
909 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
911 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
913 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
915 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
917 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
918 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
919 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
921 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
922 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
924 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
925 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
926 /// keeping additional state.
927 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
929 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
930 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
931 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
932 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
934 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
935 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
937 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
938 /// are currently open with that peer.
940 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
941 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
944 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
946 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
947 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
948 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
949 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
950 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
952 /// The set of events which we need to give to the user to handle. In some cases an event may
953 /// require some further action after the user handles it (currently only blocking a monitor
954 /// update from being handed to the user to ensure the included changes to the channel state
955 /// are handled by the user before they're persisted durably to disk). In that case, the second
956 /// element in the tuple is set to `Some` with further details of the action.
958 /// Note that events MUST NOT be removed from pending_events after deserialization, as they
959 /// could be in the middle of being processed without the direct mutex held.
961 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
962 pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
963 /// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
964 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
965 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
966 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
967 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
968 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
969 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
970 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
971 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
972 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
973 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
975 persistence_notifier: Notifier,
984 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
986 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
987 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
988 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
989 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
990 pub struct ChainParameters {
991 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
992 pub network: Network,
994 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
996 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
997 pub best_block: BestBlock,
1000 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
1006 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
1007 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
1008 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
1009 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
1010 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
1011 /// updates are ready for persistence).
1013 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
1014 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
1015 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
1016 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
1017 persistence_notifier: &'a Notifier,
1019 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
1020 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
1023 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
1024 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
1025 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
1028 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1029 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
1031 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1032 persistence_notifier: notifier,
1033 should_persist: persist_check,
1034 _read_guard: read_guard,
1039 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1040 fn drop(&mut self) {
1041 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
1042 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
1047 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1048 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1050 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1052 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1053 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1054 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1055 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1056 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1058 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1059 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1061 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1063 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1064 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1065 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1066 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1067 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1068 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1069 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
1070 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
1071 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
1072 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
1073 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
1074 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
1075 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
1077 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1078 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
1080 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1081 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1082 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1083 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
1085 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1086 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1087 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1088 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1089 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1090 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1093 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1095 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1096 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1099 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1101 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1102 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1104 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until we time-out the
1105 /// idempotency of payments by [`PaymentId`]. See
1106 /// [`OutboundPayments::remove_stale_resolved_payments`].
1107 pub(crate) const IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 7;
1109 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
1110 /// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
1111 pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
1113 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is connected until
1114 /// we mark the channel enabled and gossip the update.
1115 pub(crate) const ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 5;
1117 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
1118 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
1119 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
1120 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1122 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1123 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1124 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1126 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1127 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1128 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1130 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1131 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1132 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1133 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1134 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1135 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1136 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1137 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1138 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1139 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1140 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1143 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1144 /// to better separate parameters.
1145 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1146 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1147 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1148 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1149 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1150 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1151 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1152 pub features: InitFeatures,
1153 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1154 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1155 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1157 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1159 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1160 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1161 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1162 /// payments to us through this channel.
1163 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1164 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1165 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1166 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1167 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1168 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1169 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1172 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
1173 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1174 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1175 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1176 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1177 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1178 /// lifetime of the channel.
1179 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
1180 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1181 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1182 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1183 /// our counterparty already.
1185 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1186 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1187 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1188 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1190 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1191 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1192 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1193 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1195 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1196 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1198 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1199 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1201 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1202 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1203 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1204 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1205 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1206 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1207 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1208 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1209 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1212 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1214 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1215 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1216 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1217 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1218 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1219 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1220 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1222 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1223 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1225 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1226 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1227 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1228 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1229 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1230 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1231 /// this value on chain.
1233 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1235 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1237 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1238 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1239 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or a random value if the channel was
1240 /// inbound. This may be zero for inbound channels serialized with LDK versions prior to
1242 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1243 /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
1244 /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
1246 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
1247 pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
1248 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1249 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1250 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1252 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1253 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1254 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1255 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1257 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1258 pub balance_msat: u64,
1259 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1260 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1261 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1262 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1264 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1266 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1267 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1268 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1269 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1270 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1271 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1272 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1273 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1275 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`] and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1276 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1277 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1278 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1279 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1280 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1281 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1283 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1284 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1285 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1286 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1287 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1288 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1289 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1290 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1291 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1293 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1295 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1296 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1297 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1298 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1299 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1301 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1302 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1303 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1304 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1305 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1306 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1307 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1309 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1310 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1311 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1312 pub is_outbound: bool,
1313 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1314 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1315 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1316 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1317 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1319 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1320 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1321 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1322 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1324 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1325 pub is_usable: bool,
1326 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1327 pub is_public: bool,
1328 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1329 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1330 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1331 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1332 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1333 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1335 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1336 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1339 impl ChannelDetails {
1340 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1341 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1342 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1344 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1345 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1346 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1347 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1350 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1351 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1352 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1354 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1355 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1356 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1357 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1360 fn from_channel<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner>(channel: &Channel<Signer>,
1361 best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures) -> Self {
1363 let balance = channel.get_available_balances();
1364 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1365 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1367 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1368 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1369 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1370 features: latest_features,
1371 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1372 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1373 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1374 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1375 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1376 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1377 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1378 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if channel.have_received_message() {
1379 Some(channel.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1380 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1382 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1383 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1384 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1385 channel_type: if channel.have_received_message() { Some(channel.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1386 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1387 outbound_scid_alias: if channel.is_usable() { Some(channel.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1388 inbound_scid_alias: channel.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1389 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1390 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(channel.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
1391 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1392 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1393 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1394 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1395 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1396 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1397 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1398 confirmations: Some(channel.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1399 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1400 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1401 is_channel_ready: channel.is_usable(),
1402 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1403 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1404 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1405 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1406 config: Some(channel.config()),
1411 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1412 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1413 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1414 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1415 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1417 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1419 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1420 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1421 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1424 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1425 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1426 /// payment is removed from tracking.
1428 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1429 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1430 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1432 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1433 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1434 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1436 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1437 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1441 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1443 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
1445 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1446 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1447 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1448 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1450 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1451 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1452 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1455 macro_rules! handle_error {
1456 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
1457 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1458 // entering the macro.
1459 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1460 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1464 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1465 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1467 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1468 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1469 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1470 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1474 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1475 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1476 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1477 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1482 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1483 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1485 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1486 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1487 action: err.action.clone()
1491 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1492 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1493 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1494 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1495 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1499 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1506 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1507 ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {{
1508 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.channel_id());
1509 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1510 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1511 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1513 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1514 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1515 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1516 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1517 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1519 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1520 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1522 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1526 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1527 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1528 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1530 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1531 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1533 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1534 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1536 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1537 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1538 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel);
1539 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1540 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1541 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1547 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1548 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1552 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1554 $entry.remove_entry();
1562 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1563 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1567 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1569 $entry.remove_entry();
1577 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1578 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1580 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1581 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, channel);
1587 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1588 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
1589 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1590 node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1591 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1593 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1594 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1595 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1596 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1597 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1598 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1599 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1600 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1601 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1602 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1607 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
1608 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1609 if $channel.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
1610 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelPending {
1611 channel_id: $channel.channel_id(),
1612 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.temporary_channel_id(),
1613 counterparty_node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1614 user_channel_id: $channel.get_user_id(),
1615 funding_txo: $channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
1617 $channel.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
1622 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
1623 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1624 if $channel.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
1625 debug_assert!($channel.channel_pending_event_emitted());
1626 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelReady {
1627 channel_id: $channel.channel_id(),
1628 user_channel_id: $channel.get_user_id(),
1629 counterparty_node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1630 channel_type: $channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
1632 $channel.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
1637 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
1638 ($self: ident, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
1639 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&$self.logger,
1640 &$self.node_signer, $self.genesis_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
1641 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
1642 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
1643 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.is_usable() {
1644 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
1645 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
1646 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
1647 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
1649 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
1650 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
1651 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1657 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
1658 .remove(&$chan.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
1660 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
1661 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
1662 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
1663 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
1664 updates.announcement_sigs);
1665 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
1666 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
1669 let channel_id = $chan.channel_id();
1670 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
1671 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
1673 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
1675 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1676 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1678 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
1679 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1680 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
1681 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
1686 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
1687 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, MANUALLY_REMOVING, $remove: expr) => { {
1688 // update_maps_on_chan_removal needs to be able to take id_to_peer, so make sure we can in
1689 // any case so that it won't deadlock.
1690 debug_assert_ne!($self.id_to_peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1692 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
1693 log_debug!($self.logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
1694 log_bytes!($chan.channel_id()[..]));
1697 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
1698 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure",
1699 log_bytes!($chan.channel_id()[..]));
1700 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $chan);
1701 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(
1702 "ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), $chan.channel_id(),
1703 $chan.get_user_id(), $chan.force_shutdown(false),
1704 $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok()));
1708 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
1709 $chan.complete_one_mon_update($update_id);
1710 if $chan.no_monitor_updates_pending() {
1711 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $update_id, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
1717 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan_entry: expr) => {
1718 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $update_id, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan_entry.get_mut(), MANUALLY_REMOVING, $chan_entry.remove_entry())
1722 macro_rules! process_events_body {
1723 ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
1724 let mut processed_all_events = false;
1725 while !processed_all_events {
1726 if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
1730 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
1733 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
1734 // persists happen while processing monitor events.
1735 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1737 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
1738 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
1739 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
1740 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
1744 let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
1745 let num_events = pending_events.len();
1746 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
1747 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
1750 let mut post_event_actions = Vec::new();
1752 for (event, action_opt) in pending_events {
1753 $event_to_handle = event;
1755 if let Some(action) = action_opt {
1756 post_event_actions.push(action);
1761 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1762 pending_events.drain(..num_events);
1763 processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
1764 $self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
1767 if !post_event_actions.is_empty() {
1768 $self.handle_post_event_actions(post_event_actions);
1769 // If we had some actions, go around again as we may have more events now
1770 processed_all_events = false;
1773 if result == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
1774 $self.persistence_notifier.notify();
1780 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
1782 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
1783 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1784 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1785 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1786 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1787 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1791 /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
1793 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1794 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
1796 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1798 /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
1799 /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
1800 /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
1803 /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
1804 /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
1805 /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
1806 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1807 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1808 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1809 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
1810 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
1812 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1813 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1814 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
1819 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1821 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
1822 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1823 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
1824 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1825 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
1826 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1827 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1828 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1830 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
1833 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
1834 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1836 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1838 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1840 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1842 pending_events: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
1843 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
1844 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1845 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1846 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
1856 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
1857 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1858 &self.default_configuration
1861 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1862 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1863 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
1866 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
1867 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
1869 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
1871 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
1875 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
1880 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1882 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1883 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1884 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
1885 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
1886 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
1888 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1889 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1891 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to
1892 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
1893 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`].
1895 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1896 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1897 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1899 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1900 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1901 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1902 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1903 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1904 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1906 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1907 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1908 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1909 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1910 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1911 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1914 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1915 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1916 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1918 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1920 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
1921 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
1923 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1925 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
1926 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1927 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1928 match Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
1929 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
1930 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
1934 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
1939 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1941 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1942 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1943 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1945 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1947 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1950 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1953 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1954 node_id: their_network_key,
1957 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1960 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1961 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
1962 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
1963 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
1964 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
1965 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
1966 // the same channel.
1967 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
1969 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1970 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1971 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
1972 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1973 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1974 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1975 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel(channel, best_block_height,
1976 peer_state.latest_features.clone());
1984 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
1985 /// more information.
1986 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1987 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1990 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
1991 /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1993 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1994 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1996 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1997 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1998 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1999 // really wanted anyway.
2000 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
2003 /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
2004 pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2005 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2006 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2008 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
2009 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2010 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2011 let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2012 return peer_state.channel_by_id
2015 ChannelDetails::from_channel(channel, best_block_height, features.clone()))
2021 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
2022 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
2024 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
2025 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
2026 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
2028 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2029 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
2030 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
2031 .filter_map(|(_, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
2032 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
2033 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
2034 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2035 total_msat: *total_msat,
2038 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
2039 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2041 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
2042 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2044 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
2049 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
2050 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
2051 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2052 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
2053 Some(transaction) => {
2054 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::DiscardFunding {
2055 channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction
2060 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
2061 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
2062 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
2063 reason: closure_reason
2067 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2068 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2070 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
2071 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
2072 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2074 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2075 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2077 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2078 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2079 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2080 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2081 let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo();
2082 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2083 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut()
2084 .get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
2085 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
2087 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
2088 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
2089 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
2090 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2091 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
2095 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
2096 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
2097 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2098 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update);
2099 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry);
2102 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
2103 let channel = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
2104 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
2105 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2109 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2113 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id) })
2117 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2118 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2119 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
2120 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
2123 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
2127 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2128 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2129 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2131 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
2132 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2134 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
2135 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
2136 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
2137 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
2139 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2141 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2142 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2143 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2146 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2147 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2148 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2149 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2150 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2151 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None)
2154 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2155 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2156 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2158 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
2159 /// the channel being closed or not:
2160 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
2161 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
2162 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2163 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
2164 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
2165 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
2166 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
2168 /// The `shutdown_script` provided will be used as the `scriptPubKey` for the closing transaction.
2169 /// Will fail if a shutdown script has already been set for this channel by
2170 /// ['ChannelHandshakeConfig::commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey`]. The given shutdown script must
2171 /// also be compatible with our and the counterparty's features.
2173 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2175 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2176 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2177 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2180 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2181 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2182 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2183 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2184 pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2185 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script)
2189 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
2190 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
2191 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
2192 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2193 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
2194 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2195 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2196 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
2198 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
2199 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2200 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2201 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2202 // ignore the result here.
2203 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
2207 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2208 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2209 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
2210 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2211 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2212 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2213 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
2215 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2216 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2217 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2218 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2219 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) });
2221 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2223 remove_channel!(self, chan)
2225 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), peer_node_id) });
2228 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2229 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(broadcast));
2230 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2231 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2232 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2237 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
2240 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2241 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2242 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2243 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2244 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2245 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2246 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2247 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
2248 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2249 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2250 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
2251 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
2262 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2263 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2264 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2266 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2267 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2268 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2271 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2272 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2273 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2275 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2276 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2277 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2278 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2279 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2282 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2283 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2284 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2285 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2286 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2290 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2291 /// local transaction(s).
2292 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2293 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2294 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2298 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(&self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
2299 payment_hash: PaymentHash, amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError>
2301 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2302 if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value > cltv_expiry {
2303 return Err(ReceiveError {
2304 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to less than the CLTV set by the sender",
2306 err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
2309 // final_expiry_too_soon
2310 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2311 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2313 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2314 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2315 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2316 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2317 if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= current_height as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2318 let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12);
2319 err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes());
2320 err_data.extend_from_slice(¤t_height.to_be_bytes());
2321 return Err(ReceiveError {
2322 err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data,
2323 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2326 if hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat {
2327 return Err(ReceiveError {
2329 err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
2330 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2334 let routing = match hop_data.format {
2335 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => {
2336 return Err(ReceiveError {
2337 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2338 err_data: Vec::new(),
2339 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2342 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage, payment_metadata } => {
2343 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
2344 return Err(ReceiveError {
2345 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2346 err_data: Vec::new(),
2347 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2349 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2350 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2353 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2354 phantom_shared_secret,
2356 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2357 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2358 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2359 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2360 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2361 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2362 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2363 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2364 return Err(ReceiveError {
2365 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2366 err_data: Vec::new(),
2367 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2371 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2374 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2377 return Err(ReceiveError {
2378 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2379 err_data: Vec::new(),
2380 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2385 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2388 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2389 incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
2390 outgoing_amt_msat: hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2391 outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2395 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
2396 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2397 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2399 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2400 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2401 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2402 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2403 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2404 failure_code: $err_code,
2410 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2411 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2414 let shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(
2415 Recipient::Node, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None
2416 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
2418 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2419 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2420 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2421 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2422 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2423 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2424 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2425 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2427 macro_rules! return_err {
2428 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2430 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2431 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2432 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2433 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2434 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
2435 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
2441 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2443 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2444 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2446 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2447 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2451 let pending_forward_info = match next_hop {
2452 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
2454 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None) {
2456 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
2457 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
2458 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
2459 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
2460 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
2462 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
2465 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
2466 let new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
2467 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2469 public_key: onion_utils::next_hop_packet_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx, new_pubkey, &shared_secret),
2470 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2471 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
2474 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
2475 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2476 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
2477 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2481 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2482 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2483 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2486 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2487 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2488 incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
2489 outgoing_amt_msat: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2490 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2495 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref outgoing_amt_msat, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
2496 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
2497 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
2498 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
2499 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
2500 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
2501 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(short_channel_id).cloned();
2502 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
2503 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2504 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2505 // phantom or an intercept.
2506 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
2507 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)) ||
2508 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)
2512 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2515 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
2517 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
2518 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2519 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
2520 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
2521 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2523 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
2524 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2525 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id) {
2527 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
2528 // have no consistency guarantees.
2529 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2533 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2534 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2535 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2536 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2537 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2539 if chan.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && *short_channel_id != chan.outbound_scid_alias() {
2540 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
2541 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
2542 // we don't have the channel here.
2543 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2545 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(*short_channel_id, chan).ok();
2547 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2548 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2549 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2550 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2551 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2552 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2553 // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
2554 // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
2555 // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
2556 if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
2557 break Some(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2559 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
2562 if *outgoing_amt_msat < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2563 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
2565 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, *outgoing_amt_msat, *outgoing_cltv_value) {
2566 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
2570 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
2571 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
2572 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
2573 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
2575 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
2582 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2583 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2584 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2585 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2586 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2587 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2589 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2590 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2592 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2593 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2594 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2595 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2596 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2597 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2598 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2599 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2600 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2601 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2607 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
2608 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2609 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2610 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2612 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2613 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2615 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2616 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
2617 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2619 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2620 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2621 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2622 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
2623 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
2624 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
2625 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
2629 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
2634 pending_forward_info
2637 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2638 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2639 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2641 /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
2642 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
2643 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
2645 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2646 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
2647 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2648 if !chan.should_announce() {
2649 return Err(LightningError {
2650 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2651 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2654 if chan.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
2655 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
2657 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2658 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2661 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2662 /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
2663 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2664 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2666 /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
2667 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
2668 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
2670 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2671 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
2672 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2673 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2674 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
2675 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2679 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
2681 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2682 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2683 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2685 let enabled = chan.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
2686 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
2687 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
2688 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
2689 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => false,
2692 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2693 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2695 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2696 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
2697 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2698 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2699 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
2700 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2701 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2702 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2704 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
2705 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
2706 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
2708 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
2710 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2717 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2718 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2719 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv_bytes)
2722 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2723 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
2724 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2726 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2727 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
2728 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2730 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2731 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected".to_owned()})?;
2732 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2733 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
2734 return Err(APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Route size too large considering onion data".to_owned()});
2736 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
2738 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2739 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2740 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2741 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
2744 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2745 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
2746 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
2747 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2748 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2749 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
2750 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2751 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
2753 let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2754 let send_res = chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
2755 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2757 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2758 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2760 }, onion_packet, &self.logger);
2761 match break_chan_entry!(self, send_res, chan) {
2762 Some(monitor_update) => {
2763 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2764 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
2765 if let Err(e) = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
2768 if update_res == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress {
2769 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
2770 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
2771 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
2772 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
2773 // which we do in the send_payment check for
2774 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
2775 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
2781 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
2782 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
2783 // `channel_by_id` map.
2784 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
2785 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
2790 match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2791 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2793 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2798 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2800 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
2801 /// fields for more info.
2803 /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
2804 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
2806 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
2808 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
2809 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
2810 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
2811 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
2812 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
2814 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
2815 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
2816 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
2817 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
2818 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
2820 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
2821 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
2822 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
2823 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
2825 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
2827 /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
2828 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2829 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
2831 /// In general, a path may raise:
2832 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2833 /// node public key) is specified.
2834 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2835 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2837 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2838 /// relevant updates.
2840 /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
2841 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2842 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2844 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2845 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2846 /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
2847 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
2848 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
2849 pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2850 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2851 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2852 self.pending_outbound_payments
2853 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2854 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2855 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2858 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment`], but will automatically find a route based on
2859 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
2860 pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
2861 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2862 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2863 self.pending_outbound_payments
2864 .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
2865 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
2866 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
2867 &self.pending_events,
2868 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2869 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2873 pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2874 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2875 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2876 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2877 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2878 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2882 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
2883 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2884 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
2888 pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
2889 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
2893 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
2894 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
2895 /// retries are exhausted.
2897 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
2898 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
2900 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
2901 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
2902 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
2904 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event is generated and we restart without this
2905 /// [`ChannelManager`] having been persisted, another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated.
2907 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2908 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2909 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
2910 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2911 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
2914 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2915 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2916 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2917 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2918 /// never reach the recipient.
2920 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
2921 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
2923 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2924 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2926 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2928 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2929 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
2930 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2931 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2932 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
2933 route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
2934 &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2935 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2936 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2939 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
2940 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
2942 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
2945 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
2946 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
2947 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2948 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2949 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
2950 payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
2951 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2952 &self.logger, &self.pending_events,
2953 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2954 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2957 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
2958 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
2959 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
2960 pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2961 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2962 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2963 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2964 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2965 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2968 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
2971 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
2972 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
2975 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2976 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2977 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
2978 &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
2979 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2980 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2981 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2982 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2984 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2985 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2986 let (msg, chan) = match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2988 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2990 let funding_res = chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2991 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2992 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2993 } else { unreachable!(); });
2995 Ok(funding_msg) => (funding_msg, chan),
2997 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
2998 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3000 let _ = handle_error!(self, funding_res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id());
3001 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3002 err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
3008 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3010 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
3011 log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
3016 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
3017 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3020 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
3021 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3022 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
3024 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3025 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
3026 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.channel_id(), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
3027 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
3036 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3037 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
3038 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
3042 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
3044 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
3045 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
3047 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
3048 /// across the p2p network.
3050 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
3051 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
3053 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
3054 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
3055 /// keys per-channel).
3057 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
3058 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
3059 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
3061 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
3062 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
3063 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
3065 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
3066 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
3067 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
3068 /// for more details.
3070 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
3071 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
3072 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3073 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3075 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
3076 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
3077 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3078 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
3083 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3084 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools if their locktime is strictly
3085 // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
3086 // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
3087 // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
3088 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 1 {
3089 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3090 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
3094 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
3095 if tx.output.len() > u16::max_value() as usize {
3096 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3097 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
3101 let mut output_index = None;
3102 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
3103 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3104 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
3105 if output_index.is_some() {
3106 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3107 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
3110 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
3113 if output_index.is_none() {
3114 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3115 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
3118 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
3122 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
3124 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3125 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3126 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3127 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3129 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3130 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3132 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3133 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3135 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3137 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3138 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3139 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3140 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3141 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3142 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3143 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3144 pub fn update_channel_config(
3145 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config: &ChannelConfig,
3146 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3147 if config.cltv_expiry_delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA {
3148 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3149 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
3153 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(
3154 &self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier,
3156 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3157 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3158 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3159 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3160 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3161 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3162 if !peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) {
3163 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3164 err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
3168 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3169 let channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id).unwrap();
3170 if !channel.update_config(config) {
3173 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
3174 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
3175 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
3176 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3177 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3185 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
3186 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
3188 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
3189 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
3191 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
3192 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
3193 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
3194 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
3195 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
3197 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
3198 /// you from forwarding more than you received.
3200 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3203 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
3204 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3205 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
3206 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
3207 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &[u8; 32], next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3208 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3210 let next_hop_scid = {
3211 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3212 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
3213 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
3214 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3215 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3216 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
3218 if !chan.is_usable() {
3219 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3220 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id))
3223 chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.outbound_scid_alias())
3225 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3226 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id), next_node_id)
3231 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3232 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3233 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3236 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
3237 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => {
3238 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid }
3240 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3242 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
3243 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
3246 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
3247 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3248 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3249 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
3250 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
3252 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
3256 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
3257 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
3259 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3262 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3263 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3264 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3266 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3267 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3268 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3271 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
3272 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3273 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3274 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3275 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
3276 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
3277 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3280 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
3281 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
3282 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3283 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3288 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
3290 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
3291 /// Will likely generate further events.
3292 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
3293 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3295 let mut new_events = VecDeque::new();
3296 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
3297 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
3299 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
3300 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
3302 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
3303 if short_chan_id != 0 {
3304 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
3306 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3307 match forward_info {
3308 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3309 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3310 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3311 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
3312 outgoing_cltv_value, incoming_amt_msat: _
3315 macro_rules! failure_handler {
3316 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
3317 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3319 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3320 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3321 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3322 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3323 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3324 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
3327 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
3328 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
3330 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
3333 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3334 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
3340 macro_rules! fail_forward {
3341 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3343 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
3347 macro_rules! failed_payment {
3348 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3350 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
3354 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
3355 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
3356 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.genesis_hash) {
3357 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
3358 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
3360 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3361 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
3362 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
3363 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
3364 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
3366 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
3368 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3369 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
3373 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
3374 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) {
3375 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
3376 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
3382 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3385 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3388 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3389 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
3390 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
3391 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
3392 // problem, not ours.
3398 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id) {
3399 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3401 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3405 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3406 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3407 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3408 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3411 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3412 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3413 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
3414 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3415 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3418 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3419 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3420 match forward_info {
3421 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3422 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id: _,
3423 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3424 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
3425 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, incoming_amt_msat: _,
3428 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
3429 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3430 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3431 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3432 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3433 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3434 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
3435 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3437 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
3438 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
3439 onion_packet, &self.logger)
3441 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3442 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
3444 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3446 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
3447 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3448 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
3449 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
3454 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3455 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3457 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3458 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3459 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_fail_htlc(
3460 htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger
3462 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3463 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3465 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
3467 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3468 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3469 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3478 'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3479 match forward_info {
3480 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3481 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3482 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3483 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat, ..
3486 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
3487 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } => {
3488 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
3490 RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret), payment_metadata };
3491 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
3492 Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
3494 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry } => {
3495 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: None, payment_metadata };
3496 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
3497 None, None, onion_fields)
3500 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3503 let mut claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3504 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3505 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3506 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3507 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3508 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3509 phantom_shared_secret,
3511 // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
3512 // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
3513 // if routing nodes overpay
3514 value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
3515 sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
3517 total_value_received: None,
3518 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
3523 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
3525 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3526 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
3527 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
3528 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3529 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3530 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
3532 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3533 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
3534 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3535 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3536 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3537 phantom_shared_secret,
3539 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
3540 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
3542 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
3545 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
3546 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
3547 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
3548 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
3549 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
3552 macro_rules! check_total_value {
3553 ($payment_data: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{
3554 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
3556 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
3557 payment_preimage: $payment_preimage,
3558 payment_secret: $payment_data.payment_secret,
3561 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3562 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3563 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3565 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
3566 .entry(payment_hash)
3567 // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
3568 .or_insert_with(|| {
3569 committed_to_claimable = true;
3571 purpose: purpose(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
3574 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
3575 if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
3576 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3579 claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
3581 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
3582 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
3583 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3584 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3585 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3588 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
3589 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
3590 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3591 total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
3592 earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
3593 match &htlc.onion_payload {
3594 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3595 if htlc.total_msat != $payment_data.total_msat {
3596 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
3597 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $payment_data.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
3598 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
3600 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
3602 _ => unreachable!(),
3605 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
3606 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
3607 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
3608 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3609 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= $payment_data.total_msat {
3610 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
3611 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3612 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3613 } else if total_value >= $payment_data.total_msat {
3614 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
3615 committed_to_claimable = true;
3617 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3618 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3619 let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
3620 htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
3621 new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3622 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3626 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3627 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3628 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
3629 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
3631 payment_claimable_generated = true;
3633 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
3634 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
3636 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3637 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
3638 committed_to_claimable = true;
3641 payment_claimable_generated
3645 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
3646 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
3647 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
3648 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
3649 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
3650 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
3651 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3652 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3653 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3654 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3655 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3656 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3657 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
3658 Ok(result) => result,
3660 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3661 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3664 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
3665 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
3666 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
3667 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
3668 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
3669 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3672 check_total_value!(payment_data, payment_preimage);
3674 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
3675 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3676 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3677 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3679 match claimable_payments.claimable_payments.entry(payment_hash) {
3680 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3681 let amount_msat = claimable_htlc.value;
3682 claimable_htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat);
3683 let claim_deadline = Some(claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER);
3684 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
3685 e.insert(ClaimablePayment {
3686 purpose: purpose.clone(),
3687 onion_fields: Some(onion_fields.clone()),
3688 htlcs: vec![claimable_htlc],
3690 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3691 new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3692 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3696 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3697 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3699 onion_fields: Some(onion_fields),
3702 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3703 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3704 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3710 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
3711 if payment_data.is_none() {
3712 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3713 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3715 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3716 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
3717 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3718 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3719 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
3720 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
3721 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
3722 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3724 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage);
3725 if payment_claimable_generated {
3726 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
3732 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3733 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
3741 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3742 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
3743 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3744 &self.pending_events, &self.logger,
3745 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
3746 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv));
3748 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
3749 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3751 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
3753 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
3754 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
3755 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
3757 self.check_free_holding_cells();
3759 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
3760 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3761 events.append(&mut new_events);
3764 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
3766 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
3767 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
3769 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
3770 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
3771 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
3772 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
3773 if background_events.is_empty() {
3777 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
3779 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, update)) => {
3780 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
3781 // monitor updating completing.
3782 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
3789 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3790 /// Process background events, for functional testing
3791 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
3792 self.process_background_events();
3795 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
3796 if !chan.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersist; }
3797 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
3798 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
3799 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3800 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
3801 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3803 if !chan.is_live() {
3804 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
3805 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
3806 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3808 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3809 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
3811 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.logger);
3812 NotifyOption::DoPersist
3816 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
3817 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
3818 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
3819 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
3820 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
3821 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3822 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3824 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3826 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3827 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3828 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3829 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3830 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
3831 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3832 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3840 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
3842 /// This currently includes:
3843 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
3844 /// * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
3845 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
3847 /// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
3848 /// with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
3849 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
3851 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
3852 /// estimate fetches.
3854 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3855 /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
3856 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
3857 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3858 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3859 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3861 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3863 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
3864 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
3865 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
3867 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3868 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3869 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3870 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3871 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
3872 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
3873 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3874 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3875 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3877 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
3878 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id);
3879 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
3880 if needs_close { return false; }
3883 match chan.channel_update_status() {
3884 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
3885 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
3886 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.is_live()
3887 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3888 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.is_live()
3889 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3890 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.is_live() => {
3892 if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
3893 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3894 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3895 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3899 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3901 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
3904 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.is_live() => {
3906 if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
3907 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3908 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3909 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3913 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3915 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
3921 chan.maybe_expire_prev_config();
3925 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
3926 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
3931 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
3932 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
3933 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
3934 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
3935 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
3936 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
3937 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
3938 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
3939 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
3940 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
3941 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
3942 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
3943 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
3944 // have no channels to the peer.
3945 let remove_entry = {
3946 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
3947 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
3950 entry.remove_entry();
3953 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
3958 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
3959 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
3960 // This should be unreachable
3961 debug_assert!(false);
3964 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3965 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
3966 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
3967 // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
3968 // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
3969 if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
3970 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
3973 } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
3974 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
3975 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
3977 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
3978 .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
3985 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
3986 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
3987 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
3988 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
3989 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
3992 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3993 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3996 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_resolved_payments(&self.pending_events);
3998 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
3999 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
4000 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
4001 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
4002 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4009 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
4010 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
4011 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
4013 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
4014 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
4015 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
4016 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
4018 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
4019 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
4020 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
4021 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
4022 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
4023 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
4026 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
4027 /// reason for the failure.
4029 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
4030 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
4031 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4033 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
4034 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
4035 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
4036 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
4037 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4038 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
4039 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4044 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
4045 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
4046 match failure_code {
4047 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code as u16),
4048 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code as u16),
4049 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
4050 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4051 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
4052 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code as u16, htlc_msat_height_data)
4057 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
4058 /// that we want to return and a channel.
4060 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
4062 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
4063 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
4064 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
4065 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
4066 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
4067 let scid_pref = if chan.should_announce() {
4068 chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
4070 chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.get_short_channel_id())
4072 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
4073 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
4075 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4080 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
4081 /// that we want to return and a channel.
4082 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
4083 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
4084 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
4085 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
4086 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
4087 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
4088 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
4089 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4091 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4092 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4093 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4094 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
4096 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
4097 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
4098 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
4099 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
4100 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4104 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
4105 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
4106 // be surfaced to the user.
4107 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
4108 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32],
4109 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
4111 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
4112 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4113 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
4114 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4115 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4116 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
4117 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
4118 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
4120 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4122 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
4125 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
4126 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
4127 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
4128 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4132 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
4133 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
4134 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
4135 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
4136 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
4137 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
4138 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
4139 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
4140 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
4143 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
4144 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
4145 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
4148 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4149 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
4150 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4152 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
4153 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
4154 session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
4155 &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
4156 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
4158 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint }) => {
4159 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), onion_error);
4160 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
4162 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
4163 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4164 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
4165 push_forward_ev = true;
4167 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
4168 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4169 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
4171 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4172 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
4175 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
4176 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
4177 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4178 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
4179 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
4180 failed_next_destination: destination,
4186 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
4187 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
4189 /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
4190 /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
4191 /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
4192 /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
4194 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
4195 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
4196 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
4197 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
4199 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
4200 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
4201 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
4202 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
4203 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
4204 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
4205 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
4206 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4208 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4211 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4212 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
4213 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4214 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
4215 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4216 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4217 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4218 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
4223 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
4224 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
4225 payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id,
4227 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
4228 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
4229 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
4230 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4235 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
4237 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
4238 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
4239 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
4240 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
4241 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
4242 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
4243 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
4244 let mut valid_mpp = true;
4245 let mut errs = Vec::new();
4246 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4247 for htlc in sources.iter() {
4248 if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
4249 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4250 debug_assert!(false);
4254 prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
4256 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
4257 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4258 debug_assert!(false);
4262 expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
4264 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = &htlc.onion_payload {
4265 // We don't currently support MPP for spontaneous payments, so just check
4266 // that there's one payment here and move on.
4267 if sources.len() != 1 {
4268 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP spontaneous payment - this should not be reachable!");
4269 debug_assert!(false);
4275 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
4277 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4278 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
4279 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4280 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
4283 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
4284 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4285 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
4286 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
4290 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4291 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
4292 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
4293 |_| Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash }))
4295 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
4296 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
4297 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
4298 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
4299 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
4304 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4305 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4306 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
4307 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4308 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
4309 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
4310 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4312 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4315 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
4316 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
4317 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4318 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
4322 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
4323 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
4324 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
4325 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
4328 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4329 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
4330 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
4331 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
4335 let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
4336 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4337 .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
4340 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
4341 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
4342 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4343 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4344 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
4345 let fulfill_res = chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger);
4347 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = fulfill_res {
4348 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)) {
4349 log_trace!(self.logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
4350 log_bytes!(chan_id), action);
4351 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
4353 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4354 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update);
4355 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock,
4356 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4357 if let Err(e) = res {
4358 // TODO: This is a *critical* error - we probably updated the outbound edge
4359 // of the HTLC's monitor with a preimage. We should retry this monitor
4360 // update over and over again until morale improves.
4361 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}", payment_preimage);
4362 return Err((counterparty_node_id, e));
4369 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4370 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
4371 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
4375 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
4376 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
4377 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
4378 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
4379 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
4380 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
4381 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
4382 // again on restart.
4383 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4384 payment_preimage, update_res);
4386 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
4387 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
4388 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
4389 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
4390 // `PaymentForwarded`).
4391 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
4395 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
4396 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
4399 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
4401 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
4402 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage, session_priv, path, from_onchain, &self.pending_events, &self.logger);
4404 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
4405 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
4406 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
4407 |htlc_claim_value_msat| {
4408 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
4409 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
4410 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
4413 let prev_channel_id = Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id());
4414 let next_channel_id = Some(next_channel_id);
4416 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEvent { event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
4418 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
4421 outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
4425 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
4426 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4427 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
4433 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
4434 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4435 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
4438 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
4439 for action in actions.into_iter() {
4441 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
4442 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4443 if let Some(ClaimingPayment { amount_msat, payment_purpose: purpose, receiver_node_id }) = payment {
4444 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
4445 payment_hash, purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4449 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEvent { event } => {
4450 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
4456 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
4457 /// update completion.
4458 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4459 channel: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
4460 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
4461 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
4462 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
4463 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
4464 log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
4465 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()),
4466 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
4467 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
4468 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
4469 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
4470 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
4472 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
4474 let counterparty_node_id = channel.get_counterparty_node_id();
4475 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4476 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.outbound_scid_alias()),
4477 channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
4480 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4481 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
4483 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
4484 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4485 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4490 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
4491 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
4492 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4493 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4498 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
4499 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
4500 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4501 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4502 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4507 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
4511 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
4517 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
4518 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
4519 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
4523 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4524 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
4525 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
4531 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
4532 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
4534 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
4535 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4537 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
4538 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
4539 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4540 match id_to_peer.get(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4541 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4546 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4547 let mut peer_state_lock;
4548 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4549 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
4550 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4551 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4553 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()){
4554 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
4555 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
4558 log_trace!(self.logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}",
4559 highest_applied_update_id, channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id());
4560 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
4563 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, highest_applied_update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel.get_mut());
4566 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
4568 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
4569 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
4572 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4573 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4574 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4576 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
4577 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
4578 /// used to accept such channels.
4580 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4581 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4582 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4583 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
4586 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
4587 /// it as confirmed immediately.
4589 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4590 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4591 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4593 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
4594 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
4596 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
4597 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
4599 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
4600 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
4602 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4603 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4604 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4605 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
4608 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4609 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4611 let peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| !peer.channel_by_id.is_empty());
4612 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4613 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4614 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4615 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4616 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4617 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.len() == 1;
4618 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4619 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
4620 if !channel.get().inbound_is_awaiting_accept() {
4621 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
4624 channel.get_mut().set_0conf();
4625 } else if channel.get().get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4626 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4627 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4628 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4629 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
4632 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4633 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4634 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
4636 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
4637 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
4638 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
4639 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
4640 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4641 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4642 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4643 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
4646 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4647 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4648 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned() });
4652 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4653 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4654 msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4657 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4658 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id) });
4664 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
4665 /// or 0-conf channels.
4667 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
4668 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
4669 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
4670 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> bool {
4671 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
4672 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4674 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4675 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
4676 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
4677 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
4678 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
4679 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.channel_by_id.len() {
4680 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
4684 return peers_without_funded_channels;
4687 fn unfunded_channel_count(
4688 peer: &PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, best_block_height: u32
4690 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
4691 for (_, chan) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
4692 if !chan.is_outbound() && chan.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
4693 chan.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
4695 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
4698 num_unfunded_channels
4701 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4702 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
4703 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4706 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
4707 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4710 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
4711 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
4712 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
4713 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
4715 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
4716 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
4717 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
4718 let channeled_peers_without_funding = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| !node.channel_by_id.is_empty());
4720 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4721 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4723 debug_assert!(false);
4724 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())
4726 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4727 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4729 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
4730 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
4731 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
4732 if peer_state.channel_by_id.is_empty() &&
4733 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
4734 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
4736 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4737 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
4738 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4741 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4742 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
4743 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4744 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
4745 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4748 let mut channel = match Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
4749 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
4750 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias)
4753 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4754 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
4758 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
4759 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4760 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4761 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
4763 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4764 if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
4765 if channel.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4766 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4768 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4769 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4770 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4773 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4774 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
4775 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
4776 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4777 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
4778 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
4779 channel_type: channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
4783 entry.insert(channel);
4789 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4790 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
4791 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4792 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4794 debug_assert!(false);
4795 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
4797 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4798 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4799 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4800 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4801 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), chan);
4802 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
4804 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4807 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4808 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
4809 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
4810 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4811 channel_value_satoshis: value,
4813 user_channel_id: user_id,
4818 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4819 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4821 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4822 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4824 debug_assert!(false);
4825 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
4828 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4829 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4830 let ((funding_msg, monitor), chan) =
4831 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4832 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4833 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan), chan.remove())
4835 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4838 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
4839 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4840 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
4842 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4843 match self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().entry(chan.channel_id()) {
4844 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4845 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4846 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
4847 funding_msg.channel_id))
4849 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
4850 i_e.insert(chan.get_counterparty_node_id());
4854 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
4855 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
4856 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
4857 // until we have persisted our monitor.
4858 let new_channel_id = funding_msg.channel_id;
4859 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
4860 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4864 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
4866 let chan = e.insert(chan);
4867 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, monitor_res, 0, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
4868 per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING, { peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&new_channel_id) });
4870 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
4871 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
4872 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
4873 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
4874 // We do not propagate the monitor update to the user as it would be for a monitor
4875 // that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we don't respond
4876 // with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
4877 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { shutdown_finish: Some((res, _)), .. }) = &mut res {
4885 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4886 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4887 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4888 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4890 debug_assert!(false);
4891 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4894 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4895 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4896 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4897 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4898 let monitor = try_chan_entry!(self,
4899 chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan);
4900 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor);
4901 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, 0, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4902 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
4903 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
4904 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
4905 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
4906 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
4907 shutdown_finish.0.take();
4912 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4916 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4917 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4918 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4920 debug_assert!(false);
4921 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4923 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4924 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4925 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4926 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4927 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
4928 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan);
4929 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
4930 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4931 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4932 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4933 msg: announcement_sigs,
4935 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4936 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
4937 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
4938 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
4939 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
4940 // announcement_signatures.
4941 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4942 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
4943 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4944 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4951 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4952 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan.get_mut());
4957 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4961 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4962 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
4963 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
4964 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4965 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4967 debug_assert!(false);
4968 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4970 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4971 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4972 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4973 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4975 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
4976 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
4977 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
4978 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
4981 let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo();
4982 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self,
4983 chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_entry);
4984 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
4986 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4987 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
4988 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
4989 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
4990 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4991 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4996 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
4997 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
4998 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4999 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update);
5000 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry);
5004 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5007 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
5008 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
5009 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
5010 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
5016 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5017 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5018 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5020 debug_assert!(false);
5021 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5023 let (tx, chan_option) = {
5024 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5025 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5026 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
5027 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
5028 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_entry);
5029 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
5030 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5031 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5036 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
5037 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
5038 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
5039 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
5040 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
5041 (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, chan_entry)))
5042 } else { (tx, None) }
5044 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5047 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
5048 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
5049 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
5051 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
5052 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5053 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5054 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5055 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5059 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5064 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5065 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
5066 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
5067 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
5069 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
5070 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
5071 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
5072 //but we should prevent it anyway.
5074 let pending_forward_info = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
5075 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5076 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5078 debug_assert!(false);
5079 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5081 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5082 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5083 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5084 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5086 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
5087 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
5088 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
5089 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
5090 match pending_forward_info {
5091 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
5092 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
5093 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
5094 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
5096 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
5097 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
5098 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
5099 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
5100 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
5103 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
5105 _ => pending_forward_info
5108 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), chan);
5110 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5115 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5116 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
5117 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5118 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5120 debug_assert!(false);
5121 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5123 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5124 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5125 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5126 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5127 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan)
5129 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5132 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, msg.channel_id);
5136 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5137 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5138 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5140 debug_assert!(false);
5141 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5143 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5144 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5145 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5146 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5147 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan);
5149 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5154 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5155 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5156 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5158 debug_assert!(false);
5159 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5161 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5162 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5163 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5164 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5165 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
5166 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
5167 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan);
5169 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan);
5172 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5176 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5177 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5178 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5180 debug_assert!(false);
5181 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5183 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5184 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5185 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5186 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5187 let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo();
5188 let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
5189 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
5190 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update);
5191 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5192 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock,
5193 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan)
5196 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5201 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
5202 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
5203 let mut push_forward_event = false;
5204 let mut new_intercept_events = VecDeque::new();
5205 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
5206 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5207 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
5208 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
5209 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
5210 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
5211 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
5213 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
5214 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
5216 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5217 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
5218 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
5219 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5220 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5221 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
5223 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5224 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
5225 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.genesis_hash)
5227 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).into_inner());
5228 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5229 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
5230 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5231 new_intercept_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
5232 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
5233 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
5234 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
5235 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
5238 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5239 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
5241 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
5242 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
5243 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5244 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
5245 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
5246 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
5247 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
5248 phantom_shared_secret: None,
5251 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
5252 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
5253 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
5258 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
5259 // payments are being processed.
5260 if forward_htlcs_empty {
5261 push_forward_event = true;
5263 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5264 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
5271 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
5272 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
5275 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
5276 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5277 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
5279 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
5283 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued.
5284 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
5285 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5286 let forward_ev_exists = pending_events.iter()
5287 .find(|(ev, _)| if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false })
5289 if !forward_ev_exists {
5290 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
5292 Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
5297 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5298 let (htlcs_to_fail, res) = {
5299 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5300 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5302 debug_assert!(false);
5303 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5304 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
5305 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5306 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5307 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5308 let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo();
5309 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
5310 let res = if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
5311 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update);
5312 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5313 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id,
5314 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan)
5316 (htlcs_to_fail, res)
5318 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5321 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
5325 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5326 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5327 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5329 debug_assert!(false);
5330 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5332 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5333 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5334 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5335 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5336 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan);
5338 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5343 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5344 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5345 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5347 debug_assert!(false);
5348 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5350 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5351 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5352 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5353 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5354 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
5355 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
5358 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5359 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
5360 &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
5361 msg, &self.default_configuration
5363 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5364 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5365 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap()),
5368 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5373 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
5374 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5375 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
5376 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
5378 // It's not a local channel
5379 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5382 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5383 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
5384 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
5385 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5387 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5388 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5389 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5390 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5391 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5392 if chan.get().should_announce() {
5393 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
5394 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
5395 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
5396 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5398 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
5400 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
5401 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
5402 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
5403 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5405 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", log_bytes!(chan_id));
5406 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), chan);
5409 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5411 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
5414 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5416 let need_lnd_workaround = {
5417 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5419 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5421 debug_assert!(false);
5422 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5424 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5425 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5426 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5427 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5428 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
5429 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
5430 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
5431 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
5432 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
5433 msg, &self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash,
5434 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan);
5435 let mut channel_update = None;
5436 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
5437 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5438 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5441 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
5442 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
5443 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
5444 // they have the latest channel parameters.
5445 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
5446 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5447 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
5452 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
5453 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
5454 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get_mut(), responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
5455 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
5456 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
5457 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
5461 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5465 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
5466 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
5469 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
5470 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
5475 /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
5476 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
5477 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
5479 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5480 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
5481 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
5482 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
5483 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
5484 match monitor_event {
5485 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
5486 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
5487 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
5488 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
5490 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
5491 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
5492 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
5493 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5496 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
5497 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
5498 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
5499 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
5501 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5502 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
5503 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5504 id_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).cloned()
5507 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
5508 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5509 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
5510 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5511 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5512 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5513 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
5514 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
5515 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
5516 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5517 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5521 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
5522 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
5524 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
5526 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
5527 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5528 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5529 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5530 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5537 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
5538 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
5544 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5545 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5548 has_pending_monitor_events
5551 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
5552 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
5553 /// update events as a separate process method here.
5555 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
5556 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5557 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5558 NotifyOption::DoPersist
5560 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
5565 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
5566 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
5567 /// update was applied.
5568 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
5569 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
5570 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5571 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
5573 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
5574 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
5575 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
5576 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
5578 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5579 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5581 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5582 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5583 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
5584 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
5585 let funding_txo = chan.get_funding_txo();
5586 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
5587 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger);
5588 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
5589 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
5591 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
5592 has_monitor_update = true;
5594 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(
5595 funding_txo.expect("channel is live"), monitor_update);
5596 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5597 let channel_id: [u8; 32] = *channel_id;
5598 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id,
5599 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING,
5600 peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id));
5602 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, res));
5604 continue 'peer_loop;
5613 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
5614 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
5615 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
5618 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5619 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5625 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
5626 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
5627 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
5628 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
5629 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
5630 let mut has_update = false;
5632 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5634 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5635 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5636 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5637 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5638 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5639 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
5640 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
5641 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
5643 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5644 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
5647 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
5648 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
5649 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
5650 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5651 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5656 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5658 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
5659 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
5660 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
5666 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
5667 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5675 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5676 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5682 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
5683 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
5685 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
5686 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5687 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
5688 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
5689 // reorganized out of the main chain.
5690 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
5691 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
5692 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
5693 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
5694 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
5695 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
5696 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
5697 assert!(should_broadcast);
5698 } else { unreachable!(); }
5699 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, update)));
5701 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5705 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5706 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
5708 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
5709 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("min_value_msat of {} greater than total 21 million bitcoin supply", min_value_msat.unwrap()) });
5712 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5714 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5715 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5716 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5717 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5718 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
5719 payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
5720 user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
5721 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
5722 // it's updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
5723 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
5724 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
5725 // never fail a payment too early.
5726 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
5728 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
5731 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
5736 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
5739 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
5740 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
5742 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
5743 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
5744 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
5745 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
5747 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
5749 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5750 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5754 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5755 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5757 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5759 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
5760 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
5762 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5763 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5764 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
5765 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
5766 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
5767 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5768 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
5769 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
5770 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
5771 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
5772 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
5775 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5776 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5778 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5781 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5783 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5785 pub fn create_inbound_payment_legacy(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), APIError> {
5786 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5787 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5788 let payment_secret = self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)?;
5789 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret))
5792 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
5793 /// stored external to LDK.
5795 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
5796 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
5797 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
5799 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
5800 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
5803 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
5804 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
5805 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
5806 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
5808 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
5809 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
5810 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
5811 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
5812 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
5814 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
5815 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
5816 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
5817 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
5818 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
5820 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
5821 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
5823 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5824 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5828 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5829 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5831 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5833 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
5834 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
5836 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5837 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5838 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
5839 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
5840 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
5841 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
5842 min_final_cltv_expiry)
5845 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5846 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5848 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5851 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5853 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5855 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5856 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
5859 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
5860 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
5862 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5863 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
5864 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
5867 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
5868 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
5870 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
5871 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5872 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5873 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5875 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
5876 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5877 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
5878 Some(_) => continue,
5879 None => return scid_candidate
5884 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
5886 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
5887 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
5889 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
5890 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
5891 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
5895 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
5896 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
5897 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
5899 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
5900 /// times to get a unique scid.
5901 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5902 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5903 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5905 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
5906 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5907 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
5908 return scid_candidate
5912 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
5913 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
5914 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
5915 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
5917 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5918 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5919 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5920 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5921 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
5922 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
5923 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
5924 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
5933 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5934 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
5935 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5936 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
5937 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
5941 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
5942 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
5943 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5944 events.push_back((event, None));
5948 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
5949 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5950 events.pop_front().map(|(e, _)| e)
5954 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
5955 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
5959 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
5960 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
5963 fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint) {
5964 let mut errors = Vec::new();
5966 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5967 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
5968 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5969 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
5970 if self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().iter()
5971 .any(|(_ev, action_opt)| action_opt == &Some(EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
5972 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id
5975 // Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have another event
5976 // blocking any monitor updates for this channel. If we do, let those
5977 // events be the ones that ultimately release the monitor update(s).
5978 log_trace!(self.logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another event is pending",
5979 log_bytes!(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
5982 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
5983 debug_assert_eq!(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
5984 if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.get_mut().unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
5985 log_debug!(self.logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
5986 log_bytes!(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
5987 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update);
5988 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5989 if let Err(e) = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id,
5990 peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan)
5992 errors.push((e, counterparty_node_id));
5994 if further_update_exists {
5995 // If there are more `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to process, restart at the
6000 log_trace!(self.logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
6001 log_bytes!(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
6005 log_debug!(self.logger,
6006 "Got a release post-RAA monitor update for peer {} but the channel is gone",
6007 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6011 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in errors {
6012 let res = Err::<(), _>(err);
6013 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
6017 fn handle_post_event_actions(&self, actions: Vec<EventCompletionAction>) {
6018 for action in actions {
6020 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
6021 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id
6023 self.handle_monitor_update_release(counterparty_node_id, channel_funding_outpoint);
6029 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
6030 /// using the given event handler.
6032 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
6033 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
6037 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
6041 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6043 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6044 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6045 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6046 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6047 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6048 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6052 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
6053 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
6054 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
6055 /// is always placed next to each other.
6057 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
6058 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
6059 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
6060 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
6062 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
6063 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
6064 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
6065 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
6066 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
6067 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6068 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
6070 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
6071 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
6072 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
6073 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6076 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
6077 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6079 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
6080 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6083 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
6084 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6085 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6086 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6087 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6088 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
6089 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
6093 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
6094 events.replace(pending_events);
6103 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6105 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6106 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6107 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6108 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6109 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6110 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6114 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
6116 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
6117 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
6118 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
6120 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
6124 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6126 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6127 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6128 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6129 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6130 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6131 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6135 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
6137 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6138 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
6139 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
6140 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
6141 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
6144 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
6145 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
6148 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
6149 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6150 let new_height = height - 1;
6152 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
6153 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
6154 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
6155 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
6156 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
6157 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
6160 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
6164 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6166 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6167 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6168 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6169 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6170 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6171 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6175 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
6176 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6177 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6178 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6180 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
6181 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
6183 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6184 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)
6185 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
6187 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6188 if height < last_best_block_height {
6189 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6190 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
6194 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
6195 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6196 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6197 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6199 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
6200 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
6202 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6204 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
6206 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
6208 macro_rules! max_time {
6209 ($timestamp: expr) => {
6211 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
6212 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
6213 // having an explicit local time source.
6214 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
6215 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
6216 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6217 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
6218 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
6224 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
6225 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6226 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
6227 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
6231 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
6232 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
6233 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
6234 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6235 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6236 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
6237 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(block_hash)) = (chan.get_funding_txo(), chan.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
6238 res.push((funding_txo.txid, Some(block_hash)));
6245 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
6246 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6247 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
6248 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
6249 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
6250 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
6251 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
6252 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
6257 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6259 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6260 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6261 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6262 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6263 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6264 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6268 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
6269 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
6271 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
6272 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
6273 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6274 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6275 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6277 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6278 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
6280 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6281 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6282 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6283 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6284 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6285 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
6286 let res = f(channel);
6287 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
6288 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
6289 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
6290 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
6291 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.channel_id() }));
6293 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
6294 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
6295 if channel.is_usable() {
6296 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6297 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
6298 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6299 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6304 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6309 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6310 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
6313 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
6314 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6315 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6316 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6317 msg: announcement_sigs,
6319 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6320 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
6321 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
6323 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
6324 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
6325 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
6330 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
6331 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
6332 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
6333 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
6334 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
6335 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
6336 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
6337 // is always consistent.
6338 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
6339 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
6340 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()),
6341 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
6342 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
6345 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
6346 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, channel);
6347 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
6348 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
6349 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
6350 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
6351 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6355 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
6356 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
6357 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6358 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6359 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
6360 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
6361 data: reason_message,
6371 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6372 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
6373 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
6374 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
6375 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
6376 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
6377 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
6378 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6379 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
6380 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
6382 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
6383 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
6384 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
6388 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
6391 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6392 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
6393 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6394 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6395 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
6396 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
6397 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6398 phantom_shared_secret: None,
6399 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
6402 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
6403 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6404 _ => unreachable!(),
6406 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
6407 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
6408 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
6409 log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
6415 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
6417 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
6418 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
6422 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
6424 /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
6425 /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
6427 pub fn get_persistable_update_future(&self) -> Future {
6428 self.persistence_notifier.get_future()
6431 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6432 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
6433 self.persistence_notifier.notify_pending()
6436 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
6437 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
6438 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
6439 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
6442 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6443 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6444 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6445 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
6448 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6449 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6451 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6452 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6453 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6454 pub fn invoice_features(&self) -> InvoiceFeatures {
6455 provided_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
6458 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6459 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6460 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
6461 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
6464 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6465 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6466 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6467 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
6470 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6471 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6472 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
6473 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
6477 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
6478 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6480 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6481 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6482 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6483 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6484 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6485 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6489 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
6490 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6491 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6494 fn handle_open_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2) {
6495 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6496 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
6497 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
6500 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
6501 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6502 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6505 fn handle_accept_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannelV2) {
6506 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6507 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
6508 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
6511 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
6512 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6513 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6516 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
6517 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6518 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6521 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
6522 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6523 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6526 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
6527 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6528 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6531 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
6532 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6533 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6536 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
6537 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6538 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6541 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
6542 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6543 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6546 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
6547 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6548 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6551 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
6552 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6553 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6556 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
6557 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6558 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6561 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
6562 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6563 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6566 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
6567 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6568 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6571 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
6572 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6573 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6576 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
6577 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6578 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
6581 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
6586 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
6587 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6588 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6591 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
6592 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6593 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6594 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6596 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
6597 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6598 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
6599 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6600 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6601 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6602 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6603 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
6604 if chan.is_shutdown() {
6605 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
6606 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
6611 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
6613 // V1 Channel Establishment
6614 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
6615 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
6616 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
6617 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
6618 // V2 Channel Establishment
6619 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannelV2 { .. } => false,
6620 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 { .. } => false,
6621 // Common Channel Establishment
6622 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
6623 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
6624 // Interactive Transaction Construction
6625 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddInput { .. } => false,
6626 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddOutput { .. } => false,
6627 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveInput { .. } => false,
6628 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveOutput { .. } => false,
6629 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxComplete { .. } => false,
6630 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxSignatures { .. } => false,
6631 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxInitRbf { .. } => false,
6632 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAckRbf { .. } => false,
6633 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAbort { .. } => false,
6634 // Channel Operations
6635 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
6636 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
6637 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
6638 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
6639 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
6640 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
6642 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
6643 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6644 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
6645 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6646 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
6647 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
6648 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
6649 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
6650 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
6653 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
6654 peer_state.is_connected = false;
6655 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
6656 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
6659 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
6661 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6663 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6664 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6668 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
6669 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
6670 log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6674 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6676 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
6677 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
6678 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
6679 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
6680 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
6681 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
6684 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6685 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
6686 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6687 if inbound_peer_limited {
6690 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
6691 channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
6692 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
6693 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
6694 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
6698 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
6699 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
6700 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
6702 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6703 if inbound_peer_limited &&
6704 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
6705 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
6710 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
6711 peer_state.is_connected = true;
6716 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6718 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6719 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6720 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6721 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6722 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6723 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6724 let retain = if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
6725 if !chan.have_received_message() {
6726 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
6727 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
6728 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
6732 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
6733 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6734 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
6739 if retain && chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6740 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.default_configuration) {
6741 if let Ok(update_msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
6742 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement {
6743 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6752 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
6756 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
6757 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6759 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
6760 let channel_ids: Vec<[u8; 32]> = {
6761 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6762 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
6763 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
6764 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6765 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6766 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
6768 for channel_id in channel_ids {
6769 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6770 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6774 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
6775 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6776 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
6777 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
6778 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6779 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6780 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
6781 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash) {
6782 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
6783 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6791 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6792 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6796 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6797 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
6800 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
6801 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
6804 fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddInput) {
6805 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6806 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
6807 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
6810 fn handle_tx_add_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddOutput) {
6811 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6812 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
6813 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
6816 fn handle_tx_remove_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveInput) {
6817 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6818 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
6819 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
6822 fn handle_tx_remove_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveOutput) {
6823 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6824 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
6825 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
6828 fn handle_tx_complete(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxComplete) {
6829 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6830 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
6831 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
6834 fn handle_tx_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxSignatures) {
6835 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6836 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
6837 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
6840 fn handle_tx_init_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxInitRbf) {
6841 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6842 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
6843 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
6846 fn handle_tx_ack_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAckRbf) {
6847 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6848 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
6849 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
6852 fn handle_tx_abort(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAbort) {
6853 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6854 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
6855 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
6859 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6860 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6861 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
6862 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6865 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6866 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6868 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6869 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6870 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6871 pub(crate) fn provided_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InvoiceFeatures {
6872 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6875 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6876 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6877 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
6878 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6881 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6882 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6883 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6884 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
6887 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6888 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6889 pub fn provided_init_features(_config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
6890 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
6891 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
6892 // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
6893 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
6894 features.set_data_loss_protect_required();
6895 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
6896 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
6897 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
6898 features.set_payment_secret_required();
6899 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
6900 features.set_wumbo_optional();
6901 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
6902 features.set_channel_type_optional();
6903 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
6904 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
6906 { // Attributes are not allowed on if expressions on our current MSRV of 1.41.
6907 if _config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
6908 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
6914 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6915 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6917 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
6918 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
6919 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
6920 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
6923 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
6924 (2, node_id, required),
6925 (4, features, required),
6926 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
6927 (8, forwarding_info, option),
6928 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6929 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6932 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
6933 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6934 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6935 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6936 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
6937 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
6938 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6939 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
6940 (2, self.channel_id, required),
6941 (3, self.channel_type, option),
6942 (4, self.counterparty, required),
6943 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
6944 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
6945 (7, self.config, option),
6946 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
6947 (9, self.confirmations, option),
6948 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
6949 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6950 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6951 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
6952 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6953 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6954 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6955 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6956 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6957 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
6958 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
6959 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
6960 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
6961 (30, self.is_usable, required),
6962 (32, self.is_public, required),
6963 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6964 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6965 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6966 (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
6972 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
6973 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6974 _init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6975 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
6976 (2, channel_id, required),
6977 (3, channel_type, option),
6978 (4, counterparty, required),
6979 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6980 (6, funding_txo, option),
6981 (7, config, option),
6982 (8, short_channel_id, option),
6983 (9, confirmations, option),
6984 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
6985 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6986 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6987 (16, balance_msat, required),
6988 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6989 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6990 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6991 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6992 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6993 (22, confirmations_required, option),
6994 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
6995 (26, is_outbound, required),
6996 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
6997 (30, is_usable, required),
6998 (32, is_public, required),
6999 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
7000 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
7001 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
7002 (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
7005 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7006 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
7007 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
7008 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
7009 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
7013 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
7015 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
7016 outbound_scid_alias,
7020 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
7021 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
7023 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
7024 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
7025 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
7026 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
7027 confirmations_required,
7029 force_close_spend_delay,
7030 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
7031 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
7032 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
7033 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
7034 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
7035 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
7036 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
7041 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
7042 (2, channels, vec_type),
7043 (4, phantom_scid, required),
7044 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
7047 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
7049 (0, onion_packet, required),
7050 (2, short_channel_id, required),
7053 (0, payment_data, required),
7054 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
7055 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
7056 (3, payment_metadata, option),
7058 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
7059 (0, payment_preimage, required),
7060 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
7061 (3, payment_metadata, option),
7065 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
7066 (0, routing, required),
7067 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
7068 (4, payment_hash, required),
7069 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
7070 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
7071 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
7075 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
7076 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7078 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
7080 channel_id.write(writer)?;
7081 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7082 reason.write(writer)?;
7084 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
7085 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
7088 channel_id.write(writer)?;
7089 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7090 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
7091 failure_code.write(writer)?;
7098 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
7099 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7100 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7103 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
7104 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7105 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7106 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
7110 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
7111 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7112 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7113 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
7114 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
7117 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
7118 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
7119 // messages contained in the variants.
7120 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
7121 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
7122 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
7124 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
7125 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
7126 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
7127 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
7128 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
7131 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
7132 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
7133 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
7134 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
7135 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
7137 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
7142 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
7147 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
7148 (0, short_channel_id, required),
7149 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
7150 (2, outpoint, required),
7151 (4, htlc_id, required),
7152 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
7155 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
7156 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7157 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
7158 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
7159 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
7161 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7162 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
7163 (1, self.total_msat, required),
7164 (2, self.value, required),
7165 (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
7166 (4, payment_data, option),
7167 (5, self.total_value_received, option),
7168 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
7169 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
7175 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
7176 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7177 let mut prev_hop = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
7179 let mut sender_intended_value = None;
7180 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
7181 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
7182 let mut total_value_received = None;
7183 let mut total_msat = None;
7184 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
7185 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7186 (0, prev_hop, required),
7187 (1, total_msat, option),
7188 (2, value, required),
7189 (3, sender_intended_value, option),
7190 (4, payment_data, option),
7191 (5, total_value_received, option),
7192 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
7193 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
7195 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
7197 if payment_data.is_some() {
7198 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7200 if total_msat.is_none() {
7201 total_msat = Some(value);
7203 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
7206 if total_msat.is_none() {
7207 if payment_data.is_none() {
7208 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7210 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
7212 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
7216 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
7219 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
7220 total_value_received,
7221 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
7228 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
7229 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7230 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7233 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
7234 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
7235 let mut path_hops: Option<Vec<RouteHop>> = Some(Vec::new());
7236 let mut payment_id = None;
7237 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
7238 let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
7239 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7240 (0, session_priv, required),
7241 (1, payment_id, option),
7242 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
7243 (4, path_hops, vec_type),
7244 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
7245 (6, blinded_tail, option),
7247 if payment_id.is_none() {
7248 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
7250 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
7252 let path = Path { hops: path_hops.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?, blinded_tail };
7253 if path.hops.len() == 0 {
7254 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7256 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
7257 if let Payee::Clear { ref mut final_cltv_expiry_delta, .. } = params.payee {
7258 if final_cltv_expiry_delta == &0 {
7259 *final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.final_cltv_expiry_delta().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7263 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
7264 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
7265 first_hop_htlc_msat,
7267 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
7270 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
7271 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
7276 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
7277 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
7279 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
7281 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
7282 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7283 (0, session_priv, required),
7284 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
7285 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
7286 // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
7287 (4, path.hops, vec_type),
7288 (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
7289 (6, path.blinded_tail, option),
7292 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
7294 field.write(writer)?;
7301 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
7302 (0, forward_info, required),
7303 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
7304 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
7305 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
7306 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
7309 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
7311 (0, htlc_id, required),
7312 (2, err_packet, required),
7317 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
7318 (0, payment_secret, required),
7319 (2, expiry_time, required),
7320 (4, user_payment_id, required),
7321 (6, payment_preimage, required),
7322 (8, min_value_msat, required),
7325 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7327 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7328 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7329 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7330 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7331 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7332 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7336 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7337 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
7339 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7341 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
7343 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
7344 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
7345 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
7348 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
7350 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7351 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
7352 let mut number_of_channels = 0;
7353 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7354 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7355 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7356 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
7357 serializable_peer_count += 1;
7359 number_of_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.len();
7360 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
7361 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7362 unfunded_channels += 1;
7367 ((number_of_channels - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
7369 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7370 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7371 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7372 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
7373 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7374 channel.write(writer)?;
7381 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7382 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7383 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
7384 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
7385 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7386 for forward in pending_forwards {
7387 forward.write(writer)?;
7392 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
7394 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7395 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
7396 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7398 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
7399 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
7400 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7401 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
7402 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7403 (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7404 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
7405 htlc.write(writer)?;
7407 htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
7408 htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
7411 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
7412 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
7413 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7414 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
7415 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
7416 // per_peer_state lock at all.
7417 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
7420 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
7421 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
7422 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
7423 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
7424 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
7426 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
7427 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
7428 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
7429 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
7430 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
7431 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
7432 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
7437 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7438 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.115 don't support post-event actions, thus if there's no
7439 // actions at all, skip writing the required TLV. Otherwise, pre-0.0.115 versions will
7440 // refuse to read the new ChannelManager.
7441 let events_not_backwards_compatible = events.iter().any(|(_, action)| action.is_some());
7442 if events_not_backwards_compatible {
7443 // If we're gonna write a even TLV that will overwrite our events anyway we might as
7444 // well save the space and not write any events here.
7445 0u64.write(writer)?;
7447 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7448 for (event, _) in events.iter() {
7449 event.write(writer)?;
7453 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote the `pending_background_events`
7454 // `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here, however there was never a reason to do so -
7455 // the closing monitor updates were always effectively replayed on startup (either directly
7456 // by calling `broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn` on a `ChannelMonitor` during
7457 // deserialization or, in 0.0.115, by regenerating the monitor update itself).
7458 0u64.write(writer)?;
7460 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
7461 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
7462 // likely to be identical.
7463 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
7464 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
7466 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7467 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
7468 hash.write(writer)?;
7469 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
7472 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
7473 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
7474 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7475 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
7476 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
7479 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
7480 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7482 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7483 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7484 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
7485 session_priv.write(writer)?;
7488 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
7489 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
7493 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
7494 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
7495 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7497 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7498 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7499 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
7505 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
7506 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7507 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
7508 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
7511 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
7512 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
7513 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
7514 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
7515 pending_claiming_payments = None;
7518 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7519 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
7520 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7521 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
7522 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
7523 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
7524 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
7525 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
7526 (8, if events_not_backwards_compatible { Some(&*events) } else { None }, option),
7527 (9, htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7528 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
7529 (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
7536 impl Writeable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
7537 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7538 (self.len() as u64).write(w)?;
7539 for (event, action) in self.iter() {
7542 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
7543 // Events are MaybeReadable, in some cases indicating that they shouldn't actually
7544 // be persisted and are regenerated on restart. However, if such an event has a
7545 // post-event-handling action we'll write nothing for the event and would have to
7546 // either forget the action or fail on deserialization (which we do below). Thus,
7547 // check that the event is sane here.
7548 let event_encoded = event.encode();
7549 let event_read: Option<Event> =
7550 MaybeReadable::read(&mut &event_encoded[..]).unwrap();
7551 if action.is_some() { assert!(event_read.is_some()); }
7557 impl Readable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
7558 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7559 let len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7560 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 1024 * 16;
7561 let mut events: Self = VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(
7562 MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>() as u64,
7565 let ev_opt = MaybeReadable::read(reader)?;
7566 let action = Readable::read(reader)?;
7567 if let Some(ev) = ev_opt {
7568 events.push_back((ev, action));
7569 } else if action.is_some() {
7570 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7577 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
7579 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
7581 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7582 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
7583 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
7584 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
7585 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
7586 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
7587 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
7588 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
7589 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7590 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
7591 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
7592 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
7593 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
7595 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
7596 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
7598 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
7599 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
7601 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
7602 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
7603 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
7604 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
7605 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
7606 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
7608 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
7609 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7611 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7612 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7613 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7614 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7615 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7616 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7620 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
7621 pub entropy_source: ES,
7623 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
7624 pub node_signer: NS,
7626 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
7627 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
7629 pub signer_provider: SP,
7631 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7633 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
7634 pub fee_estimator: F,
7635 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7637 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
7638 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
7639 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
7640 pub chain_monitor: M,
7642 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
7643 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
7644 /// force-closed during deserialization.
7645 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
7646 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
7647 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
7649 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
7651 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
7652 /// deserialization.
7654 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
7655 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
7656 pub default_config: UserConfig,
7658 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
7659 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
7661 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
7662 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
7663 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
7664 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
7666 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
7669 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
7670 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>,
7673 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7674 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7676 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7677 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7678 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7679 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7680 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7681 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7685 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
7686 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
7687 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
7688 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
7689 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>) -> Self {
7691 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
7692 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
7697 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
7698 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
7699 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7700 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
7702 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7703 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7704 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7705 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7706 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7707 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7711 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7712 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
7713 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
7717 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7718 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
7720 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7721 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7722 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7723 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7724 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7725 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7729 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7730 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7732 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7733 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7734 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7736 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
7738 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7739 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7740 let mut peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7741 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7742 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7743 let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
7744 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
7745 for _ in 0..channel_count {
7746 let mut channel: Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (
7747 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
7749 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7750 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
7751 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
7752 if channel.get_latest_complete_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7753 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
7754 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
7755 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7756 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_complete_monitor_update_id());
7757 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7758 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7759 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7760 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7761 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7762 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7763 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7764 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7765 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7766 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
7767 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
7768 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
7769 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7770 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7771 let (monitor_update, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
7772 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
7773 pending_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup(monitor_update));
7775 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
7776 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7777 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7778 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7779 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
7781 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
7782 let mut found_htlc = false;
7783 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
7784 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
7787 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
7788 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
7789 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
7790 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
7791 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
7792 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
7793 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
7794 log_info!(args.logger,
7795 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
7796 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7797 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7801 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7802 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
7803 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7805 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7806 id_to_peer.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel.get_counterparty_node_id());
7808 match peer_channels.entry(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
7809 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7810 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
7811 by_id_map.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
7813 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7814 let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
7815 by_id_map.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
7816 entry.insert(by_id_map);
7820 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
7821 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
7822 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
7823 // safely discard the channel.
7824 let _ = channel.force_shutdown(false);
7825 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7826 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7827 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7828 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
7831 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7832 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7833 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7834 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7835 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7836 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7840 for (funding_txo, _) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7841 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
7842 log_info!(args.logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
7843 log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
7844 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
7845 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
7846 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
7848 pending_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, monitor_update)));
7852 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
7853 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7854 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7855 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
7856 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7857 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7858 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
7859 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
7860 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
7862 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
7865 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7866 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7867 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
7868 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7869 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7870 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
7871 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
7872 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
7874 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
7877 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7878 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>)>()));
7879 for _ in 0..peer_count {
7880 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7881 let peer_state = PeerState {
7882 channel_by_id: peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new()),
7883 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
7884 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
7885 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
7886 is_connected: false,
7888 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
7891 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7892 let mut pending_events_read: VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> =
7893 VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>()));
7894 for _ in 0..event_count {
7895 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
7896 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push_back((event, None)),
7901 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7902 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
7903 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7905 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote pending `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here,
7906 // however we really don't (and never did) need them - we regenerate all
7907 // on-startup monitor updates.
7908 let _: OutPoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
7909 let _: ChannelMonitorUpdate = Readable::read(reader)?;
7911 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7915 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
7916 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7918 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7919 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
7920 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
7921 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
7922 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7926 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7927 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
7928 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
7929 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
7930 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
7931 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
7932 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
7934 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
7935 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7939 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
7940 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
7941 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
7942 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
7943 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
7944 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7945 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7946 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
7947 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
7948 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
7949 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = Some(Vec::new());
7950 let mut events_override = None;
7951 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7952 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
7953 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7954 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
7955 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
7956 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
7957 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
7958 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
7959 (8, events_override, option),
7960 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7961 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
7962 (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
7964 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
7965 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7968 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
7969 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7972 if let Some(events) = events_override {
7973 pending_events_read = events;
7976 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
7977 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
7980 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
7981 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
7982 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
7983 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
7984 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
7985 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
7987 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
7989 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
7990 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
7991 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
7995 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
7996 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
7997 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
7998 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
7999 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
8000 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
8001 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
8003 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
8004 if id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
8005 for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
8006 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
8007 if path.hops.is_empty() {
8008 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
8009 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8012 let path_amt = path.final_value_msat();
8013 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
8014 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
8015 match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
8016 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
8017 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
8018 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
8019 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
8021 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
8022 let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
8023 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
8024 retry_strategy: None,
8025 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
8026 payment_params: None,
8027 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
8028 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
8029 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
8030 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
8031 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
8032 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
8033 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
8034 total_msat: path_amt,
8035 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
8037 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
8038 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
8043 for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
8045 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
8046 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
8047 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
8048 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
8050 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
8051 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
8052 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
8053 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
8054 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
8055 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
8056 forwards.retain(|forward| {
8057 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
8058 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
8059 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
8060 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
8065 !forwards.is_empty()
8067 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
8068 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
8069 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
8070 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
8071 pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
8072 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
8073 intercepted_id != ev_id
8080 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
8081 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
8082 let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
8083 // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
8084 // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
8085 // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
8086 // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
8087 // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
8088 // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
8089 // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
8090 // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
8091 pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv, path, false, &pending_events, &args.logger);
8092 pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
8101 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
8102 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
8103 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
8104 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
8105 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
8106 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
8107 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
8108 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
8112 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
8113 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
8115 let mut claimable_payments = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
8116 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
8117 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
8118 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8120 if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
8121 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
8122 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8124 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
8125 purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
8127 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
8128 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
8130 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
8133 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
8134 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
8135 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
8137 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
8141 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
8142 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
8143 for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
8144 if htlcs.is_empty() {
8145 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8147 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
8148 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
8149 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
8150 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
8151 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
8152 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
8153 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
8154 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
8156 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
8157 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8161 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
8163 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
8165 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
8166 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
8168 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
8169 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
8174 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8175 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
8177 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
8179 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
8181 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
8182 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
8183 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
8184 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8188 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
8189 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
8190 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8191 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8192 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
8193 if chan.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
8194 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
8196 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
8197 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
8198 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
8200 chan.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
8201 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias()) {
8202 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
8203 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
8204 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
8205 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8207 if chan.is_usable() {
8208 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
8209 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
8210 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
8211 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
8212 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8218 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
8220 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
8221 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
8222 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
8223 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
8224 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
8225 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
8226 let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
8227 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
8228 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
8229 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
8230 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
8232 for claimable_htlc in payment.htlcs {
8233 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
8235 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
8236 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
8237 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
8238 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
8240 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
8241 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
8242 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
8243 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
8245 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
8246 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
8247 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
8248 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
8250 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
8251 if let Some(peer_node_id) = id_to_peer.get(&previous_channel_id){
8252 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
8253 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8254 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8255 if let Some(channel) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
8256 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
8259 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
8260 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
8263 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
8266 purpose: payment.purpose,
8267 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
8273 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
8274 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get_mut(&node_id) {
8275 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
8277 log_error!(args.logger, "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
8278 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8282 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
8284 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
8285 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
8286 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
8287 router: args.router,
8289 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
8291 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
8292 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
8293 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
8294 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
8296 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
8297 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
8298 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
8299 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
8300 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
8301 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
8303 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
8308 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
8310 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
8312 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
8313 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
8314 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
8315 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
8316 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
8318 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
8319 node_signer: args.node_signer,
8320 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
8322 logger: args.logger,
8323 default_configuration: args.default_config,
8326 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
8327 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
8328 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
8329 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
8330 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
8333 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
8334 //connection or two.
8336 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
8342 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
8343 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
8344 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
8345 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
8346 use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
8347 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
8348 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
8349 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
8350 use crate::ln::msgs;
8351 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
8352 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
8353 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
8354 use crate::util::test_utils;
8355 use crate::util::config::ChannelConfig;
8356 use crate::sign::EntropySource;
8359 fn test_notify_limits() {
8360 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
8361 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
8362 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8363 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8364 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8365 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8367 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
8368 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
8369 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8370 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8371 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8373 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8375 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
8376 // to connect messages with new values
8377 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
8378 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
8379 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
8380 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
8381 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
8382 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
8384 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
8385 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8386 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8387 // ... but the last node should not.
8388 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8389 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
8390 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8391 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8393 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
8394 // about the channel.
8395 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
8396 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
8397 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8399 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
8401 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
8402 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
8403 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
8404 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
8405 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8406 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8408 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
8409 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
8410 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
8412 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
8413 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
8414 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
8415 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
8416 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
8417 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
8419 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
8420 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
8421 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
8422 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
8423 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8424 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8425 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
8426 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
8428 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
8429 // the channel info has updated.
8430 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
8431 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
8432 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8433 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8434 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
8435 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
8439 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
8440 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
8442 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8443 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8444 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8445 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8446 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8448 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
8449 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8450 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
8451 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
8453 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
8454 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
8455 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
8456 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
8457 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
8458 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
8459 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
8460 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
8461 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8462 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8463 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8464 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
8466 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
8467 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
8468 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8469 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8470 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8471 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8472 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8473 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8474 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8475 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8476 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8477 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8478 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
8479 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8480 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8481 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8482 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8483 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8484 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8485 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8486 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8487 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8488 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
8490 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
8491 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
8492 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
8493 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8494 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8495 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8496 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
8498 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
8499 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
8500 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
8501 // lightning messages manually.
8502 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8503 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
8504 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8506 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8507 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8508 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
8509 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8510 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8511 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
8512 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8513 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8514 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
8515 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8516 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8517 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8518 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
8519 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8520 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8521 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
8522 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8523 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8524 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
8525 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8526 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
8527 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8528 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8529 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
8530 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8532 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
8533 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
8534 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8535 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
8537 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
8538 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
8539 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
8540 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
8542 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8545 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
8546 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
8547 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
8548 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
8550 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8553 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
8554 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
8555 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
8556 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
8558 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8563 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
8564 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
8565 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
8566 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
8567 // fails as expected.
8568 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8569 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8570 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8571 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8572 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8573 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8574 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8576 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
8577 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
8578 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
8580 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
8581 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8582 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV),
8583 final_value_msat: 100_000,
8585 let route = find_route(
8586 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
8587 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8589 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
8590 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8591 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8592 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8593 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8594 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8595 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8596 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8597 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8598 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8599 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
8600 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
8601 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8602 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
8603 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8604 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8605 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8606 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8607 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8608 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8609 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8610 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8611 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8612 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
8614 // Finally, claim the original payment.
8615 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
8617 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
8618 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8619 let route = find_route(
8620 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
8621 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8623 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
8624 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8625 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8626 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8627 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8628 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
8629 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
8630 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
8632 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
8633 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8634 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
8635 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8636 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8637 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8638 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8639 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8640 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8641 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8642 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8643 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8644 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8645 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
8646 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8647 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8648 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8649 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8650 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8651 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8652 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8653 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8654 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8655 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
8657 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
8658 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
8662 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
8663 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
8664 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
8665 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8666 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8667 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8668 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8670 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8671 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8673 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
8674 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8675 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
8676 final_value_msat: 10_000,
8678 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
8679 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
8680 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8681 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8682 let route = find_route(
8683 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
8684 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8687 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8688 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
8689 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
8690 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
8691 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
8692 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
8693 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8695 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8696 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8697 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8698 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8699 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8700 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8701 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8703 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
8707 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
8708 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
8709 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8710 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8711 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8712 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8714 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8715 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8717 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
8718 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8719 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
8720 final_value_msat: 10_000,
8722 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
8723 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
8724 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8725 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8726 let route = find_route(
8727 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
8728 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8731 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8732 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8733 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
8734 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
8735 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
8736 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
8737 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
8738 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
8739 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8741 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8742 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8743 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8744 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8745 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8746 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8747 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8749 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
8753 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
8754 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8755 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8756 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8757 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8759 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8760 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8761 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8762 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8764 // Marshall an MPP route.
8765 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8766 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8767 route.paths.push(path);
8768 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8769 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8770 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8771 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8772 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8773 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8775 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
8776 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
8778 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
8779 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
8781 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
8786 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
8787 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8788 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8789 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8790 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8792 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8794 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8795 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8797 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8798 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8799 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8800 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8803 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
8804 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
8805 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8806 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
8807 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
8808 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
8811 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
8814 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
8815 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
8820 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
8821 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
8822 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8823 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8824 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8825 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8827 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
8828 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
8830 total_msat: 100_000,
8833 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
8834 // payment verification fails as expected.
8835 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
8836 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
8837 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
8838 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
8840 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
8844 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
8845 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
8849 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
8850 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
8851 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
8852 // the channel is successfully closed.
8853 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8854 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8855 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8856 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8858 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8859 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8860 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
8861 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8862 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
8864 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
8865 let channel_id = &tx.txid().into_inner();
8867 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
8868 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
8869 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8870 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8873 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8875 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8876 // as it has the funding transaction.
8877 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8878 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8879 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8882 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8884 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8886 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8888 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8889 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8890 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8892 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8895 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8896 // as it has the funding transaction.
8897 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8898 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8899 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8901 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8902 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8903 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
8904 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8905 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8906 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
8907 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
8908 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
8910 nodes[0].node.close_channel(channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8911 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8912 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8913 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
8915 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8916 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
8918 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
8919 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
8920 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
8921 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
8922 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8923 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8924 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8928 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
8929 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
8930 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
8931 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
8932 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8933 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8934 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8937 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8939 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
8940 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
8941 // closing transaction).
8942 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
8943 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
8944 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8946 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
8947 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
8948 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8949 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8950 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8953 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8955 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
8957 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
8958 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
8959 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8961 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8963 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8964 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8967 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
8968 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
8969 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
8972 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
8973 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
8974 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
8977 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
8979 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
8980 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
8982 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
8983 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
8985 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
8986 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
8991 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
8992 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
8993 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
8994 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
8995 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8996 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
8997 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
8998 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
9001 let channel_id = [4; 32];
9002 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9003 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
9005 // Test the API functions.
9006 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None), unkown_public_key);
9008 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
9010 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
9012 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
9014 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
9016 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
9018 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
9022 fn test_connection_limiting() {
9023 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
9024 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9025 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9026 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9027 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9029 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
9031 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9032 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9034 let mut funding_tx = None;
9035 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
9036 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9037 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9040 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
9041 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
9042 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
9043 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
9044 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9046 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
9047 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9048 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9050 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9052 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
9053 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9054 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9056 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9059 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
9060 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9061 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9062 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
9063 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9065 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
9066 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
9068 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
9069 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
9070 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
9071 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
9072 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
9073 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
9074 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
9076 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
9077 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
9078 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
9079 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap_err();
9081 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
9082 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
9083 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9084 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9085 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
9086 for ev in chan_closed_events {
9087 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
9089 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
9090 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
9091 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
9092 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap_err();
9094 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
9095 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
9096 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
9097 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9099 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
9100 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
9102 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
9103 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
9104 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
9105 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
9106 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9108 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
9109 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
9110 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9112 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
9113 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9114 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
9116 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
9117 // "protected" and can connect again.
9118 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
9119 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
9120 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
9121 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9123 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
9125 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
9126 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
9130 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
9131 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
9132 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9133 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9134 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9135 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9137 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
9139 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9140 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9142 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
9143 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9144 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9145 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9148 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
9150 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9151 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
9152 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9154 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
9155 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9156 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9158 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
9159 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9160 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
9161 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9165 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
9166 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
9167 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
9168 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9169 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9170 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
9171 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
9172 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
9173 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9175 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
9177 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9178 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9180 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
9181 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
9182 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
9183 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
9184 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
9185 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
9187 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
9188 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9190 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
9191 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
9193 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9195 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
9196 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9199 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
9200 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
9201 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
9202 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
9203 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
9204 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
9205 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9207 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
9208 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
9209 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
9210 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
9214 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9216 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
9217 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9219 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
9220 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
9221 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9223 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
9224 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
9226 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9228 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
9233 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
9234 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
9235 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
9236 // the channel without the anchors feature.
9237 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9238 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9239 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
9240 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
9241 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
9242 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
9243 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9245 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None).unwrap();
9246 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9247 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
9249 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9250 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9252 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
9253 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
9255 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9258 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9259 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
9261 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9262 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
9264 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
9268 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
9270 use crate::chain::Listen;
9271 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
9272 use crate::sign::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
9273 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
9274 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
9275 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
9276 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
9277 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
9278 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
9279 use crate::util::test_utils;
9280 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
9282 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
9283 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
9284 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
9286 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
9290 type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
9291 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
9292 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
9293 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
9294 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
9295 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
9296 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
9298 struct ANodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
9299 node: &'a Manager<'a, P>,
9301 impl<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'a, P> {
9302 type CM = Manager<'a, P>;
9304 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'a, P> { self.node }
9306 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
9311 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
9312 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
9315 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
9316 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
9317 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
9319 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
9321 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
9322 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
9323 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
9324 let scorer = Mutex::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
9325 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &scorer);
9327 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
9328 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
9330 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
9331 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
9332 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
9333 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
9335 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
9337 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
9339 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
9340 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
9341 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
9342 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
9343 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
9345 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
9347 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
9349 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: node_b.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
9350 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: node_a.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
9351 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9352 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
9353 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
9356 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
9357 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
9358 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
9360 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9361 } else { panic!(); }
9363 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
9364 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9365 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
9367 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
9368 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
9370 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9373 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
9374 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9375 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
9377 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
9378 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
9380 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9383 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
9386 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
9389 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
9390 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
9392 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
9393 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9394 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
9395 match msg_events[0] {
9396 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
9397 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
9398 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
9402 match msg_events[1] {
9403 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9407 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9408 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
9410 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
9411 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
9413 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9416 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9417 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
9419 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
9420 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
9422 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9425 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
9426 macro_rules! send_payment {
9427 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
9428 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
9429 .with_bolt11_features($node_b.invoice_features()).unwrap();
9430 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
9431 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
9433 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
9434 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
9436 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
9437 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), RouteParameters {
9438 payment_params, final_value_msat: 10_000,
9439 }, Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
9440 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
9441 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9442 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
9443 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
9444 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
9445 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
9446 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
9448 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
9449 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
9450 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
9451 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
9453 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
9454 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
9455 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
9456 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
9457 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
9459 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
9462 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
9463 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
9464 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
9465 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
9467 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
9472 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
9473 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);